



Report on Diplomatic Security Organization and Management



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CONTENTS

Foreword	1
Purpose and Scope	2
Executive Summary	3
Chapter 1: Organization	7
Chapter 2: Management	15
Chapter 3: Training	26
APPENDICES	
Appendix A: Other Observations	29
Appendix B: List of Interviews and Meetings	31
Appendix C: Organizational Charts	34
Appendix D: Panel Members	37
Appendix E: Acronyms/Abbreviations	40

*Afghan President
Hamid Karzai is
protected by DS
security.*



Photos: U.S. Department of State

FOREWORD

The Department of State established this panel as a follow-up to the Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB). The panel's objective was to more closely evaluate the organization and management of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), including the creation of a new position of Deputy Assistant Secretary for High Threat Posts (DAS for HTPs)¹.

DS is a large and complex organization with security responsibilities for domestic personnel and those under Chief of Mission Authority stationed overseas.



A DS security engineer checks radiation-monitoring equipment at Embassy Tokyo following damage to a Japanese nuclear plant sustained in the April 2011 earthquake.

One Team – One Mission

The Bureau's "can do" response to challenges and its role in performing vital tasks in support of U.S. diplomacy and development is admirable. However, human and financial resources have limits, and the price of failure can be high. No estimate can capture the costs—human and financial—associated with inadequate planning and prioritization, poor coordination, or lack of management oversight and direction.

The complexity of the DS security mission has, at times, overwhelmed the ability of the Department as a whole to conduct coordinated operations in the most effective and efficient way. DS as an organization has not always been quick to adapt, or been innovative in dealing with overarching strategic foreign policy issues. The culture must be modified. The Bureau is part of a larger team, and must understand how it fits within that team. However, the programmatic side of the Department needs to accept its role in ensuring security for personnel and facilities. Making hard decisions, which may put lives at risk, requires a better, corporate decision-making process.

Delay and denial are not options. There will be a next Nairobi, or a Benghazi, and DS and its Department partners must do everything to be ready. Lives are at stake.

¹ For purposes of this report, all future discussions related to High Risk Posts and High Threat Posts will be combined and referred to simply as High Threat Posts (HTP).

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The Department of State must improve its organizational approach to security, including the ways in which security-related information is obtained, disseminated, and coordinated across the Department, so as to maximize the safety and security of all employees.



As a result of the attacks on the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi, Libya on September 11-12, 2012, which resulted in the killing and wounding of U.S. government personnel, the Secretary of State convened an ARB to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding this event.

These attacks, along with other recent violence directed against U.S. missions, again highlight that employees of the Department often operate in dangerous environments where risk is common and must be carefully managed. Key components of risk mitigation include effective physical security and the ability for

DS provides protection at major events worldwide.

personnel at all levels to make informed and timely decisions. Execution of these responsibilities cannot be based on vagaries of personality or a particular leadership style, but rather must be rooted in well-defined policies and procedures that are understood and practiced by all.

The purpose of this report is not to duplicate the findings and recommendations of the ARB. It does not report on the climate that may have precipitated the attacks, nor on any of the specific on-site details of this tragic incident. These have all been thoroughly documented in the ARB report.

Rather, the objective and scope of this report—recognizing that there may be some overlap with other ARB recommendations—is to focus and expand on the following single ARB recommendation²:

The [Benghazi ARB] recommends that the Department re-examine DS organization and management with a particular emphasis on span of control for security and policy planning for all overseas U.S. diplomatic facilities. In this context, the recent creation of a new Diplomatic Security Deputy Assistant Secretary for High Threat Posts could be a positive first step if integrated into a sound strategy for DS reorganization.

² Benghazi ARB Recommendation #2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is a large, multifaceted organization, responsible for providing a safe and secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. For more than 80 years, DS and its predecessor organizations have met this challenge even as the security environment has become more complex and dangerous.

Despite the many fine accomplishments of DS personnel and the organization as a whole, there is always room for improvement, which leads to the question—**is DS organized and managed in such a way that enables it to provide the best possible support to the Department of State?**

The panel does support some reorganization to improve the way DS operates, including issues related to span of control, the creation of the new DAS (HTP), and the need to better focus leadership on certain critical missions. We also noted some management functions DS should review. The majority of concerns addressed by this panel relate to management and coordination.

During the panel's interviews and research, problems relating to how DS supports the Department were repeatedly raised. Of these issues, a number do not lend themselves to formal findings and recommendations. Many are subtle, but collectively contribute to the observations outlined in Appendix A.

The panel did not consider isolated points of contention or criticism, but rather only those general observations that were raised multiple times. The first, and probably the most troubling to the panel, was the impression that DS personnel do not think of their organization as an integrated partner with others in the Department. They instead see themselves as a law enforcement organization with loyalty first and foremost to DS, rather than to the Department. Some of those interviewed believe this to be a cultural issue that has led to fragmentation within both the Department and DS.

Contributing to the feeling of isolation by both DS and other bureaus is that DS functions are "stovepiped". There is a lack of sharing information both within DS and with other offices. Some of this is attributed to "law enforcement sensitive" issues, but other security information that enhances understanding, cooperation, and coordination should be widely disseminated in a timely way. The panel hopes newly instituted regional bureau attendance at the DS daily threat briefings, and DS attendance at regional bureau meetings, will begin to alleviate this concern.

The panel also identified other impediments to effective and efficient management within DS. Excessive document clearance processes, a lack of adequate empowerment for decision-making, poor up-and-down communication, and an ineffective use of bureau-wide strategic planning processes to assess results, successes, and failures at the program level were cited as the most significant problems.

Another area of concern is related to DS morale. Whether this is a general feeling that has built up as a result of multiple factors (leadership, assignments, funding, etc.) or influenced primarily by the recent personnel actions taken against senior DS leadership is not clear. There are, however, many in DS who feel they were made the scapegoat. The panel believes that contributing to this feeling is the lack of information that has been shared with the general DS community, including the closely-held Benghazi ARB report.

Several of those interviewed believed that the next "security crisis" may result in other DS personnel being singled out for punishment, and concern that the current climate, if continued, may well result in increased DS resignations. Many also noted that recent developments will likely lead to greater risk aversion rather than careful management of the risk. As the Benghazi ARB and other previous studies noted, the Department lacks a workable and effective structure to "corporately" manage and accept risk that cannot be mitigated. Department operations in an increasing number of non-permissive environments are particularly in need of a well-structured and resourced risk management process.

Finally, a difficulty experienced across the Department is funding personnel increases. Following the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, the foreign affairs agencies were reduced 30% in personnel and resources. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, military and intelligence capabilities were rapidly reconstituted while diplomatic capabilities were not. By 2008, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) were seriously hobbled by a human capital crisis: a 15% vacancy rate in existing positions and a lack of any viable "training float".

"If we can make the small, smart investments up front, we can avoid much more costly conflicts and burdens down the road."

ALJAZEERA
Secretary John F. Kerry

As the world has become more dangerous, DS has had to take on additional missions and responsibilities that have outpaced even their resource increases of the past decade. Responding to these various demands often requires taking critical resources from a primary security function and allocating them to necessary, but less urgent work, not necessarily related to the primary goal of protecting the men and women under Chief of Mission authority. It also meant that because of other tasks and priorities, personnel were often not available for critical training.

For 2014, the Department has requested \$4.4 billion for worldwide security protection and improved overseas infrastructure. If approved by the Congress, this should help alleviate some of the difficulties being experienced by DS in providing much needed support to the Department.

KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ORGANIZATION

- The DS Assistant Secretary (A/S) and the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (PDAS) must operate in an organizational structure that promotes coordination and reasoned decision-making. To assist, the panel suggests the following organizational changes:
 - The following should report to the A/S:
 - DAS for HTPs;
 - Executive Office;
 - Threat Analysis functions in Threat Investigations and Analysis (TIA).
 - Create an Office of Strategic Planning reporting to the A/S;
 - Adopt DAS titles for Domestic Operations (DO), Training (T), and TIA;
 - Create a Chief of Staff position reporting to the PDAS;
 - Remove the Office of Foreign Missions from DS, and have the office report directly to the Under Secretary for Management.
- There is a recognized need for more focus on High Threat Posts. While this panel supports the ongoing initiative to create a DAS for HTPs, we do not support the structure/internal organization of the proposed HTP office. In addition to creating duplication and inefficiencies, the panel questions whether this narrow focus will lead to less attention being given to real and potential threats at many other posts.

