Case 1:13-cr-00164-RWR Document 25 Filed 02/07/14 Page 1 of 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL A. BROWN, Defendant. : : : : : : : CRIMINAL NO.: 13-164 (RWR) JOINT STATUS REPORT AND JOINT MOTION TO AMEND PLEA AGREEMENT AND STATEMENT OF OFFENSE AND OTHER CONDUCT The parties in this matter, the United States of America and the defendant, Michael A. Brown, through their respective undersigned counsel, respectfully submit this joint status report and joint motion to amend the plea agreement and statement of offense and other conduct. In support of the joint status report and joint motion, the parties state as follows: 1. On June 10, 2013, the defendant pleaded guilty to a one-count Information charging the defendant with Bribery of a Public Official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A). The defendant entered his guilty plea before the Honorable Robert L. Wilkins, pursuant to a Plea Agreement dated May 30, 2013. See ECF No. 8 (the “Original Plea Agreement”). The guilty plea was pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and capped the maximum term of incarceration at 37 months, which was at the lowend of the advisory Guidelines range stipulated to by the parties (37-46 months). During the plea proceeding, the defendant acknowledged the factual basis for his plea of guilty as presented in the Statement of the Offense and Other Conduct. See ECF No. 9 (the “Original Statement of Offense and Other Conduct”). Judge Wilkins concluded that the defendant’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and with a sufficient factual and legal basis, but deferred ruling on whether or not to accept the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) guilty plea until completion of a Pre-Sentence Report and 1 Case 1:13-cr-00164-RWR Document 25 Filed 02/07/14 Page 2 of 3 arguments from counsel. As part of the Original Plea Agreement, the defendant agreed to cooperate with the government in an ongoing criminal investigation. 2. On January 16, 2014, this matter was reassigned to this Court after Judge Wilkins was elevated to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 3. Sentencing in this matter is currently scheduled for April 28, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. 4. On January 23, 2014, this Court issued an Order requiring the parties to confer and file by February 7, 2014, a joint status report and proposed order reflecting whether either side requests that this matter be reassigned to another judge or be scheduled for a conference to further discuss the Court’s knowledge of the defendant through their joint membership in the Washington, D.C. chapter of the professional fraternity, Sigma Pi Phi. The parties have conferred on this issue. The parties do not request that this matter be reassigned to another judge or be scheduled for a conference to further discuss the issue. 5. In connection with the status of the case, the parties respectfully seek to amend the terms of the Original Plea Agreement based on evidence discovered after entry of the defendant’s guilty plea on June 10, 2013. A copy of the Amended Plea Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Amended Plea Agreement modifies Paragraph 4 of the Original Plea Agreement to change only the agreed sentence under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), specifically, that a sentence of up to 43 months of incarceration, rather than 37 months of incarceration as provided in the Original Plea Agreement, is the appropriate sentence in this matter pursuant to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 6. As part of the defendant’s acceptance of the Amended Plea Agreement, the parties also seek to amend the Original Statement of Offense and Other Conduct. A copy of the Amended Statement of Offense and Other Conduct is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 2 The Case 1:13-cr-00164-RWR Document 25 Filed 02/07/14 Page 3 of 3 Amended Statement of Offense and Other Conduct modifies the Original Statement of Offense and Other Conduct by adding paragraph numbers 77 through 85 to present campaign finance violations committed by the defendant during his successful campaign in 2008 for an At-Large seat on the Council of the District of Columbia, which were discovered after the defendant pleaded guilty on June 10, 2013. 7. The parties respectfully request that the Court grant this Joint Motion for the limited purpose of setting a date for a plea hearing on the Amended Plea Agreement and Amended Statement of Offense and Other Conduct. Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, the parties respectfully and jointly request that this Court grant the joint motion to amend the Original Plea Agreement and Original Statement of Offense and Other Conduct for the limited purpose of setting a plea hearing on the Amended Plea Agreement. For the Court’s convenience, a proposed Order is attached hereto. Respectfully submitted, RONALD C. MACHEN JR. United States Attorney In and For the District of Columbia /s/ MICHAEL K. ATKINSON DAVID A. LAST ANTHONY D. SALER Assistant United States Attorneys Fraud and Public Corruption Section Washington, D.C. 20530 202.252.7817 (Atkinson) 202.252.7020 (Last) Michael.Atkinson2@usdoj.gov David.Last@usdoj.gov Counsel for the United States of America /s/ REID H. WEINGARTEN BRIAN M. HEBERLIG SCOTT P. ARMSTRONG Steptoe & Johnson LLP 1330 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036-1795 202.429.3000 Rweingarten@steptoe.com Bheberlig@steptoe.com Sarmstrong@steptoe.com Counsel for Defendant Michael A. Brown DATED: February 7, 2014 3 Case 1:13-cr-00164-RWR Document 25-1 Filed 02/07/14 Page 1 of 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL A. BROWN, Defendant. : : : : : : : CRIMINAL NO.: 13-164 (RWR) ORDER FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, based on the Joint Status Report and Joint Motion to Amend Plea Agreement and Statement of Offense and Other Conduct, arguments of counsel, and the entire record in this matter, it is this ____ day of February, 2014, hereby ORDERED, that this matter shall remain with this Court and shall not be reassigned to another judge based on the parties’ written consent, in response to this Court’s Order, dated January 23, 2014, that neither party is requesting that this matter be reassigned to another judge because of the Court’s knowledge of the defendant through their joint membership in the Washington, D.C. chapter of the professional fraternity, Sigma Pi Phi; and it is further ORDERED, that the Joint Motion to Amend Plea Agreement and Statement of Offense and Other Conduct is hereby GRANTED for the limited purpose of setting a plea hearing on the Amended Plea Agreement and Amended Statement of Offense and Other Conduct; and it is further 1 Case 1:13-cr-00164-RWR Document 25-1 Filed 02/07/14 Page 2 of 2 ORDERED, that a plea hearing on the Amended Plea Agreement and Amended Statement of Offense and Other Conduct is hereby scheduled before the Court on __________________, 2014, at ________ a.m./p.m. __________________________________ RICHARD W. ROBERTS United States District Court Chief Judge for the District of Columbia 2 Case Ddcument 25-2 Filed 02/07/14 Page 1 of 15 EXHIBIT A Case Document 25-2 Filed 02/07/14 Page 2 of 15 U.S. Department of Justice Ronald C. Machen Jr. United States Attorney District of Columbia Judiciary Center 555 Fourth St, N. W. Washington. D. C. 205 30 February 6, 2014 VIA EMAIL Reid H. Weingarten, Esq. Brian M. Heberlig, Esq. Scott Esq. Steptoe Johnson LLP 1330 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington D.C. 20036 Re: Michael A. Brown Dear Counsel: On June 10, 2013, your client, Michael A. Brown (hereinafter referred to as "your client" or "defendant"), pleaded guilty before the Honorable Robert L. Wilkins, pursuant to a Plea Agreement, dated May 30, 2013 (the "Original Plea Agreement"), from the Office of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia (hereinafter also referred to as "the Govemment" or "this Office"). This Office and your client seek to amend the terms of the Original Plea Agreement based on evidence discovered after entry of your client's guilty plea. This letter sets - forth the full and complete amended plea offer to your client from this Office. This amended plea offer expires on February 14, 2014. If your client accepts the terms and conditions of this offer, please have your client execute this document in the space provided below. Upon receipt of the executed document, this letter will become the Amended Plea Agreement. This is a Plea Agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure As provided further below, this Amended Plea Agreement modifies Paragraph 4 of the Original Plea Agreement to change only the agreed sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure specifically, that a sentence of up to 43 months of incarceration, rather than 37 months of incarceration as provided in the Original Plea Agreement, followed by up to 3 years of supervised release, is the appropriate sentence in this matter. The terms of the offer are as follows: Case Document 25-2 Filed 02/07/14 Page 3 of 15 1. Charges and Statutog Penalties Your client agrees to plead guilty to a criminal Information, a copy of which is attached, charging him with one count of Bribery of a Public Official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Your client understands that a violation of 18 U.S.C. 201(b)(2)(A) carries a maximum sentence of 15 years of imprisonment; a fine of $250,000 or not more than three times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is greater, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 201(b) and 3571(b)(l); disqualification from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ?20l(b); a term of supervised release of not more than 3 years, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 35 an order of restitution; an order of forfeiture; and an obligation to pay any applicable interest or penalties on fines and restitution not timely made. In addition, your client agrees to pay a special assessment of $100 per felony conviction to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia prior to the date of sentencing. Your client also understands that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3572 and 5E1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the Court may also impose a fine that is sufficient to pay the federal government the costs of any imprisonment, term of supervised release, and period of probation. Further, your client understands that, if your client has twoor more convictions for a crime of violence or felony drug offense, your client may be subject to the substantially higher guideline penalties provided for in the career offender statutes and provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines. 2. Factual Stipulations Your client agrees that the attached "Amended Statement of Offense and Other Conduct" fairly and accurately describes your client's actions and involvement in the offense to which your client is pleading guilty. It is anticipated that, prior to or during the plea hearing, your client will adopt and sign the Statement of Offense as a written proffer of evidence. 3. Additional Charges In consideration of your client's plea to'the above offense, your client will not be further prosecuted criminally by this Office for the conduct set forth in the attached Statement of Ofi"en_se. Your client agrees that, with respect to any and all dismissed charges, your client is not a "prevailing party" within the meaning of the "Hyde Amendment," 617, P.L.- 105-119 (Nov. 26, 1997), and will not file any claim under that law. After the entry of your client's plea of guilty to the offense identified in paragraph (1) above, your client will not be charged with any non-violent criminal offense in violation of Federal or District of Columbia law which was committed within the District of Columbia by your client prior to the execution of this agreement and about which the United States Attomey's Office for the District of Columbia was made aware by your client prior to the execution of this 2 Case Document 25-2 Filed 02/07/14 Page 4 of 15 agreement. However, the United States expressly reserves its right to prosecute your client for any crime of violence, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16 and/or 22 D.C. Code 4501, if in fact your client committed or commits such a crime of violence prior to or after the execution of this agreement. 