Gen.  (ret.)  Wesley  K.  Clark  and  Dr.  Phillip  A.  Karber  8  April  2014  INTERIM  REPORT  #1  (restricted  distribution  removed  15  April  2014)      Immediate  Improvements  Needed  in  Rapidly  Implementing  “Non-­Lethal”  US  Military  Assistance  for  Defense  of  Ukraine    BACKGROUND    A   joint   invite   from   the   Ukrainian   National   Security   Advisor   and   Senior   member   of  their   Parliament   for   help   in   assessing   their   situation   was   given   to   Gen.   (ret.)   Wesley  K.   Clark,   (former   NATO   Commander),   and   Dr.   Phillip   A.   Karber,   (former   Strategy  Advisor  to  Secretary  of  Defense  Weinberger).  With  travel  costs  covered  by  the  non-­‐profit  Potomac  Foundation  (an  organization  with  a  long  history  of  supporting  East  European   and   former   Soviet   Republic   training   for   NATO   membership),   Clark   and  Karber   traveled   to   Ukraine   to   undertake   a   joint   militarily   oriented,   non-­‐public  assessment,  and  do  so  on  a  non-­‐partisan  basis.    Clark   and   Karber   participated   in   35   meeting   with   senior   officials,   military  commanders   and   various   politicians;   with   Karber   visiting   front   line   formations   on  the  Northern,  Eastern  and  Southern  Fronts.      SUMMARY  OF  THE  SITUATION    Ukraine   is   facing   serious   military   threats   on   a   300   degree   arc   from   the   territories   of  Belorussia,   Russia,   occupied   Crimea,   the   Black   Sea   and   Transneister.   The   1,000   mile  long  front  is  three  times  the  frontier  Ukraine’s  modest  Armed  Forces  are  designed  to  handle.   Moreover,   decade-­‐long   corruption   has   left   their   Airforce   ill   equipped,  vulnerable   and   unready   for   modern   air   combat.   Russian   occupation   of   Crimea   has  virtually   destroyed   Ukraine’s   coastal   defense   from   the   south.   Threats   from  Transneister   as   well   as   Belarus’   hosting   of   Russian   forces   on   its   territory   further  divert   Ukrainian   political   attention   and   disperse   badly   needed   forces   to   the  Southwest  and  Northwest.    Over  the  last  week,  while  Clark  and  Karber  were  visiting,  they  were  able  to  witness  and   confirm   that   the   Ukrainian   Army   was   nearing   completion   of   the   largest  peacetime  mobilization  of  any  country  in  Western  or  Central  Europe  since  the  end  of  World  War  II.  As  their  forces  fall  into  position  and  are  able  to  tactically  prepare  defensive   positions   on   the   terrain,   their   ability   to   both   slow   down   a   potential  invasion   and   inflict   serious   casualties   on   an   aggressor   will   likewise   have   an  increasing  deterrent  value  as  well.            To  maximize  their  defense  potential,  Ukraine  will  need  to  acquire  additional  off-­‐the-­‐shelf  aircraft,  air  defenses  and  anti-­‐armor  systems  from  countries  with  compatible  equipment  –  specifically  NATO  members  who  have  common  equipment  such  as  Mig-­‐29,  T-­‐72  Tanks  and  Man  Portable  Air  Defense  and  Anti-­‐Tank  weapons.      However,   the   most   important   assistance   currently   needed   to   make   the   existing  Ukrainian  force  as  defensible  as  possible  in  the  current  crisis  (between  now  and  the  elections  of  25  May)  is  non-­‐lethal  equipment  from  the  US.  The  most  critical  of  this  non-­‐lethal  equipment  is:    n American   Body   Armor   capable   of   stopping   sniper   rounds   –   only   1   in   100  troops   in   the   Ukrainian   Army   are   equipped   with   any   type   of   Body   Armor,  based   on   evidence   that   Russian   snipers   and   agents   are   being   told   to   focus   on  shooting  officers  (similar  to  the  types  of  long-­‐range  assassination  evidenced  during  Maidan  by  Russian  trained  snipers).  What  little  Ukrainian  body  armor  available,  is  only  designed  for  smaller  caliber  lower  velocity  projectiles.  Given  that  Russian  troops  are  universally  equipped  with  high-­‐quality  body  armor,  it   is   both   militarily   untenable   and   political   ridiculous   to   deny   symmetrical  protection  to  the  victim  of  aggression.    