MANAGEMENT

- DS should reflect priorities in its allocation of manpower and other resources. DS must: 1) undertake a comprehensive review of DS personnel allocations, both domestically and overseas; 2) identify domestic positions and functions most critical to accomplishment of its overseas protection mission; and, 3) develop a greater capability to respond quickly to short-term overseas personnel requirements.
- Working relationships and coordination between DS and other bureaus and agencies require attention. The Department must: 1) undertake a detailed review of the security implications of the Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) embassy design approach (“Design Excellence”); 2) institute a program to cross-assign mid-career officers between DS and each regional bureau; and, 3) continuously emphasize the importance of establishing and maintaining regular dialogue between bureaus and other agencies.

- Coordination between the Department's Operations Center (OPS) and the DS Command Center (DSCC) does not function in a seamless way. The Department must: 1) ensure video received by DSCC is made readily available to the State Operations Center; 2) assign DS agents to OPS on a full time (24/7) basis; and, 3) develop standard operating procedures that define the processes and parameters for sharing information between OPS and DSCC on a timely basis.
- The Department needs a structured "corporate" process to make risk-managed assessments and decisions involving operations in high-threat locations. The process needs to include a clear-eyed assessment of the mission and its priority, security mitigation measures, cost, and risk. There must be commitment of sufficient resources to fund the mission and to mitigate risk. There must be an explicit acceptance of risks that cannot/are not mitigated. These very important processes are currently performed, often piecemeal, by the Department on an ad hoc basis.

TRAINING

- DS personnel must have a thorough understanding of Department operations and the role of DS as a full participant in the diplomatic/foreign policy mission. The Department must define and train all personnel in DS's roles and responsibilities in the overall conduct of foreign policy; the way DS interfaces with other bureaus must be reinforced at every level.
- DS training is conducted at 19 separate, widely dispersed locations, leading to fragmented and inefficient use of scarce resources. In order to effectively and efficiently train personnel and meet expanded Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) training requirements, the Department needs to establish a single, conveniently located, dedicated training center with appropriate facilities for conducting high-threat courses.



A DS Antiterrorism Assistance program instructor (right) assists a woman Afghan National Police officer during weapons training at a facility in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER ONE: ORGANIZATION

INTRODUCTION

The current DS structure tends to make the primary role of the Assistant Secretary a “manage up” role, working with Department principals, the Intelligence Community, and other organizations on high-level policy issues and decisions that cut across the Department.

The downside to this organizational structure is that the Assistant Secretary has no formal role in the “manage down” part of the equation, relinquishing day-to-day management of DS personnel, resources, and policy to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (PDAS).

While the above approach can and has worked in the past, it depends heavily on the presence of an experienced, well-rounded PDAS with strong leadership qualities. Recent DS experience, in which six people have held the PDAS position over the last six years has – in the panel’s opinion, served to weaken the current structure. This has resulted in a sometimes muddled sense of priorities within DS and a tendency to foster stovepipes in the organization. This is not intended as a criticism of any individual PDAS, but rather recognition that there is a steep learning curve for anyone filling that role. Neither the PDAS nor the organization is well-served by the constant turnover in that position.

The panel believes these internal DS problems can be somewhat mitigated by giving the Assistant Secretary responsibility for certain cross-cutting policy, resource, and strategic security roles, while continuing to keep much of the daily management responsibilities under the aegis of the PDAS. This proposed solution would require support from existing and proposed *additional* DAS positions, and establishment of a GS-15 Chief of Staff position under the PDAS.

The purpose of these recommendations is to give the Assistant Secretary a global view of his/her resources, provide a mechanism for strategic planning, and provide the ability to pinpoint threats and resource shortfalls before they become a crisis.

Note on this chapter’s structure: The panel’s observations on DS organization are divided into two sections: the panel’s recommendations on which directorates and offices should report directly to the Assistant Secretary, and which should report to the PDAS.

Direct Reports to Assistant Secretary

- DAS for High Threat Posts
- Executive Office
- Strategic Planning Office
- Threat Investigations and Analysis (TIA): *Direct report to Assistant Secretary for threat analysis.*

Suggested removal from DS organization:

- Office of Foreign Missions

DAS for High Threat Posts

Finding: In the aftermath of the Benghazi attack, the Department established a DAS for HTPs within DS. The position was created to ensure a high-level, laser-like focus on security at the Department's most threatened posts. **Creating a DAS for current and emerging HTPs will have a positive impact; however, the panel does not agree with the current approach.**

DS is considering a model that will divide the current International Programs (IP) office into two elements: 1) HTPs and 2) all other posts. In the panel's view this approach results in duplication of efforts, inefficiencies, and new stovepipes. It could also lead to lapses in service as posts are shifted periodically either into or out of the HTP category. This approach also does not acknowledge the increased attention needed for posts experiencing threats in other categories. For example, the crime threat in some locations presents individual risk that may be equal to or even greater than the risks at HTPs. This arrangement could also lead to decreased focus on posts with a perceived lower threat category, which could be dangerous, as those who would do America harm may be more likely to attack a softer target. Therefore, the panel recommends a different approach that will not duplicate or replace the functions of the IP office.

Recommendation 1: The panel recommends that DS create a lean and agile office of relatively senior staff with a broad range of experience, led by an FE-MC DAS and an FE-OC Deputy who report directly to the A/S for DS.

Unlike the more traditional organizational structures, which can easily become stovepipes, this unit should be able to respond quickly and mobilize staff and resources to address the wide range of threats anywhere in the world, from those of a short-term nature, such as an election in an unstable nation, to threats that may last years. The HTP office would be the DS interface with both the recently established "High Threat Review Board" and Mission Emergency Action Committees (EAC) in the affected posts. The DAS for HTP would serve as the DS representative at high-level DOD/DOS discussions regarding implementation of "new normal" procedures.



DS Assistant Regional Security Officers study the terrain of southern Kabul two days before Afghanistan's parliamentary election. They are part of an airborne quick reaction force ensuring safe transport of election monitors to voting stations.

The HTP office would have multiple functions including, but not necessarily limited to:

- Serving as the coordinator within DS for all DS support activities provided to HTPs;
- Developing new strategies, practices, and procedures that could be deployed at HTPs operating in non-permissive environments;
- Reviewing and evaluating the threat level and potential risk at any proposed new post location;
- Planning for situations such as the "Expeditionary Diplomatic Missions." A current example is reestablishing a presence in Syria. The HTP office would ensure that all appropriate threat mitigation measures (including equipment and personnel) are factored into planning and that, once established, new facilities are fully supported according to the plan. The office would also liaise with offices and external organizations, such as DOD and USAID;
- Serving as the focal point in DS, ensuring that all risks and/or threats are considered and weighed when making decisions on how to proceed, recognizing that, at times, certain risks must be taken;
- Coordinating closely with IP;
- Working closely with TIA, as well as the Intelligence Community, to develop more effective ways, such as use of social media, to assess threat trends and indicators at posts and regions;
- In coordination with TIA, bringing the trend analysis of this material to the attention of the DS A/S, other DS offices, relevant regional A/S and Chiefs of Mission (COM);
- Assessing the threat versus benefit of maintaining a presence or recognizing at what level a particular HTP should be staffed, and make recommendations accordingly with the relevant regional A/S and COM to Department principals;
- Ensuring that relevant DS organizations are aware of and responding to the perceived threat at a particular HTP post with appropriate personnel and resources;
- Ensuring that the situations at HTPs are continually monitored as long as the post is considered an HTP; attention should be given to whether there has been a change in the type, scope, or strength of the threat, which may necessitate changes in determining the best response to mitigate the threat and ensuring that applicable measures are consistently delivered;
- Coordinating with DS/T and FSI regarding specialized training requirements for HTPs.

In order to accomplish these tasks, the DAS for HTP must have:

- Unfettered access to appropriate senior managers;
- The ability to "borrow" additional personnel from across DS during periods of unusually high activity, surges, or crises;

- A database (dashboard) that would allow immediate and up-to-date access to data on availability of equipment and personnel worldwide (including skills and prior training and experience of the individuals);
- This office would serve as the primary DS representative in any corporate Risk Management structures established by the Department.

Like any organizational structure, the office of the DAS for HTP should be reviewed periodically to determine if it is accomplishing its mission and to assess whether the nature of threats have changed, which may require a corresponding change in the strategy being employed.

Executive Office

Finding: The Office of the Executive Director (DS/EX) has an important role in developing program plans, policies, budget and human resources planning, and tracking resources. As such, DS/EX is in a unique position to assist the Assistant Secretary in developing organizational priorities and ensuring that resources are available to meet those priorities. Moving DS/EX to report to the Assistant Secretary will provide a more “honest broker” role amongst competing resource priorities of the various directorates in DS.