4. Aggeed Sentence UngLr Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Pursuant to Rule of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, your client and the Government agree that a sentence of up to 43 months of incarceration, followed by up to 3 years of supervised release, is the appropriate sentence for the offense to which your client is pleading guilty. This Plea Agreement with respect to the appropriate sentence affects only the term of incarceration and supervised release. The Court may impose other applicable statutory provisions as part of the sentence, including specifically fines and other conditions of supervised release. A. Acceptance of Agreement by the Court The Govemment agrees, pursuant to Rule to present this Plea Agreement between the parties to the Court for its approval. In accordance with Rule ll(c)(4) and (S), the Court may accept or reject this Plea Agreement. If the Court accepts the Plea Agreement, the Court will sentence your client to a sentence of up to 43 months of incarceration, followed by up to 3 years of supervised release. The parties agree that this Office and your client retain their fitll rights to allocute for any sentence within the agreed sentencing range. Your client understands, however, that the sentence to be imposed within the range to which the parties agree in this Plea Agreement is a matter solely within the discretion of the Court. The parties further agree that the sentence imposed within that range will be determined by the Court after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 35S3(a) and the applicable guideline range under the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (2011) (hereinafter "Sentencing Guidelines" or discussed below. Your client understands that if the Court accepts this agreement, then the Court will embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition provided for in this Plea Agreement, pursuant to Rule 11(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. B. Rejection of this Agreement by the Court The parties understand that the Court may not agree that the sentence agreed to by the parties is an appropriate one and may reject the Plea Agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c)(5) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Your client understands that if this happens, the Court, in accordance with the requirements of Rule will inform the parties of its rejection of the Plea Agreement, and will afford your client an opportunity to withdraw the plea or maintain the plea. If your client elects to withdraw the plea, the Government agrees that it will not use against your client in any related criminal or civil proceedings this Plea Agreement, the guilty plea, the Statement of the Offense And Other Conduct, or any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule 11 regarding the guilty plea or this Plea Agreement, except as otherwise provided in Fed. R. Evid. 410. If your client elects to withdraw the plea, the Govemment further 3 Case Document 25-2 Filed 02/07/14 Page 5 of 15 agrees it will not use against your client in any related criminal or civil proceedings any of your client's statements made during the May 14, 2013 debriefing session, or any subsequent debriefing session, except as otherwise provided by the agreement executed by the Government and your client on May 14, 2013. If your client elects to maintain the plea, the Court will inform your client that a final disposition may be less favorable to your client than that contemplated by this Plea Agreement. Your client further understands that if the Court reiects the Plea Agreement, the Government also has the right to withdraw from this Plea Agreement and to be freed from all obligations under the agreement, and may in its sole discretion bring different or additional charges before the defendant enters any guilty plea in this case. If the Court rejects the Plea Agreement, your client elects to maintain his plea, and the Govemment does not exercise its right to withdraw from the Plea Agreement, the parties agree that your client will be sentenced upon consideration of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and the Sentencing Guidelines. Your client fiirther understands that, in such case, the sentence to be imposed is a matter solely within the discretion of the Court, and the Court is not obligated to impose a sentence within the Sentencing Guidelines range or to follow any recommendation of the Government at the time of sentencing. 5. Sentencing Guidelines Stipulations In accordance with Paragraph 4 above, your client understands that, but for the above- described agreed sentence pursuant to Rule the sentence in this case would be determined by the Court, pursuant to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including a consideration of the guidelines and policies promulgated by the Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure and to assist the Court in determining the appropriate sentence, the parties stipulate to the following: A. Offense Level Under the Guidelines The parties agree that the following Sentencing Guidelines sections apply: Base Offense Level - 14 Specific Offense Characteristics: 2C1 . More than $30,000 in payments 6 Elected official 4 Total 24 Acceptance oz Resgonsibiligg The Govemment agrees that a 2-level reduction will be appropriate, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3El.l, provided that your client clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility, to the 4 Case Document 25-2 Filed 02/07/14 Page 6 of 15 satisfaction of the Government, through your client's allocution, adherence to every provision of this Agreement, and conduct between entry of the plea and imposition of sentence. Furthermore, assuming your client has accepted responsibility as described in the previous sentence, the Government agrees that an additional 1-level reduction will be appropriate, pursuant to U.S.S.G because your client has assisted authorities by providing timely notice of your client's intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the Government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the Court to allocate its resources efficiently. Nothing in this Plea Agreement limits the right of the Government to seek denial of the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3El.l, and/or imposition of an adjustment for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, regardless of any stipulation set forth above, should your client move to withdraw his guilty plea once it is entered, or should it be determined that your client has either engaged in conduct, unknown to the Government at the time of the signing of this Plea Agreement, that constitutes obstruction of justice, or engaged in additional criminal conduct after signing this Plea Agreement. In accordance with the above, the applicable Guidelines Offense Level will be 21. B. Criminal History Category Based upon the information now available to this Office (including representations by the defense), your client has the following criminal convictions: Excessive Political Contributions (Misdemeanor, 11/21/1997). Accordingly, your client's Criminal History Category is estimated to be I. C. Applicable Guidelines Range Based upon the calculation set forth above, your client's stipulated Sentencing Guidelines range is 37 months to 46 months(the "Stipulated Guidelines Range"). In addition, the parties agree that, should the Court impose a fine, at Guidelines level 21, the applicable fine range is $7,500 to $75,000. The parties agree that, solely for the purposes of calculating the applicable range under the Sentencing Guidelines, neither a downward nor upward departure from the Stipulated Guidelines Range set forth above is warranted, subject to the paragraphs regarding cooperation, i11fr_a. Accordingly, neither party will seek any departure or adjustment to the Stipulated Guidelines Range, nor will either party suggest that the Court consider such a departure or adjustment, except as provided i1_1_f_i1a_. Your client understands and acknowledges that the terms of this section apply only to conduct that occurred before the execution of this Plea Agreement. Should your client commit any conduct after the execution of this Plea Agreement that would form the basis for an increase in your client's base offense level or justify an upward departure (examples of which include, but are not limited to, obstruction of justice, failure to appear for a court proceeding, criminal 5 Case Document 25-2 Filed 02/07/14 Page 7 of 15 conduct while pending sentencing, and false statements to law enforcement agents, the probation officer, or Court), the Government is free under this Plea Agreement to seek an increase in the base ofiense level based on that post-agreement conduct. 6. Agreement as to Sentencing Allocution In accordance with Paragraph 4 above, should the Court reject the Plea Agreement, your client elect to maintain his plea, and the Government fail to exercise its right to withdraw from the Plea Agreement, the parties agree that a sentence within the Stipulated Guidelines Range would constitute a reasonable sentence in light of all of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. ?3553(a). However, your client reserves the right to seek a sentence below the Stipulated Guidelines Range based upon factors to be considered in imposing a sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). 7. Reservation of Allocution Your client understands that, subject to the provisions of Paragraph 4 of this Plea Agreement and notwithstanding the Govemment's obligation under this Plea Agreement to inform the Court of the nature and extent of your client's cooperation, this Office reserves its full right of allocution for purposes of sentencing in this matter. If in this plea agreement the Govemment has agreed to recommend or refrain from recommending to the Court a particular resolution of any sentencing issue, the Govermnent reserves its right to full allocution in any post-sentence litigation in order to defend the Court's ultimate decision on such issues. Your client further understands that the Government retains its full right of allocution in connection with any post-sentence motion which may be filed in this matter and/or any proceeding(s) before the Bureau of Prisons. In the event that the Court rejects this Plea Agreement, your client elects to maintain his plea, and the Govermnent fails to exercise its right to withdraw from the Plea Agreement, should the Court consider any Sentencing Guidelines adjustments, departures, or calculations different from any stipulations contained in this Agreement, or contemplate a sentence outside the Guidelines range based upon the general sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the parties reserve the right to answer any related inquiries from the Court. In addition, your client acknowledges that the Govemment is not obligated to file any post-sentence downward departure motion in this case pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 8. Court Not Boyld bv the Plea Agreement In accordance with Paragraph 4 above, should the Court reject the Plea Agreement, your client elect to maintain his plea, and the Government fail to exercise its right to withdraw from the Plea Agreement, your client acknowledges that your client's entry of a guilty plea to the charged offense authorizes the sentencing court to impose any sentence, up to and including the statutory maximum sentence, which may be greater than the applicable Guidelines range. The Govemment cannot, and does not, make any promise or representation as to what sentence your client will receive in this event. Moreover, it is understood that your client will have no right to 6 Case Document 25-2 Filed 02/07/14 Page 8 of 15 withdraw your client's plea of guilty should the Court impose a sentence that is outside the Guidelines range or if the Court does not follow the Govemment's sentencing recommendation. Your client acknowledges that the Court is not obligated to follow any recommendation of the Government at the time of sentencing or to grant a downward departure based on your client's substantial assistance to the Government, even if the Government files a motion pursuant to 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Your client understands that neither the Govemment's recommendation nor the Sentencing Guidelines are binding on the Court. In the event that the Court considers any Sentencing Guidelines adjustments, departures, or calculations different from any stipulations contained in this Agreement, or contemplates a sentence outside the Guidelines range based upon the general sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the parties reserve the right to answer any related inquiries from the Court. 9. Conditions of Release Although the Government will not oppose your client's request to be released on his personal recognizance pending sentencing, the final decision regarding your client's bond status or detention will be made by the Court at the time of your client's plea of guilty. The Government may move to change your client's conditions of release, including requesting that your client be detained pending sentencing, if your client engages in further criminal conduct prior to sentencing or if the Government obtains information that it did not possess at the time of your client's plea of guilty and that is relevant to whether your client is likely to flee or pose a danger to any person or the community. 