IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Division

CENTER FOR ADVANCED DEFENSE STUDIES	:	
	:	**Case No. 2014 CA 002273 B**
Plaintiff,	:	**Judge Thomas J. Motley**
	:	**Next Court Date: 7/11/14 9:30 AM**
v.	:	**Event: Initial Scheduling Conference**
KAALBYE SHIPPING INTERNATIONAL, ET AL.	:	
Defendants.	:	

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Center for Advanced Defense Studies ("C4ADS"), by and through counsel, hereby states the following as its First Amended Complaint against DEFENDANTS Kaalbye Shipping International ("KAALBYE"), the Global Strategic Communications Group ("GSCG"), and Peter Hannaford ("HANNAFORD"), for declaratory judgment, defamation, and tortious interference with business relations.

NATURE OF THE CASE

1. This is an action for declaratory judgment and anti-suit injunction, damages, and other relief that this Court may deem appropriate. It arises from KAALBYE's serious and immediate threats of litigation against C4ADS, and from KAALBYE's, GSCG's, and HANNAFORD's defamatory statements and tortious interference with C4ADS's business relations.

INTRODUCTION

2. C4ADS, a Washington, D.C. based non-profit organization dedicated to data-driven analysis and evidence-based reporting of global conflict and security issues, published "The Odessa Network: Mapping Facilitators of Russian and Ukrainian Arms Transfers" in September 2013 ("the Report"). **See Exhibit 1.**

3. KAALBYE, a Ukrainian shipping company officially registered in the British Virgin Isles, is connected to, and has played a central role in, multiple politically-sensitive Russian and Ukrainian-sponsored arms transfers that have attracted significant global attention. KAALBYE has deep connections to current and former political figures in Russia and Ukraine.

4. For instance, as detailed herein, a KAALBYE vessel transported cargo from the Russian state-controlled arms exporting agency to the Syrian Ministry of Defense in the midst of the Syrian Civil War. KAALBYE has been linked to the transport of cruise missiles to Iran, a weapons delivery that may have enhanced that country's ability to deliver a nuclear warhead via missile attack. KAALBYE has been connected to a high-profile transfer of tanks and other military cargo to Southern Sudan in 2008, in the midst of the humanitarian crisis in Sudan. KAALBYE has been connected to the transfer of military cargo to Angola in the midst of a humanitarian catastrophe in that country. KAALBYE is connected to the widely reported transfer of arms from Russia to Venezuela in 2012. KAALBYE has been linked to the widely discussed transfer of cruise missiles from Ukraine to China in 2000-01. KAALBYE's activities undermine regional and international security, and they threaten U.S. national security and foreign policy.

5. Since the Report's publication, KAALBYE has made repeated and progressively more serious threats of litigation against C4ADS. On April 4, 2014, KAALBYE informed

C4ADS that it has drafted a complaint against C4ADS and that it is prepared to file a lawsuit against C4ADS. KAALBYE's threats are in response to what it asserts (without merit) are libelous statements contained in the Report.

6. KAALBYE has also orchestrated a defamatory public relations offensive against C4ADS, including through KAALBYE's attorneys at PATTON BOGGS LLP ("PATTON BOGGS") and through KAALBYE's Washington, D.C.-based public relations firm GSCG. This defamatory offensive included, *inter alia*, making statements that the Report was filled with "false claims" and meeting with reporters, attorneys, and editors at the Washington Post in an effort to discredit C4ADS and the Report. Through its intentional and malicious actions, KAALBYE and its agents, including HANNAFORD and GSCG, have defamed C4ADS and tortiously interfered with C4ADS's business relations.

7. The statements in the Report regarding KAALBYE are, as demonstrated herein, not defamatory. The statements are true. This truth is evident in the hundreds (if not thousands) of sources, including, but not limited to: (1) official U.S. government statements, (2) statements from principals of KAALBYE, (3) extensive reporting over a number of years contained in reputable regional, national, and international news sources (such as the New York Times, Time Magazine, and the BBC), (4) statements from industry insiders, (5) leaked internal documents, (6) data obtained from multiple commercial vendors, and (7) numerous other sources, all of which confirm the veracity of the Report.

8. The statements in the Report regarding KAALBYE concern matters of legitimate public interest, including matters subject to U.S. Executive Orders, subject to testimony in Congress, widely reported, and widely discussed amongst the general public, specialists, and policymakers.

9. The statements in the Report regarding KAALBYE concern issues of public controversy, as evidenced by the extensive media, public, and political attention these issues attracted. KAALBYE inserted itself into the public controversy around the activity detailed in the Report through its public commentary, and played a central role in the controversy because of its role in the arms transfers at issue.

10. C4ADS did not make these statements negligently, recklessly, or with malice. C4ADS reasonably and in good faith believes them to be true, and C4ADS has no reason to doubt the overwhelming weight of evidence supporting the statements made in the Report. C4ADS exercised extraordinary diligence to verify the statements in the Report, including, *inter alia,* utilizing multiple commercial vendors to corroborate the information in the Report, traveling overseas to investigate matters addressed in the Report, interviewing multiple industry insiders, and gathering hundreds of sources to corroborate the information in the Report. C4ADS did not publish any statement regarding KAALBYE that it did not believe to be true, and has no reason to doubt the veracity of the statements in the Report.

11. C4ADS possesses significant additional information, including, *inter alia*, documents concerning KAALBYE's past and ongoing activities in the Balkans, South America, Libya, and the Levant. Out of an abundance of caution, C4ADS chose not to publish details regarding those activities in the Report, as C4ADS wished to further corroborate the veracity of those sources – a process that continues to this day.

12. To settle this dispute and controversy, and to obtain finality in response to KAALBYE's threats of immediate litigation, C4ADS seeks a declaration (and accompanying anti-suit injunction) that it did not defame KAALBYE. C4ADS also prays for relief from

KAALBYE, GSCG, and HANNAFORD's tortious conduct also arising in connection with the Report, and seeks punitive damages, costs, fees, and other relief this Court deems appropriate.

PARTIES

C4ADS

13. C4ADS is a Washington, D.C.-based non-profit organization dedicated to data-driven analysis and evidence-based reporting of global conflict and security issues.

14. C4ADS's mission is to "utilize cutting-edge emerging technologies to manage, integrate, and analyze disparate data, from diverse languages, regions, and sources, including [its] own field research in conflict zones and fragile states." To further its mission, C4ADS works with powerful, leading technology providers that specialize in collating disparate open-source data.

15. C4ADS is reputed for its analytical and evidence-based reporting on issues of global import. For instance, Greek authorities cited C4ADS's reporting when they successfully interdicted a vessel carrying ammunition to the Syrian government in the midst of the Syrian Civil War, a humanitarian disaster that has to date resulted in over 150,000 casualties and been the subject of significant international debate.

16. C4ADS's publications are widely disseminated in print and electronic forms, via its website and through other media outlets. Its reports have global reach and have been distributed and redistributed countless times. C4ADS's website and reports have been accessed tens of thousands of times in the past two years alone.

KAALBYE

17. KAALBYE comprises several subsidiary and/or shell companies. According to various government records, including, but not limited to, those in Russia, Ukraine, British

Virgin Islands, Seychelles, and Panama, these subsidiary/shell companies include, *inter alia*: Kaalbye Shipping, Kaalbye Shipping International, Kaalbye Yacht Management Inc., Kaalbye Transport Ltd., Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine KSU, Kaalbye Shipping Cyprus Ltd., Kaalbye Bulk, Kaalbye Heavy Lift, Kaalbye Projects, Kaalbye Logistics International Ltd, Kaalbye Yachting, Kaalbye Oil Services, Kaalbye Group, Kaalbye Group Holding, Kaalbye Ltd., Kaalbye Marine Services, Kaalbye Agency Services, Ukrainian Maritime Agency, Red Brick Ventures, Ocean Might Shipping Ltd., Ocean Breeze Ltd., Ocean Winner Ltd., Ocean Fortune Ltd., World Wide Shipping Ltd., Deutschland Prime Transport, New Challenge Ltd., Olva Shipping Ltd., Unicorn Enterprises, Crystal Waters Shipping Ltd., Silver Streams Ltd., and White Albatross Ltd. C4ADS is informed and believes that these companies all share similar or identical agents and representatives, assets, and are alter-egos of each other, all receive direction from the same persons, are mere instrumentalities of each other, and acting as a single unit named KAALBYE.[1] C4ADS requests that the relief sought herein be binding as to KAALBYE and all shell companies/alter-egos.

18. In 2009, the Southern District of New York held that World Wide Shipping Ltd., Kaalbye Projects, Kaalbye Shipping International Ltd., and Silver Springs Ltd. are alter-egos of one another.

19. C4ADS is informed and believes that KAALBYE's principal place of business is in Odessa, Ukraine.

20. The Report identifies KAALBYE's connections to a number of shipment events, including the shipment of: (1) cruise missiles to Iran, (2) cruise missiles to China, (3) assault rifles and grenades to Angola, (4) tanks, RPGs, and other arms to South Sudan, (5) explosives to

[1] KAALBYE (without merit) takes issue with various details contained in the Report, as described herein. But, despite the fact that he Report sets forth the subsidiary/shell structure, the interconnectedness, and the overlaps amongst these KAALBYE entities, KAALBYE has not disputed those statements.

Algeria, (6) surface-to-air missiles, rocket launchers, and other arms to Venezuela, and (7) unknown weapons and explosives to Vietnam.

21. While KAALBYE (without merit) takes issue with various statements in the Report, as detailed *supra*, KAALBYE tacitly concedes a connection to many of the above shipments and the general thrust of the statements regarding it. For instance, KAALBYE does not dispute its deep connections to the Russian and Ukrainian governments, nor that KAALBYE is one of, if not the, most prolific contractors used to transfer Russian weapons internationally.

22. The above transfers, and KAALBYE's central role in those transfers, have been widely reported by numerous domestic and international media sources. The transfers at issue relate to the stability of numerous regions that the President of the United States has declared to represent unusual and extraordinary threats to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. The transfers relate to foreign policy issues that have received extensive debate domestically and internationally, including in the United States Congress. Many of these countries suffer, or around the time of the transfer did suffer, from grave human rights abuses that destabilized those countries and their neighbors and were at the heart of significant global debate.

23. Igor Urbansky ("Urbansky") founded KAALBYE in or around 1996. Urbansky is a former captain in the Soviet merchant fleet, was a Deputy Minister of Transportation in Ukraine from 2006-09, and served in the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian legislative body. Urbansky has provided a number of public interviews wherein he discussed the business of transporting weapons and the roles his companies play in transporting weapons.

24. Boris Kogan ("Kogan") is a co-founder of KAALBYE. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Kogan currently controls KAALBYE. Kogan is a partner to some of the most

powerful defense industry figures in the Russian Federation. Kogan is on the board of directors at the Russian company RT-Logistika. RT-Logistika's board is primarily composed of Russian defense-industrial figures.

25. Kogan is also affiliated with Izhmash, now called Kalashnikov Concern, a Russian state-owned company that is one of the world's largest producers of small arms. Izhmash lists Kogan as an "affiliated person" on financial disclosure forms.

26. RT-Logistika is directly involved in the transfer of Russian military cargo to, *inter alia*, Syria. For instance, during the ongoing Syrian Civil War, in October 2012, RT-Logistika arranged the transport of military radar from Moscow to Damascus. The Turkish air force intercepted this plane and forced it to land. This incident attracted substantial global press coverage.

27. RT-Logistika is 51% owned by Russian Technologies, an enormous Russian state-run holding firm run by Sergei Chemezov, a close ally of Vladimir Putin. Russian Technologies also owns JSC RosOboronExport ("RosOboronExport"), the Russian state-run agency responsible for the vast majority of Russian arms exports, worth over $30 billion. RosOboronExport has faced U.S. sanctions and has faced criticism from foreign governments and international organizations for, *inter alia*, providing weapons to the Syrian regime in the midst of the Syrian human rights crisis and humanitarian crisis.

28. C4ADS is informed and believes that Kogan's brother works for RosOboronExport. Further, the Director of Logistics for RosOboronExport is also (or at all relevant times was) on the RT-Logistika board with Kogan.

29. KAALBYE has also contracted with the U.S. government. It worked with U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command to transport a mine countermeasures ship to Japan in 2009 and a

coastal security craft to Cyprus in 2012. KAALBYE has also worked on an on-going basis to transfer NASA rockets for Orbital Sciences Corporation**.** The Report specifically identifies on page 38 that KAALBYE has a diverse business and that KAALBYE has contracted with U.S. Military Sealift Command.

GSCG

30. GSCG is a public relations firm that identifies its principal place of business at 1050 Thomas Jefferson Street, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20007.

31. GSCG has published articles on behalf of KAALBYE that defame C4ADS. KAALBYE's relationship with GSCG further confirms the substance of the Report.

32. GSCG is the registered foreign agent for Dmitry Rogozin ("ROGOZIN"), the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and the former head of the Russian political party "Rodina." ROGOZIN is identified as a "foreign principal" of GSCG. **See Exhibit 2.**

33. GSCG personnel have entered into lobbying agreements with Viktor Yanukovych ("YANUKOVYCH"), the recently deposed former President of Ukraine. GSCG's founder, Darren Spinck, witnessed and cosigned this lobbying agreement**.**

34. A GSCG principal served as a defense witness in Slobodan Milosevic's war crimes trial at The Hague in 2004.

35. The U.S. Government has sanctioned ROGOZIN and YANUKOVYCH in connection with an unusual and extraordinary threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy. The U.S. Government has also authorized sanctions on entities that "operate in the arms or related material sector in the Russian Federation" in connection with an unusual and extraordinary threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy.

HANNAFORD

36. HANNAFORD is a "senior consultant" for GSCG, and, upon information and belief, a resident of California. HANNAFORD reportedly has extensive lobbying experience and has served as a paid lobbyist to, *inter alia*, the Austrian Freedom Party.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

37. Jurisdiction is appropriate under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, the District of Columbia Long-Arm Statute, D.C. Code Ann. § 13-423, under this Court's inherent powers, and under this Court's general jurisdiction under D.C. Code § 11-921.

38. KAALBYE has reached beyond its borders to contact this forum in connection with the Report. KAALBYE retained PATTON BOGGS LLP in this forum to contact (and threaten) C4ADS, and PATTON BOGGS (acting in this forum) has contacted C4ADS (in this forum) on behalf of KAALBYE.

39. KAALBYE's attorneys at PATTON BOGGS (located in this forum), by and on behalf of KAALBYE, contacted and met with the Washington Post (in this forum) regarding statements made in the Report, causing tortious injury to C4ADS, a Washington D.C. entity.

40. KAALBYE retained GSCG, a Washington D.C.-based Public Relations firm, to respond to the evidence in the Report. GSCG, acting in Washington D.C., has taken actions on behalf of KAALBYE, causing tortious injury to C4ADS, a Washington D.C. entity.

41. GSCG is based in Washington, D.C., its tortious acts occurred in D.C., and its tortious acts were directed at an entity that operates in Washington, D.C.

42. HANNAFORD works for and on behalf of GSCG, and has published a number of op-ed articles that defamed C4ADS in Washington, D.C.-area publications. Plaintiff is also informed and believes that HANNAFORD maintains a residence in Washington, D.C.

43. Venue is appropriate here because, *inter alia*, subject-matter experts are located here, KAALBYE's and GSCG's tortious actions occurred here, GSCG is a D.C. entity, and KAALBYE's agents are here.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

44. United States Executive Order 13661, dated March 16, 2014, declares that "the actions and policies of the Russian Federation with respect to Ukraine . . . constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States." To respond to this unusual and extraordinary threat to U.S. national security and policy, the Executive Order orders blocked all property and interests in property under U.S. jurisdiction, of, *inter alia*:

> persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State: (A) to be an official of the Government of the Russian Federation; (B) to operate in the arms or related materiel sector in the Russian Federation; (C) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly: (1) a senior official of the Government of the Russian Federation; or (2) a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; or (D) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of: (1) a senior official of the Government of the Russian Federation; or (2) a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order.

45. Accompanying this Order, the United States Executive Branch designated ROGOZIN and, to respond to the unusual and extraordinary threat to U.S. national security and

policy, ordered blocked all of ROGOZIN's property or interests in property that is under, or comes within, U.S. jurisdiction. GSCG is ROGOZIN's registered foreign agent.

46. Additionally, in connection with Executive Order 13660, dated March 6, 2014,[2] the United Stated Executive Branch designated YANUKOVYCH, and to respond to an unusual and extraordinary threat to U.S. national security and policy, ordered blocked all of YANUKOVYCH's property or interests in property that is under, or comes within, U.S. jurisdiction.

47. GSCG personnel have previously entered a lobbying agreement with YANUKOVYCH, and its personnel have published articles suggesting that YANUKOVYCH deserves the Nobel Peace Prize.

48. As reflected in Executive Order 13661, persons connected to the Russian Federation's arms or related materiel sector, the Russian government's senior officials, and those that provide support to those senior officials, are connected to and undermine the national security and foreign policy of the United States.

49. As demonstrated in the Report and confirmed by a multitude of sources, KAALBYE is connected to the Russian Federation's arms and related materiel sector, a matter of significant global import and interest that impacts U.S. national security and foreign policy.

50. Page 38 of the Report states, and KAALBYE has not disputed, that there are "ties of senior Kaalbye personnel to organs of state power," which C4ADS is informed and believes correlate with "the lucrative weapons transportation contracts [KAALBYE personnel] receive."

51. As further demonstrated in the Report, KAALBYE, including through Kogan, is connected to the Russian government's senior officials, or, at a minimum, provides material

[2] Executive Order 13660 and Executive Order 13661 are available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/ukraine_eo.pdf

support to the Russian government's senior officials. The Report demonstrates KAALBYE's Russian government connections through Urbansky and Kogan, and explains how KAALBYE's emergence in the arms transport industry "coincided with the emergence of [Russian president Vladimir] Putin, and reassertion of state control over major weapons systems and other national assets."

52. The arms transfers highlighted in the Report, and KAALBYE's connections therewith, have long been at the heart of extensive public debate, are of significant public interest, and have global ramifications because of their impacts on regional stability, global security, and international geopolitics.

53. For instance, the Report references KAALBYE's well-documented connection to a 2001 transfer of assault rifles, ammunition, grenades, mortar shells, and other weapons to Angola. In 2001, Angola was in the midst of a civil war that claimed over 500,000 civilian lives and involved a significant international response. In 1993, under Executive Order 12685, U.S. President Bill Clinton declared a "national emergency," stating that "the situation in Angola constitutes a threat to international peace and security." Arms transfers to Angola were also subject to a U.N. Security Council Resolution 864 barring certain transfers.

54. The Report references KAALBYE's well-documented connection to a 2008 transfer of tanks, ammunition, rocket launchers, and other weapons to South Sudan, then part of Sudan. Instability in Sudan has been subject of extensive legislative debate and Congressional hearings, U.S. and international sanctions, U.N. security council resolutions, and near-endless press coverage, including, e.g., in the New York Times. On March 9, 2009, a Vice Admiral of the U.S. Naval Forces Command confirmed KAALBYE's involvement in this shipment in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee.

55. The Report references KAALBYE's well-documented connection to numerous arms transfers from Russia to Venezuela worth over $4 billion. The flow of arms from Russia to Venezuela, particularly in light of both countries' well-document material support for the Syrian government during the Syrian Civil War, the United States' foreign relations with Venezuela at the time, and the geopolitical impact of these transfers, is of legitimate public interest and at the root of significant public controversy, and was so well before C4ADS published the Report.

56. KAALBYE transported military equipment from RosOboronExport (the multi-billion dollar Russian state-owned arms-exporting conglomerate) ("RosOboronExport") to the Syrian Army Supply Bureau in 2008. Both RosOboronExport and the Syrian Army Supply Bureau were under U.S. sanctions at the time for posing threats to U.S. national security and foreign policy, and Syria is a designated state-sponsor of terrorism.

57. Plaintiff is informed and believes that KAALBYE transported that cargo through its alter-ego, Silver Streams Ltd., aboard the *MV Ina*.

58. KAALBYE transported hundreds of tons of cargo, contained in over 2500 cases, from RosOboronExport to the Ministry of Defense in Syria in 2012 aboard the *MV Ocean Voyager*, in the midst of the Syrian Civil War. **See Exhibits 3 & 4.** The Syrian Civil War, which has claimed well over 100,000 lives, bears significant impact on regional and international security and represents a significant humanitarian crisis. The President of the United States has declared the Syrian crisis a threat to U.S. national security. Russian arms transfers to Syria have attracted significant global coverage, and have been subject to legislation and agency action from the U.S. government.

THE REPORT

59. Beyond their exacting standards, C4ADS also took every reasonable effort to disclaim its findings to indicate that none of the activity described was necessarily illegal. Further, C4ADS took every effort to specifically disclaim statements based on less-ample evidence, identifying such statements as C4ADS's opinion and fairly-drawn inference.

60. Page three of the Report states that "[t]he mention of any individual, company, ship, or other entity in this report **does not** imply the violation of any law or international agreement, and need not be construed as such" (emphasis in original).

61. Page four of the Report states that "[t]he inclusion of any company in this report is not intended to imply participation in illegal activity, and a judgment as such is far beyond the purview of this research. Indeed, most of the activity described herein is perfectly legal."

62. Page 11 of the Report states that the Report "examines both licit and illicit weapons transfers. We use the term illicit to describe those transfers that could be perceived as contrary to accepted international norms, **not to imply violation of any international laws or agreements. We make no claims to determine the legal status of any particular transfer**" (emphasis added).

63. The Report does not allege that KAALBYE participated in any illegal activity, and it prominently, repeatedly, and explicitly disclaims such an inference.

64. The Report does not allege that KAALBYE itself trades, deals, purchases, or sells weapons. The Report repeatedly and explicitly clarifies otherwise. For instance, page four of the Report explicitly states: "The Odessa Network is a loose collection of logistics contractors for the governments of Russia and Ukraine, not independent arms dealers."

65. Page nine of the Report (both graphically and in the text) distinguishes logistic contractors such as KAALBYE from the entities that own, trade, or broker the weapons shipments discussed in the Report. The Report states that government agencies in Moscow and Kiev own the weapons discussed in the Report, while shipping companies in Odessa, Ukraine provide "A-Z Logistics Integration."

66. Page 12 of the Report clarifies that the Report references arms transfers owned or brokered by the Russian or Ukrainian government. It states "*Government control* refers to whether the Russian or Ukrainian government was the owner and broker of the sale; if not explicitly stated in our sources, we assumed this was the case if the arms transfer could be corroborated with known government sales."

67. Page 43 of the Report states: "The Odessa Network firms are logistic contractors for the Russian and Ukrainian governments, not independent arms merchants."

68. The Report provides extensive support for the statements contained inside it, and explicitly identifies areas where the authors do not have conclusive evidence but are instead drawing their own inferences and opinions from the evidence.

KAALBYE'S CONNECTIONS TO THE MV FAINA INCIDENT

69. The *MV Faina* incident, from 2008-09, attracted significant international governmental action and international press coverage. In sum, a group of Somali pirates hijacked a large shipment of arms (including tanks, tank ammunition, rocket launchers, and other weapons). The shipment was reportedly from Ukraine, ordered by Kenya, and bound for South Sudan (then a part of Sudan), at a time when international embargoes on Sudan were in effect due to the grave humanitarian situation. **See e.g. Exhibit 5; Exhibit 6.**

70. Despite public statements made by principals of KAALBYE, statements from the U.S. Navy, statements made by U.S. officials in congressional testimony, and in extensive international media reporting (including, for instance, the New York Times), all of which confirm KAALBYE's connections to the *MV Faina* incident, KAALBYE asserts that C4ADS has defamed KAALBYE by connecting it to the *MV Faina* incident.

71. The Report states on page 14 that the cargo on the *MV Faina* included "33 T-72 tanks, 8,926 rounds of VOF-36 high explosive fragmentation 125 mm tank ammunition, 5000 rounds of VDK-10 HEAT 125 mm tank ammunition, 73 packages of spare parts for tanks, 6 ZPU-4 AA guns, 36 packages of RPG-7V launchers and spare parts, 6 BM-21 122 mm multiple launch rocket launchers on Ural wheelbase." KAALBYE does not dispute the veracity of this statement.

72. The Report states on page 14 that the exporting country in the *MV Faina* incident was Ukraine, that the destination was South Sudan, that the shipment was made under government control, that the ship left port in September 2008, that pirates captured the ship on 25 September 2008, and that the ship arrived in Mombasa, Kenya, on February 2009. KAALBYE does not dispute the veracity of these statements.

73. The Report states on page 14 that **Waterlux AG** owned the *MV Faina*. KAALBYE does not dispute the veracity of this statement.

74. The Report states on page 14 that **Almar** was the *MV Faina's* ship manager. KAALBYE does not dispute the veracity of this statement.

75. The Report states on page 14 that the *MV Faina*

> is widely reported to actually be owned and operated by Kaalbye Shipping and Tomex Team (closely linked to Ukrainian businessman Vadim Alperin). The crewing agency is Carvel Shipping Ltd. Phoenix Trans-Servis and Ace Shipping Ltd. and

> Marine Energy Trading Company Ltd. (representing Milltown Corporate Services and Ireland & Overseas Acquisition Company) involved in chartering and brokering. Political connection was Hares Youssef, who acted as the agent of President Yushchenko and contacted Alperin.

KAALBYE does not dispute the veracity of these statements.

76. The Report states on page 60 that "[hijacking] is particularly troubling when the cargo is sensitive military equipment, as happened with the 2008 *MV Faina* incident in which Somali pirates hijacked a Kaalbye ship carrying Ukrainian weapons to South Sudan." KAALBYE takes issue with this statement, claiming that "Kaalbye does not own or have any relationship with the MV Faina or its alleged owner." **See Exhibit 7, p. 3.**

77. KAALBYE contends that it does not have a relationship with Waterlux AG, Phoenix Trans-Servis, or associated companies. **See Exhibit 7, p. 3.**

78. KAALBYE contends that it has not cooperated with Tomex Team, Waterlux AG, or other companies. **See Exhibit 7, p. 2.**

79. The statements in the Report regarding the *MV Faina* and KAALBYE's connection therewith are true. The statements in the Report regarding the *MV Faina* have significant factual support. They were the subject of extensive international reporting due to their sensitive nature and their bearing on items of legitimate public interest. KAALBYE, through statements from its founder and principal Urbansky and through an admitted role as commercial agent of the ship, played a central role in the surrounding public controversy over the shipment, and the statements in the Report are germane to KAALBYE's role in this controversy.

80. At the time of the *MV Faina* incident, KAALBYE had a relationship with the *MV Faina* or its alleged owner. KAALBYE has worked with the Tomex/Waterlux group of companies.

81. In December 2008, Igor Urbansky, the KAALBYE founder, then the principal of KAALBYE and the Deputy Transport Minister of Ukraine, confirmed that KAALBYE had a relationship with the *MV Faina*. Urbansky told reporters: "As far as I know, **Kaalbye Shipping was the commercial agent of Faina** and this is no way proof that Kaalbye Shipping is the owner of the vessel." **See Exhibit 8** (emphasis added)**.**

82. On September 29, 2008, the Associated Press reported that the U.S. Navy's Bahrain-based 5th Fleet "said the Faina is owned and operated by Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine," and that a Russian-based registry indicates that the ship is owned by Tomex Team and Waterlux AG. **See Exhibit 9.**

83. On September 29, 2008, CNN reported that "Faina is owned and operated by Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine, and its crew includes citizens of Ukraine, Russia and Latvia, the U.S. Navy said." **See Exhibit 10.**

84. On September 30, 2008, the New York Times reported on the incident, publishing an interview with a spokesman for the Somali pirates that hijacked the *MV Faina*. The New York Times article featured a picture of the vessel, with the caption: "Somali pirates in small boats hijacked the Faina, a Belize-flagged cargo ship owned and operated by Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine, on Sept. 25." **See Exhibit 11.**

85. On October 3, 2008, Time Magazine reported on the incident, providing another picture of the vessel with the caption: "Somali pirates in small boats hijacking on Sept. 25 the MV *Faina*, a Belize-flagged cargo ship owned and operated by 'Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine'." **See Exhibit 12.**

86. On February 6, 2009, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, which provided humanitarian assistance to the *MV Faina*, stated that "the Belize-flagged cargo ship is owned and

operated by Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine and is carrying a cargo of Ukrainian T-72 tanks and related equipment." **See Exhibit 13.**

87. On March 5, 2009, Vice Admiral William E. Gortney, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command testified before the House Armed Services Committee on Counter-Piracy Operations in the U.S. Central Command Area of Operations. In his testimony, Vice Admiral Gortney stated: "The Motor Vessel FAINA was attacked off the coast of Somalia on September 25th. The roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) ship is Belize flagged and operated by "Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine." **See Exhibit 14, p. 13**.

88. A former KAALBYE senior official has informed C4ADS that KAALBYE has a close relationship with Ukrainian businessman Vadim Alperin specifically for the purpose of shipping arms. Vadim Alperin owns or operates, *inter alia*, Waterlux AG, Tomex Team, Almar, and associated companies, which are registered at Alperin's place of business in Odessa, Ukraine. This former KAALBYE senior official confirmed numerous statements made in the report, including that Alperin hardly "knows anyone in the arms trade," and that "KAALBYE and Phoenix are just about all the companies in this trade he knows."

89. Page 39 of the Report sets forth, and KAALBYE does not dispute, that Evgenii Poltavets is, or has been, listed as an employee of both KAALBYE and Phoenix Trans-Servis.

90. A simple Google Search for "KAALBYE and FAINA" returns thousands of media articles demonstrating KAALBYE's connection to the *MV Faina* incident, and did so before C4ADS published the Report.

91. C4ADS's statements regarding KAALBYE's connections to the *MV Faina* incident (and, both directly and by extension, to the entities connected to the shipment) are not defamatory. Thousands of sources confirm these statements. These sources include the principal

of KAALBYE himself, repeated statements from the U.S. Navy, including statements made before Congress months after the vessel was hijacked, and statements in thousands of media reports, including, *inter alia*, reports from Time Magazine, the Associated Press, CNN, and the New York Times. They have been confirmed through correspondence with senior KAALBYE officials. KAALBYE's prospective claim is frivolous. Given the weight of evidence, these statements were made in good faith and with a reasonable belief.

KAALBYE'S CONNECTIONS TO THE MV ANASTASIA INCIDENT

92. The *MV Anastasia* incident, in 2001, similarly attracted significant governmental attention and international press coverage. In sum, the Russian state-run weapons export agency, then known as Rosvooruzhenie, sent cargo including over 600 tons of assault rifles, ammunition, grenades, mortar shells, and night vision goggles, to Angola in the midst of a grave humanitarian crisis that claimed over 500,000 civilian lives. Angola was then under international sanctions. The shipment left from Oktyabrsk, a Black Sea port in Ukraine specifically constructed for the transport of military cargo (for example, Oktyabrsk was the origin point for the missiles in the 1963 Cuban Missile Crisis). The Captain claimed to be transporting auto parts. According to Spanish news sources, the Spanish secret service agency CESID believed that the cargo was weapons destined for a rebel group in Angola, and alerted a local agent. Port authorities in Las Palmas, Spain, detained the vessel, searched it, discovered 20,000 boxes of weapons, and imposed a ~$800,000 bail. **See e.g. Exhibit 15; Exhibit 16; Exhibit 17.**

93. The Report accurately describes the contents of multiple sources that covered the above incident.

94. The Report identifies that the Ship Owner/Manager at the time was KAALBYE. KAALBYE has not disputed its connections to this vessel.

95. The Report identifies that Igor Urbansky, the founder of KAALBYE, was directly involved. KAALBYE has not disputed that Urbansky was involved in this incident.

96. The Report identifies that the cargo was bound from Ukraine to Angola as part of a sale from the Russian government to an entity in Angola. KAALBYE has not disputed these facts.

97. The Report identifies that the vessel flew a Georgia flag. KAALBYE does not dispute this fact.

98. The Report identifies that the vessel was registered in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. KAALBYE has not disputed this fact.

99. The Report identifies that Spanish authorities discovered weapons aboard the ship and impounded the ship. KAALBYE has not disputed this fact.

100. The Report identifies that Spanish authorities imposed an $800,000 bail, which was paid, before the ship went on to deliver its cargo. KAALBYE has not disputed this fact.

101. KAALBYE asserts that the Report "attempts to transform ordinary, legal occurrences into an allegedly improper or illegal event that has damaged Kaalbye's reputation." **See Exhibit 7, p. 1.**

102. C4ADS is not certain what KAALBYE deems to be an "ordinary" occurrence, but the Report does not state that this occurrence was "improper or illegal." Further, the Report explicitly and repeatedly disclaims any such inference. The Report merely sets forth all the well-reported (and indeed, undisputed) facts regarding this shipment, including its cargo, the fine on

the vessel, the source and destination, and the commercial entity (KAALBYE) involved in the shipment.

103. KAALBYE asserts that the *MV Anastasia* "was not improperly flying the flag of the Republic of Georgia." **See Exhibit 7, p. 1.**

104. C4ADS does not state that the vessel was "improperly flying the flag of the Republic of Georgia." C4ADS simply states that the vessel flew the Georgia flag and was registered in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, both of which statements are true, and neither of which KAALBYE disputes.

105. At the time the vessel was detained, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement saying that the vessel was illegally flying the Georgia flag.

106. The statements in the Report that KAALBYE contends are defamatory (that the transfer was "illegal" and that "the vessel was improperly flying the flag of the Republic of Georgia") are found nowhere in the Report, and are in fact explicitly disclaimed.

107. The statements in the Report regarding KAALBYE and the *MV Anastasia* are true. These statements have extensive support in widely available and widely distributed press. The transaction at issue involved matters of legitimate public interest, and KAALBYE concedes its direct connection with this arms transfer on behalf of the Russian government, through Ukraine, to Angola at a time of great humanitarian crisis. Given the weight of evidence, these statements were made in good faith with a reasonable belief of their truth.

KAALBYE'S REPORTED ROLE IN CRUISE MISSILES TRANSFERS TO IRAN & CHINA

108. The Ukrainian cruise missile incident attracted significant international attention. In 2000 – 2001, Ukrainian and Russian officials brokered a covert deal to send Ukrainian X-55

missiles to Iran and China. These weapons may have significantly enhanced Iran's capacity to deliver a nuclear warhead. The exporters used a fabricated contract with Russian defense export firm Rosvooruzhenie, along with a series of front companies, to export missiles inherited from the USSR and held in Ukraine. **See e.g. Exhibit 18; Exhibit 19; Exhibit 20; Exhibit 21.**

109. As set forth in the Report and demonstrated herein, numerous credible sources connect KAALBYE to this cruise missile incident.

110. To identify and refer to this incident, the Report on page 12 and 13 identifies two separate events, labeled "Event #1" and "Event #2." Event #1 refers to transfers of cruise missiles from Ukraine to Iran. Event #2 refers to transfers of cruise missiles from Ukraine to China.

111. KAALBYE does not dispute its connection with "Event #2," the transfer of Ukrainian cruise missiles to China in 2000 or 2001.

112. KAALBYE disputes any connection with "Event #1", the transfer of Ukrainian cruise missiles to Iran in 2000 or 2001. KAALBYE contends that it "was not in any way, shape or form involved in the transaction or the shipment described in the publication's Event #1." **See Exhibit 7, p. 1-2.**

113. A number of publicly available media reports demonstrate KAALBYE's involvement in these cruise missile transfers. For instance:

a. In 2006, Regnum, a Russian news service, wrote about the arms transfers, stating that "on June 30 [2006], Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov stated that Ukrainian Progress Firm, an Ukrspetsexport subsidiary, delivered 6 X55 cruise missiles to China and Iran each in 2000 and 2001." Regnum also states: "Reportedly, the

missiles were brought to Iran by a vessel chartered by the Ukrainian Kaalbye Shipping Company." **See Exhibit 22.**

b. A 2008 news article, reporting on Urbansky (KAALBYE's founder) and other Ukrainian political officials, states that Urbansky and KAALBYE were connected to the cruise-missile transport of Ukrainian X-55 cruise missiles in 2000-01. **See Exhibit 23[3].**

c. A 2008 news article, reporting on Urbansky and KAALBYE's affiliations with numerous different companies, states that KAALBYE was responsible for transporting these cruise missiles to Iran, and states that KAALBYE's role in these transfers became known in 2006. **See Exhibit 24.**

d. A 2008 news article also stated that KAALBYE transported the cruise missiles. **See Exhibit 25.**

e. A 2006 news article states that the Russian Federal Security Service was investigating the delivery of cruise missiles to Iran, and states that KAALBYE / Urbansky carried out the shipment. **See Exhibit 26.**

f. A 2006 news article states that the Ukrainian cruise missiles were delivered to Iran by sea aboard a KAALBYE-operated ship. **See Exhibit 27.**

g. A 2006 news article reports on the Russian legislature's interest in KAALBYE, stating that KAALBYE carried out the shipment of cruise missiles to Iran. **See Exhibit 28.**

h. A 2008 news article, discussing the *MV Faina* incident, Urbansky's control over KAALBYE shell-companies/alter-egos, and KAALBYE's connections to the *Faina* incident, states that KAALBYE delivered cruise missiles to Iran. **See Exhibit 29.**

[3] All foreign language exhibits are accompanied by certified translations.

114. The cruise missile incident is a matter of legitimate public interest, as evidenced by coordinated international sanctions designed to curtail Iranian nuclear capabilities, and attracted significant international attention, evidenced by coverage in multiple media outlets across many countries and official statements from government officials in multiple countries.

115. The statements in the Report regarding KAALBYE's connection with the cruise missile incident are not defamatory. The statements in the Report are true, and their veracity is confirmed in numerous publicly available media sources. At the time it published the Report, C4ADS did not have (nor does it now have) any reason to doubt the many sources confirming KAALBYE's prominent role in the incident, and such statements were made in good faith with a reasonable belief of their truth.

OTHER STATEMENTS IN THE REPORT REGARDING KAALBYE

The Report does not state that KAALBYE purchased or sold arms.

116. Page 67 of the Report sets out that KAALBYE "is the single most active shipper of Russian and Ukrainian weapons; it also actively transports unknown cargo between Oktyabrsk [Ukraine], St. Petersburg [Russia], and Tartus [Syria]."

117. Page 67 of the Report continues: "The Kaalbye-owned *Ocean Voyager* entered St. Petersburg [Russia] on 13 January 2012, where it remained for two days. It then left, and arrived in Tartus [Syria] on 3 February 2012. After completing this shipment, it transited to Oktyabrsk [Ukraine], loaded cargo, and delivered Russian weapons to Venezuela as part of a multi-ship convoy completing a $4 billion arms transfer that included S-300 missiles."

118. KAALBYE does not dispute that it plays a prominent role in transporting Russian and Ukrainian weapons.

119. KAALBYE does not dispute that it has actively transported unknown cargo between Ukraine, Russia, and Syria since the start of the Syrian civil war.

120. KAALBYE does not dispute that KAALBYE owned the *Ocean Voyager*, which transported cargo from St. Petersburg to Tartus in early 2012. This transfer was from RosOboronExport, the Russian arms export agency, with a notify address of "Ministry of Defense: Damascus." **See Exhibits 3 & 4.**

121. KAALBYE does not dispute that the KAALBYE ship *Ocean Voyager* loaded cargo and delivered Russian weapons to Venezuela as part of a $4 billion arms transfer in 2012.

122. KAALBYE *does* take issue with C4ADS's use of the term "shipper." KAALBYE asserts that it "serves as a cargo carrier or transporter. Thus, the allegation that Kaalbye is actually involved in the purchase or sale of arms is false." **See Exhibit 7, p. 3.**

123. KAALBYE's assertion that the Report states that KAALBYE "is actually involved in the purchase or sale of arms" is false. The Report says the opposite. As set forth above, C4ADS repeatedly sets out that the Odessa companies (including KAALBYE) are not involved in the purchase or sale of arms, but instead that these transfers are made under government control and KAALBYE has acted as a logistics contractor.

There are armed guards at KAALBYE's place of business.

124. Page 38 of the Report states: "Kaalbye's offices take up most of a 10-story building called the Maritime Business Center in the heart of Odessa. Though one can enter the ground floor reception area at will, guards armed with AK-47s are posted at the foot of the stairs."

125. KAALBYE does not dispute that its offices take up most of the 10-story building called the Maritime Business Center in Odessa, Ukraine.

126. Page 38 of the Report provides a picture of guards armed with AK-47s in the Maritime Business Center in Odessa, Ukraine, at the foot of the stairs.

127. Despite photographic evidence of armed guards at its place of business, KAALBYE asserts that "Kaalbye does not have armed guards at its place of business". **See Exhibit 7, p. 2.**

128. As shown in the photographic evidence, the statement in the Report that "guards armed with AK-47s are posted at the foot of the stairs" at KAALBYE's place of business are true. Further, that there are armed guards at a place of business is not capable of defamatory meaning. Further, these statements were made in good faith with a reasonable belief of their truth.

Kaalbye and Spliethoff simultaneously transferred arms to Venezuela.

129. Page 57 of the Report sets out the details of a $4 billion arms deal between Venezuela and the Russian Federation. The Report further sets out that in 2012, "four separate Kaalbye ships – *Socol* 3, *Socol* 6, *Ocean Voyager*, and *Ocean Fortune* – delivered Russian weapons to Venezuela."

130. Page 57 of the Report continues: "the Spliethoff ship *Sluisgracht* and Eckhoff-managed ship *Stade* accompanied Kaalbye in transporting weapons to Venezuela." The Report further states: "We lack information on the nature of Spliethoff and Eckhoff's connections to the Russian government or Odessa Network."

131. Page 57 of the Report continues: "We also believe *Sluisgracht* has some contacts with Kaalbye; the level of coordination required to move such large quantities of weapons in concert would seem to demand it."

132. KAALBYE does not dispute that it sent four separate shipments of Russian weapons to Venezuela in 2012 as part of a $4 billion arms deal.

133. KAALBYE contends that the Report "falsely alleges or implies that Spliethoff, a Netherlands company, has some kind of cooperative business relationship with Kaalbye Shipping."

134. However, the Report specifically states that C4ADS does not have information regarding a connection between Spliethoff and KAALBYE. The Report specifically identifies these statements as C4ADS's belief and opinion. The statements in the Report concerned matters of legitimate public interest, are C4ADS's fair opinion, made in good faith, and with a reasonable belief of their truth.

135. The transfer of $4 billion of arms from Russia to Venezuela is a matter of legitimate public interest. Further, the statements in the Report concerning these transfers, and KAALBYE's role therein, have been the focus of public controversy.

136. Further, the statements in the Report are true – KAALBYE did transport these weapons to Venezuela, at the same time Spliethoff transported weapons to Venezuela.

137. The statements in the Report regarding KAALBYE and Spliethoff are not capable of defamatory meaning. KAALBYE concedes its role in transporting $4 billion in arms from Russia to Venezuela – merely inferring that it cooperated with another entity for this purpose does not defame KAALBYE.

Multiple AIS providers confirm a discrepancy in AIS Coverage over Kaalbye ships.

138. KAALBYE claims that pages 67-68 the Report "directly accuses KAALBYE of circumventing safety features on its vessels and concealing movements for purportedly illegal business." **See Exhibit 7, p. 3.**

139. The Report does not "directly accuse KAALBYE of circumventing safety features on its vessels and concealing movements for purportedly illegal business."

140. Page 67-68 of the Report does not reference, nor purport to reference, any "illegal business."

141. As set forth above, the Report repeatedly and explicitly disclaims that the Report does not imply illegal activity.

142. In fact, page 68 of the Report (inside the very section of which KAALBYE complains) explicitly states that the activity detailed therein "is not inherently criminal."

143. Page 67-68 of the Report does not accuse KAALBYE of "circumventing safety features on its vessels."

144. Instead, the Report states that KAALBYE's 2013 port calls at Oktyabrsk, Ukraine are followed by long periods with "ships missing from AIS coverage."

145. Page 68 of the Report identifies the "AIS coverage" referenced in the Report. The Report states: "Many of the major commercial AIS vendors lacked information on Syria; [C4ADS] leveraged AIS 'Destination' data from smaller [European Union] and [Former Soviet Union] AIS providers, who maintain land-based receivers in the Eastern Mediterranean."

146. The Report states that this "AIS coverage is imperfect; ships are often undetectable when on the high seas, far away from land-based AIS receivers, and many under-developed ports lack adequate AIS infrastructure."

147. The Report explicitly provides an alternate to KAALBYE's assertion that C4ADS accuses it "of circumventing safety features." Page 68 of the Report posits that KAALBYE's absence from the AIS coverage considered in the Report can be explained by KAALBYE ships "docking at areas with poor AIS coverage."

148. The statements in the Report are true. KAALBYE ships were not within the AIS coverage of the multiple major commercial AIS data providers or the smaller AIS data providers' land-based receivers that C4ADS references, or were missing from the data C4ADS gathered from these sources, or bore some sort of AIS discrepancy.

149. C4ADS is not now aware, nor has it ever been aware, of any credible AIS data source that controverts the AIS data on which it relied.

150. The statements in the Report concern matters of legitimate public interest, as they relate to potential arms transfers to Syria and elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean.

151. The statements in the Report concern issues at the heart of a significant public controversy, evidenced by extensive reporting on arms transfers to Syria during the ongoing crisis in that country. As evidenced by KAALBYE's decision to transport items from the Russian arms export agency RosOboronExport to the Syrian Ministry of Defense during the Syrian Civil War, KAALBYE intentionally placed itself in this controversy. C4ADS's statements regarding such shipments are germane to the controversy.

152. C4ADS made the statements in the report in good faith, with a reasonable belief in their truth. At the time it published the Report, C4ADS had no reason to doubt the veracity of the statements in the Report, and took extensive steps to corroborate these statements, including consulting major commercial vendors that collect AIS data.

153. The statements in the Report regarding AIS data are C4ADS's reasonable and fair opinion drawn from the data identified in the report.

COUNT I – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
(as to KAALBYE)

154. Plaintiff reincorporates by reference all preceding and subsequent paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein.

155. On October 31, 2013, KAALBYE's counsel at PATTON BOGGS contacted C4ADS, seeking to have C4ADS "repudiate" what KAALBYE contended are "libelous statements" contained in the Report.

156. On November 5, 2013, KAALBYE's counsel at PATTON BOGGS advised C4ADS that KAALBYE's counsel is authorized to draft and file a complaint against C4ADS "in the next couple of weeks."

157. KAALBYE's counsel at PATTON BOGGS repeatedly informed C4ADS that KAALBYE's counsel either is drafting or has drafted a complaint against C4ADS.

158. As recently as April 4, 2014, KAALBYE's counsel informed C4ADS that KAALBYE's counsel is prepared to file and serve a complaint against C4ADS.

159. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as well as this Court's general equity powers, permit this Court in case of an actual controversy within its jurisdiction to declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party in seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.

160. An actual and substantial controversy exists between C4ADS and KAALBYE as to whether C4ADS's statements in the Report concerning KAALBYE are defamatory. C4ADS

and KAALBYE have adverse legal interests that are of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

161. C4ADS requests that this Court issue a declaration that the statements in the Report concerning KAALBYE did not defame KAALBYE.

162. Such declaration will assist in determining C4ADS's legal rights and obligations and in terminating the controversy.

163. As set forth above, the statements in the Report concerning KAALBYE are not defamatory. For instance, many of the statements KAALBYE contends are defamatory are not published in the Report and are in fact specifically and repeatedly disclaimed in the Report. The Report does not create a defamatory inference – it merely conveys materially true facts. The statements of which KAALBYE complains are not capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. Further, the statements in the Report are true and were made with a reasonable belief in their truth, as there is ample evidentiary support for those statements.

164. KAALBYE does not dispute the "gist" of the statements in the Report concerning KAALBYE, tacitly conceding that the statements in the Report concerning KAALBYE are at least substantially true and not actionable.

165. Further, the statements in the Report are constitutionally protected. KAALBYE is a public figure featured repeatedly in press articles internationally and with extensive connections to prominent political figures in Russia and Ukraine, and/or is an instrumentality for public officials in the Russian Federation and/or Ukraine. KAALBYE is also a limited purpose public figure, choosing to involve itself in, playing a central role in, and affecting the outcome of matters of public controversy. C4ADS's reporting was germane to KAALBYE's involvement in

these public controversies. Additionally, the statements in the Report bear on matters of legitimate public interest.

166. C4ADS did not make statements regarding KAALBYE with negligence, nor did C4ADS make such statements with recklessness or malice. C4ADS exercised reasonable (indeed, extraordinary) care.

167. The statements in the Report concerning KAALBYE did not injure KAALBYE's reputation or expose KAALBYE to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or degradation.

168. KAALBYE had a reputation for transporting arms, including transporting arms to areas at risk of grave humanitarian crises, prior to the publication of the Report, such that its reputation could not have been further damaged.

169. C4ADS further requests that this Court issue an anti-suit injunction against KAALBYE to prevent KAALBYE from further threatening C4ADS on the basis of C4ADS's exercise of its constitutionally protected rights, to prevent C4ADS from facing a multiplicity of suits, and to protect C4ADS from harassing litigation strategically calculated to limit C4ADS's public participation.

170. C4ADS requests further necessary or proper relief as this Court may deem appropriate.

COUNT II – DEFAMATION
(as to ALL DEFENDANTS)

171. Plaintiff reincorporates by reference all preceding and subsequent paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein.

172. In or around December, 2013, KAALBYE, by and through its agents at PATTON BOGGS, contacted the Washington Post's reporters and attorneys and, in meetings and/or

correspondence with the Washington Post, impugned C4ADS's reputation and reporting and/or discredited C4ADS.

173. On or about February 11, 2014, GSCG, independently and as agent for KAALBYE, published a "news release" claiming that C4ADS made "false claims" in its Report.

174. On or about February 17, 2014, HANNAFORD, independently and on behalf of GSCG and KAALBYE, publicly impugned C4ADS and the Report. In an American Spectator column, HANNAFORD, acting independently and as agent for KAALBYE and GSCG, claimed that Plaintiff "put two and two together . . . but didn't come up with 'four'."

175. On or about March 27, 2014, GSCG published yet another article defaming Plaintiff. The article states that C4ADS made "false claims" in the Report. The article states that C4ADS "inaccurately reported that Kaalbye's transponder system was non-functional during a 2012 voyage to Venezuela and inaccurately wrote that Ukrainian Vadim Alperin is a Kaalbye business partner." The article repeated the false and defamatory characterization of the Report as "inaccurate." In that article, Kogan (a principal at KAALBYE) asserted that C4ADS's reporting is "inaccurate and unsubstantiated."

176. On or about April 7, 2014, HANNAFORD, independently and on behalf of GSCG and KAALBYE, publicly impugned C4ADS and the Report. In a Washington Times column, HANNAFORD claims, *inter alia*, that "C4ADS gathers information from sundry sources, but seems to have no resources to separate fact from fiction." HANNAFORD continues to state that "the C4ADS people forgot to apply Ronald Reagan's dictum 'Trust, but verify.'" HANNAFORD also states that C4ADS had not "bothered to look into Kaalbye's track record" because it supposedly did not know about KAALBYE's relationship with the U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command.

177. On or about May 1, 2013, after the filing of the lawsuit *sub judice*, KAALBYE placed an advertisement in the Washington Post claiming that statements in the Report were "unsubstantiated," and that C4ADS made its statements "wrongly." KAALBYE continues to state that C4ADS's reporting and analysis is "inaccurate."

178. These statements are false and defamatory. The statements regarding KAALBYE in the Report are not "false" and C4ADS did not make any "false claims." C4ADS's analysis is not "inaccurate," and C4ADS's reporting is not "unsubstantiated." C4ADS did "verify" the statements in the Report, exercised extraordinary caution "to separate fact from fiction," and has extensively investigated into KAALBYE's "track record." For instance, page 38 of the Report specifically states: "Kaalbye also is a contractor for US military sealift command."

179. These statements were widely published without privilege to third parties.

180. DEFENDANTS knew, or reasonably should have known, that these statements were false when made.

181. DEFENDANTS made its defamatory statements with actual malice and wrongful and willful intent to injure Plaintiff. These statements were made with reckless disregard for their veracity, or with knowledge of their falsity, and with wanton and reckless disregard of Plaintiff's reputation and rights.

182. These statements have damaged Plaintiff in the form of injury to Plaintiff's reputation nationally and internationally, and have also specially harmed Plaintiff, in an amount to be proven at trial.

183. DEFENDANTS acted intentionally, maliciously, willfully, and with the intent to injure Plaintiff and benefit KAALBYE. DEFENDANTS are liable for punitive damages and any additional relief this court may deem appropriate.

184. DEFENDANTS acted collectively, cooperating amongst themselves to publish their false and defamatory statements. They are joint tortfeasors, and are thus jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for damages.

COUNT III – TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
(as to ALL DEFENDANTS)

185. Plaintiff reincorporates by reference all preceding and subsequent paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein.

186. Plaintiff had an advantageous and/or prospectively advantageous business relationship with a number of entities, including, *inter alia*, the Washington Post.

187. DEFENDANTS had knowledge of Plaintiff's advantageous or prospectively advantageous business relationship with the Washington Post and other entities.

188. DEFENDANTS intentionally and improperly interfered with Plaintiff's advantageous and prospectively advantageous business relationships through their defamatory actions.

189. DEFENDANTS' conduct was not privileged.

190. DEFENDANTS' conduct has harmed Plaintiff's existing business relationships and prospective business relationships in an amount to be proven at trial.

191. DEFENDANTS' conduct was wanton, and DEFENDANTS are liable for punitive damages and for other additional relief this Court may deem appropriate.

COUNT IV – PUNITIVE DAMAGES
(as to ALL DEFENDANTS)

192. DEFENDANTS' conduct is wanton and reckless, and evidence of a disregard for Plaintiff's rights.

193. DEFENDANTS' continued litigation threats are frivolous, as the statements in the Report are true, are known by DEFENDANTS to be true, and are privileged.

194. DEFENDANTS' continued litigation threats and tortious acts are part of an ongoing effort to chill legitimate dialogue on important public issues.

195. DEFENDANTS' malicious conduct warrants exemplary and punitive damages to deter such future conduct by DEFENDANTS.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE C4ADS prays for the following relief:

- A Declaration of its Rights under the Declaratory Judgment Act and this Court's inherent powers, stating that C4ADS did not defame KAALBYE (or its alter-egos), along with an anti-suit injunction to prevent KAALBYE from further harassing or threatening to harass C4ADS for C4ADS's exercise of its constitutionally protected rights;
- Actual and compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial;
- Punitive damages in an amount sufficient to deter further wanton and reckless behavior from DEFENDANTS and their agents;
- Costs, expenses, and attorney fees incurred by C4ADS in this case;
- Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

C4ADS requests a trial by jury on any and all issues so triable.

WARD & WARD, PLLC

BY: *<u>/s/ Daniel S. Ward</u>*
Thomas J. Ward (D.C. Bar No. 155838)
Daniel S. Ward (D.C. Bar No. 474339)
Taimur Rabbani (D.C. Bar Pending)
2020 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Phone: (202) 331-8160
Email: tom@wardlawdc.com
Email: dan@wardlawdc.com
Email: trabbani@wardlawdc.com

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
CENTER FOR ADVANCED
DEFENSE STUDIES

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This certifies that I have, this 12th day of May 2014, served a copy of the foregoing filing electronically with the Courts electronic filing system, CaseFileXpress, upon the following counsel of record:

Andrew M. Friedman
PATTON BOGGS LLP
2550 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037
(202) 457-6000
(202) 457-6315
afriedman@pattonboggs

and by first class mail, postage prepaid upon the following:

GLOBAL STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS GROUP
1776 I Street, NW, 9th Floor
Washington, DC 20006

PETER HANNAFORD
3555 J Street, #201
Eureka, CA 95503

/s/ Daniel S. Ward

Daniel S. Ward

EXHIBIT 1

The Odessa Network

Mapping Facilitators of Russian and Ukrainian Arms Transfers

—

by Tom Wallace & Farley Mesko

September 2013

©2013

c4ads

ABOUT C4ADS

C4ADS is a 501c3 nonprofit research organization whose mission is to understand global conflict and security through on-the-ground research and data-driven analysis. We seek to alleviate the analytical burden carried by public sector institutions by applying manpower, depth, and rigor to questions of conflict and security.

Our approach to understanding the drivers and enablers of global conflict leverages nontraditional investigative techniques and emerging analytical technologies. We recognize the value of working on the ground in the field, capturing local knowledge, and collecting original data to inform our analysis. At the same time, we employ cutting-edge technology to manage and analyze that data. The result is an innovative analytical approach to conflict prevention and mitigation.

© 2013 C4ADS

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Tom Wallace is a Senior Analyst at C4ADS. He received his undergraduate degree from the University of Michigan in Political Science and Russian Studies, where he was named the National Russian Scholar Laureate, and is a Wolcott Fellow at the George Washington University, where he is currently receiving his master's in Security Policy Studies. Tom's research focuses primarily on government-private collaboration in Russian and Chinese foreign policy. Tom has lived in Russia and China, and speaks Russian and Mandarin.

Farley Mesko is the Chief Operating Officer, and a specialist on illicit maritime networks. He received his undergraduate degree in Natural Resource Policy and Economics from Bowdoin College. He is a consultant for World Bank, a freelance journalist, and sits on the Board of Directors of a Somali NGO. Prior to joining C4ADS, Farley ran a successful small commercial fishing business in Maine. His research focuses primarily on aid, governance, transnational crime, and conflict in Africa. Farley has worked and traveled extensively in East and West Africa, and speaks Arabic.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank Palantir for their generous support; this project would not have been possible without it.

LEGAL DISCLAIMER

The mention of any individual, company, ship, or other entity in this report **does not** imply the violation of any law or international agreement, and need not be construed as such.

Executive Summary

A network of Ukraine-based individuals and logistics companies—referred to herein as the "Odessa Network" due to its key leadership being located in Odessa, Ukraine—is responsible for transporting weapons out of Russia and Ukraine on behalf of government sellers. Evidence suggests that some of these companies may transport weapons to the Assad regime in Syria, among other notorious violators of human rights.

The Odessa Network is a loose collection of logistics contractors for the governments of Russia and Ukraine, not independent arms dealers. Key companies and figures in Odessa include Kaalbye Group, Phoenix Trans-Servis, and their high-level political connections via key facilitators such as Boris Kogan. The companies work with state weapons export agencies such as Rosoboronexport and Ukrspetsexport. Odessa Network company leaders have personal and financial relationships with cabinet-level officials in the Russian and Ukrainian governments, including a personal advisor to Putin and senior Russian military-industrial figures. The Odessa Network centers on a group of Odessa-based private companies that regularly move large arms shipments. Affiliated EU and Russian shipping firms such as Briese Schiffahrts (and its subsidiary BBC Chartering) and Balchart play an important specialized role in transporting particularly large or sensitive shipments. The network is deeply interconnected. Personnel and equipment frequently cycle between different companies, and many network members are family members, close friends, former classmates, etc.

The vast majority of weapons shipments leave from the Ukrainian port of Oktyabrsk, which was specially built by the USSR to move weapons (for example, this was the point of origin for Cuba-bound missiles in 1963). Despite being located in Ukraine, Oktyabrsk is functionally controlled by Russia—the port manager is a former Russian navy captain, and the port owner is a Kremlin-linked oligarch. Russian state weapons export agencies and Odessa Network firms maintain offices and personnel in Oktyabrsk.

The Ukrainian firms also engage in non-weapons business—freight brokering, crewing, chartering, etc.—and operate in global shipping centers such as Hamburg, Rio de Janeiro, Singapore, and Dubai. To protect their weapons shipments, some of the Ukrainian and Russian firms own or contract with multiple private maritime security companies, who also operate in African conflict zones.

Weapons and non-weapons shipping activities generate large profits for Odessa Network leaders. They put their money in both legitimate ventures and a well-known network of Panamamian shell companies and Latvian banks that have been used for money laundering by other entities, including the Sinaloa Cartel and Hezbollah. They also are active users of US and EU financial institutions.

Understanding and tracking Odessa Network activities is valuable in several ways. Since the Odessa Network consists of the prime transportation contractors for Russian and Ukrainian weapons export agencies, tracking their ship movements is an efficient way of determining weapon destinations. This is particularly helpful because Russia and Ukraine are the main weapons suppliers to countries such as Syria and the DRC. This report identifies over 20 previously undiscovered shipments of unknown cargo by Odessa Network-linked shipping companies from Oktyabrsk to Syria in 2012 and 2013. Finally, our report proposes an alternative hypothesis that examines the high volume of Syrian ships moving unknown cargo between Oktyabrsk and the Eastern Mediterranean in 2012.

The inclusion of any company in this report is not intended to imply participation in illegal activity, and a judgment as such is far beyond the purview of this research. Indeed, most of the activity described herein is perfectly legal. Rather, the goal of the report is simply to bring some measure of transparency to an otherwise opaque industry.

Table of Contents

	Table of Figures	6
1	Introduction	9
2	Weapons Shipment Data	12
3	Preliminary Insights	31
4	End-to-End Logistics Integration: Odessa	36
5	Government Connections: Moscow & Kiev	43
6	Port of Origin: Oktyabrsk	50
7	EU & Russian Shipping: Specialized Services	54
8	African Private Security Companies	60
9	Latvia: Financial Services & Laundering	62
10	The Odessa Network: Overview	66
11	Case Study: Syria	67
12	Conclusion	74
13	References	76

Table of Figures

FIGURE 1:	Odessa Network by Location & Function	9
FIGURE 2:	Tanks for Yemen	14
FIGURE 3:	Tanks for Yemen, Cont.	14
FIGURE 4:	APCs for Angola	14
FIGURE 5:	Tanks Being Loaded	15
FIGURE 6:	Ammunition for Uganda	19
FIGURE 7:	Tanks/APCs for Cambodia	21
FIGURE 8:	Tanks/APCs for Cambodia, Cont.	21
FIGURE 9:	Miscellaneous Arms to Venezuela	22
FIGURE 10:	Tanks for Ethiopia	26
FIGURE 11:	Patrol Boats for Vietnam	27
FIGURE 12:	Tanks & APCs for Cambodia	28
FIGURE 13:	Tanks & APCs for Cambodia, Cont.	28
FIGURE 14:	Assault Rifles to Libya	29
FIGURE 15:	Arms Shipment Count	31
FIGURE 16:	Countries in Our Dataset. All Possible Candidate Countries	31
FIGURE 17:	Ukrainian Defense Industrial Agency	32
FIGURE 18:	Ukrainian Defense Industrial Agency	32
FIGURE 19:	Shipment Counts	34
FIGURE 20:	Port of Oktyabrsk	34
FIGURE 21:	Descriptive Statistics	35
FIGURE 22:	Geographic & Functional Map of Odessa Network	36
FIGURE 23:	Kaalbye Shipment Events	37
FIGURE 24:	Kaalbye Subsidiaries, Shells, etc.	38
FIGURE 25:	Kaalbye Guards	38
FIGURE 26:	Dual-Listed Personnel	39
FIGURE 27:	Varamar/Nortrop Shipment Events	40
FIGURE 28:	Varamar Office	40
FIGURE 29:	Barwil Shipment Events	40
FIGURE 30:	Phoenix Shipment Events	41
FIGURE 31:	Phoenix Office	41
FIGURE 32:	Alperin Shipment Events	41
FIGURE 33:	Alperin & Ukr. Intelligence (Mykola Malomuzh, Head of SZR)	42
FIGURE 34:	Hares Youssef (Second From Right), with Rinat Akhmetov & Vadim Novinsky to His Left)	42
FIGURE 35:	Vadim Alperin & Faina	42
FIGURE 36:	Waterlux Official Seal & Signature	42
FIGURE 37:	Levitin & Putin	43
FIGURE 38:	Igor Urbansky	44
FIGURE 39:	Ministry of Transportation	44
FIGURE 40:	Kogan Connections	45
FIGURE 41:	Russian Technologies Subsidiaries (Non-Exhaustive)	45
FIGURE 42:	Olerskiy & Levitin	46
FIGURE 43:	Aleksandr Annenkov	46
FIGURE 44:	Political Connections of the Odessa Network	49
FIGURE 45:	Oktyabrsk Versus St. Petersburg Transit Times	49
FIGURE 46:	FSU Weapons Export Pathways	51
FIGURE 47:	Andrei Yegorov	52
FIGURE 48:	Excerpt From Ukrainian Newspaper Article	52
FIGURE 49:	Vadim Novinsky with President of Ukraine	52
FIGURE 50:	Oktyabrsk Photographs	53
FIGURE 51:	Eide Ships	54
FIGURE 52:	Eide Shipment Events	55
FIGURE 53:	Briese Shipment Events	55

Table of Figures Cont.