Recommendation 2: The panel recommends that DS/EX report directly to the Assistant Secretary.

Strategic Planning Office

Finding: In the Department’s response to Benghazi ARB recommendations, the former Secretary of State called for Congress to work with the Department on several issues. One of those was to mandate that the State Department conduct the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) every four years, given its utility as a resource for **Department and Congressional planning**. Despite this reference to planning, the QDDR does not address DS needs and management challenges or how DS exercises authority.

In the panel’s view, DS, and the Department as a whole, do not place adequate emphasis on long-term strategic planning. One of the key measures of the success of any organization is how efficiently it plans its operational duties and how well it evaluates its ongoing performance. Plans written in the abstract without an assessment of how well an organization is meeting its priorities are not useful. Successful organizations need to continually assess how well they are doing, what they are not doing well, and what interferes with doing well. In order to predict what organizations must do to improve performance, they must first measure performance and review if priorities are in the right place. Organizations must also anticipate how to manage emerging issues.

Inattention to strategic planning can lead to undermining U.S. diplomatic and development success.

Several factors make this level of planning very difficult for DS: 1) Over the last ten years, DS has undertaken new responsibilities, and as a result, the organization has seen tremendous growth in its workforce and budget; however, the increased responsibility still has outpaced growth; 2) DS has multiple competing offices with self-interests, each in its own judgment more important than others, constantly vying for resources; and, 3) DS lacks a formal method of allocating its workforce to ensure the highest priorities are met.

While the QDDR could be a good planning tool, it does not address the level of detail DS needs to truly assess its performance, plan its improvements, and plan for the future. DS needs to undertake in-depth strategic planning to better ensure that the security needs of the Department today, and in the future, are being met.

For a bureau that is often by necessity reactive, planning could lead to a proactive outlook receptive to innovation as well as an overall vision that will allow the organization to execute missions in a unified way. Planning discloses strengths and weaknesses and enables leadership to make the best decisions possible.

Recommendation 3: The panel recommends that a dedicated DS strategic planning office with senior leadership be established and report to the Assistant Secretary. This office should perform bureau-wide assessments to determine:

- Are delegations of authority at the right level or do they force decisions into stovepipes?
- Are all of the functions the bureau is performing still required, are too many resources being used on low-priority activities that could be reduced or eliminated, and should some functions be combined to eliminate redundancy?
- Are bureau priorities clearly articulated and communicated to those on the ground doing work?
- Does DS have adequate resources to do the job? Are the available resources focused on the right things?
- Are the current skills of the workforce sufficient for today? What about tomorrow?
- What emerging trends in technology, threats, or possibilities need to be anticipated and planned for?
- Do the priorities of DS support the priorities of the Department?
- Is DS communicating with the Department effectively to maximize security?

DS employee helps a U.S. citizen fill out forms for an emergency evacuation out of Cairo in 2011.



Threat Investigations and Analysis

Benghazi ARB recommendation 22 stated "The DS Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis (TIA) should report directly to the DS Assistant Secretary and directly supply threat analysis to all DS components, regional Assistant Secretaries and Chiefs of Mission in order to get key security related threat information into the right hands more rapidly." In its response, the Department has indicated that it has created a dual-reporting chain for the Assistant Director for Threat Analysis and Investigations. In this scenario the DAS reports to the A/S on all matters related to reporting threat analysis, but reports to the PDAS on all other items. **The panel concurs with the Department's decision to create an indirect report between TIA and the DS A/S.**

Both the ARB and this panel noted the need for more focused and timely analytical products that pull together incidents, trends, threat reporting, and other information sources, and the ability to better tailor results specifically for operational security-related decision-making. To be effective, such an analysis would need to include knowledge, at the operational level, of defenses and protective measures in place, as well as a realistic understanding of their limitations.

In the run-up to the Benghazi attack, TIA did perform much of this function, sending reports to the field in April, June, and July 2012. These reports clearly articulated the declining situation, the rise of the militias, and a litany of incidents and decreasing levels of predictability regarding the situation. To better enhance its capability, TIA was recently authorized to hire and deploy nine analysts overseas to establish the strategic/tactical coordination of intelligence necessary to support Regional Security Officer (RSO)/COM risk mitigation operations. Diplomatic Security's goal is to expand this program, as necessary, as expertise is developed. The panel is very supportive of this initiative, and hopes this enhanced threat/risk assessment capability will lead to more informed decision-making by both the Department and overseas posts.

***Inadequate follow-through by senior leadership
is a recipe for failure.***

Office of Foreign Missions

Finding: The panel assessed the placement and functioning of the Office of Foreign Missions (OFM). OFM was moved from the Bureau of Administration (A) into DS in 1996 when the incumbent OFM Director was asked to also assume the Assistant Secretary position in DS. Generally speaking, OFM seems to function well within DS, requiring minimal attention from the Assistant Secretary for DS, who also carries the title of Ambassador, Director of OFM. However, a number of reciprocity issues have arisen over the years which lie outside the purview of the DS Assistant Secretary/OFM Director. These incidents require independent action by the Under Secretary for Management. Such issues include but are not limited to reciprocal issues on banking, property ownership and management, telecommunications frequency assignments, the Affordable Health Care Act, parking infractions in major U.S. cities such as New York and Washington, zoning restrictions, employment issues, and new foreign embassy/consulate construction. Furthermore, the dual-hatting of the DS Assistant Secretary may diffuse his/her focus from running such a large, high-visible bureau that is critical to overseas and domestic operations.

Recommendation 4: The panel recommends the Office of Foreign Missions be removed from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and placed directly under the Under Secretary for Management.

Direct Reports to Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (PDAS)

- Diplomatic Security Service (DSS)
- Countermeasures (C)
- Domestic Operations (DO)
- International Programs (IP)
- Security Infrastructure (SI)
- Threat Investigations and Analysis (TIA): Everything except threat analysis, which reports to the Assistant Secretary.
- Training (T)
- Public Affairs

Assign Deputy Assistant Secretary Titles to Equivalent Positions:

- Domestic Operations (DO)
- Training (T)
- Threat Investigations and Analysis (TIA)

- Proposed Chief of Staff (GS-15)

Assign DAS Titles to Domestic Operations, Training, and Threat Investigations and Analysis Directorates

Finding: The panel believes that the scope of responsibilities and the amount of resources and personnel assigned to these offices should easily satisfy the requirements for creation of DAS positions. The title of Assistant Director (DAS equivalent), which carries weight in the law enforcement community, has little standing in the Foreign Service and can sometimes confuse other Department employees. Converting these directorates to DAS positions will provide the recognition senior DS officers require, while helping dispel the notion that DS is different and wants to be set apart from the Foreign Service.

A DS special agent protects Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair.



The panel was struck by the contrast with almost yearly revolving PDAS and DS/T positions while certain other DAS and Assistant Director positions were filled for long periods of time by the same person. We feel neither of these situations is optimum and that as a matter of policy, DS should rotate DAS's to other DAS positions on a regular basis. While such rotations would be disruptive in the short term, we believe DS would benefit by getting more well-rounded leaders and gaining more ability to cut across stovepipes as the DAS's would have a greater appreciation for the problems and issues faced by other directorates.

Recommendation 5: The panel recommends assigning DAS titles to these equivalent positions: Assistant Directors for Domestic Operations (DO), Training (T), and Threat Investigations and Analysis (TIA).

Recommendation 6: The panel recommends that the Department and DS consider rotating DS senior officers to other senior positions within the Department and DS on a 3 or 4 year basis.

Chief of Staff Position (GS-15)

Finding: The panel believes that the rapid turnover in the PDAS position has led to continuity problems. Given the grade, experience, and proximity to retirement age of those that are likely to be assigned to this position, it is not surprising that some former incumbents have chosen to retire and accept positions outside the government. This has contributed to rapid turnover. For DS and its customers to be best served, there should be more continuity in the immediate office of the PDAS.

Recommendation 7: The panel recommends that DS establish a Chief of Staff position at the GS-15 level in the immediate office of the PDAS to ensure continuity. This could be done by either assigning a new position to that office or by elevating the responsibilities and rank of one of the existing Special Assistant positions.



Analysts at DS's state-of-the-art Foreign Affairs Cybersecurity Center in suburban Washington, D.C. monitor suspicious cyber incidents on the State Department's IT network.

CHAPTER TWO: MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

DS administers a remarkable array of programs focused on the global protection of people, information, and facilities. To accomplish its mission, DS personnel perform a wide variety of investigative, law enforcement, dignitary protection, liaison, security, analysis, administrative, and security related functions. The DS U.S. citizen direct-hire and contract work force is in excess of 5,200 personnel, operating in over 30 U.S. cities and at all of the Department's overseas posts. In addition, DS supervises over 35,000 overseas and domestic guards. DS is a complex, diversified, and large enterprise that is also seriously stovepiped with many competing priorities.