10. Coogeration Your client agrees to cooperate with the Office of the United States Attomey for the District of Columbia on the following terms and conditions: Your client shall cooperate fully, truthfully, completely and with this Office and other Federal, state and local law enforcement authorities identified by this Office in any and all matters as to which the Government deems the cooperation relevant. Your client acknowledges that your client's cooperation may include, but will not necessarily be limited to: answering questions; and providing swom written statements. Any refusal by your client to cooperate fitlly, truthfully, completely and as directed by this Office and other Federal, state and local law enforcement authorities identified by this Office in any and all matters in which the Government deems your client's assistance relevant will constitute a breach of this agreement by your client, and will relieve the Government of its obligations under this agreement, including, but not limited to, its obligation to inform this Court and the Departure Guidelines Committee of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia of any assistance your client has provided. Your client agrees, however, that such breach by your client will not constitute a basis for withdrawal of your client's plea of guilty or otherwise relieve your client of his obligations under this agreement. Case Document 25-2 Filed 02/07/14 Page 9 of 15 Your client shall tum over to the Govermnent, or other law enforcement authorities, or direct such law enforcement authorities to, any and all evidence of crimes about which your client is aware; all contraband and proceeds of such crimes; and all assets traceable to the proceeds of such crimes. Your client agrees to the forfeiture of all assets which are proceeds of crime or traceable to such proceeds of crime. Your client shall submit a full and complete accounting of all your client's financial assets, whether such assets are in your client's name or in the name of a third party. Your client shall testify fully, completely and truthfully before any and all Grand Jury(ies) in the District of Columbia, and elsewhere, and at any and all trials of cases or other court proceedings in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, at which your client's testimony may be deemed relevant by the Govemment. Your client understands and acknowledges that nothing in this agreement allows your client to commit any criminal violation of local, state or federal law during the period of your client's cooperation with law enforcement authorities or at any time prior to the sentencing in this case. The commission of a criminal offense during the period of your client's cooperation or at any time prior to sentencing will constitute a breach of this plea agreement and will relieve the Government of all of its obligations under this agreement, including, but not limited to, its obligation to inform this Court and the Departure Guidelines Committee of the United States Attomey's Office for the District of Columbia of any assistance your client has provided. However, your client acknowledges and agrees that such a breach of this agreement will not entitle your client to withdraw your client's plea of guilty or relieve your client of his obligations under this agreement. Your client further understands that, to establish a breach of this agreement, the Government need only prove your client's commission of a criminal offense by a preponderance of the evidence. 11. Waiver of Rights Your client understands that by pleading guilty in this case he agrees to waive certain rights afforded by the Constitution of the United States and/or by statute or rule. Your client agrees to forego the right to any further discovery or disclosures of information not already provided at the time of the entry of your client's guilty plea. Your client also agrees to waive, among other rights, the right to be indicted by a Grand Jmy, the right to plead not guilty, and the right to a jury trial. At trial, your client would have the right to be represented by counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, to compel witnesses to appear for the purpose of testifying and presenting other evidence on your client's behalf, and. to choose whether to testify himself. If your client chose not to testify at a jury trial, your client would have the right to have the jury instructed that his failure to testify could not be held against him. Your client would further have the right to have the jury instructed that your client is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and that the burden would be on the United States to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If your client was found guilty after a trial, your client would have the right to appeal his conviction. Your client understands that the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of 8 Case Document 25-2 Filed 02/07/14 Page 10 of 15 the United States protects your client from the use of self-incriminating statements in a criminal prosecution. By entering a plea of guilty, your client knowingly and voluntarily waives or gives up his right against self-incrimination. 12. Restitution Your client understands that the Court has an obligation to determine whether, and in what amount, mandatory restitution applies in this case under 18 U.S.C. 3663A. The parties agree that restitution is not applicable here. If ordered by the Court, payments of restitution shall be made to the Clerk of the Court. Your client agrees that he will submit a completed financial statement to the U.S. Attomey's Office, in a form it provides and as it directs. Your client promises that his financial statement and disclosures will be complete, accurate, and truthful. Your client expressly authorizes the U.S. Attomey's Office to obtain a credit report on him in order to evaluate your client's ability to satisfy any financial obligations imposed by the Court or agreed to herein. - Your client understands and agrees that the restitution or fines imposed by the Court will be due and payable immediately and subject to immediate enforcement by the United States. If the Court imposes a schedule of payments, your client understands that the schedule of payments is merely a minimum schedule of payments and will not be the only method, not a limitation on the methods, available to the United States to enforce the criminal judgment. If your client is sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the Court, your client agrees to participate in the Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, regardless of whether the court specifically directs the participation or imposes a schedule of payments. Your client certifies that he has made no transfer of assets in contemplation of this prosecution for the purpose of evading or defeating financial obligations that are created by the Agreement and/or that may be imposed upon him by the Court. In addition, your client promises that he will make no such transfers in the future until he has fulfilled the financial obligations under this agreement. 13. Forfeiture Your client agrees to the forfeiture set forth in the Forfeiture Allegation in the Criminal Information to which he is pleading guilty. Specifically, your client agrees to the entry of a forfeiture money judgment in the amount of $35,000. Your client agrees that the proffer of evidence supporting your client's guilty plea is sufficient evidence to support this forfeiture. Your client agrees that the Court will enter a Consent Order of Forfeiture for this property at the time of his guilty plea. Your client agrees Case Document 25-2 Filed 02/07/14 Page 11 of 15 that upon entry of the Consent Order of Forfeiture, it will be a final order as to your client under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Your client agrees that this plea agreement permits the government to seek to forfeit any of his assets, real or personal, that are subject to forfeiture under any federal statute, whether or not this agreement specifically identifies the asset. Regarding any asset or property, your client agrees to forfeiture of all interest in: (1) any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the violation to which he is pleading guilty; and (2) any substitute assets for property otherwise subject to forfeiture. See 18 U.S.C. 28 U.S.C. 2461(c), 21 U.S.C. 853(p). Your client waives the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 regarding notice of the forfeiture in the charging instrument, armouncement of the forfeiture at sentencing, and incorporation of the forfeiture in the judgment. Your client understands that the forfeiture of assets is part of the sentence that may be imposed in this case, and he waives any failure by the Court to advise him of this, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 at the time of his guilty plea. Your client agrees to take all necessary actions to identify all assets over which your client exercises or exercised control, directly or indirectly, at any time since January 1, 2012, or in which your client has or had during that time any financial interest. Your client will complete and provide to the undersigned Assistant United States Attomey a standard financial disclosure form, which has been provided to you with this plea agreement, at least 10 days prior to sentencing, unless the forfeited amount has been paid as of that date. Your client agrees to take all steps as requested by the Government to obtain from any other parties by any lawful means any records of assets owned at any time by your client. Your client agrees to provide and/or consent to the release of your client's tax returns for the previous five years. Your client agrees to take all steps as requested by the Government to pass clear title to forfeitable interests or to property to the United States and to testify truthfully in any judicial forfeiture proceeding. Your client agrees to waive all constitutional and statutory challenges in any marmer (including, but not limited to, direct appeal) to any forfeiture carried out in accordance with this plea agreement on any, grounds, including that the forfeiture constitutes an excessive fine or punishment. The United States Attorney's Office agrees to make a non-binding recommendation to the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section at the Department of Justice that any monies obtained from the defendant through forfeiture be distributed to the victims of the offense in accordance with any restitution order entered in this case.' 14. Breach of Agreement Your client understands and agrees that if, after entering this Plea Agreement, your client fails specifically to perform or to fulfill completely each and every one of your client's 10 Case Document 25-2 Filed 02/07/14 Page 12 of 15 obligations under-this Plea Agreement, or engages in any criminal activity prior to sentencing, your client will have breached this Plea Agreement. In the event of such a breach: the Government will be free from its obligations under the 'Agreement; your client will not have the right to withdraw the guilty plea; your client shall be fitlly subject to criminal prosecution for any other crimes, including perjury and obstruction of ustice; and the Government will be free to use against your client, directly and indirectly, in any criminal or civil proceeding, all statements made by your client and any of the information or materials provided by your client, including such statements, information and materials provided pursuant to this Agreement or during the course of any debriefings conducted in anticipation of, or after entry of this Agreement, whether or not the debriefings were previously characterized as "off the record" debriefings, and including your client's statements made during proceedings before the Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Your client acknowledges discussing with you Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, rules which ordinarily limit the admissibility of statements made by a defendant in the course of plea discussions or plea proceedings if a guilty plea is later withdrawn. Your client knowingly and voluntarily waives the rights which arise under these rules in the event your client withdraws his guilty plea. Your client understands and agrees that the Govemment shall only be required to prove a breach of this Plea Agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. Your client further understands and agrees that the Government need only prove a violation of federal, state, or local criminal law by probable cause in order to establish a breach of this Plea Agreement. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to permit your client to commit perjury, to make false statements or declarations, to obstruct justice, or to protect your client from prosecution for any crimes not included within this Agreement or committed by your client after the execution of this Agreement. Your client understands and agrees that the Govemment reserves the right to prosecute your client for any such offenses. Your client further understands that any perjury, false statements or declarations, or obstruction of ustice relating to your client's obligations under this Agreement shall constitute a breach of this Agreement. However, in the event of such a breach, your client will not be allowed to withdraw this guilty plea. 15. Waiver of Statute of Limitations It is further agreed that, should the conviction following your client's plea of guilty pursuant to this Agreement be vacated for any reason, any prosecution that is not time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations on the date of the signing of this Agreement (including any counts that the Government has agreed not to prosecute or to dismiss at sentencing pursuant to this Agreement) may be commenced or reinstated against your client, notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations between the signing of this Agreement and the commencement or reinstatement of such prosecution. It is the intent of this Agreement to waive all defenses based on the statute of limitations with respect to any prosecution that is not time- barred on the date that this Agreement is signed. 11 Case Document 25-2 Filed 02/07/14 Page 13 of 15 16. Government's Obligations This Office will bring to the Court's attention at the time of sentencing the nature and extent of your client's cooperation or lack of cooperation. The Departure Guideline Committee of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia will evaluate the fitll nature and extent of your client's cooperation to determine whether your client has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. If the Departure Guideline Committee determines that your client has provided such substantial assistance, it will further determine whether this Office should file a departure motion pursuant to Section 5K1.l of the Sentencing Guidelines, which would afford your client an opportunity to persuade the Court that your client should be sentenced to a lesser period of incarceration and/or fine than indicated by the Sentencing Guidelines. The determination of whether your client has provided substantial assistance warranting the filing of a motion pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines is within the sole discretion of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia and is not reviewable by the Court. Notwithstanding a determination by the Departure Guideline Committee of the United States Attomey's Office for the District of Columbia that your client has provided substantial assistance, in the event your client should fail to specifically perform and fulfill completely each and every one of your client's obligations under this plea agreement, the Govemment will be free from its obligations under the agreement, and will have no obligation to present this case to the Departure Guideline Committee or file a departure motion pursuant to Section .1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. 17. Waiver of Agpeal Your client understands that federal law, specifically l8 U.S.C. 3742, affords defendants the right to appeal their sentences in certain circumstances. Your client agrees to waive the right to appeal the sentence in this case, including any term of imprisonment, fine, award of restitution, term of supervised release, and the marmer in which the sentence was determined, except to the extent the Court sentences your client above the statutory maximum or applicable guidelines range, in which case your client would have the right to appeal the illegal sentence or above-guidelines sentence, but not to raise on appeal other issues regarding the sentencing. In agreeing to this waiver, your client is aware that your client's sentence has yet to be determined by the Court. Realizing the uncertainty in estimating what sentence the Court ultimately will impose, your client knowingly and willingly waives your client's right to appeal the sentence, to the extent noted .above, in exchange for the concessions made by the Govemment in this Plea Agreement. Your client reserves the right to make a collateral attack upon your client's sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255, if new and currently unavailable information becomes known to him. 12 Case Document 25-2 Filed 02/07/14 Page 14 of 15 18. Complete Agreement No agreements, promises, understandings, or representations have been made by the parties or their counsel other than those contained in writing herein, nor will any such agreements, promises, understandings, or representations be made unless committed to writing and signed by your client, defense counsel, and an Assistant United States Attomey for the District of Columbia. Your client further understands that this Agreement is binding only upon the Criminal and Superior Court Divisions of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia. This Agreement does not bind the Civil Division of this Office or any other United States Attorney's Office, nor does it bind any other state, local, or federal prosecutor. It also does not bar or compromise any civil, tax, or administrative claim pending or that may be made against your client. If the foregoing terms and conditions are satisfactory, your client may so indicate by signing the Agreement in the space indicated below and returning the original to me once it has been signed by your client and by you or other defense counsel. Sincerely yours, /47 /age/1, RONALD E. MACHEN JR. United States Attorney D.C. Bar No. 447-889 Bye: MICHAEL K. A SON DAVID A. LAS ANTHONY D. SALER Assistant United States Attomeys 555 Fourth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530 202.252.7817 (Atkinson) 202.252.7020 (Last) Michael.Atkinson2 usdo'. ov David.Last@usdoj.gov . Case Document 25--2 Filed 02/07/14 Page 15 of 15 ACCEPTANCE I have read this Plea Agreement and have discussed it with my attorneys, Reid Weingarten, Esq., Brian I-Icberlig, Esq., and Scott Esq. I fully understand this Agreement and agree to it without reservation. I do this voluntarily and of my own free will, intending to be legally bound. No threats have been made to me nor am I under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Agreement fully. I am pleading guilty because I am in fact guilty of the offense identified in this Agreement. I reaffirm that absolutely no promises, agreements, understandings, or conditions have been made or entered into in connection with my decision to plead guilty except those set forth in this Plea Agreement. I am satisfied with the leg rvices provided by my attorneys in connection with this Plea Agreement and matters rela it. Date: ehael Aytlown efendant ACKNOWLEDGMENT I have read 'each of the pages constituting this Plea Agreement, reviewed them with my client, Michael A. Brown, and fully discussed the provisions of the Agreement with my client. These pages accurately and completely set forth the entire Plea Agreement. I concur in my client's desire to plead guilty as set forth in this Agreement. Date: 2" 7' Reid Weinfiarten Brian Heber 1g Scott Attorneys for the Defendant 14 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 1 of 36 EXHIBIT Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 2 of 36 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Criminal No. 13-164 (RWR) MICHAEL A. BROWN, Defendant. AMENDED STATEMENT OF THE OFFENSE AND OTHER CONDUCT On June 10, 2013, the defendant, Michael A. Brown pleaded guilty before the Honorable Robert L. Wilkins, pursuant to an agreed Statement of the Offense and Other Conduct (the "Original Statement of the Offense"). This Amended Statement of the Offense and Other Conduct modifies the Original Statement of the Offense and Other Conduct by adding paragraph numbers 77 through 85. Had this case proceeded to trial, the govermnent would have proved the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt: Relevant Individuals and Entities 1. From in or about January 2009 through January 2, 2013, the defendant, MICHAEL A. BROWN was an elected at-large member of the Council of the District of Columbia Council"). As such, he was a public official within the meaning of Title 18, United States Code, 201(a)(l). Among other official duties, BROWN provided constituent services, directed the activities of his Council and attendant Committee staff members, and communicated with agencies and departments concerning constituent and Council activities. Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 3 of 36 2. As part of his official duties, defendant BROWN was the Chair of the D.C. Council's Committee on Economic Development and Housing, which was responsible for matters related to economic, industrial, and commercial development. Committee Employee A was the Committee Director of the Committee on Economic Development and Housing. 3. The District of Columbia had a special program to help its small, disadvantaged, local businesses become economically viable: the certified business enterprise program. Status as a CBE conferred preferential procurement and contracting opportunities on such businesses. To be eligible, the businesses had to meet certain requirements and be certified by the District of Columbia's Department of Small and Local Business Development a District of Columbia government agency. At all relevant times, Employee A was the Director of the 4. The Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs was a District of Columbia govemment agency that, among other things, regulated the issuances of certificates of occupancy and home occupancy permits. One way for a business to establish its qualification as a local business under the CBE program was through the issuance of such a permit. 5. Person A was an individual known to defendant BROWN. 6. Company was a Maryland company. Undercover Employee 1 and Undercover Employee 2. were undercover agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation posing as employees of Company M. The Introduction of BROWN to Company 7. Prior to July 11, 2012, defendant BROWN had discussions with Person A about whether Person A could assist BROWN to obtain for BROWN from any Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 4 of 36 govemment contractors known to Person A. BROWN referred to this as a "loan." BROWN expected to assist the govemment contractor with its business if the contractor provided such financial assistance to BROWN. 8. On July 11, 2012, Person A, knowing that defendant BROWN wanted to secure arranged a meeting between defendant BROWN and UCE-1 who was interested in paying defendant BROWN the sum of $50,000 for assistance with a CBE application and government contracting opportunities. The First Cash Pavment to BROWN fronLComnanv 9. Later that day on July 11, 2012, defendant BROWN met Person A and UCE-1 at a restaurant, The Channel Inn, in the District of Columbia. UCE-1 was introduced to BROWN as an employee of Company M. UCE-1 described Company to BROWN as a company interested in obtaining CBE approval and contracting opportunities in the District of Columbia. At the meeting, BROWN accepted $15,000 in cash from UCE-1 as part of a promised amount of $50,000 for BROWN's efforts to use his offici_al position to assist Company in becoming a CBE and obtaining contracting opportunities. The cash was in denominations of $100 bills and placed in a duffel bag with a Washington Nationals baseball hat and two Washington Nationals t-shirts. 10. While accepting the bag from UCE-1, defendant BROWN referred to the cash payment as a loan. UCE-1 told BROWN that he could keep the money. BROWN understood from his discussions with Person A and UCE-1 that, notwithstanding BROWN's reference to the payment as a loan, BROWN was not expected to repay the money. During subsequent discussions with UCE-1 and BROWN occasionally referred to the payments from Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 5 of 36 Company as a loan. Notwithstanding these discussions, no loan documents were ever drafted and no loan terms were ever discussed -- between BROWN and Company M. 11. On July 12, 2012, defendant BROWN provided Person A with the name and telephone number of two staff members at the to give to UCE-1 to serve as points of contact for Company M's CBE application. The Second Cash Payment to BROWN from Company 12. On the evening of August 2, 2012, UCE-1 and defendant BROWN met at the Four Seasons Hotel in the District of Columbia to discuss, among other things, Company M's CBE application and its contracting opportunities. BROWN and UCE-1 agreed to meet a few days later for UCE-1 to pay the $35,000 balance owed to BROWN. During the conversation, BROWN suggested that Company could pay him an amount of money "north of" -- meaning more than -- the $35,000 balance that Company owed to BROWN. BROWN did not quantify the amount of money "north of' the $35,000 balance that Company could pay to BROWN. 13. On August 7, 2012,. defendant BROWN and UCE-1 met at a booth at The Charmel Inn. During the meeting, BROWN accepted an additional cash payment of $10,000 from UCE-1 in exchange for BROWN continuing to assist Company in obtaining approval of its CBE application and contracting opportunities. In handing the money over to BROWN, UCE-1 stated, got 10 for you, bro." UCE-1 handed BROWN $10,000 in cash in denominations of $100 'bills. The cash was placed inside a Washington Redskins coffee mug. BROWN left the booth with the mug. 14. After defendant BROWN and UCE-1 left the booth, BROWN told UCE-1 that BROWN would call the after Company submitted the necessary paperwork for its Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 6 of 36 CBE application. When UCE-1 inquired about the anticipated timing for approval of Company M's CBE application, adding that UCE-1 could. 