FIGURE 54:	Briese Ad In Odessa	55
FIGURE 55:	Primetransport & Kaalbye	55
FIGURE 56:	Briese Corporate Structure	56
FIGURE 57:	Beluga Shipment Events	57
FIGURE 58:	Spliethoff & Eckhoff Shipment Events	57
FIGURE 59:	Balchart Shipment Events	58
FIGURE 60:	Balchart Current & former Employees	58
FIGURE 61:	FEMCO Shipment Events	59
FIGURE 62:	North-Western Shipment Events	59
FIGURE 63:	Westberg Shipment Events	59
FIGURE 64:	Moran Security	60
FIGURE 65:	Private Maritime Security Companies	61
FIGURE 66:	Statement of Russian Official On Money Laundering	62
FIGURE 67:	EU Statement	63
FIGURE 68:	ABLV Sponsorship of Odessa Event	64
FIGURE 69:	Waterlux AG Court Documents	64
FIGURE 70:	Waterlux AG Court Documents, Cont.	65
FIGURE 71:	# Weapons Shipments By Facilitator	66
FIGURE 72:	Syria-Oktyabrsk Maritime Traffic, 2012	70–73

Glossary of Terms

AIS	Automatic Identification System. Remote tracking system used on ships.
AGL	Automatic grenade launcher
APC	Armored personnel carrier
ASM	Anti-ship missile
ATGM	Anti-tank guided missile
BVI	British Virgin Islands
DWT	Deadweight tonnage. A ship's maximum weight capacity.
EXIF	Exchangeable image file format. Stores metadata about a digital image.
FSB	Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti; Russian domestic intelligence agency
FSU	Former Soviet Union
GOR	Government of Russia
GOU	Government of Ukraine
GRU	Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoe Upravlenie; Russian military intelligence agency
GT	Gross tonnage. A measure of a ship's cargo volume capacity.
HEAT	High explosive anti-tank round
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IMOID	International Maritime Organization ID. Ship unique identification code.
IRISL	Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines
MMSI	Maritime Mobile Service Identity. Ship unique identification code.
MV	Motor vessel. Appended in front of a ship's name, e.g. MV Victoria.
ROE	Rosoboronexport; main Russian state weapons export agency
RO-RO	Roll on, roll off. Cargo ship with a specialized ramp for wheeled vehicles.
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SAM	Surface to air missile
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SBU	Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrayiny; Ukrainian state security agency
SDN	Specially designated national
SMG	Somalia Monitoring Group
SPB	St. Petersburg, Russia.
SVR	Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki; Russian foreign intelligence agency
SZR	Sluzhba Zovishnoi Razvedki; Ukrainian foreign intelligence agency
SWIFT	Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications.
TEU	Twenty-foot equivalent unit. Standard unit of measurement for cargo.
USE	Ukrspetsexport; one of Ukraine's state weapons export agencies

1 Introduction

OVERVIEW

When an arms deal is negotiated between Russian officials and foreign dignitaries, little attention is paid until months later, when newspaper articles announce that the purchaser has received the weapons. Pundits examine the political impact *(why is Putin antagonizing the West?)*, and assess its impact on military capability *(how does the S–300 affect a potential intervention in Syria?)*. The question not asked, and the fundamental goal of this investigation, is how did the arms transfer occur? What logistical, financial, and contractual processes are necessary for moving literally tons of military equipment worth millions or even billions of dollars halfway around the globe? Who performs these tasks?

This report is the culmination of a 10-month investigation into Ukrainian and Russian state arms transfers, with these questions in mind. Key findings include: previously unknown or under-reported arms transfers; specific companies and individuals facilitating these arms transfers; familial, financial, and professional links between key facilitators and the governments of Russia and Ukraine. In short, the report analyzes the web of entities and processes through which an arms transfer is executed. We collectively refer to this web as the **Odessa Network** on account of many of the key personnel and companies being based in Odessa, Ukraine.

The Odessa Network is not a hierarchical, unitary organization. It is better characterized as a "contacts market:" clusters of individuals and firms geographically concentrated in a particular area, and performing a specific sub-task of the weapons-export process. For example, the primary logistics contractors for Russian and Ukrainian weapons exports are shipping companies headquartered in the city of Odessa, while the financial services sometimes used to 'clean' profits are located in Latvia. We have categorized six main clusters, as shown in **Figure 1**. These clusters are both intra– and inter-linked. For example, the various Odessa-based shipping companies share common owners and equipment and coordinate with each other on projects, but also are connected to different clusters: powerful officials in Moscow and Kiev, port authorities at Oktyabrsk, etc.

LOCATION	ENTITY	FUNCTION
Moscow and Kiev	Government Agencies	Ownership of Weapons
Odessa, Ukraine	Shipping Companies	A-Z Logistics Integration
EU and Russia	Shipping Companies	Specialized Shipping Services
Oktyabrsk, Ukraine	Port and Port Authority	Loading of Weapons onto Ships
Africa and Middle East	Private Security Companies	Protection of Sensitive Cargo
Latvia	Banks	Financial Services

Figure 1: *Odessa Network by Location and Function*

INVESTIGATION ROADMAP

The analysis presented herein is centered on several datasets of Russian and Ukrainian weapons shipments, which were analyzed for patterns. **Chapter 2** presents this data. Our key assumption is that transporting state-sanctioned arms shipments to sensitive foreign customers such as Syria requires a great deal of trust between contractor and government. As such, these governments are likely to replicate the use of companies, ships, and patterns of behavior found in previous weapons exports. To identify patterns, we researched and assembled a database of Russian and Ukrainian arms shipments spanning 12 years and 22 recipient countries, some licit and documented and others undocumented (i.e. shipments to sanctioned states such as Syria, Myanmar, DPRK, etc.). Each shipment event has up to 12 properties, including ship name, ship owner, ship manager, cargo owner, port of origin, dates, etc.

A cursory analysis of this dataset reveals several key preliminary insights, which are presented in **Section 3**. Importantly, the Russian and Ukrainian governments appear to be the dominant owner and seller of weapons leaving their respective countries. The

popular image of post-Soviet private individuals and criminal groups smuggling major weapons systems[i] is a relic of the 1990s, when state control of strategic assets was considerably weaker. Our data also shows that relatively few shipping companies are responsible for facilitating a high percentage of arms transfers, implying there is a persistent group of trusted contractors upon whom Moscow and Kiev rely. Lastly, our data shows the importance of Oktyabrsk, Ukraine as a port of origin for a high percentage of Russian weapons shipments, again implying some sort of special relationship with the Russian and Ukrainian governments.

Having derived these big-picture insights, **Chapters 4–10** go on to investigate and analyze the weapons export process in greater detail. We identify key individuals, companies, and locations, drawing upon a wide range of open-source data: local media reports in Arabic, Spanish, Russian, and Ukrainian, court cases and contract disputes from Russia, Ukraine, and the United States, incorporation documents made available as exhibits in those cases, and business directories from Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and more. These sections make use of the Palantir Gotham analytical platform to perform network and link analysis on key entities. The overarching finding is that there is a persistent, predictable network by which Moscow and Kiev export weapons: a certain group of people own the ships, a certain group of people handle the money, and so on.

There are several applications of this data and analysis. Identifying patterns of weapons shipping should lead to better predictions of weapons flows out of the Former Soviet Union. Put simply, observing a known weapons transporter leaving a known port of origin for weapons, headed for a country known to buy Russian and Ukrainian weapons leads to stronger predictions about the nature of otherwise unknown cargo. **Chapter 11** applies this inductive analytical approach to the issue of Syria. Russian material support for the Assad regime is well known, but exactly how the Kremlin funnels military equipment into Syria is less well understood. The key question for this section is how to identify arms shipments, or at least narrow the field of candidate shipment events, from among the thousands of ships[ii] transiting the Eastern Mediterranean each year. To answer this question, we built a large dataset of Automated Information System (AIS) [iii] logs for all of Russia, Ukraine, and Syria in 2012. This log of 60,000+ port calls and 10,000+ ships very likely contains weapons shipments from Russia or Ukraine to the Assad regime. We use our insights about the detectable signature of weapons transfers to find ships that are operated or covertly controlled by Odessa Network affiliates, and have recently delivered unknown cargo to Assad. The paper concludes in **Chapter 13**, which summarizes the hard facts uncovered about the Odessa Network and presents our definitive and inferential analytical judgments.

---

i. There is no doubt private entities still export small arms and ammunition without governmental knowledge, but submarines, tanks, missiles, etc. appear to generally be under state control.

ii. Of course, commercial ships are not the only vehicle for transporting weapons. Military vessels, airplanes, rail, truck, etc. are all viable options. With that said, there are significant drawbacks to these alternate vehicles that make commercial ships the best option in most cases. Planes can only carry cargo of relatively small volume and weight, and are under the jurisdiction of whatever country they happen to overfly, creating the risk of interdiction. For example, Turkish fighter jets interdicted a Syrian Air Airbus carrying weapons from Russia in October 2012. In contrast, specialized cargo ships have massive holds capable of carrying almost any equipment, and ships in international waters are generally under the jurisdiction of whatever country they are flagged in (often weak states like Panama or Liberia unlikely to interfere), meaning they can only be legally interdicted if they enter territorial waters. Rail and truck are similarly limited to relatively small equipment, as they must fit onto a standard rail gauge or highway. They also are vulnerable to interdiction as they pass through intermediary countries. Military vessels are obviously safe from interdiction, but are generally not designed for large cargo, and are highly conspicuous, making them a poor choice for covert arms transfers. For all these reasons, we focused our investigation on commercial vessels.

iii. A ship-based transponder that records port calls at a particular date and time, and the stated destination for all ships on their journey past a series of land-based antennas.

GOALS

This report has two goals. The first is to empower global policymakers. As the 2nd and 10th largest arms exporters in the world, respectively, Russia and Ukraine sell to many countries of interest to the international community. In particular, some of their best customers are states with poor human rights records or active sanctions: Venezuela, Sudan, etc. Russian support (including but not limited to weapons) has kept the Assad regime armed and viable through two years of brutal civil war. Russian anti-ship and anti-air missiles shield Assad from international intervention; Russian bullets and bombs kill Free Syrian Army members, jihadis, and civilians alike. Some weapons shipments from Russia to Syria have been publicly exposed—e.g. the ships *Alaed*, *Professor Katsman*, and *Chariot*, and various Russian warships[1]—but these logically must be simply the tip of the iceberg. The sheer quantity of materiel required to fight a conventional war for over two years dictates there must be far more Russian weapons flowing to Syria than these few ships.[2] Policymakers armed with better information about arms transfers from the former Soviet Union to sanctioned states and conflict zones like Syria will be better able to monitor, shape, deter, or publicize these weapons flows. If limiting access to FSU weapons is a policy priority, the Odessa Network is a useful place to start.

Second, this report demonstrates the utility of combining open-source data, foreign language and regional expertise, and cutting-edge technology in answering complex research questions, and bridging the gap between tactical data and strategic insight. The best policy-level insights are those derived from tactical data that has been traced upwards into abstraction. For example, deep investigation into the weapons export process provides not just names and locations, but also political insights into the workings of Putin's Russia. Abstract themes find detailed expression in the Odessa Network: reassertion of state control over strategic assets, keeping regime stakeholders loyal through sanctioned corruption, "power vertical" relationships, and fusion of public and private entities.

DISCLAIMER

This project was conceived, funded, and carried out independently. It has received no external funding, public or private. All data was obtained open-source or commercially purchased. Although the authors travelled to Ukraine (including Kiev, Odessa, Nikolaev, and Oktyabrsk) for field research, the vast majority of work was done in the US. This paper examines both licit and illicit weapons transfers. We use the term illicit to describe those transfers that could be perceived as contrary to accepted international norms, not to imply violation of any international laws or agreements. We make no claims to determine the legal status of any particular transfer.

2 Weapons Shipment Data

OVERVIEW

This section presents our dataset on Russian and Ukrainian weapons shipments, and the ships, companies, and ports used to facilitate them. **Preliminary insights derived from this dataset are presented in Chapter 3.**

Countries and shipments were determined by comparing lists of recipient countries to values of arms transfers from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers and Military Expenditures databases, and searching for international media coverage of shipment events (for those that were of sufficient size or nature to warrant international media coverage), and native-language local media coverage of the arrivals of shipments. This database draws heavily on unconventional open data sources such as photos posted by local Venezuelan military bloggers or Cambodian activists of ships unloading weapons. Ship or owner names were determined from pictures (if visible) or from searching for unique IMOID identifiers (if visible).

A note on terms: *exporting country* refers to the country that owned and sold the weapons (i.e. Russia or Ukraine). *Government control* refers to whether the Russian or Ukrainian government was the owner and broker of the sale; if not explicitly stated in our sources, we assumed this was the case if the arms transfer could be corroborated with known government sales. *Port of origin* refers to the port from which the shipment of weapons originated. This is often different than exporting country; for example, Russian arms sales are often shipped from Ukrainian ports. Similarly, *importing country* refers to the country which purchased the weapons, which often is different than *port of arrival*; for example, landlocked countries (e.g. South Sudan) may use their neighbor's ports (e.g. Mombasa, Kenya) to receive weapons shipments. Lastly, *date* should be treated as only a rough indication of when a weapons shipment took place. Different sources use different dates; some only report when a shipment was loaded, others when it was off-loaded, and still others when it was interdicted by a 3rd party. Given such noisy data, this paper treats *date* as generally indicative of when a shipment took place, not an exact value.

EVENT #1

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine[3]
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Iran
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	No (Corrupt Official)
CARGO	Kh–55 (NATO: AS–15 Kent) cruise missiles. US intelligence officials are quoted as saying 6 missiles were shipped,[4] while Ukrainian sources have said 12.[5]
PORT OF ORIGIN	-
PORT OF ARRIVAL	-
DATE	2000 or 2001
SHIP	-
IMOID	-
FLAG	-
GROSS TONNAGE	-
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	-
SHIP OWNER	Kaalbye Shipping[6]
SHIP OPERATOR/BROKER	Kaalbye Shipping
NOTES	*Covert deal brokered by corrupt Ukrainian and Russian officials, including from Ministry of Defense and State Security Service. Used fabricated contract with Russian defense export firm Rosvooruzhenie and series of front companies (including "Progress" and "Far West Ltd.") to export missiles inherited from USSR and held in Ukraine. All parties involved except Igor Urbansky (of Kaalbye Shipping) died under mysterious circumstances: then-head of Ukrspetsexport Valeri Maleev died in a car crash on 6 March 2002, Australian-Iranian Haider Sarfraz died in a car crash in 2004, Oleg Orlov was arrested in the Czech Republic and extradited to Ukraine, where his throat was slit in prison, Sergei Petrov died in a car bombing in Africa in 2004,[7] and Vladimir Filin disappeared.*[8]

EVENT #2

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine
IMPORTING COUNTRY	China
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	No (corrupt officials)
CARGO	6 Kh–55 cruise missiles.
PORT OF ORIGIN	-
PORT OF ARRIVAL	-
DATE	2000 or 2001
SHIP	-
IMOID	-
FLAG	-
GROSS TONNAGE	-
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	-
SHIP OWNER/OPERATOR	Kaalbye Shipping
NOTES	*Carried out by same group as Event #1.*

EVENT #3

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia (Rosvooruzhenie)[9]
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Angola (some sources report the government acting through state firm Simportex was the purchaser, while others report the rebel group UNITA) [10, 11]
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	636 tons of assault rifles, ammunition, grenades, mortar shells, NVGs, and more.[12]
PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine[13]
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Intended for Luanda, Angola; intercepted in Las Palmas, Spain[14]
DATE	24 February 2001
SHIP	*MV Anastasia*
IMOID	-
FLAG	St. Vincent and Grenadines/Georgia
GROSS TONNAGE	-
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	-
SHIP OWNER/MANAGER	Kaalbye Shipping[15]
NOTES	*Igor Urbansky, founder of Kaalbye, was directly involved. Ship was intercepted in Las Palmas in the Canary Islands, where Spanish officials uncovered weapons and impounded the ship. After an $800,000 bail was paid, the ship continued on to Angola and delivered its cargo. Ship was flying the Georgia flag, but in fact was registered in St. Vincent and Grenadines.*

EVENT #4

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Myanmar
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	-
CARGO	-
PORT OF ORIGIN	Unknown, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Rangoon, Myanmar[16]
DATE	25 February 2003
SHIP	-
IMOID	-
FLAG	-
GROSS TONNAGE	-
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	-
SHIP OWNER/MANAGER	-

EVENT #5

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Angola and Yemen?
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes

EVENT #5 CONT.

CARGO	32 T–72 tanks for Yemen and 11 BTR–80 APCs for Angola?
PORT OF ORIGIN	Unknown, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Unknown
DATE	15 October 2003[17]
SHIP	-
IMOID	-
FLAG	-
GROSS TONNAGE	-
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	-
SHIP OWNER	-
SHIP MANAGER	-
NOTES	*Phoenix Trans-Servis (Odessa, Ukraine) brokered the shipment. Data on this shipment was obtained by locating several pictures on Phoenix's website showing various military equipment—including tanks and APCs—being loaded onto one or more unidentified ships.[18] The tanks and APCs appear to be loaded on the same ship. EXIF data reveals the pictures are from 15 October 2003. We cross-referenced SIPRI arms transfer databases[19] for tanks and APCs delivered from Russia or Ukraine to a foreign customer for whom maritime transport would be necessary (i.e. not a landlocked neighbor like Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan). Based on this dataset, Yemen is the only plausible candidate for the tanks, and Angola the only plausible candidate for the APCs. Nevertheless, it is possible this delivery was not previously detected and hence not included in the SIPRI dataset, in which case we do not know to whom the arms were sold.*

Figures 2 & 3: *Tanks for Yemen*

Figure 4: *APCs for Angola*

EVENT #6

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia (Rosoboronexport)
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Eritrea
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	Pechora–2 SAMs

EVENT #6 CONT.

PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Massawa, Eritrea
DATE	Contract was signed 12 May 2004
SHIP	-
IMOID	-
FLAG	-
GROSS TONNAGE	-
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	-
SHIP OWNER	-
SHIP MANAGER	-
NOTES	*Involved parties included Rosoboronexport, Gorizont, and Almaz-Antei. Data gathered from Russian court case[20] that contains a wealth of information on ROE contracting procedures. SIPRI does not contain information for this arms transfer; either it never occurred, or was previously undetected.*

EVENT #7

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine or Russia
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Georgia? Algeria? South Korea?
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	T–72 or T–80 tanks
PORT OF ORIGIN	Unknown, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Unknown
DATE	7 May 2005[21]
SHIP	*MV Clipper Century*
IMOID	9252826
FLAG	Bahamas
GROSS TONNAGE	6714
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	8729
SHIP OWNER	Clipper Project Shipping Ltd.
SHIP MANAGER	Clipper Project Shipping Ltd.[22]
NOTES	*Data was uncovered by locating a picture on Nortrop's website of tanks being loaded onto a ship whose name and IMOID were visible, allowing identification of ship ownership and management.[23] EXIF data revealed the picture's date and time. Querying SIPRI databases for tanks delivered from Ukraine or Russia in 2005 revealed three possible candidates: Algeria (received 21 T–72 tanks from Ukraine in 2005), Georgia (received 90 T–72 tanks from Ukraine between 2005 and 2007), and South Korea (received 10 T–80 tanks from Russia between 2005 and 2006.) It is possible this was a previously undetected shipment to an unknown customer.*

Figure 5:
Tanks being loaded

EVENT #8

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia
IMPORTING COUNTRY	China[24]
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	2 *Kilo*-class attack submarines[25]
PORT OF ORIGIN	Severodvinsk, Russia[26]

EVENT #8 CONT.

PORT OF ARRIVAL	Unknown, China
DATE	Submarines loaded 30 May 2006
SHIP	*MV Eide Transporter*
IMOID	8030130
FLAG	Bahamas
GROSS TONNAGE	19579
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	11434
SHIP OWNER	Eide Marine Services AS[27]
SHIP MANAGER	Eide Marine Services AS
NOTES	-

EVENT #9

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine (Ukroboronservis)[28]
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Democratic Republic of Congo (Ministry of Defense)
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	Significant quantities of ammunition and armored vehicles
PORT OF ORIGIN	Unknown, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Unknown
DATE	26 July 2006
SHIP	*MV BBC Singapore*
IMOID	*9137727*
FLAG	Gibraltar
GROSS TONNAGE	4078
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	4900
SHIP OWNER	Juister Balje (listed at same address as Briese Schiffahrts)[29]
SHIP MANAGER	Briese Schiffahrts KMBH and Co.
NOTES	-

EVENT #10

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia (Rosoboronexport)[30]
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Morocco
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	Likely repaired and serviced tanks
PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktyabrsk, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Unknown, Morocco
DATE	Late 2006
SHIP	-
IMOID	-
FLAG	-
GROSS TONNAGE	-
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	-
SHIP OWNER	-
SHIP MANAGER	-
NOTES	-

EVENT #11

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia (Rosoboronexport)[31]
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Algeria and South Korea
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	For South Korea, some portion of the "Red Bear–2" deal that included 2000 AT–13 anti-tank missiles, 37 BMP–3 IFVs, 23 Il–103 aircraft, 7 Ka–32 helicopters, 3 Murena landing craft, and 10 T–80U tanks. For Algeria, unknown.
PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktyabrsk, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Unknown
DATE	Late 2006

EVENT #11 CONT.

SHIP	-
IMOID	-
FLAG	-
GROSS TONNAGE	-
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	-
SHIP OWNER	-
SHIP MANAGER	-
NOTES	-

EVENT #12

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Reported as Iraq, actual purchaser unknown
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes (Confirmed by Ukrainian government)
CARGO	Fagot ATGMs
PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Reported as Um Qasr, Iraq, actual destination unknown
DATE	21 July 2007
SHIP	*MV Slavyanin*
IMOID	8300169
FLAG	St. Vincent and Grenadines
GROSS TONNAGE	6327
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	6258
SHIP OWNER	Starway Management Property (listed at same address as AnShip)[32]
SHIP MANAGER	Anship LLC (subsidiary of AnRussTrans, a major Russian transportation company owned by Aleksandr Annenkov, a former Russian Ministry of Transportation deputy minister).[33]
NOTES	-

EVENT #13

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Vietnam[34]
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	2 *Tarantul*-class missile corvettes, each armed with 16 SS-N–25 anti-ship missiles.[35]
PORT OF ORIGIN	Unknown, Russia
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Cam Ranh, Vietnam
DATE	21 December 2007
SHIP	*MV Eide Transporter*
IMOID	8030130
FLAG	Bahamas
GROSS TONNAGE	19579
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	11434
SHIP OWNER	Eide Marine Services AS[36]
SHIP MANAGER	Eide Marine Services AS
NOTES	-

EVENT #14

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine
IMPORTING COUNTRY	South Sudan
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	Confirmed as military shipment as part of overall arms transfer (see events #15 and #16), but exact cargo is not known.
PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Mombasa, Kenya
DATE	Left port 14 September 2007, arrived 29 October 2007

EVENT #14 CONT.

SHIP	*MV Radomyshl*
IMOID	7415527
FLAG	Ukraine
GROSS TONNAGE	4966
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	5657
SHIP OWNER	Ukrainian Danube Shipping Company[37]
SHIP MANAGER	Ukrainian Danube Shipping Company
NOTES	*Marine Energy Trading Company Ltd. (representing Milltown Corporate Services and Ireland & Overseas Acquisition Company) and Phoenix Trans-Servis involved in chartering and brokering. Use of Latvian proxies (detailed in later chapter.)*[38]

EVENT #15

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine
IMPORTING COUNTRY	South Sudan
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	42 T–72 tanks, 138 packages of spare parts for them, 15 ZU–23–2 anti-aircraft guns, 90 packages of spare parts for them, 26 packages of RPG–7 weapons and spare parts, 2 BM–21 122 multiple launch rocket launchers on Ural wheelbase, 10,000 AKM assault rifles.
PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Mombasa, Kenya
DATE	21 December 2007
SHIP	*MV Beluga Endurance*
IMOID	9312169
FLAG	Antigua and Barbuda
GROSS TONNAGE	9611
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	12714
SHIP OWNER	Martin Schiffahrts (listed at same address as Heino Winter)[39]
SHIP MANAGER	Heino Winter GmbH and Co. KG
NOTES	*Operated by Beluga Shipping. Marine Energy Trading Company Ltd. (representing Milltown Corporate Services and Ireland & Overseas Acquisition Company), Phoenix Trans-Servis, and Ace Shipping involved in chartering and brokering. Use of Latvian proxies (detailed in later chapter.)*

EVENT #16

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine[40 41 42]
IMPORTING COUNTRY	South Sudan
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	33 T–72 tanks, 8,926 rounds of VOF–36 high explosive fragmentation 125 mm tank ammunition, 5,000 rounds of VDK–10 HEAT 125 mm tank ammunition, 73 packages of spare parts for tanks, 6 ZPU–4 AA guns, 36 packages of RPG–7V launchers and spare parts, 6 BM–21 122 mm multiple launch rocket launchers on Ural wheelbase.
PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Mombasa, Kenya
DATE	Left port 1 September 2008, captured by pirates 25 September 2008, arrived 10 February 2009
SHIP	*MV Faina*
IMOID	7419337
FLAG	Belize
GROSS TONNAGE	10931
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	9019
SHIP OWNER	Waterlux AG
SHIP MANAGER	Almar
NOTES	*Ship is widely reported to actually be owned and operated by Kaalbye Shipping and Tomex Team (closely linked to Ukrainian businessman Vadim Alperin). The crewing*

EVENT #16 CONT.

NOTES CONT.	*agency is Carvel Shipping Ltd. Phoenix Trans-Servis and Ace Shipping Ltd. and Marine Energy Trading Company Ltd. (representing Milltown Corporate Services and Ireland & Overseas Acquisition Company) involved in chartering and brokering. Political connection was Hares Youssef, who acted as the agent of President Yushchenko and contacted Alperin.*[43]

EVENT #17

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine (Ukrinmash)
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Uganda (Ministry of Defense)
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	1000 tons of ammunition
PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktyabrsk, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
DATE	24 June 2008
SHIP	*MV Ann Scan*
IMOID	9145126
FLAG	Antigua and Barbuda
GROSS TONNAGE	2528
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	3526
SHIP OWNER	Hasetal Mardex Schiffahrts[44]
SHIP MANAGER	Held Bereederungs GmbH and Co.
NOTES	*Barwil Ukraine involved in shipment. Same ship was later used for cigarette smuggling into Britain.*[45]

Figure 6:
Ammunition for Uganda

EVENT #18

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Myanmar
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	APC components, AGLs, ATGMs, and tank machine guns.[46]
PORT OF ORIGIN	Unknown, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Unknown, Myanmar
DATE	Mid-August 2009
SHIP	*MV Beluga Eternity*

EVENT #18 CONT.

IMOID	9283966
FLAG	Antigua and Barbuda
GROSS TONNAGE	9611
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	12806
SHIP OWNER	Beluga Eternity GmbH and Co. (listed at same address as Beluga Shipping)[47]
SHIP MANAGER	Beluga Fleet Management GmbH and Co.
NOTES	-

EVENT #19

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Algeria
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Unknown
CARGO	6.9 tons of ammonium nitrate
PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine[48]
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Skidda, Algeria
DATE	18 December 2009
SHIP	*Lady Juliet*
IMOID	8225204
FLAG	St. Vincent and Grenadines
GROSS TONNAGE	12296
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	15896
SHIP OWNER	White Albatross Ltd. (listed at same address as Kaalbye Shipping)[49]
SHIP MANAGER	Kaalbye Shipping
NOTES	*Ship was dead in the water in Dardanelles.[50] Ship previously was victim of attempted pirate hijacking off the coast of Somalia, but ship was defended by armed personnel aboard.[51]*

EVENT #20

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Vietnam
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	Two *Svetlyak*-class patrol boats[52]
PORT OF ORIGIN	Unknown, Russia
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Unknown, Vietnam
DATE	2010
SHIP	*MV Eide Transporter*
IMOID	8030130
FLAG	Bahamas
GROSS TONNAGE	19579
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	11434
SHIP OWNER	Eide Marine Services AS[53]
SHIP MANAGER	Eide Marine Services AS
NOTES	-

EVENT #21

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine[54]
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Democratic Republic of Congo
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	20 T–72 tanks, 100 lorries, 60 anti-aircraft guns, 10,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles, several hundred thousand rounds of ammunition
PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktyabrsk, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Matadi, DRC
DATE	6 March 2010
SHIP	*BBC Romania*
IMOID	9195420

EVENT #21 CONT.

FLAG	Gibraltar
GROSS TONNAGE	3198
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	4304
SHIP OWNER	Briesesee Briese Schiffahrts
SHIP MANAGER	Briese Schiffahrts
NOTES	*Deal reportedly worth $80 million. Other ships likely involved.*

EVENT #22

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Unknown, presumed Russia
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Sudan and Singapore[55]
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Unknown
CARGO	Tanks for Sudan, explosives for Singapore[56]
PORT OF ORIGIN	Unknown port in Norway[57]
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Intercepted while docking at Limassol, Cyprus[58]
DATE	11 June 2010
SHIP	*MV Santiago*
IMOID	9145114
FLAG	Antigua and Barbuda
GROSS TONNAGE	2528
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	3525
SHIP OWNER	Pewsum Briese Schiffahrts. Listed at same address in Germany as Briese Schiffahrts[59]
SHIP MANAGER	Briese Schiffahrts GmbH and Co.
NOTES	*Crew was 4 Russians and 5 Ukrainians.*[60]

Figures 7 & 8:
Tanks/APCs for Cambodia

EVENT #23

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Czech Republic and Poland, or Ukraine
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Cambodia[61]
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	50 T–55 tanks and 40 PTR–26 APCs[62]
PORT OF ORIGIN	Unknown
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Sikhanoukville, Cambodia
DATE	10 September 2010
SHIP	*MV BBC Pacific*
IMOID	9427081
FLAG	Antigua and Barbuda
GROSS TONNAGE	5261
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	6192
SHIP OWNER	Norderloog. Listed at same address in Germany as Briese Schiffahrts
SHIP MANAGER	Briese Schiffahrts GmbH and Co.[63]
NOTES	*Ship identity was ascertained through leaked pictures of it unloading tanks at Sikhanoukville port. Some sources indicate the tanks came from the Czech Republic and the APCs from Poland,*[64] *while others indicate they all came from Ukraine.*[65]

EVENT #24

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Vietnam
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	One *Gepard*-class frigate[66]
PORT OF ORIGIN	Unknown
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Cam Ranh, Vietnam
DATE	5 March 2011
SHIP	*MV Eide Transporter*
IMOID	8030130
FLAG	Bahamas

EVENT #24 CONT.

GROSS TONNAGE	19579
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	11434
SHIP OWNER	Eide Marine Services AS[67]
SHIP MANAGER	Eide Marine Services AS
NOTES	-

EVENT #25

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Iraq
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	26 BTR–4 APCs, two maintenance and repair vehicles, and two armor trainers[68]
PORT OF ORIGIN	Unknown, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Um Qasr, Iraq
DATE	Left 20 April 2011, arrived 29 May 2011
SHIP	-
IMOID	-
FLAG	-
GROSS TONNAGE	-
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	-
SHIP OWNER	-
SHIP MANAGER	-
NOTES	-

Figure 9:
Miscellaneous Arms to Venezuela

EVENT #26

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia[69]
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Venezuela
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	35 T–72 tanks, 16 BMP–3 IFVs, 32 BTR–80A APCs, 4 1B152 armored command vehicles, 13 2c23 Nona-SVK self-propelled 120 mm artillery, 24 2C12 Sani 120 mm artillery, 24 BM–21 truck-mounted rocket launchers, unknown quantity of ZI–23–2 AA guns, and unknown quantity of military automobiles
PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Puerto Cabello, Venezuela
DATE	25 May 2011
SHIP	*MV Sluisgracht*
IMOID	9202522
FLAG	Netherlands
GROSS TONNAGE	16639
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	21250
SHIP OWNER	Sluisgracht Rederij (listed at same address as Spliethoff)[70]
SHIP MANAGER	Spliethoff
NOTES	*Use pictures. Spliethoff also is contracted to transport weapons for the US Military Sealift Command; for example, its ship MV Schippersgracht transported military cargo from the United States to Egypt in March 2012.*[71]

EVENT #27

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Vietnam
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	One *Gepard*-class frigate
PORT OF ORIGIN	Unknown, Russia
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam[72]
DATE	25 July 2011
SHIP	*MV Eide Transporter*
IMOID	8030130

EVENT #27 CONT.

FLAG	Bahamas
GROSS TONNAGE	19579
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	11434
SHIP OWNER	Eide Marine Services AS[73]
SHIP MANAGER	Eide Marine Services AS
NOTES	-

EVENT #28

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Syria
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	Between 35 and 60 tons of munitions and explosives[74]
PORT OF ORIGIN	St. Petersburg, Russia
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Intended for Al Ladaqiyah, Syria, detained in Cyprus
DATE	Left SPB on 9 December 2011, detained in Limassol, Cyprus on 10 January 2012[75]
SHIP	*MV Chariot*
IMOID	8302882
FLAG	St. Vincent and Grenadines
GROSS TONNAGE	845
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	922
SHIP OWNER	Westberg Management AG (listed at same address as Westberg Ltd.)[76]
SHIP MANAGER	Westberg Ltd.
NOTES	*Shipment chartered by Balchart.*

EVENT #29

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Venezuela
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	See notes
PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Puerto Cabello, Venezuela
DATE	20 March 2012[77]
SHIP	*MV Ocean Voyager*
IMOID	9111216
FLAG	St. Vincent and Grenadines
GROSS TONNAGE	7249
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	7278
SHIP OWNER	Unicorn Enterprises (listed at same address as Kaalbye)[78]
SHIP MANAGER	Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine KSU
NOTES	*Part of group shipment consisting of Events #29–30 and #32–34, consisting of S–300 SAMs, Buk-M1–2 SAMs, BM–30 Smerch heavy rocket multiple launcher, and SSC–6 Sennight coastal defense missile system (including the SS-N–25 Switchblade missile.) It is unclear which weapons were on which ship.*

EVENT #30

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Venezuela
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	See notes
PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Puerto Cabello, Venezuela
DATE	20 March 2012[79]
SHIP	*MV Ocean Fortune*[80]
IMOID	9512434
FLAG	Liberia

EVENT #30 CONT.

GROSS TONNAGE	6479
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	8058
SHIP OWNER	Ocean Fortune Ltd. (listed at same address as Kaalbye)
SHIP MANAGER	Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine
NOTES	*Part of group shipment consisting of Events #29–30 and #32–34, consisting of S–300 SAMs, Buk-M1–2 SAMs, BM–30 Smerch heavy rocket multiple launcher, and SSC–6 Sennight coastal defense missile system (including the SS-N–25 Switchblade missile.) It is unclear which weapons were on which ship.*

EVENT #31

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Venezuela
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	T–72 tanks, after having undergone renovations and modernization at the 103rd Tank Factory in Atamanovka (Zakbaykaylsky Krai)
PORT OF ORIGIN	Kronshtadt, Russia (Near St. Petersburg)
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Puerto Cabello, Venezuela
DATE	27 March 2012
SHIP	*MV Sluisgracht*
IMOID	9202522
FLAG	Netherlands
GROSS TONNAGE	16639
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	21250
SHIP OWNER	Sluisgracht Rederij (listed at same address as Spliethoff)
SHIP MANAGER	Spliethoff
NOTES	-

EVENT #32

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Venezuela
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	See notes
PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktaybrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Puerto Cabello, Venezuela
DATE	March 2012
SHIP	*MV Stade*
IMOID	9535620
FLAG	Antigua and Barbuda
GROSS TONNAGE	8059
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	10872
SHIP OWNER	Stade BV
SHIP MANAGER	Eckhoff[81]
NOTES	*Part of group shipment consisting of Events #29–30 and #32–34, consisting of S–300 SAMs, Buk-M1–2 SAMs, BM–30 Smerch heavy rocket multiple launcher, and SSC–6 Sennight coastal defense missile system (including the SS-N–25 Switchblade missile.) It is unclear which weapons were on which ship.*

EVENT #33

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Venezuela
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	Unknown weapons
PORT OF ORIGIN	Unknown
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Puerto Cabello, Venezuela
DATE	13 April 2012

EVENT #33 CONT.

SHIP	*MV Socol 6*[82]
IMOID	9004516
FLAG	Panama
GROSS TONNAGE	6030
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	9597
SHIP OWNER	Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine[83]
SHIP MANAGER	Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine
NOTES	*Part of group shipment consisting of Events #29–30 and #32–34.*

EVENT #34

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia[84]
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Venezuela
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	85 kilogram of Class I explosives (ammunition) and other unknown cargo[85]
PORT OF ORIGIN	Unknown
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Puerto Cabello, Venezuela
DATE	March 2012
SHIP	*MV Socol 3*
IMOID	9004487
FLAG	St. Vincent and Grenadines
GROSS TONNAGE	6030
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	9500
SHIP OWNER	Arcadia Shipping (listed at same address as Kaalbye)
SHIP MANAGER	Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine[86]
NOTES	*Part of group shipment consisting of Events #29–30 and #32–34. Suffered mechanical failure in the Aegean Sea, had to stop for repairs and continued on to Venezuela. All 23 crewmembers were Ukrainian.[87] Prior to 2001 ship was owned by Rosvooruzhenie, a Russian state weapons export agency. Kaalbye Shipping became the manager in March 2003, at which point Oboronprom (a Russian state defense holding) became the owner.[88] Ownership was transferred to Arcadia Shipping (a Kaalbye shell company) in 2004. Ship was previously known as MV BBC Ukraine; BBC Chartering is a subsidiary of Briese.[89]*

EVENT #35

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia[90]
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Syria
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	Rotor blades for helicopters, some reports of heavy weapons[91]
PORT OF ORIGIN	Kronshtadt (St. Petersburg), Russia
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Tartus, Syria
DATE	Departed Kronshtadt on 6 May 2012, arrived in Tartus on 26 May 2012[92]
SHIP	*MV Professor Katsman*
IMOID	9368261
FLAG	Russia
GROSS TONNAGE	4970
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	5465
SHIP OWNER	Rusich–12 Ltd. (listed at same address as and subsidiary of North-Western Shipping Co.)[93]
SHIP MANAGER	North-Western Shipping Co. (ultimately owned by UCL Holding)
NOTES	*Cargo owner listed as Lira LLC. Formerly managed by INOK NV.*[94]

EVENT #36

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia[95]
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Vietnam
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Unknown

EVENT #36 CONT.

CARGO	Unknown weapons and explosives
PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Unknown, Vietnam
DATE	Left port on 13 June 2012, crossed the Suez Canal on 19–20 June, stopped in India for repairs on 27 July
SHIP	*MV Socol 6*[96]
IMOID	9004516
FLAG	Panama
GROSS TONNAGE	6030
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	9597
SHIP OWNER	Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine[97]
SHIP MANAGER	Kaalbye Shipping
NOTES	*All crewmembers were Ukrainian.*

EVENT #37

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia[98]
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Syria
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	Refurbished Mi–25 attack helicopters and munitions[99]
PORT OF ORIGIN	Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg, Russia[100]
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Tartus, Syria
DATE	June and July 2012. Ship was originally forced to turn back after senior US officials and international media publicized its journey, and its British insurer revoked its insurance, but made another voyage under the protection of a Russian naval flotilla.[101]
SHIP	*MV Alaed*
IMOID	9574999
FLAG	Russia
GROSS TONNAGE	7579
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	9000
SHIP OWNER	FEMCO-West Ltd.[102]
SHIP MANAGER	FEMCO Management
NOTES	*The Alaed also has been used to transport parts for Russian Navy ships under construction between different parts of the country.*[103]

Figure 10:
Tanks for Ethiopia

EVENT #38

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine[104]
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Ethiopia
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	Two T–72–UA1 tanks
PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	-
DATE	25 July 2012
SHIP	-
IMOID	-
FLAG	-
GROSS TONNAGE	-
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	-
SHIP OWNER	-
SHIP MANAGER	-
NOTES	*Part of a contract with Ethiopia for 200 T–72 tanks, worth $100 million, signed in June 2011.*[105 106]

EVENT #39

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia[107]
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Vietnam
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	Two *Svetlyak*-class patrol boats
PORT OF ORIGIN	Vladivostok, Russia
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Unknown, Vietnam
DATE	16 August 2012
SHIP	*MV Eide Transporter*
IMOID	8030130
FLAG	Bahamas
GROSS TONNAGE	19579
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	11434
SHIP OWNER	Eide Marine Services AS[108]
SHIP MANAGER	Eide Marine Services AS
NOTES	-

Figure 11: *Patrol boats for Vietnam*

EVENT #40

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine (Ukrspetsexport and Ukroboronprom)
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Iraq
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	62 BTR—4 APCs[109]
PORT OF ORIGIN	Odessa, Ukraine[110]
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Um Qasr, Iraq
DATE	13 September 2012
SHIP	Unknown
IMOID	-
FLAG	-
GROSS TONNAGE	-
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	-
SHIP OWNER	-
SHIP MANAGER	-
NOTES	*Part of $550 million dollar deal.*[111]

EVENT #41

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Unknown
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Nigeria
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	No
CARGO	14 AK–47 rifles and 3,643 rounds of ammunition, as well as 22 Benelli MR1 rifles with 4,955 rounds of ammunition[112]
PORT OF ORIGIN	Unknown
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Detained in Lagos
DATE	20 October 2012[113]
SHIP	*MV Myre Seadiver*
IMOID	6505662
FLAG	Officially listed as Cook Islands, but witnesses indicate it was flying a Dutch flag at time of seizure[114]
GROSS TONNAGE	541
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	315
SHIP OWNER	Midas Pete Ltd.[115]
SHIP MANAGER	Westberg Ltd.
NOTES	*Operated and used by Moran Security Group, a Russian private security firm.*[116] *All crew members were Ukrainians and Russians.*[117]

EVENT #42

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Ukraine[118]
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Cambodia[119]
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	100 tanks and 40 eight and six wheel APCs[120]
PORT OF ORIGIN	Unknown, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Sikhanoukville, Cambodia
DATE	31 October 2012
SHIP	-
IMOID	-
FLAG	-
GROSS TONNAGE	-
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	-
SHIP OWNER	-
SHIP MANAGER	-
NOTES	*Pictures available, but unable to locate identifying characteristics.*

Figure 12: *Tanks and APCs for Cambodia*

Figure 13: *Tanks and APCs for Cambodia cont.*

EVENT #43

EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia[121]
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Libya
GOVERNMENT CONTROL	Yes
CARGO	AK–47 style assault rifles and Igla MANPADs.
PORT OF ORIGIN	Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Tripoli, Libya

EVENT #43 CONT.	
DATE	Unknown
SHIP	-
IMOID	-
FLAG	-
GROSS TONNAGE	-
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	-
SHIP OWNER	-
SHIP MANAGER	-
NOTES	*Pictures available, but unable to locate identifying characteristics.*

Figure 14: *Assault Rifles to Libya*

OUT OF SAMPLE DATA

The below events are excluded from our main weapons shipment dataset because they are not weapons sales from Russia or Ukraine to a foreign party. However, these 'out of sample' events are analytically useful, as they show the involvement of known weapons transporters in transporting other interesting cargos. For example, the German shipping company Beluga has carried out several weapons shipments, but also owned and operated the ship on which A.Q. Khan centrifuges were transported to Libya.

EVENT A	
EXPORTING COUNTRY	A.Q. Khan network
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Libya
CARGO	Nuclear centrifuges and components thereof
PORT OF ORIGIN	Dubai, UAE
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Intercepted in Taranto, Italy, intending to go to Tripoli, Libya[122]
DATE	4 October 2003
SHIP	*MV BBC China*[123]
IMOID	9219082
FLAG	Antigua and Barbuda
GROSS TONNAGE	5548
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	6500
SHIP OWNER	Beluga Superstition[124]
SHIP MANAGER	Beluga Shipping GmbH
NOTES	*Chartered by BBC Chartering.*[125]

EVENT B	
EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia[126]
IMPORTING COUNTRY	France
CARGO	182 tons of Uranium

EVENT B CONT.	
PORT OF ORIGIN	St. Petersburg, Russia
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Le Havre, France
DATE	3 July 2009
SHIP	*MV Kapitan Lus*
IMOID	9077551
FLAG	Malta
GROSS TONNAGE	4998
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	4618
SHIP OWNER	Shipline Two Ltd. (listed at same address as NB Maritime)
SHIP MANAGER	NB Maritime Management Cyprus
NOTES	*Ship collided with another ship off the coast of Sweden and Denmark. NB Maritime Management Cyprus also was the owner of the MV Monchegorsk, which was interdicted in Cyprus for attempting to ship more than 2,000 tons of Iranian munitions to Syria.*[127]

EVENT C	
EXPORTING COUNTRY	Egypt (Ministry of Defense)
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Democratic Republic of Congo (government)
CARGO	Thousands of grenades, 7,000 mortars, four million rounds of ammunition, and 700 rockets[128]
PORT OF ORIGIN	Alexandria, Egypt
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Unknown, DRC
DATE	June 2011
SHIP	*MV Chariot*[129]
IMOID	8302882
FLAG	St. Vincent and Grenadines
GROSS TONNAGE	845
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	922
SHIP OWNER	Westberg Management AG (listed at same address as Westberg Ltd.)[130]
SHIP MANAGER	Westberg Ltd.
NOTES	*Westberg and* Chariot *previously shipped weapons to Syria and the DRC, as described in the main dataset.*

EVENT D	
EXPORTING COUNTRY	Russia
IMPORTING COUNTRY	Unknown
CARGO	Likely advanced military equipment
PORT OF ORIGIN	Jakobstad, Finland
PORT OF ARRIVAL	Unknown
DATE	24 July 2009
SHIP	*MV Arctic Sea*
IMOID	8912792
FLAG	Malta
GROSS TONNAGE	3988
DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE	4706
SHIP OWNER	Solchart[131]
SHIP MANAGER	Solchart
NOTES	*The Arctic Sea was ostensibly loaded with timber in Finland bound for Algeria. The ship was hijacked off the coast of Sweden by 10 English-speaking men posing as counter-narcotics officers, who then turned off its AIS transponder and fled for points unknown. Russia dispatched two nuclear submarines and three warships from the Black Sea Fleet to recover it.*[132] *The ship was located off the coast of Cape Verde, at which point it was taken back into Russian custody. This is widely believed to be a case of illicit arms smuggling, with numerous Russian sources and most foreign analysis stating their belief that the Arctic Sea was carrying advanced military equipment (most often named as S–300 SAMs) to Iran.*[133]

3 Preliminary Insights

INSIGHT 1

Our weapons shipment dataset is broadly representative of overall Russian and Ukrainian seaborne weapons exports.

A basic research question is whether the sampled data (**Figure 15**) is representative of the larger population under study. We are interested in Russian and Ukrainian seaborne weapons exports, and while a complete listing of all shipment events (many of which go unreported) is not possible, our sample should be as large and diverse as possible. Our dataset includes 43 separate shipment events, and at least 21 different purchasing countries. Considering that Russia alone regularly exports to at least 57 countries yearly,[134] this would seem to indicate our data is not particularly representative.

A closer examination reveals otherwise. Many of Russia and Ukraine's customers are geographic neighbors or landlocked, making it impractical or impossible to use sea transportation. For example, when Russia exports weapons to neighboring Kazakhstan it does so by plane, rail, or truck. Similarly, even distant customers may be purchasing military equipment that is typically not moved by sea. For example, Russia has a $300 million contract to supply Su–30 MK2 and Su–27 SKM fighters to Indonesia, but these are transported on An–124 transport aircraft, not ships.[135] Similarly, Ukraine has a contract to supply BTR–3E1 APCs to Thailand, but previous shipments have been flown on an Il–76 to U-Tapao Airport, not shipped.[136]

As a heuristic, **Figure 16** compares shipments in our dataset with countries to which Russia or Ukraine would plausibly export by sea (i.e. all known past purchasers of Russian or Ukrainian weapons, minus geographic neighbors and countries only purchasing equipment not typically shipped, such as helicopters or planes). The fact that they nearly match[iv] leads us to believe our dataset is a reasonably representative sample of overall seaborne weapons exports.

Figure 15: *Arms Shipment Count*

DESTINATION	SHIPMENT COUNT
VENEZUELA	7
VIETNAM	6
SUDAN/SOUTH SUDAN	4
ANGOLA	3
SYRIA	3
ALGERIA	2
CAMBODIA	2
CHINA	2
DRC	2
IRAQ	2
MYANMAR	2
UNKNOWN	2
ERITREA	1
ETHIOPIA	1
IRAN	1
LIBYA	1
MOROCCO	1
NIGERIA	1
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	1
SINGAPORE	1
UGANDA	1
YEMEN	1

Figure 16: *Countries in our dataset.*

All possible candidate countries.

iv. India is the most glaring exception. New Delhi has become the largest purchaser of Russian weapons in recent years, but is absent from our dataset. Other notable omissions include Indonesia, Kuwait, Turkey, and potential customers like Saudi Arabia and Brazil.

INSIGHT 2

The Russian and Ukrainian governments own and sell the vast majority of advanced weapons leaving their countries.

Our dataset indicates government ownership and control of virtually all weapons being shipped abroad. In some cases there is direct evidence. For example, the cargo manifest for the *Ann Scan*, which shipped 1000 tons of ammunition to Uganda in 2008, lists state firm Ukrinmash as the owner; crates of ammunition uncovered in Libya have Rosoboronexport information printed on their side. In other cases, we cross-referenced weapons shipments in our dataset with acknowledged state arms transfers. For example, we did not obtain cargo manifests for the multiple ships carrying weapons to Venezuela in 2012, but extensive media reporting of multi-billion dollar arms sales between the Russian and Venezuelan governments during this time period leave us confident that this was not a private sale.[137] The only instance of advanced weapons systems definitely being sold without governmental knowledge was the chronologically first event in our dataset, the export of Ukrainian X–55 missiles by rogue Russian intelligence officers in collaboration with corrupt Ukrainian officials and Kaalbye Shipping to Iran and China in 2001.

We acknowledge potential selection bias. Heavy weapons—tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), artillery, etc.—are larger, easier for governments to keep track of, and presumably less likely to be illicitly sold than small arms and light weapons (SALW). Because heavy weapons are so conspicuous, they also are easier for researchers to track, and make up a high percentage of our shipment dataset. These factors mean it is quite possible that there are private arms dealers moving large quantities of small arms, which we did not detect. We also acknowledge the troublesome ambiguity of 'governmental control,' a term assuming both unity of purpose among state entities and a distinction between the public and private sectors, neither of which are very applicable to the often chaotic and corrupt Russian and (especially) Ukrainian political systems. For example, assessing whether defense-industrial officials who sell state-owned weapons but personally retain profits are acting under government mandate is problematic. Our decision criteria was the involvement of official state weapons export agencies (ROE, USE, etc.); such arms transfers could be categorized as institutional, not personal. We note that this does not preclude non-transparency or corruption, but that such behavior continually occurring under a government roof indicates it is in some sense sanctioned.

Figure 17: *Ukrainian Defense Industrial Agency*

Figure 18: *Ukrainian Defense Industrial Agency*

Under this definition, the weapons in our dataset are overwhelmingly government owned and sold, which has important implications. There is little evidence to support the hypothesis that private actors sell major military hardware to the highest bidder. The chaos and weakening of state control in Russia and Ukraine in the 1990s led many Western analysts to believe FSU organized crime groups would export weapons (nuclear was the most feared, but also conventional).[138] These fears were not unfounded, as arms smugglers like Victor Bout, Leonid Minin, and Arkadiy Gaydamak moved weapons to customers such as the RUF in Sierra Leone and FARC forces in Columbia.[139] [140] [141] But our dataset, which largely coincides with the Putin era, indicates the Russian and Ukrainian governments have fairly good control over their major weapons systems; if they are exported, it is because someone in the government wishes it so.

Moscow and Kiev's dominant role in the weapons export process also indicates the facilitators of weapons shipments are an important foreign policy tool. Most analysts would agree that selling weapons is a Russian foreign policy lever, in particular to bolster states against the perceived threat of American intervention that Russia firmly opposes as hegemonic meddling. If this is so, then the facilitators of arms transfers are of critical importance for Russian foreign policy: they are the vehicle by which Moscow aids allied militaries and favored factions.

Governmental ownership of exported weapons since the early 2000s also confirms a narrative of Russian politics that emphasizes reassertion of state control over national assets (defense plants, oil and gas, industrial concerns, etc.) and profits resulting from sale of these assets being distributed to regime stakeholders via sanctioned corruption in exchange for political loyalty. As the story goes, the chaos of the 1990s and corrupt privatization of formerly Soviet assets meant a few oligarchs and criminals seized control, became incredibly rich and powerful, and ran the country into the ground while the ineffective Yeltsin and Kuchma governments dithered. Putin stabilized the country by marshalling a powerful coalition of military and intelligence officials and political conservatives (*siloviki*), which he used as a club to force oligarchs to return some national assets to the government, toe the United Russia political line, and perform useful services for the government when requested, creating a quasi-feudal system by which state loyalists control vast swathes of industry and government.[v]

The danger in this system is centrifugal forces, i.e. those granted immense power deciding to use it to challenge the state. To mitigate this, officials, *siloviki*, and oligarchs are kept loyal by a mix of stick (e.g. crushing those who buck the system) and carrot (paying them off to make cooperation with the state more profitable than opposition). Thus, continued Putinist rule depends on maintaining the coercive power to punish defectors, the profitability of key industries, and the ability to funnel money from these industries to the regime loyalists in charge of them.[vi] This narrative rings true for the energy industry: corrupt 1990s privatization under Yukos and Sibneft, the refusal of oligarchs Khodorkovsky and Berezovsky to relinquish control to the new Putin government and their subsequent destruction (jailed or exiled), and reassertion of state control via holding companies such as Gazprom and Rosneft, with regime stakeholders—Igor Sechin, Victor Zubkov, etc.—being placed in key positions and profiting handsomely from it.

The same is true for the defense industry, which remains one of Russia's largest export sectors. State control has been restored under holding corporations like Russian Technologies, Russian Aircraft, etc., and the profits from weapons exports are used as a feeding trough for military and intelligence stakeholders. Assuming that the loyalty of these actors is partially dependent on continued access to such rewards, then the facilitators of weapons exports are a critical element of domestic politics. As the logistical bridge linking Russian producers with foreign customers, facilitators allow the generation of profits that can be redistributed to regime stakeholders to ensure the continuation of Putinist rule. Given this, we should expect to find strong connections between high-ranking Russian officials and weapons shipment facilitators, a topic which is explored in depth in **Chapter 5**.

INSIGHT 3

A relatively small number of companies facilitate a high percentage of Russian and Ukrainian weapons exports. Most of these companies are based in Ukraine or the EU.

As shown in the table and chart below, Ukrainian firms (particularly Kaalbye and Phoenix) play a particularly prominent role, as well as EU firms Eide and Briese. Key research questions include: who are these companies, and their key personnel? What qualities do they possess that allow them to carry out so many arms shipments? Are these firms connected? If so, how? Do some firms have a particular specialty (i.e. a certain kind of weapon or customer)?

---

v. Stephen Blank terms this the boyar class, after the medieval Russian nobility. See "Russian Democracy Revisited", *International Journal of Security Affairs*, Spring 2007, No. 12.

vi. This implies money laundering is a similarly essential part of the Putin system, a topic which is covered in depth in Chapter 9.

SHIPMENTS BY FACILITATOR NATIONALITY

Figure 19: *Shipment counts*

COMPANY[vii]	COUNTRIES	COUNT
Kaalbye	UKRAINE	10
Eide	NORWAY	7
Phoenix Trans-Servis	UKRAINE	4
Briese	GERMANY	4
Westberg Ltd.	RUSSIA	2
Beluga Shipping	GERMANY	2
Spliethoff	NETHERLANDS	2
Nortrop	UKRAINE	1
Ukrainian Danube Shipping Co.	UKRAINE	1
Barwil Ukraine	UKRAINE	1
FEMCO	RUSSIA	1
North-Western Shipping Company	RUSSIA	1
AnRussTrans	RUSSIA	1
Balchart	RUSSIA	1
Eckhoff	GERMANY	1
Held Bereederungs	GERMANY	1
Clipper Group	DENMARK	1

INSIGHT 4

Most weapons shipments originate at the port of Oktyabrsk, Ukraine. This is true regardless of whether the weapons being exported are Russian or Ukrainian.

Our data on port of origin for weapons shipments is inconsistent. Sometimes sources list a specific port, other times they list only a country (e.g. *shipment left Russia on September 15*), and in some cases they entirely omit information. Regardless, it is unambiguous that Oktyabrsk is the most common port of origin for Russian and Ukrainian weapons shipments. Weapons shipments with a known port of origin were over four times as likely to originate in Oktyabrsk as the next most common port (St. Petersburg). For shipments in which at least the country (if not specific port) of origin was known, Ukrainian ports (primarily Oktyabrsk) accounted for nearly five times as many shipments as Russian ports (see **Figure 21** on the next page). This finding raises more questions. What is unique about Oktyabrsk that makes it the preferred port from which to export FSU weapons? If the governments of Ukraine and Russia ship so many weapons from there, what are their mechanisms for controlling and safeguarding this vital port? Since Oktyabrsk is

Figure 20: *Port of Oktyabrsk*

Oktyabrsk lies in Southern Ukraine on the Bug River, which feeds into the Black Sea. It is in the city of Nikolaev, which has its own port. Because the two ports are so close, we often refer to Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev as a single destination.

vii. This chart lists the number of shipments in which the listed company participated. Because multiple companies can collaborate on a single shipment, the total number of shipments listed here is higher than the actual number of shipments which occurred.

in Ukraine, how does the Kremlin exert influence over a port that lies outside of Russia *de jure*? **Chapter 5** addresses these questions.

One important exception to the general dominance of Oktyabrsk is that none of the publicly known maritime weapons shipments from Russia to Syria (i.e. the ships *Chariot, Professor Katsman,* and *Alaed*) originated at Oktyabrsk, instead departing from the northern Russian ports of St. Petersburg or Kaliningrad. We have two, non-mutually exclusive hypotheses to explain this anomaly. It could be that there are ships transporting Russian weapons from Oktyabrsk to Syria, and they simply have not been publicly exposed. It also could be that St. Petersburg has particular advantages for shipments to Syria: it is located inside Russia, making it relatively immune from foreign political pressures (as opposed to Oktyabrsk, in which case the Ukrainian government may be under significant political pressure from the West to disallow Russia's Syria-bound weapons shipments).

SHIPMENTS BY COUNTRY OF PORT

SHIPMENTS BY PORT OF ORIGIN

Figure 21: *Descriptive Statistics*

WEAPONS EXPORT PORTS OF ORIGIN

4 End-to-End Logistics Integration: Odessa

The overarching hypothesis of this analysis is that the Odessa, Ukraine-based firms comprise the end-to-end logistics integration backbone behind many Russian and Ukrainian weapons shipments, and the key nodes of the network. There is some empirical evidence to motivate this assumption: Odessa-based firms are collectively responsible for the largest share of weapons shipments in our dataset. But to simply count shipments would ignore the Odessa companies' greatest asset: connections. Link and network analysis reveals that the Odessa companies and personnel are the center of a rich network of businesses and individuals who provide all the services necessary for a weapons shipment to occur. This hyper-connectedness includes both other Odessa companies and their partners abroad (e.g. other nodes of the Odessa Network.) We judge that Odessa companies' unique access to everything from heavy-lift vessels to skilled crews to powerful defense-industrial officials helps explain their prominence as weapons export facilitators.

Before identifying and analyzing this network in detail, we must make a few concessions to readability. The Odessa maritime industry is a bewildering sprawl of companies, subsidiaries, joint ventures, personnel (often working at one or more of said companies at the same or different times), shared facilities and equipment, common customers, family relations, and more. To some extent, this is simply how business works, licit, semi-licit, or illicit: companies try different strategies, people hop between different jobs in the industry, etc. However, the Odessa companies are transporting billions of dollars of weapons to embargoed conflict zones and US strategic competitors, and there is reason to believe some of their complex arrangements are to obscure attribution. To reduce this complexity to a manageable level, we have split up the network; this chapter is mostly devoted to introducing the key players of the Odessa Network. Successive chapters explore in detail their connections to government officials, the port of Oktyabrsk, EU shipping companies, etc.

Figure 22: *Geographic and Functional Map of Odessa Network*

THE KAALBYE GROUP

By far the most important Odessa Network firm is **Kaalbye**. Kaalbye has engaged in at least 10 separate weapons shipments over the course of a decade, and likely more. Founder **Igor Urbansky**, a former captain in the Soviet merchant fleet, created his first company Evas in 1992 before founding Kaalbye Shipping in 1996.[142] It is important to understand this particular time and place, which spawned not just Kaalbye but many of the other entities we mention. The botched post–1991 privatization of formerly Soviet assets, in which a small group of businessmen and organized criminal figures (often working in concert) managed to control vast swathes of the new economy, created lucrative opportunities if one knew how to exploit them. Huge amounts of oil, gas, timber, and steel formerly locked away in Soviet holdings were suddenly on the free market. The overwhelming 1990s FSU business theme was getting one's hands on these newly privatized assets, and moving them out of the country to Western and Asian markets as fast as possible. Odessa has been a center of shipping and trade for centuries: much of the Soviet merchant fleet was based out of there, and multiple oil and gas pipelines terminated at the city. The race was on to grab old Soviet ships, privatize them into new companies, and use them as vehicles to export valuable resources that foreign countries and companies so dearly coveted.

SHIPMENT EVENTS	
#1	Cruise Missiles to Iran
#2	Cruise Missiles to China
#3	Assault Rifles and Grenades to Angola
#16	Tanks, RPGs, and More to South Sudan
#19	Explosives to Algeria
#29	Mega-shipment of SAMs, Rocket Launchers, ASMs, and More to Venezuela
#30	"
#33	"
#34	"
#36	Unknown Weapons to Vietnam

Figure 23: *Kaalbye Shipment Events*

Weak governance, vast stockpiles of Soviet weaponry, and foreign demand meant Odessa also was a hub of international arms shipping in the 1990s. One trafficker, Leonid Minin, was a major broker of arms to Charles Taylor in Liberia, the RUF in Sierra Leone,[143] the Ivory Coast, and even tried to sell an aircraft carrier to Turkey.[144] Another arms dealer, Arkady Gaydamak, funneled over $500 million of Russian weapons to Angola during the same time period in partnership with the son of French President Mitterand.[145] It is important to note that these businessmen were equal opportunists, exporting whatever held value: sometimes weapons, but sometimes not. For example, Minin also dealt in timber, oil, metal, and the like, primarily operating out of Odessa Port in conjunction with organized crime figures like Aleksandr Angert.[146] The situation was such that US intelligence figures singled out Odessa as the epicenter of post-Soviet arms trafficking.[147] Average Odessites and dock-workers interviewed by the authors confirmed that the city still is (or at least is perceived as being) a hub for contraband. Dockworkers maintain that they do not know the contents of the cargo they load or unload, but do know a significant portion of it is illicit. They also allege that one group with multiple front companies controls most contraband moving through the port.[148]

The existence or extent of Kaalbye's involvement in the weapons trade during the 1990s is unknown, but it certainly engaged in the Odessa port trade writ large, with companies like Kaalbye Oil Services, Ukrainian Maritime Agency, and Kaalbye Shipping providing oil services, crewing, and cargo transport, respectively. This business diversification is a major theme of Kaalbye. Kaalbye certainly entered into the weapons trade by the early aughts, and stayed there for the next decade. Kaalbye's entry into the weapons transportation market coincided with the exit of traditional facilitators: Minin was arrested in Italy in 2000,[149] and Gaydamak indicted in France in April 1999 and June 2000.[150] It also coincided with the emergence of Putin, and reassertion of state control over major weapons systems and other national assets. The 2000 sale of Ukrainian X–55 cruise missiles to Iran and China by corrupt officials, which Kaalbye facilitated,[151] is one of the very last instances of the private sale of major FSU weapons systems. Kaalbye clearly adapted to the new state-dominated weapons market, as its long list of subsequent shipments shows.