DS security engineering officer and two security technical specialists survey technical security equipment.



Core Mission and Personnel

Finding: DS must not lose focus on its most critical core mission: the protection of overseas personnel and operations. This mantra needs to be clearly understood and continuously voiced by DS leadership. It is not the intent of this panel to suggest that other DS responsibilities are not important, but to highlight that the protection of overseas personnel and operations is the function by which DS will be measured. DS should reflect this priority in its allocation of manpower and resources, training, assignment, and promotion of employees.

The Benghazi ARB endorsed the Department's request for increased DS personnel and Mobile Security Deployment (MSD) teams; recommended permanent change of station (PCS) and longer temporary duty (TDY) tours to high threat posts for DS officers; recommended increasing language training; and RSO and high threat training levels for a wider number of DS agents. The panel supports these recommendations but notes that the new hires, even if approved and

funded, will not fill the immediate need of "sending more experienced officers....to high risk, high threat locations."³ On the contrary, new training requirements and requirements for increased agent experience more than likely will decrease the available pool for this type of assignment. A significant challenge for the new DS Assistant Secretary and his/her management team will be to correctly prioritize DS personnel resources in order to fulfill the DS core responsibility of protecting lives, property, and information in the overseas environment.

Recommendation 8: The panel recommends that the new DS management team undertake a comprehensive review of DS personnel allocation both domestically and abroad. The review should include prioritizing positions to ensure that those supporting vital overseas operations are filled on a timely basis by experienced officers, even if a lower priority position goes unfilled due to training requirements or lack of personnel. In furtherance of this goal, DS should be given greater latitude to make directed assignments, if necessary, to fill these critical staffing needs.

Recommendation 9: It is essential that DS develop a greater capability to respond rapidly and robustly to short-term overseas personnel requirements. It is also important that vital support structures in IP and other offices be identified and "fenced off" to some degree, from other demands such as protective detail assignments. The current ad hoc approach to staffing short-term and temporary positions is not sustainable in an organization of the size and operational tempo of DS. The panel recommends that DS establish and enforce a formal method of identifying and rapidly deploying short-term personnel overseas when required and identifying which high-priority domestic positions should not be subject to regular TDY rotations. The panel noted that such a method, the *Integrated Threat Response* (ITR), has been proposed but not yet adopted within DS. We recommend that the ITR or something similar be established as soon as possible.

Recommendation 10: The increased training requirements noted in the ARB report, while needed and justified, will only serve to exacerbate the existing problem faced by DS managers who are not able to replace personnel attending their required training. This practice means that a full-functioning office on paper may actually be 25-50 percent below strength in practice. The panel recommends that the Department implement a "Training Float" for DS, which would provide greater flexibility for the organization to meet its overseas priorities.

Recommendation 11: The panel recommends that DS expand and improve its "DS Life" database, which is intended to provide up-to-date status/readiness/availability reports of DS agent personnel. With targeted improvements, DS Life could become an important decision tool for DS managers, incorporating information on agent availability for temporary deployment, level of training, medical limitations, and experience. DS should also ensure that decision makers have ready access to databases containing up-to-date inventories of relevant security equipment/hardware that could be deployed/reallocated as needed.

Organizational and management changes cannot be ad hoc, but rather, must be institutionalized in policy, procedures, and regulations so that they become the standard.

³ Bengtuzzi Accountability Review Report, December 19, 2013.

DS Culture and Isolation

Finding: A recurring theme in panel interviews with both DS and other Department personnel is the sense that DS is becoming increasingly isolated from the overseas-oriented culture of the Department and more focused on its law enforcement and para-military functions. As a result, DS personnel do not fully understand what the rest of the Department is doing and why, and others in the Department do not truly understand the range of roles for which DS is responsible.

This trend is hardly surprising given Diplomatic Security's rapid expansion in the past decade while building, literally from scratch, very robust security infrastructures for Department operations in not one, but two war zones, and supporting diplomacy in dozens of non-permissive "hot spots" around the globe. DS has simultaneously experienced an increased demand on its domestic criminal investigative and dignitary protection programs, neither of which has high visibility within the Foreign Service.

DS has not institutionalized its role within the Foreign Service culture.

These expanded operational imperatives have served to distort the traditional DS career path, in which an officer would be considered "seasoned" after serving an initial field office tour, serving at headquarters, and then serving one or two tours overseas as an ARSO/RSO. That experience would normally provide DS officers with a global view of DS programs and their role in the Foreign Service. Now it is entirely possible for agents to serve their entire careers alternating between one-year overseas assignments to HTPs and U.S. assignments at field offices or in domestic protection. While these are important jobs, they provide few chances for agents to absorb or work within the Foreign Service culture and tend to encourage a narrow focus on law enforcement and personnel protection at the cost of a more global outlook. One-year overseas assignments are, by their nature, often narrow in scope of responsibility and provide little insight into how traditional embassies and security programs function. In the field offices, the law enforcement function is paramount; agents are rated on their investigative prowess and have little to no connection to the overseas components of DS. The panel notes that the isolation factor is evident even in DS headquarters, as physical separation from the Main State building contributes to the problem.

DS must also do a better job of establishing communication both vertically and horizontally, especially at the headquarters-level. Agents and managers alike have expressed concern that they are not consistently informed of important Department or bureau developments outside their own offices. Personnel have also noted the cumbersome and bureaucratic document clearance process for even routine correspondence and a lack of empowerment at the program manager level. These problems contribute to low morale and a tendency to stovepipe within the organization. The panel believes DS can and should do more to:

- Instill in mid- and entry-level agents the sense that DS is a *security* and a law enforcement agency, and that its primary function is the protection of life, property, and information in the overseas environment;
- Improve communication and cooperation, especially at the headquarters-level;
- Take active measures to empower program managers and eliminate stovepipes.

Recommendation 12: The panel recommends that the new DS management team revitalize and actively participate in the existing Diplomatic Security Planning Structure (DSPS). The DSPS provides a means to track, on a quarterly basis, program accomplishments against goals. Used properly, the panel believes DSPS will help the DS management team break down stovepipes, empower program managers at all levels of the organization, and recognize problems and information the A/S and PDAS might not otherwise see.

Recommendation 13: As guidance from senior levels in DS is essential for crafting the culture of the organization, the panel recommends that DS management seek more robust communication mechanisms with mid- and entry-level agents worldwide. Such mechanisms could include a more user friendly intranet website, increased use of the already established DS mentoring system, and regular, concerted efforts on the part of senior- and mid-level managers to meet informally with working agents and keep them informed of organizational developments. DS should review the “1CA initiative” (worldwide Consular Management tenets) and adopt any best practices they feel would be useful.

Recommendation 14: In terms of its relationship with the Department, a number of interlocutors cited the simple fact that Department ID badges don’t allow access to DS headquarters as a symptom of DS’s isolation. On investigation, the panel determined that this situation is, in part, caused by a technical limitation in the badge system, which excludes many annexes – not just DS, from automatic enrollment for lobby access. Nonetheless, the perception is real as is the damage it causes. The panel recommends that DS take advantage of the ongoing access system upgrade to review the current policy for access to annexes in order to bring it more closely in line with access policies for HST.



A locally hired embassy security guard inspects the undercarriage of an arriving vehicle at a security checkpoint at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad.

Risk Management

Finding: Threat-based interagency security standards developed by DS and administered by the Department and other agencies have generally worked well and in a transparent manner to mitigate risks at established and permissive environments. However, Department operations in many dangerous and non-permissive locations (such as in Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.), require difficult and resource-intensive “risk managed decisions” to customize security mitigation arrangements and identify risks that cannot be reasonably mitigated.

The U.S. government must weigh security risks against the need to conduct its diplomatic mission.

The QDDR conducted in 2010 states that the Department will establish “a new global standard for risk management, recognizing that in order for State and USAID to fulfill our missions today, a greater level of mitigated risk, commensurate with the expected benefits must be acceptable.” This resulted in a significant effort within the Department to develop risk management policy guidance for activities under COM authority. This initiative, led first by the Secretary’s Policy Planning Office (S/P) and then by the QDDR office in close coordination with DS, the regional bureaus, and others in the Department, had not reached consensus before the Benghazi attack occurred. However, no subsequent actions have been taken.