'get BROWN "the other 25" upon approval, BROWN responded, "Or north." BROWN further explained what he intended to say to the "[J]ust move a bunch of them to the top of the pile. Just don't single [Company out. Put [Company in a group of folks that have contracts waiting and then the scrutiny is fine. You just move the whole group that has contracts waiting. You are not just picking [Company 15. On August 24, 2012, defendant BROWN and UCE-1 spoke by telephone. During the call, BROWN asked UCE-1 for an update on the status of Company M's CBE application. When UCE-1 told BROWN that he had not been able to obtain a certificate of occupancy for Company M, BROWN stated "that may even be a call I can make for you." UCE-1 identified for BROWN an employee at the involved in Company M's CBE application. BROWN responded that he did not know the employee, but stated, "keep in mind, I know, whoever his boss who I know." During the call, BROWN raised "the other piece," referring to the money still owed by Company to BROWN. BROWN asked UCE-1 to check with associates to "see if they can break off another small piece for me." 16. On August 27, 2012, defendant BROWN and UCE-1 spoke by telephone. During the call, UCE-1 told BROWN that UCE-1 had a meeting at the scheduled for August 30, 2012, but that UCE-1 might have to attend the meeting at the without a certificate of occupancy as part of Company M's CBE application. BROWN told UCE-1 that BROWN would call the DCRA to check on the status of Company M's certificate of occupancy. BROWN and UCE-1 agreed to meet the next afternoon for UCE-1 to make another payment to BROWN. Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 7 of 36 Later, on August 27, 2012, BROWN called UCE-1 and stated that he had called the "head dude" at the DCRA to "see what's up." The Third Cash Payment to BROWN from Company 17. On August 28, 2012, defendant BROWN and UCE-1 met at The Channel Inn. During the meeting, BROWN accepted an additional cash payment of $5,000 from UCE-1 in exchange for BROWN's assistance with Company M's CBE application and contracting opportunities. Prior to paying BROWN the money, BROWN and UCE-1 discussed UCE-1's upcoming meeting at the BROWN instructed UCE-1 to call BROWN after the meeting and inform him of any "next steps." BROWN agreed to "double-back" to the to tell the to move Company M's application as quickly as possible. Later during the meeting, UCE-I stated to BROWN that UCE-1 was able to "put together five Gs," referencing an additional cash payment of $5,000. UCE-1 placed on the table a silver coffee mug containing $5,000 in cash. The cash was in denominations of $100 bills. BROWN responded, "Definitely always very helpfiil." BROWN left the restaurant with the mug. BROWN's Efforts to Help Company at the DCRA 18. On August. 30, 2012, defendant BROWN sent UCE-1 a text message that a staff member from BROWN's office at the D.C. Council had been trying to reach UCE-1. BROWN's staff member also had left a voicemail for UCE-1 stating that the staff member had contacted the DCRA to inquire about the status of Company 's certificate of occupancy permit. 19. On October 10, 2012, the DCRA approved Company M's application for a home occupancy permit. Later that evening, UCE-1 sent a text message to defendant BROWN stating, "Hey thanks Mike. I got the permit today. I'll resubmit the app tonight. And should be Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 8 of 36 back at next week." BROWN replied by text message, "Great!! That's quick, I'm glad . it worked out. Congrats!" 20. On October 11, 2012, BROWN and UCE-1 spoke by telephone. During the call, informed BROWN that Company included false information in its home occupancy pennit application concerning UCE-1 's residency in the District of Columbia, which was required for Company M's CBE application: UCE-I 2 BROWN: UCE-1 BROWN: UCE-1 BROWN: BROWN: UCE- 1 BROWN: Hey Ijust wanted to catch up with you. I haven't talked with you in a while, so. No no no. I was just making sure everything uh is moving forward. It is man. I go um, um I don't know what you did man, but that app - that um that permit came through pretty quick. You're damn, danm right it came through quick. {Laughing} So yeah. I got that. And I just submitted the uh, re- submitted the application. So I think next week I should be able to get back up at the uh CBE spot. And get this thing, get it moving. Great. So I'm glad about that. I had to just, I mean to get that permit, I had to create a danm lease and just sign it and so I can get it, you know. It's saying that I lived in DC. You know I live in Marylandwe're moving now, so. What's uh, what's your schedule like next week some time and you know sit down and talk a little bit more? Oh no, absolutely. Um, why don't you uh uh you always have to do some maneuvering before we meet, so. I know. I know. Why don't you, why don't you let me know on Monday what day works for you, after you've done your maneuvering. And then I'll uh. Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 9 of 36 UCE-1: Okay. BROWN: And then we'll figure it out. And next week is fine. UCE-1: Okay, so maybe we can um like get um get something to eat or have a couple of drinks or something like that. BROWN: Oh no problem. No problem. UCE-1 [Unintelligible] BROWN: Just do, do your maneuvering. And even if you don't do the full maneuvering, do a piece. And then you do the last piece at the uh, you know, when it's all done. UCE-1: Okay. So I'll hit you up um, I'll hit you up Monday. And then we'll get to sit down and we'll, we'll talk. BROWN: That's my man. Okay. BROWN's Initial Efforts to Help Companv at the 21. On October 11, 2012, Company submitted its CBE application to the 22. On October 19, 2012, following a meeting at the UCE-1 sent a text message to defendant BROWN stating, "Hey Mike, might be running into an issue over here at the cbe office. Can give them a call?" Within minutes, BROWN made an outgoing call to Committee Employee A. During the call, BROWN told Committee Employee A the following: "There's a small company over at CBE, a DC company, they're giving him a little run around. Can you call over there and see what's up?" 23. A short while later, defendant BROWN called UCE-1 and initiated a conference call between BROWN, UCE-1, and Committee Employee A. Afier UCE-1 provided additional information to Committee Employee A, BROWN stated, "So, basically, we want to see if there is some kind of, I take it you want a waiver or something" relating to Company M's application for CBE certification. As the call concluded, BROWN stated, "Alright, so [Committee 8 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 10 of 36 Employee call over there, then we will get back to you and let you know what, if we can try, if there is a waiver or something. I don't know what are in the rules relative to waivers for stuff like this, but [Committee Employee will find out." 24. On October 22, 2012, URCE-1 sent a text message to defendant BROWN asking, "Hey Mike any news from the cbe BROWN sent a text message to Committee Employee A asking, "Any update on that cbe In a subsequent call with UCE-1 on October 23, 2012, BROWN stated that Committee Employee A "called over there yesterday and so hopefully we'll get some kind of response on something in the next day or so, and then I'll be able to give you some guidance about what's up." During the call, BROWN also agreed to introduce UCE-1 to contractors, explaining the following: "Well, remember -- keep in mind the CBE just gives folks the extra points. There is nothing that stops a company without CBE from being hooked up with somebody. Again, I can be helpful whether you're a CBE or not. It just makes it easier because it gives a benefit to the larger company that they get extra points." BROWN's Election Loss and Efforts to Obtain the "Last Piece" from Company 25. On November 6, 2012, defendant BROWN lost his bid for re-election as an at- large member of the D.C. Council. BROWN continued to serve as a member of the D.C. Council until his term expired on January 2, 2013. 26. On November 9, 2012, UCE-1 sent defendant BROWN a text message stating, "Hey Mike. You think we can finish that thing we started?" BROWN responded, "Yes. On both fronts?" UCE-1 replied by referencing the money still owed to BROWN, which UCE-1 referred to as the "last piece," telling BROWN that got that last piece for as soon as we finish." Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 11 of 36 27. On November 11, 2012, BROWN sent a text message to UCE-1 stating that BROWN "need[ed]" a partial payment of the "last piece," which BROWN referred to as a "piece of the piece." UCE-1 replied, "If we can make that waiver happen this week you can have all of it. Maybe a little more." 28. On November 13, 2012, defendant BROWN and UCE-1. had a telephone call to discuss a payment to BROWN, which BROWN had referred to as the "piece of the piece." In discussing an anticipated meeting between BROWN, UCE-1, and.UCE-2, BROWN stated he would provide an update on the "waiver" for Company to get it "over that hump." BROWN also stated that he would be working to get Company in fi'ont of potential contract partners. 29. On November 14, 2012, defendant BROWN and UCE-1 had a call to discuss plans for paying BROWN a "piece of the piece" during a meeting scheduled the next day between BROWN, UCE-1, and UCE-2. BROWN specifically inquired whether BROWN and UCE-1 would be "dealing with the piece of the piece" in front of UCE-2, or whether BROWN and UCE-1 would be "meeting separately on that." When told that they would be able to "deal with it" with UCE-2 present and that UCE-2 was "cool," BROWN responded, UCE-1 inquired as to the amount of additional money that BROWN was requesting: "How much are you thinking? I gave you, last time we did it, I gave you five, are you thinking about the samc?. Or, how much are you thinking?" In response, BROWN stated, "Well, whatever you -- I always want more so whatever you can do. So, whatever you can do is fine. . . . Whatever north of that is great." 30. On the evening of November 15, 2012, defendant BROWN met with UCE-1 and UCE-2 at The Hamilton restaurant in the District of Columbia. During the meeting, BROWN 10 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 12 of 36 stated he was continuing to look into the "waiver" for Company M's CBE certification. In addressing the approach BROWN anticipated that the would take to approve Company application, BROWN stated, don't think they're going to do just one company out of the whole. You have to be in a group of companies . . . they're trying to figure out how many to put . . . in another wave that's about to come through. And then we can put you guys in that wave. Rather than just you by yourself because then there's less scrutiny." UCE-2 inquired whether BROWN could make an additional call on their behalf, possibly to Employee A. BROWN responded, "That's what I'm doing. The problem is because of the new crackdown in the CBE process, it's made it difficult to move these companies in." Later in the conversation, BROWN stated, made the first call, again, to the big fella" -- referring to Employee A -- "and then had my staff do a lot of the stuff to churn it through the system." When asked about the time-frame for approval, BROWN replied, have to get that from Employee I can't stress enough -- because he needs to obviously protect himself -- it's a 12-18 month process and you all are at, what -- month two or three? So you are way ahead of the curve." 31. The next day, November 16, 2012, UCE-1 sent a text message to defendant BROWN asking, "Were able [to] make any headway today?" BROWN replied by text message: "Calls made. No updates yet." The following day, November 17, 2012, BROWN sent a text message to UCE-1 asking, "Do have the piece of the piece?" 