Figure 24:
Kaalbye subsidiaries, shells, etc.

Kaalbye Shipping
Kaalbye Shipping International
Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine
Kaalbye Shipping Cyprus
Kaalbye Bulk
Kaalbye Heavy Lift
Kaalbye Projects
Kaalbye Logistics
Kaalbye Yachting
Kaalbye Oil Services
Kaalbye Group
Kaalbye Group Holding
Kaalbye Ltd.
Kaalbye Agency Services
Ukrainian Maritime Agency
Deutscheland Prime Transport
New Challenge Ltd.
Olva Shipping Ltd.
Silver Streams Limited
White Albatross Ltd.

DATA: RUSSIAN, UKRAINIAN, BVI, AND PANAMAMIAN BUSINESS RECORDS

Figure 25:
Kaalbye guards

There are three factors that explain Kaalbye's prominence. The most immediate is its government connections. Founder **Igor Urbansky** was a Deputy Minister of Transportation in Ukraine from 2006–2009, and is linked to senior Ukrainian defense officials. **Boris Kogan**, a co-founder of Kaalbye Shipping, is partner to some of the most powerful defense-industrial figures in Russia, including a deputy director of RosTech (the state defense industry holding firm—see **Chapter 5** for details). These personal connections are of immense importance, as government officials must have great trust in a facilitator's competence and honesty in order to feel comfortable handing over immensely valuable and powerful weapons systems to this private individual. Our weapons shipment dataset empirically shows that the Russian and Ukrainian governments are willing to let Kaalbye carry out even the most sensitive foreign policy maneuvers: the transfer of S–300s to bolster Venezuela against the US is a prominent example. We judge there is a direct correlation between the ties of senior Kaalbye personnel to organs of state power, and the lucrative weapons transportation contracts they receive.

Second is Kaalbye's business diversification. Kaalbye is not so much a company as an interlocking network. Through its subsidiaries, Kaalbye is one of the largest crewing (i.e. providing trained seamen for Ukrainian and foreign companies), chartering and freight forwarding (match-making of cargo owners with transportation companies), container shipping, bulk shipping (grain, coal, etc.), and project and heavy-lift (very large and unusually shaped cargo) firms in Ukraine. It even has a yacht division, which crews and manages luxury ships. This is relatively rare for the international shipping industry, in which many firms pick a specialty; it is even truer for the international *weapons* shipping industry. For example, Norwegian firm **Eide Marine Services** specializes in massive barges that can comfortably fit a warship or submarine. This means Eide is the preferred partner when Russia exports Kilo submarines to China or missile corvettes to Vietnam, but it also means Eide cannot handle any shipments outside of its lane. In contrast, Kaalbye has general cargo ships for crate-able military cargo, heavy-lift vessels for tanks and artillery, and more. This wide range of services lets it handle shipments of diverse military cargo end-to-end. The spread of weapon types and destinations that Kaalbye has shipped over the past decade is remarkable, including everything from advanced missile systems to boxes of rusty bullets, from well-heeled licit customers like Vietnam to third-world conflict zones like South Sudan. No other firm in our dataset has such a wide collection of cargo and destinations. Our assumption is that this ability to perform near end-to-end logistics integration for almost all cargos is a major reason why Moscow and Kiev turn to Kaalbye with such frequency.

The third factor is Kaalbye's external connectedness. If Kaalbye itself cannot perform a particular shipment for customers (either because all its ships are booked, or it does not have the requisite ships or personnel), it almost certainly knows someone either in Odessa or abroad who does. Virtually all of the other Odessa companies we examined are subsidiaries of Kaalbye, have collaborated with Kaalbye in the past, are staffed by Kaalbye alumni, or know Kaalbye personnel from other experiences (school, family, and the like). Kaalbye collaborated with **Tomex Team**, **Waterlux AG**, **Almar**, and **Phoenix Trans-Servis** to transport weapons to South Sudan between 2007 and 2009. Through its subsidiary **Primetransport Ltd.**, Kaalbye partners with German firm Briese, one of the most active shippers of FSU weapons. All these ties and more are examined in great detail in later chapters, but the overarching point is that Kaalbye is one of the only entities in the Odessa Network with plausible pathways for reaching out to all different corner of the network for needed services: Latvian financial services, German heavy-lift ships, Moscow officials, and more.

Kaalbye's offices take up most of a 10–story building called the Maritime Business Center in the heart of Odessa. Though one can enter the ground floor reception area at will, guards armed with AK–47s are posted at the foot of the stairs.

Kaalbye also is a contractor for US Military Sealift command.[152]

Figure 26: *Dual-listed personnel*

VARAMAR, WHITE WHALE, NORTROP, AND BARWIL

Aleksandr Varvarenko is a key connector in the Odessa Network, although his involvement in weapons transportation appears to be strictly licit, and contracts include Ukrainian, EU, and US arms shipments, not Russian. He was a director of Kaalbye Projects,[153] dating back to 2006 and continuing to at least 2009, although we believe the Projects division was not directly involved in weapons shipments. Aleksandr has been the owner and director of **Varamar/White Whale Shipping** since at least 2009. Varamar does have a track record of operating or chartering the *Alaed*, a ship caught delivering Russian weapons to Syria in 2012 (although Varamar was unaffiliated with that incident).[154] Varamar's office is located in one of the most prestigious and expensive areas of Odessa; its closest neighbors are a large consulate of the People's Republic of China and luxury restaurant.

Aleksandr's brother, **Andrei Varvarenko**, runs another Odessa maritime company, **Nortrop**, which has shipped weapons in the past.[155] Their father, **Valentin Varvarenko**, is one of the most powerful men in the FSU transportation industry, and worked in Latvia and Belgium for decades before returning to Russia and Ukraine to run several national transportation companies.[156] Aleksandr and Andrei grew up in Latvia and Belgium,[157] and have extensive ties there: Aleksandr started his career after graduating from Odessa National Maritime University at Belgian firm OXL-Flamar, while Andrei's firm Nortrop is part owned by Belgian firm Noord Natie (where Valentin used to be a senior executive).[158]

SHIPPING EVENTS		
#7	NORTROP	Tanks to Unknown Customer

Note: Does not include current Varamar contract to deliver APCs to Iraq, organized by US government.

Figure 27:
Varamar/Nortrop Shipment Events

Figure 28:
Varamar office

Aleksandr's associate **Evgenii Poltavets** has formerly worked at Kaalbye, Beluga (a known German facilitator), Phoenix (another Odessa facilitator), is the commercial director of Varamar, and is a close personal associate of Varvarenko. He is interesting as a connecting figure but appears to be too junior to be involved in brokering major weapons shipments.

Vsevolod Ivanov is a Chartering Manager at Varamar.[159] Previously, he worked at Kaalbye Projects under Varvarenko, and before this was employed at **Barwil Ukraine**,[160] which shipped 1000 tons of ammunition to Uganda while he was employed there. While his direct involvement in this shipment is unknown, he worked out of the Nikolaev/Oktyabrsk office, which is known as a hub of weapons shipping and was the port of origin for the Uganda shipment.

BARWIL SHIPMENT EVENTS	
#17	Ammunition to Uganda

Figure 29: *Barwil shipment events*

Barwil Ukraine is a Ukrainian joint venture of Norwegian firm Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding with an unknown FSU partner. Cargo manifests from a 2008 shipment of Ukrainian ammunition to the Ugandan Ministry of Defense show Barwil as the shipping agent.[161] Barwil Ukraine has its main office in Odessa,[162] but also maintains an office and personnel at the port of Oktyabrsk.[163] The general manager of Barwil Ukraine at the time of the Ugandan weapons shipment, Vsevolod Ivanov, now is a chartering manager at Kaalbye and Varamar.[164] Ivanov also is a graduate of Odessa National Maritime University, which he attended at the same time as Andrei Varvarenko.[165]

PHOENIX SHIPPING

Phoenix is an Odessa-based company specializing in military logistics, and has deep connections to Kaalbye and defense-industrial figures. Phoenix acts primarily as a freight forwarding firm, arranging for the transportation of goods along Ukrainian railways to port, onto ships, and on to their destination. Regular Phoenix customers include Ukrspetsexport, Ukrinmash (a Ukrainian state holding company which controls much of the defense industry), the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, and Israeli defense firm LR Avionics.[166] Phoenix is co-owned by Ukrainian nationals Yuri Tupchi and Igor Kolesov.[167] The three co-founders of Phoenix—Tupchi, Kolesov, and Aleksandr Tarasik—are reported to have served together in military maritime logistics posts in Odessa, with Phoenix continuing to act as a "soft landing" for retiring officers.[168] On this note, Igor Levitin, the Russian Minister of Transportation from 2004–2012 and current personal advisor to Putin, was a senior executive at Phoenix in the 1990s after retiring from the military (see **Chapter 5** "Government Connections" for more information), and may continue to exert influence.

PHOENIX SHIPMENT EVENTS

#4	Tanks and APCs to Yemen and Angola
#14	Tanks, RPGs and Ammunition to South Sudan
#15	"
#16	"

Figure 30: *Phoenix shipment events*

Figure 31: *Phoenix office*

Phoenix both directly collaborates on weapons shipments with Kaalbye and other Odessa maritime companies, and has personnel integrated into their structures. Yuri Tupchi is the founder of Ace Shipping,[169] an Isle of Man-registered company, which helped (along with Phoenix, Kaalbye, Tomex Team, and Almar) transport multiple weapons shipments from Ukraine to South Sudan between 2007 and 2009. A Phoenix spokesperson claims that Ace acts as a tax and accounting vehicle for Phoenix.[170] Sergei Nazarenko and Oksana Popova are listed in 2008 and 2010 as employees of Phoenix,[171] [172] and in 2012 as employees at maritime transportation firm Dealex.[173]

Phoenix also has EU connections. It collaborated with German firm Beluga Shipping on arms transfers to Sudan in 2008; Beluga has also moved Ukrainian APCs to Myanmar in 2009. Common personnel may aid this business cooperation. Evgenii Poltavets was a chartering manager at Beluga from at least 2007–2009,[174] and still likely has contacts in the German heavy-lift industry. Being a junior employee he is unlikely to have brokered sensitive weapons deals, but he serves as a further example of how interconnected these companies are through their personnel.

The authors visited Phoenix's reported offices in Odessa, which were closed at 3 PM on a working day, and consisted of a single, unlabeled door in an alleyway far off the main drag. This is somewhat understandable, as brokering companies such as Phoenix make their living through connections (i.e. matching cargo owners with ship owners), and therefore do not possess significant physical assets. With that said, the relative squalor of Phoenix, as well as the presence of so many former military and transportation officials, leads us to believe the company's 'real' business is located elsewhere.

VADIM ALPERIN AND AFFILIATES

Vadim Alperin is a Ukrainian-Israeli businessman prominent in Odessa, and famous for his connection to the *Faina*, a ship carrying Ukrainian weapons for Sudan which was hijacked by Somali pirates in 2008.[175] [176] As his stamp and signature below show, Alperin is the director of Waterlux AG, the Panama-registered company which owns the *Faina*,[177] and also controls Tomex Team, another Panama-registered company which operates the Faina. **Victor Murenko** is head of Tomex.[178] Together, these two men control a wide range of Panama-registered but Odessa-based maritime companies, including Almar Shipping, Stonehill Maritime, and Lyumar Odessa. Alperin also is a former Party of Regions deputy in the Odessa city council, and owns many other businesses in real estate, transportation, and cargo brokering, including the firms Temp-Progress,[179] Logistic Servis,[180] and Metalloproduct.[181] Alperin also is reported to be business partners with Aleksandr Oiberman, another influential Israeli-Ukrainian Odessa businessman and deputy on the Odessa City Council.[182]

ALPERIN SHIPMENT EVENTS

#16	Tanks, RPGs and Ammo to South Sudan

Figure 32: *Alperin shipment events*

Interestingly, Alperin appears to have ties to Syria. It was widely reported that when the

Figure 33:
Alperin and Ukranian Intelligence *(Mykola Malomuzh, head of SZR)*

Figure 34:
Hares Youssef *(second from right), with Rinat Akhmetov and Vadim Novinsky to his left*

Figure 35:
Vadim Alperin *and* Faina

Ukrainian government wanted to export weapons to South Sudan in 2007, it was **Hares Youssef**, a Syrian businessman living and operating in Ukraine[183] and personal advisor to then-President Victor Yushchenko,[184] who selected Alperin and the *Faina* as the facilitators of the shipment,[185] possibly indicating a pre-existing relationship. Youssef founded the conglomerate Hares Group, and is a business partner of some of FSU's most powerful oligarchs. For example, he co-owns a large steel factory in Moldova along with Alisher Usmanov and Vadim Novinsky, among others.[186] Youssef been the subject of intense Arab and FSU media scrutiny for his alleged ties to the international arms trade, Semen Mogilievich (for whom he is accused of being a representative), smuggling of antiquities, business partnership with Syrian-Slovakian metals trader Akthar Barakat, and ties to Maher al-Assad. Vadim Alperin appears to have additional contacts in Syria beyond Youssef. For example, he recently leased his ship *Etel* to an unnamed Syrian businessman using it for trade with Libya.[187] [188]

Appendix No.6
to the CLAIM FOR DAMAGES dated November 18, 2008

Calculation of costs for m/v "Etel"
in the voyage Arzew - Alexandria - Ilyichevsk

Description	*Quantity*	*Amount, USD*
Voyage time	13	
Running cost		45 845.93
Bunker consumption at sea (IFO)	139.3	115 711.91
Bunker consumption at sea (MGO)	23.1	28 729.00
Bunker consumption at port (IFO)	0	0.00
Bunker consumption at port (MGO)	0	0.00
Disbursement account at Alexandria		8 072.00
Disbursement account for transit Turkish straits		1 353.67
Disbursement account at Ilyichevsk		15 091.42
Lashing/unlashing		556.50
Total:		**215 360.43**

Comments: running cost calculated as per budget, bunker price are actual price of bunker on board at the moment of voyage, disbursement expenses are actual expenses

Director of "Waterlux AG"

WATERLUX AG CORPORATE SEAL PANAMA WATERLUX

Figure 36:
Waterlux official seal and signature

5 Government Connections: Moscow & Kiev

The Odessa Network firms are logistics contractors for the Russian and Ukrainian governments, not independent arms merchants. State agencies such as Rosoboronexport and Ukrspetsexport own the weapons and broker almost all foreign sales. The Odessa Network companies play a critical role in making these arms transfers happen, but they only do so on behalf of powerful customers in Moscow and Kiev.

The key assumption is that there must be persistent links and contractual relationships between the Odessa Network and government officials. The Odessa Network has moved billions of dollars of advanced military hardware, which indicates a high level of government trust in its competency and honesty, implying contact between leaders on both sides. The need to keep track of what weapons are being shipped where and when necessitates contracts between state agencies and the Odessa Network. This hypothesis is supported by Rosoboronexport court cases specifying detailed contractual arrangements with other (i.e. non-Odessa Network) facilitators.[189] The Odessa shipping companies must be compensated for their services, implying exchange of bank account information, payment schedules, etc. Although we lack direct evidence for most of these links, we have uncovered multiple personal relationships between Odessa Network personnel and Russian and Ukrainain officials, including cabinet level ministers and senior defense-industrial personnel. These relationships may be the pathways along which information and trust flows.

IGOR LEVITIN

Phoenix Trans-Servis is an Odessa shipping firm that has brokered multiple weapons shipments, and openly advertises its connections to Russian and Ukrainian defense industrial concerns.[190] One former Phoenix employee is Igor Levitin, who served as the Russian Minister of Transportation from 2004–2012 and currently works as a personal advisor to Vladimir Putin, in addition to stints on the board of directors at Sheremetevo Airport and Aeroflot.[191] Levitin served in the Soviet and then Russian army from 1970 to 1994, primarily as a logistics and transportation specialist, before being cashiered in 1994. Between 1995 and 1996 he worked at Phoenix Trans-Servis, where he served as Vice-President.[192] Levitin is the most high profile, but by no means only military-logistics figure connected to Phoenix. The three co-founders of Phoenix—Yuri Tupchi, Aleksandr Tarasik, and Igor Kolesov—are reported to have served together in military maritime logistics posts in Odessa, with Phoenix continuing to act as a "soft landing" for retiring officers.[193] Although we have no data on whether Levitin continues to have contact with Phoenix, it is interesting that one of the most powerful men in Russia worked at one of the major exporters of FSU weapons.

Figure 37:
Levitin & Putin

IGOR URBANSKY

Igor Urbansky is the founder of Kaalbye, served as Deputy Minister of Transport in Ukraine from 2006 to roughly 2009, and enjoys extensive contacts among the Ukrainian defense establishment and Party of Regions clique.

The son of a Soviet KGB colonel, Urbansky was born in Georgia, where one of his close friends grew up to become former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze's personal bodyguard.[194] Urbansky was educated at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO).[195] MGIMO is the diplomatic school of the Soviet (and then Russian) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and widely perceived as a training ground for political, intelligence, and economic elites. Urbansky served as a captain in the Soviet cargo fleet before starting his first business, Evas, in Odessa in 1992. Urbansky went on to found Kaalbye Shipping in 1996, followed by a string of subsidiaries and offshores: Kaalbye Oil Service, Kaalbye Shipping Cyprus, Kaalbye Marine Service, and more.[196] It is worth noting that during the 1990s Odessa Port was a hub of weapons trafficking and general smuggling; local mafiosos such as Leonid Minin (whose list of deeds ranges from bullets to the Ivory Coast and Angola to attempting to sell an aircraft carrier to Turkey)[197] [198] used it as a base for operations. It is possible two of the leading figures in Odessa maritime transportation did not know each other, but unlikely. The existence or extent of Urbansky's weapons transportation activities in the 1990s is unknown, but he was certainly involved by the aughts. Urbansky was involved in the sale of Kh–55 cruise missiles to Iran and China in 2000 (in cooperation with corrupt Ukrainian and Russian intelligence officials), and shipping military equipment to Angola in 2001.[199]

Figure 38:
Igor Urbansky

Figure 39:
Ministry of Transportation

Whatever its origins, Urbansky's wealth and power allowed him to become a political figure in Ukraine. From 2006 to 2009 Urbansky served as Deputy Minister of Transportation under two separate Ministers, Nikolai Rudkovsky and Josef Vinsky.[200] Urbansky apparently resigned as general of director at Kaalbye prior to taking this post; the extent of his continued connection to the firm is unknown.[201] Urbansky continued to serve as a deputy in the Verkhovnaya Rada [Ukrainian legislative body] until recently.[202] Urbansky is closely linked to military and intelligence figures in Ukraine. For example, in 2007 he personally paid for then-Minister of the Interior Vasilii Tsushko, who he knew from serving together in the Odessa Socialist Party,[203] to be flown to Germany for medical treatment.[204] The sophistication and quantity of weapons in deals personally attended to by Urbansky—cruise missiles, 636 tons of equipment, etc.—leaves little doubt of his connections to defense officials.

BORIS KOGAN

Boris Kogan is one of the cofounders of Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine and serves as a director and senior manager of the company.[205] He is a close business partner of Kaalbye co-founder Igor Urbansky.[206] Kogan is also on the board of directors of a Russian company, RT-Logistika. RT-Logistika is 51% owned by Russian Technologies, the enormous state holding firm (headed by Putin's former KGB colleague and close ally Sergei Chemezov) which owns a variety of industrial companies, including Rosoboronexport and much of the Russian defense industry. RT-Logistika is deeply involved in transporting weapons. For example, in October 2012 RT-Logistika arranged a cargo plane to transport sensory equipment for Syrian Pantsir SAM complexes from Moscow to Damascus, which the Turkish Air Force intercepted.[207] Kogan is the only RT-Logistika board member who is *not* a senior Russian defense-industrial figure.

The list of government officials affiliated with RT-Logistika includes:[208] V**alerii Yemets**, director of logistics at Rosoboronexport; **Igor Zavyalov**, deputy director of Russian Technologies, board member at Rosoboronexport,[209] and close connection of Sergei Chemezov, a key Putin ally and one of the most powerful men in Russia; **Andrei Shipilov**, **Sergei Kulikov**, and **Vladimir Litvin**, all of whom are senior executives at Russian Technologies; many other senior Russian defense-industrial figures, including **Aleksandr Kuzhekin** (an executive at Vladikinski Factory and Avtovaz),[210] **Yuri Churchen**, A**leksandr Kuznetsov**, **Aleksandr Vetvitskii**, and more.

The significance of this is difficult to overstate: Boris Kogan personally knows and works with some of the most senior defense-industrial figures in the Russian government. The company linking them, RT-Logistika, actively moves Russian weapons to Syria. The other company Kogan is involved with (Kaalbye) is by far the most frequent facilitator of Russian and Ukrainian weapons shipments. Taken together, this data indicates a convincing hypothesis about Kaalbye's connections to the Kremlin, and possible role in arming Assad. At the very least, it seems probable that Kogan is a go-between for the Odessa Network and government agencies.

Figure 40: *Kogan Connections*
Igor Zavyalov, Deputy Director at Russian Technologies, and Sergei Kulikov, Executive Director. Kogan knows and works with both.

ROSOBORONEXPORT
State weapons export agency

RUSSIAN HELICOPTERS
Military helicopters

VYSOKOTOCHNYE KOMPLEKSY
Missile targeting systems

KB MASHINOSTROENIYA
Tactical ballistic missiles

ORION
Military satellites and communications

AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING CONCERN
Fighter jets

UNITED ENGINE CORPORATION
High-performance military turbofans

MACHINE ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGIES
Artillery and rocket launchers

IZHMASH
One of world's largest small arms maker

Figure 41: *Russian Technologies Subsidiaries (Non-Exhaustive)*

VIKTOR OLERSKIY

Viktor Olerskiy is the current Russian Deputy Minister of Transportation.[211] Before entering this position in 2009, Olerskiy was a long-time member of the board of directors at North-Western Shipping, a large Russian company which managed the *Professor Katsman* when it delivered weapons to Syria in 2012.[212] Olerskiy confirmed this fact in an interview with a Russian newspaper.[213] This leads us to believe Olerskiy is one of the vectors by which the Russian government can coordinate with private shipping companies such as North-Western to facilitate weapons transfers.

Some sources also report Olerskiy as being a former director of Inok, a Belgian company which was a previous manager of the *Professor Katsman*.[214] The company has strenuously denied any connections to North-Western Shipping, the Kremlin, or weapons shipping. While we have no definitive judgments here, multiple other North-Western Shipping executives currently serve as executives at Inok,[215] and Olerskiy was previously a Belgian citizen (he renounced it when he assumed governmental office),[216] [217] lending credence to the claims that he worked for Inok. These facts would seem to contradict Inok's claims, and indicate relationships to Russia.

North-Western Shipping is owned by UCL,[218] a holding company of oligarch Vladimir Lisin.

Figure 42: *Olerskiy and Levitin*
From left to right: two unidentified Russian military officers, Viktor Olerskiy, Igor Orlov (governor of Archangelsk), and Putin's personal advisor Igor Levitin (previously covered in this section).

ALEKSANDR ANNENKOV

Aleksandr Annenkov is the Chairmen of the Board of Directors at AnRussTrans,[219] the ultimate owner of the *Slavyanin*,[220] which delivered weapons supposedly bound for Iraq to some unknown customer in 2007. Annenkov was a long-time bureaucrat in Russian transportation ministries, rising to the rank of Deputy Minister of Transportation in 1999–2000.[221] Annenkov also owns Morskoi Bank.[222] Annenkov is based out of Sevastopol, which is home of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Annekov's current connections either to the Russian or Ukrainian governments, or to Odessa Network leaders, are unknown. Despite the paucity of data on him, we believe that using Annenkov as a transporter for weapons confirms our hypothesis about the strong requirement for trust between state weapons agencies and their logisticians; Annenkov's long service as a government transportation specialist likely played some role.

Figure 43: *Aleksandr Annenkov*

CONNECTIONS TO FACILITATORS AND EACH OTHER

As shown on **Figure 44** on the next page, almost all the major Odessa-based facilitators are connected to organs of Russian and Ukrainian state power through the personal connections covered in this section. We believe that the fact that the most active shippers of weapons are also the most politically connected is no coincidence. Such connections are presumably vital to establishing the trust for the state to hand over advanced weapons systems to ostensibly private transporters, to communicating what weapons need to go where, and to verifying that they have done.

Interestingly, the government officials examined in this section not only know and work with the facilitators, but also with each other. For example, as co-founders of Kaalbye and long-time business partners, Igor Urbansky and Boris Kogan indisputably know each other and collaborate on weapons shipments. Victor Olerskiy served as Deputy Minister of Transportation under Igor Levitin for three years; this and photographic evidence in **Figure 42** make it clear they also have a working relationship.

Figure 44: *Political connections of companies in the Odessa Network*

6 Port of Origin: Oktyabrsk

The port of Oktyabrsk is the point of origin for almost all Russian and Ukrainian weapons exports in our dataset. Located in the city of Nikolaev in Ukraine, and specially built by the Soviet Union to ship weapons, Oktyabrsk possesses a number of qualities making it well-suited for arms exports: advantageous geography, specialized equipment, transportation infrastructure to major FSU defense-industrial plants, and more. It is for this reason that many of the previously mentioned Odessa shipping companies (including Kaalbye and Nortrop) and Russian state weapons exports agencies maintain offices and personnel in Oktyabrsk. Our data suggests that Moscow exerts significant control over Oktyabrsk, despite technically being in Ukraine: the port's owner and operators have close ties to the Russian military and Kremlin. The government owns the weapons and facilitators operate the ships, but Oktyabrsk is where a weapons ship's journey physically begins.

Oktyabrsk's geographic position is advantageous for weapons exports. Because Russia and Ukraine are near the top of the Northern Hemisphere, virtually all their customers are located to the south. Ships leaving northern ports like St. Petersburg and Murmansk must traverse great distances to reach destinations in Africa, Asia, and South America, if they can depart at all—winter ice slows or shuts down these ports for part of the year. In contrast, Oktyabrsk's location on the Black Sea, nearly 1000 miles south of busier ports such as St. Petersburg or Kaliningrad, allows ships departing from there to reach typical weapons export destinations much more quickly. After transiting the Bosphorus, they can continue through the Mediterranean or Suez Canal, entering the Indian Ocean and gaining access to sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. The economics of maritime transport make the time and distance savings of leaving from Oktyabrsk very significant. From a shipper's perspective, every extra mile and day eats away profit—more fuel costs, more crew costs, and more time spent fulfilling one contract, when profitability often depends on fitting as many voyages into a year as possible.

LOCATION	ALGERIA	SYRIA	INDIA	VIETNAM
ST. PETERSBURG	19.9 DAYS	28.2 DAYS	36.9 DAYS	44.6 DAYS
OKTYABRSK	10.8 DAYS	9.7 DAYS	23.6 DAYS	35.4 DAYS

Figure 45: *Oktyabrsk versus St. Petersburg transit times*

Oktyabrsk also possesses specialized infrastructure for shipping weapons discreetly and safely, and is widely known as a hub of arms export.[223] The Soviet Union specially built Oktyabrsk to move weapons from the USSR to Communist allies across the world. For example, many of the Soviet missiles sent to Cuba in Operation Anadyr, which triggered the Cuban Missile Crisis, departed from Oktyabrsk.[224] It still is heavily used for weapons exports; a senior Ukrainian government official estimates 40 weapons shipments a year,[225] and the photo gallery on the port's official website contains several shots of military cargo.[226] Oktyabrsk possesses heavy cranes, which are necessary for handling military cargo such as tanks or missiles. There also are special ammunition storage buildings separated by dirt berms, which would absorb the blast of accidentally exploding ammunition and prevent the entire stockpile from going up.

Workers at Oktyabrsk are reputed to earn much higher wages and perform at a much higher level than other ports, perhaps reflecting unusual demands on competency and secrecy.[227] Although Oktyabrsk is no longer a completely closed port, as it was during Soviet times, only trusted personnel work there and the flow of information is controlled.[228] The port was clearly engineered for operational security. Located six kilometers south of Nikolaev amidst empty farmland, there is little traffic near the port. In addition, a thick man-made forest provides a multi-kilometer buffer. Guard towers, armored bunkers, and floodlights are scattered throughout the facility. Armed guards are stationed at a single entrance, and all cars are searched.

The Soviet legacy also means there is excellent rail infrastructure running from Russian defense-industrial centers to Oktyabrsk and Nikolaev. Rosoboronexport court documents regarding arms transfers to Eritrea indicate that light weapons shipments are carried by rail from Russia to Nikolaevskaya rail station, unloaded, and then shipped out of Nikolaev port. Heavy weapons are brought by rail from Russia to Zhovtenaya rail station, unloaded, and shipped out of Oktyabrsk port.[229] This is confirmed by another court case involving the export of heavy weapons to South Korea and Algeria; all goods are listed as being delivered to Zhovtenaya Station in Oktaybrsk before being loaded onto ships.[230] A 2001 Kaalbye shipment of 636 tons of military equipment to Angola was moved by train to Zhovtenaya before embarking.[231] Yet another Rosoboronexport court case refers to weapons being transported directly from Ulyanovsk (home to several major defense plants) to Oktyabrsk for further export to Morocco.[232]

Figure 46: *FSU Weapons Export Pathways*

Figure 47:
Andrei Yegorov

The background of Oktyabrsk's leadership adds to the perception that the Kremlin functionally controls the port. Port manager Andrei Yegorov was born in Sochi (now part of Russia), served as a submarine commander in the Russian Navy Black Sea Fleet until 2000 and achieved the rank of Captain, is a graduate of multiple elite Soviet/Russian military academies, and only received Ukrainian citizenship in 2000.[233] Yegorov is reported to be a tool of the Russian-Ukrainian oligarch Vadim Novinsky, who is reputed to own Oktyabrsk.[234]

Novinsky, whose wealth has been estimated between $1.9 and $4.4 billion,[235] [236] is a co-owner of Smart-Holding, through which he controls a wide range of primarily metallurgical and shipbuilding businesses in Ukraine and Russia. Novinsky is a business partner of and closely linked to Party of Regions figures such as Rinat Akhmetov (with whom he co-owns multiple steel and agricultural holdings),[237] [238] Dmitrii Firtash, and Victor Yanukovich, who in turn are closely tied to organized crime and the Kremlin. Novinsky also co-owns a steel factory in Rybnita, Moldova, along with Hares Youssef, Alisher Usmanov, and Grigori Surkis.[239] Novinsky was born in Russia and only acquired Ukrainian citizenship in 2012, when President Yanukovich personally granted him citizenship for unnamed services.[240] He splits his time between St. Petersburg and Kiev. Although "FSB-spotting" is somewhat of a media sport in Ukraine, Novinsky has come under particular scrutiny for his perceived ties to Russian power ministries: a recent Ukrainian article entitled "Is Murky Businessman Vadim Novinsky a Stooge of Russian Intelligence?" gives some indication of this distrust.[241] [242]

Since the Soviet era, weapons shipments to various countries of the world have gone through exactly this port [Oktyabrsk.] The port has preserved this specialty even after Ukrainian independence. How this relates to the unfolding privatization of Ukrainian ports is unclear, especially if a certain fact is taken into consideration: Vadim Novinsky is a citizen of Russia.

Figure 48:
Excerpt from Ukrainian Newspaper Article

Novinsky's control of Oktyabrsk is particularly interesting with additional context. The Ukrainian government recently privatized or granted private concessions on most of the country's major ports.[243] Because Ukraine has emerged as a transportation hub for Eastern Europe and FSU, control of these ports is highly lucrative. Unsurprisingly, the privatization process has been marred by charges of corruption, with government officials collaborating with oligarchs for sweetheart deals and kickbacks. There has been fierce competition between competing factions for control of the busiest ports. Yet Oktyabrsk, which moves hundreds of thousands of tons of cargo a month[244] and generates enough revenue to be among the top taxpayers in the entire province,[245] has been largely exempt from this competition. No government official or oligarch has made a move on Oktyabrsk or challenged Novinsky's control.[246] [247] No other port has been so exempted. We interpret this as recognition of the Kremlin's special interest in Oktyabrsk, i.e. that the Russian government has communicated to oligarchs that it will not tolerate disruptions or intrigue (ownership change, personnel turnover, etc.) that

Figure 49:
Vadim Novinsky with President of Ukraine

could impede the multi-billion dollar flow of weapons through Oktyabrsk. There are few forces that can tame the chaotic, no-holds-barred competition of post-Soviet big business, but a highly motivated Russian power ministry is one of them.

Virtually all of the Odessa Network-linked shipments uncovered during this investigation departed from Oktyabrsk. The one persistent exception is weapons leaving Russia bound for the Assad regime. On multiple occasions, Russian ships have attempted or succeeded at delivering military equipment to Tartus. We are unaware of any Syria-bound weapons shipments that did not originate in St. Petersburg, and possibly Kaliningrad. As an anomaly, this deserves further examination. The reasons why *not* to use St. Petersburg are clear. Its extreme northern location adds roughly 3,000 nautical miles and 10 days of travel to an average arms shipment, as compared to Oktyabrsk. A ship leaving St. Petersburg must pass through the North Sea, which thanks to the Cold War is ringed by long-time US allies (Germany, UK, Denmark, Netherlands, etc.) and extensive surveillance equipment. These states can and have interfered with Syria-bound shipments; for example, the *Alaed*, which was carrying helicopter parts for Assad, had its insurance revoked by the British underwriter. Lastly, St. Petersburg is one of the busiest ports in the former Soviet Union. Maintaining secrecy or operational security in such an environment would be highly challenging. Lastly, it also is possible that Western governments aware of the Kremlin's use of Oktyabrsk as a weapons port have placed significant pressure on the government of Ukraine (perhaps using its EU membership bid as a bargaining chip) to disallow Syria-bound shipments from transiting Ukrainian ports.

Figure 50:
Oktyabrsk Photographs

7 EU & Russian Shipping: Specialized Services

Although Odessa-based companies carry out the majority of Russian and Ukrainian weapons shipments, EU and Russia-based companies are responsible for a significant minority. We believe they play a complementary role to the Odessa-based facilitators by providing specialized services outside of Kaalbye or Phoenix's competency if necessary. Specifically, we judge that they provide specialized heavy-lift ships for unusually large shipments (warships, submarines, etc.), surge capacity during periods of high demand, or, knowingly or unknowingly, illicit shipments. Based in cities like Hamburg, Rotterdam, and St. Petersburg, these companies load weapons at Oktyabrsk and deliver them to locations like Myanmar, Libya, and Sudan. This section profiles the EU and Russian companies known to facilitate weapons transfers, and explains in detail their role in the overall weapons export process, including their connections to Odessa Network leaders.

EIDE MARINE SERVICES (NORWAY)

Warship and Submarine Transportation

The Norwegian firm Eide Marine Services is the second most frequent weapons transporter in our dataset (after Kaalbye). Eide is a perfect example of how EU firms provide specialized ships to handle large or unusual cargo the Odessa firms cannot, such as warships and submarines. If the Russian government has multiple billion-dollar contracts to deliver Kilo attack submarines to Asian customers, it is not immediately obvious how exactly to deliver a 242 foot long, 32 foot wide steel tube from European Russia to the Pacific Rim. Delivering the submarine under its own power is out of the question, given the expensive wear and tear it would inflict on a brand new machine. Most cargo ships—including those owned by trusted logistics contractors in Odessa—are unable to accommodate such huge, irregularly shaped cargo. Cargo ships are typically designed to handle granular cargo such as grain or coal (i.e. bulk carriers), liquids (i.e. tankers), 20–foot long intermodal containers (i.e. container ships), or small wheeled vehicles (i.e. ro-ros and car carriers.) Only a submersible barge, which has a single huge flat cargo bay designed to sink into the water, could handle the Kilo submarine. Eide is one of the few firms which possesses exactly such a ship, the *Eide Transporter*, which has been used multiple times to move unusual Russian military cargo to foreign customers. This includes *Tarantul*-class missile corvettes, *Gepard*-class frigates, and *Svetlyak*-class patrol boats to Vietnam, and *Kilo*-class submarines to China.

Figure 51: *Eide Ships*
From top to bottom: two Gepard *frigates, two* Kilo *attack submarines, one* Tarantul *missile corvette*

Eide's connections to either the Kremlin or Odessa shipping companies are unclear. Given how often Eide has moved Russian

weapons, it clearly has some relationship with Russian weapons export agencies, but details of this are unknown to us. We speculate that Eide interacts with Rosoboronexport directly, and does not go through the Odessa firms. This judgment is motivated in part by the lack of data on Eide-Odessa connections. While our research uncovered personal and financial ties between many EU shipping firms and Odessa, we did not find any for Eide. Thinking more broadly, Eide's specialized role also explains the lack of ties to Odessa: it operates in an entirely different market situation. Any ship can transport boxes of bullets or radar components; the value-add for shipping "typical" exports like guns or tanks is trustworthiness (implying connections with government officials) and general competency. A normal EU shipping company—i.e. one with ro-ros, container ships, etc.—seeking to enter the Russian and Ukrainian weapons market would do well to establish a relationship with Odessa companies such as Kaalbye in order to leverage their unique political connections. But Eide's distinction is functional, not political: its barge ships allow it move large military cargo that few others can. Eide does not need access to Odessa's political connections to find customers: given that Eide has moved military cargo not just for Russia, but also for the Canadian Navy,[248] US Navy,[249] Swedish Navy,[250] it is fair to say that it is a service which sells itself. Thus, our final judgment on Eide is that while it is an important logistics contractor for moving Russian weapons, it is not truly a part of the Odessa Network.

EIDE SHIPMENT EVENTS	
#8	Attack submarines to China
#13	Missile corvettes to Vietnam
#20	Patrol boats to Vietnam
#24	Frigate to Vietnam
#27	Frigate to Vietnam
#39	Patrol Boats to Vietnam

Figure 52: *Eide shipment events*

BRIESE, BBC, BELUGA, SPLIETHOFF, ECKHOFF, & CLIPPER (GERMANY AND NETHERLANDS)

Heavy-Lift Transportation

The German firm Briese Schiffahrts GmbH and Co KG is another transporter of Russian and Ukrainian weapons. Based in Leer, Germany, Briese is one of the largest shipping companies in Germany and among the largest heavy-lift shippers in the world, with a fleet of over 140 ships. Heavy lift ships typically carry their own cranes, and so can move large, heavy, and unusually shaped cargo such as tanks, artillery, etc. Bulk carriers and normal cargo ships—such as those owned by Kaalbye Shipping—cannot do so. This ability becomes even more useful if the port of discharge lacks proper infrastructure for handling such bulky cargo, since the ship can use its own crane rather than relying on old or non-existent port equipment. We believe that this gives Briese (and other EU heavy-lift firms discussed later) an important functional role in the Odessa Network: heavy weapons shipments, in particular to poor-infrastructure countries. This judgment is born of empirical data. As **Figure 53** shows, every weapons export event Briese has facilitated involved transporting heavy military equipment to poor-infrastructure states.

BRIESE SHIPMENT EVENTS	
#9	Ammo and military vehicles to DRC
#21	Heavy weapons to DRC
#22	Tanks to Sudan, unknown explosives to Singapore
#23	Tanks and APCs to Cambodia
#A	A.Q.Khan nuclear centrifuges to Libya

Figure 53: *Briese shipment events*

Figure 54: *Briese ad in Odessa*

Briese ships appear to be heavily staffed with Russian and Ukrainian captains and seamen, reflecting the fact that most of Briese's crewing business comes from Russia and Ukraine.[251] In confirmation of this, there are multiple Briese advertisements on the streets of Odessa soliciting seamen to apply. Briese maintains offices or branches in Odessa,[252] Sevastopol,[253] St. Petersburg,[254] Murmansk, Archangelsk, Petrozavodsk, Astrakhan, Rostov-na-Donu, and Vladivostok.[255]

In addition, Kaalbye Transport is the agent for a BVI-registered and Hamburg-based shipping company,[256] Primetransport Ltd. Primetransport maintains an office and personnel (Leonid Simakov) in Hamburg, but the company appears to be mostly based out of Odessa and staffed entirely with Russians and Ukrainians,[257] the majority of whom are dual-listed in other Kaalbye companies,[258] leading us to believe Primetransport is simply a Kaalbye shell. This perception is strengthened by the fact that Primetransport is even located at the same office building in Odessa as Kaalbye, as **Figure 55** shows. Primetransport lists BBC Chartering (a Briese subsidiary) as one of its clients, and counts *BBC Conan* as part of its fleet.[259] It is clear they have an existing business relationship, in addition to the personal ties described above.

Figure 55: *Primetransport and Kaalbye Author's photo of portion of business directory at Kaalbye headquarters; Primetransport is listed fourth.*

BRIESE CORPORATE STRUCTURE

MANAGEMENT	Ems Offshore Service GmbH & Co. KG *Leer, Germany*	Briese Schiffahrts GmbH & Co. KG *Leer, Germany*	Ems-Leda Shipping GmbH & Co. KG *Germany*	Briese Shipping BV *Scheemda, Netherlands*	Briese Research *Leer, Germany*
CHARTERING	BBC Chartering & Logistic GmbH & Co. KG *Leer, Germany*	BBC Project Chartering GmbH & Co. KG *Leer, Germany*	Briese Chartering GmbH & Co. KG *Leer, Germany*	Bremer Reederei E&B GmbH *Bremen, Germany*	Peak Shipping AS *Bergen, Norway*
CONSULTING	OWT – Offshore Wind technologie GmbH *Leer, Germany*	Briese Agency Ltd. Spolka z.o.o. *Szczecin, Poland*	China Supervision *Tianjin, China*	SEC GmbH & Co. KG *Leer, Germany*	
CREWING	Briese Swallow St. Petersburg Ltd. *St. Petersburg, Russia*	Briese Schiffahrt Ukraine *Sevastopol-Odessa, Ukraine*	Heavy Lift Manila Inc. *Manila, Philippines*	Leda Shipping GmbH *Leer, Germany*	
PORT LOGISTICS	EPAS Emden Port Agency Service GmbH & Co. KG *Port of Emden, Germany*	BERA GmbH & Co. KG *Port of Papenburg, Germany*			

Figure 56:
Briese corporate structure

Beluga Shipping is a now-insolvent[260] German shipping company that previously was one of the largest in Germany, and one of Briese's chief competitors. Like Briese, Beluga specialized in heavy-lift shipping and possessed an extensive heavy-lift fleet.[261] This allowed it a similar functional specialty within the Odessa Network in heavy-weapons shipments to low-infrastructure countries (note the countries and cargo in **Figure 57**). Beluga also appeared to specialize in spectacularly controversial cargo and customers: it was responsible for moving A.Q. Khan nuclear centrifuges to Libya, tanks and APCs to Myanmar (which was then under active UN sanction), and tanks, rockets, ammo, and more to South Sudan (also under UN sanctions).

BELUGA SHIPMENT EVENTS

#15	Tanks, ammo, rockets to South Sudan
#19	APCs, ATGMs to Myanmar
#A	A.Q. Khan nuclear centrifuges to Libya

Figure 57:
Beluga shipment events

Beluga had multiple connections to the FSU and Odessa Network. Phoenix Trans-Servis chartered the *Beluga Endurance* to deliver a large weapons shipment to Sudan/South Sudan (Event #15). Beluga also established a joint stock venture, Beluga Projects Logistics,[262] with an unnamed Russian transportation company to specialize in the Russian and Eastern European market.[263] Beluga also worked closely with BBC (Briese); for example, the ship that moved centrifuges to Libya was owned by Beluga but chartered by BBC.[264] Beluga and BBC (Briese) even signed a strategic alliance to coordinate business activities.[265] In addition to these documented ties, Beluga employees had ample opportunity to form personal contacts with Odessa Network firms, seeing as they frequently attended the same Russian shipping trade conferences. For example, Beluga representatives Harry Kaegebein, Nikolai Mishkin, Sergey Ovsienko, and Olga Gulyaeva attended the 2010 Heavy Lift Russia Trade Conference, also attended by Odessa companies.[266] Other guests of interests included representatives from BBC Chartering (i.e. Briese), Atomstroyexport (the Russia government's nuclear technology export firm), and a Libyan shipping firm.[267]

Spliethoff (Netherlands) and **Eckhoff** (Germany) provide another interesting example of EU companies' cooperation with the Odessa Network. Between 2005 and 2007, Venezuela signed $4 billion worth of arms deals with Russia (Sukhoi fighter jets, combat helicopters, and small arms) and in 2010 received a $2.2 billion Russia loan to buy S–300 SAMs, T–72 tanks, BMP–3 IFVs, BTR–80 APCs, Grad MRLs,[268] and more,[269] making it the single largest importer of Russian ground weapons in the world. Arms transfers of such magnitude required equally extensive logistical processes to physically move the weapons from Russia to Venezuela. In 2012 alone, four separate Kaalbye ships—*Socol* 3, *Socol* 6, *Ocean Voyager*, and *Ocean Fortune*—delivered Russian weapons to Venezuela. They were not alone: the Spliethoff ship *Sluisgracht* and Eckhoff-managed ship *Stade* accompanied Kaalbye in transporting weapons to Venezuela.[270] Their behavior confirms our hypothesis about EU firms specializing in heavy lift: the *Sluisgracht* was responsible for transporting the T–72 tanks, presumably leaving the lighter cargo for Kaalbye. We lack information on the nature of Spliethoff and Eckhoff's connections to the Russian government or Odessa Network. One source names Spliethoff as a long-time partner of Rosoboronexport. This seems plausible, especially since Spliethoff appears to ship weapons for other countries as well (i.e. military transportation is a consistent business for them). At the same time *Sluisgracht* was in Venezuela in 2012, another Spliefhoff ship, *Schippersgracht*, was delivering arms to Egypt on behalf of US Military Sealift Command.[271] We also believe *Sluisgracht* has some contacts with Kaalbye; the level of coordination required to move such large quantities of weapons in concert would seem to demand it.

SPLIETHOFF & ECKHOFF SHIPMENT EVENTS

#26	Venezuela mega-shipment
#31	Tanks to Venezuela
#32	#Venezuela mega-shipment

Figure 58:
Spliethoff and Eckhoff shipment events

Clipper Group is a Denmark-based shipping company that moved Ukrainian tanks in 2005 in cooperation with Nortrop.

BALCHART, WESTBERG, FEMCO, NORTH-WESTERN SHIPPING COMPANY, ANRUSSTRANS (RUSSIA)

Highly Sensitive Shipments

Russian shipping companies play a surprisingly small role in the maritime export of FSU weapons. Our dataset shows only four arms transfers facilitated by Russian companies: three to Syria, and one to an unknown customer of sufficient interest that the US State Department formally complained about the transfer. Russian shipping companies have been linked to a number of other incidents, which while not 'true' FSU arms transfers and hence excluded from our dataset, are also interesting. This includes the transportation of weapons from Iran to Syria in 2009,[viii] weapons of unknown nationality from Egypt to DRC in 2012, and the *Arctic Sea* incident in 2009, in which a Russian-operated ship was hijacked off the coast of Sweden, allegedly by Mossad in order to prevent it from delivering S–300 missiles to Iran.

These events all share two qualities. The first is that the customers and/or intermediary nations make these events highly illicit.[ix] Syria, Iran, and the DRC are all under arms embargos and subject to intense scrutiny from Western governments. Strikingly, we can find no weapons transfers facilitated by a Russian shipping company that were *not* highly illicit (whereas the Ukrainian and EU elements of the Odessa Network have plenty of licit shipments to Vietnam, Venezuela, etc.). Similarly, the second common feature is that the Russian government is deeply involved. For example, Russian arms transfers to Assad during the heat of the Syrian civil war are far more politically motivated than 'typical' weapons sales, and thus imply more direct military, SVR, FSB, and GRU involvement. While the small sample size of shipments means that any analytical judgments are fairly low confidence, these factors lead to two tentative hypotheses. One, Russian shipping companies 'specialize' in illicit shipments, i.e. are more likely to be contracted by state weapons export agencies for this kind of shipment. Two, they have particularly strong connections to the Russian government, including through the Odessa Network. The remainder of this chapter profiles the Russian shipping companies known to facilitate arms transfers, and how they confirm or deny the above two hypotheses.

BALCHART SHIPMENT EVENTS	
#28	Munitions to Syria

Figure 59:
Balchart shipment events

Sergei Cherkasov	Aleksei Pestrikov
Igor Evstigneev	Nikolai Potiavin
Evgenii Gunchev	Tatiana Shimskaya
Oleg Katrechko	Andrei Shuklenkov
Aleksandr Lisitsky	Evgenii Sklyarov
Pavel Machalov	Konstantin Volanskis

Figure 60:
Balchart current and former Employees

Balchart is a chartering company specializing in shipments throughout the Baltic region, with offices in Riga, Latvia,[272] Tallinn, Estonia[273] and St. Petersburg, Russia. The company is managed by Russian national Andrei Shuklenkov, and Estonian nationals Evgenii Sklyarov and Aleksei Pestrikov.[x] The list to the right contains all current or former Balchart employees publicly available.[274] As Balchart is primarily a chartering company, not a ship owner or operator, it is fairly difficult to locate open-source records of the companies and ships they work with. The only result we could find was an international shipping registry listing Balchart Estonia as the manager of *Porhov*. [275]

Balchart's connections to the Russian government and Odessa Network leaders are not so hard to find. The company's website lists Rosoboronexport, Izhmash (a Russian Technologies-owned defense firm that is one of the largest small arms producers in the world), and IRISL as clients,[276] and openly states the company's specialty in military logistics. Balchart representatives have attended many of the major trade conventions at which senior

viii. The MV Monchegorsk incident

ix. To be clear, we use the term 'illicit' to emphasize that the listed states are widely perceived as violating international norms, and sending weapons to them is highly controversial. Judging the exact legality of these arms transfers is beyond our purview.

x. Judging by name, ethnic Russians.

Odessa Network personnel were present, giving them ample opportunity to establish or maintain contact. For example, Balchart representative Igor Yevstigneev attended the 2008 Novo International Shipbrokers and Shipowners Conference in Novorossiysk,[277] also attended by Nikolai Melnikov and Artur Nitsevich (Interlegal), Victor Puyu (Kaalbye), as well as other interesting guests such as IRISL.[278]

FEMCO SHIPMENT EVENTS
#37 Attack helicopters to Syria

Figure 61:
FEMCO shipment events

FEMCO operated the *Alaed*,[279] which moved weapons to Syria in 2012. According to the company's website, FEMCO provides marine management services for oil and natural gas development. FEMCO appears to be a contractor for Gazprom on the Barents Sea, and for the Sakhalin oil field under development by Rosneft. FEMCO is in fact a spinoff from Rosneft, of which it previously was a subsidiary.[280] It goes without saying that these two companies are the archetype for "power vertical" politics and headed by United Russia apparatchiki such as Igor Sechin and Viktor Zubkov. FEMCO has performed military logistics tasks within Russia, for example shipping the bulkhead of a new Russian navy corvette from the construction yard to Komsomolsk-na-Amur for assembly.[281] In addition to these government ties, FEMCO also has direct business relationships with key Odessa Network firms. Varamar (a Varvarenko company) has operated and/or chartered the *Alaed*, the FEMCO-owned ship, implying a contractual relationship between the two.[282]

NORTH-WESTERN SHIPMENT EVENTS
#35 Helicopter parts to Syria

Figure 62:
North-Western shipment events

Northwestern Shipping Company was the owner and operator of the *Professor Katsman*, which delivered helicopter parts to Syria in 2012. Northwestern is a subsidiary of UCL, the holding company of oligarch Vladimir Lisin. Northwestern personnel have almost certainly met and interacted with other Odessa Network firms at various events attended by high-level personnel. For example, the then-Deputy Director of Northwestern Shipping, Aleksei Morozov, attended a 2009 trade conference in Odessa.[283] Attendees included representatives from Phoenix Trans-Servis. Similarly, in 2011, Northwestern sent representatives Tatiana Morozova and Yulia Gorbunova to that year's conference; other attendees included Phoenix Trans-Servis, ABLV,[xi] and other Odessa Network mainstays.

WESTBERG LTD. SHIPMENT EVENTS
#28 SALW and rockets to Syria

Figure 63:
Westberg Ltd. shipment events

Westberg Ltd. was the owner and operator of the *Chariot*, which transported AK–47 and rocket launcher ammunition to Syria in January 2012. Registered in the Marshall Islands but operating out of St. Petersburg,[284] Westberg has a complicated ownership structure of multiple subsidiaries and proxy companies, including Trolle Shipping (BVI), Midas Pete Ltd. (Belize), Goldwick Maritime Inc., and Valetta Holding Corp. According to the company's website and confirmed by Russian business records,[285] Westberg is managed by Oleg Aleksandrovich Smolyan. Westberg is the owner of the *Myre Seadiver*, a ship used by Moran Security Group, a private maritime security company linked to the Odessa Network. This is covered in more detail in the following chapter.

xi. A Latvian bank used by various Odessa Network companies. See Chapter 9.

8 African Private Security Companies

SHIP AND CARGO PROTECTION

Odessa shipping companies appear to own or employ multiple private maritime security companies [PMSCs], including Moran Security Group, Muse Professional Group, Helicon Security, Changsuk Security Group, and Al Mina Security Group. These companies' business model revolves around staffing ships transiting dangerous areas (particularly the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea) with heavily armed FSU military veterans, who provide protection from pirates.[286] Though hijacking is a threat for any ship-owner, it is particularly troubling when the cargo is sensitive military equipment, as happened with the 2008 *MV Faina* incident in which Somali pirates hijacked a Kaalbye ship carrying Ukrainian weapons to South Sudan.

Figure 64:
Moran Security

We believe the Odessa Network uses PMSCs as protection for its military cargos to avoid a repeat of this kind of event. Although we lack direct evidence of PMSC participation in Odessa Network weapons shipments—e.g. photos of PMSC personnel on a ship definitely carrying weapons—we judge that this is so. Logically, it is fair to assume if a group of companies specializing in weapons shipments has extensive connections with a group of companies specializing in guarding shipments, the guarding of weapons shipments is likely the basis for their cooperation. It seems highly improbable that the Odessa Network would not upgrade their security after the *Faina* incident; having their sensitive military cargo hijacked would demand some kind of security solution.

Moran Maritime Group is registered in Belize[287] but based in Moscow.[288] Moran is staffed primarily with Russian and Ukrainian military veterans, but also includes former intelligence officers. For example, company president Vyacheslav Kalashnikov is a St. Petersburg KGB and FSB veteran. Like many PMSCs, Moran operates its own ships, including both patrol craft and "floating armories" (ships carrying weapons and ammunition for the PMSC's use).[289] This practice has been heavily criticized by groups such as the UN Somalia Monitoring Group for its lack of transparency and safety, since these high-seas ships are not subject to shore-based regulations.[290] One of Moran's ships, *Myre Seadiver*, is owned and managed by Westberg,[291] the Russian company which also owns the *MV Chariot*, which shipped weapons to Syria and the DRC in 2012. Strengthening this hypothesis is a 2011 incident in which the *Chariot* was transiting the Arabian Sea and attacked by Somali pirates, who were repelled by Russian Special Forces veterans acting as guards for the ship.[292] It is impossible to say for certain that the Chariot was carrying weapons at the time, or that the guards aboard were from Moran, but since Westberg is a known weapons shipper and has a business relationship with Moran, it is worthy of further investigation. Interestingly, the Moran-operated *MV Myre Seadiver* was arrested in Nigeria in October 2012 in possession of significant quantities of small arms and ammunition.[293]

Another one of Moran's clients is the German company Hansa Heavy Lift[294] [HHL]. HHL is in fact just a 'reboot'[295] or rebranding[296] of now-bankrupt Beluga Shipping, which previously was one of the most active European nodes of the Odessa Network. Two members of HHL's four managing directors are Beluga veterans,[297] and a high percentage of HHL's fleet is inherited from Beluga.[298] Beluga was responsible for shipments of A.Q. Khan centrifuges to Libya, anti-tank missiles to Myanmar, and tanks to South Sudan. The exact nature of Moran's relationship with HHL, or what kind of cargo they are hired to protect, is unknown.

Muse Professional Group is another major PMSC with clear links to the Odessa Network. Headquartered out of Ukraine,[299] and primarily employing Ukrainian veterans,[300] Muse is run by U.S. citizen Charles Kuneff.[301] Muse reportedly was at one time affiliated with Varamar, but this relationship appears to be since terminated.[302] Muse has multiple affiliates, including Changsuk Security and Al Mina Security.[303] Mr. Kuneff is also reported to own and run Helicon Security.[304] [305]

The fact that private security companies are linked to the Odessa Network is particularly interesting given recent developments in East Africa. Foreign observers,[306] local media, and on-the-ground contacts report a growing number of Russian and Ukrainian private military security companies and arms dealers operating in war zones such as Somalia and

the DRC. FSU entities offer a wide range of services, acting as a one-stop shop for governments and militant groups alike to purchase weapons, mercenary services, trained pilots, and the like. Muse is certainly active in Somalia, where a SMG report lists it as guarding ships entering and leaving Bossaso Port.[307] Muse also works with the Yemeni coast guard to contract its services out to the highest bidder.

Figure 65:
Private Maritime Security Companies

9 Latvia: Financial Services & Laundering

Russian and Ukrainian weapons are big business, both for the governments who export them and the Odessa Network companies contracted as transporters. Russia exported over $17.6 billion of weapons in 2012 alone,[308] with Ukraine coming in at $1.3 billion.[309] The Odessa Network company leaders facilitating these weapons flows clearly earn significant profits from doing so. They drive Mercedes and BMWs, vacation in the South of France, and have numerous real estate and business investments. For example, Kaalbye co-founder Boris Kogan is reputed to own multiple Odessa nightclubs,[310] while Tomex head Victor Murenko is a VIP customer at Odessa Alfa Bank.[311] There is also evidence that some of these companies employ Latvian banks known or accused of money laundering and a series of Panamamian companies run by Latvian nationals who act as "proxy directors."

The Odessa Network operates in a region of the world where financial crime is endemic, large-scale, and persistent. Precise numbers for the value of money laundering in FSU are of course nonexistent, but in 2001 the UN estimated Russia alone was laundering more than $100 billion of "dirty money" every year.[312] In 2012, the Bank of Russia estimated that a full 4% of Russia's GDP was illicitly siphoned out of the country every year, and that 40% of all capital leaving Russia was in fact laundered.[313] The outgoing head of the Russian central bank, Sergei Ignatiev, recently gave a more conservative estimate of $49–52 billion yearly.[314] Redistribution within Russia is also a problem: experts estimate that the total value of corruption in Russia, which ranks 133rd out of 176 on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index [TICPI],[315] is between 5 and 10% of GDP ($94-$190 billion).[316] Ukraine ranks even lower at 144th on the TICPI. It is important to understand that Russian and Ukrainian arms exports occur in this context of massive and systemic financial evasion.[317]

There are also functional reasons why money laundering is useful in arms shipping, particularly in concealing illicit arms transfers. Although some of Russia and Ukraine's weapons exports are perfectly licit (e.g. Vietnam, Venezuela, etc.), some are or were in violation of international sanctions (Sudan, Myanmar, Syria, etc.). The shipping companies and officials involved in such transfers would be wise to conceal their involvement for fear of public identification or legal retribution. Since the "money trail" is one of the most powerful and widely used ways to connect criminals to crimes, obscuring illicitly obtained finances via off-shore shell companies, proxy directors, and the like is a useful strategy for evasion.

Lastly, we argue that money laundering

… official figures from the Central Bank show that in 2011, 250,000 Russian firms paid no taxes and submitted annual reports reporting no business activities. Simultaneously, the Central Bank found that more than 4 trillion rubles ($130 billion) had been processed through the accounts of these inactive companies.

"That is almost half the budget of Russia in 2011," he said. And that is just the official accounting

"Unofficially, we believe that of the 5 million firms registered in Russia, 3 million or even more are phantom companies, which don't conduct any real commercial activities and are aimed only at money laundering."

Figure 66:
Statement of Russian Official on Money Laundering

and corruption are built-in features of the Putin political system, and so we should expect military-industrial exporters to engage in it. As stated in **Chapter 5**, illicit redistribution of national wealth to regime stakeholders is how United Russia and the Party of Regions maintain stability, by making collaboration with the state more profitable than challenging it. By definition, money laundering is essential for such corrupt redistribution. It is the mechanism by which favored officials can steal tax revenue,[318] well-connected generals can sell military property to the highest bidder,[319] and trusted oligarchs can receive sweetheart deals on state assets. Money laundering also plays an important role in Russian foreign policy by bankrolling the Kremlin's ability to manipulate and influence countries of interest. A small but well-documented example would be the SVR funding the election of a pro-Russian candidate in a Latvian city mayoral election;[320] the slush funds for such operations do not come about licitly. An official EU statement on the Magnitsky affair (**Figure 67**) summarizes this argument nicely.[321] If we accept this as true, then money laundering is an indispensable service for the Putinist system, and we should expect weapons export agencies and their contractors to engage in it.

All these factors lead us to hypothesize, even before examining specific data, that both the government owners of exported weapons and some Odessa transporters of exported weapons use financial institutions known or accused of money laundering.

"Russia has a huge parallel budget, involving massive black funds used for stabilizing and expanding the elite's power, in Russia and beyond, but especially in the territory of the former Soviet Union… such a parallel budget needs to be fed."

Figure 67:
EU Statement

FSU money laundering relies on proxy directors and shell companies. In this scheme, companies or people wishing to remain anonymous recruit people with no business qualifications to lend their names as directors to businesses located in offshore havens like Panama, allowing the "real" owners to conduct business with near total anonymity. One shell company can then be named as the director of yet another new company, creating a daisy chain of shell companies facilitating anonymous financial transactions and obscuring ownership.[322] A group of Latvian nationals (most notably Erik Vanagels and Stan Gorin) are among the most prolific proxy directors.[323] Their identities have been used by Ireland and BVI-based International Offshore Services to set up thousands of companies responsible for a wide range of crimes. A non-exhaustive list of examples includes a Kazakh official laundering $5 billion of money through the UK,[324] a $150 million kickback scheme involving a Ukrainian government contract to procure oil rigs,[325] money laundering for the Sinaloa Cartel and Vietnamese mafia,[326] and procurement of North Korean weapons for Iran.[327]

The Odessa Network also is an active user of Latvian proxies. For example, the companies owning the *MV Faina* which transported weapons to South Sudan are all Vanagels-Gorin shells. The ship's manager Almar Shipping is directed by Williston Line, which is directed by Williston Impex Corp, which is directed by Integri SA, a Gorin-Vanagels Panamamian shell company used to register thousands of other shells. The ship's owners, Tomex Team and Waterlux AG, similarly can be traced back to Cascado AG and Systemo AG, two more of Gorin and Vanagel's preferred shell registrars.[328] Kaalbye Agency Services Ltd., Kaalbye Logistics International, and Kaalbye Yachts all were established by International Offshore Services and/or directed by Vanagels-Gorin affiliates.

Some Odessa Network entities also has strong ties to Latvian banks known or accused of laundering money. A financial hub even during Soviet times, Latvia has multiple advantages which have made it a global hub of money laundering, particularly for FSU countries (above all, Russia). Latvia is neighbors with Russia and has regular flights to FSU cities like Baku and Astana. It has a large ethnic Russian population, and the Russian language (the

lingua franca of FSU) is widely spoken. Most importantly, it is a member of the EU, and so money cleaned through Latvia can readily be transferred into safe havens in Zurich or London. Over half of the $25 billion held in Latvian banks is held by foreign depositors; the IMF estimates FSU entities account for 90% of this.[329] The US Treasury blacklisted two Latvian banks in 2005 under the Patriot Act for the role their money laundering services played in terrorist financing.[330] The EU, IMF, [331] and Council of Europe[332] (among others) have all expressed their concern about Latvian money laundering, with the Magnitsky affair only increasing the level of interest. In the following section, we explore several Latvian banks which the Odessa Network companies may use to launder profits from weapons shipments.