A key recommendation⁴ of the Benghazi ARB states that the Department should urgently review the proper balance between acceptable risk and expected outcomes in high risk, high threat areas. Prior studies have made similar observations. The Department, in its response to the ARB recommendation, noted the recent establishment of a “High Threat Post Review Board”. It appears, however, that this board’s focus will be limited to primarily being a mechanism for bi-annual and ad hoc reviews of staffing at HTPs. The ARB also called for the creation of “Support Cells” within the regional bureaus to focus on opening or reopening critical or HTPs. These support cells could provide a framework and a starting point for formalized risk management processes for new or reopening posts, but not for current HTPs.

Diplomatic Courier Expediter unload U.S. diplomatic pouches from a plane’s cargo hold at the Manama Regional Diplomatic Courier Hub in Bahrain.



⁴ Benghazi ARB Recommendation // I

Recommendation 15: The panel recommends the Department create a structured “corporate” process to make risk-managed assessments and decisions involving operations in high-threat locations. The process needs to include a clear-eyed assessment of the mission and its priority, security mitigation measures, cost, and risk, and accept the possibility that even with mitigation, there may be casualties. There must be commitment of sufficient resources to fund the mission and to mitigate risk. There must be an explicit acceptance of risks that cannot/are not reasonably mitigated due to operational imperatives, cost, or other factors. Decisions should be made by a transparent, formal process based on all available information. These very important processes are currently performed, often piecemeal, by the Department on an ad hoc basis.

U.S. diplomatic facilities rank as one of the most threatened class of buildings in the world.

DS Relationships with Other Bureaus and Agencies

The panel found several areas for improvement regarding DS relationships with Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), the regional bureaus, the State Department Operations Center (OPS), the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

DS Relationship with Overseas Buildings Operations

Finding: The panel agrees that U.S. facilities overseas should present a visually attractive representation of our country and the democratic ideals it stands for. The panel also understands the desire to have the buildings be more welcoming and to reflect the openness of American society. OBO is convinced its move from Standard Embassy Design (SED) to a new initiative – “Design Excellence” has widespread support. They also argue these will be better buildings and can be built with equal speed at a similar cost. However, from a DS standpoint, there are questions raised by these changes, and while the panel agrees that special consideration for posts in places like London and Paris are warranted, security concerns for many other posts deserve serious consideration.



A DS special agent surveys the crowd as Great Britain’s Duke and Duchess of Cambridge arrive at Los Angeles International Airport.

Below are observations noted by the panel:

- There is no evidence of a business case or cost benefit analysis supporting this new initiative;
- Despite schedule/cost assurances from OBO, there is concern that fewer facilities (embassies/consulates) can be built over the same time frame (leaving more personnel exposed in inadequate facilities for longer periods of time);
- Having unique designs for each facility requires more time for DS to review the designs and determine the necessary countermeasures; with DS already overloaded with tasks, the panel questions the advisability of requiring this extra time;
- As enemies find new ways to attack U.S. facilities, having multiple designs makes developing and deploying countermeasures more difficult;
- Having various building designs will cause confusion as personnel transfer between posts, requiring increased training; also, building maintenance personnel will face a steep learning curve as they deal with various types of building maintenance, management, and security technology, which may be significantly different from post-to-post.
- There will be a need to hire, train, and deploy additional skilled personnel to install and maintain non-standard and/or increasingly complex systems;
- Variations in design will require increased availability of non-standard items that require replacing (doors, windows, access barriers, etc.) particularly when a post must recover from a recent attack;
- There is also likely to be increased risk associated with constructing some facilities on smaller sites in urban areas to enhance accessibility.

Recommendation 16: The panel recommends the Department undertake a detailed review of the security implications in the new Overseas Buildings Operations design approach.

A DS Training Center controlled explosion during a DS agent training exercise.



DS Relationship with the Regional Bureaus

Finding: The Benghazi ARB recommended that a senior DS officer be assigned to each regional bureau and report to the regional Assistant Secretary⁵. The regional bureaus and DS agreed that there needed to be better coordination and communication, but did not believe that strictly adhering to the Benghazi ARB's recommendation was the only means to improvement. However, the panel sees merit in an exchange program between DS and the regional bureaus at the FS-02-03 level. Both DS and regional bureau personnel would gain a better understanding of roles and responsibilities across bureau lines and could facilitate communication and coordination. It is clear from the panel's review that many career officers in the regional bureaus have no real understanding of what occurs at DS headquarters.

The panel is also concerned about the role of the regional officers in DS International Programs (IP). To increase information flow about the overseas environment, the panel believes DS/IP needs to be appropriately staffed so they can provide a close and effective interface with the regional bureaus, to better coordinate the activities of all DS elements providing overseas support, and to act as a first contact to address problems or DS processes. In addition, the increased staff will allow DS IP regional directors to conduct more proactive RSO program reviews at post.

Poor coordination increases cost and diminishes mission success.

The panel found that the relationship between the IP regional directors and the regional bureaus has improved since the Benghazi ARB; however, the panel believes more can be done to maximize this relationship. The IP regional directors are crucial to security overseas, and as such, there should be constant, active communication and information exchange with the regional bureaus on a daily basis. The IP regional directors should be the point persons within DS who identify and resolve issues crossing internal office boundaries. IP should ensure that the regional bureaus are fully briefed on changing threats and how DS is mitigating such threats.

Many people the panel spoke to expressed concern about the "cultural gap" between DS and the rest of the Department. Such a gap is somewhat understandable given DS's physical separation and the fact that many DS functions, such as investigations and protection, do not have high visibility in the overseas foreign policy/security context. Nonetheless the panel concluded that increased efforts should be made to further break down cultural barriers between DS and the regional bureaus.

Recommendation 17: While frequent meetings between the regional bureaus and DS are useful, the long-term viability of these methods of coordination is questionable. Too often as crises fade from memory, and other imperatives assume importance, meeting frequency may wane along with attendance. If one accepts the fact that coordination of security issues is important, then continual exchange of information through these various formats is critical. The panel recommends that the Department initiate a program in which DS assigns mid-career officers to each of the regional bureaus to report to the Assistant Secretary. This individual will act as a conduit into DS for the bureau. Likewise, the panel recommends that the regional bureaus assign a mid-career officer to DS, to serve a similar coordinating function.

Recommendation 18: In addition to reviewing the viability of these exchanges on a regular basis, the panel recommends that the Assistant Secretaries (DS and the regional bureaus) assume responsibility to ensure that job descriptions, work requirements, and performance ratings are consistent

⁵ Benghazi ARB Recommendation #3

with these scheduled exchanges. This responsibility should be reinforced by the IP director soliciting and incorporating regional bureaus comments in IP regional director annual evaluation reports.

Recommendation 19: The panel recommends more proactive reviews of RSO programs/ performance rather than relying only on scheduled program reviews. IP should make use of experienced WAE personnel to assist with RSO program reviews.

Recommendation 20: The panel recommends that DS increase the size of the IP regional directors' staffs.

Recommendation 21: The panel noted that many of the DS Regional Director positions are currently filled by officers holding ranks below the established OC levels. Filling these important positions with officers at a commensurate level of expertise and experience is essential. The panel recommends that the new DS management team place a priority in filling these positions with at-grade personnel.

DS Relationship with the State Operations Center

Finding: Currently the State Operations Center (OPS) and the Diplomatic Security Command Center (DSCC) are physically separated: OPS is located at Main State and DSCC is located at SA-20 in Rosslyn, Virginia. The panel notes that both operations have unique duties and should remain separate.

However, steps should be taken to ensure better coordination and ensure that OPS and DSCC feel they are part of one team supporting the Department. Current technology can provide the tools to promote the sharing of information quickly in a time of crisis – a “virtual co-location” – but technology alone cannot be the solution. Technology is not a substitute for face-to-face communication.

The Department must be cautious of releasing information prior to confirmation of its accuracy; conflicting information obtained from different sources can lead to confusion or uninformed decisions.

The panel commends the work already being done by the DSCC and OPS to facilitate the integration and exchange of information through shift change calls and the current full-shift shadowing effort to develop a set of best practices for use in training newly-assigned personnel.

The Department must communicate operational information quickly and securely to guarantee the protection of employees, facilities, and operations worldwide.

Recommendation 22: The panel recognizes that the Department is working to make the live video feeds in the DSCC available to OPS, so that Department principals may have viewing access in real-time. The panel recommends that these enhancements be engineered as expeditiously as possible.

Recommendation 23: The panel recommends resuming the former practice of assigning DS security officers to OPS full time (24/7). Equally, the Department should consider assigning OPS personnel to the DSCC. This will further facilitate the exchange of information, as well as prevent any cultural miscommunications and improve coordination between the two organizations.