32. On November 19, 2012, defendant BROWN sent two identical text messages to UCE-1 asking, "Do have the piece of the piece?" Later on November 19, 2012, BROWN and UCE-1 talked by telephone. During the conversation, BROWN stated "we're on it," concerning Company M's CBE application, but stated that many people and their staffs had left for the 11 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 13 of 36 Thanksgiving holiday. BROWN suggested that UCE-1 call the to discuss a potential restructuring of Company to address a potential deficiency in the application concerning the_ residency requirement and added, "I'll do what I'm supposed to do, but I think for you to keep your own dialogue stream open with them and ask that legitimate question, which is if we fix the structure, how long it takes, then you'll let me know what that is, and then I'll intervene if I have to." BROWN told UCE-1 that he had called Employee A on Friday, November 16, 2012, but could not reach Employee A. When UCE-1 clarified that BROWN had called Employee A, referred to by UCE-1 as the "main guy"_at the BROWN replied, "Yeah, yeah, yeah, I told, that's what I told you and I would do." UCE-1 told BROWN that UCE-1 would contact UCE-2 to "see what we can do about sliding you some money." BROWN replied, "alright, man." 33. On November 23, 2012, defendant BROWN and UCE-1 engaged in the following text message exchange in which UCE-1 informed BROWN that Company had "restructured" its CBE application: UCE-1: Mike, what time is that event on the BROWN: 10. will be able to intro 2 folks at that event. UCE-1: Ok good. I'm planning on a meeting with the cbe folks that aftemoon. I restructured, so hopefully we're good. BROWN: Ok. Great. The piece? I can meet on sat. UCE-1: I'm in jersey now. I'll be back Monday. Can look out for me when I go to the cbe spot on Thursday? BROWN: I always look out 4 u. Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 14 of 36 UCE-1 I know. You do. I really need it Thursday so we can push this through. I did some crazy maneuvering to make it look like I reside in DC. It should work. BROWN: on Monday. I go 2 Monday pm. So let's make it work. 34. On November 26, 2012, defendant BROWN and UCE-2 spoke by telephone. During the call, BROWN expressed his intention to introduce UCE-1 and UCE-2 to Employee A and contractors at a symposium to be hosted by BROWN on November 29, 2012. UCE-2 told BROWN that UCE-1 had "changed up the stuff' on Company M's CBE application "to obviously make it look like we're in UCE-2 asked BROWN if there would be "any additional scrutiny" based on Company M's changes to the CBE application. BROWN advised UCE-2 to follow the instructions provided by the BROWN agreed to speak with Employee A to assist Company through the CBE approval process. BROWN reiterated that "it is a 12-18 month process" to obtain a CBE and Company was "at month three," which was "way, way ahead of where other people are who started at the same time." BROWN stated he intended to introduce UCE-1 and UCE-2 to contractors at the symposium, telling UCE-2 "not everybody is going to get introduced by me -- so you don't have to worry about that, there won't be that kind of competition." BROWN also stated the following: "You're going to meet the Director. You'll probably end up meeting the Mayor. You'll probably end up meeting the Deputy Mayor for Economic 'Development. You're going to meet all the players. No one gets an opportunity to do that. Not everyone gets an opportunity to do that. You're getting that opportunity." 35. When UCE-2 discussed the money already paid, defendant BROWN stated he was not "linking the two" and "one thing has nothing to do with the other," stating that he did 13 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 15 of 36 this for "people of color contractors all the time." UCE-2 advised BROWN, "I'm not a bank - whether it's a loan, whether you're paying me back, or whether I'm giving it to you -- really to me, that's miniscule. But, the thing is -- I loaned it, gave it, or whatever it is, in an effort to get some access." UCE-2 stated, "To me, it is linked together." When UCE-2 stated, want to get access," BROWN replied, "But you are -- it's a 12-18 month process and you're way ahead of the game . . . way ahead. Very few people get the kind of access and get through the process as quickly as you guys have gotten. And I do that for other people. That's what I do. I try to increase, again, the opportunities for black folk." When asked about the "other people," BROWN stated, "Do I have friends that have helped me? Absolutely. But they did not link, they're not linking the two." BROWN also stated, "I'm still going to do everything I promised I would do for to try to get him certified, to assist him in doing that, to introduce him to contractors so you guys can get some contracts," and reiterated that "one thing has nothing to do with the other." BROWN's Initial Call to Employee A on Behalf of Company 36. On the morning of November 28, 2012, defendant BROWN had a telephone call with Employee A regarding Company M. During the call, BROWN told Employee A the following: "There are some -- there is a young African American company I don't mean young in age, I mean young as in, in how long they have been up and running. If you could give a couple of - they're going through the normal process with your office now to get their certification. But, they would love to kind of tell you a little bit of their story at some point today, if you have 15 minutes for them." BROWN also explained that UCE-1 and UCE-2 would be at the the next day, "[b]ut with all the people walking around, they're not 14 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 16 of 36 going to really be able to kind of bend your ear the way they would like to, unless they were sitting in your office." Employee A agreed to meet with UCE-1 and UCE-2, as requested by BROWN, and advised BROWN to have UCE-1 and UCE-2 call Employee A's assistant to schedule the meeting "based off of your referral." 37. Almost immediately following his call with Employee A, defendant BROWN called Person A and provided the name and phone number of Employee A's assistant. BROWN explained further, "And they need to call by -- they might as well start calling now. Use my name, with [the assistant]. And they'll set it -- they can have 20 minutes or 30 minutes today to tell them - they can go and tell them their story. To the Director, I just talked to him." 38. Later that afternoon, UCE-1 called defendant BROWN to advise BROWN that UCE-1 had left two messages for Employee A's assistant, but had not heard back from the assistant. BROWN stated, "Let me call him right now and let her know that, that meeting was supposed to happen today. So, I'll hit you right back." Approximately one minute later, BROWN made an outgoing call to Employee A. During the call, BROWN advised Employee A that UCE-1 had tried reaching Employee A's assistant, but had not yet received a call back. Employee A told BROWN that Employee would "walk back and touch base" with the assistant to follow-up on the issue. One minute after that, BROWN tried to call UCE-1. UCE-1, however, did not answer BROWN's call because Employee A's assistant had called and was on the telephone with UCE-1. 39. Later in the evening of November 28, 2012, UCE-1 received a call from Employee A. During the call, Employee A agreed to confirm Company M's upcoming 15 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 17 of 36 appointment at BROWN Facilitates Meeting Between Employee A and Company 40. On November 29, 2012, UCE-1 and UCE-2 attended an economic development symposium, "Securing Access to Capital: An Economic Development Workshop for D.C.'s Small Local Businesses," which was "Hosted by Councilmember Michael A. Brown, Chair, Committee on Economic Development Housing." During the symposium, defendant BROWN facilitated a meeting between UCE-1, UCE-2, and Employee A concerning Company M's CBE application. BROWN also introduced UCE-I and UCE-2 to a local businessperson who, according to BROWN, facilitated financing for contractors. The Fourth Cash Payment to BROWN from Company 41. On the evening of November 29, 2012, defendant BROWN met UCE-I at The Channel Inn. During the meeting, BROWN accepted an additional $5,000 in cash from UCE-I as payment for BROWN's assistance with Company M's CBE application and contracting opportunities. _The cash was in denominations of $100 bills and placed in an envelope. Prior to making the payment, UCE-I stated to BROWN that he had "five," referring to $5,000 in cash that he was paying BROWN. BROWN responded, "The piece of the piece." BROWN left the restaurant with the envelope. BROWN's Continuing Efforts to Assist Company 42. On December 6, 2012, defendant BROWN and UCE-I spoke by telephone. During the call, they discussed Company M's CBE application and efforts to contact Employee A. UCE-I informed BROWN that UCE-I had a meeting scheduled with the the next day. BROWN told UCE-I that Employee A "knows why I'm calling, 16 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 18 of 36 so whether I get him or not, still go through with your meeting." BROWN advised UCE-1 to request an opporttmity to meet with Employee A during the meeting at the and to mention to the staff members that UCE-1 had met Employee A at BROWN's economic symposium on November 29, 2012. BROWN also expressed his intention to ask Employee A to "stay on top" of Company M's CBE application. 43. On December 11, 2012, defendant BROWN and UCE-1 engaged in two telephone calls. During the conversations, BROWN stated that he had "talked to the director" and "the story is that right now your stuff is being processed we speak." BROWN added, "And if everything is in order, there's no reason it should take more than 20 days." BROWN stated that this was "very good" and that "hopefully they have everything they need and once they complete the process, hopefully we'll be moving and grooving." UCE-1 asked whether BROWN told Employee A that "we had some contracts pending," and BROWN responded, "ExactIy." 44. On December 19, 2012, defendant BROWN sent UCE-1 a text message stating, "Need 2 get a piece 2day or thurs." UCE-1 replied, got that get that cert by fri." Later the same morning, BROWN called UCE-1 to reiterate his request to "at least get 5 from you," and stated that he was "continuing to try to move this ball forward for you as quickly as possible." BROWN stated that "our goal" of obtaining Company M's CBE approval before the holidays was "a stifi' one, but it's our goal." UCE-1 explained 'it would be difficult to provide BROWN with a "piece of the piece," but stated that he would give BROWN "the whole 20," referring to the remaining $20,000 promised to BROWN by Company M, "once we get" the CBE certification. BROWN stated it would be a "tall order" to obtain the CBE approval "by 17 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 19 of 36 Tuesday," December 25, 2012, but that "we're working on it." BROWN again asked UCE-1 to "talk to and see if at least you can get a piece of the piece today or tomorrow." - BROWN later that day sent a text message to UCE-1 stating, "Hey fella, need 2 2nite or very very early am 4 that piece." BROWN Continues to Advocate to Employee A on Behalf of Company 45. On the evening of December 19, 2012, defendant BROWN and Person A spoke by telephone. During the call, Person A explained to BROWN that BROWN would have "to do something for and, then, Person A could "get them to get you the money or meet you tomorrow and give you the money in the morning." Person A stated that if BROWN called Employee A and asked Employee A to call UCE--1 with a status update on Company M's CBE application or, alternatively, stated that Employee A was assisting with obtaining a "temporary" CBE approval, Person A would be able to call UCE-2 and tell UCE-2, "Go ahead and give him some money tomorrow so he can go." BROWN agreed to contact Employee A and stated, "Ok, I can try and track him down tonight, otherwise in the moming and I'll 'hit you tomorrow." At approximately 8:07 p.m. on December 19, 2012, BROWN sent a text message to Employee A's cell phone stating, "Please call michael brown. Thanks." 46. On December 20, 2012, at approximately 9:18 defendant BROWN called Employee A's cell phone, which was not answered and no voicemail was left. At approximately 9:20 a.m. that same morning, BROWN sent a text message to UCE-1 stating, "What time we meeting At approximately 9:26 BROWN sent a text message to Person A stating, need 2 meet 2day." At approximately 9:57 BROWN and 18 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 20 of 36 Person A spoke by telephone. During the call, BROWN stated, need to catch up with When Person A inquired whether BROWN "g[o]t the phone call made for BROWN responded, "That's what I'm trying to get done today." Person A explained that if BROWN could "get that done," Person A would "get the money myself and bring it to you." Person A informed BROWN that UCE--2 "just needs some movement or something," because UCE--2 had "spent a lot of money." Person A told BROWN that if BROWN could "tell Employee to call and say, 'Look man, I'm going to work on trying to get you your temporary certification so you can start bidding on some work,"' that would be sufficient for Person piece of a piece." 47. On December 20, 2012, at approximately 10:21 defendant BROWN called Employee A's cell phone again, but the call was not answered. BROWN left a voicemail stating, "Mr. Director, Michael Brown . . . . Call me back when you can. Quick favor. Thanks." 