ABLV BANK

ABLV Bank is one of Latvia's largest financial institutions, an alleged money launderer, and closely connected to the Odessa Network. ABLV is the largest Latvian-owned bank by assets,[333] and holds the largest amount of non-resident deposits of any bank.[334] 40% of its clients are Russian.[335] ABLV has been recently linked to two high-profile cases of money laundering. Then known as Aizkraukles, ABLV is alleged to be one of the six banks through which illicit money in the Magnitsky case was laundered (along with Baltic International Bank, Trasta Kommercbank, Rietumu Bank,[xii] Baltic Trust Bank, and PrivatBank).[336] In addition, the anti-corruption group Global Witness accused ABLV in August 2012 of laundering roughly $30 million out of Kyrgyzstan.[337]

ABLV Bank has been a financial supporter of "Maritime Days in Odessa" from its inception,[338] and has sent senior executives to the event multiple times, often as keynote speakers. They have done the same for other conferences heavily attended by the Odessa Network firms. For example, ABLV Head of the Regional Development Department Kazimir Rezvy and Head of the Private Bankers Department Igor Shlivko both made the trip from Riga to Odessa for the 2011 "Practice of Maritime Business 2011" conference in Odessa, attended by representatives from Phoenix Trans-Servis, North-Western Shipping, and others.[339]

We infer that this is evidence for a financial relationship between ABLV and some Odessa Network shipping firms, and a personal relationship between senior ABLV personnel and some Odessa Network leaders. Strengthening this inference is data directly indicating that some of these com-

Figure 68:
ABLV sponsorship of Odessa event

Invoice No. 236/08-S

16th May 2008

Figure 69:
Waterlux AG court documents

xii. Rietumu Bank also attended some of the Odessa Network-sponsored events, similar to ABLV.

panies use ABLV bank. The below document is from a 2009 US court case involving Waterlux AG and Phoenix Trans-Servis (owner and manager of the Faina, and closely tied to Kaalbye) show one of their business partners using "Aizkraukles Bank."[340] This was the previous name of ABLV.[341]

REGIONAL INVESTMENT BANK JSG

Documents from a 2009 court case[342] show that some elements of the Odessa Network use Regional Investment Bank JSG. Again, this Latvian bank has a track record of being used for money laundering; a US Securities and Exchange Commission filing indicates it as the destination for money a $11 million Ponzi scheme.[343] As the below documents show, Waterlux AG and Phoenix Trans-Servis (the owner and manager of the weapons ship *Faina*, and closely linked to Kaalbye) both appear to have regularly used Regional Investment Bank JSG.

"WATERLUX AG"
50 th Street, Global Plaza Tower, 19 th Floor, Suite H,
Panama City, Panama

COMMERCIAL INVOICE
Invoice No: WAT 260508
Invoice Date: 26.05.2008
To: Amros Carriers Corp., USA

DESCRIPTION	UNIT, pcs	QUANTITY	UNIT PRICE, USD	AMOUNT, USD
MV "FAINA"				
Freight Derince - Tripoli - Algiers - Arzew 11.05.08				305 000.00
Less brokerage 2.5%				7 625.00
Fresh water supply 72 mt	mt	72	9.50	684.00
Total:				296 691.00

Details of payment

"WATERLUX AG"
50 th Street, Global Plaza Tower, 19 th Floor, Suite H,
Panama City, Panama
Intermediary bank:
Raiffeisen Zentralbank
Oesterreich AG (Vienna, Austria)
SWIFT code: RZBAATWW
Acc. Nr. 70-55.065.965
Beneficiary's Bank
Regional Investment Bank JSC
RIGA, LATVIA
SWIFT code:
RIBRLV22
Beneficiary's Acc:
LV63RIBR00034670N0000

AS FOR "WATERLUX AG"

Instance Type and Transmission
Notification (Transmission) of Original sent to SWIFT (ACK)
Network Delivery Status : Network Ack
Priority/Delivery : Normal
Message Input Reference : 1532 080604RIBRLV22AXXX0529308564
Message Header
Swift Input : FIN 103.STP Single Customer Credt Transfer
Sender : RIBRLV22XXX
REGIONALA INVESTICIJU BANKA
RIGA LV
Receiver : RZBAATWWXXX
RAIFFEISEN ZENTRALBANK OESTERREICH AG
VIENNA AT
Message Text
20: Sender's Reference
2008060405300041
23B: Bank Operation Code
CRED
32A: Val Date/Curr/Interbnk Settld Amt
Date : 04 June 2008
Currency : USD (US DOLLAR)
Amount : #428,000.#
33B: Currency/Instructed Amount
Currency : USD (US DOLLAR)
Amount : #428,000.#
50F: Ordering Customer - ID
/LV63RIBR00034670N0000
1/WATERLUX AG
2/50TH STR.,GLOBAL PLAZA TOWER, 19T
3/H FLOOR, SUITE H,
5/PA/PANAMA CITY
56A: Intermediary Institution - BIC
MRMDUS33XXX
HSBC BANK USA, N.A.
NEW YORK,NY US
57A: Account With Institution - BIC
MIDLGRAAXXX
HSBC BANK PLC
(ALL GREEK BRANCHES)
ATHENS GR
59: Beneficiary Customer-Name & Addr
/GR8301200500000005011697071
IMVALA NAVIGATION LTD
GREECE
70: Remittance Information
PAYMENT FOR FREIGHT MV GENOI SHIPKI
ILLICHEVSK-TARTUS-ILLICHEVSK INV. 8
/1 DD. 29.05.08
71A: Details of Charges
OUR
Message Trailer
{MAC:DEF6C8A4}
{CHK:7E70FA3E3F6F}

"WATERLUX AG"
50 th Street, Global Plaza Tower, 19 th Floor, Suite H,
Panama City, Panama

COMMERCIAL INVOICE
Invoice No: WAT 090906
Invoice Date: 09.06.2008
To: Atlas Uluslararasi Nakliyat Proje Tasimaciligi Sanayi Ve Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi",
Egitim Mahallesi, Kasap Ismail Sokak, Sedikoglu Plaza 5 Kat, 1 No 33, Kadikoy, TR-Istanbul, Turkey

DESCRIPTION	UNIT, pcs	QUANTITY	UNIT PRICE, USD	AMOUNT, USD
MV "FAINA"				
Derince, Turkey – Tripoli, Lebanon / Algiers, Algeria / Arzew, Algeria, on May 11 – June 12, 2008.				77 906.70
Total:				77 906.70

Details of payment

"WATERLUX AG"
50 th Street, Global Plaza Tower, 19 th Floor, Suite H,
Panama City, Panama
Intermediary bank:
Raiffeisen Zentralbank
Oesterreich AG (Vienna, Austria)
SWIFT code: RZBAATWW
Acc. Nr. 70-55.065.965
Beneficiary's Bank
Regional Investment Bank JSC
RIGA, LATVIA
SWIFT code:
RIBRLV22
Beneficiary's Acc:
LV63RIBR00034670N0000

AS FOR "WATERLUX AG"

Figure 70:
Waterlux AG court documents continued

10 The Odessa Network: Overview

The quantity and complexity of inter-connected entities in this investigation have thus far compelled us to divide them into location-function clusters (e.g. Odessa—Logistics Integration, Oktyabrsk-Port of Origin, etc.) and examine one by one. Though this allows granular analysis, it risks losing the forest for the trees. In this section, we present a more abstract overview of the network.

Figure 71:
Number of weapons shipments by facilitator

One of the preliminary insights from the weapons shipment dataset was that a relatively small amount of facilitators accounted for a high percentage of Russian and Ukrainian arms transfers, with many 'repeat offenders.' Our subsequent analysis discovered that many of these facilitators possess personal and financial ties with each other. Using this information to re-examine our dataset and compare the number of weapons shipments carried out by Odessa Network facilitators versus the number carried out by non-connected facilitators reveals that the Odessa Network as a whole is responsible for the majority of Russian and Ukrainian seaborne arms transfers in our dataset. Out of all shipments for which the facilitator is known, all but six are attributable to the Odessa Network. Eide Marine is the only facilitator in our dataset without clear personal and financial ties to other facilitators and Russian or Ukrainian government officials.[xiii]

The fact that such a high percentage of FSU arms transfers are facilitated by the Odessa Network implies that the common equipment, procedures, and locations used by these facilitators serve as a detectable 'signature' of Russian or Ukrainian arms shipments. In more practical terms, if we know that a few linked companies account for the majority of arms transfers, and these companies follow predictable patterns of ships, personnel, ports, and more, we should be able to recognize these patterns and identify possible arms shipments ahead of time.

xiii. As previously discussed, Eide Marine is a unique case. It is one of the few companies in the world that possesses huge submersible-bay barges capable of transporting warships and military submarines. The fact that it offers such a specialized and rare service means in some sense it does not 'need' connections to get contracts; if a government needs to move a 250 foot long, 30 foot wide submarine between continents, Eide is one of very few options.

11 Case Study: Syria

The main value of this research lies in prediction. We have identified the companies, facilities, and processes through which Russia and Ukraine have exported weapons by sea to foreign customers in the past. Under the assumption that past behavior is indicative of future behavior, we should be able to make better guesses about where FSU weapons are flowing by looking for the patterns of weapons shipments uncovered by our analysis. In practical terms, this means ships owned by companies that have moved weapons in the past, are loading cargo at Oktyabrsk, and are delivering it to a state known to purchase Russian or Ukrainian weapons, are more likely to be transporting Russian or Ukrainian weapons to that state than a ship not matching these criteria.

Syria provides a compelling case study for this approach. There is no doubt that Russia is supplying Assad, but the extent of arms transfers is less well known, at least in the public sphere. Multiple ships—the *Professor Katsman*, *Chariot*, and *Alaed*, among others—have been interdicted carrying Russian weapons to Syria, as have aircraft such as the Syrian Airbus 320 intercepted over Turkey. These few cases where Russia has been publicly "caught" are likely indicative of a larger trade. Assad-controlled Syria cannot domestically produce enough ammunition, military equipment, diesel fuel, etc. to sustain a two-year-long conventional war. Large-scale Russian (and Iranian) support is the only logical explanation for how it has been able to do so. Identifying and closing the avenues by which the Kremlin is arming Assad with everything from tank parts to missiles is a possible tactic for reducing this support and weakening Assad.

By obtaining AIS transponder records for all ports in Syria, Ukraine, and Russia between 1 January 2012 and 30 June 2013, we constructed a near-complete log of commercial maritime traffic entering or exiting ports in these countries over the given timeframe, complete with exact date, time, and location. Using the unique IMOID identifier for each ship, we cross-referenced the port call dataset against ship registry records, allowing us to determine ship owner, manager, tonnage, flag, etc. Given the byzantine financial and organizational arrangements used by the Odessa Network, this entailed significant investigative research into identifying the ownership structure of shell companies; this was accomplished by using Palantir to integrate diverse datasets drawn from sources such as Ukrainian court records, SWIFT transaction receipts, Russian business directories, international shipping registrars, and more. Once this combined database was complete, we searched it for the "signature" of FSU arms shipments discovered through our analysis: ships owned or operated by companies with a track record of transporting Russian and Ukrainian weapons, transiting from Oktyabrsk, St. Petersburg, or Kaliningrad to Syrian ports such as Tartus, Al Ladaqiya, and Baniyas. We added one more possible selection criteria of "AIS discrepancy." Ships can turn off their transponders, broadcast a false name or IMOID or MMSI, or even "spoof" their signals to appear as if they are in an entirely different location or are an entirely different ship than they actually are. Past Russian weapon shipments to Syria such as the *Katsman* have turned their AIS transponders off, and Iranian vessels routinely spoof their signals.[344] [345] The International Maritime Organization publishes lists of ships that are detected with these discrepancies, which we included in our database. Putting this all together, we identified shipment events that match patterns of ownership and behavior seen in past Russian weapons shipments.

ODESSA NETWORK AND SYRIA

Kaalbye is the single most active shipper of Russian and Ukrainian weapons; it also actively transports unknown cargo between Oktyabrsk, St. Petersburg, and Tartus. The Kaalbye-owned *Ocean Voyager* entered St. Petersburg on 13 January 2012, where it remained for two days. It then left, and arrived in Tartus on 3 February 2012. After completing this shipment, it transited to Oktyabrsk, loaded cargo, and delivered Russian weapons to Venezuela as part of a multi-ship convoy completing a $4 billion arms transfer that included S–300 missiles. *Ocean Voyager* made many other port calls in Oktyabrsk in 2012, including 22 May, 28 May, 13 October, and 14 November. The same is true for all of Kaalbye's other ships; literally their entire fleet transported cargo from Oktyabrsk to points abroad in 2012 and

2013, often multiple times. These ships include *LS Aizenshtat*, *Ocean Fortune*, *Ocean Winner*, *Ocean Force*, *Ocean Energy*, and *Ocean Power*.

Many of Kaalbye's 2013 port calls at Oktyabrsk are followed by long periods with its ships missing from AIS coverage. These ships call in Oktyabrsk, are detected transiting through the Bosphorus into the Mediterranean by Turkish AIS receivers, and then go "off the grid" for weeks or even months. This is not inherently criminal, as AIS coverage is imperfect; ships are often undetectable when on the high seas, far away from land-based AIS receivers, and many under-developed ports lack adequate AIS infrastructure. Yet these areas are relatively few. Virtually all of Europe, North and South America, Russia, China, Japan, Korea, Australia, and much of the Middle East and North Africa are covered by commercial AIS services. The fact that so many of Kaalbye's destinations after leaving Oktyabrsk are not detected on AIS means either they are docking at areas with poor AIS coverage, or are deliberately turning off their AIS transponders to avoid detection. Both of these conditions apply to Syria; AIS data is difficult to come by,[xiv] and many of the known Russian and Iranian weapons shipments (such as *Katsman* and *Chariot*) have turned off or spoofed their AIS transponders when approaching Syria to avoid detection.

This pattern of Kaalbye ships docking at Oktyabrsk, entering the Mediterranean, then disappearing from AIS coverage has been most prevalent during periods of heavy Russian military aid to Syria. Russia allegedly surged heavy weapons shipments to Syria in Spring 2013, a period during which the majority of the Kaalbye heavy lift and ro-ro fleet loaded cargo at Oktyabrsk, entered the Mediterranean, and then disappeared for weeks on end. These voyages fall into three categories: innocuous voyages, where the transit times and distances line up, and gaps in coverage coincide with long periods of high seas transit; moderately suspicious voyages, where transit times indicate major delays or diversions, but could be offset by high seas transit; and highly suspicious voyages, where transit times and distances indicate major delays or diversions not sufficiently explainable by high seas transit (i.e. missing AIS records either outbound, inbound, or at destination ports).

Innocuous voyages are explainable as simply taking place on the high seas, away from land-based AIS receivers, within average timeframes for transit: *Ocean Power* loaded at Oktyabrsk 27 May–8 June, passed through the Bosphorus a few days later, and was off the grid until 2 July, when it reappeared in Curacao. The approximate travel time for a ro-ro transiting Istanbul—Curacao at an industry-standard average of 13 knots is 32 days, suggesting Kaalbye's ships may even operate at higher than industry-standard speeds.

Moderately suspicious voyages where the transit time indicates a major diversion or delay and a blackout period possibly explainable by high seas transit include *Ocean Winner*, which loaded at Oktyabrsk 17–24 March, passed through the Bosphorus 27 March, the Aegean 29 March, and disappeared until 10 May, when it reappeared in Wilmington, North Carolina. The approximate travel time for a heavy-lift ship transiting Istanbul—Wilmington at *Ocean Winner*'s average of 8 knots is 28 days, meaning it spent 17 more days at sea than necessary to complete that voyage. However, the ship's final March positions show it heading west from the Aegean, so it is unlikely to have diverted to Syria or the Eastern Mediterranean.

The remaining Kaalbye voyages are highly suspicious. *Ocean Fortune* loaded at Oktyabrsk 1–5 January, broadcast its last position heading southeast out of the Aegean on 9 January, and then reappeared outside the Eastern Mediterranean, reentering through the Suez Canal, on 7 March. Possible final destinations include India, although that trip should only take approximately 13 days at the ship's average speed of 11 knots. The *Ocean Voyager* shows a similar gap, but its last positions were in the Western Mediterranean, meaning it likely did not obscure movements to Syria. Both ships have only one other gap in their AIS records, Spring 2012, when they were in Venezuela delivering heavy weapons.

---

xiv. Many of the major commercial AIS vendors lacked information on Syria; we leveraged AIS "Destination" data from smaller EU and FSU AIS providers, who maintain land-based receivers in the Eastern Mediterranean.

xv. Average travel times and speeds calculated using the Transit Time/Distance Calculator at http://www.searates.com/reference/portdistance/.

Kaalbye was not the only Odessa Network company delivering unknown cargo to Syria in 2012 and 2013:

- Almar is a known weapons transporter, having been involved in the 2009 Faina incident, and is tied to Vadim Alperin, who has multiple business contacts in Syria. Almar manages a ship called the *Aviva*. The *Aviva* entered Odessa on 2 May 2012, and left for Tartus on 14 May 2012. It arrived in Syria on 21 May 2012. Aviva also loaded cargo at Novorossiysk, departed on 13 March 2013, and arrived in Tartus on either 22 or 29 March. Again, this corresponds with the surge in Russian weapons deliveries to Syria in Spring 2013.

- Ukrainian Danube Shipping Company, which was the ship owner and operator for a delivery of Ukrainian weapons to South Sudan in 2007, also owns the *Viano do Castelo* and *Tatarbunary*. These ships delivered or loaded some unknown cargo in Tartus on 22 February 2012 and 12 July 2012, respectively. *Viano do Castelo* has made many other port calls in Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, including 21 May 2012, 28 May 2012, and 24 December 2012.

- The German company Briese is one of the most active European nodes of the Odessa Network. It owns *Bonacieux*, which declared Al Ladaqiyah, Syria as a destination on 13 March 2012; the company claims this was an AIS error. Briese also owns *Wybelsum*, which entered Al Ladaqiyah on 29 December 2012, 6 January 2013, 13 January 2013, and 20 January 2013, respectively.

- Inok NV was involved in shipping Russian weapons to Syria aboard the *Professor Katsman*, which it managed, and it has political connections to Kremlin. This was not Inok's first trip to Syria: it owns and operates the *Pola Atlantic*, which docked in Tartus between 22 April 2012 and 28 April 2012 (before the *Katsman*).

- Eckhoff Reederei was the ship manager for a shipment of Russian weapons to Venezuela in early 2012. Eckhoff Reederei also manages the *OXL Emir*, which docked in Tartus on 2 May 2012 and then arrived in St. Petersburg on 30 May 2012.

- Solchart Archangelsk was the owner and operator of the *Arctic Sea*, widely suspected of attempting to transport S–300s to Iran in 2009. Solchart also is the owner and operator of *Arctic Sky*, which has made multiple trips from Kaliningrad to Syria, the exact path by which known weapons shipments have traversed. *Arctic Sky* left Kaliningrad on 14 April 2012, and arrived in Tartus on 12 May 2012. It returned to Kaliningrad on 8 August 2012, and then again transited to Tartus between 14 and 21 October. *Arctic Sky* also made multiple stops in Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev.

- Dutch firm Spliethoff has been linked to multiple Russian weapons shipments in the past. Spliethoff owns and operates *Artisgracht*, which docked in Al Ladaqiyah on 12 March 2012.

While it is impossible to say using only open source and commercial data exactly what cargo was contained in each of the above shipments, the key takeaway is that in 2012 and 2013 many ships from the Odessa Network left from known ports of origin for Russian weapons shipments and went directly to Syria or embarked on voyages that only make sense if large portions of their movements were obscured. The evidence (i.e. Syrian port calls by Odessa Network-linked ships, AIS discrepancies coinciding with known Russian seaborne arms shipments) presents a strong circumstantial case that these ships and companies are moving weapons or other sensitive cargo to the Assad regime, which is bolstered by the fact that most of the interdicted and publicly reported Russian arms shipments were also carried out by members of this network.

ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS: SYRIAN SHIPPING COMPANIES

An assumption of this paper has been that when the governments of Russia or Ukraine sell weapons abroad, they (not the purchaser) coordinate the transportation of said weapons, most often through the Odessa Network. While we believe this is the case for the vast majority of arms transfers, it is plausible that in some cases the purchasing country itself

would handle logistics. The two are not mutually exclusive: it could be that both Russia or Ukraine and the purchasing country handle different sub-sections of an overall arms transfer, perhaps with Kremlin-linked FSU facilitators handling the most high-value (in both the military and financial senses) weapons, systems, and 'native' facilitators from the purchasing country handling the lower value weapons.

If we suppose this 'mixed' hypothesis (some FSU facilitators, some purchasing country facilitators) is true, and apply this to Syria, we should expect to find Syrian shipping companies transporting weapons from Oktyabrsk and/or St. Petersburg to Syria. While we have no data confirming the presence of weapons onboard, our AIS records show a steady stream of ships owned by Syrian companies (often relocated to intermediary countries such as Lebanon or Egypt) transiting between Oktyabrsk and Tartus. In some cases these companies are known partners of Odessa Network facilitators. For example, Mamari Shipping, a Syrian company which has conducted business with Kaalbye in the past, owns the *Lady Nour*. This ship left Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev on 21 November 2012, and entered Tartus on 14 December 2012.

The following table shows all ships which docked in both Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev and Syrian ports (Tartus, Al Ladaqiyah, and Baniyas) in 2012, along with the name and nationality of the ship owner and manager. In many cases, the nationality and base of operations reported to registrars is a cover; many of the Egyptian, Lebanese, etc. shipping companies listed below are in fact Syrian. The table is sorted by combined port calls. For example, a ship that docked in Oktyabrsk once and Tartus once would have two total. We use this as an imperfect but useful measure of the overall Oktyabrsk-Tartus (or vice versa) trade facilitated by the ship.

What leaps off the page is that Syrian companies comprised most of the Oktyabrsk-Syria traffic in 2012. Again, we stress that we cannot say with certainty that there were weapons aboard these ships. Russia and Ukraine are major grain exporters,[346] and Syria (whose domestic production has been hit hard by the ongoing conflict) is a net importer.[347] This trade could explain some percentage of the overall Oktyabrsk-Syria traffic.

Interestingly, however, ships owned or operated by companies based in Syria or common intermediary countries (Lebanon and Egypt) made up a higher percentage of traffic at Oktyabrsk in 2012 as compared to other, busier, Ukrainian ports such as Odessa.[xv] The percentage of Syrian traffic at Oktyabrsk is significantly higher even compared to Nikolaev, just a few kilometers up the Bug River. In addition, bulk grain carriers are in fact ideal for shipping large quantities of small arms; for example, court documents from the 2007 US trial of legendary Syrian arms dealer Monzer al-Kassar show he intended to use a grain carrier, *Anastasia*, to move thousands of assault rifles and grenades to the FARC.[348] It is of course possible that there is no correlation between an abnormally high percentage of Syrian ships loading cargo at a port that is the epicenter of Russian arms exports and then travelling to Tartus, and the continued flow of Russian weapons into Syria.

Figure 72:
Syria-Oktyabrsk maritime traffic, 2012

SHIP NAME	IMOID	PORT CALLS IN 2012			SHIP MANAGER	COUNTRY*
		SYRIA	NIK/OKT	COMBINED		
MINO G	7725697	14	12	26	Yass Marine Co Ltd	Lebanon & Syria
C. R. TANGER	7722621	20	1	21	Melody Shipping Co	Greece, Turkey
JAMIL G	7725673	12	9	21	Yass Marine Co Ltd	Lebanon & Syria
ABBOUD-G	7821635	8	11	19	Yass Marine Co Ltd	Lebanon & Syria
ISMAEL MEHIEDDINE	7616171	10	5	15	MTM United Co Sal	Lebanon & Syria
KOPALNIA BORYNIA	8701911	10	4	14	Yass Marine Co Ltd	Lebanon & Syria
TRUSTWORTHY	7713876	7	6	13	Realistic Stand Shipping SA	Panama, Syria
FAST CHALLENGER	7725130	8	4	12	Levant Shipping and Technical	France, Lebanon, Egypt
HAROUN	7211373	11	1	12	Gate Marine Co Ltd	Lebanon & Syria

* Refers to where company is based

xvi. The overall percentage is still quite low (< 11%), but it is higher than that found at other Ukrainian ports (< 4%.) Of course, this could be an artifact of Oktyabrsk being a smaller sample size than, say, Odessa.

SHIP NAME	IMOID	PORT CALLS IN 2012			SHIP MANAGER	COUNTRY
		SYRIA	NIK/OKT	COMBINED		
OCEANIC STAR	7818353	8	4	12	UFC Ship Management Co Ltd	Syria
RASHA B	8113140	7	5	12	Rasha Shipping Ltd	Lebanon & Syria
EAGLE	7521170	8	3	11	Abdul Rahman Othman Ismail Co	Syria
KOPALNIA HALEMBA	8701935	8	3	11	BNY Shipping Ltd	Marshall Islands
LADY RIMA	7908782	3	8	11	Mercator Marine Ltd	Marshall Islands, UK
ANA MARIA D	8418253	8	2	10	GMZ Ship Management Co SA	Lebanon
FINIKIA	9385233	9	1	10	Syrian General Authority	Syria
LADY DINA M	8110411	7	3	10	Hind Maritime Enterprises SA	Greece, Lebanon, Syria
LADY NADA	8029507	4	6	10	Hind Maritime Enterprises SA	Greece, Lebanon, Syria
MARWAN. A	8408648	6	4	10	Ismail Maritime Co	Syria
PALMYRA I	7501819	7	3	10	Rayan Maritime Services	Syria
ABDOUL RAHMAN B	8028682	8	1	9	Buzzard Marine SA	Lebanon, Syria, UK
ADI I	7623100	6	3	9	Sigma Grains Ltd-Leb	Lebanon, Cyprus
LAODICEA	9274343	6	3	9	Syrian General Authority	Syria
PARIS Y	7433426	4	5	9	Eastern Shipping Co Ltd	Lebanon, US, Germany, China
SURAYA-Y	8023319	5	4	9	Indicator Marine Co Ltd	Egypt, Syria
ABDUL B	7920259	6	2	8	Bayazid Shipping Co.	Lebanon, Syria
AHMED JUNIOR 1	8222056	3	5	8	Rayah Maritime Services Group	Lebanon & Syria
CARGO ENTERPRISE	7626396	4	4	8	Midtrade Sal	Lebanon
DREAM TRUE	8126824	4	4	8	Rayah Maritime Services Group	Lebanon & Syria
JINAN	8322844	1	7	8	Al Jinan Operation Co	Syria
KHALDOUN S	8907577	6	2	8	Brave Sea Trading Maritime	Turkey
LADY LEEN	8503840	4	4	8	Transocean Services SRL	Romania
NADA Y	7505190	4	4	8	JLS Marine Co	Jordan, Syria
RAKAN M	7341685	7	1	8	IMS Hellenic Co	Greece
RAND	7713266	4	4	8	Nejem Co Marine Services	Egypt, Syria
RASHA STAR	7516448	7	1	8	MCD Shipping SA	Turkey
M/V MASTER ISMAIL	8202056	3	4	7	MTM United Co SAL	Lebanon
MV PIRIREIS	7916727	2	5	7	Emiroglu Deniz Nakliyati	Turkey
NELSON	8009416	2	5	7	Transit Denizcilik Nakliyat	Turkey
SOURIA	9274331	6	1	7	Syrian General Authority	Syria
ZARA	8206284	4	3	7	Rasha Shipping Ltd	Lebanon & Syria
AMINA H	7505217	4	2	6	Arados Shipping Co SRL	Romania
CAPTAIN ISMAEL	7607742	5	1	6	MTM United Co SAL	Lebanon
GHADA D	7715989	3	3	6	Barhoum Maritime Co	Lebanon & Syria
GHANIA	7424229	5	1	6	Faros Shipping Co SARL	Lebanon
HASSAN D	7610270	3	3	6	Barhoum Maritime Co	Lebanon & Syria
HUZUR 1	7720702	2	4	6	Emiroglu Deniz Nakliyati	Turkey
LADY HIND	9114464	2	4	6	Hind Maritime Enterprises SA	Greece, Lebanon, Syria
M/T TAMGOUT	9120425	2	4	6	NOLIS-SPA	Algeria
M/V ASRA-Y	7433347	2	4	6	Gate Marine Co Ltd	Lebanon & Syria
RAZAN STAR	7720910	4	2	6	Nejem Co Marine Services	Egypt, Syria
SHEHAB ALMUHIEDDINE	8316364	5	1	6	Judi Group JKM	Lebanon & Syria
VEYSEL VARDAL	9079303	4	2	6	Veysel Vardal Gemicilik	Turkey
AMAR MUHIEDDINE	8413942	3	2	5	Judi Group JKM	Lebanon & Syria
ASCO B	7360734	4	1	5	Yass Marine Co Ltd	Lebanon & Syria
BALTIMAR ORION	8812875	4	1	5	Nereide Marine SA	Greece
CASSINI	7915230	2	3	5	RPTD sold undisclosed interest	
CRYSTAL.MOON	8000305	4	1	5	Gold East Logistics Co	Egypt
FATIH SULTAN MEHMET	8308874	4	1	5	Emiroglu Deniz Nakliyati	Turkey
HIBA.K	8322179	4	1	5	ISM Group Inc.	Lebanon & Syria
LIBRA	8122610	4	1	5	Terra Navis Shipping Ltd	Greece

SHIP NAME	IMOID	PORT CALLS IN 2012			SHIP MANAGER	COUNTRY
		SYRIA	NIK/OKT	COMBINED		
MASHTA AZZAR	8414283	4	1	5	Jomarine Shipping and Trading Co.	Jordan, Syria
OCEAN VOYAGER	9111216	1	4	5	Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine KSU	Ukraine
PRINCESS MARIA	8212087	1	4	5	Arados Shipping Co. SRL	Romania (See Note)
SOMAYA	8116960	3	2	5	Mallah Ship Management Co. Ltd	Greece, UK?
VENUS	7942441	3	1	4	Zahra Maritime Services Co.	Lebanon, Syria
AL YOUSSEF	8005549	1	3	4	Delmar Logistics Ltd.	Lebanon
ARCTIC SKY	9111242	2	2	4	Solchart Ltd. OY	Finland
BOSPHORUS QUEEN	8517384	2	2	4	Kalamis Shipping Industry	Greece
FT QUINTO	9447304	2	2	4	Furtrans Denizcilik	Turkey
HARISSA	7530418	2	2	4	Ismail Maritime Co.	Syria
JUDI ALAMAR	8222018	2	2	4	Judi Group JKM	Lebanon, Syria
M/T EMRE T	9286475	1	3	4	Transpasifik Denizcilik	Turkey
MALMO	8116738	2	2	4	IMS Greece Co.	Turkey
MEGA STAR	7729198	2	2	4	ISM Group Ltd.	Syria
M-T PAZAR	8871003	1	3	4	Granmar Denizcilik	Turkey
NAZLI N	7929619	3	1	4	GMZ Ship Management Co SA	Lebanon
SEA AMORE	8319524	2	2	4	MCD Shipping SA	Turkey, Panama
AK ABBA	8315217	2	1	3	Zeytin Denizcilik Gemi	Turkey
AZIZEH F	7611523	2	1	3	UFC Ship Management Co. Ltd.	Syria
BLACK SEA GLORY	7826491	2	1	3	Arados Shipping Co. SRL (since 8/12)	Romania, Syria
CHARLY	7721952	2	1	3	GMZ Ship Management Co SA	Lebanon
G INEBOLU	7389833	1	2	3	Manta Denizcilik Nakliyat	Turkey
HAMOUDI B	8012231	2	1	3	Bayazid Shipping Co.	Lebanon, Syria
LAILA QUEEN	8311390	2	1	3	Judi Group JKM	Lebanon, Syria
MARIA	8513792	1	2	3	Ademar Shipping Lines SARL	Lebanon, Romania
MEVLANA	7610749	2	1	3	Emiroglu Deniz Nakliyati	Turkey, Malta?
SEA AMAZON	9104263	2	1	3	MCCL	Greece, Liberia
SEA SHARK	8316338	2	1	3	ISM Group SARL (since 3/12)	Lebanon, Syria
SMART SAIL	8315152	2	1	3	Tranglory Shipping Co Ltd	China
STAR PRINCE	7625706	2	1	3	IMS Hellenic Co	Greece
SUSANNE	9002403	2	1	3	Sigma Grains Ltd-Leb (since 5/12)	Lebanon, Cyprus
VIANO DO CASTELO	8918356	1	2	3	Ukrainian Danube Shipping Co	Ukraine
WAVE	9313785	2	1	3	Flinter Shipping BV	Netherlands, Turkey
YAHIA STAR	8306400	1	2	3	El Reedy Shipping Agency	Egypt
AKSOY	8624278	1	1	2	Aksoy Denizcilik Tasimacilik	Turkey
AL HADI	6929193	1	1	2	Rania Marine SARL	Lebanon
ALEKSANDR LEBED	8866826	1	1	2	Kent Shipping & Chartering Ltd.	Turkey
ALTRANY	8129321	1	1	2	Menkent Shipping Co. Ltd.	Bulgaria, Cyprus,
ARADOS H	7501871	1	1	2	Arados Shipping Co. SRL	Ukraine
						Romania, Syria
ARROW S	7392608	1	1	2	Global Management & Trading	Lebanon
AYSE AKANSU	7827328	1	1	2	Asu Denizcilik Nakliyat	Turkey
BELDE	8308903	1	1	2	Meridyen Transit Deniz	Turkey
BLUE IMAGE	9136565	1	1	2	Stavros Roussos Management	Greece
FIRTINA	8834940	1	1	2	Sunar Gemi Acentilik	Turkey
GOLDEN ENDURANCE	9043110	1	1	2	Gothmar Shipmanagement Inc.	Greece
IKARIA ISLAND	9138898	1	1	2	Firodi Shipping Ltd.	Greece
KEREM	9126429	1	1	2	IST Denizcilik Ltd. STI	Turkey
LADY NOUR	8002822	1	1	2	Mamari Shipping Co.	Lebanon, Syria
MARIM	9435844	1	1	2	Roswell Tankers Corp.	Greece
MARINE LEGEND JR.	9381952	1	1	2	Action Maritime SA	Greece
MRC HATICE ANA	9536935	1	1	2	MRC Denizcilik Turizm	Turkey
NIKOLAY MESHKOV	8862507	1	1	2	Sailtrade Ltd	Russia

SHIP NAME	IMOID	PORT CALLS IN 2012			SHIP MANAGER	COUNTRY
		SYRIA	NIK/OKT	COMBINED		
OMAR B	8012243	1	1	2	Bayazid Shipping Co.	Lebanon, Syria
REIS-G	8413186	1	1	2	Negmar Denizcilik Ve Yatirim	Turkey
RIMEO	8324713	1	1	2	Rimenes Shipping and Transport	Turkey
SEBA M	7511199	1	1	2	Rabunion Maritime Agency Sarl	Lebanon
SIDER FAIOCH	8602555	1	1	2	Sider Navi Spa	Italy
ST.VALENTINA	9414735	1	1	2	Unimor Shipping Agency	Ukraine
TATARBUNARY	8918394	1	1	2	Ukrainian Danube Shipping Co	Ukraine
UNION DEMETER	8412558	1	1	2	Tranglory Shipping Co Ltd	China
UNION HELLEN	8307856	1	1	2	Tranglory Shipping Co Ltd	China

12 Conclusion

As stated in the introduction to this paper, abstract post-Soviet themes find detailed expression in the Odessa Network. We have presented an abundance of hard data on weapons shipments, the facilitators enabling them, and senior officials in the Russian and Ukrainian governments. We also have made analytic judgments about this data, specifically how it relates to Russian foreign policy writ large. We conclude this paper by summarizing the definitive facts about Russian and Ukrainian weapons shipments and facilitators, as well as our inferential insights on them.

DEFINITIVE FINDINGS

This report documents over forty weapons shipment events from the official state weapons export agencies of Russia and Ukraine to a wide variety of customers. These shipments include weapons ranging from crates of surplus ammunition to state of the art SAM systems, customers ranging from countries in good international standing to states under active international sanction, and span over a decade of time. Some of these arms transfers are well-known, while others were previously undetected.

These shipments were facilitated by a comparatively small group of Ukrainian and EU companies and individuals with close ties to one another, and to senior Russian and Ukrainian governmental and military-industrial officials. To some extent, the key facilitators in the weapons export process provide similar services: project and heavy-lift cargo, end-to-end logistics, and freight forwarding. However, different companies based in different ports tend to specialize in shipments to different customers.

Ukrainian and EU companies facilitate the vast majority of these weapons shipments, which leave from the port of Oktyabrsk, Ukraine. Oktyabrsk is controlled by a Russian oligarch and managed by a former Russian nuclear submarine captain, and was built by the Soviet Union specifically to ship weapons. The exception to this pattern is Russian companies moving weapons directly to Syria from Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg. However, these Russian companies are still closely linked to the core facilitators in Ukraine and the EU.

In addition, these facilitators utilize support services provided by Latvian money launderers and maritime private security companies staffed by former members of the Russian and Ukrainian security and intelligence services.

INFERENTIAL FINDINGS

The diverse array of customers and weapons in our dataset lead us to believe that it is adequately representative of overall Russian and Ukrainian sea-born arms transfers. Analytic judgments about the entities in our admittedly non-exhaustive dataset are still indicative of some larger truth.

We believe the weapons sales documented in this paper serve three non-mutually exclusive purposes. First, arms exports have significant commercial value to the state, and the weapons industry keeps entire regions employed. Russia alone exported $17.6 billion USD of weapons in 2012;[349] the Black Sea Shipyard in Nikolaev supports an estimated 95,000 pensioners.[350] Second, the proceeds of these sales are used to buy loyalty and stability within the Russian and Ukrainian political patronage systems, which hinge on delivering rewards to a small coalition of regime stakeholders. In particular, allowing Russian military and intelligence sectors to take a cut of profits keeps them loyal and funded. Third, arms transfers are an important foreign policy tool. Russia, consistent with its opposition to perceived American hegemony and interventionism, appears to be arming strategic antagonists of the United States, including Libya, Venezuela, and Syria. Ukraine is more commercially oriented, but still uses arms transfers as a policy tool; for example, the anti-Russian Yushchenko government selling heavily discounted anti-aircraft systems to Georgia under the similarly anti-Russian Saakashvili government.[351] In sum, these factors mean arms transfers are deeply important to the Russian and Ukrainian governments.

That a small and tight-knit group of ostensibly private companies is trusted to move such a high percentage of state weapons exports implies that these facilitators are effectively part of the Russian and Ukrainian foreign policy arsenal. The connections between

weapons shippers such as Kaalbye, Phoenix, and North-Western Shipping, and organs of Russian state power such as Rosoboronexport, the Ministry of Transport, and Putin's personal advisors, fit this pattern. We believe that these connections serve as a means of communication, coordination, and verification. In other words, it is not a coincidence that Boris Kogan has close business and personal ties to the deputy director of Russian Technologies and director of logistics at Rosoboronexport, and that his company, Kaalbye, was trusted to move $4 billion USD of Russian weapons (including the S–300 SAM system) to Venezuela, a US strategic antagonist. The Kremlin's use of financial rewards, personal connections, and implied coercion to induce private companies to carry out useful tasks matches a larger "power vertical" narrative.

To some extent, the shipping business as a whole relies on degrees of separation between owners and operators of assets in order to minimize liability, and the Odessa Network is no exception. However, the opacity and complexity of the financial and social network surrounding these core facilitators provides a vehicle for wide distribution of profits and additional space to conduct sensitive foreign policy without interference. Offshore shell companies, proxy directors, personnel dual-listed between different companies, leveraging social ties to enlist the services of other firms, and Latvian banks maximize the ability to convert public money into private profit for key stakeholders (maximizing domestic political benefit), and provide the operational security necessary to successfully carry out arms transfers (maximizing foreign policy benefit).

The value of this data for policymakers is that it provides a "road-map" for piercing this complexity. The specific companies, individuals, and locations analyzed in this paper comprise a detectable signature of FSU arms transfers. If identifying such arms transfers is a policy priority, understanding the network of facilitators carrying out those transfers is a useful place to start.

13 References

1 "Pentagon official: Russian warships may be carrying weapons to Syria," *CNN*, 5 June 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/05/world/meast/syria-russia-shipments
2 "Syrian rebels: Russian ships transferring Hezbollah fighters to Syria," *Y-Net*, 24 July 2013. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4409405,00.html
3 "Cruise missile row rocks Ukraine," *BBC*, 18 March 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4361505.stm
4 "Ukraine leader confirms missile sales to Iran," *NBC News*, 31 March 2005. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7349303/ns/world_news/t/ukraine-leader-confirms-missile-sales-iran/#.UazoyEDvtBY
5 "Ukraine admits missiles sold to Iran and China," *Telegraph* (London, UK), 18 March 2005. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1485933/Ukraine-admits-missiles-sold-to-Iran-and-China.html
6 Куда «плывем», боцман? ["Where are we sailing, captain?"] *Rabochaya Gazeta,* 6 March 2008. http://rg.kiev.ua/page5/article9179/
7 "Непотопляемый Урбанский: адмирал «секретного флота,» ["The Unsinkable Urbansky: Admiral of a 'Secret Fleet,'"] *Tribuna* (Ukraine), 24 April 2008. http://tribuna.com.ua/articles/persons/161811.htm
8 "Did an Aussie sell nukes to Iran?" *Melbourne Herald Sun,* 7 June 2009.
9 Испанские власти задержали украинский экипаж судна «анастасия» по подозрению в контрабанде более 600 тонн оружия и взрывчатки и требуют выплаты штрафа в размере 850 тысяч долларов [Spanish authorities held the Ukrainian crew of the ship Anastasia in suspicion of transporting more than 600 tons of weapons and explosives and demand a fine of more than $850,000] *Argumenti I Fakti*, 3 March 2001. http://srv1.fakty.ua/101462-ispanskie-vlasti-zaderzhali-ukrainskij-ekipazh-sudna-quot-anastasiya-quot-po-podozreniyu-v-kontrabande-bolee-600-tonn-oruzhiya-i-vzryvchatki-i-trebuyut-vyplaty-shtrafa-v-razmere-850-tysyach-dollarov
10 "Spain halts Angolan-bound ship carrying Russian arms: press," *Agence France-Presse,* 28 February 2001. http://reliefweb.int/report/angola/spain-halts-angolan-bound-ship-carrying-russian-arms-press
11 "Illegal small weapons pose global threat," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer,* 9 July 2001. http://www.commondreams.org/headlines.shtml?/headlines01/0709-03.htm
12 "Georgian vessel, laden in Ukraine, was carrying weapons," *Pravda*, 1 March 2001. http://english.pravda.ru/news/russia/01-03-2001/39602-0/
13 Куда «плывем», боцман? ["Where are we sailing, captain?"] *Rabochaya Gazeta,* 6 March 2008. http://rg.kiev.ua/page5/article9179/
14 "Angola buys 630 tons of arms," *CNBC Africa,* 2 March 2001. http://cms.privatelabel.co.za/pls/cms/iac.page?p_t1=2245&p_t2=0&p_t3=0&p_t4=0&p_dynamic=YP&p_content_id=227743&p_site_id=113
15 Equasis
16 "Ukrainian firms setting up in Burma," *The Irrawady*, 6 April 2004. http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=3951
17 EXIF data
18 Available at http://www.phoenix.odessa.ua/
19 Available at http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
20 Арбитражный суд города Москвы решение от 23 мая 2011 года Дело N А40-19271/2010 [Arbitrage Court of Moscow, Decision from 23 May 2011, Case Number A-40-19271/2010.] Available at http://docs.cntd.ru/document/454034931
21 EXIF data
22 Equasis
23 Available at http://www.nortrop.com.ua/
24 "Eide Marine Services A/S", *ISS Report*, Autumn 2006. http://www.iss-shipping.com/Attachments/491163460_iss_issue_one.pdf
25 Ibid; SIPRI.
26 SevMash [submarine producer] website. http://www.sevmash.ru/eng/production/millitary/vsotrud
27 Equasis
28 Interim report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1698. United Nations Security Council, 31 January 2007. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20S200740.pdf
29 Equasis
30 Российская Федерация Одиннадцатый арбитражный апелляционный суд, Постановление от 28 октября 2008 года № 11АП-6995/2008 По делу № А72-1833/2008 [Russian Federation 11th Arbitrage Court, Decision from 28 October No. 11 AO-6995/2008 on Case No. № A72-1833/2008]
31 ДЕВЯТЫЙ АРБИТРАЖНЫЙ АПЕЛЛЯЦИОННЫЙ СУД ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ г. Москва 11.07.2006 г Дело № 09АП-7048/06-АК [10th Arbitrage Court of Appeals Decision on Case No. 09AO-7048/06-AK]
32 Equasis
33 Норвежские паромы в Севастополе: что купили, кто купил, или «АнРуссТранс» расширяет рынок [Norwegian ferries in Sevastopol: what was bought, who bought them, or how AnRussTrans is expanding the market,"] *Black Sea News*, 3 June 2012. http://www.blackseanews.net/read/37650
34 "Manche : La marine surprend un navire chargé de patrouilleurs lance-missiles," [Channel: Marines surprised a ship loaded with missile patrol] *Mer et Marine*, 21 December 2007. http://www.meretmarine.com/fr/content/manche-la-marine-surprend-un-navire-charge-de-patrouilleurs-lance-missiles
35 http://www.uminhcoc.com/forums/showthread.php?t=37814
36 Equasis
37 Equasis
38 For more information, see the excellent work by the Organized Crime and Corrupting Reporting Project and Paul Radu on the use of proxies in the FSU. Available at http://www.reportingproject.net/proxy/en/
39 Equasis
40 День национального позора ["Day of national shame"], *Polemika*, 20 February 2009. http://polemika.com.ua/news-29257.html
41 Mike Lewis, *Skirting the Law: Sudan's Post-CPA Arms Flows*, Small Arms Survey, September 2009. http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/SAS_SudansPostCPAArmsFlows.pdf
42 "Somali pirates capture Ukrainian cargo ship loaded with military hardware," *Guardian*, 26 September 2009.
43 Личный оружейный бизнес президента [Personal weapons business of the President.] *Nezavisimaya Gazeta,* 10 August 2008.
44 Equasis
45 "£45m cigarettes haul was first of five planned runs in audacious smuggling scheme," *Belfast Telegraph*, 29 October 2009. http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/45m-cigarettes-haul-was-first-of-five-planned-runs-in-audacious-smuggling-scheme-28501074.html
46 "Beluga soll illegal Panzer verschifft haben" [Beluga is said to have illegally shipped tanks], Norddeutscher Rudfunk, 1 November 2012. http://www.ndr.de/regional/niedersachsen/oldenburg/beluga283.html
47 Equasis
48 Fact Sheet. http://cargo-vessels-international.at/LADY_JULIET_IMO8225204.pdf
49 Equasis

50 "Украинцы на взрывоопасном судне сели на мель в Дарданеллах" [Ukrainians on an high-explosives ship ran upon a shoal in the Dardanelles], *RosBalt* (Ukraine), 18 December 2009. http://www.rosbalt.ru/ukraina/2009/12/18/698387.html
51 "Украинские моряки открыли стрельбу по сомалийским пиратам" [Ukrainian seamen opened fire on Somali pirates], *RosBalt* (Ukraine), 18 November 2009. http://www.rosbalt.ru/ukraina/2009/11/18/689716.html
52 "Отправка во Вьетнам «Светляков» из Владивостока" [Shipment of Svetlyak ships from Vladivostok to Vietnam.] *BPMD*, 16 August 2012. http://bmpd.livejournal.com/314694.html
53 Equasis
54 Mark Bromley and Paul Holton. *Arms transfer to the Democratic Republic of Congo: Assessing the System of Arms Transfer Notifications, 2008-2010*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, October 2010, p. 7
55 "Cyprus detains Sudan-bound arms ship," *BBC*, 22 June 2010. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10377917
56 "На Сантьяго росиийско-украинский экипкаж," [A Russian-Ukrainian crew on the Santiago], Oruzhie Rossii, 24 June 2010. http://www.arms-expo.ru/049057052048124049054052053056.html
57 "German freighter Santiago with Russian-Ukranian crew detained in Cyprus with illegal arms," *Maritime Bulletin*, 23 June 2010. http://www.odin.tc/eng/articles/399-German-freighter-Santiago-with-Russian-Ukranian-crew-detained-in-Cyprus-with-illegal-arms.asp
58 "The Santiago ship laden with weapons and ammunition, detained at the Cyprus Limassol," PortNews, 23 June 2010. http://portnews.ru/news/122865/
59 Equasis
60 Славяне с оружием в трюме "The Slavs with weapons in the cargo hold." Rossiskaya Gazeta, 24 June 2010. http://www.rg.ru/2010/06/23/tanki-site.html
61 "94 European tanks purchased, enroute: officials," *Voice of America Cambodia*, 16 September 2010. http://www.voacambodia.com/content/article-94-european-tanks-purchased-en-route-officials-103070549/1356971.html
62 "Cambodia buys 50 T-55 tanks and 40 PTR-26 APCs," *Cambodia Air Defense,* 18 September 2010. http://cambodiaairdefense.wordpress.com/2010/09/18/cambodia-buys-50-t55-tanks-and-40-ptr26-apcs/
63 Equasis
64 "Cambodia buys 50 T-55 tanks and 40 PTR-26 APCs," *Cambodia Air Defense*, 18 September 2010. http://cambodiaairdefense.wordpress.com/2010/09/18/cambodia-buys-50-t55-tanks-and-40-ptr26-apcs/
65 "Tanks and APCs arrive in Sikhanoukville port," *Phnom Penh Post*, 31 October 2012. http://www.phnompenhpost.com/2012103159484/National/tanks-and-apcs-arrive-in-sihanoukville-port.html
66 "Vedette-boat lands at Cam Ranh port," *Vietnam News*, 8 August 2011. http://english.vietnamnet.vn/en/society/11644/vedette-boat-lands-cam-ranh-port.html
67 Equasis
68 "Ukrainian plant to make second shipment of BTR-4 vehicles to Iraq on time," *Kiev Post*, 14 July 2011. http://www.kyivpost.com/content/business/ukrainian-plant-to-make-second-shipment-of-btr-4-v-108623.html
69 "Прибытие нового российского вооружения в Венесуэлу" ["Arrival of new Russian weapons in Venezuela"], *BPMD*, 28 May 2011. http://bmpd.livejournal.com/5687.html
70 Equasis
71 "'Ship of Shame' carrying weapons and explosives to Egypt should not be allowed to deliver cargo," *Amnesty International* press release, 15 March 2012. http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/ship-of-shame-carrying-weapons-and-explosives-to-egypt-from-united-states-should-not-be-allowed-to-d
72 "Second Gepard frigate delivered to Vietnam," *RusNavy*, 5 August 2011. http://rusnavy.com/news/newsofday/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=12631
73 Equasis
74 "Cyprus releases a Russian Syria-bound ammunitions ship," *Al Arabiya*, 11 January 2012. http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/11/187723.html
75 Кипр подтверждает задержание судна из России с грузом для Сирии [Cyprus confirms detainment of a ship from Russia with cargo for Syria," *RIA Novosti*, 11 January 2012. http://ria.ru/arab_sy/20120111/536992302.html
76 Equasis
77 Прибытие в Венесуэлу третьей партии вооружения из России ["The third party of Russian weapons arrives in Venezuela"], *BPMD*, 25 March 2012. http://bmpd.livejournal.com/186218.html
78 Equasis
79 "Венесуэла завершает получение танков Т-72Б1В из России" ["Venezuela completes receipt of T–72B1V tanks from Russia"], *BPMD*, 30 March 2012. http://bmpd.livejournal.com/190080.html
80 *Ibid*,
81 Equasis
82 "Венесуэла завершает получение танков Т-72Б1В из России" ["Venezuela completes receipt of T–72B1V tanks from Russia"], *BPMD*, 30 March 2012. http://bmpd.livejournal.com/190080.html
83 Equasis
84 "Vessel with Russian explosives bound for Venezuela stuck in Greece," *Turkey Sea News*, 29 April 2011. http://www.seanews.com.tr/article/ACCIDENTS/60685/Socol-3-Russian-Explosives
85 Российские боеприпасы для Венесуэлы застряли в Греции на украинском судне Сокол-3 [Russian ammunition for Venezuela is stuck in Greece on the Ukrainian ship Sokol-3]. Morskoi Bulletin Sovfracht, 28 April 2011. http://www.sovfracht.info/?PageID=2555
86 Equasis
87 "Судно с украинскими моряками в Греции не просило о помощи – Мининфраструктуры" [The ship with Ukrainian seamen in Greece did not ask for help – Ministry of Infrastructure] Podrobnosti, 28 April 2011. http://podrobnosti.ua/society/2011/04/28/766758.html
88 Financial documents of ZAO Oboronprom, available at http://www.lin.ru/db/emitent/210B20D9C874A4DAC3256DAD003EC32D/discl_doc.html
89 Equasis
90 "Russian freighter Professor Katsman sneaked to Tartus violating Syrian arms embargo," *Reuters* 27 May 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/25/us-syria-arms-russia-idUSBRE84O12F20120525
91 "U.S. condemns reported Russian arms shipment to Syria," *Reuters*, 31 May 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/31/syria-arms-russia-idUSL1E8GVBXJ20120531
92 AIS records.
93 Equasis
94 Equasis
95 Украинский сухогруз Сокол 6 стоит в Индии, груженый оружием и загадками [Ukrainian cargo ship Socol 6 sits in India, loaded with weapons and mysteries.] *Morskoi Bulletin*, 13 August 2012. http://www.odin.tc/newsru/read.asp?articleID=942
96 "Vessel carrying arms develops technical snag; docked at WISL amid tight security," *Navhind Times*, 12 August 2012. http://www.navhindtimes.in/goa-news/vessel-carrying-arms-develops-technical-snag-docked-wisl-amid-tight-security
97 Equasis
98 МИД РФ признал, что «Алаид» вез в Сирию оружие ["The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has acknowledged that the Alaed was transporting weapons into Syria"], *Novaya Gazeta*, 21 June 2012. http://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/57657.html
99 *Disrupting Atrocity Enablers: Maritime Arms Shipments from Russia to Syr*ia, Human Rights Watch, August 2012. http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/HRF-Maritime-Arms-Supply-Syria.pdf
100 "Russian arms ships loads up with new secret cargo," *RIA Novosti*, 24 July 2012. http://en.ria.ru/mlitary_news/20120724/174757466.html
101 "Russian arms ship to make second attempt to deliver helicopters to Syria," *Telegraph*, 24 June 2012.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9352852/Russian-arms-ship-to-make-second-attempt-to-deliver-helicopters-to-Syria.html
102 Equasis
103 Надстройка для корвета «Совершенный» доставлена в Комсомольск-на-Амуре ["Bulkhead for the 'Sovershenni' corvette is delivered to Komsomolsk-na-Amur,"], *BMPD*, 12 October 2012.
104 В украинских люкс-БТРах установили двигатели «Мерседес» и кондиционеры (фото) [In Ukrainian luxury APCs there are Mercedes engines and air conditioners.] *Segodnya*, 25 July 2012.
http://www.segodnya.ua/ukraine/ljukc--btr-c-konderom-i-korobkoj-avtomatom-cpetsekcport-n-ukraina-otpravit-v-tailand-233-mashiny-za-270-mln.html
105 "Эфиопия начинает получение танков Т-72УА1" [Ethiopia is begins receipt of T–72 tanks.] *BPMD,* 26 July 2012.
http://bmpd.livejournal.com/299255.html
106 "Эфиопия купила две сотни украинских танков," [Ethiopia has bought 200 Ukrainian tanks], *Lenta,* 9 June 2011.
http://lenta.ru/news/2011/06/09/tanks/
107 "Отправка во Вьетнам «Светляков» из Владивостока," [Shipment of Svetlyaks from Vladivostok to Vietnam.] *BPMD*, 16 August 2012.
http://bmpd.livejournal.com/314694.html
108 Equasis
109 "Ирак получил вторую партию БТР-4» [Iraq received the second party of BTR-4], press release from Malyshev plant, 19 October 2012.
http://www.malyshevplant.com/content/irak-poluchil-vtoruyu-partiyu-btr-4
110 "The second batch of BTR-4 armored personnel carriers shipped to Iraq from Odessa Seaport," *Army Guide*, 14 September 2012.
http://www.army-guide.com/eng/article/article.php?forumID=2523
111 "Ukraine to supply armored vehicles to Iraq," *Kyiv Post*, 25 March 2011.
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ukraine-to-supply-armored-vehicles-to-iraq-100814.html
112 "Russian gun dealers charged in Nigerian court," *BBC*, 19 February 2013.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21509535
113 "Задержанное в Нигерии судно с российским экипажем имело разрешение на перевозку оружия" [The detained ship in Nigeria with a Russian crew had permission for transportation of weapons] *ITAR-TASS*, 23 October 2012.
http://www.itar-tass.com/c1/553369.html
114 "Russian gun dealers charged in Nigerian court," *BBC*, 19 February 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21509535
115 Equasis
116 Press release by Moran Security Group.
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/why-doesnt-nigeria-implement-imo-resolutions-200048701.html
117 "Arrested in Nigeria Russian m/v Myre Seadiver most probably, is a floating arsenal," *Maritime Bulletin*, 23 October 2012.
http://www.odin.tc/news/read.asp?articleID=1464
118 "Tanks and APCs apparently come from Ukraine," *Phnom Penh Post*, 11 November 2012.
http://www.defence.pk/forums/china-far-east/216439-tanks-apcs-cambodia-arrive-sihanoukville-port.html
119 "Tanks and APCs arrive in Sikhanoukville port," *Phnom Penh Post*, 31 October 2012.
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/2012103159484/National/tanks-and-apcs-arrive-in-sihanoukville-port.html
120 "Government mum on tank origins," *Phnom Penh Post*, 1 November 2012.
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/2012110159518/National/government-mum-on-tanks-origins.html
121 *Arms Transfers to the Middle East and North Africa: Lessons for an Effective Arms Trade Treaty*. Amnesty International (Amnesty International Ltd.: London, 2011), 44. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT30/117/2011/en/049fdeee-66fe-4b13-a90e-6d7773d6a546/act30117201ien.pdf
122 "Press release by inspector-general of police in relation to investigation on the alleged production of components for Libya's uranium enrichment program," *The Star* (Malaysia), 21 February 2004. http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2004/2/21/nation/73695078&sec=nation
123 David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Libya's gas centrifuge procurement: much remains undiscovered," *Institute for Science and International Security*, 1 March 2004. http://www.isis-online.org/publications/libya/cent_procure.html
124 Equasis
125 Al Venter, *Allah's Bomb: The Islamic Quest for Nuclear Weapons, p. 43.*
126 "Cargo vessel carrying uranium collides with chemical tanker off Swedish and Danish coasts," *Dagens Nyheter*, 4 July 2009.
http://www.wise-uranium.org/utiss.html
127 Jeffery Lewis, "Saga of the Monchegorsk," *Arms Control Wonk*, 13 July 2011.
http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/4248/saga-of-the-monchegorsk
128 "Russia's Chariot calls at Iran," *Forbes*, 6 March 2012.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/claudiarosett/2012/03/06/russias-chariot-calls-at-iran/
129 '*If You Resist, We'll Shoot You': The Democratic Republic of Congo and The Case for an Effective Arms Treaty*. Amnesty International, 2012, p. 38.
https://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR62/007/2012/en/cdd8cdd9-913f-4dc5-8418-71d2eedbddeo/afr620072012en.pdf
130 Equasis
131 "Arctic Sea operator unaware of ships whereabouts," *RIA Novosti*, 14 August 2009. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090814/155811463.html
132 Ищут подводники, ищет полиция [Submarines are searching, the police are searching], *Gazeta.ru*, 12 August 2009.
http://www.gazeta.ru/social/2009/08/12/3235487.shtml
133 For example, see "Что вез и куда плыл Arctic Sea" [What was the Arctic Sea carrying to where?], *Izvestiya*, 9 September 2009.
http://izvestia.ru/news/352829 and "Arctic Sea ghost ship 'was carrying weapons to Iran,'" *Telegraph,* 6 September 2009.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/6145336/Arctic-Sea-ghost-ship-was-carrying-weapons-to-Iran.html
134 Рособоронэкспорт объявил о рекордном количестве контрактов в 2012 году [Rosoboronexport informs about the record quantity of contracts in 2012,] Vzglyad, 13 February 2013. http://vz.ru/news/2013/2/13/620142.html
135 "Russia to complete delivery of Su fighter jets to Indonesia by mid-September," *RIA Novosti*, 9 June 2010.
http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20100906/160480114.html
136 "Ukraine delivers first two armored vehicles to Thailand," *Xinhua*, 16 September 2010.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-09/16/c_13515026.htm
137 Russia Vows to Keep Arms Deals With Caracas After Chavez Death, *RIA Novosti,* 3 June 2012.
http://en.rian.ru/trend/venezuela_russia_arms_160909/
138 For example, see "Weapons Proliferation and Organized Crime: Russian Military Dimensions," *Airpower Journal*, 1996. http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj96/spec96/turbi.pdf
139 "Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout found guilty of selling weapons to Farc rebels," *Guardian*, 2 November 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/02/viktor-bout-arms-trade
140 "The international dealers in death," *Guardian*, 9 July 2001. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/jul/09/armstrade.iantraynor
141 Lenta biography. http://lenta.ru/lib/14185932/
142 Вечный зам [The eternal deputy], *Tribuna*, 10 January 2008.
http://tribuna.com.ua/articles/persons/156207.htm
143 "Международный крестный отец" Леонид Минин [International mob boss Leonid Minin], *Ukrainskaya Pravda*, 3 February 2003.
http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2003/02/3/4371494/

144 "Leonid Yefrimovich Minin: from Ukraine, a new kind of arms trafficker," *PBS*, May 2002.
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/sierraleone/minin.html
145 "Angling in on Angola," *Haaretz*, 4 January 2002. http://www.haaretz.com/angling-in-on-angola-1.79089
146 "Drugs, diamonds and deadly cargoes," *Center for Public Integrity*, 18 November 2002.