Recommendation 24: The panel recommends that standard operating procedures be developed to prevent the premature release of information that has not been verified and evaluated. Personnel in the DSCC and OPS should provide their counterparts with information explaining the origin and reliability of their spot reports, so that both organizations have the same understanding. Sensitive law enforcement information would be an exception to this procedure.

DS Relationship with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Finding: The Benghazi ARB called for a more robust mechanism⁶ to predict where threats are likely to develop, what types of new threats are emerging, and a more active effort to inform Department leadership of these threats. During the panel's discussion and review of TIA, the panel determined that TIA is anxious to proceed with all of these new requirements, but lacks true integration with the larger intelligence community, and relies on INR for access. The panel believes this lack of direct interaction with the larger intelligence community is a significant roadblock for TIA to operate appropriately. TIA analysts work with INR analysts; however, not being a full player with the intelligence community limits TIA's ability to ask questions, particularly in instances when answers are needed immediately. In addition, the panel believes TIA has insight that will frequently help others in the intelligence community to do their jobs better.

Recommendation 25: The panel recommends that the Department seek to have TIA designated as a member in full standing of the intelligence community.

DS Relationship with the U.S. Agency for International Development

Finding: While the panel did not have time to speak with every agency that operates overseas, the panel interviewed representatives from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to gain a sense of how DS relates to other agencies. The panel sought to understand if DS and USAID work well together and to determine if there had been any significant changes since the designation of HTPs. USAID has a variety of operations at all HTPs. The panel interviewed personnel who are frequently the first to arrive at new HTPs, people who had worked in several HTPs recently, and those who work regularly with DS.

The interviewees indicated they had not seen any significant change in DS since the creation of the HTP list. They indicated that they were not aware of the changes to the Interagency Security Assessment Team (ISAT) list of September 2012. They had not been asked for input on either the posts currently on the list or the selection criteria. While USAID senior management had met with senior managers in the Department and DS, and was assured the list and criteria would be shared, it has not yet been provided. USAID expressed concern that the Overseas Interagency Council on Threats is not aware of the new March 22 HTP list, particularly as it applies to Missions where all agencies are not collocated. USAID shared the panel's concern that non-terrorist type threats, such as crime, may not have been adequately considered. As an example, USAID mentioned that in Nairobi over the past eighteen weeks, there had been an average of almost one criminal act per week perpetrated against USAID employees, including the mission director. The mission director was abducted after her home was invaded and robbed.

USAID believes that DS views their personnel as a problem, as they often want greater freedom than others at post. USAID acknowledges this is true, but even as DS requests that USAID reduce the number

⁶ Benghazi ARB Recommendation #21

of visits to evaluate their programs, Congress is demanding USAID perform more direct oversight.

Only very recently has USAID been included in the planning for re-entering Syria, but they had not been informed of the alternative approaches being considered, even though USAID has personnel in neighboring countries, supervising programs assisting Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons and likely would be among the first to enter.

Understanding the missions and capabilities of others is crucial to organizational cooperation and effectiveness.

Recommendation 26: The panel recommends that the Department and DS reach out to USAID and other agencies to solicit their views, concerns, and priorities on the designation of HTPs. USAID personnel in Washington would like to brief RSOs on activities in country before they deploy to post; likewise, RSOs should regularly meet with the mission director when at post. The DAS for HTPs should regularly update USAID and other agencies operating overseas of threats and concerns.

Cyber Security and Information Resource Management

Finding: Cyber security is a significant twenty-first century challenge. Department computer networks are subject to daily penetration attempts by both foreign government intelligence agencies as well as private individuals. The Bureau of Information Resource Management (IRM) has developed robust distributed unclassified and classified networks that efficiently operate worldwide under constant insider/outside monitoring provided by the DS NSA-award winning program. Currently, only the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) operates/monitors unclassified and classified networks (including intelligence community networks) that fall outside the IRM and DS purview. The separation of network operation and monitoring by IRM and DS reflects an industry best practice, and should be applied to all Department network operations.

Furthermore, IRM is now contemplating the development and operation of a classified distributed network that will be capable of moving Top Secret and higher classified information to domestic offices and overseas posts.

To enhance the Department's overall security, and facilitate quick and accurate dissemination of security information on all of its networks to the appropriate staff, the panel recommends the following actions:

Recommendation 27: The panel recommends that IRM assume the operational control of all INR networks, including its segment of the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS).

Recommendation 28: Because the Department requires a comprehensive understanding of its entire information infrastructure, the panel recommends DS be provided full insight and administrative access to JWICS to ensure the safety and security of the Department's information in the realms of counter intelligence and cyber security.

Recommendation 29: The panel recommends the Department direct INR to ensure that the Department CIO occupies the lead seat for the Department at the Intelligence Community's Chief Information Officers Council (IC-CIO).

CHAPTER THREE: TRAINING

After years of ignoring the importance of regular training at every level, the Department has made significant progress.

The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) is the primary training institution of the U.S. foreign affairs community. FSI provides more than 700 classroom courses, including some 70 foreign languages. In addition to custom-developed distance learning products, approximately 2,700 commercial distance learning courses are available through the internet. These courses are designed to promote successful performance in each assignment, ease adjustment to other countries and cultures, and enhance leadership and management skills.

Leaders are responsible for ensuring how their people are trained.

In addition to the courses offered by FSI, DS offers training and professional development programs for DS personnel as well as specialized security training for other employees of the Department, other foreign affairs agencies, and certain foreign government security and law enforcement personnel through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program.

Some security courses referenced in the Department's response to the Benghazi ARB include, but are not limited to, the High Threat Tactical course, the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) course and the Basic Special Agent course – all of which are undergoing or being considered for modification and/or expansion. DS is also considering establishing a security training course for Locally Employed Staff. The panel applauds the initiatives both taken and planned by the Department and DS.

In addition to security-related training, there remains a need to educate all personnel in the workings of other bureaus. In particular, DS's role in overall foreign policy deliberations and actions should be highlighted.

Finally, there is a critical need to consolidate DS security training from approximately 19 dispersed sites to a single centralized and convenient location.

Improve Understanding of DS's Role in Conducting U.S. Foreign Policy

Finding: The primary responsibility of DS as described in its mission statement is to "provide a secure environment for the conduct of American diplomacy." As such, DS personnel must have a thorough understanding of Department operations and the role of DS as a participant in U.S. foreign policy.

Recommendation 30: The panel recommends that an experienced RSO emphasize the role and various responsibilities of DS in the A-100 course. This should also be reinforced with instruction at the appropriate mid- and senior-level training programs.

Recommendation 31: The panel recommends that the role and responsibilities of DS be given significant emphasis in both the Ambassadorial Seminar and Deputy Chiefs of Mission Seminar. Particular emphasis should be placed on the responsibilities of senior leaders with regard to the security of their post and its personnel as well as the importance of close coordination between DS and the management staff. This training should be given by a senior DS manager with broad experience both overseas and in the United States.

Recommendation 32: The panel recommends that, at every level, DS personnel be taught (or re-taught) the importance of the DS role in conducting U.S. foreign policy. This should go beyond tactics, law enforcement, and other operational issues, and include in-depth sessions in areas such as: overall roles and responsibilities; identifying, building, and managing key relationships; the importance of communications, leadership, and management of people; and other areas that contribute to a fully coordinated "one-team" approach to the Department's national security mission.

Recommendation 33: FSI and DS should consider establishing a short (3-4 day) course, emphasizing RSO relationships with embassy offices and regional bureaus, specifically designed for outgoing RSOs with overseas experience only in HTPs.

Recommendation 34: Other than training focused specifically on DS operations, the panel recommends that DS personnel take greater advantage of courses such as the following, which are offered by FSI:

- **PT203 – Washington Tradecraft:** To the maximum extent possible, DS agents assigned to Washington for their first tour should attend (4 days)
- **PT307 – Overcoming Boundaries:** Working Effectively Across Office and Agency Lines (1 day)
- **PT330 – National Security Executive Leadership Seminar** (five monthly, two-day sessions, followed by a one-day capstone)
- **PT331 – Understanding the Interagency:** A Primer for National Security Professionals (5 days)

A DS Washington Field Office Criminal Investigation team practices an entry maneuver.



Dedicated Diplomatic Security Training Center

Finding: The panel concurs with the ARB recommendation that the Diplomatic Security Training Center (DSTC) and FSI should collaborate in the development of courses that integrate high threat training and risk management decision processes⁷.

This ARB recommendation also said FACT training should be mandatory for HTPs. This additional training for both DS personnel and all others deploying to HTPs will greatly complicate and add to the DS training mission. DS currently conducts security training at approximately 19 separately leased and contracted facilities dispersed around the country. Frequently, these facilities do not provide the quality or level of training required. Additionally, the lack of dedicated facilities results in scheduling inefficiencies, increased costs, and decreased productivity in an era of high risk.