48. Later that same morning, defendant BROWN called one of his D.C. Council staff members. During the call, BROWN asked the staff member to have another staff member send him two telephone numbers, one of which was for Employee A. Minutes later, BROWN received a text message from a staff member identifying Employee A by his last name and providing the telephone number for the At approximately 10:38 BROWN called the number provided for learned Employee A was not available, and left a message for Employee A to call him back. At approximately 1:31 BROWN sent another text message to Employee A's cell phone stating, "Call me, thanks." At approximately 2:40 BROWN again called Employee A's cell phone, 19 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 21 of 36 but the call was not answered and no voicemail was left. At approximately 2:41 BROWN again called the number for the asked to speak to Employee A, learned Employee A was on a conference call, and left two telephone numbers for Employee A to return the call. 49. On December 20, 2012, at approximately 5:20 defendant BROWN and Employee A spoke by telephone. Employee A addressed BROWN as "Councilmember Brown." During the call, BROWN explained, "The reason I have been trying to push these guys along the uh, I think you met him at my access to capital thing, I think you may have talked to him a couple times - BROWN stated that UCE-1 and UCE-2 "supposedly have some contracts that they're ready to sign teaming agreements with contractors and with um, um, some potential joint venture folks." BROWN continued, "Obviously, they don't want to lose the opportunity -- and so that's why they're trying to get their stuff done as quickly as possible. I know you've been, um, you've been very helpful trying to make sure that they have all their paperwork -- at least, your staff -- making sure their paperwork is done and the like, um, and so I'm just trying to see do you guys still have the, um, temporary one that you give until people are actually certified, or is that gone?" Employee A explained that the "provisional approval" process had been eliminated. BROWN inquired whether there had been "a lot of fraud in there I take it?" Employee A responded, "Yeah, and generally because we would, if a contract was pending, we would work with a company to actually expedite the review and just approve it. You know, if it was on track to be approved we would . . . put it up in a line so to say." As the call continued, Employee A told BROWN, "Let me do this, I can check in with the team to see, uh, to see where 20 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page because I know they've, they've been in to meet and everything and I think they've submitted everything, but I can check with the team to see what the status is." BROWN replied, "That would be great," and asked Employee A if someone from the "wouldn't mind just calling and giving them that update so then they can tell their potential contractors at least where they are in the queue that would be great." BROWN provided Employee A with name and telephone number, and stated that he would send a text message to Employee A with Company M's name. BROWN reiterated his request to have someone from the "call them tomorrow, or even this evening if they find out even though it's 5:00-5:30, but tomorrow that would be great." 50. Immediately afier hanging up with Employee A, defendant BROWN called UCE-1., but the call was not answered. Seconds later, BROWN sent two text messages to UCE-1 stating, have him on the phone 4 u. Call me asap. Just called At approximately 5:28 BROWN sent another text message to UCE-1 stating, "Name of company and your complete name asap." At approximately 5:30 UCE-1 replied back to BROWN with a text message identifying Company M's name and address. Approximately a minute later, BROWN called Employee A's cell phone, but the call was not answered. Approximately a minute later, BROWN sent a text message' to Employee A identifying Company M's name and street address. 51. On December 20, 2012, at approximately 6:15 defendant BROWN called Person A. During the call, BROWN stated he previously had Employee A on the phone for UCE-1 and BROWN had called and texted UCE-1 to call him right back, but UCE-1 had not done so. BROWN stated further, got the information that, you know, we need, but I wanted 21 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 23 of 36 him to hear -- you know their whole thing was they wanted to hear it from him - not only did I call him, I also text him and said I have him on the phone holding." BROWN also stated, "Well see, but I don't want to hear it on the other thing. So, I need to see tonight or tomorrow on the other piece because I did my part." BROWN explained to Person A that UCE-1 "is in the expedite pile so they are moving him as quickly through the process." 52. On the evening of December 20, 2012, and the morning of December 21, 2012, defendant BROWN sent text messages to UCE-1 inquiring about a time for a meeting. When UCE-1 asked BROWN whether there had been "[a]ny confirmation on the cbe," BROWN responded, had him on the phone 4 yesterday. Things moving. When am I seeing 53. On December 21, 2012, defendant BROWN and UCE-1 spoke by telephone. During the call, BROWN stated that when he had Employee A on the phone that BROWN had intended to initiate a "three-way" communication between BROWN, Employee A, and UCE-1 because Employee A "wanted to talk." When asked about Company M's status in the approval process, BROWN stated that Employee A was "moving it," and added the following: wanted him to tell you directly. He's moving it as quickly as he can. His team is working on it. I told him you all had some contracts, that you had -- not contracts -- but some teaming agreements and joint ventures ready to sign and you couldn't do it until you got that." BROWN added that Employee A was "trying to move it quickly for me and he wanted to kind of tell you that." BROWN stated that Employee A was doing "a whole lot' for me on this." In response, UCE-1 told BROWN that "the bargain, you know, is we get the paperwork and you just push it along, so we need a little more 22 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 24 of 36 confirmation if it's approved." BROWN stated that Employee A was "expediting" Company M's CBE application, Company was "way ahead of the curve" and "at the top of the pile" in terms of approval, and Employee A "has been bending over backwards for me." BROWN asked to meet with UCE-1 later that day or the next day for "a piece of the piece." 54. In a subsequent call between defendant BROWN and Person A on December 21, 2012, Person A explained that he had spoken with UCE-2, who wanted to see something additional for the "35 grand on the table," referring to the previous $35,000 that already had been paid to BROWN. In response, BROWN stated, "That's what I had worked out yesterday. I had it, I had the dude you know, I mean, these are important people, and there is certainly a way they can equate, but when people hire lobbyists to do stuff -- you know, this shit ain't -- no, it's not cheap to get people on top of the pile. I can't - you know, shit that's not my fault that's how the process works. The process is what it is, but they are way ahead of the curve. Way ahead! I mean, you probably could count on one hand how many. applicants get to talk to the Director -- and meet the Director." BROWN explained further, told him just a piece just another piece of a piece. I understand that they need to continue to parcel it ou BROWN's Continuing Efforts to Obtain a "Piece of the Piece" from Company 55. In additional text messages between defendant BROWN and UCE-1 between December 21, 2012, and January 2, 2013, BROWN attempted to schedule a meeting to receive an additional payment, which BROWN continued to refer to as "the piece of the' piece." BROWN offered to travel to Maryland to meet UCE-1 for the payment and, upon learning that UCE-1 was out of town, suggested that UCE-1 "go 2 a bank and wire it." In response, UCE-1 23 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 25 of 36 asked BROWN for "some affirmation from Employee or even one of his workers that this thing is going through." BROWN replied, tried 2 do that the other day with him on the phone." On January 2, 2013, BROWN's last day in office as a D.C. Councilmember, UCE-1 asked via text message whether BROWN had received an update from the BROWN responded, "Working on it. Need 2 56. On January 4, 2013, defendant BROWN sent a text message to UCE-1 asking, "What time we meeting 4 the piece of the Later that afternoon, BROWN called Employee A's cell phone, but the call was not answered and BROWN did not leave a voicemail. Within minutes following that attempted call, BROWN sent two text messages to UCE-1 stating, "What time we meeting 4 the piece of the piece[?] Call me. I have a[n] update." During a subsequent telephone conversation with UCE-1 on January 4, 2013, BROWN stated that he and Employee A "missed each other today." BROWN stated that he had' spoken with "one of Employee A's] folks" and that Company M's CBE application was "being expedited and kind of moving through the process pretty quickly." UCE-1 advised BROWN that the had scheduled a site visit for Company for Monday, January 7, 2013. In response, BROWN stated, "Oh good, that must have been from he and I missing each other 'cause he probably knew I was calling to check on your progress." During the call, BROWN instructed UCE-1, "you need to tell I need a piece of a piece, man." BROWN stated he had called Employee A "more than anybody else I've ever called for. I mean, I'm not going to be able call him on anybody else, ever in life.'' BROWN stated that he had been "moving you all through, trying to get you all through like I do for other folks," and added, "But I'm using all the capital up just for you guys." BROWN again reiterated his request for a "piece 24 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 26 of 36 of a piece" and stated further, mean, again, one thing has nothing to do with the other, but a piece for a piece would be great." 57. On January 7, 2013, the conducted a site visit as part of Company M's CBE application. 58. On January 9, 2013, defendant BROWN and UCE--1 spoke by telephone. During the call, UCE-1 told BROWN that the site visit had occurred on January 7, 2013. 59. On January 16, 2013, defendant BROWN and UCE-1 spoke by telephone. During the call, BROWN reiterated his request for "a piece of the piece" and stated, "You guys have had major movement now. You got the [site] visit, you're meeting contractors." UCE-1 told BROWN that UCE-1 and UCE-2 would pay BROWN the "whole thing at one time" once Company M's CBE application was approved. 60. On January 29, 2013, defendant BROWN and Person A spoke by telephone. During the call, BROWN stated that Company M's CBE application "should be close, but I can't . spend any more political capital. They're not really doing anything to help me do that." BROWN's Reguest for the Final Payment from Company 61. On March 9, 2013, defendant BROWN and Person A spoke by telephone. During the call, Person A told BROWN that BROWN's "political muscle must have paid off because was happy as shit." Person A asked BROWN, "does still owe you anything?" BROWN replied, "yes . . . . the answer is yes." Person A asked BROWN how much money still owed BROWN. BROWN said "the remainder, like 20." 62. Later that day on March 9, 2013, defendant BROWN sent a text message to UCE- 1 stating, "Call me." Later the same day, BROWN sent another text message to UCE-1 stating, 25 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 27 of 36 "Call me." UCE-I replied bygtext message that was out of town and could meet with BROWN on March 13 or 14, 2013. . 63. On March 10, 2013, defendant BROWN sent a text message to UCE-1 stating, "Can or have it delivered or sent on monday," i. March 11, 2013. UCE-I replied the same day, "That dude hates to wire money. He'll be in DC Thursday for a presentation we have for the business. I 'll talk to him about bringing a piece." BROWN replied less than two hours later, 64. Later that-evening on March 10, 2013, defendant BROWN and UCE-1 spoke by telephone. During the call, BROWN stated that he "heard you all got some good news." UCE-1 told BROWN that UCE-1 had talked to and "we are in good shape now." BROWN asked, "So piece of the piece or the whole piece?" UCE-1 stated that he would talk to UCE-2 and they "might be able to do the whole piece because, I mean, I think we are that good." UCE- 1 stated that UCE-2 would be in the District of Columbia on March 14, 2013. The following conversation ensued: BROWN: Sounds like the whole thing, doesn't it? UCE-1: Yeah, it sounds like the whole thing. So I'll talk -- BROWN: Right. UCE-1: We can do the whole thing. Is it -- BROWN: Alright. UCE-1: We were talking what, 15? BROWN: Um, pardon me? UCE-1: It was 15 left? 26 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 28 of 36 BROWN: It was 20 left. UCE-1: 20 left, okay. Alright, yeah, I'll talk to him. I don't think it's going to be an issue cause - BROWN: Okay. UCE-1: Based on the conversation. So, will you be able to meet Thursday? BROWN: Yeah, yeah you text me when and where and, and we'll figure it out. UCE-1: Cause we're ready now. So -- BROWN: I betwarp speed. UCE-1: Good. Good. That's good. I guess your calls and, uh, helped out. BROWN: Usually there's a 14, 14 month process. UCE-1 and BROWN agreed to meet on March 14, 2013. The Fifth and Final Cash Payment to BROWN from Company 65. On March 14, 2013, defendant BROWN met.UCE-1 and UCE-2 at a conference room in the Marriott Wardman Park hotel in Washington, D.C. During the meeting, BROWN accepted an additional payment of $15,000 in cash from UCE-2 as fulfillment of Company M's promise to pay $50,000 to BROWN for assistance in obtaining CBE approval and govemment contracting opportunities. UCE-2 told BROWN that UCE-2 "appreciated" BROWN's assistance, including the calls and introduction to Employee A, and explained further to BROWN, "You did your piece." The cash was in denominations of $100 bills and wrapped with a rubber band. 66. During the meeting, UCE-2 also paid BROWN a "bonus" of $5,000 cash for 27 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 29 of 36 BROWN's past official acts on behalf of Company and future influence if BROWN were re- elected to public office. UCE-2 told BROWN, "I'm going to give you another 5 -- and that's because you did it." UCE-2 explained further that BROWN would be paid a "little something extra" because "you did do what you were supposed to do." During the conversation, UCE-2 also discussed "doing more things together" if BROWN were re-elected to public office in the future, and explained further, see what you can do, -and I'd love to keep you in my comer." The $5000 cash was in denominations of $100 bills and wrapped with a rubber band. As a result, the total amount paid to BROWN by Company was $55,000. 