http://www.publicintegrity.org/2002/11/18/5697/drugs-diamonds-and-deadly-cargoes
147 "Arms and the Man," *New York Times*, 17 August 2003.
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/17/magazine/arms-and-the-man.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
148 Author's personal interviews.
149 Леонид Минин: Деркач и Рабинович – сообщники во всех операциях с нелегальной продажей оружия [Leonid Minin: Derkach and Rabinovich were associates in all operations concerning the illegal sale of weapons.] Ukrainskaya Pravda, 14 June 2002.
http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2002/06/14/4368178/ and "Comrades in Arms," Washington Monthly, January/February 2002.
150 "Anatomy of two arms dealers," *Asia Times*, 19 June 2004. http://atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/FF19Aa01.html
151 "Продажей» украинских ракет Ирану займется Дума [The Duma is handling the sale of Ukrainian rockets to Iran], *Obozrevatel*, 4 July 2006.
http://obozrevatel.com/news/2006/7/4/122262.htm
152 Kaalbye website.
153 See documents of incorporation.
154 Archived Varamar website.
155 Nortrop website
156 Vedmosti biography. http://www.vedomosti.ru/persons/231391/%D0%92%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD%20%D0%92%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BA%D0%BE
157 www.acmodasi.ru/a_117941.html
158 http://dptm.donetsk.ua/direktorom-chp-ukrtranskontejner-naznachen.htm
159 http://www.varamar.com/varamar-joined-vsevolod-ivanov-n-18.html
160 http://www.wilhelmsen.com/services/maritime/companies/buss/BUSS_Pressroom/Documents/WSS-2-10.pdf
161 See shipping manifest in Weapons Shipments Data section.
162 Ukrainian business registries.
163 Wilh. WIlhemson website.
http://www.wilhelmsen.com/services/maritime/companies/buss/directory/operations/Countries/ViewOffice.aspx?Office=168716
164 Varamar press release, 12 November 2012. http://www.varamar.com/varamar-joined-vsevolod-ivanov-n-18.html
165 Alumni list. Available at http://vodnyy.odessa.ua/lists/city.phtml?city=78TF09PB&co_id=105&all_c=0&txt=%CC%E4%E5%FA%FA%F7 and http://vodnyy.odessa.ua/lists/city.phtml?city=78TF09PB&co_id=105&all_c=0&txt=%CC%E4%E5%FA%FA%F7
166 Phoenix Trans-servis website. http://www.phoenix.odessa.ua/
167 "День национального позора" [Day of national shame], *Polemika*, 20 February 2009. http://polemika.com.ua/news-29257.html
168 Сага о Фаине, Сомалии. [The Saga of the Faina and Somalia.] Ukrainian web forum, available at
http://ord-ua.com/2009/01/13/saga-o-faine-somali/?page=22
169 *Ibid.*
170 *Arms Exports And Transfers: Europe To Africa, By Country.* Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network, December 2010, p. 30.
171 http://novoconference.ru/eng/novo/2010/participants/
172 http://novoconference.ru/eng/novo/2008/participants/
173 http://2012.maritimedays.odessa.ua/component/content/article/58.html
174 http://ua.linkedin.com/pub/evgeny-poltavets/13/287/693
175 Info on Malomuzh from Украинские разведчики просят больше полномочий [Ukrainian intelligence officers ask for more power], *RosBalt*, 15 February 2009. http://www.rosbalt.ru/ukraina/2009/02/15/618484.html
176 Info on Malomuzh from "Malomuzh informs media on the situation with now released Faina cargo ship," Press office of President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko, 5 February 2009. http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/12820.html?PrintVersion
177 "Pirates' Prison", *Kyiv Post*, 28 January 2009.
178 "Warships begin patrol off Somalia," *Associated Press*, 28 October 2008.
179 http://www.apn-ua.com/industry/%D0%9E%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B0/%D0%9E%D0%9E%D0%9E_%D0%A2%D0%95%D0%9C%D0%9F%D0%9F%D0%A0%D0%9E%D0%93%D0%A0%D0%95%D0%A1+145326
180 http://www.ilogista.com/autonavig4.php?nav4=32417
181 Кто у нас торгует оружием [Who among us is selling weapons.] *Obozrevatel*, 14 October 2008. obozrevatel.com/news/2008/10/14/263226.htm
182 Official City of Odessa website. http://www.odessa.ua/council/groups/30675
183 Харес Юссеф: И Ющенко, и его жена убеждены, что отравление произошло на даче у Сацюка [Hares Youssef: both Yushchenko and his wife are convinced the poisoning took place at their Satsyuk dacha] *Pravda*, 25 January 2007.
http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2007/01/25/3201187/
184 Харес Юссеф: Ющенко даже не догадывался, какой передел собственности планировали «любі друзі» [Hares Youssef: Yushchenko didn't even guess what kind of redistribution of assets his "dear friends" had planned.] *Pravda*, 26 January 2007.
http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2007/01/26/4412116/
185 Личный оружейный бизнес президента [Personal weapons business of the President.] *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 10 August 2008.
186 Алишер Усманов берет под контроль Молдавский метзавод [Alisher Usmanov brings a Moldovan metal factory under his control.] *Ukrrudprom*, 6 December 2012. http://www.ukrrudprom.ua/news/Alisher_Usmanov_beret_pod_kontrol_Moldavskiy_metzavod.html
187 "Ro-ro Etel seizure update. Syrian trace explained." *Maritime Bulletin*, 26 July 2013.
www.news.odin.tc/index.php?page=view/article/666/Ro-ro-Etel-seizure-update-Syrian-trace-explained
188 Между украинцами и домом прочертили Ливию. *Kommersant Ukraina*, 23 July 2013. www.kommersant.ua/doc/2239368
189 Российская Федерация Арбитражный суд города Москвы. Решение от 23 мая 2011 года По делу № А40-19271/2010 [Russian Federation Arbitrage Court of the City of Moscow. Decision from 23 May 2011 on Case No. A-40-19721/2010.] Российская Федерация Одиннадцатый арбитражный апелляционный суд, Постановление от 28 октября 2008 года № 11АП-6995/2008 По делу № А72-1833/2008 [Russian Federation 11th Arbitrage Court, Decision from 28 October No. 11 AO-6995/2008 on Case No. № A72-1833/2008] ДЕВЯТЫЙ АРБИТРАЖНЫЙ АПЕЛЛЯЦИОННЫЙ СУД ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ г. Москва 11.07.2006 г Дело № 09АП-7048/06-АК [10th Arbitrage Court of Appeals Decision on Case No. 09AO-7048/06-AK]
190 See http://www.phoenix.odessa.ua/
191 RBK biography, available at http://www.rbc.ru/persons/levitin.shtml
192 Lenta.ru biography, available at http://lenta.ru/lib/14161085/
193 Сага о Фаине, Сомалии. [The Saga of the Faina and Somalia.] Ukrainian web forum, available at
http://ord-ua.com/2009/01/13/saga-o-faine-somali/?page=22
194 Report of КОМИТЕТ ПРОТИВОДЕЙСТВИЯ КОРРУПЦИИ И ОРГАНИЗОВАННОЙ ПРЕСТУПНОСТИ.
http://kpk.org.ua/2007/07/18/spu_specialnaja_partija_ukrainy.html
195 Непотопляемый Урбанский: адмирал «секретного флота» [The unsinkable Urbansky: admiral of a 'secret fleet,'], *Tribuna*, 24 April 2008. http://tribuna.com.ua/articles/persons/161811.htm
196 Вечный зам [The eternal deputy], *Tribuna*, 10 January 2008. http://tribuna.com.ua/articles/persons/156207.htm
197 "Международный крестный отец» Леонид Минин [International mob boss Leonid Minin], *Ukrainskaya Pravda*, 3 February 2003.
http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2003/02/3/43714944/
198 "Leonid Yefrimovich Minin: from Ukraine, a new kind of arms trafficker," *PBS*, May 2002.
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/sierraleone/minin.html
199 See weapons shipment dataset.
200 *Liga* dossier. http://file.liga.net/person/726-igor-yrbanskii.html
201 Владелец судна «Фаина» - важный украинский чиновник? [The owner of the ship Faina – an important Ukrainian official?] *Newsland*, 15 October 2008. http://newsland.com/news/detail/id/307408/

202 Более 40 укркомпаний попали в крупнейшую базу оффшоров [Over 40 Ukrainian companies found in the database of offshores], *Ukrainskaya Pravda*, 26 June 2013. http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2013/06/26/6993057/view_print/
203 Социалисты вместо выбывшего губернатора Одесской области Цушко предлагают Урбанского [The socialists pick Urbansky to replace former governor of Odessa oblast], CensorNet, 17 May 2006, http://censor.net.ua/news/64161/sotsialisty_vmesto_vybyvshego_gubernatora_odesskoyi_oblasti_tsushko_predlagayut_urbanskogo
204 За лечение Василия Цушко платят его друзья по Социалистической партии [Friends in the Socialist Party are paying for Vasilii Tsushko's medical treatment,] *News.ua*, 4 July 2007. http://rus.newsru.ua/ukraine/04jul2007/druzicushka.html
205 Ukrainian shipping forum. http://odessacrewing.borda.ru/?1-17-0-00000003-000-40-0
206 **Полный Каалбай** [Full Kaalbye], *Kartina Dnya*, 12 November 2007. http://kartina-ua.info/index.phtml?art_id=198164&action=view&sel_date=2007-12-10
207 Россия и Турция начали переговоры о возврате груза с сирийского самолета [Russia and Syria begin negotiations over reimbursement for the cargo from the Syrian plane], *Lenta*, 30 October 2012. http://lenta.ru/news/2012/10/30/cargo/
208 All information from earnings statements, yearly reports, etc. gathered from RT-Logistika's website, available at http://rtlog.ru/ In particular, see the following documents: Список аффилированных лиц на 31 декабря 2011 года
209 Listed in RT-Logistika financial documents and confirmed on Ukrainian government website, available at http://wap.uz.gov.ua/?f=Doc.View&p=taruz2010exp.2
210 See various Russian corporate documents, available at mosvmz.ru/board/svvlnast.doc www.zavodural.ru/src/spis_aff.rtf
211 "Биография: Олерский Виткор Александрович", Ministry of Transportation of the Russian Federation website. http://www.mintrans.ru/ministry/person.php?ELEMENT_ID=388
212 "2010 Годовой отчет Открытого акционерного общества «Северо-Западное пароходство»" [2010 Yearly Report of the Open Stock Company North-Western Shipping." North-Western Shipping website. http://www.nwsc.spb.ru/upload/1620099432-gd02010.pdf
213 "Виктор Олерский: «Флот - это не нефтяная труба, если его поставить на прикол на пару лет, то потом уже нечего будет поднимать»" *Business Gazeta*, 14 July 2011. http://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/43455/
214 "Russian arms shipment en route to Syria: report," *Reuters*, 25 May 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/25/us-syria-arms-russia-idUSBRE84O12F20120525
215 "2010 Годовой отчет Открытого акционерного общества «Северо-Западное пароходство»" [2010 Yearly Report of the Open Stock Company North-Western Shipping." North-Western Shipping website. http://www.nwsc.spb.ru/upload/1620099432-gd02010.pdf
216 "Сухогруз Профессор Кацман, поставки оружия в Сирию и замминистра Олерский" [The freighter Professor Katsman, a delivery of weapons to Syria, and Deputy Minister Olerskiy], *Morskoi Bulletin*, 27 May 2012. http://www.odin.tc/newsru/print.asp?articleID=622
217 "Виктор Олерский: «Флот - это не нефтяная труба, если его поставить на прикол на пару лет, то потом уже нечего будет поднимать»" *Business Gazeta*, 14 July 2011. http://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/43455/
218 UCL website. http://uclholding.com/en/holding/structure/divisions/shipping/north-western-shipping-company.phtml
219 Большая биографическая энциклопедия. 2009. [The big biographical encyclopedia, 2009]. Available at http://www.mke.su/doc/ANNENKOV%20AV.html
220 Equasis
221 TV interview with *Pervii Sevastapol*, 7 April 2012. http://www.1sev.tv/story/id/2868/
222 *Ibid.*
223 Уволен начальник спецпорта «Октябрьск» Борис Козырь [Boris Kozyr is replaced as boss of specialized port Oktybrsk.] Novosti-N, 22 May 2012. http://novosti-n.mk.ua/news/read/40349.html
224 День национального позора ["Day of national shame"], *Polemika*, 20 February 2009. http://polemika.com.ua/news-29257.html
225 День национального позора ["Day of national shame"], *Polemika*, 20 February 2009. http://polemika.com.ua/news-29257.html
226 For example, see http://www.oktport.com.ua/index.php?view=image&format=raw&type=img&id=13&option=com_joomgallery&Itemid=5
227 Куда придет престиж страны со сменой руководства в порту «Октябрьск»? [Where is the prestige of the country going with the change at Oktyabrsk port?] *Prestupnosti Net*, 1 December 2011.http://news.pn/ru/politics/49684
228 *Ibid.*
229 Российская Федерация Арбитражный суд города Москвы. Решение от 23 мая 2011 года По делу № А40-19271/2010 [Russian Federation Arbitrage Court of the City of Moscow. Decision from 23 May 2011 on Case No. A-40-19721/2010.]
230 ДЕВЯТЫЙ АРБИТРАЖНЫЙ АПЕЛЛЯЦИОННЫЙ СУД ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ г. Москва 11.07.2006 г Дело № 09АП-7048/06-АК [10th Arbitrage Court of Appeals Decision on Case No. 09AO-7048/06-AK]
231 "Непотопляемый Урбанский: адмирал «секретного флота,» ["'The Unsinkable Urbansky: Admiral of a 'Secret Fleet,'"] *Tribuna* (Ukraine), 24 April 2008. http://tribuna.com.ua/articles/persons/161811.htm
232 Российская Федерация Одиннадцатый арбитражный апелляционный суд, Постановление от 28 октября 2008 года № 11АП-6995/2008 По делу № А72-1833/2008 [Russian Federation 11th Arbitrage Court, Decision from 28 October No. 11 AO-6995/2008 on Case No. № A72-1833/2008]
233 Ставка порта [Headquarters of the port.] *Yuzhnaya Pravda,* 18 December 2012. http://www.up.mk.ua/cgi-bin/page2st.php?param=5512
234 Враг не пройдет! - Егоров, начальник военного порта Октябрьск [The enemy shall not pass! – Egorov, the boss of Oktyabrsk military port.] *Korabelov*, 10 July 2012. http://www.korabelov.info/ekonomika/voennyiy-port-egorov.html
235 Forbes Russia. http://www.forbes.ru/profile/vadim-novinskii
236 Треть самых богатых украинцев - депутаты и чиновники [One third of the richest Ukrainians are deputies and bureaucrats.] *Argument*, 30 March 2012. http://argumentua.com/novosti/tret-samykh-bogatykh-ukraintsev-deputaty-i-chinovniki
237 "Deal of the Century. The Mining and Metals sector of Ukraine Gets a Flagship," *Delovaya Stolitsa*, 1 October 2007. http://www.scmholding.com/en/media-centre/coverage/view/58/
238 "Akhmetov's SCM, Smart Holding Create Ukraine Agricultural Group," *Bloomberg*, 7 June 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-07/akhmetov-s-scm-smart-holding-create-ukraine-agricultural-group.html
239 Президент Hares Group Харес Юссеф: «Рентабельность строительства в Украине колеблется между 60% и 100% годовых. На меньшее строители просто не согласны».http://haresgroup.com/html/media/econ_izvestiya_hy.pdf
240 Бизнес-партнер Ахметова Новинский получил украинское гражданство [Akhmetov's business partner Novinsky has received Ukrainian citizenship.] *Nezavisimoe Bureau Novosti*, 1 June 2012. http://nbnews.com.ua/ru/news/42920/
241 Вадим Новинский: «мутный бизнесмен» или проект российских спецслужб? [Is Murky Businessman Vadim Novinsky a Stooge of Russian Intelligence] *Argument*, 14 June 2013. http://argumentua.com/stati/vadim-novinskii-mutnyi-biznesmen-ili-proekt-rossiiskikh-spetssluzhb
242 Самый секретный порт Украины попал под контроль Вадима Новинского [The most secret port in Ukraine has fallen under the control of Vadim Novinsky.] *Novosti-N*, 22 May 2012. http://novosti-n.mk.ua/news/read/40354.html
243 Приватизация портов. В Украине разрешили концессию портов на 49 лет. [Privatization of the ports. In Ukraine, concessions on ports are granted for 49 years.] *Korabelov*, 15 June 2013. http://www.korabelov.info/ekonomika/privatizatsiya-portov-v-ukraine-razreshili-kontsessiyu-morskikh-portov-na-49-let.html
244 Грузооборот порта «Октябрьск» составил 160,3 тыс. т в апреле 2013 года [Port Oktyabrsk moved 160.3 tons of cargo in April 2013.] *Morskie Biznes-novosti Ukrainy,* 23 May 2013. http://www.maritimebusinessnews.com.ua/news/cargo/2013/05/23/21684.html
245 В первую тройку добросовестных налогоплательщиков вошел СМП «Октябрьск» [Specialized maritime port Oktyabrsk is among the top three taxpayers.] *Korabelov*, 20 March 2013. http://www.korabelov.info/ekonomika/v-pervuyu-troyku-dobrosovestnyih-nalogoplatelschikov-voshel-smp-oktyabrsk.html
246 Украина раздала порты «пацанам» [Ukrainian ports have been handed to buddies.] *Ukrainskaya Pravda*, 21 November 2012. http://www.epravda.com.ua/rus/publications/2012/11/21/345750/
247 Николаевский порт: «прощай, оружие!» [Nikolaev Port: Enter, weapons!] *Port News*, 23 December 2008.http://portnews.ru/digest/4236/
248 "Domestic Stories: HMCS CHICOUTIMI arrives in Halifax," Royal Canadian Navy, 1 February 2005. http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/3/3-a_eng.asp?category=7&id=225

249 US Military Sealift Command website. http://www.msc.navy.mil/sealift/2013/July/lantlines.htm
250 "Swedish Submarine HMS Gotland Arrives in San Diego," United States Navy official website, 30 June 2005. http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=18984
251 http://www.briese.de/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF-Daten/Briese_news_3-2012_web.pdf
252 See Briese Ukraine website. http://www.briese.net.ua/contacts/
253 *Ibid.*
254 See Briese Russia website. http://briese.ru/
255 See Briese Russia website. http://briese.ru/Filialy
256 See Kaalbye Transport website. http://kaalbye-group.com/ktransport.html
257 See Primetransport website. http://www.primetransportltd.com/?page=team&lang=de
258 e.g. Victor Puyu.
259 Primetransport website. http://www.primetransportltd.com/?page=fleet&lang=de
260 "Beluga Files for Bankruptcy," *Journal of Commerce*, 16 March 2011. http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/beluga-files-bankruptcy_20110316.html
261 "Beluga Shipping Announces Restructuring," *Journal* of Commerce, 3 March 2011. http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/international-freight-shipping/beluga-shipping-announces-restructuring_20110303.html
262 Beluga Projects website http://www.beluga-projects.com/
263 Heavylift PFI Newsletter, September/October 2010, p. 130.
264 Al Venter, *Allah's Bomb: The Islamic Quest for Nuclear Weapons, p. 43.*
265 Beluga press release. http://www.docstoc.com/docs/48182214/Beluga-Group-and-BBC-Chartering-Logistic-form-Americas-Joint
266 Guest list. http://www.novpt.ru/doc/list-eng.pdf
267 *Ibid.*
268 "Venezuela ranked top importer of Russian arms," RIA-Novosti, 27 December 2011. http://en.rian.ru/world/20111227/170519145.html
269 "Russia to lend Venezuela $4 bln to pay for arms deals," *RIA-Novosti*, 7 October 2010.
270 Прибытие в Венесуэлу третьей партии вооружения из России ["The third party of Russian weapons arrives in Venezuela"], *BPMD*, 25 March 2012. http://bmpd.livejournal.com/186218.html
271 "Halt ships of shame from the USA carrying weapons to Egypt," *Amnesty International*, 15 March 2012. http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/halt-ships-shame-usa-carrying-weapons-egypt-2012-03-15
272 http://www.best-maritime-crewing.info/catalogue_companies_list/company_source_6719_1.html
273 http://www.equifax.co.uk/equifax/commercial/pdf/Estonia.pdf
274 Balchart website.
275 Equasis
276 Balchart website.
277 Program brochure. Available at http://novoconference.ru/eng/userfiles/File/NOVO2008_prog_ENG_10-04-08.pdf
278 Guest list. Available at http://novoconference.ru/eng/novo/2008/participants/
279 ФЕМКО ответила за Сирию [FEMCO answers for Syria], *PortNews*, 16 July 2012. http://portnews.ru/comments/1447/?backurl=%2Fcomments%2Fs1%2Fp3%2F
280 Губернатор Мурманской области и глава «Роснефти» обсудят перспективы освоения Приразломного месторождения нефти [The governor of Murmansk oblast and the head of Rosneft discuss perspectives on reclaiming fault-line oil], *RosBalt*, 23 April 2003. http://www.murman.ru/themes/oil-rosbalt.shtml?page=6&name=themes&base=oil&file=oil-rosbalt&print=1
281 Надстройка для корвета «Совершенный» доставлена в Комсомольск-на-Амуре ["Bulkhead for the 'Sovershenni' corvette is delivered to Komsomolsk-na-Amur,"], *BMPD*, 12 October 2012.
282 Varamar website
283 Program attendees list. Available at http://www.interlegal.com.ua/en/events/eng_participants_2009.pdf
284 Office 32, 20-ya Liniya 5/7, St Petersburg, 199106, Russia. Equasis.
285 http://westberg.ru/the-company/structure/
286 For a full list of private security companies, see signatory list of "The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers", a Switzerland-based NGO and trade association seeking to promote transparency and common standards in the private security industry. Available at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/88987240/ICoC-Signatory-Companies-Total-December-2012
287 As evidenced by registration certificates on the Moran website. http://moran-group.org/upload/about/ISO_9001.jpg
288 "Задержанное в Нигерии судно с российским экипажем имело разрешение на перевозку оружия" [The detained ship in Nigeria with a Russian crew had permission for transportation of weapons] ITAR-TASS, 23 October 2012. http://www.itar-tass.com/c1/553369.html
289 "Massive Floating Armories Filled With Weapons Are A Pirate›s Sweet Dream," Guardian, 10 January 2013. http://www.businessinsider.com/massive-floating-armories-filled-with-weapons-are-a-pirates-sweet-dream-2013-1
290 *Report of the Monitoring Group on* Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011), 279-281. http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/mongroup.shtml
291 Equasis.
292 "Оружие для Сирии везут из Петербурга?» [Are weapons for Syria being transported from St. Petersburg?] Fontanka, 1 November 2012. http://www.fontanka.ru/2012/01/11/104/
293 "Arrested in Nigeria Russian m/v Myre Seadiver most probably, is a floating arsenal," Maritime Bulletin, 23 October 2012. http://www.odin.tc/news/read.asp?articleID=1464
294 See Moran website. http://moran-group.org/en/about/index
295 "Hansa Builds New Heavy-lift Competitor," *BreakBulk*, 11 March 2013. http://www.breakbulk.com/breakbulk-news/transportation-logistics/hansa-builds-new-heavy-lift-competitor/
296 "Beluga rebranded as Hansa Heavy Lift," World Cargo News, 2 June 2011. http://www.worldcargonews.com/htm/w20110602.054680.htm
297 See HHL website. http://www.hansaheavylift.com/kontakt/fuehrungsteam.html
298 Hansa newsletter. http://www.hansaheavylift.com/fileadmin/pdf/HHL_Tradewinds_15072011.pdf
299 "Hired guns secure ships, stir controversy," *Stars and Stripes*, 15 February 2010. http://www.stripes.com/news/hired-guns-secure-ships-stir-controversy-1.98968
300 PMSC forum. http://www.closeprotectionworld.com/members-looking-work/11817-advice-needed-urgently-3.html
301 PMSC forum. https://www.socnet.com/showthread.php?t=108599
302 *Ibid.*
303 We characterize them as fronts based on the fact that their websites contain identical quotes, brochures, personnel, etc.
304 PMSC forum. http://www.closeprotectionworld.com/members-looking-work/11817-advice-needed-urgently-3.html
305 Ripoff Report. http://www.ripoffreport.com/r/Varamar/nationwide/Varamar-Helicon-Security-Group-Varvarenko-Aleksandr-To-avoid-any-illegal-activity-we-want-909284
306 For example, see Somalia Monitoring Group reports.
307 *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritr*ea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011), 279-281. http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/mongroup.shtml
308 Рособоронэкспорт объявил о рекордном количестве контрактов в 2012 году [Rosoboronexport informs about the record quantity of contracts in 2012,] Vzglyad, 13 February 2013. http://vz.ru/news/2013/2/13/620142.html
309 "Ukraine world›s 4th largest arms exporter in 2012, according to SIPRI," Kyiv Post, 18 March 2013. http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ukraine-worlds-4th-largest-arms-exporter-in-2012-according-to-sipri-321878.html
310 Information gathered from Odessa leader's social media profiles, newspaper articles, etc.
311 Одесса. Незаконная ликвидация предприятия [Odessa. Illegal liquidation of a company.] *LB.ua*, 10 February 2012.

312 "В России ежегодно отмывается 100 миллиардов долларов," NewsRu, 5 June 2001. http://www.newsru.com/russia/05jun2001/money.html
313 "В прошлом году из России нелегально вывели 2 трлн рублей," RBK Daily, 17 February 2012. http://www.rbcdaily.ru/politics/562949982830349
314 "Откровения Игнатьева: куда уходят $49 млрд в год?," Forbes, 1 April 2013. http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya-column/gosplan/236500-otkroveniya-ignateva-kuda-uhodyat-49-mlrd-v-god
315 Transparency International website. http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/
316 "Russia loses £52bn a year in tax evasion and illegal transfers, says bank chief," Guardian, 21 February 2013. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/21/russia-loses-52-billion-tax-evasion
317 "The proxy platform," *OCCRP*, 22 November 2011. https://www.reportingproject.net/proxy/en/the-proxy-platform
318 "Russia moves to prosecute a lawyer who died in jail," *New York Times*, 28 January 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/world/europe/russia-tries-to-prosecute-the-dead-whistle-blower-magnitsky.html
319 "Russia sacks armed forces chief amid corruption scandal," BBC, 9 November 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20265166
320 "Ушаков передавал сведения российскому разведчику Хапилову (документы, видео)" [Ushakov testifies about the Russian intelligence agent Khalipov [with documents and video], Kompromat.lv, 16 November 2011. http://www.kompromat.lv/item.php?docid=readn&id=7114 Kompromat sources are usually unreliable, but this one is extensively documented.
321 *Refusing impunity for the killers of Sergei Magnitsky,* European Union Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, draft version, 18 June 2013, p. 40. http://euobserver.com/media/src/e78308f7366584a30c4b75b81fa6a0a2.pdf
322 "Faux Corporate Directors Stand in for Fraudsters, Despots and Spies," *International* Consortium of Investigative Journalists, 7 April 2013. http://www.icij.org/offshore/faux-corporate-directors-stand-fraudsters-despots-and-spies
323 "The Latvian proxies," *OCCRP*, 15 March 2012. https://www.reportingproject.net/proxy/en/the-latvian-proxies
324 "Arrest warrant for Kazakh billionaire accused of one of world's biggest frauds," Guardian, 16 February 2012. http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/feb/16/arrest-warrant-kazakh-billionaire-mukhtar-ablyazov
325 "Report says Ukraine overpaid for oil rig," *Ukrainian Journal*. http://www.ukrainianjournal.com/index.php?w=article&id=12553
326 "Erik Vanagels: the extent of a money laundering supermarket," *Economic Crime Intelligence*, 23 February 2012. http://economiccrimeintelligence.wordpress.com/2012/02/23/erik-vanagels-trademark-the-extent-of-a-money-laundering-supermarket/
327 "Offshore Registration Business Forced to Halt Operations," *OCCRP*, 28 June 2011. https://reportingproject.net/offshore/index.php/offshore-registration-business-forced-to-halt-operations
328 Panamamian business registrar
329 "Latvia fines bank over Magnitsky money laundering," *EU Observer*, 20 June 2013. http://euobserver.com/economic/120568
330 "Treasury Wields PATRIOT Act Powers to Isolate Two Latvian Banks: Financial Institutions Identified as Primary Money Laundering Concerns," US Treasury press release, 21 April 2005.
331 *Republic Of Latvia: Detailed Assessment of Anti-Money Laundering And Combating The Financing Of Terrorism*. International Monetary Fund, 2006. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07189.pdf

332 *Report on Fourth Assessment Visit –Summary of Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, Latvia.* Council of Europe, Committee Of Experts On The Evaluation Of Anti-Money Laundering Measures And The Financing Of Terrorism, 5 July 2012. https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?Command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&DocId=1955172&SecMode=1&Admin=0&Usage=2&InstranetImage=2187208
333 "Latvia sees good and bad as Russian money haven," *Reuters*, 23 October 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/23/us-latvia-russia-banks-idUSBRE89M0S120121023
334 "Swiss-Style Latvian Banking Hub Thrives on Ex-Soviet Cash," *Bloomberg*, 30 August 2012. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-29/swiss-style-latvian-banking-hub-thrives-on-ex-soviet-cash-flood.html
335 "Swiss-Style Latvian Banking Hub Thrives on Ex-Soviet Cash," *Bloomberg*, 30 August 2012. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-29/swiss-style-latvian-banking-hub-thrives-on-ex-soviet-cash-flood.html
336 "Latvian Regulator Imposes Largest Possible Fine on a Latvian Bank involved in Money Laundering Connected to the Magnitsky Case," *Law and Order in Russia*, 19 June 2013. http://lawandorderinrussia.org/2013/latvian-regulator-imposes-largest-possible-fine-on-a-latvian-bank-involved-in-money-laundering-connected-to-the-magnitsky-case/
337 "Swiss-Style Latvian Banking Hub Thrives on Ex-Soviet Cash," *Bloomberg*, 30 August 2012. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-29/swiss-style-latvian-banking-hub-thrives-on-ex-soviet-cash-flood.html
338 Odessa Maritime Days press release, http://www.maritimedays.odessa.ua/?r=site/page&src=release&print=page
339 Attendees list available at http://www.interlegal.com.ua/en/comnfacts/pdf/participants2011.pdf
340 *Waterlux AG vs. Atlas Uluslararasi Nakiyat Proje Tasimaciligi Sanayi ve Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi, Atlasium Denizcilik Ve Proje Kargo Tasimaciligi Limited Sirk and General Co. Ltd.* 1:2009cv05705, 2009.
341 See ABLV website. http://www.ablv.com/en/about/history
342 *Waterlux AG vs. Atlas Uluslararasi Nakiyat Proje Tasimaciligi Sanayi ve Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi, Atlasium Denizcilik Ve Proje Kargo Tasimaciligi Limited Sirk and General Co. Ltd.* 1:2009cv05705, 2009.
343 *Securities and Exchange Commission v. Rockford Funding Group, et. al.,* Civil Action No. 1:2009CV10047 (PGG)(SDNY). http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21329.htm
344 "Iranian oil tanker signals conceal ships to Syria," Jerusalem Post, 6 December 2012. http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Iranian-oil-tanker-signals-conceal-ships-to-Syria
345 "Have Tehran's Tankers Hijacked the Tanzanian Flag?" *Forbes*, 12 July 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/claudiarosett/2013/07/12/have-tehrans-tankers-hijacked-the-tanzanian-flag/
346 UN Comtrade data
347 "Syrian grain imports pick up despite worsening war," *Reuters*, 17 May 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/17/syria-food-idUSL6N0DR1V920130517
348 *United States of America vs. Monzer al Kassar*, 2007.
349 Рособоронэкспорт объявил о рекордном количестве контрактов в 2012 году [Rosoboronexport informs about the record quantity of contracts in 2012,] Vzglyad, 13 February 2013. http://vz.ru/news/2013/2/13/620142.html
350 Author personal interview with Nikolaev residents
351 "Putin Sharply Criticizes Ukraine Over Georgian Arms Reports," *Radio Free Europe*, 3 Octob er 2008. http://www.rferl.org/content/Putin_Sharply_Criticizes_Ukraine_Over_Georgian_Arms_Reports/1293613.html

EXHIBIT 2

OMB NO. 1105-0001

U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, DC 20530

Registration Statement
Pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act
of 1938, as amended

I - REGISTRANT

1. Name of the registrant.
Global Strategic Communications Group, LLC

2. Registration No. 5726

3. Principal business address.
1050 Thomas Jefferson Street
Suite 300
Washington, DC 20007

4. If the registrant is an individual, furnish the following information:

(a) Residence address(es). N/A

(b) Other business address(es), if any. N/A

(c) Nationality. N/A

(d) Date and place of birth. N/A

(e) Present citizenship. N/A

(f) If present citizenship not acquired by birth, state when, where and how acquired. N/A

(g) Occupation. N/A

CRM/ISS
REGISTRATION UNIT
2005 NOV -2 AM 10: 43

5. If the registrant is not an individual, furnish the following information:

(a) Type of organization: Committee ☐ Association ☐ Partnership ☐ Voluntary group ☐
Corporation ☐ Other (specify) Limited Liability Company

(b) Date and place of organization. October 12, 2005

(c) Address of principal office. 1050 Thomas Jefferson Street
Suite 300
Washington, DC 20007

(d) Name of person in charge. Darren G. Spinell

(e) Locations of branch or local offices. None

(f) If a membership organization, give number of members. 1 member of the LLC

(g) List all partners, officers, directors or persons performing the functions of an officer or director of the registrant.

Name	Residence address(es)	Position	Nationality
Darren G. Spinck	203 Yoakum Parkway, #215 Alexandria, VA 22304	Principal	U.S

(h) Which of the above named persons renders service directly in furtherance of the interests of any of the foreign principals?

Darren Spinck

(i) Describe the nature of the registrant's regular business or activity.

Public relations services with U.S. media

(j) Give a complete statement of the ownership and control of the registrant.

The LLC is 100% owned by Darren Spinck. Control and management also by Darren Spinck.

6. List all employees who render services to the registrant directly in furtherance of the interests of any of the foreign principals in other than clerical, secretarial, or related or similar capacity.

Name	Residence address(es)	Nature of services
Darren G. Spinck	203 Yoakum Pkwy., #215 Alexandria, VA. 22304	public relations services

II - FOREIGN PRINCIPAL

7. List every foreign principal[1] for whom the registrant is acting or has agreed to act.

Name of foreign principal	Principal address(es)
Leadership of the Rodina Political Party	Moscow, Russia

III - ACTIVITIES

8. In addition to the activities described in any Exhibit B to this statement, will you engage or are you engaging now in activity on your own behalf which benefits any or all of your foreign principals? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, describe fully.

IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

9. (a) RECEIPTS -MONIES

During the period beginning 60 days prior to the date of your obligation to register[2] to the time of filing this statement, did you receive from any foreign principal named in Item 7 any contribution, income, or money either as compensation or for disbursement or otherwise? Yes ☒ No ☐

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each such foreign principal an account of such monies[3].

Name of foreign principal	Date received	Purpose	Amount
Leadership of the Rodina Political Party, via Venable, LLC, acting as U.S. agent for the Leadership of the Rodina Political Party	10/12/05	Fee and expenses for public relations services	$32,332.00
		Total	$33,332.00

1 The term "foreign principal" includes a foreign government, foreign political party, foreign organization, foreign individual and, for the purpose of registration, an organization or an individual any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign government, foreign political party, foreign organization or foreign individual.

2 An agent must register within ten days of becoming an agent, and before acting as such.

3 A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fund raising campaign. There is no printed form for this exhibit. (See Rule 201 (e).)

(b) RECEIPTS -THINGS OF VALUE

During the period beginning 60 days prior to the date of your obligation to register[4] to the time of filing this statement, did you receive from any foreign principal named in Item 7 anything of value[5] other than money, either as compensation, or for disbursement, or otherwise? Yes ☐ No ☑

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name of foreign principal	Date received	Description of thing of value	Purpose for which received
N/A			

10. (a) DISBURSEMENT-MONIES

During the period beginning 60 days prior to the date of your obligation to register[6] to the time of filing this statement, did you spend or disburse any money in furtherance of or in connection with your activities on behalf of any foreign principal named in Item 7? Yes ☐ No ☑

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each such foreign principal named including monies transmitted, if any, to each foreign principal.

Date	To whom	Purpose	Amount

(b) DISBURSEMENTS -THINGS OF VALUE

During the period beginning 60 days prior to the date of your obligation to register[7] to the time of filing this statement, did you dispose of any thing of value[8] other than money in furtherance of or in connection with your activities on behalf of any foreign principal named in Item 7? Yes ☐ No ☑

If yes, furnish the following information:

Date	Name of person to whom given	On behalf of what foreign principal	Description of thing of value	Purpose in giving

(c) DISBURSEMENTS -POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

During the period beginning 60 days prior to the date of your obligation to register[9] to the time of filing this statement, did you, the registrant, or any short form registrant, make any contribution of money or other thing of value from your own funds and on your own behalf in connection with an election to any political office or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select candidates for any political office? Yes ☐ No ☑

If yes, furnish the following information:

Date	Amount or thing of value	Party or Candidate	Identify location of election, convention, etc. if any

4,6,7 and 9 See Footnote 2, on page 3.

5 and 8 Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks", and the like.

V - INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS[10]

11. Will the activities of the registrant on behalf of any foreign principal include the preparation or dissemination of informational materials? Yes ☑ No ☐

IF YES, RESPOND TO THE REMAINING ITEMS IN THIS SECTION V.

12. Identify each such foreign principal.
Leadership of the Rodina Political Party, including Dmitry Rogozin, chairman of the Rodina Political Party and a Russian Federation State Duma Deputy.

13. Has a bu[illegible]een established or specified sum of money allocated to finance your activities in preparing or disseminating informationa[illegible]erials? Yes ☑ No ☐

If yes, identify each such foreign principal, specify amount and for what period of time.
The budget is $45,000 for activities between October 2005 and January 31, 2006.

14. Will any public relations firms or publicity agents participate in the preparation or dissemination of such informational materials?
Yes ☑ No ☐

If yes, furnish the names and addresses of such persons or firms.
The registrant, Global Strategic Communications Group, LLC, is a public relations firm and will be preparing the dissemination of materials.

15. Will your activities in preparing or disseminating informational materials include the use of any of the following:

- ☑ Radio or TV broadcasts
- ☐ Advertising campaigns
- ☑ Magazine or Newspaper articles
- ☑ Press releases
- ☑ Internet
- ☐ Motion picture films
- ☐ Pamphlets or other publications
- ☑ Letters or telegrams
- ☑ Lectures or speeches
- ☑ Other (specify): press kit, press conference

16. Will the informational materials be disseminated among any of the following groups:

- ☐ Public Officials
- ☐ Legislators
- ☐ Government agencies
- ☑ Newspapers
- ☑ Editors
- ☐ Civic groups or associations
- ☐ Libraries
- ☐ Educational groups
- ☐ Nationality groups
- ☑ Other (specify): television producers, reporters

17. Indicate language to be used in the informational materials:

- ☑ English
- ☐ Other (specify) _____

10 The term informational materials includes any oral, visual, graphic, written, or pictorial information or matter of any kind, including that published by means of advertising, books, periodicals, newspapers, lectures, broadcasts, motion pictures, or any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce or otherwise. Informational materials disseminated by an agent of a foreign principal as part of an activity in itself exempt from registration, or an activity which by itself would not require registration, need not be filed pursuant to Section 4(b) of the Act.

VI - EXHIBITS AND ATTACHMENTS

18. (a) The following described exhibits shall be filed in triplicate with an initial registration statement:

Exhibit A- This exhibit, which is filed on Form CRM-157, sets forth the information required to be disclosed concerning each foreign principal named in Item 7.

Exhibit B- This exhibit, which is filed on Form CRM -155, sets forth the information concerning the agreement or understanding between the registrant and the foreign principal.

(b) An Exhibit C shall be filed when applicable. This exhibit, for which no printed form is provided, consists of a true copy of the charter, articles of incorporation, association, constitution, and bylaws of a registrant that is an organization. A waiver of the requirement to file an Exhibit C may be obtained for good cause shown upon written application to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530. (See Rule 201(c) and (d).)

(c) An Exhibit D shall be filed when applicable. This exhibit, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fund raising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal. (See Rule 201(e).)

VII - EXECUTION

In accordance with 28 U. S.C. § 1746, the undersigned swear(s) or affirm(s) under penalty of perjury that he/she has (they have) read the information set forth in this registration statement and the attached exhibits and that he/she is (they are) familiar with the contents thereof and that such contents are in their entirety true and accurate to the best of his/her (their) knowledge and belief, except that the undersigned make(s) no representation as to the truth or accuracy of the information contained in the attached Short Form Registration Statement(s), if any, insofar as such information is not within his/her (their) personal knowledge.

(Date of signature)	(Type or print name under each signature[11])
October 26, 2005	Darren G. Spinck

11 This statement shall be signed by the individual agent, if the registrant is an individual, or by a majority of those partners, officers, directors or persons performing similar functions, if the registrant is an organization, except that the organization can, by power of attorney, authorize one or more individuals to execute this statement on its behalf.

EXHIBIT 3

CARGO MANIFEST

Vessel	Flag	Port of loading	Page No.
OCEAN VOYAGER	Saint Vincent and The Grenadines	ST.PETERSBURG	1/1
Agents	**Master**	**Port of discharge**	**Date of issue**
NEVA-TRANSPORT-TRADING	Capt. O.Tarasevich	TARTOUS PORT	15/01/12

B/L No.	Shipper	Consignee	Description of goods and kind of packages	Gross waight
B/L No. 1 Ref: 519/1190	JSC ROSOBORONEXPORT, MOSCOW, RUSSIAN	TO THE ORDER OF CENTRAL BANK OF SYRIA Notify address MINISTRY OF DEFENSE - DAMASCUS	EQUIPMENT (BRUTTO: 37369,00 KGS; TARE: 11670,00 KGS; GROSS: 49039,00 KGS) SUBJECT CONTRACT NO P/076006131726 DD 31/10/2010 CIF LATTAKIA OR TARTOUS PORT INCOTERMS 2000 L/C NO. 28670/15060	49 039,00 KGS
B/L No. 2 Ref: 519/1190	JSC ROSOBORONEXPORT, MOSCOW, RUSSIAN	TO THE ORDER OF CENTRAL BANK OF SYRIA Notify address MINISTRY OF DEFENSE - DAMASCUS	EQUIPMENT (BRUTTO: 70982,00 KGS; TARE: 14740,00 KGS; GROSS: 85722,00 KGS) SUBJECT CONTRACT NO P/076006130569 DD 5/7/2010 AND ITS SUPPLEMENT NO. /076006131647/ DATED 31/10/2010 CIF LATTAKIA OR TARTOUS PORT INCOTERMS 2000. L/C NO. 28769/15060	85 722,00 KGS
B/L No. 3 Ref: 519/1190	JSC ROSOBORONEXPORT, MOSCOW, RUSSIAN	TO THE ORDER OF CENTRAL BANK OF SYRIA Notify address MINISTRY OF DEFENSE - DAMASCUS	EQUIPMENT (BRUTTO: 26527,00 KGS; TARE: 7510,00 KGS; GROSS: 34037,00 KGS) SUBJECT CONTRACT NO P/076006131414 DD 31/10/2010 CIF LATTAKIA OR TARTOUS PORT INCOTERMS 2000 L/C NO. 28680/15060.	34 037,00 KGS
			TOTAL: 2520 CASES IN 9 X 40' CONTAINERS	
			TOTAL BRUTTO WEIGHT:	134 878,00 KGS
			TOTAL TARE WEIGHT:	33 920,00 KGS
			TOTAL GROSS WEIGHT:	168 798,00 KGS

НЕВА-ТРАНСПОРТ-ТРЕЙДИНГ
AS AGENT ONLY
НЕВА-ТРАНСПОРТ-ТРЕЙДИНГ

EXHIBIT 4

Ship info

IMO number :	9111216	
Name of ship :	OCEAN VOYAGER	(since 01/02/2010)
Call Sign :	J8B3139	
MMSI :	375019000	
Gross tonnage :	7249	(during 2000)
DWT :	7278	
Type of ship :	General Cargo Ship	(during 1994)
Year of build :	1994	
Flag :	St Vincent and Grenadines	(since 01/12/2004)
Status of ship :	In Service/Commission	(since 01/05/2008)
Last update :	08/04/2014	

OVERVIEW

Overview	Value
The ship is classed by (at least) one of the IACS member societies	Yes
The ship's flag is not on the black list of the Paris MoU	Yes
The ship's flag is on the white list of the Paris MoU	No
The ship's flag is not on the black list of the Tokyo MoU	Yes
The ship's flag is on the white list of the Tokyo MoU	Yes
Percentage of inspections having led to a detention in last 36 months	12.5 %
The ship's flag is not on the targeted list of the USCG	No

MANAGEMENT DETAIL

IMO number	Role	Name of company	Address	Date of effect
5166964	Registered owner	KAALBYE SHIPPING UKRAINE KSU	ul Bunina 10, Odessa, 65026, Ukraine.	since 02/09/2013
5166964	ISM Manager	KAALBYE SHIPPING UKRAINE KSU	ul Bunina 10, Odessa, 65026, Ukraine.	since 09/03/2010
5166964	Ship manager	KAALBYE SHIPPING UKRAINE KSU	ul Bunina 10, Odessa, 65026, Ukraine.	since 01/01/2005

CLASSIFICATION STATUS

Classification society	Date change status	Status	Reason
Russian Maritime Register of Shipping	since 08/10/2012	Delivered	

CLASSIFICATION SURVEYS

Classification society	Date of last renewal survey	Date of next renewal survey
Russian Maritime Register of Shipping	06/06/2009	31/07/2014

SAFETY MANAGEMENT CERTIFICATE (RECOGNISED ORGANISATIONS)

Classification society	Date survey	Date expiry	Date change status	Status	Reason	C/V
Russian Maritime Register of Shipping	09/03/2010	26/02/2015	09/03/2010	Delivered		Convention

Equasis's contributors :

© Copyright 2000-2011; Version : prodPv2.6.4; Developed and hosted by French Ministry for Transport -DAM/SI-Saint-Malo

EXHIBIT 5

Cookies on the BBC website

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. We also use cookies to ensure we show you advertising that is relevant to you. If you continue without changing your settings, we'll assume that you are happy to receive all cookies on the BBC website. However, if you would like to, you can **change your cookie settings** at any time.

Continue

Find out more

Page last updated at 16:09 GMT, Tuesday, 7 October 2008 17:09 UK

Hijacked tanks 'for South Sudan'

The BBC has seen evidence suggesting that the Ukrainian ship being held by pirates off Somalia is carrying weapons and tanks destined for South Sudan.

Kind of packages and description of goods	Number of pieces	Gross weight KGS
6	7	8
CONTRACT No. MOD/GOSS/T-72/06-07-5/9-1K DATED 15/02/07		
T-72M1, T-72M1K ITEMS UNPACKED	33	1 353 000
SPARE PARTS TO T-72M1, T-72M1K ITEMS PACKED	73	11 900
TOTAL	106	1 364 900

Contract numbers include the initials GOSS, thought to be government of South Sudan.

Enlarge Enlarge Image

A copy of the freight manifest appears to show contracts were made by Kenya on behalf of South Sudan's government.

Kenya has repeatedly said the weapons on board the MV Faina are for its army. A South Sudanese official said South Sudan had nothing to do with the tanks.

The MV Faina is currently surrounded by warships monitoring the situation.

Last week, the Somali government said the ship's owners were involved in direct negotiations with the pirates, who are demanding a $20m (£11m) ransom.

'Diplomatic embarrassment'

A copy of the MV Faina's manifest given to the BBC appears to confirm that the contract was issued on behalf of South Sudan, although the Kenyan defence ministry is named as the consignee.

Contract numbers for tanks, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and anti-aircraft guns contain the initials GOSS, which military sources tell the BBC is a reference to the Government Of South Sudan.

This is an acronym commonly used in Sudan.
But Francis Nazario, head of South Sudan's mission in Brussels, said he had seen the manifest and it did not prove anything.

> **"Kenya could be seen as playing the same role as Cuba did during the Angolan civil war"**
>
> Helmoed Heitman
> Jane's Defence Weekly

Pirates reveal precarious peace
Tanks 'were for Sudan arms race'
Somalia: Special report

"What I know is that we have nothing at all to do with the content of this ship, and the ship was not heading for South Sudan," he told the BBC's Focus on Africa programme.

"I think if there was anything like that we would not hide it because constitutionally we have the right to do so, to bring arms from anywhere."

The Kenyan government has not yet commented on the document but it has been presented to the defence and foreign relations committee of Kenya's parliament.

Kenya has repeatedly insisted that the shipment was part of a programme to restock its military.

SEE ALSO

Pirates reveal Sudan's precarious peace
07 Oct 08 | Africa

Tanks 'were for Sudan arms race'
02 Oct 08 | Africa

Somalia's pirates seize 33 tanks
26 Sep 08 | Africa

Life in Somalia's pirate town
18 Sep 08 | Africa

Somalia's pirates face battles at sea
29 Sep 08 | Africa

Country profile: Somalia
18 Jun 08 | Country profiles

RELATED BBC LINKS

Somalia: Special report

Network Africa

TOP AFRICA STORIES

Nigeria state oil firm 'insolvent'

France to help Africa veterans

Churches call for Sudan to split

| News feeds

MOST POPULAR STORIES NOW

SHARED READ WATCHED/LISTENED

Ukraine crisis: Crimean Russia vote

Crimean MPs decide to join Russia

Neighbour backs Pistorius defence

What do the flags in Ukraine crisis mean?

Naked body found on beach identified

The 'average' doll v Barbie

Dog sex man spared jail sentence

Schoolboy creates nuclear fusion

Sarkozy couple seeks tape injunction

Great white shark's epic ocean trek

Most popular now, in detail

The BBC's Karen Allen in Nairobi says that this will be a huge embarrassment to the Kenyan government.

Although the import of military hardware is not illegal, it does put Kenya in a tight spot diplomatically, our correspondent says, not least because it was Kenya which helped broker an end to the civil war between South Sudan and the government in Khartoum in 2005.

Meanwhile, a Kenyan court has granted bail to Andrew Mwangura, a spokesman for the Kenyan chapter of the Seafarers Assistance Programme, who had been arrested after he said the tanks were bound for South Sudan.

Mr Mwangura was charged with making alarming statements and illegal possession of marijuana.

However, he has not yet raised the 200,000 shillings, ($2,700) and so he is still in custody.

The MV Faina is currently moored off the coast of Somalia, close to the town of Hobyo. There have been conflicting reports about where its cargo was destined for since it was captured two weeks ago.

Military balance

Last week, Western military experts told the BBC that the tanks on board the MV Faina were going to Sudan and that the shipment indicated an arms race between North and South Sudan had begun.

They are reported to both be building up their forces ahead of a referendum on independence for the South in 2011.
The military experts, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said a previous delivery of tanks had taken place last November.

The pirates want a $20m ransom for the MV Faina and its valuable cargo

Helmoed Heitman, Africa correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly, also said he had reports that more than 100 T-72 and T-55 Russian tanks have been received by the southern Sudanese in recent months.

"If these reports are true, they could change the regional military balance," he told the BBC.

"Kenya could be seen as playing the same role as Cuba did during the Angolan civil war - when they armed the MPLA."

The experts said the tanks would most likely be dug in along Sudan's north-south border, with the tanks using their guns to protect military installations.

E-mail this to a friend Printable version

Bookmark with: What are these?

Delicious Digg reddit Facebook StumbleUpon

FEATURES, VIEWS, ANALYSIS

Ghost town
Has China's housing bubble burst?

The guerilla plant
How the world's oldest clove tree defied an empire

Walking away
Why Royal Ballet principal Sergei Polunin quit

MOST POPULAR NOW | The most shared story right now is: The ricin case timeline

BBC © 2013 The BBC is not responsible for the content of external sites. Read more.

EXHIBIT 6

18

Skirting the Law: Sudan's Post-CPA Arms Flows

By Mike Lewis

Copyright

Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey

© Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva 2009

First published in September 2009

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior permission in writing of the Small Arms Survey, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Publications Manager, Small Arms Survey, at the address below.

Small Arms Survey
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland

Copy-edited by Tania Inowlocki
Proofread by Donald Strachan

Cartography by MAP*grafix*

Typeset in Optima and Palatino by Richard Jones (rick@studioexile.com)

Printed by nbmedia in Geneva, Switzerland

ISBN 978-2-940415-17-5

Case study 3

Ukrainian arms shipments to the SPLA

On 25 September 2008 a 10,000-ton cargo vessel, the *Faina,* was hijacked by Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean en route from Oktyabrsk, Ukraine, to Mombasa, Kenya. The vessel's substantial military cargo consisted of both heavy weaponry and small arms and light weapons, including T-72M1 main battle tanks, BM-21 multiple-launch rocket systems, 14.5 mm anti-aircraft guns, and a large quantity of RPG-7V grenade launchers (MV *Faina,* 2008). Western military and diplomatic sources, including the spokesperson of the US Navy's 5th Fleet in the Indian Ocean, immediately alleged that the *Faina*'s military cargo, consigned to the Kenyan Ministry of Defence according to accompanying shipping documents, was in fact en route to the GoSS (AP, 2008). Both the GoSS and the Kenyan government denied this allegation, the latter claiming that its existing British-built Vickers Mk III tanks were to be replaced by the Soviet-origin T-72s (*Nairobi Chronicle,* 2009). The credibility of this claim is questionable. A complete conversion from NATO-origin to Soviet-origin armour would entail a major shift in training and equipment—unlikely to have taken place unnoticed. Indeed, despite the Kenyan army's insistence that they are converting to T-72s, procurement and training for Kenya's Vickers Mk III tanks has evidently continued. Mk III tanks were photographed in West Pokot in March 2009, reportedly destined for training exercises there; in May 2007, two months *after* the signing of the February 2007 Ukrainian contract for T-72M1 tanks, Kenya imported 2,000 105 mm tank shells from India, suitable for Vickers Mk III tanks but not for the 125 mm armament of T-72M1 tanks (India, 2007).[65]

Documentation obtained by the author and Amnesty International's UK Section shows that the *Faina*'s cargo—transported to the Kenyan army's Kahawa barracks near Nairobi after its release and arrival in Mombasa in February 2009—was in fact the latest of three major maritime arms shipments under contracts for 'MOD/GOSS' since September 2007. The Kenyan government has yet to acknowledge the existence of the first two shipments.

At least three contracts were signed with Ukrainian state-owned arms exporter SSSFTF 'Ukrinmash' on 29 December 2006, 15 February 2007, and 5 May 2008.[66] The first contract covered the supply of ZU-23-2 (23 mm) and ZPU-4 (14.5 mm) anti-aircraft guns; BM-21 'Grad' 122 mm multiple-launch rocket systems, mounted

on URAL trucks; RPG-7Vs; and a large number of AKM assault rifles. The second contract consisted of T-72M1 and T-72M1K (command-version) main battle tanks, along with spare parts, tools, and accessories.[67] The third included 13,926 rounds of 125 mm tank ammunition, suitable for T-72 tanks (MV *Faina,* 2008).

These types of arms correspond precisely with those listed in the Ukrainian government's national reports, and in its reporting to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, as having been transferred from Ukraine to 'Kenya' during 2007 and 2008, suggesting that these publicly reported transfers correspond to the first two 'MOD/GOSS'-designated contracts of 2006 and 2007 (see Table 7).

Both diplomatic and military sources close to the SPLA in Juba have informed the author that these weapons were destined for Southern Sudan, and that many have already arrived from Kenya.[68] One military source close to the SPLA described in some detail the political and military considerations of their acquisition following a visit by former SPLA Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Oyei Deng Ajak and other senior SPLA officers to Ukraine in early 2006. Three eyewitnesses in Juba described seeing new tanks, which matched the description of T-72 tanks,

Table 7 **Arms shipped from Ukraine to Mombasa under 'GOSS' contracts, 2007–09**

Armament type	Transferred from Ukraine in 2007	Transferred from Ukraine to 'Kenya' in 2008–09
T-72 main battle tanks	77	33
125 mm tank ammunition rounds	n/a	13,926
BM-21 122 mm multiple-launch rocket launchers*	2*	6
Anti-aircraft guns	15 (ZU-23-2, 23 mm)**	6 (ZPU-4, 14.5 mm)
RPGs	405	n/a (36 packages)
Automatic rifles	40,000	n/a

Notes:

* The 2007 report of the Ukraine State Service for Export Control lists the transfer of two BM-21 systems to Kenya; Ukraine's submission to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, by contrast, lists the transfer to Kenya of five 'large-calibre artillery systems', including BM-21 (122 mm) systems and 203 mm systems.

** Figures in this column have all been taken from Ukrainian government reporting except one weapons category—anti-aircraft guns—which is not included in these reports. Figures for anti-aircraft guns are taken from the shipping documentation of the *Beluga Endurance,* and so should be regarded as a minimum figure.

Sources: col. 2: DSECU (2008); col. 3: MV *Faina* (2008); MV *Beluga Endurance* (2007)

EXHIBIT 7

PATTON BOGGS LLP

2550 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1350
202-457-6000

Facsimile 202-457-6315
www.pattonboggs.com

Andrew M. Friedman
(202) 457-5267
afriedman@pattonboggs.com

October 31, 2013

BY U.S. MAIL

Mr. David Johnson, Executive Director
c4ads
1100 H St NW, STE 450
Washington, DC, USA 20005

Re: September 2013 Publication "The Odessa Network"

Dear Mr. Johnson,

I am writing on behalf of my client, Kaalbye Shipping International, to ask that you take immediate steps to correct demonstrably false and highly damaging statements in a recent publication by c4ads, "The Odessa Network," authored by Tom Wallace and Farley Mesko. The publication is rife with false and defamatory statements about Kaalbye Shipping. The publication's rampant speculation and numerous falsehoods demonstrate malicious disregard for the facts. Among other false statements, the publication alleges:

- Page 13, "Event #3" concerning Kaalbye Shipping vessel MV Anastasia. The summary in the publication attempts to transform ordinary, legal occurrences into an allegedly improper or illegal event that has damaged Kaalbye's reputation. The vessel was not "intercepted" in Las Palmas. It stopped at the Las Palmas port for ordinary bunkering (taking on fuel). The vessel was fined due to an erroneous description of the cargo, not because authorities "uncovered" weapons. None of the cargo on board was illegal; otherwise, the Las Palmas Port Authority would never have allowed the vessel to sail. Further, the vessel was not improperly flying the flag of the Republic of Georgia.

- Page 32, references to exports engineered by corrupt officials. The publication refers to "Event #1" on page 12 of the report. The entire section of so-called "events" is grossly and falsely mischaracterized as "weapons shipment data," when the supporting footnotes prove that the primary support for the report is a series of speculative and unsupported news stories. On page 32, the publication states that "[t]he only instance of advanced weapons systems definitely being sold without governmental knowledge was the chronologically first event in our dataset, the export of Ukrainian X-55 missiles by rogue Russian intelligence officers in collaboration with corrupt Ukrainian

officials and Kaalbye Shipping to Iran and China in 2001." To the best of its knowledge, Kaalbye Shipping has not knowingly done business with corrupt officials. More importantly, Kaalbye Shipping was not in any way, shape or form involved in the transaction or the shipment described in the publication's "Event #1." This damaging allegation does not rely on any facts and fails to note that its only support is a series of references, buried in footnotes, to highly speculative and unsupported media stories.

- Page 37, references to the Kaalbye Group facilitating arms sales by corrupt officials. In the last paragraph on the page, the publication again refers to Kaalbye Shipping "facilitating" a 2000 sale of Ukrainian X-55 cruise missiles to Iran and China by "corrupt officials." This appears to be related to the same false, unsupported allegation described in "Event #1" and on page 32 of the publication. As a company that operates and maintains vessels but does not engage in trade of either weapons or commodities that its vessels transport, Kaalbye clearly did not facilitate any arms sale to Iran or China. Also, as noted above, Kaalbye Shipping was not involved in the alleged transaction or shipment described in the publication's "Event #1."

- Page 38, alleged collaboration with Tomex, Waterlux, etc. Kaalbye Shipping did not cooperate with Tomex Team, Waterlux AG, or any other company to transport weapons to South Sudan from 2007-2009. Kaalbye also has no special relationship or partnership with Briese. Briese is a German company that is at least ten times the size of Kaalbye and that transports its own cargo without Kaalbye's involvement. All of these statements are completely false and damagingly attempt to tie Kaalbye to allegedly illicit transactions in which Kaalbye had no involvement.

- Page 38, allegations about guards armed with assault rifles at Kaalbye offices. Kaalbye has maintained offices at the Maritime Business Center in Odessa since 2003. Any person can freely enter the building, which houses not only Kaalbye's offices, but also a bank, a medical clinic, and a number of other businesses unrelated to Kaalbye Shipping. Figure 25, which purports to show "Kaalbye guards," is false because the people pictured in the photograph are not employed by or contracted by Kaalbye Shipping. Kaalbye does not have armed guards at its place of business, and any statement or implication that Kaalbye has or needs armed guards due to the nature of its business is not only false, but also damaging to Kaalbye's reputation.

- Page 57, references to Spliethoff ship Sluisgracht. The publication falsely alleges or implies that Spliethoff, a Netherlands company, has some kind of cooperative business

relationship with Kaalbye Shipping: "the Spliethoff ship Sluisgracht...accompanied Kaalbye in transporting weapons to Venezuela." Later, the same section states: "the Sluisgracht was responsible for transporting the T-72 tanks, presumably leaving the lighter cargo for Kaalbye." Kaalbye Shipping has no relationship with Spliethoff and therefore had no knowledge of cargo transported by any Spliethoff vessel. All of these references falsely suggest some kind of coordinated, illicit arms-transportation "network" that does not exist, and that is based on the authors' unsupported and false efforts to state otherwise.

- Page 60, references to Kaalbye as an owner of the MV Faina. The publication falsely states that Somali pirates hijacked a Kaalbye vessel named MV Faina that was allegedly transporting arms to South Sudan. Kaalbye does not own or have any relationship with the MV Faina or its alleged owner. This false reference, which is devoid of any factual support, is characteristic of the extent to which c4ads is willing to maliciously smear Kaalbye, in rank disregard for the truth.

- Page 65, references to Kaalbye relationship with Waterlux AG and Phoenix Trans-Servis. The publication falsely states that the owner and manager of the MV Faina and the companies listed above are "closely tied" or "closely linked" to Kaalbye. This statement has no factual support and is a blatantly false attempt to tie Kaalbye Shipping to some kind of "network."

- Page 67, references to Kaalbye as an arms "shipper." Kaalbye Shipping is not and has never been a shipper of any cargo. It serves as a cargo carrier or transporter. Thus, the allegation that Kaalbye is actually involved in the purchase or sale of arms is false.

- Pages 67-68, references to Kaalbye tampering with transponders. The publication falsely suggests that Kaalbye is "deliberately turning off their AIS transponders to avoid detection" and has engaged in many "highly suspicious" voyages. This reference directly accuses Kaalbye of circumventing safety features on its vessels and concealing movements for purportedly illegal business. The allegations are groundless, utterly false, and highly damaging to Kaalbye's reputation.

All of these statements are recklessly false and highly damaging to Kaalbye Shipping. In the international shipping community, accusing a vessel owner of tampering with or disabling safety equipment is highly damaging. The International Maritime Organization's International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea requires the operation of AIS on all vessels with gross tonnage of 300 or more (which clearly includes the Kaalbye Shipping

vessels addressed in the publication). Consequently, the publication unequivocally and falsely accuses Kaalbye of violating the international convention and illegally placing the lives of its crew, as well as the integrity of its cargo, at risk. The fact of the matter is that Kaalbye vessels do not operate with AIS locators that have been disabled or tampered with, and Kaalbye contracts with a London-based company to track its vessels in a much more reliable and accurate manner than the AIS data taken from public websites by the authors of the publication. Moreover, that data flatly disproves several of the false allegations in the publication about Kaalbye Shipping.

Likewise, the publication's attempt to tie Kaalbye Shipping to corrupt officials, armed guards, or relationships with individuals or companies that may engage in illegal activity is false and highly damaging. The publication purports to base its libelous statements on facts and data, when it is in fact based on speculative news stories, deliberate falsehoods, and connections or relationships that simply do not exist and therefore cannot be proved.

Accordingly, we ask that c4ads promptly and unequivocally repudiate the false statements in its publication, "The Odessa Network," and take appropriate steps to mitigate the damage that c4ads has caused to Kaalbye's reputation – steps over and above the limited revisions c4ads apparently made to the publication in September 2013. I am happy to meet with you at your convenience to address these matters.

Yours sincerely,

Andrew M. Friedman

EXHIBIT 8

ADVERTISING
ADVERTISING
ADVERTISING
ADVERTISING
ADVERTISING
ADVERTISING
ADVERTISING
ADVERTISING
WEATHER
ADVERTISING

Facts

23:32
16.12.2008

Deputy transport minister denies ownership of Faina ship seized by Somali pirates

Like 0 Tweet 0 g+1 0 Like +1

Ukrainian-based company Kaalbye Shipping, founded and for a long period headed by incumbent Deputy Transport and Communications Minister Ihor Urbansky is the commercial manager, but not the owner of the Faina ship seized by Somali pirates, Urbansky said.

"As far as I know, Kaalbye Shipping was the commercial agent of Faina and this is no way proof that Kaalbye Shipping is the owner of the vessel," he told reporters in Kyiv on Wednesday.

He said the Security Service of Ukraine, also known as SBU, had not probed his involvement in the case. "You won't believe, but SBU established at the very early stage of the investigation that Kaalbye Shipping and personally have nothing to do with the ownership of Faina," he said.

If you wish to know how this story develops, use TRAQ IT

Add a comment...
Also post on Facebook Posting as Tom Wallace (Not you?) Comment
Facebook social plugin

IMPORTANT

SBU opens proceedings into encroachment on Ukraine's territorial integrity due to Crimean parliament's decision to include Crimea in Russia

SBU detains 'self-proclaimed governor' of Donetsk region Gubarev

OSCE military observers not let in Crimea - Foreign Ministry

Kyiv ready to sign Association Agreement with EU as soon as possible - Yatseniuk

Crimea remains integral part of Ukraine – PM Yatseniuk

LATEST

Gunmen seize Simferopol television station, turn off Channel 5, 1+1, turn on Rossiya 24

US imposes visa restrictions on Russian, Ukrainian citizens whose actions threaten Ukraine's integrity - media

Linkevicius: Crimean parliament's decision to join Russia contradicts international law and Ukrainian Constitution

Holding referendum in Crimea is illegal, says Ukraine's Justice Ministry

OSCE could delegate observers for referendum in Crimea only if Ukraine invites

ADVERTISING
SOCIAL
ADVERTISING

© 1992-2014, Интерфакс-Украина. Все права защищены
Вся информация, размещенная на данном веб-сайте, предназначена только для персонального использования и не подлежит дальнейшему воспроизведению и/или распространению в какой-либо форме, иначе как с письменного разрешения "Интерфакс-Украина".

bigmir)net
123785 358157

EXHIBIT 9

March 6, 2014
HUFF POST POLITICS

Somalian Pirate Ship Surrounded By US Navy For Fear That Arms Onboard My Fall "Into The Wrong Hands"

ELIZABETH A. KENNEDY | September 29, 2008 06:10 PM EST | AP
Compare other versions »

NAIROBI, Kenya — U.S. helicopters on Monday buzzed a hijacked Ukrainian cargo ship carrying 33 Soviet-designed tanks and other weapons that officials fear could end up in the hands of al-Qaida-linked militants in Somalia if the pirates are allowed to escape.