In January 2013, the Department requested that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reconsider its earlier decision to disapprove realigning \$54 million of surplus Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds for a consolidated Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC). As of May 2013, OMB had not responded.

Recommendation 35: In order to meet the increased demand of training 10,000 students per year, the panel recommends that the Department establish a single, dedicated training center that is conveniently located and meets DS facility and high threat training standards.

*A vibrant organization can only exist when individuals
work together for a common cause.*

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⁷ Benghazi ARB Recommendation 17

APPENDIX A: OTHER OBSERVATIONS

In the course of reviewing DS organization and management, including interviews with more than 100 personnel, either assigned to DS or closely associated with DS operations, a number of issues were raised that are outside the scope of the panel's charter. Several of these reinforced findings and recommendations that were made by the Benghazi ARB, while others highlighted issues not addressed previously. Thus, in the spirit of enhancing cooperation and coordination, the panel offers the following observations that may be detrimental to the Department's overall mission.

- The Department has established multiple panels and boards to deal with a variety of security issues raised by the ARB. It is unclear exactly what the roles of each will be, and the degree of overlap and duplication. It is also unclear how they will be monitored and who is responsible for reporting on their activities, and to whom. The panel recommends that the Department review the roles and responsibilities of each "panel" with the objective of eliminating duplication. Clear objectives should be established for each, including how recommendations will be implemented, as well as reporting criteria.
- While generally well-organized to accomplish its missions, DS has some investigative, administrative, and training functions scattered throughout different directorates, rather than in what would seem to be their logical "homes" under DO, DS/EX, or T. Reorganization at this level should be undertaken by the new Assistant Secretary and his/her team, guided by the new strategic planning office and DS/EX.
- All DS contracting should be processed through the Contracts and Procurement Division within DS/EX.
- Distributed Finance Officers within the various DS directorates should report directly to EX/Chief Financial Officer while remaining physically located within the directorates.
- During FY2013, the DS/EX/Chief Financial Officer has administered twenty-two different accounts within six different appropriations totaling an estimated \$3.5 billion. As such, the position should be elevated to SES.
- DS/EX should examine its position grade structure to ensure appropriate grade levels correlate to assigned responsibilities.
- The panel recognizes DS for its participation in the consultative assignment process of senior RSOs, and recommends that regional bureaus familiarize themselves with this process.
- DS/C/ST is administering some multi-million dollar programs without a dedicated organizational structure. One should be developed and implemented.
- Recognizing there may be a need for short-term TDYs for maintenance and other quick tasks, the panel recommends the Department review its current TDY policy for HTPs. The panel noted that

to circumvent the current policy requiring anyone performing TDY at an HTP for more than 30 days to have taken FACT training, some organizations may be sending personnel to HTPs for 29 or fewer days.

- The Department should ensure that annual evaluation reports of appropriate senior officers continue to specifically call attention to and evaluate performance in dealing with security issues.
- Blogs and other social media sites contain an increasing amount of potentially exploitable information relating to Department operations, personnel, and activities. This is a government-wide concern. Strategies, policies, and resources to better address this security vulnerability may be needed.



ALJAZEERA

APPENDIX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND MEETINGS

CONTACT	OFFICE	POSITION
Doug Allison	DS/IP/OPO	Office Director
Wayne Ashbery	DS/C/ST	Office Director
Kathleen Austin-Ferguson	M	Executive Assistant
Juan Avecilla	EUR-IO/EX	Post Management Officer
Shawn Bardwell	DS	Safety and Security Coordinator
Richard Barton	OCP	Political Officer
John Bass	S/ES	Executive Secretary
Bryce Bhatnager	DS/CTO	Chief Technology Officer
David Blackshaw	USAID	Division Chief for International Security
Eric Boswell	DS	Former Assistant Secretary
Clint Boushel	DS/EX	Special Assistant to Director
Charlie Brandeis	DS/C/PSP	Office Director
Maria Brewer	EX/AF	Deputy Executive Director
Mark Brewer	IRM/OPS/RIMC	RIMC Coordinator
Carolyn Bryan	USAID	Division Chief, Overseas Management Division, Office of Management
Scott Bultrowicz	DS	Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Gregorie Bujac	DS/OSAC	OSAC Alumni, former DS Director
Steven Chalupsky	DS/IP/SPC	Deputy Director
Carol Chan	USAID/DCHA/OFDA	Acting Director
Dan Christenson	EX/EAP	Deputy Director
Aaron Codispoti	DS/IP/SPC	Branch Chief
Susan Curley	M/PRI	Managing Director
Darryl DaHarb	DS/IP/RS	Security Specialist
Tim Dalton	HR/CDA	Assignments Officer
Ken Davis	DS/T	Special Assistant to Director
John Davis	DS/IP/SPC	Office Director
Jeff Denale	USAID	Counterterrorism and Information Security Coordinator, Office of Security
Dave Eckerson	USAID	Agency Counselor
Paul Folmsbee	EX/AF	Executive Director
George Frederick	DS/IP/RD/AF	Regional Director
Carol Gallo	DS/IP	Deputy Assistant Director
Amb. Harold Geisel	OIG	Inspector General
Joe Giardino	DS/SI/IS	Deputy Director
Philip Goldberg	INR	Assistant Secretary
Ed Guard	DS/IP/RD/SCA	Regional Director

Robert Hartung	DS/IP	Assistant Director
Francisca Thomas Helmer	EUR-IO/EX	Deputy Executive Director
Cash Herbolich	EUR-IO/EX	Supervisory Post Management Officer
Mark Hipp	DS/T	Assistant Director
Mary S. Holland	DS/SI/CS	Office Director
Todd Horne	USAID	Logistics Team Leader
Patrick Hughes	DS/IP/RS	Program Analyst
Richard J. Ingram	DS	Director of Protection
Rob Jenkins	USAID	Director, Office of Transition Initiatives and Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
Margaret Johnson	IRM	MSMC Division Chief
Beth Jones	NEA	Assistant Secretary
Deborah Jones	NEA	Ambassador-designate to Libya
Harry Kamian	D/QDDR	Deputy Director
Joshua Kearns	USAID	Safety and Security Specialist
Patrick F. Kennedy	M	Under Secretary for Management
Fred Ketchum	DS	RSO Kabul
Christopher Lambert	WHA/EX	Executive Director
Dave Leavitt	USAID	Agency Executive Secretary
Kent Logsdon	State Operations Center	Director
Lee Lohman	NEA/EX-IO	Executive Director
T.J. Lunardi	DS	Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary
Dave Lyons	DS/IP/RD/EAP	Regional Director
Mike Mack	DS/IP/RD/NEA	Deputy Regional Director
Tracy Mahaffey	DS/EX	Executive Director
Lorraine Meehan	USAID	Division Chief, Personnel Security, Office of Security
Bill Miller	DS/HTP	Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bobby Miller	DS/SI/CS	Deputy Director
Grace Moe	DS/PA	Office Director
Leslie Moeller	D/QDDR	Analyst
John Scott Moretti	DS/P/SD	Special Agent in Charge
Barry Moore	DS/DO	Assistant Director
Gary Nagle	USAID	Senior Overseas Property Manager, Overseas Management Division, Office of Management Services, Bureau for Management
Al Nathanson	DS/IP/RS	Security Specialist
Rick (W) Nelson	HR/CDA	Division Director
Mark Phelan	USAID	Humanitarian Advisor
Amb. Thomas R. Pickering	Benghazi ARB	Chairman
Dan Power	DS/C/DC	Director
Laura Powers	USAID	Agriculture and Food Security Technical Advisor
Don Reid	DS/SI	Senior Coordinator