67. During the meeting, BROWN placed the two cash payments ($15,000 and $5,000) in his lap. At the end of the meeting, law enforcement agents entered the room and announced their presence. As the agents were entering the room, BROWN placed the $20,000 in cash on the table in front of him. . 68. Company subsequently withdrew its CBE application from the consideration. AMENDED STATEMENT OF OTHER CONDUCT 69. Eugenia C. Harris ("Harris"), a resident of the District of Columbia, owned and controlled Details International, Inc. ("Details International"), a for-profit corporation registered in the District of Columbia. I 70. Co-Conspirator 1 was the sole owner of Company A and the majority owner of Company B, both of which were District of Columbia for-profit corporations. Defendant . BROWN knew Co-Conspirator 1 through family connections and mutual friends. 71. The District of Columbia Campaign Finance Reform and Conflict of Interest Act 28 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 30 of 36 of 1974, as amended, D.C. Code 1-1101.01 through 1-1151.06 (the Campaign Finance Reform Act"), regulated financial activity intended to influence the election of candidates for public office in the District of Columbia. The D.C. Campaign Finance Reform Act established limits on the amounts that individuals could contribute to an individual candidate's political campaign committees and also prohibited making a political contribution in the name of another person. Secret Funding for BROWN's Campaign for the Ward 4 Seat on the D.C. Council (2007) 72. In the Spring of 2007, defendant BROWN was an announced candidate in a special election for the Ward 4 seat on the D.C. Council. In or around that time, BROWN met with Co-Conspirator 1 at Co-Conspirator 1's office in the District of Columbia. The purpose of the meeting was for BROWN to seek a contribution from Co-Conspirator 1 to BROWN's political campaign committee for the Ward 4 seat. BROWN understood from his discussion with Co-Conspirator 1 during that meeting, and from similar discussions with Co-Conspiratorl during BROWN's candidacy for Mayor in 2005-06, that Co-Conspirator 1 would not contribute to BROWN's political campaign committee in a public marmer because certain business activities of Company A and Company required Co-Conspirator 1 to publicly support different candidates based on the contemporaneous political dynamics. During the meeting, Co- Conspirator I agreed to contribute to BROWN's political campaign committee for the Ward 4 seat, but not in a public manner. Instead, BROWN understood from the meeting that Co- Conspirator 1's contribution to BROWN's political campaign committee would be publicly disclosed as having been contributed in the name of another person. BROWN also understood from his discussion with Co-Conspirator 1 that Co-Conspirator 1's contribution to BROWN's 29 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 31 of 36 political campaign committee would exceed the limits on the amount that an individual could contribute to a political campaign committee. At the end of the meeting, Co-Conspirator I told BROWN that BROWN would hear from somebody to arrange Co-Conspirator l's contribution to BROWN's political campaign committee. 73. Following his meeting with Co-Conspirator 1, defendant BROWN was contacted by Harris on behalf of Co-Conspirator 1. BROWN and Harris discussed an arrangement whereby Co-Conspirator 1 would contribute to BROWN's political campaign committee, but not in the name of Co-Conspirator 1. As part of the arrangement, BROWN understood that the money to be contributed to BROWN's political campaign committee by Co-Conspirator 1 would exceed the limits on the amounts that individuals could contribute to BROWN's political campaign committee. Because Co-Conspirator 1 did not want Co-Conspirator I's name publicly associated with the contribution, and because the amount of Co-Conspirator 1's contribution would exceed the limits on individual contributions, BROWN agreed as part of the arrangement to mask the contribution from Co-Conspirator I as a campaign contribution directly from BROWN to his own political campaign committee. Unlike limits on individual contributions, the D.C. Campaign Finance Reform Act did not limit the amount that a candidate could contribute to his or her own political campaign committee, provided the candidate publicly disclosed the contribution. 74. As agreed between BROWN, Harris, and Co-Conspirator 1, Co-Conspirator 1 would provide money to Harris, who would then provide the money to BROWN. On or about April 26, 2007, and May 3, 2007, Harris sent two wire transfers of $10,000 to defendant BROWN's personal account. BROWN understood that the $20,000 from Harris originated from 30 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 32 of 36 Co-Conspirator 1. BROWN, in turn, contributed the funds to his political campaign committee. 75. Defendant BROWN subsequently caused his political campaign committee to file a form with the District of Columbia's Office of Campaign Finance (OCF Form 16) publicly disclosing that BROWN made an individual contribution of $25,000 to his political campaign committee on April 30, 2007, which BROWN knew disguised the fact that Co-Conspirator 1 was the source of a $20,000 contribution to BROWN's political campaign committee. 76. As part of the arrangement with Co-Conspirator 1 and Harris, BROWN signed a document that described the payments from Details Intemational to BROWN as a loan. BROWN understood that the document was a pretext intended to provide a legitimate, albeit misleading, basis for the payments from Details Intemational to BROWN. BROWN understood fi'om his discussions with Co-Conspirator 1 and Harris that, notwithstanding the document describing the payment as a loan, BROWN was not expected -- and BROWN did not intend -- to repay the money. Neither Co-Conspirator 1 nor Harris ever sought repayment of the money. 77. Defendant Brown was not successful in the election for the Ward 4 seat on the D.C. Council. Secret Funding for BROWN's Campaign for At-Large Member of the D.C. Council 12008) 78. After losing the election for the Ward 4 seat, defendant BROWN decided to enter the election for At-Large Member of the D.C. Council, which was scheduled to be held on November 4, 2008. BROWN met with Co-Conspirator A1 to discuss fundraising by Co- Conspirator 1 in support of BROWN's campaign for At-Large Member of the D.C. Council. Co- Conspirator I agreed to assist BROWN in raising funds for the campaign from donors. As with BROWN's earlier discussions with Co-Conspirator 1, BROWN understood from his discussion 31 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 33 of 36 with Co-Conspirator 1 during that meeting that Co-Conspirator 1 would not assist BROWN's political campaign committee in a public manner based on the contemporaneous political dynamics. During the meeting, Co-Conspirator I agreed to support BROWN's campaign by helping to solicit contributions, but not in a public manner. Thereafter, BROWN's principal campaign committee for At-Large Member of the D.C. Council, known as "Friends of Michael Brown," received campaign donations from individuals and entities 'associated with Co- Conspirator 1. 79. In or about October 2008, defendant BROWN's principal campaign committee experienced financial troubles, including at least one check returned for insufficient funds. As a result of those financial troubles, BROWN met with Co-Conspirator 1 and sought an in-kind contribution in excess of $100,000 from Co-Conspirator 1 to fund get out the vote efforts in support of and in coordination with BROWN's principal campaign committee. During the meeting, Co-Conspirator I discussed and agreed with BROWN to the following: Co- Conspirator 1 would contribute to BROWN's principal campaign committee, but not in a public manner; (ii) Co-Conspirator 1's contribution to BROWN's principal campaign committee would exceed the contribution limits for an individual contribution under the D.C. Campaign Finance Reform Act; and Harris, at Co-Conspirator 1's direction, would be in contact with BROWN to arrange Co-Conspirator l's in-kind contribution. BROWN understood from the discussion that Co-Conspirator 1's contribution would not be disclosed to OCF. 80. Following this meeting, at Co-Conspirator 1's direction, defendant BROWN met with Harris. During the meeting, BROWN shared with Harris a list of BROWN's expected campaign expenses for Harris to pay with funds from Co-Conspirator 1. 32 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 34 of.36 81. From in or about October 2008, until in or about November 2008, Co-Conspirator 1, together with Harris, and with defendant BROWN's knowledge, using fimds provided fi'om Co-Conspirator 1, did make and disburse in-kind contributions of more than $100,000 in coordination with and in support of BROWN's principal campaign committee. 82. For example, on or about October 29, 2008, at Co-Conspirator 1's direction, Harris caused Details Intemational to wire $35,000 to a vendor for services provided to defendant BROWN's principal campaign committee as an in-kind contribution in support of and in coordination with BROWN's principal campaign committee. 83. For example, on or about November 3, 2008, the day before the general election, at Co-Conspirator 1's direction, Harris caused Details Intemational to issue a check for $44,150 payable to defendant BROWN as a contribution in support of and in coordination with BROWN's principal campaign committee. On or about the same day, BROWN cashed the check and provided $39,850 in cash and a cashier's check in the amount of $4,300 to a campaign consultant to pay for GOTV efforts in support of and in coordination with BROWN's principal campaign committee. 84. On or about November 3, 2008, as well as on subsequent dates, by funding and concealing contributions in excess of those permitted under the D.C. Campaign Finance Reform Act in support of and in coordination with defendant BROWN's principal campaign committee, Co-Conspirator 1, Harris, and BROWN caused Friends of Michael Brown to file false and misleading OCF Forms 16 with OCF that misrepresented and concealed the in-kind contributions provided directly and indirectly by Co-Conspirator 1 and Harris in support of and in coordination with BROWN's principal campaign committee. 33 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 35 of 36 85. On or about November 4, 2008, defendant BROWN was elected an At-Large MICHAEL K. DAVID A. LAST ANTHONY D. SALER Assistant United States Attorneys 555 4th Street, N.W., Floor Washington, D.C. 20530 Member of the D.C. Council. 34 Case Document 25-3 Filed 02/07/14 Page 36 of 36 Defendant's Acceptance I have read this Amended Statement of the Offense and carefully reviewed every part of it with my attorneys. I am fully satisfied with the legal services provided by my attorneys in connection with this Amended Statement of the Offense and all matters relating to it. I fully understand this Amended Statement of the Offense and voluntarily agree to it. No threats haye been made to me, nor am I under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Amended Statement of the Offense fully. No agreements, promises, understandings, or representations have been made with, to, or for me other than those set forth above. 2-7-/7 Date BROWN Defense CounseI's Acknowledgment We are Michael A. Brown's attorneys. We have reviewed every part of this Amended Statement of the Offense with him. It accurately and completely sets forth the Amended Statement of the Offense agreed to by the defendant and the Office of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. z-'7-I'1 35