Thursday's seizure of the MV Faina off Somalia, a failed state seen as a key battleground in the war on terrorism, could bring dangerous effects across the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden, one of the world's busiest shipping lanes.

Piracy has become a lucrative criminal racket in impoverished Somalia, bringing in millions of dollars in ransom.

The pirates aboard the blue-and-white Ukrainian-operated freighter are demanding $20 million to release the ship, its 21 crew members, one of whom has died of an apparent heart attack, and its cargo of T-72 tanks, rifles and ammunition.

The ship, now anchored off Somalia's coast near the central town of Hobyo, apparently was destined for Sudan when armed pirates overtook it, likely from a speedboat, and climbed up the side of the ship.

"We maintain a vigilant watch over the ship and we will remain on station while negotiations between the pirates and the shipping company are going on," Lt. Nathan Christensen, a deputy spokesman for the U.S. Navy's Bahrain-based 5th Fleet, told The Associated Press.

Although the pirates have not been allowed to take anything off the Faina, they have been allowed to resupply, one U.S. official said when asked if those aboard needed anything such as food. The official declined to comment on whether the negotiations between the pirates and the shipping company are being monitored.

U.S. Navy destroyers and cruisers have been deployed within 10 miles of the hijacked vessel and helicopters were circling overhead because of "great concern" over the possibility of the cargo falling "into the wrong hands," Christensen said. At one point on Sunday, the captain of the Faina said a warship was about two miles away.

"Our goal is to ensure the safety of the crew, to not allow off-loading of dangerous cargo and to make certain Faina can return to legitimate shipping," said Rear Adm. Kendall Card, commander of the task force monitoring the ship.

Although analysts say the pirates will likely be unable to unload the tanks, the other military hardware or a huge ransom could exacerbate the two-decade-old civil war in a country where nearly every building is pockmarked with bullet holes and all major civil institutions have crumbled.

The U.S. fears the armaments may end up with al-Qaida-linked Islamic insurgents who have been fighting the shaky, U.N.-backed Somali transitional government since late 2006, when they were driven out after six months in power. More than 9,000 people have been killed in the Iraq-style insurgency, most of them civilians.

Mark Bellamy, senior fellow in the Africa program at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the pirates "are more interested in the money than disposing of the cargo."

"There's theoretically a possibility these weapons can fall into the wrong hands, but what is al-Qaida going to do with tanks in Somalia?" he said.

Christensen said the arms shipment was destined for Sudan _ not Kenya, which had been claiming to be the arms' destination. "We are aware that the actual cargo was intended for Sudan, not Kenya," he said.

The 5th Fleet said the ship was headed for the Kenyan port of Mombasa, but that "additional reports state the cargo was intended for Sudan."

U.N. officials said there is no blanket arms embargo on Sudan's government, but any movement of military equipment and supplies into the Darfur region would violate a U.N. arms embargo if it were not first requested by the government and approved by the Security Council's Sudan sanctions committee.

The United States has expressed opposition to all arms transfers to Sudan, which it considers a state sponsor of terrorism. U.S. officials also have warned that the transfer of lethal military equipment to state sponsors of terrorism could lead to sanctions under U.S. law.

A Western diplomat in Nairobi, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he is not authorized to talk to the media, said the shipment was destined for autonomous southern Sudan _ not Darfur _ and did not violate the embargo.

Bellamy said it was not illegal to send weapons to the north or south Sudanese governments.

"There are lots of ways that weapons can get into Sudan, and this happens to be one boatload," Bellamy said. "The bigger thing is this continuing problem of piracy. It's been escalating for three years and they're becoming more brazen and emboldened. They're being paid and they then turn around and step up activities."

Jervasio Okot, spokesman for southern Sudan's mission to Kenya, said officials there were "surprised" to hear reports that the tanks and arms were destined for their region.

"Our government has no contract for the importation of arms with the Russian or Ukrainian governments," Okot said.

U.S. intelligence reports said the cargo's ultimate destination was Sudan and that Kenya was only a transit point, said a Western official in Washington who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was discussing classified material.

Ukrainian Defense Ministry spokesman Valentyn Mandriyevsky said the ministry was not participating in the arms trade and didn't know where the cargo was bound. A spokesman for Ukraine's arms trader, Ukrspetexport, would not comment.

The 5th Fleet said the Faina is owned and operated by Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine. A woman who answered phone at the Odessa-based shipping company and declined to identify herself said the company was not involved with the Faina.

Ukrainian and Russian media have said the Faina is operated by Tomex Team, a company based in Odessa. Its representatives have repeatedly declined to comment.

A Russian-based registry indicates the ship, sailing under a Belize flag, is also owned by Tomex Team. It lists the owner as Waterlux AG, with a Panama address but the Odessa phone number of Tomex Team, which it indicates is a subsidiary.

Russia dispatched a warship to the area, and it will take about a week to get there. The Neustrashnimy, or Intrepid, was in the Atlantic near the English Channel on Monday and will have to go through the Strait of Gibraltar, the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal to get to the Somali coast, said Capt. Igor Dygalo, a spokesman for the Russian navy.

At the United Nations, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said the world body should "organize a kind of cooperation between the naval forces of the countries that want to make their practical contribution to put an end to piracy in the area of the African Horn."

Christensen said the U.S. Navy maintains "standard bridge-to-bridge communication" with Faina's crew via radio, but stressed that they are not taking part in or facilitating any negotiations.

The 21-member crew was from Ukraine, Russia and Latvia. A Latvian Foreign Ministry spokesman said one man from Latvia was a "non-citizen," a term authorities typically refer to ethnic Russians who have not obtained Latvian citizenship.

There have been 24 reported attacks in Somalia this year, according to the International Maritime Bureau's piracy reporting center. In June, the U.N. Security Council voted to allow international warships to enter Somali waters to combat the problem, but its 1,880-mile coastline _ the longest in Africa _ remains virtually unpoliced.

Nick Brown, the editor of Jane's International Defense Review, said it was unlikely the pirates would be able to use the tanks without specialized training and mechanics.

Mogadishu's arms markets are teeming with heavy weapons _ including rocket-propelled grenades, AK-47s and mortars.

—

Associated Press writers Mohamed Olad Hassan in Mogadishu, Somalia, Barbara Surk in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Edith M. Lederer and John Heilprin at the U.N., Pauline Jelinek in Washington, Steve Gutterman in Moscow, Yana Sedova in Kiev, Ukraine, and Katharine Houreld and Tom Maliti in Nairobi contributed to this report.

—

Web site for USS Howard:

http://www.howard.navy.mil/default.aspx

Filed by Dan Duray | Report Corrections

2 people are discussing this article with **2 comments**

Comments are closed on this entry.

Highlighted Most Recent Oldest Most Faved My Conversations

Eric Lurio (messy)
SUPER USER · 487 Fans · artist, writer, adventurer

Aaaarggghl Get these bastards as soon as possible Arrgh.

Pirates are evil, maities! Argh.
1 OCT 2006 10:52 AM

FAVE SHARE MORE

PlanetKansas
31 Fans

Let me get this straight. The ship was from the Soviet Ukrain, with weapons bound for Sudan. Sudan is the same government opressing the Darfur region. The US is going to us military force to ensure Russian arms make it to Sudan so they can oppress their own people.
1 OCT 2006 5:42 PM

FAVE SHARE MORE

EXHIBIT 10

updated 2:45 a.m. EDT, Mon September 29, 2008

Crew member of hijacked ship dead, Somali town official says

STORY HIGHLIGHTS

- NEW: Crew member aboard hijacked Ukrainian ship died, Somali town official says
- Pirates seized ship carrying tanks, ammunition on Thursday off Somali coast
- Ship was bound for Kenya

Next Article in World »

READ VIDEO

TEXT SIZE

(CNN) -- A crew member of a Ukrainian vessel pirates seized off the African coast last week has died, a Somali town commissioner said Sunday.

A photo from the USS Howard shows Somali pirates in small boats hijacking the MV Faina last week

1 of 3

Abdi Salan Khalif, commissioner of the coastal town of Harardhere, Somalia, said the pirates told town elders the man died of problems relating to high blood pressure.

Khalif said the pirates, who were communicating with the elders and the U.S. Navy by radio, reported they were holding the crew in a hot part of the ship. The elders, who talked to the U.S. Navy by radio, had formed a crisis team.

The ship Faina, loaded with tanks and weapons, was seized Thursday not far from its destination port of Mombasa, Kenya, officials said. Ukraine had sold the weapons to Kenya, said Ukraine Defense Minister Yuri Yekhanurov, according to the Interfax-Ukraine news agency.

On Friday, the Russian news agency Interfax quoted a source in Kiev, Ukraine, as saying the pirates had contacted the Kenyan Defense Ministry to obtain information about the ship's owner so ransom negotiations could begin.

Watch CNN's David McKenzie report on the hijacking »

However, Dr. Alfred N. Mutua, a spokesman for the Kenyan government, said Sunday it had neither been contacted by the pirates nor asked to pay ransom.

"Combined security efforts are still going on to secure the ship ferrying Kenya military equipment that was hijacked ... by pirates off the Somali coast," Mutua said in a written statement.

"The Kenyan government is NOT in contact with the pirates. ... The Kenyan government will not engage in answering back to terrorists who have hijacked important military equipment paid for by the Kenyan taxpayer for use by the Kenyan military."

The Ukrainian defense ministry said the ship is carrying 33 Soviet-made T-72 tanks, tank artillery shells, grenade launchers and small arms. The ship departed from Nikolayev, Ukraine, officials said.

The Pentagon said U.S. naval ships in the area are "monitoring the situation."

"I think we're looking at the full range of options here," Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said, because the United States does not want the pirates to dock the ship in Somalia and offload the weapons.

Khalif said representatives of Harardhere "have told the pirates that they can't bring any crew or material from that ship to our town because we don't want to risk a military response from the surrounding military navies."

Faina is owned and operated by Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine, and its crew includes citizens of Ukraine, Russia and Latvia, the U.S. Navy said.

U.S. officials said the ship reported being surrounded by three small boats of pirates while sailing 250 miles off the coast of Somalia. E-mail to a friend | Mixx it | Share

CNN's Mohamed Amiin Adow, Maxim Tkachenko and Barbara Starr contributed to this report.

All About Ukraine • Somalia • Pirates

EMAIL SAVE PRINT

From the Blogs: Controversy, commentary, and debate

Most Popular on CNN

STORIES

Most Viewed | Most Emailed | Top Searches

1 Oscar Pistorius breaks down at evidence
2 CPAC: 'Republican leaders preach the gospel'
3 U.S. paves way for sanctions over Ukraine
4 Ukraine PM rejects referendum on Crimea split
5 Anchor quits Russian state-funded network
6 Woman who drove kids into sea to be evaluated
7 NJ student suing parents for support
8 Massachusetts court: 'Upskirt' photos legal
9 Gupta: 'doubling down' on medical marijuana
10 Gadhafi's son in Libyan custody

more most popular »

VIDEOS

TOPICS

careerbuilder.com

Quick Job Search

keyword(s):

enter city:

State Job

SEARCH more options »

• Part Time Jobs
• Sales & Marketing Jobs
• Customer Service Jobs

We Recommend

Stories you may be interested in based on past browsing

Malala: Global symbol, but still just a kid

Genocide trial of ex-Bosnian Serb leader begins

UK blocks hacker's extradition to U.S.

Modern art stolen in Dutch heist

Hurricane Rafael closes in on Bermuda

Top News

Senators 'troubled' after Rice meeting

Bergen: Senseless Benghazi obsession

© 2013 Cable News Network. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

EXHIBIT 11

Q. & A. With a Pirate: "We Just Want the Money"

By JEFFREY GETTLEMAN SEPTEMBER 30, 2008, 9:10 AM

Somali pirates in small boats hijacked the Faina, a Belize-flagged cargo ship owned and operated by Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine, on Sept. 25.

Sugule Ali, the spokesman for the Somali pirates holding hostage the Faina, a Ukrainian freighter loaded with weapons, spoke to me by satellite telephone today from the bridge of the seized ship. In the holds of the Faina, which the pirates seized on Thursday, are 33 Russian-built battle tanks and crates of grenade launchers, anti-aircraft guns, ammunition and other explosives. American officials fear that the weapons could fall into the hands of radical Islamist insurgents who are battling Somalia's weak government. My questions were translated into Somali, and Mr. Ali's responses into English, by a translator employed by The New York Times.

Q. *Tell us how you discovered the weapons on board.*
A. As soon as we get on a ship, we normally do what is called a control. We search everything. That's how we found the weapons. Tanks, anti-aircraft, artillery. That's all we will say right now.

Q. *Were you surprised?*
A. No, we weren't surprised. We know everything goes through the sea. We see people who dump waste in our waters. We see people who illegally fish in our waters. We see people doing all sorts of things in our waters.

Q. *Are you going to sell the weapons to insurgents?*
A. No. We don't want these weapons to go to anyone in Somalia. Somalia has suffered from many years of destruction because of all these weapons. We don't want that suffering and chaos to continue. We are not going to offload the weapons. We just want the money.

Q. *How much?*
A. $20 million, in cash. We don't use any other system than cash.

Q. *Will you negotiate?*
A. That's deal making. Common sense says human beings can make deals.

Q. *Right now, the American Navy has you surrounded. Are you scared?*
A. No, we're not scared. We are prepared. We are not afraid because we know you only die once.

Q. *Will you kill the hostages if attacked?*
A. Killing is not in our plans. We don't want to do anything more than the hijacking.

Q. *What will you do with the money?*
A. We will protect ourselves from hunger.

Q. *That's a lot of money to protect yourselves from hunger.*
A. Yes, because we have a lot of men and it will be divided amongst all of us.

Q. *[There are 20 crew members, most of them Ukrainian, being held hostage.] How are you interacting with the hostages? Eating with them? Playing cards?*
A. We interact with each other in an honorable manner. We are all human beings. We talk to one another, and because we are in the same place, we eat together.

Q. *What if you were told you could leave peacefully, without arrest, though without any ransom money. Would you do it?*

A. [*With a laugh*] We're not afraid of arrest or death or any of these things. For us, hunger is our enemy.

Q. *Have the pirates been misunderstood?*
A. We don't consider ourselves sea bandits ["sea bandit" is one way Somalis translate the English word pirate]. We consider sea bandits those who illegally fish in our seas and dump waste in our seas and carry weapons in our seas. We are simply patrolling our seas. Think of us like a coast guard.

Q. *Why did you want to become a pirate?*
A. We are patrolling our seas. This is a normal thing for people to do in their regions.

Q. *Isn't what you are doing a crime? Holding people at gunpoint?*
A. If you hold hostage innocent people, that's a crime. If you hold hostage people who are doing illegal activities, like waste dumping or fishing, that is not a crime.

Q. *What has this Ukrainian ship done that was a crime?*
A. To go through our waters carrying all these weapons without permission.

Q. *What is the name of your group? How many ships have you hijacked before?*
A. I won't say how many ships we have hijacked. I won't talk about that. Our name is the Central Region Coast Guard.

NEWS, PIRACY, SOMALIA, TRANSPORTATION

SHARE

EXHIBIT 12

Arrr! The Somali Pirates and Their Troublesome Treasure

By Alex Perry | Friday, Oct. 05, 2008

Like 2 Tweet 0 g+1 0 Share Read Later

Pirates aren't picky. Armed with Kalashnikovs and rocket launchers and using skiffs mounted with high-powered engines launched from "motherships" disguised as fishing boats, the buccaneers who prowl the waters off the Somali coast pick their prey from the passing shipping traffic like lions selecting a kill: the slower and more defenseless, the better. "We hijack every ship we can," Sugule Ali, a pirate captain, told TIME by satellite phone this week.

HO / AFP / Getty

Somali pirates in small boats hijacking on Sept. 25 the MV *Faina*, a Belize-flagged cargo ship owned and operated by "Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine"

The MV *Faina* fitted the bill. Slow, low-sided and sailing under a Belize flag, the freighter seemed no different from any of the 60 other ships attacked by pirates this year in the same waters. And Ali and his men had no reason to believe the outcome of this hijacking would be any different. In a well-established routine, a vessel is typically held for a few days or weeks while the pirates negotiate a ransom with the ship's owners, usually netting between $500,000 and $2 million. Then ship and crew are then released unharmed. This year, according to a new report by the British think tank Chatham House, the Somali pirate industry has raked in as much as $30 million.

But the *Faina's* cargo surprised Ali and his men and sent alarm bells ringing around the world — the unprepossessing freighter was carrying 33 Russian T-72 tanks and a host of other armaments that had originated in Ukraine. By the end of this week, U.S. frigates and a Russian warship were bearing down on the pirates, the European Union had decided to launch a multinational antipiracy patrol, and Ukraine and Kenya found themselves embroiled in an arms scandal.

RELATED

A Brief History of Pirates

Email Print

Share Reprints

Follow @TIME

The U.S. — together with allies such as France — has taken the lead in providing security in a vital shipping lane leading to and from the Suez Canal. Somalia has been convulsed by civil war since 1991, and as an attendant humanitarian disaster involving millions of refugees has spread chaos and lawlessness across the land, piracy at sea has rocketed. The primary strategic concern of the U.S. in the region appears to be rooting out al-Qaeda, which is why the U.S. military backed an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia to prevent a popular Islamist movement from taking power. But the Islamists remain powerful, and the still violent stalemate clouds any prospect of restoring law and order onshore. Although the pirates lack the quays to take the tanks ashore, and their clan affiliations make connections to the Islamists unlikely, the U.S.S. *Howard* sailed to within three miles of the Faina to ensure that the tanks did not fall into Islamist hands.

The fate of the cargo is also rapidly becoming a hot potato for other reasons. Russia responded to the hijacking by announcing it was sending a warship to the area — three of the crew being held hostage are Russian, and Sudan's government has called on Moscow to attack the pirates. That's because while the government of Kenya claims to be the intended recipient of the tanks, many — like Andrew Mwangura, the Mombasa-based coordinator for the Seafarers Assistance Programme, and Lieutenant Nathan Christensen, press liaison of the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet in Bahrain — believe the weapons were headed elsewhere. "We are aware that the actual cargo was destined for Sudan, not Kenya," Christensen told the Associated Press. Christenen's press releases have since dried up, and Mwangura has been arrested by Kenyan police for issuing "alarmist statements."

Diplomats in Nairobi, speaking on condition of anonymity, made clear that they shared the suspicion that the tanks were destined for south Sudan, where Kenya has supported a secessionist resistance movement oppossed to the northern Sudanese–dominated government in Khartoum. The fact that such a shipment might contravene international arms embargoes might help explain why the *Faina*, traveling with minimal security on board,

The Magazine Subscribe

Obama's Trauma Team

Kiev's Russian Roulette

On the Night Train with Wes Anderson

Sorry Situation

Table of Contents

Subscribe Now

Online Issue Archive

RECOMMENDED FOR YOU by Taboola

Five Worst Inventions

5 Ways You Know You're Watching a Spielberg Movie

The Netherlands Tells Immigrants to Learn Dutch o...

Jodi Arias Asks For Death Penalty

Most Read | Most Emailed

1 The New Barbie: Meet the Doll with an Average Woman's Proportions

2 Crimean Prime Minister: Pro-Russian Troops Are Now in Complete Control

3 Alzheimer's Bigger Killer Than We Realize, Study Says

4 The Duke Porn Star Isn't as Empowered as She Claims

5 Top of the World

6 The Insanely Huge and Complex Exercise Known as the Indian Elections Begins on April 7

7 Ukraine Region to Vote on Joining Russia

8 Obama Orders Sanctions Against Ukraine Agitators

9 3 Dead Simple Ways to Catch a Liar in the Act

10 This Infographic Shows How to Completely Erase Your Identity From the Internet

Person Of The Year

The People's Pope

He took the name of a humble saint and then called for a church of healing. Read more about Pope Francis and see the rest of the shortlist.

presented itself as an unremarkable cargo freighter — to fool officials along its route as well as pirates. Of more concern to East Africa's regional security, recent reports from north and south Sudan have suggested both sides are currently re-equipping their militaries. A revival of the decades-long north-south civil war would reopen one of Africa's bloodiest and most intractable wars — 2 million died in the fighting between 1972 and 2005 — and jeopardize hopes for a solution to the crisis in Darfur.

For Ali and his men, piracy is a business: realizing the value of the *Faina's* cargo, he demanded $35 million, although that figure was later reduced to $20 million. But he likes to cast it as also a protest. "We were forced into this work," he argues, speaking from the *Faina's* bridge at anchor off the village of Hobyo. "We were fishermen. I used to work in the sea every day. But ships from other countries fish our coasts illegally, destroy our nets and fire on whoever approaches them. We were refused the right to fish. They even dump toxic waste. We couldn't work. So we decided to defend ourselves." Ali insists that piracy would stop if the pirates' fundamental grievances were addressed. "If the world stops stealing our property and harming us, we have a solution," he said. "We will stop the piracy and go back to our normal jobs."

That seems unlikely. On Thursday, French Defense Minister Herve Morin announced that at least eight European countries had agreed to contribute to an international naval antipiracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden, in addition to the U.S. and Russian naval presence already there. Faced with such overwhelming force, Ali said his men would fight to the last. "If someone attacks you in your home, you need to defend yourself," he said. "Whatever weapons they have, you must fight. A person in his home cannot be afraid. Whoever attacks, we will defend ourselves."

— With reporting by Abdiaziz Hassan Ahmed Dhoore / Nairobi

WE RECOMMEND

- H&R Block Is Calling All Hipsters to Do Their Taxes
- 13-Year-Old Forced to Dance at Miami Strip Club
- Oops: Kindergarten Teacher Accidentally Posts Class Photo To Tinder | TIME
- Karzai's Not-So-Crazy End Game
- Boomers Can't Let Go of the 1960s

ELSEWHERE ON THE WEB

(Blinkx)

Recommended by

TIME Newsletters See all Newsletters

Free! Sign Up Now

- ✓ Breaking News
- ✓ Politics
- ✓ Entertainment
- ✓ LightBox
- ✓ *and more...*

Your Email Go

Voices

Joel Stein
Call Me Plenipotentiary

James Poniewozik
Sorry Situation

© 2014 Time Inc. All rights reserved | Privacy Policy | Your California Privacy Rights | RSS | Newsletter | Mobile | TIME For Kids

Subscribe | Contact Us | Terms of Use | Media Kit | Reprints & Permissions | Help | Site Map | Ad Choices | Custom Content

our partners

EXHIBIT 13

U.S. Navy Provides Humanitarian Assistance to Faina

Story Number: NNS090206-07 Release Date: 2/6/2009 11:20:00 AM

A A A

From Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/5th Fleet Public Affairs

MANAMA, Bahrain (NNS) -- Following Motor Vessel Faina's release by Somali pirates Feb. 5, the U.S. Navy is providing humanitarian assistance support to the merchant vessel and its crew.

Sailors from the Norfolk-based destroyer, USS Mason (DDG 87), went aboard Faina to conduct a health and comfort inspection of the crew as well as provide Faina's crew with food, water and medical support. The U.S. Navy fleet ocean tug USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168) also provided fuel and fresh water to the merchant vessel.
Faina is currently anchored off the coast of Somalia, near Hobyo, and is making engineering preparations to get underway.

Somali pirates released the Motor Vessel Faina after holding it for more than four months. The U.S. Navy has remained within visual range of the ship and maintained a 24-hour, 7-days a week presence since it was captured.

Motor Vessel Faina was attacked off the coast of Somalia Sept. 25. The roll-on/roll-off ship is Belize flagged and operated by "Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine."

While the ship initially had had a crew of 21, the ship's captain reportedly suffered a heart-attack shortly after being taken hostage. The pirates refused all requests to turn over the captain's remains. The ship's remaining crew includes 17 Ukrainian citizens, as well as two Russians and one Latvian.

For more news from Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/Commander, U.S. 5th Fleet, visit www.navy.mil/local/cusnc/.

Like 2.9k Tweet 0 SHARE

Comment submission for this story is now closed.

RELATED PHOTOS

Download High Resolution View All Photos 1 of 2 >

090206-N-3931M-087 SOMALIA (Feb. 6, 2009) The U.S. Navy fleet ocean tug USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168) provides fuel and fresh water to Motor Vessel Faina following its release by Somali pirates Feb. 5, after holding it for more than four months. The U.S. Navy has remained within visual range of the ship and maintained a 24-hour, 7-days a week presence since it was captured. The Belize-flagged cargo ship is owned and operated by "Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine" and is carrying a cargo of Ukrainian T-72 tanks and related equipment. The ship was attacked on Sept. 25 and forced to proceed to anchorage off the Somali Coast. U.S. 5th Fleet conducts maritime security operations to promote stability and regional economic prosperity. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Michael R. McCormick/Released)

February 6, 2009

RELATED CONTENT

Pirate Hijacking Resolved Peacefully: U.S. Monitors Situation - 2/5/2009

Deterring Piracy at Sea - 1/15/2009

Several U.S. Ships Join Mission to Monitor Faina - 9/30/2008

USS Howard Monitoring MV Faina - 9/28/2008

Navy Social Media

To sign up for updates or to access your subscriber preferences, please click on the envelope icon in the page header above or click here.

EXHIBIT 14

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL
RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM E. GORTNEY, U.S. NAVY

COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

COUNTER-PIRACY OPERATIONS IN THE

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF OPERATIONS

5 MARCH 2009

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL
RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Good morning Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McHugh and members of the House Armed Services Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on our Coalition counter piracy operations in the Central Command area of operation. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the accomplishments that have been made over the past several months and to identify some of the challenges that lie ahead.

My name is Vice Admiral Bill Gortney, and I am the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command headquartered in the Kingdom of Bahrain. I took command of NAVCENT at the beginning of July, but have been operationally deployed to the region throughout my Navy career. As the NAVCENT Commander, I am the Naval Component Commander for General Petraeus at U.S. Central Command.

I also command two additional organizations. I serve as the Commander of the United States Fifth Fleet – the Navy's Numbered Fleet Commander. And most importantly in terms of this hearing, I serve as the Commander of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) – an international coalition of more than twenty nations who provide people, ships and aircraft in the region. There are national mandates that limit the participation of some of our coalition partners, but this remains a cooperative, multi-national effort. a coalition of the willing.

As most of you know, acts of piracy spiked in late August – but the recent history of piracy doesn't start there. Several years ago we started to see an increase in piracy off the east coast of Somalia. At that time, it was routine for merchant vessels to transit along the coast. In response to those attacks, the shipping industry moved the transit lane further off the coast. It worked, and the rate of attacks decreased – returning to just a few per year.

That changed in August, when a new clan of Somali pirates begin to attack ships in the Gulf of Aden – to the north of Somalia. The number of ships pirated went from three to twelve in just a few days. Ultimately, the solution to the problem of piracy is ashore — in Somalia. I focused the Coalition maritime efforts on security and stability prevention

operations at sea that would give the international community time to address the long-term solution.

In late August, as the commander of the CMF – I directed the establishment of a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) in the Gulf of Aden. We have had coalition ships and aircraft patrolling the area ever since.

The MSPA was just one part of a Counter-Piracy Campaign Plan developed by my staff. The plan was designed to complement and further the efforts of the Political/Diplomatic and Industrial/Maritime communities. The operational design of the plan was developed with the purpose of outlining our efforts to engage the international community along three primary lanes: Political/Legal, Informational/Industrial, and Military.

We focused our counter-piracy efforts on three main areas:

- International Naval Presence
- Improved Defensive Measures from the Shipping Industry
- International Legal Framework for Resolving Piracy Cases

Since late August there have been significant strides made. To date, we have seen forces from the US, UK, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey and Yemen. Some of these forces operate within alliances such as NATO or EU, some as part of the CMF coalition and some independently representing their own nation's interests. Additional forces from Japan, Singapore, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Belgium, and Poland are expected to participate in the coming months.

The shipping industry has also been at the forefront. We have seen countless examples of shipping companies, and individual merchant mariners taking proactive measures to serve as the first line of self defense against pirates – these armed criminals operating at sea.

On the operational side of the plan, I initially gave the mission to the Commodore of one of our existing task forces – Combined Task Force (CTF) -150. However, I did so knowing that it was an additional mission for an already busy operational commander.

More importantly, I did so very carefully – because I knew that some navies in our coalition did not have the authority to conduct counter-piracy operations. We will never ask a member of the coalition to be involved in operations that they do not have the authority from their national authority to do.

As a result of the complexity of the operations in that portion of our Area of Responsibility (AOR), I determined that it was necessary and prudent to establish a separate task force with a specific mission and mandate to conduct counter-piracy operations. In early January we established CTF 151 based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1838, 1846 and 1851. The task force was operational by the middle of the month.

Since that time we have had several nations join the task force, and have had formal indications from others who have stated that they will be sending ships and/or aircraft in the coming months. The efforts of CTF-151 are critical to the tactical coordination and deconfliction efforts with all of the international naval forces operating in the Gulf of Aden. We have incredible examples of international cooperation – ranging from personnel exchanges to operational mission coordination to maximize the efficiency of our efforts.

CTF-151 and other cooperating naval forces have encountered approximately 250 pirates: 130 were disarmed and released, 110 disarmed and turned over for prosecution, and 7 are pending final disposition.

Pirate capacity has been further impacted by the seizure or destruction of 28 pirate vessels, and the confiscation of the pirates' tools of the trade, including: 133 small arms,

28 Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), 51 RPG projectiles, and 21 ladders/grappling hooks.

Ultimately, piracy is a problem that starts ashore and requires an international solution ashore. We made this clear at the outset of our efforts – we cannot guarantee safety in this vast region. Our role in preventing some of these attacks is only one part of the solution to preventing further attacks. Historical precedent can be found in our nation's encounters with the Barbary pirates.

We have been successful not only in our Coalition efforts, but in communicating and coordinating with other naval forces deployed to the region, as well as working with the merchant shipping industry to share lessons learned and best practices.

Lastly, I would like to take a moment to acknowledge the tremendous efforts of the Sailors, Marines, Coast Guard personnel and civilian Navy mariners under the command of Rear Admiral Terry McKnight – the CTF-151 commander. They have truly made a difference.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to thank you for inviting me to appear here today and I will be happy to answer your questions.

Executive Summary:

Piracy is a threat to the security of all nations and ultimately requires an international solution ashore. The U.S. Navy leads a Coalition of nations sending ships and aircraft to deter maritime pirate activity, enabling the shipping industry time to implement self-protection measures and the international community to establish a legal framework to hold pirates accountable for their actions.

Ultimately, the solution is in Somalia — assuring security and stability, enacting the rule of law and eliminating the conditions that breed pirates.

The proactive measures being taken by a considerable number of merchant vessels are exactly what we have been recommending. We have been working closely with the commercial shipping industry and the International Maritime Organization to recommend best practices and leverage lessons learned to employ reasonable self-protection measures. We applaud the efforts that the industry has undertaken.

The following is a comprehensive overview of our Coalition, the problem of piracy, and the measures we have undertaken in the maritime environment to help prevent the problem.

1. BACKGROUND ON THE COMBINED MARITIME FORCES (CMF)

The Combined Maritime Forces is an international coalition consisting of more than 20 nations. Coalition maritime operations are structured along geographic and operational areas of responsibility.

- **CTF 150** conducts Maritime Security Operations (MSO) southeast of the Strait of Hormuz and in the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea to the Suez Canal, and portions of the Indian Ocean.
- **CTF 151** was established to conduct counter-piracy operations throughout the CMF area of responsibility. Currently, these operations are focused in the Gulf of Aden with an aim of creating a lawful maritime order and maintaining security in the maritime environment.
- **CTF 152** conducts MSO in the international waters of the Arabian Gulf, and complements the security activities of Gulf Cooperation Council nations in their own territorial waters.

2. PIRACY BACKGOUND

The piracy problem emanating from Somalia has grown from the economic, social and political strife that has gripped that country since the mid-1990s. With a government powerless to stop illegal fishing and dumping in the waters off Somalia, local Somali fisherman began taking it upon themselves to deal with the problem by capturing what they perceived as illegal fisherman. The country has no national level military organization.

During recent years, the Darod and Hawiye clans in Somalia have taken to piracy as a means of conducting this sort of 'vigilante' justice as well as to supplement their livelihood by capturing larger, ocean going boats and ships. With the amount of traffic in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) and the ease with which the pirates were able to seize ships, the Darod clan pirates dramatically increased their efforts to capture larger merchant vessels in order to obtain larger ransoms. These clans operate along more than 1800 miles of Somalia coastline.

This increase in activity sharply spiked in August of 2008, prompting greater international interest. The capture of ships with dangerous military cargo like Motor Vessel FAINA and supertankers like the SIRIUS STAR prompted a greater international naval response.

3. THE STATISTICAL INFORMATION

Piracy impacts less than 1% of shipping. More than 33,000 vessels transit the Gulf of Aden annually, and in 2008 there were 122 attempted attacks, of which 42 were successful and 80 unsuccessful. While this is statistically small, even one attack is too many, and threatens confidence in the safety and reliability of international sea lanes.

To put the challenge into geographic perspective, the area involved off the coast of Somalia and Kenya as well as the Gulf of Aden covers more than 1.1 million square miles, roughly four times the size of Texas.

Of 15 pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden in late 2008, at least 10 involved ships operating outside the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) recommended traffic corridor or failing to employ recommended self protection measures, making them more vulnerable to a successful attack.

Thus far in 2009 there have been 26 attacks on merchant vessels, with 4 ships being successfully pirated. We believe that the international naval presence, coupled with the efforts of the merchant mariners and the shipping industry – aided in some cases by the weather – has had an impact on the success rate of these pirate attacks. The following are snapshots of piracy in 2008 and thus far in 2009.

2009 Daily Piracy Events Snapshot as of 04 MAR [NAVCENT AOR]

- 26 piracy events
- 4 successful [15 % of the events]
- 22 unsuccessful [85 % of the events]
- 7 suspected pirates currently held by CTF-151
  - ⇒ 0 suspected pirates turned over for legal prosecution
  - ⇒ 9 released based on lack of evidence, positive identification
- 7 ships currently pirated
- Approximately 123 merchant mariners being held hostage

2008 Piracy Events Summary [NAVCENT AOR]

- Estimated 33,000 ships transit the Gulf of Aden annually
- 122 piracy events [0.37% of overall traffic]
- 42 successful [0.13% overall / 38% of the events]
- 80 unsuccessful [62% of the events]

4. COMBINED MARITIME FORCES EFFORTS TO COUNTER PIRACY

The Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA)

Our initial response following the August 2008 spike in successful pirate attacks was to establish a presence in the Gulf of Aden using ships and aircraft already working in the region under the command of Combined Task Force 150. We created a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) to enable warships to work in concert with each other to protect vital shipping in the GOA.

Merchant mariners are being encouraged to transit through the patrol area via Notices to Mariner messages and broadcasts over VHF radio. The have also been asked to share information with naval forces and with their fellow merchant mariners.

Coalition ships are in the area as part of our continual presence in this region. While they have conducted routine operations in the area in the past, the establishment of the MSPA focused efforts to prevent destabilizing activities in the region, while the IMO works the long-term international efforts.

The MSPA was not designed as a specific geographic area, but rather it was established as a moveable area placed atop the existing internationally recognized transit corridor.

This enabled the limited number of warships to protect a greater number of merchant vessels by concentrating them in numbers and in proximity. The MSPA has since proven to be an effective method of de-conflicting the many international warships that are now patrolling the GOA.

Ultimately, the solution to piracy is ashore, and involves removing the conditions which have enabled the pirates to operate with impunity from safe havens along more than 1800 miles of Somali coastline. The designation of the MSPA was originally intended as a near-term effort to allow the international political community time to establish a proper long-term legal framework for dealing with pirates. We also placed a significant emphasis on working with the merchant community identify and implement effective self-protective measures.

Combined Maritime Forces Counter-Piracy Campaign Plan

In order to assist and further the efforts of the Political/Diplomatic and Industrial/Maritime communities, CMF developed a counter-piracy campaign plan. This plan's operational design was developed with the purpose of outlining our efforts to engage the international community along Political/Legal, Informational/Industrial, and Military lines.

We focused our counter-piracy efforts on three main areas:

- International Naval Presence
- Improved Defensive Measures from the Shipping Industry
- International Legal Framework for Resolving Piracy Cases

Most importantly, we articulated that all of these areas must be addressed – none will be successful by itself.

Lessons Learned and Best Practices

We have worked closely with the merchant shipping industry to share the lessons learned and best practices to help merchant mariners more effectively provide the first layer of defense against pirates who would target their vessels.

Some merchant mariners have clearly listened to our recommendations and lessons and have employed reasonable self-protection measures that discourage pirates from attempting to take their vessels. These measures have ranged from proactive lookouts and evasive maneuvering to using charged fire hoses to fend off attackers.

However, we have also recommended that shipping companies embark professional security teams to protect their ships, cargo, and crews. Security teams, whether they employ non-kinetic or kinetic means of deterring pirates add an important layer of defense measures to the equation. We don't have any indications that the pirates are going after specific targets – they are going after the easy targets.

The Establishment of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151)

As noted in the introduction, we established Combined Task Force 151 in early January 2009. CTF 151 has been exclusively focused on conducting counter-piracy operations in the Central Command area of responsibility.

Following a growing international naval response, CMF determined that counter-piracy operations required the establishment of a stand alone task force. CTF-151 was formally established on 1 January 2009, and an initial core staff began to work with the staff of CTF-150 to develop the framework for the new task force. The task force became fully operational in the middle of January.

Establishing CTF-151 cleared up the lines of command. Not all nations participating in CTF-150 had national authorization to conduct counter-piracy operations. This allows coalition nations who have a national mandate to conduct counter-piracy operations to join CTF-151, and those nations without such authority to operate with CTF-150 or CTF-152 with their pre-established Maritime Security Operation mandates.

U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Terence "Terry" McKnight commands Combined Task Force 151.

Counter-piracy operations exemplify the basic principals of the Navy's Maritime Strategy, including: Forward Presence, Deterrence, Sea Control, Power Projection, and Maritime Security.

Tactical and Operational Coordination and Deconfliction

As other nations and organizations like NATO and EUNAVFOR began to send ships to combat piracy, we quickly identified the need to coordinate and tactically de-conflict the efforts of the various task forces. It was imperative from an operational risk management perspective as well as an efficiency of mission perspective. Our forces took the initiative to share unclassified tactical and operational level information with any and all forces in the region conducting counter-piracy operations. The reality is that the vast majority of the material is unclassified.

Direct tactical and operational coordination with NATO and EU forces has led to successful interdiction and capture of suspect pirates, enabled the safe transit of otherwise vulnerable shipping, including World Food Programme ships, effective monitoring and intelligence gathering, as well as enhanced communication among an diverse international naval presence in the Gulf of Aden. To date, forces from the US, UK, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey and Yemen have conducted counter-

piracy operations. Some of these forces operate within alliances such as NATO or EU, some as part of the CMF coalition and some independently representing their own nation's interests. Additional forces from Japan, Singapore, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Belgium, and Poland are expected to participate in the coming months.

All are in communication with CMF and with each other at some level, and there have been zero safety incidents resulting in injury or death of friendly forces due to lack of effective communication and coordination.

Since implementation of our campaign plan, a number of remarkable positive steps and effects have been achieved. The deployment of the naval forces from all of the nations identified above is a clear indication of the importance of maintaining security in the sea lines of communication.

Shared Awareness and DE-confliction (SHADE) Working Group

CMF has also established SHADE to ensure the various naval forces are working in concert. This is a staff-level group of officers from the various operational headquarters who meet regularly to ensure the naval forces conducting counter-piracy operations are coordinating effectively. The products from this group include the establishment of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), and the incorporation of the Fleet Exercise Web (FEXWEB), which is an unclassified internet-based information sharing forum, similar to a chat room. FEXWEB is hosted by the European Union Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR) headquarters in Northwood, UK.

Our initial track record

CMF and other cooperating naval forces have encountered and disarmed approximately 250 pirates: 130 were released, 110 turned over for prosecution, and 7 are pending final disposition.

Pirate capacity has been further impacted by the seizure or destruction of 28 pirate vessels, 133 small arms, 28 Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), 51 RPG projectiles, 21 ladders/grappling hooks, 12 cell phones, and 4 GPS devices.

Despite these results, pirate capacity and number of attempts per month by the pirates have not been significantly reduced. Until the mid- to long-term goals of removing safe havens ashore are achieved, the military presence will be required to be robust. CMF will continue to pursue all elements of the campaign and will continue to seek cooperation, coordination, and de-confliction from all participants.

5. THE COSTS OF COUNTER-PIRACY OPERATIONS

U.S. Navy units operating as a part of Combined Task Force 151 are units already deployed to the NAVCENT / FIFTH Fleet Area of Responsibility. Total costs of the task force's counter-piracy operations from its establishment in January through 19 February 2009 are estimated at $1.5 million. These costs include flight hours, steaming days, and supplies.

6. ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF COUNTER-PIRACY OPERATIONS

The following sections provide additional information on issues related to piracy and CMF counter-piracy operations.

M/V FAINA – From Attack to Release/Humanitarian Support

The Motor Vessel FAINA was attacked off the coast of Somalia on September 25th. The roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) ship is Belize flagged and operated by "Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine." While the ship initially had a crew of 21, the ship's captain reportedly suffered a fatal heart attack shortly after being taken hostage. The pirates refused all requests to

turn over the Captain's remains. The ship's remaining crew included 17 Ukrainian citizens, as well as two Russians and one Latvian.

For the more than four months that the ship was pirated, the U.S. Navy maintained a visual watch over this ship as it was anchored just off the Somali town of Hobyo. Assigned ships included the cruiser USS Vella Gulf (CG 72), the destroyers USS Howard (DDG 83) and USS Mason (DDG 87), and the Military Sealift Command's USNS Catawba. Operational support of FAINA was a U.S. Navy-only (vs. Coalition / CTF 150/151) operation, and there were no Coalition naval vessels taking part in this specific mission. This was due to the fact that U.S. ships were under national tasking.

The Norfolk-based destroyer, USS Mason (DDG 87) provided humanitarian assistance support to the crew of the M/V FAINA following the ship's release by Somali pirates. A medical corpsman from Mason checked on the health of the crew, and found them to be in good health. The remains of the ship's Captain were also repatriated.

The U.S. Navy fleet ocean tug USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168) provided logistics support to M/V FAINA and her crew – including fuel and water. USNS Catawba is one of four 226-foot-long fleet ocean tugs operated by the Navy's Military Sealift Command.

Days later, the Captain of the FAINA sent thank you letters to the Captains and crews of the U.S. Navy vessels that had kept watch over the ship. The letters were signed by members of the FAINA crew. Copies of those letters are included at the end of this document.

The Supertanker SIRIUS STAR

On November 15, 2008 the very large crude tanker Sirius Star was attacked more than 450 nautical miles southeast of Mombasa, Kenya. The ship is flagged in Liberia, owned by the Saudi Arabian-based Saudi Aramco, and operated by Vela International. The crew

of 25 includes citizens of Croatia, Great Britain, the Philippines, Poland, and Saudi Arabia.

The attack on the Sirius Star set several precedents:

- The ship was the largest pirated in this region: more than 300,000 metric tons, almost three times the tonnage of a Nimitz class aircraft carrier
- It was attacked more than 450 nautical miles southeast of Mombasa, Kenya
- The ship has a freeboard of approximately 10 meters (33 feet)

This SIRIUS STAR attack occurred amid a decrease in the rate of successful pirate attacks on merchant vessels off the coast of Somalia.

The ship was released early on the morning of January 10th, after payment was made via an air drop.

Memorandum of Understanding with Kenya

The United States is consulting with the Government of Kenya about the transfer of suspected pirates for purposes of prosecution in Kenyan courts. However, we're not yet in a position to say where prosecution might take place. There are many possible venues, including the states associated with the victims of these attacks.

Piracy is a universal crime under international law and many states have implemented domestic legislation criminalizing piracy. Moreover, Kenya and the United States have entered into an MOU under which Kenya would prosecute pirates that had been interdicted by U.S. forces.

We are grateful to Kenya in this regard, and want to stress that regardless of where the prosecution takes place, the United States believes that all the affected states must play a role and share the burden in bringing suspected pirates to justice.

Legal Authorities for Holding Suspected Pirates

The legal authority to hold pirates on board a Navy ship is customary and conventional international law, coupled with the recent United Nations Security Counsel Resolutions on Piracy in Somalia (UNSCR 1816, 1838, 1846, 1851). It is customary international law that every State may seize pirate ships and arrest persons suspected of piracy; they must use "warships, or military aircraft or other ships and aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect" to do so. The persons can be held on board the vessels until appropriate arrangements can be made to move them ashore to an appropriate jurisdiction. There is no standard time period requirement.

The suspected pirates have the right to be treated humanely. The pirates' rights with respect to alleged offenses depend on the country that agrees to take them for prosecution. Since piracy is a universal crime, all countries have the right to prosecute them. Whether a particular country has taken steps to create a domestic legal regime for prosecution of piracy and what limitations that regime may have is a separate issue.

We have a number of Somali translators aboard our vessels. We also have basic communication cards with pictures that aid in the communication process.

The task force commander's staff assembles evidence and forwards the material to the legal staff of the Combined Maritime Forces / NAVCENT. The materials will be reviewed, and a recommendation will be made to the Commander, who will determine whether to pursue prosecution or release the individuals. We have embarked security personnel - to include the Naval Criminal Investigative Service - who are experienced in evidence collection and processing.

Each situation is likely to be different. If the vessel they were operating was determined to be sea worthy, suspected pirates may be returned to their vessel -- without their

weapons. If their vessel is not sea worthy, we will make arrangements to ensure they are safely repatriated.

Safe and Humane Treatment for Suspected Pirates

Currently suspected pirates are housed onboard USNS Lewis and Clark in two separate converted storage facilities. Each Suspect Pirate is given a foam mat and blanket, as well as coveralls and shoes. They are provided three meals per day, allowed to shower, and issued fresh clothing every other day. Navy medical personnel evaluate their health daily. They are handled with the utmost of care and monitored by United States Marine Corps security personnel who are trained in handling these situations. Our trained Somali translators have been invaluable to facilitate communication

The Presence of International Navies and Their Missions

EU – Operation ATALANTA

As noted previously, our coalition forces work closely with a number of international naval forces deployed to the region to conduct counter-piracy operations. In accordance with Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the EU decided to conduct a maritime military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast and in the broader area.

UNSC Resolution 1838 (2008) of 7 October 2008 commends the ongoing planning process towards a possible EU naval operation and urges States that have the capacity to do so to cooperate with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea. The UN Security Council also urges States and regional organizations to continue to take action to protect the World Food Programme (WFP) maritime convoys.

The EU has publically stated that it is very concerned by the recent proliferation of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea against vessels off the coast of Somalia, and by the serious threat it poses:

- to the prompt, safe and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia,
- to international navigation and the safety of commercial maritime routes, and
- to fishing activities conducted in conformity with international law

In the deployment of its forces, the EU has reaffirmed its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia. The eradication of piracy in the region will only be achievable through the restoration of peace in Somalia. To this end, the EU acts within a comprehensive approach to achieve a lasting settlement of the Somali crisis, covering its political, security and humanitarian aspects.

7. CONCLUSION

The risk of being pirated is statistically small, but we can not overlook the impact that it has on stability and security in the region.

The ultimate solution to the problem is ashore, and will be hard to solve. The U.S. Navy and our international Coalition partners are committed to maintaining a presence in the region. We will continue to prevent destabilizing activities such as piracy in the maritime domain, while the larger international community works to improve the conditions ashore in Somalia.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee and stand ready to answer any questions the members of the committee may have.

Viktor Nikolsky
Captain, M/V FAINA
Indian Ocean
February 2009

Dear Captain Mark Genung and the crew of USS VELLA GULF,

On behalf of myself and the crew, I wish to show my sincerest appreciation for all the support VELLA GULF has shown us during our four months of captivity under the Somali pirates. Our liberation would not have been possible without your constant presence. It is difficult for me to express my feelings towards you and your crew. Our lives were spared because you were here to protect us. You gave us the strength to endure the hardest of times. We will keep VELLA GULF and her crew in our hearts and prayers forever. We wish you a safe journey home and good health for all your days. Thanks for everything you have done.

Your friend,

M/V FAINA IMO No 7419377 BELIZE CITY

Viktor Nikolsky
Captain, M/V FAINA

Crew of M/V FAINA:

Viktor Nikolsky
Captain, M/V FAINA
Indian Ocean
February 2009

Dear Captain Charles Rodriguez and the crew of USNS CATAWBA,

On behalf of myself and the crew, I wish to show my sincerest appreciation for all the support CATAWBA has shown us during our four months of captivity under the Somali pirates. Our liberation would not have been possible without your constant presence. It is difficult for me to express my feelings towards you and your crew. Our lives were spared because you were here to protect us. You gave us the strength to endure the hardest of times. We will keep CATAWBA and her crew in our hearts and prayers forever. We wish you a safe journey home and good health for all your days. Thanks for everything you have done.

Your friend,

M/V FAINA IMO No 7419377 BELIZE CITY

Viktor Nikolsky
Captain, M/V FAINA

Crew of M/V FAINA:

EXHIBIT 15

Published on Monday, July 9, 2001 in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer

Illegal Small Weapons Pose Global Threat

by Margaret Coker

MOGADISHU, Somalia -- Amid stalls selling tomatoes and live chickens at the Bakhar Market, a jarring cry pierces the clatter. "Guns for sale! You need a gun?" asks a teenage boy, pointing to rows of Kalashnikov assault rifles hanging like sides of beef in wooden kiosks along the dusty, rutted street.

After two customers test-fire some of the displayed merchandise, a slightly used Russian-made AK-47 with a well-oiled muzzle and polished wood butt changes hands for $200.

"The Kalashnikov is a weapon all fighters love. It will shoot whether it's covered in mud or filled with sand. It's so easy, even a child can use it," said Ali Stilla, an arms dealer and father of three.

Artist Wallis Kendal

Artist Wallis Kendal puts the finishing touches on his gun sculpture entitled 'The Art of Peacemaking' at United Nations headquarters Sunday, July 8, 2001. The exhibit will open Monday on the first day of the U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. (AP Photo/Shawn Baldwin)

A decade after the end of the Cold War, the Kalashnikov assault rifle is one thing Soviet that hasn't been relegated to the dustbin of history.

This simple 9-pound amalgamation of forged steel, molded plastic and wooden parts -- and millions of small arms like it -- are considered by arms-control experts to be a global threat with devastating long-term consequences, in the same league with nuclear and chemical weapons.

U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan calls small arms "weapons of mass destruction in slow motion." The issues of how small arms threaten communities around the world will be discussed at a United Nations General Assembly conference scheduled to begin today.

Also See:
Bush Triggers Fresh Arms Trade Row
Guardian of London 7/9/01

UN Conference on the

"Their proliferation is one of the key challenges in preventing conflict in the next century," Annan said in prepared remarks for the conference.

Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons
July 9-20, 2001

More than any other type of weapon, assault rifles have "changed the face of war in Africa" and other developing countries, said Peter Marwa, a retired Kenyan army colonel turned arms analyst.

Assault rifles and other small arms -- a definition that includes rifles, hand-held rocket launchers, machine guns and pistols -- are responsible for 90 percent of all conflict-related deaths in the last decade, a number equal to about 3 million people, according to the International Red Cross.

The most widely used of these weapons, according to arms-control analysts, is the AK-47 and its variants. About 50 million of these guns are in circulation throughout the world, enough to arm half of all U.S. households.

These economy-class weapons fuel economy-class wars common in Somalia and other developing nations. They also spur the global illegal-arms market. Under international conventions, legal arms sales occur only between two national governments, while rebel organizations usually involved in today's low-level conflicts are barred from buying guns through open channels.

So, although the United States is by far the world's leading source for legal weapons, with annual arms sales totaling about $12 billion, the bulk of illegal weapons sales come from former Soviet-bloc countries where the Kalashnikov is produced, according to law enforcement officials and arms traffickers. Most of the weapons used in fighting from the Balkans to Colombia have come from Russia and former Soviet satellite states.

Expectations are low about what will be accomplished at the U.N. conference. International sanctions and other multinational legal efforts to halt sales have had little effect against the extensive and shadowy trade in black-market arms.

But the implications for regional conflicts around the globe are clear, as are the tragic results for civilians trapped by years of war.

A team of Cox Newspapers correspondents traveled to 12 countries on five continents to trace small arms sold illegally from the former Soviet Union and the effects of their proliferation. What they uncovered was an alarming lack of control over small-arms stockpiles in the former Soviet bloc and the brazenness of arms traffickers who control the business. There is a shortage of political will to stem the trade and a surplus of human pain because of it.

Thanks to the end of the Cold War, supplies of small arms and weapons of mass destruction have never been greater, and procuring these weapons has never been easier.

During the heady, anything-goes chaos that characterized the breakup of the Soviet Union, many with access to conventional weapons scrambled to get a piece of the illegal-arms market, estimated at $8 billion annually, equivalent to one-fourth the total global arms trade.

The days when superpower patrons shipped weapons to client states in exchange for political loyalty waned. With a mercenary view of the open market, ex-Soviet entrepreneurs quickly organized global businesses in which arms could be swapped for a one-off payment in drugs, diamonds or cash.

Local military commanders became the linchpin of this black market in the early 1990s, when plans to reorganize the Soviet army into national militaries for each of the newly independent states disintegrated into chaos. Many officers quit in disgust, not knowing to whom their loyalties should remain, Mother Russia or new governments in places such as Kazakstan and Ukraine. Amid the organizational holes, those who stayed found themselves in control of huge caches of weapons.

"Imagine what an enterprising soul could do in the confusion," said Moscow-based arms analyst Sergei Matvienko. "In Soviet times, all numbers concerning weapons numbers and locations had been kept in Moscow, and suddenly, overnight, Moscow was located in a foreign country. No one there cared about the stockpiles in Kazakstan, for example, and no one in Kazakstan would ever know what had been in the stockpiles, let alone if anything were missing."

Arms ended up in the hands of hundreds of private security groups in Russia and Eastern Europe that had been organized to protect an emerging class of wealthy businessmen. They also were bought by rebels from Chechnya to Colombia who valued AK-47s, mobile anti-aircraft launchers, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and low-caliber ammunition for their low cost and portability.

By in the mid-1990s, the business of stealing from stockpiles matured into a more tightly organized black market. It was led by sawy, Russian-speaking men who could cash in on their connections in the ex-Soviet military and in countries where it once had influence.

How could the continued plundering of Soviet stockpiles of small weapons pass virtually unnoticed and unpunished?

Secrecy and corruption are to blame, said Sergei Fedkin, the acting head of Russia's Interior Ministry department for combating illegal-arms trade and terrorism.

"I'm supposed to report on the state of the Defense Ministry stockpiles, but I have no access either to the stockpiles or to full statistics from the Defense Ministry," he said in an interview at his Moscow office. "They give me a number of weapons every month that they say are unaccounted for. But never have I been given information about how many weapons exist in the stockpiles or how many stockpiles there are."

Statistics are elusive in the former Soviet Union, as they were in the days when the Communists ruled. Numbers often are conjured up out of thin air to satisfy political whims or to fulfill, at least on paper, unrealistic economic plans. Arms production is no different.

Goskomsat, the successor agency to the Soviet statistics agency, says the number of small arms produced by the Soviet Union is still classified. The Russian Defense Ministry and the state arms-export agency Rosoboronexport say the same is true of post-Soviet production. No Russian or U.S. think tank knows the answer. Military attaches in Moscow say they don't either.

In fact, none of the arms-controls treaties and military cooperation agreements signed between Moscow and Western capitals requires small arms to be counted, according to arms-control experts.

"The West was worried about nuclear missiles, tanks and aircraft, not hand-held weapons," explained Dosim Sapayev, an analyst from the International War and Peace Institute, a London-based think tank.

Without accurate statistics, there can be no adequate controls. And without adequate controls, corruption flourishes and arms transfers are easily carried out under a veil of secrecy.

Such a case occurred in February, when the Anastasia, a freighter flying the flag of the former Soviet republic of Georgia, set sail from the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Oktyabarskii and docked at Spain's Canary Islands to refuel.

Its manifest said it was carrying auto parts, but the destination was illegible. Intrigued, the port authority demanded access to the ship to inspect the cargo. What they found was 650 tons of assault rifles, ammunition and infantry gear.

After Spanish authorities complained, Russia's Rosoboronexport claimed the shipment was part of a legal sale from Moscow to Angola, thus giving the Anastasia a green light to leave port once the ship's captain had paid a small fine. After its departure, Spanish officials said they had no legal basis to monitor its journey, and the ship's owners could not be found in the Georgian town where it was registered.

Rosoboronexport officials, agreeing to talk only after the ship had sailed, told Cox Newspapers that the details of the deal were "a commercial secret." When pressed whether the sale was to the government of Angola or the rebel group UNITA, the agency refused further comment. The group is under international sanctions, which makes arms shipments illegal.

Not surprisingly, the main destinations for Kalashnikov rifles are developing nations in which central governments are weak, civil conflict is rife, and rule of law is thin, at best.

Of course, not all small-arms transfers are illegal, and not all weapons fall into the wrong hands. But all too often, the proliferation of small arms is detrimental for citizens of the countries where they end up, aid officials say.

"The results have been horrendous," said Marwa, of the Bonn International Center for Conversion and International Resource Group, a German arms-control organization.

Weary aid officials recite a litany of ills caused by easy access to small arms: Psychological horrors experienced by child soldiers, loss of productivity because of a maimed and wounded work force, public money spent on arms instead of education and health care.

Somalia shows the vexing realities of a country overrun by guns and those who have ruled by the gun. For now, it's a climate that not only tolerates places like the Bakhar Market, but also makes them seem necessary to the population . Suppliers are only half of the problem.

"For Bakhar to shut down, we need to see a change in attitude about fighting. Only if there is no more conflict will there be no more guns," Abdiqasim Salad Hasan, the president of Somalia's transitional government, told Cox Newspapers.

Copyright 2001 Cox Newspapers

###

Printer Friendly Version E-Mail This Article

CommonDreams.org is an Internet-based progressive news and grassroots activism organization, founded in 1997.
We are a nonprofit, progressive, independent and nonpartisan organization.

Home | About Us | Donate | Signup | Archives | Search

To inform. To inspire. To ignite change for the common good.

© Copyrighted 1997-2011

EXHIBIT 16

Angola buys 630 tons of arms

Fri, 02 Mar 2001

The Angolan government has laid claim to an arms cargo transported by a Ukrainian ship which was intercepted in Spain.

The Spanish secret service Cesid had believed the cargo of 630 tons of weapons were going to be delivered to the rebel movement Unita, which has been waging a war against the ruling MPLA for decades in the southwest African country.

The MS Anastasia was intercepted in Las Palmas on the Canary Islands on 24 February after the captain had tried to hide the nature of his cargo from officials.

The captain claimed to be transporting car spare parts, but police and customs officials discovered 20 000 boxes of ammunition, grenades and other weapons. The ship was retained in Las Palmas, where it had stopped to refuel.

The secret service Cesid had alerted its local agent of the arrival of the Anastasia, telling him that the weapons were going to be picked up by the Unita movement, the daily El Mundo reported.

But a spokesperson for the Angolan embassy in Madrid said that the government had ordered the weapons from a Ukrainian company. The deal was perfectly legal, and Luanda did not know why the captain had lied about his cargo, the spokesperson said.

Spain does not allow transport of arms via its territory without permission. Once the administrative problems were cleared, the Anastasia could continue its journey after paying a $800 000 bail, officials were quoted as saying.

EXHIBIT 17

28 Feb 2001

Spain halts Angolan-bound ship carrying Russian arms: press

Report

from Agence France-Presse

Published on 28 Feb 2001

Email - - googleplus - - reddit - -

MADRID, Feb 28 (AFP) - Officials in the Spanish-ruled Canary Islands have detained a Georgian-registered freighter carrying an undeclared cargo of 636 tonnes of Russian arms for Angola, the newspaper El Pais said on Wednesday.

The arms were seized on Saturday in the Canary Islands port of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, the Madrid paper said.

It said the cargo, which the captain had tried to conceal, included several thousand cases of 7.62-millimetre shells, mortar shells and night-vision devices.

The Spanish transport ministry confirmed that the ship, the Anastasia, had been seized and that it was carrying weapons, but did not say where the cargo was from or where it was headed for.

El Pais said the weapons had been sold by a state-owned Russian company, Rosvoruzheni; to the Angolan state-owned firm Simportex.

It said the captain of the vessel, which had sailed from a Ukrainian Black Sea port for Luanda on February 11, had initially claimed the Anastasia was carrying automobile parts.

The paper said the [illegible] ıorities imposed a fine of 900,000 euros (one million dollars) on the ship's owners for seeking to evade S[illegible] ıe compulsory declaration of arms cargos.

Angola is considered a sensitive destination for arms exports as the UNITA rebel group, which has been battling the government there for decades, has been subject to a UN arms embargo since 1993.

do/jhd/ds/nb AFP

Copyright (c) 2001 Agence France-Presse

Received by NewsEdge Insight: 02/28/2001 08:36:30

=A9AFP 2001: The information provided in this product is for personal use only. None of it may be reproduced in any form whatsoever without the express permission of Agence France-Presse.

Agence France-Presse:

©AFP: The information provided in this product is for personal use only. None of it may be reproduced in any form whatsoever without the express permission of Agence France-Presse.

humanitarian related information.

So to help you easily find what you're...

Visit the blog

Connect With ReliefWeb

Receive news about us Email address Subscribe

Related Sites

Consolidated
Appeal Process

Humanitarian
Response

Virtual
OSOCC

Submit Content

Share information through ReliefWeb to better inform humanitarians worldwide.

How to submit content

Tools

Location Maps - Country maps for your reports and presentations.

Humanitarian Icons - Ready-to-use symbols and icons. Free download.

Briefing Kit - Download collections of important content.

RSS - Subscribe to information finely tuned to your needs.

Support & Feedback Forum - Get answers and help us improve ReliefWeb.

EXHIBIT 18

Jump to discuss
Loading comments...
Recommend 2
0
8+1 2
Below: Discuss Related 6

U.S. officials says rockets could aid Tehran's nuke program

By
Preston Mendenhall and Robert Windrem
NBC News
updated 3/31/2005 4:23:15 PM ET

EXCLUSIVE

Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko listens to questions during a

KIEV, Ukraine — President Viktor Yushchenko confirmed Thursday that nuclear-capable cruise missiles were illegally sold to Iran and China under Ukraine's previous government. In an interview with NBC News, Yushchenko offered the highest-level acknowledgement that the sales, which have alarmed the U.S. intelligence community, indeed took place.

"I confirm this, though I do so with bitterness," the president said.

Yushchenko spoke on the eve of his first visit to the United States since leading a wave of democratic protests last year that overturned an election won by Yushchenko but rigged by his rivals.

Yushchenko said the X-55 missiles, called AS-15s by NATO, were exported under a forged contract that listed Russia as the destination country. A copy of the contract viewed by NBC News appears to bear necessary clearance stamps for the export of 20 missiles to the Russia, which has denied any role in the sale.

U.S. intelligence officials said that China and Iran each took delivery of six missiles. Ukrainian officials have offered conflicting accounts of the number of rockets delivered.

The missiles were sold without nuclear warheads. They were manufactured in 1987 and poorly maintained, if at all, according to a Ukrainian source familiar with the investigation.

Reverse engineering possible

Still, the U.S. intelligence officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the rockets could propel Iran's quest for nuclear weapons several steps forward.