Kurt Rice	DS/TIA	Acting Assistant Director
Tim Riley	DS/T/MSD	Director
Brian Roundy	DS/IP/RD	EUR Desk Officer
Cliff Seagroves	DS/OFM	Acting Managing Director
Tanya Sears	DS/FO	Former Executive Assistant
Charles Seel	DS/SI/CS/CTAD	Division Chief
Richard Shinnick	Benghazi ARB	Panel Member
Dan Simpson	DS/SI/IS	Office Director
Kristin Skipper	WHA/EX	Deputy Director
Gentry Smith	DS/C	Deputy Assistant Secretary
Harry (Ray) Smith	HR/CDA	Assignments Officer
Charlie Sparks	DS/T	FASTC Coordinator
Robert Spencer	DS	Former DS Executive Director
Karen Stanton	EX/EAP	Executive Director
Gregory Starr	DS	Acting Assistant Secretary
Donald Steinberg	USAID	Deputy Administrator
Laureen Stephens	DS/IP/RD/EUR	Deputy Regional Director
Tony Stitt	USAID	Field Coordinator
Hillary Tanton	DS/IP/RD	WHA Desk Officer
Steven Taylor	CIO	Chief Information Officer
Rabih Torbay	Vice President	International Medical Corps
Margaret Uyehara	EUR-IO/EX	Executive Director
Jeffrey VanDreal	EUR-IO/EX	Deputy Executive Director
Roger VanSanford	DS/IP/RD/AF	Deputy Regional Director
Mark Webb	USAID	Acting Director, Office of Security
Patrick Whelan	DS/IP/RD	SCA Desk Officer
Christa White	USAID	Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Management
Dennis Williams	DS/ST	Senior Advisor
Todd Zicarelli	DS/TIA	DS Command Center Director
Giselle Zimmerman	USAID	Mission Disaster Preparedness Coordinator

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
APPENDIX C: DS ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS



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


Current Diplomatic Security Organizational Chart



Staffing figures derived from DS/EX/HRM and Q1 Quarterly Performance Reports and are current as of 1/1/13

Panel's Proposed Changes to the Diplomatic Security Organizational Chart



APPENDIX D: PANEL MEMBERS

PANEL MEMBERS

Grant S. Green, Jr. (Chairman)
Joseph H. Melrose, Jr. (Vice-Chairman)
Larry Byrne
Lynwood M. Dent, Jr.
Thomas McKeever
Wayne Rychak

STAFF

Rebecca Drilling
Miranda Longstreth

GRANT S. GREEN, JR. – CHAIRMAN

Grant Green served as Under Secretary of State for Management from March 2001 – January 2005. Subsequently he was a commissioner on the Congressional Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior to being appointed Under Secretary of State for Management, Mr. Green served in the private sector and also served as an Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Prior to being appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. Green served in the White House as Special Assistant to President Reagan for National Security Affairs and Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

Earlier, Mr. Green served for 22 years in the U.S. Army in a variety of Infantry and Aviation command and staff assignments. Major staff assignments include 4 years on the Army General Staff and 4 years on the immediate staff of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

JOSEPH H. MELROSE, JR. – VICE CHAIRMAN

Ambassador (Ret.) Joe Melrose formerly served as the Acting U.S. Representative for Management and Reform at the United States Mission to the United Nations. Prior to joining the Mission, he served as a Foreign Service Officer for the U.S. Department of State for more than three decades, including service as U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone. He currently serves as the Ambassador in Residence and Professor of International Relations at Ursinus College in Collegeville, Pennsylvania.

In Addition to his service in Sierra Leone, Ambassador Melrose served in Vietnam and Syria, and as Consul General in Karachi, Pakistan, and Deputy Chief of Mission in Nigeria. He has also held a wide range of domestic positions, including Executive Director of the Political-Military and Near East and South Asia Bureaus. He also served as a coordinator for the State Department's post-September 11th Task Force.

LARRY BYRNE

Larry Byrne is President of Byrne and Associates Inc., a consulting firm serving both small and large businesses. He previously served as the Assistant Administrator and Chief Operating Officer for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) from 1993-1997. Mr. Byrne was the National Practice Director for Government Consulting for the Hay Group an international consulting company from 1983 to 1993. He has also worked for The White House from 1978 to 1980 and had prior government service with the Departments of Energy, HUD, OMB, and the Civil Service Commission. He directed the task force for OMB on management reform (Reform 88) and was one of directors of the Civil Service Reform Task force for President Carter.

LYNWOOD M. DENT, JR.

Lynwood Dent is a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer who has served in a variety of positions for over 31 years. He was the Executive Director and Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department's Executive Secretariat. He served as the Management Counselor in both U.S. Embassy London and Berlin, as the Chief Management Officer of the Bureau of European Affairs, and as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Office of Foreign Missions. He retired as the Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Management. Other overseas assignments included Embassies Port of Spain, Sofia, Canberra, and Consulate General Frankfurt.

He has extensive experience in managing the production of international meetings to include numerous G8 summits, the Regan-Gorbachev Summit in Geneva in 1985, the Madrid Mid-East Peace Summit in 1991, the Annapolis Mid-East Peace Summit in 2007, the Washington G20 meeting in 2008, the Pittsburg Summit in 2009, the Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, the APEC 2011 Summit Year, and the G8 and NATO Summits of 2012.

THOMAS MCKEEVER

Tom McKeever is a retired career member of the Senior Foreign Service of the Department of State, where he served for 32 years. He specialized in security, counter-terrorism/espionage and law enforcement. From 2004 to 2007, Mr. McKeever served as the Director of Security for NATO. Prior to that, he worked in a variety of senior management positions with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. From 2002 to 2004 he served as the Assistant Director for Domestic Operations which includes responsibility for all DS criminal investigations, the protection of the Secretary of State and visiting foreign dignitaries and for security of all Department of State Domestic facilities. Mr. McKeever was assigned to Buenos Aires, Argentina, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic and Geneva, Switzerland as well as to a variety of domestic offices within Diplomatic Security.

WAYNE RYCHAK

Wayne Rychak is a retired career member of the Senior Foreign Service, where he served for 29 years. His career specialized in security, counter-terrorism/espionage and law enforcement. From 2000 to 2004, Mr. Rychak served as the Director of Security for NATO. Prior to that assignment, he worked in a variety of senior management positions with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. From 1997 to 2000, he was appointed the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Countermeasures and Information Security responsible for worldwide security measures to protect U.S. Diplomatic facilities, personnel and operations, physical and computer security, guards, residential security, technical countermeasures and the Courier Service. These responsibilities included oversight for all security measures related to new construction or renovations at diplomatic facilities. He also served as the Director for Physical Security programs and was responsible for overseeing the Department of State's domestic Field Office operations.

In addition to Brussels Belgium, Mr. Rychak served abroad as a Regional Security Officer in Brasilia, Brazil, Kingston, Jamaica, Seoul, Korea, and Islamabad, Pakistan. On two occasions, he has served as a member of Accountability Review Boards.

REBECCA DRILLING

Rebecca Drilling began working for the Department of State as the Office Management Specialist (OMS) to the Deputy Assistant Director for the International Programs Directorate of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS/IP). She followed that assignment with being the OMS for the Deputy Assistant Secretary for DS/IP, and the Assistant Director for DS/IP. Ms. Drilling is currently a Program Assistant with the DS/IP Resource Staff, managing overseas staffing and maintaining the DS/IP Sharepoint sites.

MIRANDA LONGSTRETH

Miranda Longstreth began working for the Department of State in 2003. She has served in the Office of the Under Secretary for Management as personal assistant to the Under Secretary; the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation as a management analyst; the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance as personal assistant to the Director; the Office of Foreign Missions as a program officer; and completed an internship with the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.



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APPENDIX E: ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

ICA	Consular Affairs Management Tenets
A	Bureau of Administration
A/S	Assistant Secretary
ARB	Accountability Review Board
ARSO	Assistant Regional Security Officer
C	DS Directorate for Countermeasures
COM	Chief of Mission
COS	Chief of Staff
DAS	Deputy Assistant Secretary
DO	DS Directorate for Domestic Operations
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DS	Diplomatic Security
DSCC	Diplomatic Security Command Center
DSS	Diplomatic Security Service
DSTC	Diplomatic Security Training Center
EAC	Emergency Action Committee
EX	Executive Office
FACT	Foreign Affairs Counter Threat Training
FE-MC	Rank of Minister-Counselor
FE-OC	Rank of Counselor
FSI	Foreign Service Institute
GS	General Schedule
HST	Harry S. Truman Building
HTP	High Threat, High Risk Posts
IC	Intelligence Community
IC-CIO	Intelligence Community's Chief Information Officers Council
INR	Bureau of Intelligence and Research
IP	Diplomatic Security Directorate of International Programs
ISAT	Interagency Security Assessment Team
ITA	Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis
ITR	Integrated Threat Response
JWICS	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System
MSD	Mobile Security Deployment
OBO	Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
OCO	Overseas Contingency Operations
OFM	Office of Foreign Missions
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPS	State Department Operations Center

PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PDAS	Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
QDDR	Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
RSO	Regional Security Officer
SI	DS Directorate for Security Infrastructure
S/P	Secretary's Policy Planning Office
SED	Standard Embassy Design
T	DS Directorate for Training
TDY	Temporary Duty Assignment
TIA	DS Directorate of Threat Investigations and Analysis
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
WAE	When Actually Employed (Retiree)



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