n Night   Vision   Devices   are   a   critical   need   in   the   Ukrainian   Army.   Now   that  they   are   in   position,   their   key   facilities,   bridges   and   front   lines   are   under  continuing   threat   of   infiltration.   There   is   neither   the   time   nor   do   they   have  the   budget   to   quickly   outfit   critical   units   with   the   proper   Night   Vision  Devices.  Again,  this  is  a  technology  routinely  available  to  the  Russian  Army,  and   if   it   is   provocative,   then   that   provocation   needs   to   be   answered   with  symmetrical  response.    n Communications  Equipment,  given  the  extraordinarily  broad  front  that  the  Ukrainian  Army  is  operating  on,  covering  wide  areas  with  no  reserve  and  no  air   support   to   fill   in   the   gaps,   along   with   the   high   prospect   that   their   military  analog  communications  are  compromised  and  civilian  telecom  will  likely  be  taken   down   in   the   initial   hours   of   conflict,   they   need   immediate   delivery   of  Satellite   Radios.   Longer-­‐term,   it   is   unconscionable   that   the   seven   Ukrainian  Brigades   that   served   with   distinction   alongside   US   forces   in   Iraq   and  Afghanistan  (and  their  95th  Air  Mobile  Brigade  had  already  been  received  on  an  experimental  basis  the  Harris  distributed  digital  secure  communications)  should  not  be  continued  to  be  modernized  as  a  routine  effort  to  all  Ukrainian  Brigades  that  served  with  the  US.    n Aviation   Fuel   -­‐-­‐   Ukraine’s   weak   Air   Force   needs   to   be   flying   as   much   as  possible   –   to   detect   intruders,   to   cover   the   ground   forces   in   their   forward  deployment  and  to  provide  their  pilots  with  normal  levels  of  training.  The  US  ban  on  Aviation  Fuel  as  a  “Force  Multiplier”  is  blatantly  ridiculous  at  a  time  that   Russian   aircraft   and   UAV   are   routinely   flying   the   Ukrainian   border  within  minutes  of  their  targets.  Again,  to  respond  to  aggressive  provocation      is   not   “provocative”   –   indeed,   unanswered   it   incentives   continued  provocation.      BOTTOM  LINE    Independent   of   American   high-­‐level   policy   -­‐-­‐   implementation   of   US   non-­‐lethal  military  aid  is  seriously  flawed  and  needs  immediate  correction:    1).  A  confusing  “Force  Multiplier”  criteria  applying  a  ban  on  support  equipment  that  is  not  lethal  (neither  a  weapon  nor  ammunition)  needs  to  be  dropped  immediately.  This  “Force  Multiplier”  criterion  is  as  illogical  and  inconsistent  as  its  ban  is  harmful  to   getting   some   of   the   most   valuable   technology   and   support   equipment   that   the  Ukrainian  military  needs  most.      The  “Force  Multiplier”  criteria  needs  to  be  replaced  with  a  clear  and  unambiguous  distinction:   if   Lethal   Weapons   and   Ammunition   stay   banned,   everything   “non-­‐Lethal”   should   be   allowed   –   with   priority   on   Body   Armor,   Night   Vision,  Communications  and  Aviation  Fuel.      2).   Delivery   of   US   non-­‐lethal   military   aid   is   harmed   by   a   bureaucracy   that   is   not  operating  with  a  sense  of  urgency  or  implementing  leadership.  It  must  be  replaced  with   an   attitude   that   puts   a   priority   on   helping   Ukraine   ahead   of   a   narrow  preoccupation  with  administrative  procedure  and  institutional  budgets.      The  Administration  needs  to  immediately  appoint  a  high-­‐level  official  with  military  experience   and   a   “get   it   done”   attitude   –   armed   with   Presidential   Authority   to   cut  across  the  bureaucracy  and  insure  prioritization  and  timely  delivery  of  all  non-­‐lethal  military  assistance  it  is  possible  for  the  US  to  provide  to  Ukraine.    3).  The  current  Ukrainian  leadership  has  limited  professional  military  and  national  security   knowledge   –   they   have   an   interim   coalition   government   whose   leaders  have  virtually  no  professional  experience,  and  the  rapid  turnover  in  military  leaders  has  created  a  major  problem  in  their  senior  staff  as  well.  