Tehran could reverse engineer the missiles, and double the range of its most powerful rocket, the Shahab-3. The X-55s have a range of roughly 2,000 miles. If the Iranians were successful in duplicating the technology, they could target U.S. military bases and assets in the Middle East — and Iran's archenemy Israel.

And while the missiles were sold without nuclear warheads, they provide Iran with a model for designing its own.

"It's not the physical item itself that is valuable to the Iranians," one official said. "It's the updated technology they were after."

The "integration of the warhead with the missile" is the key "learning exercise" that the Iranians could gain from the acquisition, the same official said.

Japanese officials have protested to Ukraine over the sale of the missiles, saying that they could also enhance rival China's weapons delivery capability.

Ahead of his trip to the United States, perhaps anticipating what is expected to be a main theme of discussions in Washington, Yushchenko said he had asked his government for a definitive report on the sale of the X-55s.

"A few days ago, I received report that the sale took place though a series of false individuals," Yushchenko said.

Ukraine's 'bandit' days gone

In an interview in an ornate government mansion near his office in the center of the Ukrainian capital, the president insisted that Ukraine would become a transparent state that fully embraces democracy, in contrast to the "bandit government" of his predecessor Leonid Kuchma.

Meantime, the Ukrainian leader said his health continues to improve from a poisoning that has disfigured his face, the result of an attack he blames on political opponents.

"I feel much better than I did five months ago when it happened," he said. "And it's very important that we now know more about what kind of poison it was, how it got into me and most importantly, how to fight it."

NBC correspondent Preston Mendenhall is on assignment in Ukraine. NBC investigative producer Robert Windrem contributed to this report from New York.

0 g+1 2 Recommend 2 people recommend this. Sign Up to see what your friends recommend. 6

From around the web

Father Hires Escort Who Turns Out to Be Someone He Knows Far Too Well (Stirring Daily)

Natural gas cars: A look under the hood (ExxonMobil Perspectives Blog)

15 Good Looking Celebrities Who Destroyed Themselves with Plastic Surgery (She Budgets)

Homeowners Are In For A Big Surprise (Smart Life Weekly)

Even Kate Middleton Has Yoga-Pants Days (POPSUGAR Celebrity)

Malware Removal: Top Ranked Antivirus Software (Beta News)

More from NBCNews.com

Man loses 56 pounds after eating only McDonald's for six months (TODAY)

Elderly couple die together holding hands (TODAY)

Sheldon breaks up with Amy on 'Big Bang Theory' (TODAY)

Saluting Soldier Takes First Steps (NBC News)

Malaysia Airlines plane missing, presumed crashed in South China Sea (NBC News)

Apps I Live By: Gretchen Rubin (NBC News)

EXHIBIT 19

Ukraine admits missiles sold to Iran and China

A Ukrainian X-55 missile

9:44AM GMT 18 Mar 2005

Ukraine has admitted cruise missiles were exported to Iran and China, reports say.

Ukraine's prosecutor-general Svyatoslav Piskun was cited as saying businessmen sold 12 missiles to Iran and six to China.

The X-55 cruise missiles, also known as Kh-55s or AS-15s, were sold in 2001, although none were exported with the nuclear warheads they were designed to carry, the Financial Times adds.

The X-55 had a range of 1,800 miles, enough to put Japan within striking range of the Asian continent or to reach Israel from Iran, said the newspaper.

A spokesman for the prosecutor general's office in Kiev offered no comment on the report, but said: "A meeting is now going on. Please wait two or three hours."

The report appeared less than three months after Ukrainians elected a new Western-leaning president, Viktor Yushchenko, to lead the former Soviet republic.

The United States has long expressed concern that parts of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal could be sold or smuggled to countries that it regards as a potential danger.

Mr Piskun is reported to have said that the previous administration under president Leonid Kuchma had charged a Ukrainian businessman over the exports and initiated a secret trial last year.

One of two Russian businessmen suspected of masterminding the sale was arrested in Prague last July and was under an extradition request, he added.

The Financial Times quoted the US embassy in Kiev as saying it was "closely monitoring" a Ukrainian government investigation into the case and wanted the findings of the secret trial made public.

The United States accuses Iran of trying to secretly develop a nuclear weapons programme. Tehran denies the charge, saying its nuclear programme is only for power generation.

© Copyright of Telegraph Media Group Limited 2014

EXHIBIT 20

Text
BBC NEWS

Cruise missile row rocks Ukraine

Ukrainian arms dealers smuggled 18 nuclear-capable cruise missiles to Iran and China in 1999-2001, Ukraine's prosecutor-general has said.

The Soviet-era Kh-55 missiles - also known as X-55s - have a maximum range of 2,500km (1,550 miles). They are launched by long-range bombers.

Official Ukrainian state bodies were not involved in the sales, the prosecutor-general's office said.

It added that the missiles were not exported with nuclear warheads.

Investigation under way

The Kiev Court of Appeals is examining the case, and "a few Ukrainian and Russian citizens are suspects," the statement said.

X-55 CRUISE MISSILE
- Soviet-era air-launched missile
- Nuclear or conventional warhead
- First test flight - 1976
- Max range - 2,500km
- Cruising speed - mach 0.8
- Length - 6.04m
- Launch weight - 1,210kg
- Ukraine reportedly had 1,612 X-55s in 1991 *Source: Jane's defence information*

The smuggling happened while Leonid Kuchma was president of Ukraine. His administration was voted out of office in December.

The Financial Times reports that the missiles could reach Japan if fired from mainland Asia or Israel if fired from Iran.

Ukraine reportedly had 1,612 of the missiles after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.

It had agreed to return 575 of them to Russia, and the rest were to be scrapped under a US-funded disarmament programme.

The Kh-55, known in the West as the AS-15, is designed to carry a nuclear warhead with a 200-kiloton yield.

Ukrainian First Deputy Defence Minister Leonid Polyakov said there were no indications yet that any Ukrainian Defence Ministry officials were involved in selling the missiles.

And Ukraine's State Export Control Service said it did not authorise any sales of long-range cruise missiles to Iran or China.

The US suspects that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons, while Tehran insists that its nuclear programme is purely for civilian purposes.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/4361505.stm

Published: 2005/03/18 17:10:18 GMT

© BBC 2014

EXHIBIT 21

GlobalSecurity.org Subscribe Now ! Sign In

Get a 4 weeks subscription for only 99¢ TRY IT NOW

X-55 Long Range Cruise Missile

On 28 January 2005, Ukranian parliamentarian Hryhoriy Omelchenko issued an open letter to President Viktor Yushchenko that Ukraine had illegally sold cruise missiles to Iran. It's was a credible report, which names dates, names, the bank accounts, fictitious shell companies that were set up to extradite the transfer of money from Iran. Plus there was collaborating evidence to this whole affair. He refered to a paper company set up in Cyprus to channel money for the missiles.

Anti-corruption lawmaker Omelchenko was a ranking State Secret Services (SBU) officer and a deputy belonging to Yulia Tymoshenko's parliament faction. Omelchenko is the past head of the parliament's committee on combating organized crime and corruption and is also the Head of the Temporary Committee on Investigating the Murder of Georgiy Gongadze. He has requested that the Attorney General arrest Leonid Kuchma for his involvement with the murder of Internet journalist Heorhiy Gongadze.

On 18 March 2005 "Financial Times" newspaper of Britain reported that Ukrainian Prosecutor-General Svyatoslav Piskun had stated that Ukraine exported 12 cruise missiles to Iran and six to China in 2001. Piskun told the paper that none of the 18 X-55 cruise missiles (also known as Kh-55 or AS-15) was exported with the nuclear warheads they were designed to carry.

The newspaper said it was the first confirmation by a Ukrainian government official that the exports took place. The the X-55 has a range of 3,000 kilometers, more than enough to reach Israel from Iran. The US embassy in Kyiv is closely monitoring the investigation and wanted the findings of a reported secret trial over the missile exports to be made public.

The missiles themselves were not in very good shape, according to one US official. They were diverted from Soviet stocks left behind when the Ukraine declared its independence in 1991.

Prosecutors said the missiles were sold illegally, and were not exported by Ukrainian enterprises. Export documents known as end-user certificates recorded the recipient of the 20 Kh55 missiles as "Russia's Defense Ministry."

A government investigation into illicit weapons sales by officials loyal to former President Leonid Kuchma, who left office in January 2005, led to secret indictments or arrests arms dealers accused of selling missiles to Iran and China. At least three people were arrested and another three were indicted last year in connection with the illicit arms trade.

In 2000 Russian national Oleg Orlov and a Ukrainian partner identified as E.V. Shilenko exported 20 Kh55 cruise missiles through a fake contract and end-user certificate with Russia's state-run arms dealer and with a firm called Progress, a subsidiary company of Ukrspetseksport -- Ukraine's arms export agency. Orlov was detained 13 July 2004 in the Czech Republic, and as of early 2005 an extradition procedure was under way to return him to Ukraine for prosecution. Orlov and his partners were suspected of providing Iran with maintenance equipment and technicians to service the Kh-55 missiles.

Prosecutor General Svyatoslav Piskun was chief prosecutor under Kuchma and retained his job after Yushchenko, a Kuchma opponent, came to power in January 2005. Legislator Hrihoriy Omelchenko dismissed the statement by prosecutors as a "political trick" by Piskun to keep his post in the face of calls by pro-Yushchenko legislators for his resignation.

Lawyer Bogdan Ferents defends in court the sole defendant in the case on the sale of the missiles,

Further Reading

- Kh-55 Granat
- Kh-55 Granat References
- AS-15 Kent
- AS-15 Specifications
- AS-15 Pictures
- AS-15 Export to Iran
- SS-N-21 Sampson
- SSC-4 Slingshot
- Kh-SD ALCM
- Kh-65 ALCM
- Kh-101 ALCM
- Kh-102 ALCM
- Kh-555 ALCM

References

- Iran has no documentary evidence on missile deal with Ukraine IRNA 10 Apr 2005
- Yushchenko Confirms Missile Sales to Iran, China RFE/RL 01 Apr 2005
- Ukrainian Official Says Missiles Exported To Iran, China RFE/RL 18 Mar 2005
- Analysis: Kuchma's Ukraine Cruises Back Into The Spotlight RFE/RL 02 Feb 2005
- Ukraine Accused Of Selling Weapons To Iran RFE/RL 02 Feb 2005

director-general of the company Ukrainaviazakaz Vladimir Yevdokimov. The Kh-55 cruise missiles delivered by Ukraine to Iran and China in 1999-2001 "are not weapons", Ferents said, adding that the missiles were not complete with parts.

The missiles delivered to third countries were manufactured in 1987, and had a service life of eight years. The lawyer maintained that storage of the missile did not meet standards since 1992. Former Air Force commander Viktor Strelnikov and specialists who examined the missiles said that they were marked with the inscription "training".

Jane's Intelligence Digest, published on 18 March 2005, noted: "There is no doubt that the sale of the missiles to Iran and China could only have taken place with the knowledge and cooperation of senior Ukrainian officials. ... there is ... mounting evidence to suggest that the sale of missiles to Iran was undertaken with the assistance of the Russian security services."

Handgun Accuracy Secrets:

www.instantaccuracy.org

Avoid the 7 Deadly Sins of Handgun Accuracy:

Why Does Iran Want Cruise Missiles?

The half-dozen missiles sold to China are consistent with a Chinese interest in reverse-engineering these weapons to provide technical input into China's ongoing efforts to develop long range cruise missiles. But Iran is not known to have a long range cruise missile development program, and the dozen missiles aquired by Iran suggest the possibility that Iran hoped to equip these missiles with nuclear warheads, once Iran completed its atomic weaponization program.

Press reports noted that while Iran does not operate long-range bombers, it was believed that Tehran could adapt its Soviet-built Su-24 strike aircraft to launch the missile. But this totally misunderstands the multiple launch modes of this missile, which can also be launched from ships or from land based truck launchers. These later modes are certainly the ones relevant to Iran. The Soviet sea and ground launched versions of the missile had a small solid rocket motor that would boost the missile to cruising speed, and Iran would have to make some provisions to replicate this equipment. Such small motors would seem well within the reach of Iran's capability base.

Long range cruise missiles tipped with atomic bombs would provide an attractive capability for attacking Israel. It may be imagined that an Iranian atomic bomb would be somewhat larger and heavier than the Soviet nuclear charge the missile was initially designed to carry, but no so much larger as to preclude installation in the missile's nose. Absent unavailable data on Iranian atomic bomb characteristics, some reduction in the Kh-55's 2,500-3,000 km range would be anticipated, but not so much as to preclude reaching Israel at a distance of less than 1,500 km.

While Israel has invested considerable effort in developing the Arrow anti-missile system for countering Iran's ballistic missiles, Israeli capbilities to counter low-flying cruise missiles are less well developed. The X-55 cruise missile is much smaller than the Shehab 3, and consequently could be mounted on a much smaller launching truck, making it easier for the launcher garrison to evade detection.

Unlike a ballistic missile, it is hard to detect a cruise missile when it is launched. The KH-55 flies at medium altitude for the first part of its flight. Cruise missiles can fly at low altitude and weave in between mountain ranges to minimise the risk of detection. They are much more difficult for SAMs and other air defences to track or attempt to engage. The only way to effectively deal with cruise missiles is to use AWACS to guide in fighters. Even then its hard for the fighters' AAMs to engage the missiles. Trying to intercept cruise missiles over land is a difficult challenge for the defending side.

Basic computer maps used for navigation can be compiled from information bought from most countries with operational satellite systems. With the inflight navigation fixes periodically throughout its flight this would be good enough for a 1,500 km flight. With a simple low powered altimeter radio system it could avoid the ground quite easily.

With converted civilian planes, Iran could possibly launch these missiles from the middle of the Atlantic to hit the United States. This might require some fancy engineering on the part of Iran. The missiles could be mounted on launchers slung under the wings of a heavy cargo plane such as an IL-76, but Iran only has one such airplane in military service. Low-wing commercial aircraft would not provide sufficient ground clearance for such an installation. In principle commercial passenger aircraft could be modified with a bomb-bay, but the structural modifications required would be rather heroic.

A more attractive alternative might consist of arming small ships with single cruise missiles. The modifications required to launch such a small missile would easily escape detection.

Iran's merchant marine fleet is controlled by the state shipping company Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL). It serves now two container services from the port of Bender-e Abbas. One of them goes on a 30-day loop to East Asia, the other reaches Europe via the Suez in 22 days.

In 2003 it was estimated that Iran's merchant marine consisted of 130 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 4,715,242 GRT / 8,240,069 DWT. This was composed of 40 bulk, 36 cargo, 3 chemical tankers, 7 container, 1 liquefied gas tanker, 5 multifunction large-load carrier, 33 petroleum tankers, 8 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 1 short-sea passenger, and 10 other ships registered in other countries.

Iran's merchant marine fleet is doing relatively well, but the average age of 40% of its vessels is over 20 years, which makes it rather unfit for international

competition. In October 2001 an agreement for manufacturing six ships was signed with Germany. The ships will be constructed with a total investment of $188 million in Bandar Abbas under German supervision.

Iran Shipbuilding and Offshore Industries Complex [ISOICO] is a qualified Iranian company, active as shipbuilder and shiprepairer of different types of vessels and contractor of offshore structures. It operates from a production premises on the Persian Gulf (37 km west Bandar Abbas City), shipping to any location offshore or onshore.

The activity of the Company started in the early 1990s as a workshop and a yard. The experience gained in this operation enabled the company to enlarge its sphere of activity to plants and mechanical plant components, then to multidisciplinary projects. Although the offshore experiences is short but ISOICO has played an important role in offshore market, constructing in its Bandar Abbas Yard.

ISOICO shipyard is capable of constructing any type of vessel up to about 4 x 80,000 DWT per year on its existing building berths mainly bulk carrier, containership and oil product carrier using advance technology, which after accomplishing the development in process (i.e. two Dry Docks) the constructing capability will increase for the vessel up to about 2 x 300,000 DWT VLCC or 2 x 140,000 m3 LNG carrier per year in addition to the existing capacity.

NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
Enter Your Email Address
Sign Up Now!

Poll: You've been chosen
www.civiqs.com
Take a five question survey on Obama and the direction of the US.

Gain Dual Citizenship

Learn languages free

Atomic Athletic
www.atomicathletic.com
Retro Strength Training Tools Gym Equipment, Books, Charts, DVDs

Advertise with Us | About Us | GlobalSecurity.org In the News | Internships | Site Map | Privacy

Copyright © 2000-2014 GlobalSecurity.org All rights reserved.
Site maintained by: John Pike
Page last modified: 24-07-2011 04:43:01 ZULU

EXHIBIT 22

REGNUM
NEWS AGENCY

13:16 04.07.2006
Permanent news address: http://www.regnum.ru/english/667321.html

State Duma may discuss Ukraine's delivery of cruise missiles to Iran

Discussion of Ukraine's delivery of X55 cruise missiles to Iran in 2000-2001 is being prepared at the Russian State Duma. According to **REGNUM**'s information, an appropriate request was already submitted by Edinaya Rossiya (United Russia) Faction MPs.

Reportedly, the missiles were brought to Iran by a vessel chartered by the Ukrainian Kaalbye Shipping Company. X55 cruise missile is a subsonic small-size strategic cruise missile which is able to fly at a low altitude following terrain. It is designed to carry nuclear warheads and to strike enemy's strategic objects which coordinates were determined in advance.

As it was reported earlier, on June 30, Russian Defense Minister **Sergey Ivanov** stated that Ukrainian Progress Firm, an Ukrspetsexport subsidiary, delivered 6 X55 cruise missiles to China and Iran each in 2000 and 2001. On July 3, Iranian Foreign Ministry disproved the Russian Defense Minister's statement on purchasing by Tehran of X55 air-to-surface cruise missiles in Ukraine.

© 1999-2014 REGNUM News Agency
Registration certificate No. El 77-6430 of the 6th August, 2002
All materials reprinted from the site must link to REGNUM News Agency

EXHIBIT 23

Кто управляет транспортом

+1
Нравится 0
Твитнуть 0
g+1 0

12/02/2008 **16:01**

0

Автор:

Продолжение цикла о кухне власти в Кабмине Тимошенко. Социал-бютовское прошлое министра Иосифа Винского определило «перекланировку» бизнеса в транспортной вотчине.

Новоиспеченный министр транспорта и связи **Иосиф Викентьевич Винский** в отраслевых проблемах разбирается на уровне сына машиниста тепловоза. Однако является докой в проблемах менеджмента и финансов. Долгие годы был главным аппаратчиком и куратором финансовых потоков Соцпартии. После ухода от Александра Мороза Иосиф Викентьевич зарекомендовал себя и перед Юлией Тимошенко, которая отдала ему министерство после самоотвода Тариэла Васадзе. Навыки финансиста и аппаратчика не замедлили вылезть наружу. 11 января были аннулированы все ранее проведенные тендеры по закупке материально-технических ресурсов на 2008 год. Старых поставщиков теперь ждут интересные разговоры с «новой метлой».

Зачищаются «донецкие» клерки, взамен которых приходят бютовцы и экс-соратники Винского по СПУ. При этом некоторые кадры предшественника Николая Рудьковского остаются в структуре Минтранссвязи. Например, глава патронатной службы экс-министра Рудьковского Андрей Пазюк стал личным помощником министра Винского. А его место занял Петр Устенко (№60 в списке СПУ), советник Александра Мороза по экономическим вопросам и сам по себе бизнесмен (выпускает вино «Золотая балка»). Но главное в его бизнесе – холдинговая компания «Исполин» и финансово-кредитная «Лев». Следы этих фирм можно найти в числе учредителей компаний, ищущих возможности оптимизировать налогообложение.

Из этого можно сделать вывод, что Винский как заправский head-hunter, либо зачищает финансовую базу Александра Мороза для последующего переворота в СПУ, либо его конфликт с лидером социалистов не настолько уж и силен.

Один из участников авиарынка рассказал «proUA» историю, датированную началом прошлого года. **Авиакомпании должны платить НДС за потребляемый керосин. А с азаровской налоговой любое возмещение НДС превращалось в торг о комиссионных. Команде Рудьковского удалось получить «оптовую скидку» и перевозчики получили предложение – вам возврат НДС, а нам всего лишь «откатных» 10%. Это, конечно, было на руку бизнесу, однако многие не согласились.**

Теперь же налаживать взаимодействие бизнеса и власти будут другие люди, в то время как Николаю Рудьковскому, видимо, придется испытать всю мощь СБУ по полной программе. Причем его нынешние злоключения он же сам и спровоцировал. Прошлым летом Секретариат президента требовал от Кабмина Януковича «сдать» министров транспорта и по чрезвычайным ситуациям. «Регионал» Нестор Шуфрич тогда внял гласу свыше и снизил градус антипрезидентских высказываний вплоть до совместного тушения пожара на Херсонщине. А социалист Рудьковский «не понял» и продолжил говорить о Викторе Балоге и главе СБУ Валентине Наливайченко. В ответ он получил уголовное дело, которым занимается СБУ, и прекрасные перспективы тюремного заключения.

Впрочем, дело может и рассыпаться, как это было когда-то с Борисом Колесниковым. Но для этого нужно, чтобы Партия регионов мобилизовалась на борьбу с Юлией Тимошенко. Уж больно вяло «доны» воюют с врагом президента. По крайней мере, пока.

Но оставим рассказ о злоключениях бывшего министра Минтрансвязи и перейдем к команде замов министра нынешнего.

1-й замминистра Василий Васильевич Шевченко (НУНС). Должность первого заместителя бютовского министра, согласно коалиционному соглашению, отошла «оранжевым». Волею Секретариата президента, карьерный взлет пережил аппаратчик из центрального исполкома Народного союза «Наша Украина», на досрочных выборах шедший в парламент 171-м номером в НУНС.

Говорят, именно Василию Шевченко принадлежит фраза: «А тяжело работать первым заместителем министра?». Неудивительно, что за месяц работы в Минтрансе Василий Шевченко «засветился» только в роли главы комиссии по расследованию аварии на затонувшем в Азовском море теплоходе «Сергей Скадовский».

Замминистра Вадим Николаевич Гуржос (Секретариат президента).

Еще одно редкое инородное тело в социал-бютовском Минтранссвязи. В 2002 году он был членом «Команды озимого поколения», затем вместе с Инной Богословской стал соучредителем фонда «Вече Украины», а в 2006 возглавил Партию частной собственности. Но более всего обращают на себя внимание *дружба и кумовство Вадима Гуржоса* с Евгением Червоненко, который, будучи главой Минтранса в 2005 году, назначил Гуржоса главой «Укравтодора».

Евгений Альфредович с подачи Виктора Ющенко недавно вернулся в большую политику на министерскую должность главы Нацагенства по Евро-2012. Но обнаружил, что, невзирая на громкий пост, *его возможности влиять на футбольно-строительные миллиарды крайне ограничены*. Однако старые связи с Банковой не заржавели, и Червоненко удалось добиться назначения Гуржоса в Минтранс - с прицелом на дорожное строительство. В последние месяцы Вадим Николаевич работал замглавы киевского губернатора Веры Ульянченко, занимаясь проблемой строительства кольцевой дороги вокруг Киева. Эту же тематику он будет курировать и в Минтрансе (напомним, что Президент своим указом обязал Кабмин строить дорогу вместе в КОГА).

С именем Евгения Червоненко связывают еще одно «автодорожное» назначение: новым замглавы «Укравтодора» стал **Зеновий Васильевич Холоднюк.** С 2004 года он работал руководителем страховой компании в группе VAB-банка. Группу контролирует Сергей Максимов, в связке с которым Червоненко и Ефим Звягильский, в пику Вадиму Рабиновичу, создали Еврейскую конфедерацию Украины.

Глава «Укравтодора» Петр Константинович Кравчук (Юлия Тимошенко).

Иосиф Винский *анонсировал* возврат ведомства в подчинение министерства («Укравтодор» отобран правительством Януковича у министра Рудьковского), однако есть основания сомневаться в успешности операции. По данным *«proUA»*, глава «Укравтодора» назначен лично премьер-министром во избежание влияния Секретариата президента и прочих на автодорожные миллиарды.

45-летний выходец из среднего бизнеса (грузоперевозки, магазин, производство изделий из камня) имеет крепкие корни на Волыни.

Выпускник львовского политеха по специальности «автомобили и автохозяйство» выступил соучредителем Волынской Федерации дзюдо и местной ячейки онопенковской УСДП. По квоте социал-демократов Кравчук в 2006 г. стал нардепом фракции БЮТ.

Замминистра Урбанский Игорь Анатольевич (Иосиф Винский).

Первым крупным кадровым решением Иосифа Винского по Минтранссвязи стало введение дополнительной должности замминистра и назначение на нее своего соратника, аполитичного специалиста по морским перевозкам.

Урбанского с Винским в 2005 г. свел одесский губернатор Василий Цушко. До этого Игорь Анатольевич был авторитетным одесским транспортником. Его судоходная империя «Каалбай» со времен СССР (когда Урбанский был простым капитаном дальнего плавания) выросла настолько, что потребовалось политическое прикрытие. Возникновения «Каалбая» окутано легендами об оружейном «контрабасе». В пользу достоверности этих легенд говорят как происхождение Урбанского (отец - военный), так и карьера одного из его одноклассников по школе в Кутаиси (стал личным телохранителем Эдуарда Шеварднадзе).

В 2001 г. судно «Каалбая» «засветилось» в испанской Мальорке. Тогда местные таможенники выявили на борту судна большую партию оружия, шедшего из России в Анголу. Помимо этого, компания упоминалась в связи с незаконными поставками крылатых ракет Х-55 в Иран.

Богатая мифология во многом и не позволила Урбанскому в 2006 г. выиграть внутрипартийную борьбу за Минтранс, отданный Николаю Рудьковскому.

Несмотря на уход Урбанского из орбиты СПУ под «крышу» бютовца Винского, связей с социалистами он не потерял. Всего за месяц до назначения Фонд госимущества Валентины Семенюк решил продать «Измаильский судоремонтный завод» в руки подконтрольной Урбанскому компании ИССЗ, арендовавшей завод.

Одним из первых действий нового замминистра стало назначение 29-летнего Юрия Юрьевича Крука и.о. начальника портя Южный (Одесская обл.). Юрий Крук - сын замглавы транспортного комитета Верховной Рады Юрия Борисовича Крука (БЮТ). Ожидается, что еще один сын Крука – Вячеслав – возглавит Дунайское пароходство.

С Игорем Урбанским семья Круков связана давно. Тот же судостроительный завод в Измаиле до 2004 г. контролировала компания семьи Круков, после чего передала его компании Урбанского. Для всей этой «тусовки» характерна политическая всеядность с упором на стабильную возможность влияния на власть. Так, старший Крук в последние годы числится в БЮТ, младший – в Партия зеленых, Урбанский мигрировал из СПУ в БЮТ. При этом не теряются связи и с Партией регионов.

Еще при антикризисной коалиции Игорь Урбанский побыл пару месяцев заместителем министра, причем эта должность была, что называется, создана «под него». Но как только исход членов фракции СПУ в исполнительную власть сделал проходным 37-е место в избирательном списке, Урбанский ушел в парламент. В этом контексте памятна история с недавним формированием «оранжевой» коалиции. Стоило вице-премьеру Андрею Клюеву одобрить назначение Крука-младшего главой порта «Южный» - и Крук-старший едва не отозвал подпись под коалиционным соглашением.

Замминистра Анатолий Владимирович Клименко (Иосиф Винский).

Выпускник высшей школы КГБ в Минске, в 90-х годах Клименко работал замглавы Днепропетровской обладминистрации, по ходу выступив соучредителем благотворительного фонда «Батьківщина без сиріт». В 2002 прошел в парламент, где вошел во фракцию «Единая Украина» Богдана Губского. В 2004 году Клименко перешел во фракцию Соцпартии, но после ухода Винского от Александра Мороза на досрочных выборах по спискам СПУ уже не баллотировался. Теперь генерал-майор КГБ получил в свое распоряжение КРУ Минтранссвязи.

Замминистра-глава «Укравтотранса» Леонид Григорьевич Сергиенко(СПУ).

Как и в случае с Клименко, его карьера начиналась в Днепропетровске. Леонид Сергиенко был бизнесменом (украино-немецкое СП «Днепромайн»). В 2002 он прошел в парламент по спискам фракции «Единая Украина», но после Майдана мигрировал в СПУ. С Александром Морозом порвал не до конца и в 2006 оказался 40-м (непроходным) в списке СПУ, после чего был жалован постом зама в Минтрансе. С той поры курирует автотранспорт. **Любопытно, что этой неделе позиции Сергиенко усилились: он стал еще и главой «Укравтотранса». По нынешним временам, это сложный участок – нравы у автомобильных менеджеров крутые.** Так, о заграничных полетах министра Рудьковского за бюджетный счет общественность впервые *узнала из уст уволенного главы Службы международных автоперевозок Украины Анатолия Ткаченко*...

Замминистра Владимир Федорович Бадагов (Константин Жеваго).

63-летний депутат Полтавского облсовета (фракция СПУ) последние десять лет работал гендиректором Полтавского горнообогатительного комбината, входящего в бизнес-группу бютовского олигарха Константина Жеваго. На двух последних выборах неудачно баллотировался в парламент по спискам СПУ. По *предварительным данным*, Бадагов будет курировать Службу железнодорожного транспорта. Это позволит бютовскому олигарху от металлургии лоббировать льготные цены на грузовые ж/д перевозки для своих компаний.

Замминистра-глава Госавиаадминистрации Давыдов Александр Николаевич (Юлия Тимошенко).

Еще в 1996 г. Давыдов возглавил авиадепартамент «Единых энергетических систем Украины» Юлии Тимошенко, до этого 12 лет отлетав на ЯК-40 в Днепропетровском авиаотряде. Параллельно он возглавил «ЕЭС-авиа». Позже Юлия Тимошенко устраивает его помощником министра транспорта в Кабмине «днепропетровского» Валерия Пустовойтенко. В 2002 г. Давыдов возглавил «Авиалинии Украины», но с правительством Януковича не сработался, вернувшись в Госавиаслужбу по безопасности авиации лишь после Майдана и пройдя затем в Киевсовет по спискам БЮТ.

Однако, еще до этого упомянутая «ЕЭС-авиа» завладела 4 га земли возле «Борисполя», что помешало планам по расширению аэропорта, которые лоббировала компания «Аэросвит» Виктора Пинчука (еще одно свидетельство застарелой взаимной неприязни Тимошенко и зятя Леонида Кучмы). В 2006 г. министр транспорта Виктор Бондарь решил разобраться с землями «Борисполя». **Когда же, наконец, докопались до владельцев земли, на собрание коллектива аэропорта явился Александр Турчинов. Поверенный в делах Юлии Владимировны открестился от «ЕЭС-авиа», однако позицию «бунтующих» сотрудников аэропорта одобрил. Возможно дело в том, что кроме «ЕЭС-авиа» еще 43 га в конфликтном районе ушло фирме, которую контролировала жена тогдашнего директора аэропорта.**

В прошлом году, когда «Аэросвит» и ахметовская «Донбассаэро» объявили о заключении стратегического альянса, правительство поддержало компанию Пинчука и на днях стало известно, что «Борисполь» получил от японского правительства первый транш $8 млн на реконструкцию аэропорта.

Старой гвардии замов, которые пережили первую волну чисток, удастся, видимо, сохранить свои кресла и впредь. Зам по связи **Леонид Нетудыхата и Екатерина Фоменко** из блока Литвина особых вопросов у министра не вызвали. Последняя, ввиду малозначительности ее бюрократических функций, вообще никому не мешает. Что касается Нетудыхаты, то особых причин для его увольнения нет, поскольку БЮТ полностью контролирует «Укртелеком» через главу правления Григория Дзекона. Его бизнес-партнер по ряду предприятий («Энерго-нет», «Лікар-інфо») Евгений Зимин входит в парламентскую фракцию БЮТ. Еще один знакомец Дзекона - Виталий Чудновский – начальник охраны Тимошенко.

Таким образом, количество замов Иосифа Винского достигло уже девяти человек. Что, к слову, противоречит обещаниям Юлии Тимошенко сократить бюрократический аппарат в министерствах. Да и обещанный профессионализм нового правительства ничем не отличается от опыта предыдущих «проФФессионалов». По крайней мере, в транспортной отрасли.

ЧИТАЙТЕ ТАКЖЕ:

Кто управляет образованием

Читайте новости Comments.UA в социальных сетях facebook и twitter.

Источник: Юрий Николов

Источник фото:

Теги:

Версия для печати

Поделиться Поделиться в Google+

Recommend Sign Up to see what your friends recommend.

А ТЫ уже читаешь нас Вконтакте?

Follow Коментарі, новини України

Коментарі, новини України

25,645 followers

Karina Inessa Sergey Alexander Natalya Andrey Alexey Sergio Ivan Stanislav

Follow on VK

hotnews.ugmk

Ахметов отдал свой крупнейший актив россиянину

Почему «валятся» самолеты «Антонова»?

Как депутат-олигарх прячет свое состояние

0 Комментариев Comments.UA Вой...

Новое вначале Поделиться Избранный

Начать обсуждение....

Прокомментируйте первым.

ТАКЖЕ НА COMMENTS.UA ЧТО ЭТО?

Количество поддерживающих украинскую политику Путина «перешагнуло» три сотни ...

88 комментариев • 4 часа назад

Лиза — И что? Кто же их после этого уважает??? Бойкот артистам!

В Донецке пророссийские «титушки» избили митингующих за Украину

103 комментариев • 2 часа назад

Дмитрий — Где это вы начитались такого? Да хоть сколько Россия будет терять барабан у России денег достаточно я вам скажу по ...

Как сенаторы Совета Федерации намухлевали Путину войну с Украиной

18 комментариев • 3 часа назад

Сергей — Матвиенко - самый главный позор Украины, в которой она родилась!!! Жертва аборта!

В ГПУ говорят, что Янукович заработал уже четыре уголовных дела

3 комментариев • 3 часа назад

гость — ВОЛНИСТЫЙ ПОПУГАЙЧИК, не отвлекайся, работай, думать у тебя не получается

Подписаться Добавь Disqus на свой сайт

Фильм недели. Кинематограф мускулистого героизма

ГЛАВНОЕ™
новости • аналитика

20:16 09.03.2014
Героизм украинских военных в Крыму: голыми руками против армии оккупантов из России (+видео)

20:03 09.03.2014
Криминальные разборки в центре Харькова. Есть жертвы (+фото)

C8.Network

Погода 13.03.14, вечер

Погода в Киеве
+9°
влажность: **27%**
давление: **749 мм**
ветер: **4 м/с,**

Последние новости

20:30 В Донецке появляются патриотические граффити (ФОТО)

20:27 В Росии закрывают доступ к оппозиционным сайтам и блогам

20:13 В Киеве произошло массовое отравление кулинарией из супермаркета Billa

20:03 В Донецке пророссийские «титушки» избили митингующих за Украину

19:51 Ярема пояснил, почему Аксенов до сих пор не задержан

19:36 В ГПУ говорят, что Янукович заработал уже четыре уголовных дела

19:28 Прокуроры хотят отправить Кернеса под домашний арест

19:19 Федерацию футбола и Премьер-лигу ожидает аудит

19:17 Фрегат ВМС Франции направляется в Черное море

19:16 Как сенаторы Совета Федерации намухлевали Путину войну с Украиной

Читать все »

Последние статьи

Как ищут главу «Укрзализныци» »

Поможет ли технологическая нейтральность появлению связи 3G и 4G? »

Читать все »

Яндекс.Директ

Морские перевозки контейнеров!

Мультимодальные грузоперевозки. Морские перевозки контейнеров!

Контейнерные перевозки

по России, СНГ и международные авто, жд, море; таможенное оформление.

Расчет стоимости грузоперевозки

Грузовые перевозки по России и миру. От 1 кг. Гарантии. От 2,70 руб./кг!

Регионы

Львов

Підстав для перенесення виборів немає - Турчинов »

Днепропетровск

Ультрас «Днепра» зовут приходить на стадион с флагами »

Черновцы

Жителі буковинського села звернулись до кримчан »

ищу работу наборщика текста в киеве, правдивое гадание онлайн, avtosale.ua

comments.ua КОММЕНТАРИИ:
© «Комментарии:», 2014
bigmir)net 182906 688409
каталог сайтов i.ua 472 066 131 597 3 454 1 529 1 154 1 154 система Orphus

При воспроизведении или цитировании статей, опубликованных на Информационно-аналитическом портале «КОММЕНТАРИИ:» (comments.ua), указания имени авторов и источника обязательно. Интернет-ресурсам запрещено цитировать и воспроизводить текстовые материалы Информационно-аналитического портала «КОММЕНТАРИИ:» (comments.ua) без указания активной гиперссылки на www.comments.ua (не закрытой от индексирования поисковыми системами) непосредственно в тексте новости, не ниже второго абзаца, а также вносить изменения в тексты без письменного разрешения редакции портала. Перепечатка, копирование или воспроизведение информации, содержащей ссылку на информационные агентства «Интерфакс-Украина», «Українські новини», УНИАН, в каком-либо виде строго запрещены. Фотографии, изображения принадлежат правообладателям. Редакция портала может не разделять мнение автора и не несет ответственности за авторские материалы. Оценочные суждения не подлежат опровержению и доказыванию их правдивости. За достоверность и содержание рекламы ответственность несет рекламодатель. В разделе «Дайджест» публикуются материалы, ранее опубликованные другими СМИ.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

a. http://comments.ua/politics/28675-Kto-upravlyaet-transportom.html

Who Controls the Transportation?
02/12/2008 **16:01**

Here's the sequel of our articles about the members of Timoshenko's Cabinet of Ministers. Due to the affiliation to Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and Socialist Party, Iosif Vinskiy was granted the position of the Minister of Transportation as a representative of a new "business clan".

The newly-appointed Minister of Transportation and Communications, Iosif Vikentievich Vinskiy is completely unaware of transportation issues. However, he is a renowned expert in the sphere of management and finance. For many years he was the chief curator and party functionary of the Socialist Party's financial flows. After the resignation of Alexander Moroz, Iosif Vikentievich proved himself to Yulia Tymoshenko, so she appointed him on the Minister position after the rejection of Tariel Vasadze. Thus, he eagerly put his hand to the plough revealing his mastery as a money-man and party functionary. On January 11, all previously conducted tenders for the purchase of material and technical resources for the year of 2008 have been canceled. Previous suppliers are now waiting for the upcoming haggles with the "new broom".

The "Donetsk" officials are being replaced by the members of Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and previous associates of Vinskiy from Socialist Party. However, some specialists that used to work for Nicholay Rudkovskiy preserved their positions in the structure of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. For example, Andrei Pazyuk, the head of patronage service of ex-minister Rudkovskiy, became the personal assistant of minister Vinskiy. His was superseded by Petr Ustenko (№ 60 in the Socialist Party's list), who used to be the Counselor for Economic Affairs of Aleksandr Moroz. Moreover, Ustenko can be called a successful businessman (he produces the wine under the brand "Zolota Balka"). But his main business assets constitute the holding company "Ispolin" and the financial and credit company "Lev". Traces of these companies can be found among the founders of companies seeking the possibilities to optimize the taxation.

From this we can conclude that Vinskiy like a real head-hunter either destroys the financial resources of Alexander Moroz with the view of the calculated overturn in the Socialist Party or his conflict with the Socialists' leader is not so serious at all.

One representative of the aviation market told «proUA» about the situation that took place at the beginning of last year. **Airlines had to pay VAT on kerosene consumption. But VAT refund turned into bargaining on the commission with the State Tax Service of Ukraine controlled by Azarov. Rudkovskiy team managed to get a "bulk discount", so carriers received the offer – they could get the VAT refund for just 10% of "kickback". Certainly, this offer was profitable for some businessmen but yet many refused to pay.**

So, now the new officials will try to establish the interaction of business and government, while Nikolay Rudkovskiy will probably experience the full-scale problems with Security Service of

Ukraine. Nevertheless, he provoked these troubles only by himself. Last summer, the President's Secretariat demanded from the Cabinet of Ministers controlled by Yanukovych to "surrender" the Minister of Transportation and the Minister of Emergency Situations. Thus, Nestor Shufrich, the member of Party of Regions, came to his senses and reduced the degree of his anti-presidential statements and even joined him to put out a fire in Kherson. But the socialist Rudkovskiy pretended that he "did not understand" that hint and proceeded to discuss Victor Baloga and the head of Security Service of Ukraine, Valentyn Nalyvaychenko. In response, the Security Service of Ukraine has started the legal proceedings against him, so now he can get imprisoned at any moment.

However, this case may fall apart as Boris Kolesnikov's case. Therefore, Party of Regions needs to get mobilized for a fight with Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc. Meanwhile the "dons" do not put much effort in this struggle with the president's enemy. At least for now.
But let us put off the story about the misfortunes of former Minister of Transportation and Communications and move on to the deputies team of the current minister.
First Deputy Minister, Vasiliy Vasilievich Shevchenko (member of Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc). According to the coalition agreement the position of First Deputy of the Minister who is a member of Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc was left for "orange" representative. The Presidential Secretariat chose this experienced party functionary of the central executive committee of the People's Union "Our Ukraine", which took part in the early elections to Parliament occupying the 171-th position in the Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc's list. There is a rumor that it is Vasiliy Shevchenko who asked: "Is it hard to work as a first deputy minister?" No wonder that over the last month of work in the Transport Ministry Vasiliy Shevchenko "showed up" only as the head of the commission investigating the accident with "Sergei Skadovskiy", the ship that sank in the Sea of Azov.
Deputy Minister, Vadim Nikolaevich Gurzhos (Presidential Secretariat).
That is another alien representative working in the Ministry of Transportation which is controlled by the members of Socialist Party and Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc. In 2002 he was a member of "Team of Winter Generation", later became a cofounder of the fund "Veche of Ukraine" together with Inna Bogoslovskaya, and in 2006 was the leader of Private Property Party. But above all he is known for his friendship and nepotism with Yevgeniy Chervonenko, who appointed him as a head of State Road Administration of Ukraine, while being the Minister of Transport in 2005.
With the help of Viktor Yushchenko, Eugene Alfredovich recently returned to national politics being appointed on a ministerial post as the head of National Agency in charge of Euro 2012. But he discovered that despite the notorious position, *his ability to influence the financial flows to be spent on building of the football infrastructure were extremely limited.* However, due to the fact that he was still in good relations with Bankova representatives, Chervonenko succeeded to appoint Gurzhos as a Minister of Transportation - with an eye on road construction. In recent months, Vadim occupied a position of a deputy of Vera Ulianchenko, the governor of Kiev, working on the problem of building a ring road around Kiev. He will supervise the same issue at

the Ministry of Transportation (as the President issued a decree ordering the Cabinet of Ministers to build this road together with Kiev Regional State Administration).
Chervonenko is also associated with another designation in the sphere of road administration: he insisted to appoint **Zenoviy Vasilievich Holodnyuk** as deputy head of State Road Administration of Ukraine. Since 2004 he worked as the head of the insurance company belonging to the VAB-bank group. This Group is controlled by Sergey Maksimov in tandem with whom Chervonenko and Yefim Zvyagilskiy founded a Jewish Confederation of Ukraine in defiance of Vadim Rabinovich.

Head of State Road Administration of Ukraine, Petr Konstantinovich Kravchuk (Yulia Tymoshenko).

Joseph Vinskiy *announced* the return of the department to the Ministry subjection (State Road Administration of Ukraine became independent from the Ministry by the order of Cabinet of Ministers controlled by Yanukovych when Rudkovskiy was the Minister of Transportation). but there are reasons to doubt the success of this operation. According to «*proUA*», the head of State Road Administration of Ukraine was personally appointed by prime minister in order to avoid the influence of the Presidential Secretariat on the financial flows to be spent on road construction.
45-year-old owner of a medium-sized business (trucking, stores, and manufacture of stones) has strong connection to Volyn region. Having graduated from Lviv Polytechnic National University majoring in "Automobiles and motor transport enterprises" he was a cofounder of Volyn Judo Federation and the local department of Ukrainian Social Democratic Party controlled by Onopenko. In 2006 Kravchuk became the people's deputy of Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc's faction in the Parliament being on the list of Social Democratic Party.

Deputy Minister, Igor Anatolievich Urbanskiy (Iosif Vinskiy).

The first major personnel decision made by Iosif Vinskiy as the Minister of Transportation was the introduction of an additional deputy minister and the appointment of his colleague on this position who was an apolitical expert on maritime transport.
In 2005 it was Vasiliy Tsushko, the governor of Odessa, who acquainted Urbanskiy with Vinskiy. Prior to that, Igor Anatolievich was the authoritative Odessa transporter. His shipping empire "Kaalbye" has developed greatly since Soviet times (when Urbanskiy was an ordinary sea captain) that it started to require the political cover-up. The appearance of "Kaalbye" is shrouded in legends about the arms smuggling. Both the origin of Urbanskiy (his father served in military) and the career of his classmate in Kutaisi (who became the personal bodyguard of Eduard Shevardnadze) serve as evidence of these legends.
In 2001, one of the "Kaalbye"'s ships "showed up" in Spanish Majorca. The local customs detected a large shipment of weapons which had been going from Russia to Angola that was concealed on board. In addition, the company was mentioned in connection with the illegal supply of cruise missiles X-55 to Iran.
In 2006 the presence of too many rumors prevented Urbanskiy from winning the intraparty struggle for the Ministry of Transport that was granted to Nikolay Rudkovskiy.
Despite the fact that Urbanskiy left Socialist Party in order to become a member of Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and Vinskiy's depositary, he hasn't broken off the relations with the Socialists. Just a month before his appointment, the State Property Fund of Ukraine controlled by

Valentina Semenyuk decided to sell "Izmail Shipyard" to ISSZ company which leased the plant while being controlled by Urbanskiy.

One of the first steps of a new Deputy was the appointment of 29-year-old Yuriy Yurievich Kruk as an acting Head of the South Port (Odessa region.). Yuri Kruk who is the son of Yuriy Borisovich Kruk (YTB), the deputy head of Verkhovna Rada transport committee. It is expected that another Kruk's son, Vyacheslav, will take charge of Danube Shipping Company.

The Kruks are strongly connected with Igor Urbanskiy. Until 2004, before it was granted to Urbanskiy's company, the aforementioned shipyard in Izmail was controlled by the Kruks. These people can be characterized by their political omnivory with the emphasis on the stable possibility to influence the authorities. So, in recent years Kruk-father became the member of YTB, his son joined the Green Party, and Urbanskiy deserted the Socialist Party in order to become a member of YTB. Nevertheless, they haven't broken off the connection with Party of Regions.

Even during the anti-crisis coalition Igor Urbanski spent a couple of months as a Deputy Minister, and this position was created specially for him. But when some members of the Socialist Party of Ukraine were granted positions in the executive branch, his 37th place in the electoral list allowed Urbansky to become the people's deputy. In this context, one can remember the story of the recent formation of the "orange" coalition. When Andriy Klyuyev, the Deputy Prime Minister, approved the appointment of Kruk Jr. as the head of port "South", so Kruk Sr. refused to sign the coalition agreement on which he previously agreed.

Deputy Minister, Anatoliy Vladimirovich Klimenko (Iosif Vinskiy).

In the 90s having graduated from the Higher School of the KGB in Minsk, Klimenko worked as a deputy head of Dnipropetrovsk regional state administration and became the co-founder of the charity fund "Motherland without orphans". In 2002 he entered the Parliament where he joined the "United Ukraine" fraction controlled by Bogdan Gubskiy. In 2004, Klimenko moved to a fraction of the Socialist Party, but when Vinskiy left Alexandr Moroz, Klimenko decided not to take part in the early elections as a member of Socialist Party. So, at the moment former KGB Major General is in charge of Financial Inspection of Ministry of Transportation and Communication.

Deputy Minister –Head of State Department of Motor Transportation, Leonid Grigorievich Sergienko (SPoU).

As in the case with Klimenko, his career began in Dnepropetrovsk. Leonid Sergienko was a businessman (Ukrainian-German JV "Dnepromayn"). In 2002 he was elected to parliament as a member of "United Ukraine" fraction, but after Maidan he changed it to SPoU. Nevertheless, he hasn't severed the relationships with Alexandr Moroz as in 2006 he appeared on the 40th position (impassable) in the list of the Socialist Party, and was appointed as the deputy minister of Ministry of Transportation. Since then he is in charge of motor transportations. **It is interesting that this week Sergienko's position got strengthened: he became the head of State Department of Motor Transportation. At present, this is a tough position as automotive managers are known for their rude manners.** Thus, the public found out about the foreign missions of minister Rudkovskiy using the budget funds *from the interview*

of Anatoliy Tkachenko, the sacked head of International Motor Transportation Department of Ukraine...

Deputy Minister, Vladimir Fedorovich Badagov (Konstantin Zhevago).

63-year-old member of Poltava Regional Council (SPoU fraction) spent the last ten years working as a CEO of Poltava Ore Processing Plant which belonged to the business group of Konstantin Zhevago, the oligarch and the member of YTB. He hasn't managed to enter the parliament on the last two elections being on the list of SPoU. *According to the preliminary information*, Badagov will supervise the Railway Transport Department. This will help the YTB oligarchs from metallurgy lobby to discount prices for freight railway transportations for their companies.

Deputy Minister - head of State Aviation Administration, Aleksandr Nikolaevich Davydov (Yulia Tymoshenko).

Back in 1996 Davydov headed the aviation department of "United Energy Systems of Ukraine" controlled by Yulia Tymoshenko having spent 12 years on Yak-40 in Dnepropetrovsk squadron. At the same time he was a head of "EES-Avia". Later Yulia Tymoshenko arranged his appointment as an assistant of Minister of Transportation in the Cabinet of Ministers controlled by Valeriy Pustovojtenko from the "Dnepropetrovsk" clan. In 2002, Davydov headed "Airlines of Ukraine", but he couldn't work well together with the Yanukovych government, so he returned to the Aviation Safety Department of State Aviation Administration only after Maidan and then entered the Kiev council being on the lists of YTB. However, even before that the aforementioned "EES - Avia" took over 4 hectares of land near the "Boryspil" that prevented the realizations of plans to expand the airport's territory lobbied by Victor Pinchuk's company "Aerosvit" (further evidence of the long-standing mutual hostility between Tymoshenko and Kuchma's son-in-law). In 2006, Viktor Bondar, the Minister of Transportation, decided to investigate the problem with "Boryspil's" territory. **After having finally revealed the owners of the territory, Alexandr Turchinov visited the airport staff meeting. Tymoshenko's charge d'affaires refused to have anything to do with "EES-Avia" but he supported the position of "rebellious" airport staff. Perhaps that was because of the fact that in addition to "EES-Avia" another 43 hectares of conflict airport's territory were occupied by the company that was controlled by the wife of then-airport director.**
Last year, when "Aerosvit" and "Donbassaero" controlled by Ahmetov declared about their strategic alliance, the government supported the Pinchuk's company and recently it was announced that "Borispol" received first tranche of $ 8,000,000 from the Japanese government for the reconstruction of the airport.

The old guard of deputies who survived the first wave of purges, apparently managed to keep their positions. **Leonid Netudykhata**, the Deputy in charge of Communications and **Yekaterina Fomenko** from Lytvyn bloc will undoubtedly remain on their posts. The latter, due to her insignificant bureaucratic functions, definitely won't destroy somebody's plans. Moreover, there are no specific reasons for Netudykhata dismissal as YTB completely controls the "Ukrtelecom" through Gregory Dzekon, the head of its Board. Yevgeniy Zimin, his business partner in a number of companies ("Energo-net", "Likar-info"), entered the parliament being a member of YTB fraction. Vitaliy Chudnovskiy, another friend of Dzekon, is Tymoshenko's chief of security.

Thus, the number of Iosif Vinskiy deputies has reached nine people. That, by the way, contradicts the promises of Yulia Tymoshenko to reduce the bureaucracy in the ministries. So, the promised professionalism of the new government is no different from the professionalism of previous Donetsk clans. At least in the transportation sector.

READ ALSO:

Certified Translation
InWhatLanguage.com
Certified Translation

EXHIBIT 24

Выпуск № 44 от 06 марта 2008 г.

РАБОЧАЯ ГАЗЕТА

Подписаться на наше издание через Интернет можно на сайте ГП "Пресса" www.presa.ua с помощью сервиса "Подписаться On-line"

Куда «плывем», боцман?

06.03.2008 , № 44 от 06 марта 2008 г.

В тесной связке с вышеупомянутым семейством работает еще один “серый кардинал” морского бизнеса. Речь идет о нынешнем заместителе министра транспорта и связи Игоре Урбанском. Но, в отличие от политика Крука, депутат Верховной Рады 5-го созыва Игорь Анатольевич Урбанский — чистый бизнесмен, с именем которого связывают следующие компании:

ООО “Эвас”

“Kaalbye ltd.”

“Каалбай шиппинг (Сайпрус) Лтд.”

“Каалбай марин сервис”

“Каалбай эйдженси сервисез Лтд.”

“Каалбай марин сервисез Лтд.”

ООО “Каалбай шиппинг Украина”

“Каалбай Ойл Сервис”

“Каалбай шиппинг Сервис”

АОЗТ “Эпикор”

АОЗТ “Эпсилон”

Холдинг “Каалбай Групп”

• “Украинское морское агентство”

• “Каалбай Транспорт”

• “Каалбай шиппинг Украина”

Назначение Ю.Крука-младшего начальником порта “Южный” было бы невозможным без прямого содействия Игоря Урбанского, который (вместе со своим “компаньоном” В.Г.Работневым, умудрившимся подставить В.А.Ющенко на переговорах с президентом Румынии, а также дважды ранее уволенным из таких организаций, как Укрморречфлот и Госфлотинспекция) является одним из вдохновителей идеи о создании частных стивидорных компаний на базе не только порта “Южный”, но и других государственных морских портов.

Однако примечателен этот человек не только этим.

В 1986 г. Игорь Урбанский решил, что капитан дальнего плавания — это не его профессия, и начал заниматься бизнесом.

В Одессе в Приморском районе в 1992 г. было зарегистрировано ООО “Эвас”, где директором работал сам Игорь Анатольевич Урбанский. Чем занималась фирма? Согласно статистической отчетности, предоставлением услуг в сфере общественного питания и посредничеством при купле-продаже товаров народного потребления.

Следующий раз государство узнало об Урбанском только в 1996 г.

Сначала на острове Мэн (юрисдикция Великобритании) была зарегистрирована “Kaalbye Ltd.”, которая, в свою очередь, создала на Кипре оффшорную “дочку” “Каалбай шиппинг (Сайпрус) Лтд.”. Последняя открыла свое представительство в Одессе, назначив его директором Игоря Анатольевича Урбанского.

Были зарегистрированы компании “Каалбай Ойл Сервис”, “Каалбай марин сервис”, “Каалбай эйдженси сервисез”, “Каалбай марин сервисез” и просто “Каалбай шиппинг Украина”. У “Каалбай” появился даже собственный профсоюз.

В конце зимы 2001 г. из морского порта “Октябрьский” (Николаевская область, Украина) в Африку отплыло судно “Анастасия”. На его борту, кроме всего прочего, находилось 636 тонн груза, который был обозначен как “генеральный”.

По пути в Анголу 24 февраля 2001 г. “Анастасия” зашла для бункеровки в испанский порт Лас-Пальмас на Канарских островах и, согласно заведенной процедуре, приняла на борт местных чиновников.

При проверке оказалось, что на борту “Анастасии” находится большая партия оружия, боеприпасов и военного снаряжения.

По существующей практике это имущество должно было именоваться в документах как “груз первого класса” (взрывчатые вещества, оружие и пр.), подлежало обязательному декларированию и требовало специального разрешения Министерства иностранных дел Испании для транспортировки по испанской территории или через территориальные воды страны.

Расследование обнаружило следующее.

Заявление капитана “Анастасии” о том, что судно приписано к порту Батуми (Грузия), оказалось ложью. Флаг республики Грузия

Заявление капитана "Анастасии" о том, что судно приписано к порту Батуми (Грузия), оказалось ложью. Флаг республики Грузия, как 2 марта 2001 г. заявил МИД Грузии, “Анастасия” несла незаконно. И поскольку на ее борту не было ни одного гражданина Грузии, в Тбилиси вообще отказались от любого участия в этом инциденте.

Оружие продала российская государственная фирма “Росвооружение”. Конечным покупателем оружия была ангольская государственная компания “Симпортекс”. Портом приписки “Анастасии” оказалась Одесса, а судно фрахтовала компания “Каалбай шиппинг”.

Объясняться пришлось, естественно, украинцам. Исполнительный директор “Каалбай шиппинг” Сергей Лапин вышел из трудного положения, свалив вину на капитана “Анастасии”: “Скандал вызван элементарной ошибкой капитана. Он указал в документах “генеральный груз” вместо “опасный груз”...

Тот скандал стоил И. Урбанскому $ 850 000 штрафа и длительного простоя “Анастасии” в порту Лас-Пальмаса. Но, возможно, эти потери были покрыты доходами от другой операции по контрабанде оружия, в которой приняла участие “Каалбай шиппинг”?

Речь идет о продаже Ирану крылатых ракет Х-55.

Иран купил 6 (шесть) ракет Х-55 и систему наземного обеспечения КНО-120.

Организацию доставки груза от продавца к покупателю взяла на себя компания “Каалбай шиппинг”.

Дело в том, что эти “изделия” относятся к стратегическим наступательным вооружениям (СНВ) и подпадают под действие договора о СНВ от 31 июля 1991 г. между СССР и США. Украина присоединилась к этому договору в качестве независимого безъядерного государства в 1994 г. и взяла на себя обязательство “не распространять стратегические вооружения”.

Кроме того, на ракеты Х-55 распространяется соглашение “Международный режим контроля за ракетными технологиями” (РКРТ), членом которого Украина является с 1998 г.

И самое главное — все ракеты Х-55 Украина, от греха подальше, вообще должна была уничтожить! И сделала это, по крайней мере, на бумаге. На самом деле 20 штук Х-55 просто перевезли на другие склады и “забыли” там.

Тайна была раскрыта в 2005 г. Предварительное следствие и суд, проведенные в Украине, завершились вынесением приговоров участникам сделки.

В 2004-2005 гг. только самые ленивые журналисты не писали об этом скандале, но информация о соучастии в нем “Каалбай шиппинг” появилась только в июне 2006 г.

В мае-июне 2006 г. различные политики стали лоббировать назначение Урбанского либо губернатором Одесской области, либо министром транспорта Украины. Не удалось.

20 сентября 2006 г. Урбанский получил пост первого заместителя министра транспорта и связи Украины, введенный Кабинетом министров специально для него, и стал курировать морехозяйственный комплекс (порты), авиацию и связи Минтранса с ВР.

В должности первого замминистра он продержался менее двух месяцев — с сентября по ноябрь 2006 г. Во-первых, министр Н.Рудьковский не забыл конкуренции за влияние на партийных вождей. Во-вторых, сам Урбанский не мог тогда особо повлиять на

тех бизнесменов, в том числе и российских, которые давно превратили украинские порты в свою вотчину. И, главное, в-третьих, расследование участия группы компаний “Каалбай” в контрабандных поставках оружия не было закончено ни в Украине, ни в России, ни в Европе...

Новое пришествие Урбанского и компании, легко меняющей знамена, под которыми они зарабатывают свой авторитет, активы и денежные знаки, только началось, но уже скоро читатель сможет узнать о продаже должностей, реорганизации государственных структур и предприятий, изменении собственников и победах близких людей и фирм во всевозможных конкурсах и тендерах — если их не остановить. А остановить их надо немедленно, потому что стиль работы этих людей — “до первого милиционера”, которому небезразлична судьба морской отрасли страны. И неважно, где этот “милиционер” находится: на Грушевского, на Банковой или в другом месте. Важно, чтобы он захотел поинтересоваться, разобраться и пресечь деятельность указанных выше “государственных” мужей, как это было не раз.

КОММЕНТИРОВАТЬ комментариев: 0

печатная версия

Двум протестующим "титушки" отрубили головы, - активист. ШОКИРУЮЩЕЕ ВИ...

Офицер, обнародовавший ВИДЕО издевательств "Беркута" над голым...

Полковник Мамчур и майор Бабий произносят речь перед атакой на россиян на авиаба...

Путин не рассчитывал на быструю и однозначную реакцию мира на вторжение в Украин...

Кучма рассказал, кто должен стать новым Премьером

© Рабочая Газета, 2008-2010.

Создание сайта Limenet

ENGLISH
TRANSLATION

Hey boatswain, where are we "sailing" to?

06.03.2008 , No. 44 March 06, 2008 г.

Another "grey eminence" of maritime business operates in close conjunction with the aforementioned family. We are talking about Igor Urbanskiy, the current Deputy Minister of Transport and Communications. But, unlike Kruk who is a politician, Igor Urbanskiy, the deputy of the 5th convocation of Verkhovna Rada, is a clean businessman whose name is associated with the following companies:
LLC "Evas"
"Kaalbye ltd."
"Kaalbye Shipping (Cyprus) Ltd."
"Kaalbye Marine Service"
"Kaalbye Agency Services Ltd."
"Kaalbye Marine Services Ltd."
LLC "Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine"
"Kaalbye Oil Service"
"Kaalbye Shipping Service"
JSC "Epikor"
JSC "Epsilon"
Holding "Kaalbye Group"
• " Ukrainian Marine Agency "
• " Kaalbye Transport "
Appointment of Yuriy Kruk Jr. as a chief of the port "South" would have been impossible without the direct assistance of Igor Urbanskiy who (along with his "companion" V.G. Rabotnev who managed to cross Viktor Yushchenko up at the talks with the President of Romania and who was dismissed from such organizations as State Administration of Sea and River Transportation and Shipping Safety State Administration) is one of the masterminds of the idea to create the private stevedoring companies that would be based not only in the port "South" but also in the other public seaports.
However, this person is remarkable for some other reasons.
In 1986 Igor Urbanskiy decided that he wasn't born for a sea captain profession and went into business.
In 1992 in Primorsky district of Odessa, the LLC "Evas" where Igor Urbanskiy worked as a CEO was registered. What services did the company provide? According to the statistical reports, the company provided the services in sphere of public catering as well as the mediation when buying and selling of consumer goods.
The next time Urbanskiy appeared only in 1996.
First, "Kaalbye Ltd." was registered on the Isle of Man (Jurisdiction of Great Britain) which, in turn, created a Cyprus offshore subsidiary "Kaalbye Shipping (Cyprus) Ltd.". The latter opened a representative office in Odessa, with Igor Anatolievich Urbanskiy on the director position.
The following companies were registered: "Kaalbye Oil Service", "Kaalbye Marine Service", "Kaalbye Agency Services", "Kaalbye Marine Services" and just "Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine". Moreover, "Kaalbye" company appeared to have its own trade union.

In late winter of 2001 the vessel called "Anastasia" left seaport "October" (Nikolaev region, Ukraine) and set off for Africa. Among the other things 636 tons of cargo were taken aboard that were designated as "general".
On February 24, 2001, on the way to Angola "Anastasia" visited the Spanish port of Las Palmas in the Canary Islands for bunkering, and in accordance with the procedure the local officials boarded the vessel.
When checking the local officials found a large consignment of arms, ammunition and military equipment on board of "Anastasia".
Under the existing practice, this property should have been named as "first-class cargo" (explosives, weapons, etc.) in order to be the subject to mandatory declaration and its transportation through the Spanish territory or territorial waters of the country required special permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain.
The investigation revealed the following.
It appeared that the statement made by the captain of "Anastasia" regarding the fact that the vessel is assigned to the port of Batumi (Georgia), was a lie. On March 2, 2001 Georgian Foreign Ministry said that "Anastasia" didn't have the right to carry the flag of the Republic of Georgia. And as there were no citizens of Georgia on its board, Tbilisi officially refused to be involved in this incident.
These weapons were sold by a Russian state company "Rosvooruzhenie." And Angolan state company "Simporteks" was stated as a final buyer of these weapons. Odessa was a homeport of "Anastasia" and the vessel was chartered by "Kaalbye Shipping".
So, the Ukrainians had to explain the existing situation. Sergey Lapin, the Executive Director of "Kaalbye Shipping" landed on his feet blaming the captain of "Anastasia": "This scandal evoked due to the elementary captain's mistake. He indicated "general cargo" instead of "dangerous cargo" in the documents"...
Iosif Urbanskiy had to pay $ 850,000 of fines in order to smotherк up the scandal and "Anastasia" was a subject to a lengthy downtime in the port of Las Palmas. But perhaps "Kaalbye Shipping" could cover these losses by the revenues from the other operations with weapons smuggling?
It is about the selling of Kh-55 cruise missiles to Iran.
Iran has bought six (6) X-55 missiles and the ground support system KNO-120.
"Kaalbye Shipping" took over the organization of delivery from the seller to the buyer.
The matter is that these "products" are considered as Strategic Arms (SA), and are the subject to the START treaty signed on July 31, 1991 between the USSR and the USA. In 1994 Ukraine acceded to the treaty as an independent non-nuclear state and undertook a commitment "not to distribute strategic arms".
In addition, since 1998 Ukraine is a member of "International Rocket Technologies Control Regime" (RTCP) which controls the usage of Kh-55.
And most importantly - Ukraine had to destroy all the Kh-55missiles! And that was performed according o the documents. In fact, 20 items of X-55 were just moved to the other warehouses and were "forgotten" there.
The secret was revealed in 2005. Preliminary trial and investigation conducted in Ukraine resulted in sentencing the transaction parties.
In 2004-2005 this scandal was discussed in press but the information about the "Kaalbye Shipping" participation appeared only in June of 2006.