They  know  they  have  this  problem,  and  that  was  one  of  the  reasons  that  they  requested  the  assistance  of  Clark  and  Karber.      As   the   crisis   deepens,   Ukraine   needs   seasoned   professional   American   military   and  national  security  advice  to  assist  them  in  making  prudent  and  wise  decisions  –  if  this  cannot   be   provided   by   active   military   and   civilian   professionals   –   plans   should   be  made  to  bring  in  retired  senior  people  to  help.  If  the  Russians  can  publicly  announce  that  the  fugitive  Ukrainian  previous  President  is  an  Official  Advisor  to  Putin,  it  can  hardly   be   provocative   to   provide   low-­‐ley   non-­‐uniformed   advice   and   professional  situation  awareness  training.    NOTE:   This   interim   report   is   focused   on   fixing   Non-­‐Lethal   Aid.   We   will   offer  subsequent  thoughts  on  the  need  to  get  ready  for  a  Lethal  Aid  contingency.      APPENDIX:  Photos  from  the  Front  (taken  during  Dr.  Karber’s  visiting  troops  with  his  comments  added  15  April)    Ukraine military helicopters deadlined due to limited availability of aviation fueland lack of spare parts.    Only 1 in 100 Ukrainian soldiers have armored vests. Despite concern thatRussian snipers are targeting the officers, many of them are giving their personalarmored vests to female soldiers. Dr. Karber at the front line 300 yards fromRussian positions with female trooper wearing one of the rare armored vests.    Ukrainian troops guarding bridge on the Northern Front. Near here Russianinfiltrators were found to be scouting positions and bridges at night. Lack of NightVision Devices is a major vulnerability for troops guarding forward positions.  As of last week, US promised Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) had not reached theUkrainian troops at the Front. A territorial Army not designed for deployment farfrom their home bases, they depend on local farmers supplying food in ponycarts and civilian convoys from the cities dropping off boxes of groceries to thetroops in the field.      As of last week, US promised Sleeping Bags had not arrived in Ukraine. Troopsin the rain and mud at the front build fires to keep themselves warm and dry theirwet blankets. But the fires give away their positions to Russian snipers andinfiltrators.As of last week, US promised Diesel Fuel and not arrived at the front. LimitedUkrainian stocks of Diesel Fuel limit the amount of field training andmaneuverability of the armored and mechanized forces — such as this tankguarding the Eastern approaches to Kiev.    Ukrainian forces served in support of US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, includingelements of seven Brigades — 24th, 30th, 72nd, and 93rd Mechanized Brigadesand the 20th, 25th and 95th Airmobile Brigades. Last year the US supplied the95th Brigade with US command and digital communication equipment and theUkrainians were hoping to outfit the other units that had served with the US.However, under current “Force Multiplier” criteria, this type non-lethal aid wouldnow be prohibited – in essence punishing the victim.Ukrainian troops holding the causeway to Crimea are dug in, but in theseexposed positions they are very vulnerable to Russian snipers and artillery firewithout Armored Vests.    The Ukrainian Air Force is massively outnumbered and forward troops arehighly vulnerability to air strikes due to limited supply of Air Defense missiles.The  Ukrainian  Army  is  nearing  completion  of  the  largest  peacetime  mobilization  and  crisis  deployment  of  any  country  in  Western  or  Central  Europe  since  the  end  of  World  War  II.    Commanders  at  the  Front  believe  they  can  now  hold  for  up  to  two  weeks  against  a  determined  Russian  attack.  However,  due  to  slow  delivery  and  US  “Force  Multiplier”  restrictions  on  Non-­‐lethal  Aid  their  defenses  are  not  as  strong  as  they  could  be  and  poor  implementation  of  American  assistance  is  thus  serving  as  a  “Force  Divisor”  on  Ukrainian  defense  potential.