In May-June 2006, various politicians began lobbying the appointment of Urbanskiy either as a governor of Odessa region, or as a Minister of Transportation of Ukraine. Nevertheless, they failed to do that.

On September 20, 2006 Urbanskiy was appointed as the First Deputy Minister of Transportation and Communications of Ukraine, this position was introduced by Cabinet of Ministers specifically for him. So, he started controlling the maritime complex (ports), Aviation, and Ministry's interactions with Verkhovna Rada.

He spent less than two months on the position of first deputy minister (September - November 2006). First of all, Minister Nikolay Rudkovskiy did not forget the competition for the influence on the party leaders. Secondly, at that point of time even Urbanskiy could not influence on the decisions of those businessmen, including the Russians who have transformed the Ukrainian ports into their ancestral lands. And, most importantly, thirdly, the investigation of "Kaalbye" group of companies' participation in smuggling arms shipments was not finished neither in Ukraine nor in Russia nor in Europe...

The new appearance of Urbanskiy and Co. who used to change their banners in order to earn their authority, assets and funds, just started but soon the reader will learn about the sold posts, reorganization of government agencies and businesses, change of owners and wins of close friends and their companies in various competitions and tenders – so, they definitely should be stopped. And they should be stopped immediately due to the fact that these people will control the maritime industry of the country until someone notices their illegal activities. And no matter where this indifferent person works: on Hrushevskoho, on Bankova, or elsewhere. It is important to ask the necessary questions in order to understand and to prevent the activities of the above "public" persons, as was already previously done.

Certified Translation
inWhatLanguage.com
Certified Translation

EXHIBIT 25

Яндекс.Директ
Проверенный бизнес план для
новичков! Выручка 90 000 руб. в мес. Начальный капитал - 7800 руб.
super-earn.com

ЭКОНОМИКА

«Теневые капитаны» морского транспорта Украины

Морская отрасль на сегодняшний день – одна из немногих, остающаяся под контролем государства. Это двадцать государственных...

...морских торговых портов и более полусотни других государственных предприятий, деятельность которых так или иначе связана с морским и речным транспортом. В денежном исчислении все это добро тянет на порядка десяти миллиардов гривен доходов госпредприятий и более двух миллиардов налоговых отчислений в государственный бюджет, который, к слову, в этом году определен на уровне плюс 20 процентов к 2007-му.

Пока премьер и Президент спорят по поводу необходимости приватизации ряда государственных предприятий, группа влиятельных в морской отрасли чиновников без всяких конкурсов проводит тихую оккупацию государственных морских активов.

Кажущаяся организованность и продуманность вертикали государственного контроля и управления морской отраслью (Министерство транспорта и связи – Государственный департамент морского и речного транспорта), наличие многочисленного штата государственных служащих, отвечающих за состояние дел «на море», не должны вводить читателя в заблуждение. На самом деле заправилами морской отрасли является довольно узкая группа людей. Об их существовании и делах все знают, но вслух говорят нечасто.

Крук-старший и Крук-младший

Итак, первым в нашей «табели о рангах» значится некто Крук Юрий Борисович. Народный депутат последних пяти созывов. Постоянный член или даже глава транспортных комитетов Верховной Рады. Заслуженный работник транспорта Украины. С апреля 2005 года член фракции БЮТ. Имеет троих сыновей, пошедших по стопам отца.

Справка. Ю.Б. Крук родился 2 июня 1941 года в Херсоне, закончил Херсонский судомеханический техникум и Одесский институт инженеров морского флота. В 1980-1988 гг. - начальник Ильичевского морского рыбного порта. В 1988-1992 гг. - заместитель генерального директора Черноморского ПО рыбной промышленности «Антарктика». С февраля 1992-го - заместитель начальника Главного планово-экономического управления Одесского облисполкома. С марта того же года - заместитель по морехозяйству, транспорту и связи главы Одесской облгосадминистрации. С марта по июнь 1995 года - заместитель министра транспорта Украины - директор департамента морского и речного транспорта.

Несколько лет назад семейство создало страховую компанию «Инто-Санта», чтобы, с одной стороны, на добровольных началах, с другой, достаточно настойчиво «обложить» Одесский порт «страховой скорой помощью». Кроме того, сперва Одесский порт (не без финансового участия которого построена и больница скорой помощи компании «Инто-Санта»), а затем другие порты стали платить бюджетные деньги за «страхование» жизни портовиков. Надо объяснять, в чьи карманы потекли миллионы из бюджетных денег под предлогом страхования...

каналы более объективные
я против, потому что если мы запрещаем информацию - значит мы ее боимся
запрещайте, не запрещайте, я их не смотрю
я никаких каналов не смотрю
а когда это запретили?

Голосовать

РЕКЛАМА

Пуховики фирмы Joutsen
Статьи о бизнесе и производстве. Курток, накидок, пальто, дубленок и др.
bigbrands-shop.ru
Ремонт iphone
Ремонт квартир, офисов, магазинов. Быстро, качественно, недорого
appleprofessional.ru

В портах были зафиксированы случаи с летальным исходом, когда травмированным на производстве простым портовикам срочно требовалась медицинская помощь, а «Инто-Санта» отказывалась не только оказывать такую помощь, но даже приезжать к месту ЧП, чтобы доставить пострадавшего в больницу!

Порты юга Одесской области были до такой степени «обласканы» пятикратным народным депутатом, что ныне все они либо практически полностью опустошены, либо близки к этому состоянию.

Это Рени, Измаил, Килия, Усть-Дунайск. Есть сведения о том, что еще пригодные к эксплуатации морские суда принудительно выводили из эксплуатации, ставили в док, якобы для ремонта, затем разбирали и снимали все ценные запчасти, в том числе гребные винты весом в несколько тонн каждый, состоящие из чистой меди и других цветных металлов. Все это вместе с «убитыми» таким образом судами продавалось за границу.

Потом в сферу интересов семьи попал порт «Южный». Случилось это якобы после провала нескольких попыток накинуть узду на контейнерный бизнес Одесского морского порта. И это несмотря на договоренности с несколькими министрами транспорта. Но как бы там ни было, вскоре исполняющим обязанности начальника порта «Южный» назначается сын г-на Крука Юрий. В свои 29 лет так же, как и отец, он уже - почетный работник транспорта Украины. Безусловно, молодость – не порок. Но, господа, не слишком ли большой груз «почетности» для молодого человека с 7-летним стажем работы? До назначения на должность стратегически важного порта он принимал участие в учредительстве нескольких экспедиторских компаний (ожидаем в течение месяца появление их, либо их клонов в порту «Южный») и небольшой стивидорной компании под названием «Украинская национальная стивидорная компания», которая осуществляет деятельность на причале Одесского морского порта, имеющем наименьшую осадку и оснащенность. Работа данной компании началась после формально проведенного конкурса, в ходе которого руководство Одесского порта под давлением Крука-отца по какой-то уж очень странной логике отдало предпочтение именно «Украинской национальной стивидорной компании», а не фирмам, имеющим наработанную базу грузопотоков, технику, профессиональный персонал.

Приняв должность начальника порта «Южный», сын большого папы начал свою деятельность с подготовки общественного мнения о необходимости создания на основе порта частной стивидорной компании для переработки грузов, прекрасно понимая, что существующая грузовая база и техника порта не требуют каких-либо дополнительных капиталовложений со стороны. А ментальность, работа только в своем частном бизнесе, не допускает сомнений в том, кому именно будет принадлежать ожидаемая стивидорная компания. Вот только один момент был забыт этим достопочтенным семейством. А именно то, что порт - это государственное предприятие, и передача основных средств и техники порта частной стивидорной компании является не чем иным, как скрытой приватизацией, после которой доходы порта и отчисления в госбюджет уменьшатся в разы, а большая часть сотрудников порта останутся безработными.

Так как работа по скрытой приватизации порта – дело достаточно долгое и затратное, параллельно с созданием частной стивидорной компании Крук-младший проводит планомерную работу по выбиванию «быстрых денег». Лоббируются интересы конкретных банков, в которых порт будет осуществлять денежные операции и хранить деньги. Проводится четкая сепарация экспедиторов и агентов, которые обслуживают грузы и суда в порту, поставщиков оборудования и материалов.

На сегодняшний день «профессионализм» новой команды еще не проявился в полной мере, так как все еще действуют ранее наработанные связи и грузопотоки, порядок налаженный годами, в том числе и незаконно отстраненным предыдущим начальником порта. Большое предприятие не так-то легко пустить под откос. Но уже становится нормой срывать планы выгрузки вагонов, что приводит к их накоплению и штрафам, необоснованные отказы от приема грузов, сумбурное планирование подхода судов, когда под погрузку ставятся прежде всего «свои» теплоходы, а не согласно графику подхода. Небывалый для порта простой кораблей (по пять суток) приводит к огромным штрафам и недовольству клиентов порта (грузовладельцев), которое неминуемо приведет к переориентации грузопотоков на порты, работающие стабильно, выполняющие условия договоров и не отказывающихся от взятых обязательств.

Возможно, в этом и стоит задача - показать неэффективность работы порта – как первый этап для передачи порта в семейное управление.

«покращення»
Скоро украинцам будет с чем сравнить свое вчерашнее «горькое и нищенское» существование

«Если Крымский кризис продлится до лета, то крымчан нужно будет кормить бесплатным супом»
Эксклюзивное интервью с украинским экономистом Владимиром Панченко

Коррупционеры пытаются захватить Миндоходов
Воспользовавшись хаосом в стране, группа оборотней снова рвется к власти

НОВОСТИ ПАРТНЕРОВ

Российские штурмовики хотят занять Харьков в воскресенье
В Харькове пророссийские организации в воскресенье, 16 марта...

Почему мы должны ненавидеть?
Режиссер Роман Балаян: "Кремль сошел с ума". Актриса Лариса ...

Сын старейшего активиста Майдана побоялся приехать на похоро...
На Майдане Независимости в Киеве отпели старейшего героя "Не...

Филарет сравнил Путина с Гитлером
Глава Украинской православной церкви считает Патриарх Филаре...

Откровения "гренадера" из "Правого сектора" шокируют (ВИДЕО)
У популяции "майдана" все более популярными становятся тенев...

Замсекретаря СНБО: Россия проиграла информационную войну в м...
Российская Федерация не смогла одержать победу в информацион...

ИНТЕРНЕТ-МАГАЗИН

7 дней - и ГЕМОРРОЯ не
Врачи разводят руками! Этот чудо-гель работает на 200%!

Реальные заработки с
Зарабатывай вместе с 888poker

Вопрос о переориентации грузов в собственную стивидорную компанию не стоит из-за ее маломощности (разве что в экспедиторскую).

Непрофессионализм руководителей привел к тому, что впервые за многие годы работы предприятие не имеет нормального плана поставок грузов в порт на февраль, что может уже во втором квартале этого года показать неэффективность порта «Южный».

Главным ориентиром работы сегодняшнего руководства порта является не прибыль порта, а доходы конкретной группы людей. Есть ли способы напомнить Юрию-младшему сотоварищи о том, что порт пока не стивидорная компания и наполнение госбюджета и собственного кармана – это совсем не одно и то же?

Урбанский и Работнев: госпорты «уплывают», а инициаторов повышают

В тесной связке с вышеупомянутым семейством работает и нынешний заместитель министра транспорта и связи Игорь Урбанский. Но в отличие от политика Юрия Юрьевича, Игорь Анатольевич - член СПУ, депутат Верховной Рады только одного, пятого, созыва. Поскольку по сути своей этот социалист - чистый бизнесмен, поэтому подход к нему в партии чисто «бизнесовый»: вы нам деньги – мы вам место в списке. Вот перечень компаний, с которыми связывают имя этого г-на: ООО «Эвас», «Kaalbye ltd.», «Каалбай шиппинг (Сайпрус) Лтд, «Каалбай марин сервис», «Каалбай эйдженси сервисез Лтд.», «Каалбай марин сервисез Лтд.», ООО «Каалбай шиппинг Украина», «Каалбай Ойл Сервис», «Каалбай шиппинг Сервис», АОЗТ «Эпикор», АОЗТ «Эпсилон». А еще холдинг «Каалбай Групп», в состав которого входят «Украинское морское агентство», «Каалбай Транспорт» и «Каалбай Шиппинг Украина».

Поговаривают, что назначение Крука-младшего начальником порта «Южный» было бы невозможным без прямого содействия Игоря Урбанского, который является одним из вдохновителей идеи о создании частных стивидорных компаний на базе не только порта «Южный», но и других государственных морских портов.

На высокую должность в транспортном ведомстве претендует еще один единомышленник Урбанского и семьи Круков в деле коммерционализации государственных портов – Владимир Работнев. В 2004-2005 годах он занимал должность директора Госдепартамента морского и речного транспорта Украины и Госфлотинспеции. В мае 2005 года Работнев был уволен с этой должности постановлением Кабинета министров, которым тогда руководила Юлия Тимошенко. Увольнению предшествовал дипломатический казус, случившийся во время переговоров президентов Украины и Румынии по вопросу Дунайского канала. К этим переговорам ведомство Работнева подготовило для Ющенко недостоверную информацию о глубине канала, что и вызвало конфуз Виктора Андреевича в беседе с румынским коллегой.

Оружейный скандал

В 1986 году Игорь Анатольевич решил, что «капитан дальнего плавания» - это не его профессия. И начал заниматься бизнесом. Спустя почти четыре года в Приморском районе Одессы было зарегистрировано ООО, где он занял уютное кресло директора.

Согласно статистической отчетности, фирма занималась предоставлением услуг в сфере общественного питания и посредничеством при купле-продаже товаров народного потребления. Следующий раз государство узнало о своем «замечательном» гражданине только в 1996 году.

Сначала на острове Мэн (юрисдикция Великобритании) была зарегистрирована некая «Kaalbye Ltd.», которая, в свою очередь, создала на Кипре офшорную «дочку» «Каалбай шиппинг (Сайпрус) лтд.». Последняя открыла свое представительство в Одессе.

Дело было поставлено столь широко, что у «Каалбай» появился даже собственный профсоюз.

В конце зимы 2001 года из морского порта «Октябрьский», что в Николаевской области, в Африку отплыло судно «Анастасия». На его борту, кроме всего прочего, находилось 636 тонн груза, который был обозначен как «генеральный».

По пути в Анголу, 24 февраля 2001 года, «Анастасия» зашла для бункеровки в испанский порт Лас-Пальмас на Канарских островах и, согласно заведенной процедуре, приняла на борт местных чиновников.

НОВОСТИ ПАРТНЕРОВ

Экономического роста в 2014 году не будет – Шлапак

Путин повторит путь Саддама Хусейна?

Артему Милевскому посоветовали провести прощальный матч

Украинцы массово переоформляют недвижимость на родственников

Вор у ворв "бэху" украл... Донецкие угонщики потеряли страх

Кабмин собирается повысить налоги на автомобили с 1 апреля

Эксперты высказались о ростовской речи Януковича

На орбите Земли происходит нечто странное - НАСА (видео)

Украинцам обещают плавное повышение цен на газ

В Крыму начинается продовольственный кризис, бензин резко вырос в цене

При проверке оказалось, что на борту «Анастасии» находится большая партия военного снаряжения.

По существующей практике, это имущество должно было именоваться в документах как «груз первого класса» (взрывчатые вещества, оружие и пр.), подлежало обязательному декларированию и требовало специального разрешения Министерства иностранных дел Испании для транспортировки по испанской территории или через территориальные воды страны.

Расследование обнаружило следующее. Заявление капитана «Анастасии» о том, что судно приписано к порту Батуми (Грузия), оказалось ложью. Флаг республики Грузия, как 2 марта 2001 года заявило МИД Грузии, «Анастасия» несла незаконно. И поскольку на ее борту не было ни одного гражданина Грузии, в Тбилиси вообще отказались от любого участия в этом инциденте.

Оружие продала российская государственная фирма «Росвооружение». Конечным покупателем оружия была ангольская государственная компания «Симпортекс». Портом приписки «Анастасии» «оказалась» Одесса, а судно фрахтовала компания «Каалбай шиппинг».

Объясняться пришлось, естественно, украинцам. Исполнительный директор «Каалбай шиппинг», Сергей Лапин, выкрутился из трудного положения, свалив вину на капитана «Анастасии». Мол, скандал вызван элементарной ошибкой капитана. Он указал в документах «генеральный груз» вместо «опасный груз»…

Это «недоразумение» стоило г-ну Урбанскому 850 000 долларов штрафа и длительного простоя «Анастасии» в порту Лас-Пальмаса. Но, возможно, эти потери были покрыты доходами от другой операции по переправке оружия, в которой приняла участие «Каалбай шиппин»? Речь идет о продаже одной из ближних восточных стран крылатых ракет Х-55.

Иран купил шесть ракет Х-55 и систему наземного обеспечения КНО-120. Организацию доставки груза от продавца к покупателю взяла на себя компания «Каалбай шиппинг». Дело в том, что эти «изделия» относятся к стратегическим наступательным вооружениям (СНВ) и подпадают под действие договора о СНВ от 31 июля 1991 года между СССР и США. Украина присоединилась к этому договору в качестве независимого безъядерного государства в 1994 году и взяла на себя обязательство «не распространять стратегические вооружения». Кроме того, на ракеты Х-55 распространяется соглашение «Международный режим контроля за ракетными технологиями» (РКРТ), членом которого Украина является с 1998 года. И самое главное, все ракеты Х-55 Украина, от греха подальше, вообще должна была уничтожить! И сделала это. По крайней мере, на бумаге. На самом деле 20 штук Х-55 просто перевезли на другие склады и «забыли» там.

Кстати, Министерство обороны Украины в то время возглавлял Александр Кузьмук (вице-премьер ушедшего правительства Виктора Януковича).

Официальное разбирательство по этому делу получило ход в 2005 году. Предварительное следствие и суд, проведенные в Украине, завершились вынесением приговоров участникам сделки. В то время только самые ленивые журналисты не писали об этом скандале, но информация о соучастии в нем «Каалбай шиппинг» появилась только в июне 2006-го. Тогда различные политики стали лоббировать назначение Урбанского либо губернатором Одесской области, либо министром транспорта Украины. Не удалось.

20 сентября 2006-го он получил пост первого заместителя министра транспорта и связи Украины, введенный Кабинетом министров специально для него, и стал курировать морехозяйственный комплекс (порты), авиацию и связи Минтранса с ВР.

В должности первого замминистра он продержался менее двух месяцев, с сентября по ноябрь 2006 года. Во-первых, министр Николай Рудьковский не забыл конкуренции за влияние на партийных вождей. Во-вторых, сам бизнес-социалист не мог тогда особо повлиять на тех бизнесменов, в том числе и российских, которые давно превратили украинские порты в свою вотчину. И, главное, в-третьих, расследование участия группы компаний «Каалбай» в переправке оружия не было закончено ни в Украине, ни в России, ни в Европе…

А в мае 2007 года случилась неприятность – приболел министр внутренних дел и главная политическая «крыша» Юрия Анатольевича Василий Цушко. Месяц спустя депутат-социалист Иван Бокий публично сообщил, что за лечение Василия Цушко в Германии платит не кто иной, как народный депутат Игорь Урбанский.

как народный депутат Игорь Урбанский.

Они близко познакомились, когда экс-министр МВД занимал должность губернатора Одесской области. Накануне объявления предвыборной кампании-2006 Цушко, с известной целью, познакомил Урбанского с будущим министром…

Новое правительство – старые кадры?

Новое пришествие Урбанского и компании, легко меняющей знамена, под которыми они зарабатывают свой авторитет, активы и денежные знаки, только началось, но уже скоро читатель сможет узнать о продаже должностей; реорганизации государственных структур и предприятий; изменении собственников и победах близких людей и фирм во всевозможных конкурсах и тендерах – если их не остановить. А остановить их можно, потому что стиль работы этих людей «до первого милиционера», которому не безразлична судьба морской отрасли страны. И не важно, где этот «милиционер» находится : на Грушевского, на Банковой или в другом месте. Важно, чтобы он захотел поинтересоваться, разобраться и остановить деятельность указанных выше «государственных» мужей, как это было не раз.

Виктор Гончаренко

версия для печати

добавить комментарий

Если этот материал не оставил вас равнодушным - поделитесь им в Соцсетях

+1 Я рекомендую 0 Твитнуть Поделиться 0

Читайте также:

- **Сын Януковича предупредил всех, кто был на Майдане**
- **Познер рассказал, какой исход ждет Украину**
- **США хотят ударить по России**
- **Медведев откровенно высказал о Януковиче все, что накипело**
- **Отношение россиян к событиям на Украине удивило**
- **Журналисты показали любовницу Януковича (Фото)**
- **16-летнюю школьницу заставили отдать долг "натурой"**

Комментарии

Гость 14-02-2008 / 17:03

По правде говоря - читая про порт Южный - полный бред, так как я в нем работаю и вижу что почем. Аффтар - 2!

Гость 13-02-2008 / 14:59

в стране беспредел! за "державу" обидно :(

Гость 12-02-2008 / 14:25

Жаль автор остановился на проблеме пОртов, а ведь есть еще такое предприятие как "Украинское Дунайское пароходство", разбазариванием которого занимаются последние несколько лет практически все вышеперечисленные персонажи. Да и некоторые новые (поговаривают об участие в последних событиях вокруг нардепа от БЮТ Дубового). Предприятие лихорадит, а в министерстве до этого нет никакого дела. Предлагаю автору занятся этой проблемой! Можно накопать много интересного!

НОВОСТИ SMI24

Украинских журналистов выгнали из российского парламента

Путин через телевидение вербует украинцев

Ксения Собчак выдала хвалебную оду благоразумию украинцев

НОВОСТИ ОТ MARKETGID

Уже не тайна, почему Басков не женится. Певец сам признался

Неожиданная ПРАВДА о чесноке. Ученые больше не могут молчать

Авиация НАТО атаковала российские истребители

В Крыму сбиты два американских самолета, – СМИ

from-ua.com

© 2004-2012, From-UA
Новости Украины
Все права защищены
Редакция не несет ответственности за содержание рекламных баннеров

Политика | Экономика | Наука и технологии | Глас народа | Криминал | Зона КиО | Видео-конференции | Путешествия | Здоровье | Спецпроекты

Перепечатка, копирование или воспроизведение информации, содержащей ссылку на агентство УНІАН, в каком-либо виде запрещено.
Юридическая поддержка - Правозащитная организация "Спільна мета"

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

e. http://from-ua.com/eco/8746a32731d21.html

«Shady captains» of Maritime Transport of Ukraine

Nowadays, the maritime industry is one of the few remaining under the state control. It includes twenty state...

...commercial seaports and more than fifty other state enterprises whose activities are somehow related to marine and river transportations. In monetary terms, all that stuff costs approximately ten billion hryvnias of state-owned enterprises' revenues and more than two billion of tax payments to the state budget, which, by the way, this year is 20% greater than in 2007.

While the Prime Minister and the President argue about the necessity to privatize some state-owned enterprises, a group of influential officials in the maritime industry conducts a quiet occupation of state marine assets without any tenders.

The seeming organization and reasoning of state control vertical as well as the management of the marine industry (Ministry of Transportation and Communications - State Department of Maritime and River Transportations), the presence of numerous state government officials responsible for the state of affairs "at sea" should not mislead the reader. The real tycoons of marine industry comprise a relatively small group of people. Everybody knows about their activities but prefers to pass over in silence.

Kruk Sr. and Kruk Jr.

So, the first in our "Table of Ranks" is someone called Yuriy Borisovich Kruk. People's deputy of last five convocations. Permanent member or even the head of the transport committee of Verkhovna Rada. Honorary Transport Worker of Ukraine. Since April 2005, a member of the YTB fraction. Has three sons who followed in their father's footsteps.

Reference. Yuriy Kruk was born on June 2, 1941 in Kherson, he graduated from Kherson Marine Engineering college and Odessa Institute of Marine Engineers.
1980-1988 – Head of Ilyichevsk fishing port.
1988-1992 - Deputy Director of the Black Sea Fish Industry Enterprise "Antarctica".
Since February 1992 - Deputy Chief of Planning and Economic Department of Odessa regional state administration.
Since March 1992 - Deputy head of Odessa Regional State Administration in charge of marine industry, transport and communications.
March - June 1995 - Deputy Minister of Transportation of Ukraine - Director of Maritime and River Transportations Department.

Several years ago, the Kruks family has established the insurance company "Into-Santa" with the aggressive purpose to "force" the Odessa port to pat for their insurance services. In addition, Odessa port (who was a sponsor of "Into Santa" Emergency Hospital's construction) and then the other ports started paying their budget money for "life insurance" of port workers. There is no

need to explain who received those millions of budget funds under the pretext of life insurance...

There have been documented fatal cases when ordinary port workers injured due to the work accident were in urgent need of medical assistance, and "Into-Santa" not only refused to provide such assistance, but even refused to bring the injured worker to the hospital!

The ports situated on the south of Odessa region were so "favored" by the national deputy that at the moment they are almost completely devastated or are close to this state.

These are Reni, Izmail, Kiliya, Ust-Dunaysk. There is evidence that some serviceable naval vessels were forcibly decommissioned and docked under pretence of their repair, and then these ships were dismantled and all their valuable parts were removed, including the propellers weighing several tons each, consisting of pure copper and other non-ferrous metals. All these parts were sequentially sold abroad.

Then the family became interested in port "South". This happened after several failures to get hold of the container business of Odessa sea port. And despite the agreement with several ministers of transportation. But whatever the truth of the matter is, soon the son of Mr. Yuriy Kruk was appointed as an acting chief of port "South". At the age of 29, he as his father is the Honorary Worker of Transport of Ukraine. Certainly, being young is not a crime. But isn't it just too much "honoring" for a young man with a 7- year experience? Prior to his appointment as a chief of strategically important port, he participated in the foundation of several shipping companies (that are expected to appear in the port "South" within a couple of months) and a small stevedoring company called "Ukrainian National Stevedoring Company", which operates on the quay of Odessa sea port, which has the lowest draft and equipment status. The functioning of this company began after it formally won the tender during which the administration of Odessa port under the pressure of Kruk Sr. for some strange logic preferred "Ukrainian national stevedoring company" to other companies with accumulated base of cargo flows, technology and professional staff.

After his appointment as a chief of port "South" , the son of a big daddy started with the preparation of public opinion on the need to create a port-based private stevedoring company for cargo handling, being quite aware that the current cargo base and the port equipment do not require any additional investment. Nevertheless, it is quite clear who will own this expected Stevedoring Company. But this venerable family just forgot about one thing. This port is a state enterprise and transferring of fixed assets and port equipment to the private stevedoring company is not more than a hidden privatization after which port revenues and contributions to the state budget will decrease at times, and most of the port employees will become unemployed.

Since the hidden port privatization is a quite long and costly project, Kruk Jr. expends methodical efforts in order to extort the "fast money" along with the establishment of private stevedoring company. The interests of several banks are being lobbied; these banks will carry out the monetary transactions and keep the money of the port. A clear separation of freight forwarders, agents that work with cargos and ships in the port, and suppliers of equipment and materials is being performed.

So far, the "professionalism" of the new team is not yet revealed in full, as there still exist previously established contacts and traffic flows settled over the years, including the rules established by the former head of the port who was unlawfully dismissed. Large enterprise is not that easy to derail. But foiling of car discharge which leads to their accumulation and penalties, unjustified refusal to accept the cargos, chaotic planning of landfalls when the "favored" ships are loaded at the highest priority but not according to the schedule, gradually become the norm. Unprecedented detention of ships in the port (up to five days) leads to huge fines and customer (cargo-owners) dissatisfaction which will inevitably lead to the reorientation of freight traffic to those ports that operate stably, abide the terms of the contracts, and do not abandon their commitments.

Perhaps the task is to show the inefficiency of the port - as a first step to transfer the port to the family management.

The question of cargo reorientation to their own stevedoring company is not worth discussing because of its low capacity (except for freight forwarding).

The lack of leaders' professionalism led to the fact that for the first time in many years of work the company has no normal plan for cargo delivery which could prove the inefficiency of port "South" in the second quarter of this year.

The main guideline of the present administration of the port is not the port profits but the income of a particular group of people. Is there a way to remind Yuriy Jr. and his companions that the port is not a stevedoring company and the filling their own pockets and the filling of the state budget are not the same things?

Urbanskiy and Rabotnev: state ports «sail away» but organizers are being promoted

Igor Urbanskiy, the current Deputy Minister of Transportation and Communications, operates in close conjunction with the aforementioned family. But unlike Yuriy Yurievich who is a politician, Igor Anatolievich is a member of SPoU and the deputy of the 5th convocation of Verkhovna Rada. As his socialist is a clean businessman, he is treated with a "business" approach: you give us money - we give you a position on the list. Here is a list of companies which are associated with his name: LLC "Evas", "Kaalbye ltd.", «"Kaalbye Oil Service", "Kaalbye Agency Services Ltd.", Kaalbye Marine Service", "Kaalbye Shipping (Cyprus) Ltd.", LLC "Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine", "Kaalbye Shipping Service", JSC "Epikor", JSC "Epsilon", "Kaalbye Marine Services Ltd.". And the Holding "Kaalbye Group" which includes "Ukrainian Marine Agency", "Kaalbye Transport" and "Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine".

Appointment of Yuriy Kruk Jr. as a chief of the port "South" would have been impossible without the direct assistance of Igor Urbanskiy who is one of the masterminds of the idea to create the private stevedoring companies that would be based not only in the port "South" but also in the other public seaports.

Vladimir Rabotnev, another supporter of Urbanskiy and the Kruks family in the commercialization of public ports claims to occupy a high position in the transport department.

In 2004-2005, he served as Director of the State Department of Maritime and River Transportation of Ukraine and Navigation Safety State Inspection. In May 2005, Rabotnev was dismissed from his post by the Cabinet of Ministers which then was controlled by Yulia Timoshenko . His dismissal was preceded by a diplomatic incident that occurred during the talks between the presidents of Ukraine and Romania on the Danube Canal. Rabotnev's subordinates prepared for Yushchenko the false information about the depth of the channel, which caused the confusion in Viktor Yushchenko's interview with Romanian counterpart.

Weapon Scandal

In 1986 Igor Urbanskiy decided that he wasn't born for a sea captain profession and went into business. In 1992 in Primorsky district of Odessa, the LLC "Evas" where Igor Urbanskiy worked as a CEO was registered.

According to the statistical reports, the company provided the services in sphere of public catering as well as the mediation when buying and selling of consumer goods. The next time Urbanskiy appeared only in 1996.

First, "Kaalbye Ltd." was registered on the Isle of Man (Jurisdiction of Great Britain) which, in turn, created a Cyprus offshore subsidiary "Kaalbye Shipping (Cyprus) Ltd.". The latter opened a representative office in Odessa.

Moreover, "Kaalbye" company appeared to have its own trade union.

In late winter of 2001 the vessel called "Anastasia" left seaport "October" (Nikolaev region, Ukraine) and set off for Africa. Among the other things 636 tons of cargo were taken aboard that were designated as "general".

On February 24, 2001, on the way to Angola "Anastasia" visited the Spanish port of Las Palmas in the Canary Islands for bunkering, and in accordance with the procedure the local officials boarded the vessel.

When checking the local officials found a large consignment of arms, ammunition and military equipment on board of "Anastasia".

Under the existing practice, this property should have been named as "first-class cargo" (explosives, weapons, etc.) in order to be the subject to mandatory declaration and its transportation through the Spanish territory or territorial waters of the country required special permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain.

The investigation revealed the following. It appeared that the statement made by the captain of "Anastasia" regarding the fact that the vessel is assigned to the port of Batumi (Georgia), was a lie. On March 2, 2001 Georgian Foreign Ministry said that "Anastasia" didn't have the right to carry the flag of the Republic of Georgia. And as there were no citizens of Georgia on its board, Tbilisi officially refused to be involved in this incident.

These weapons were sold by a Russian state company "Rosvooruzhenie." And Angolan state company "Simporteks" was stated as a final buyer of these weapons. Odessa was a homeport of "Anastasia" and the vessel was chartered by "Kaalbye Shipping".

So, the Ukrainians had to explain the existing situation. Sergey Lapin, the Executive Director of "Kaalbye Shipping" landed on his feet blaming the captain of "Anastasia": "This scandal evoked due to the elementary captain's mistake. He indicated "general cargo" instead of "dangerous cargo" in the documents"…

Iosif Urbanskiy had to pay $ 850,000 of fines in order to smotherк up the scandal and "Anastasia" was a subject to a lengthy downtime in the port of Las Palmas. But perhaps "Kaalbye Shipping" could cover these losses by the revenues from the other operations with weapons smuggling? It is about the selling of Kh-55 cruise missiles to one country from the East.

Iran has bought six (6) X-55 missiles and the ground support system KNO-120. "Kaalbye Shipping" took over the organization of delivery from the seller to the buyer. The matter is that these "products" are considered as Strategic Arms (SA), and are the subject to the START treaty signed on July 31, 1991 between the USSR and the USA. In 1994 Ukraine acceded to the treaty as an independent non-nuclear state and undertook a commitment "not to distribute strategic arms". In addition, since 1998 Ukraine is a member of "International Rocket Technologies Control Regime" (RTCP) which controls the usage of Kh-55. And most importantly - Ukraine had to destroy all the Kh-55missiles! And that was performed according o the documents. In fact, 20 items of X-55 were just moved to the other warehouses and were "forgotten" there.

Incidentally, the Ministry of Defence at the time was headed by Alexandr Kuzmuk (Deputy Prime Minister of previous Viktor Yanukovych's government).

The secret was revealed in 2005. Preliminary trial and investigation conducted in Ukraine resulted in sentencing the transaction parties. In 2004-2005 this scandal was discussed in press but the information about the "Kaalbye Shipping" participation appeared only in June of 2006. In May-June 2006, various politicians began lobbying the appointment of Urbanskiy either as a governor of Odessa region, or as a Minister of Transportation of Ukraine. Nevertheless, they failed to do that.

On September 20, 2006 Urbanskiy was appointed as the First Deputy Minister of Transportation and Communications of Ukraine, this position was introduced by Cabinet of Ministers specifically for him. So, he started controlling the maritime complex (ports), Aviation, and Ministry's interactions with Verkhovna Rada.

He spent less than two months on the position of first deputy minister (September - November 2006). First of all, Minister Nikolay Rudkovskiy did not forget the competition for the influence on the party leaders. Secondly, at that point of time even Urbanskiy could not influence on the decisions of those businessmen, including the Russians who have transformed the Ukrainian ports into their ancestral lands. And, most importantly, thirdly, the investigation of "Kaalbye" group of companies' participation in smuggling arms shipments was not finished neither in Ukraine nor in Russia nor in Europe...

In May 2007, Vasiliy Tsushko fell ill; he was the Minister of Internal Affairs and the main political "roof" of Yuriy Anatolievich. A month later, Ivan Bokiy, a member of Socialist party, publicly reported that Vasyl Tsushko's treatment in Germany was paid by the deputy Igor Urbanskiy.

They got to know each other when ex-Minister of Internal Affairs served as governor of Odessa region. Before the announcement of the election campaign of 2006, Tsushko, put in a word for Urbanskiy while talking with the future minister...

New government - old personnel?

The new appearance of Urbanskiy and Co. who used to change their banners in order to earn their authority, assets and funds, just started but soon the reader will learn about the sold posts, reorganization of government agencies and businesses, change of owners and wins of close friends and their companies in various competitions and tenders – so, they definitely should be stopped. And they should be stopped immediately due to the fact that these people will control the maritime industry of the country until someone notices their illegal activities. And no matter where this indifferent person works: on Hrushevskoho, on Bankova, or elsewhere. It is important to ask the necessary questions in order to understand and to prevent the activities of the above "public" persons, as was already previously done.

Certified Translation
inWhatLanguage.com
Certified Translation

EXHIBIT 26

Происшествия

среда, 05 июля 2006 20:28

ФСБ России заинтересовалась украинскими социалистами

Gazeta.ua

На адрес Службы Безопасности Украины поступило обращение ФСБ РФ с просьбой осуществить проверку причастности лидеров одной из политических партий к поставкам оружия в Иран и Анголу. Запрос может быть связан со вчерашним решением Государственной Думы РФ о расследовании факта поставок крылатых ракет Х-55 в Иран. Поставку осуществляла компания "Kaalbye Shipping", приближенная к бизнесмену **Игорю Урбанскому**.

Напомним, что Урбанский является кандидатом на пост министра транспорта и связи Украины от СПУ.

Пресс-служба Социалистической партии Украины отказалась от комментариев, сообщив, что за информацией необходимо обращаться в офис компании "Kaalbye Shipping". В приемной компании заявили, что пана Урбанского нет, он выехал на встречу, сообщает УРА-Информ.

Если вы заметили ошибку в тексте, выделите ее мышкой и нажмите комбинацию клавиш Alt+A

Поделиться:

+1 0 Подобается! 0 Like +1 Класс +1 Твитнуть 0

Сейчас вы читаете новость «ФСБ России заинтересовалась украинскими социалистами» Вас также могут заинтересовать свежие новости Украины и мировые на Gazeta.ua

Новини

Вот о чем уже заявляет Лукашенко!

Из уст Кравчука всплыла ошеломляющая правда о Тимошенко ...

То, что заявила Тимошенко, заставило задуматься всю Украину! ...

Турчинов рассказал всю правду о жертвах Евромайдана! ...

Новини

Вот что заявил Горбачев по поводу Украины! ...

Тягнибок сделал резкое заявление по поводу США ...

Новые требования Яценюка насторожили власть ...

Кучма случайно проговорился о том, как Россия...

24SMI News

Украина погибнет быстро и мучительно

США объявили, что готовы бомбить Украину: "ради мира"

Варианты разделения Украины в случае обострения конфликта

Самое читаемое

17-18 марта войска РФ начнут вторжение в Украину - политолог
Просмотров: 98644

В СБУ назвали ответственных за массовые убийства "Небесной сотни"
Просмотров: 59514

Турчинова хотят лишить должности через суд
Просмотров: 52780

"Мы будем вынуждены открыть огонь" — командир из Крыма
Просмотров: 51961

"В Киеве хаос и полный беспредел" - 33-летняя прокурор Крыма нервничала и читала обращение с листа бумаги 7
Просмотров: 50869

Происшествия

В Виннице обстреливают городские автобусы
Просмотров: 3185

В Крыму в заложники захватили французского журналиста
Просмотров: 637

МИД подтвердило задержание Фирташа в Вене
Просмотров: 728

Украинские войска нужно вывозить из Крыма немедленно - эксперт

Просмотров: 9373

Фирташа арестовали за взяточничество и организацию криминальной группировки - СМИ

Просмотров: 3276

Фото 1 Все фото

Российские войска стягиваются к границе с Харьковской областью

Видео Все видео

Милиция задержала луганского сепаратиста Клинчаева

Эксклюзивы 2 / 5

"Путин потерял представление о добре и зле"

Просмотров: 1365

"Можем вернуть Крым через три-пять лет"

Просмотров: 23387

Блог 2 / 5

Олександр Бригинець

13 марта 2014

Просмотров: 403

Руйнівнику Народної лічниці дадуть іншу земельну ділянку для

Виконавчими органами Львівської міської ради розглядається можливість заміни забудовнику

Интервью 2 / 5

"Ультрас были по одну сторону баррикад. Есть вещи важнее клубной вражды"

Просмотров: 637

Мнение Колонка

Андрій Бондар

13 марта 2014

Просмотров: 0

Острів Великодня

Мій приятель, поет Мата-уїроа Мануель Атан з острова Пасхи, тобто Великодня, у Тихому

Погода 13.03.14, вечір

Погода у Києві

+9°

вологість: **27%**
тиск: **749 мм**
вітер: **4 м/с, північно-західний**

на сьогодні завтра 10 днів в інших містах

Gazeta.ua

Gazeta.ua

Like

23,648 people like Gazeta.ua.

Facebook social plugin

Gazeta.ua

24,729 followers

Viktoria Vanya Andrey Maxim

Alexey Yulia Yulia Olexandr

Follow on VK

Мы на Одноклассниках

Группа «Gazeta.ua»

Gazeta.ua присоединиться

В группе уже 5 211 участников

Получить виджет

Новости@Mail.Ru

Вооруженные силы Украины приведены в полную боевую готовность

В центре Киева захватили банк

Рада обратилась в ООН с просьбой о военной помощи

севастополь business analyst

Job Выберилучшее!

Пошук вакансій в Києві

Програміст 1С

Php розробник

Silverlight developer

Адміністратор офісу

Розкрійник

работа врач окулист

прогноз погоди в горохівському районі

Всі права на матеріали, які містить цей сайт, охороняються у відповідності із законодавством України, в тому числі, про авторське право і суміжні права. Використання матеріалів Gazeta.ua для друкованих видань дозволяється лише з письмової згоди редакції сайту. Для інтернет-видань обов'язковим є гіперпосилання на Gazeta.ua, відкрите для пошукових систем. Посилання та гіперпосилання повинні міститися виключно в першому чи в другому абзаці тексту.

Передрук, копіювання або відтворення інформації, що містить посилання на агентства "Інтерфакс-Україна", FHL та Reuters у будь-якій формі суворо забороняється. Матеріали з позначкою (PR) друкуються на правах реклами. Редакція Gazeta.ua може не розділяти позицію авторів розділу "Погляди" та не несе відповідальність за матеріали авторів та читачів розділу "Блоги"

ENGLISH
TRANSLATION

f. http://gazeta.ua/ru/articles/np/_fsb-rossii-zainteresovalas-ukrainskimi-socialistami/119240

The Security Service of Ukraine received a petition from the Russian FSB requesting to verify the involvement of one of the leaders from one political party to the supply of weapons to Iran and Angola. This request may be associated with yesterday's decision of the State Duma to investigate the fact of Kh-55 cruise missiles supplies to Iran. Deliveries were made the "Kaalbye Shipping" company associated with **Igor Urbanskiy**.

Let us recall that Urbanskiy is a candidate for the position of Minister of Transportation and Communications from the Socialist Party.

Press office of the Socialist Party of Ukraine refused to comment this issue, saying that in need of information, one should contact the office of "Kaalbye Shipping". But according to URA-Inform, the company's reception said that Urbanskiy was absent as he went to the meeting.

Certified Translation
inWhatLanguage.com
Certified Translation

EXHIBIT 27

Воронюк Ромочка, Эпилепсия
Подари шанс на здоровое детство
18 000 €

Депутаты РФ собираются заняться украинскими ракетами

Крылатая ракета Х-55 (другие названия - изделие 120, РКВ-500) - дозвуковая малогабаритная стратегическая крылатая ракета, совершающая полет на малой высоте с огибанием рельефа местности. Главред >> 11:26

Ракеты были доставлены в Иран морским путем на судне, зафрахтованном украинской компанией Kaalbye Shipping. Резонанс >> 12:46

В Государственной Думе Российской Федерации готовится к рассмотрению вопрос о поставках Украиной крылатых ракет Х-55 в Иран в 2000-2001 годах. >> 10:14

30 июня министр обороны РФ Сергей Иванов заявил о том, что украинская фирма Прогресс, которая является дочерним предприятием Укроспецэкспорта, в 2000 и 2001 годах поставила шесть крылатых ракет Х-55 в Китай и еще шесть таких же ракет в Иран. NewsToday >> 10:36

3 июля Мид Ирана опровергнул заявление министра обороны России Сергея Иванова о покупке Тегераном у Украины крылатых ракет Х-55 класса воздух-земля. NewsToday >> 10:36

Читать полные новости (4) >>

Поделиться

Другие новости темы:

- Продажей украинских ракет Ирану займется Дума NewsToday 10:41
- Российская Дума рассмотрит вопрос о поставках Украиной крылатых ра 13:52
- Депутаты РФ собираются заняться украинскими ракетами Daily UA 10:36

Актуальные темы

Мир про Украину
События на Юго-Востоке
События в Крыму

Метки сюжета

• Kaalbye • Тегеран
• Укрспецэкспорта
• Урбанский • огибание

Персоны

Сергей Ивановым

Полная лента новостей
Источники
Архив

Download Free Audiobook
audible.com
Try Audible with a Free Audiobook. Listen on iPhone, Android or Tablet

Калейдоскоп событий

Путін радить Януковичу "повіситися або втопитися"

Джемилев заявляет, что татары возьмутся за ружья

Украинцев хотят штрафовать за автономное отопление

Симферопольцы выгнали Порошенко от Верховного Совета Крыма

Что показывают крымские телевизоры

В Луганске освистали и избили Добкина

Найдите нас на Facebook

ENGLISH
TRANSLATION

g. http://news.meta.ua/archive/05.07.06/cluster:4477798-Deputaty-RF-sobiraiutsia-zaniatsia-ukrainskimi-raketami/

Cruise missile Kh-55 (other names - article No. 120, RKV-500) is a small-sized subsonic strategic cruise missile performing the flight at the low altitude with terrain following. Glavred >> 11:26

The missiles were delivered to Iran by sea on a ship chartered by the Ukrainian company Kaalbye Shipping. Resonance >> 12:46

The State Duma of the Russian Federation is going to discuss the question of cruise missiles X-55 supplies from Ukraine to Iran performed in 2000-2001. >> 10:14

On July 3, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran refuted the statement of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov concerning the purchase of Ukrainian Kh-55 air-to-ground cruise missiles by Tehran. NewsToday >> 10:36

Certified Translation
inWhatLanguage.com
Certified Translation

EXHIBIT 28

УРА-Информ
независимое информационно-аналитическое издание

Arrest Records: 2 Secrets
instantcheckmate.com
1) Enter Name and State. 2) Access Full Background Checks Instantly.

[illegible] УРА-Архив Новости укр | рус
[illegible]

Российская ФСБ заинтересовалась социалистами?

Как сообщают источники в журналистских кругах Москвы, близкие к руководству российских спецслужб, в адрес Службы Безопасности Украины поступило обращение ФСБ РФ с просьбой осуществить проверку причастности лидеров одной из политических партий к поставкам оружия в Иран и Анголу. Источник не сообщил деталей, хотя предположил, что запрос может быть связан со вчерашним решением Государственной Думы РФ о расследовании факта поставок крылатых ракет Х-55 в Иран. Российские информагентства сообщали о том, что поставки осуществляла компания «Kaalbye Shipping», близкая к бизнесмену Игорю Урбанскому.

Напомним, что Игорь Урбанский является кандидатом на пост министра транспорта и связи Украины от СПУ.

Пресс-служба Социалистической партии Украины отказалась от комментариев, сославшись на то, что за информацией необходимо обращаться в офис компании «Kaalbye Shipping». В приемной компании заявили, что господин Урбанский в срочном порядке выехал на встречу после того, как ему сообщили суть вопросов редакции.

This is interesting +1 Твитнуть 0
Я рекомендую 0 g+1 0
Порекомендуйте новость своим друзьям
Нравится 12 тыс.
Подписывайтесь на наши материалы в Фейсбуке
Подписывайтесь на наши материалы ВКонтакте
Follow УРА-Информ
..
Читают сейчас 1
Нравится
Поделитесь с друзьями
Взять себе виджетО сервисеВойти
(0)
Комментарии
Все
Новые
Популярные
Темы
Введите текст сообщения...
Комментировать
e-mail
УРА-Информ
НОВОСТИ УКРАИНЫ
Нравится
2 261 день остается нравится УРА-Информ

29.55 На Крещатике коммунальщики разбирают баррикады - ФОТО
23:40 Правительство приняло решение объединить Минэкономразвития и Минпромполитики
[illegible] В Донецке сепаратисты пытались напасть на котельную
23:00 НАТО требует отвести российские войска от границ Украины, - Расмуссен
22:40 Верховная Рада приняла правительственный закон о госзакупках
[illegible] В центре Горловки сегодня неизвестный открыл стрельбу
22:00 Поезда с материка на Крым могут больше не ходить
21:40 Депутаты с третьей попытки проголосовали за снижение ставки на импорт лекарств
21:20 Федерализация в Украине может привести к расколу, - Нуланд
21:05 Тимошенко не планирует снимать собственную кандидатуру с выборов
21:00 Из-за кризиса в Украине Европа останется без газа, - Путин
20:45 США и Россия практически прекратили сотрудничество, - Нуланд
20:25 Добкин не уверен, что возвращение Януковича сможет решить проблемы
20:13 Рада должна принять закон про статус оккупированных территорий, - ЦИК
20:15 Встреча в формате «ЕС-США-Украина-Россия» состоится 17 апреля в Женеве
Вся лента RSS

Suggestions
Зеленский спел о Крыме: Не отделяются, любя - ВИДЕО
27 people like this
Украина прекратила закачивать российский газ, - Продан
14 people like this
Активисты прогнали Добкина от здания Луганского СБУ - ВИДЕО
5 people like this
Show all suggestions
Поиск

Кем на самом деле был Сашко Билый при жизни?

Неожиданное решение Москвы по поводу Януковича

Безруков стал первым пострадавшим за Крым

Юлия Тимошенко: трус, загнанный в угол

США больше не скрывают зачем им Украина

Крымские татары сближаются с Россией

ENGLISH
TRANSLATION

h. http://ura-inform.com/ru/arhive/2006/07/05/urbanski

18:36 05.07.2006 | URA-Archive | News ua | ru 58645:

Russian FSB became interested in Socialists?

According to the sources in journalistic circles of Moscow, close to the administration of the Russian special services, Security Service of Ukraine received a petition from the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation with a request to verify the involvement of one of the leaders of political parties to the supply of weapons to Iran and Angola. The source did not disclose the details, though suggested that the request may be associated with yesterday's decision of the State Duma on the investigation of facts concerning the X -55 cruise missiles supplies to Iran. Russian news agencies reported that the supplies were performed by «Kaalbye Shipping» which is associated with Igor Urbanskiy.

Let us recall that Igor Urbanskiy is a candidate for the post of Minister of Transport and Communications from the Socialist Party.

Press office of the Socialist Party of Ukraine refused to comment this issue, saying that in need of information, one should contact the office of "Kaalbye Shipping". The company's reception said that Urbanskiy urgently went to the meeting after he was informed concerning the questions planed to be asked.

Certified Translation
inWhatLanguage.com
Certified Translation

EXHIBIT 29

This is Google's cache of http://tribuna.com.ua/articles/socium/167994.htm. It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on Feb 22, 2014 00:31:32 GMT. The current page could have changed in the meantime. Learn more
Tip: To quickly find your search term on this page, press **Ctrl+F** or **⌘-F** (Mac) and use the find bar.

Full version

ОПРОС

Сколько медалей завоюют в Сочи украинские спортсмены?

1-3

3-5

Больше 5

Спортивными тотализаторами не

увлекаюсь

АРХИВ
Загрузка...
Новости
тут, новые имена, Элен Ролле, продам Mitsubishi Pajero в Харькове
Загрузка...

Общество

Кому отдалась добрая «FAINA»

Евгений ЛАУЭР, 27.09.2008, 18:30 Версия для печати

В прошлую пятницу очередным нерадостным сообщением для Украины стал захват сомалийскими пиратами судна с мирным названием «Faina». В плен к пиратам попало рекордное число граждан нашей страны - 17 человек, вместе с ними в плену очутились и трое россиян, а также один гражданин Латвии.

На этот раз мы, что называется, «попали». По информации, которую впоследствии подтвердил министр обороны Украины Юрий Еханурoв, включая гусеничные буксировщики и ремонтные машины, и масса стрелкового вооружения и боеприпасов. Все это «железо» было продано Кении «Укрспецэкспортом» и «Укринмашем» на основании легального, что особо подчеркнул господин Еханурoв, контракта. Извините, а что есть нелегальные контракты? Расскажите! Непонятно, почему ситуацию с грузом не комментирует тот же «Укрспецэкспорт» или Минтранс, или «Укринмаш», обеспечивавший продажу. Кстати. Еханурoв отметил, что «Укрспецэкспорт» и «Укринмаш» являются владельцами груза. Это говорит о том, что контракт был подписан на условиях CIF, когда транспортировка и страховка груза лежит на продавце. Как правило, окончательно банковский аккредитив раскрывается уже после того, как вооружение приводится в состояние, годное к эксплуатации. Не верить уважаемому министру обороны нет оснований, так что в пассивы Украины можно занести убытки от потери стоимости танкового батальона и кучи вооружений. Правда, на счет того, кому реально сейчас принадлежит оружие, находящееся на борту «Faina», есть и другое мнение. Говорят, что груз все-таки уже является собственностью минобороны Кении. Во всяком случае, это утверждают неназванные источники BBC. Кому верить? Украинские чиновники по совковой привычке прячут информацию поглубже, понимая, что «рыльце в пуху» (читай - в долларах) и явно опасаясь собственного народа.

На борту судна «Faina» находилось 33 танка Т-72Отметим, что средняя стоимость модифицированного танка (НАТО-стандарт, африканское исполнение, новые системы связи, защиты и вооружения), а именно такие машины покупала Кения, равна от 1,5 до 2 миллионов долларов США. Крики бывшего паркетного офицера ГСВГ, а ныне депутата В.Коновалюка по поводу разной стоимости танков одной модификации можно отнести только к его безграмотности в области продажи вооружений. Танков, как и автомобилей BMW, одинаковых не бывает. Все попытки соревноваться с «великими и ужасным» В.Сивковичем у Коновалюка заканчиваются «пуком».

Замминистра Игорь Урбанский успел стать фигурантом не одного Если хозяева «Укринмаша» - Минпромполитики - молчат, то странно, почему не говорит Минтранс. Несомненно, что в их компетенции был подбор перевозчика и страховщика для подобного рода «товара». «Трибуна» уже писала про некоронованного короля морских оружейных перевозок, заместителя министра транспорта господина Игоря Урбанского. Замминистра Урбанский, кроме того, является еще и успешным бизнесменом, совмещая госслужбу с управлением и владением де-факто целым семейством компаний «Каалабай». Именно эти «колобки» были замешаны в контрабандных схемах поставок вооружений в Африку, именно они доставляли злополучные крылатые ракеты Х-55 в Иран. Так что опыта оружейно-морских афер «товарищу» Урбанскому не занимать. Простая, как мозги Винского, схема - «один пароход - одна менеджерская компания» - позволила ему увести в оффшоры практически весь украинский флот (напомним, что «Faina» ходит под флагом Белиза) и позволяет не платить в бюджет ни копейки налогов от весьма выгодных сделок по перевозкам грузов. По нашим данным, украинская

Центр внимания:

S&P улучшил прогноз роста экономики Украины

У Нацбанка достаточно ресурсов для поддержания ликвидности банков – глава НБУ

Украинские дипломаты во Франции призвали продолжить курс в ЕС

Погода в других городах

Гороскоп
Загрузка...

НОВОСТИ УКРАИНЫ

ДАЙДЖЕСТ
Die Presse:
"Митингующих на Украине убедит только нечто значительное"

Le Figaro:
Русский аналог Facebook взял под контроль человек из окружения Путина

Neue Zuercher Zeitung:
Кто предложит Украине больше?

ЭКСТРЕННО
12:31:
Мессенджер Viber продадут японцам

12:29:
В США повесился осужденный за военные преступления солдат

15:58:
Бывший премьер Грузии получил пять лет тюрьмы

15:54:
Автобус с туристами в Египте взорвал самоубийца

АНЕКДОТ НА ТРИБУНЕ:
Вскрытие началось в 8:30...

Живые сопротивляются

Бородатая история

РАКУРС

весьма выгодных сделок по перевозкам грузов. По нашим данным, украинская (?) менеджерская компания «Tomax Team Inc.», управляющая злополучной «Faina», является именно такой «прослойкой» и имеет самое непосредственное отношение к Игорю Анатольевичу.

Реклама на Трибуне - залог Вашего успеха

Загрузка...

Вообще, последнее время «боевая пара» Винский-Урбанский функционирует весьма успешно. С одобрения (несомненно, обильно подкрепленного финансово) господина Винского - министра транспорта с менталитетом провинциального агронома - огромное количество мрачных афер проворачивается на транспортном рынке. Не только морской транспорт, но и железная дорога стали вотчиной для вороватого руководства Минтранса. Действия Винского и его камарильи уже вызывают нетихий ропот в его собственной политической тусовке, когда именно с его подачи «мочат» успешные фирмы однопартийцев на железной дороге, когда после его дилетантских и хамских высказываний сворачиваются целые отрасли в авиации, и многое-многое другое.

Этот «честняга»-бютовец уже благополучно достроил свои скромные домишки, о которых «Трибуна», да и не только она, уже писала. Не с министерской же копеечной зарплаты политик Винский воздвиг себе хоромы в центре Киева и, по авторитетным слухам, прикупил себе землицы под Киевом, не глядя на заоблачные цены. Однако «если звезды зажигают, то это кому-нибудь нужно» - именно так можно оценить реакцию нынешнего премьер-министра, а вернее, отсутствие таковой, на все критические публикации о Винском и его подельнике Урбанском. Взнос товарища Винского на «общую свечу» БЮТ значительно перевешивает его проделки на ниве коррупции и воровства. А в БЮТ, как известно, финансовые доноры вне всякой критики - они святые, как и одноименная глава блока.

Хатынка министра Винского. Фото УП.А что касается лично товарища

Винского (или, простите, господина - "товарищем" Иосиф Викентиевич был в Соцпартии), то венценосной даме его вообще трогать не с руки. Не дай Бог, обидится еще и начнет рассказывать, какие делишки проворачиваются руководством БЮТ на ниве партийного строительства. Начнет, например, Винский свидетельствовать, как он с подельником (снова простите, не подельником, а уважаемым человеком - первым замом Тимошенко по партии и правительству), «святым отцом»-проповедником Александром Турчиновым людей на бабки кидали. «Продавая» за семь миллионов места в списке, а потом самолично из этого списка вычеркивая и деньги при этом не возвращая. «Трибуна об этом также, кстати, уже писала, ссылаясь на депутатский запрос Григория Омельченко - можете ознакомиться... Вот и прощает Юлия Владимировна с барского плеча придурковатому экс-социалисту даже приснопамятный Мерседес S-класса, вызвавший немалый скандал, грозивший, по всем прикидкам, стать коррупционным...

Если сейчас же перейти к конспирологической части нашего повествования, то люди, помнящие «горячие» деньки в 80-х в Африке и Латинской Америке, наверняка скажут, что подобного рода проделки с оружием были им известны с тех времен, когда министр Винский еще коровам хвосты в хлеву крутил или что он там с ними в хлеву делал...

Приснопамятный Мерседес S-классаГруженые оружием самолеты делали вынужденную посадку «случайно» на территориях, контролируемых того или иного окраса повстанцами, сотрудничество с которыми страна - «теряльщик» оружия ну никак не хотела официально признавать. В саваннах терялись конвои с грузовиками, доверху набитыми стрелковым и тяжелым пехотным вооружением, там же экипажи покидали новенькие танки и БМП с полным боекомплектом, якобы испугавшись «рыков пустыни». Небольшие суда бесхозными обнаруживались у рыбачьих причалов деревень, подконтрольных партизанам, и прочее, на что была способна фантазия «затейников» из ГРУ, КГБ, Мухарабата, ЦРУ, Моссада или аналогичных контор, коих и в те времена, и сейчас по миру хоть отбавляй.

Вот и в нашем случае напрашивается вопрос, а не была ли лихая пиратская атака в 160 милях от берега хорошо спланированным актом передачи танкового батальона в руки сомалийских геррилос? Специалисты говорят, что вполне могла бы. Тем более, что кенийские власти не совсем равнодушны к своим сомалийским соседям-бунтарям и рады были бы пособить «родным человечкам» чем Бог послал. А страховка покроет любые убытки. Вот только те же специалисты говорят, что без ведома и участия продавцов и особенно перевозчиков такой трюк было бы сделать крайне сложно. Тем более понятно, что суда с подобным грузом не объявляют о содержимом своих трюмов в открытой печати и не вывешивают на борту рекламных

слоганов. Вероятно, кто-то участливо «отстучал» из Николаевского порта в Октябрьский, где обычно происходит погрузка этого «интимного» товара, и проинформировал нужных товарищей о деталях вояжа «Faina». Средняя стоимость модифицированного Т-72 - 1,5-2 миллиона долларов СШАНе окажется ли потом, что у Иосифа Винского появились новые гектары земли, и не пристроит ли он к имеющемуся палацу дополнительные башенки? И сколь долго может продолжаться эпопея с плаванием украинских судов под чужими флагами жарких либерий, белизов и панам? Сколько перепадает

государству от подобного рода перевозок? Не пора ли депутатам поинтересоваться у господина Урбанского деталями его схем и секретами коммерческих успехов? Было бы также интересно, кто именно страховал груз и саму сделку, какие убытки и в каком размере понесет Украина от пиратского - или коррупционного - рейда у Восточного побережья Африки. Почему даже в условиях всемирного освещения этого происшествия, кроме непонятно как причастного к этому Еханурова, все чиновники воды в рот набрали, не хотят в субботу дачи и подружек покидать? Почему и чем так долго болеет Сергей Бондарчук, который практически самоустранился (или его все-таки устранили?) от руководства «Укрспецэкспортом»? Много всяких почему... И если бы все это произошло внезапно, то еще была бы понятна и растерянность, и молчание. Но ведь о том, что может произойти, писалось и говорилось многократно и публично. Не знал ли капитан, что район, в котором будет идти судно, опасен в отношении пиратов? Не ведали ли чиновники Минтранса, что в этих водах находится французская эскадра, которая следит и за пиратами? Не знали ли офицеры «леса» и «острова» о существующей опасности, или они могут только в юбилейных статьях расхваливать свои спецназы, которые-де в любой точке Земного шара «чё хош» сотворят? Пусть творят, раз их начальники регулярно брешут в газетах и исправно получают деньги налогоплательщиков. Или будем ждать, когда в регион придет российский фрегат «Неустрашимый» и напугает пиратов «до нестями», попросимся к русским на борт и с их помощью и благодаря их милости попробуем освободить сограждан? Должен напомнить, что у русских опыта борьбы с пиратами чуть меньше, чем у папуасов в охоте на белых медведей.

Фрегат В свое время «газетно-легендарный» генерал Василий Крутов суетился в Лондоне, пытаясь изобразить бурную деятельность по освобождению украинцев из пиратского плена. Куда теперь тревожно-патриотическая планида забросит мужа известной певицы, чтобы подготовить освобождение украинских моряков? Или в очередной раз поставят «под пары» Ил-76 с украинским подводным спецназом, чтобы в очередной раз дать им отбой? Интересно, как с точки зрения тактики спецопераций будет выглядеть такой десант? Какой-то пиаровский бред, рассчитанный на особо одаренных детей с дефектами речи! Возникает сомнение, отвечают ли за «базар» руководители наших спецслужб, трезвонящие о сверхспособностях своих ведомств. О чем может идти речь, когда элементарную утечку информации они не смогли предотвратить, а транспортировку груза стоимостью в сотню миллионов долларов доверили пароходу из Белиза, управляемому компанией с загадочной историей? Или кто-то хочет сказать, что пиратики случайно «надыбали» сухогруз в 160 милях от берега, набитый оружием, как склад кадрированной армии? Еще раз лихо обделались в глазах всего мира! Не впервой, а главное, не в последний раз!

Tweet Класс! Поделиться
В Мой Мир Мой Google В ЖЖ!

Важно

Министр обороны Украины отчитался перед своим американским коллегой о проделанной работе

Майдановские сотни и Правый сектор уже контролируют весь правительственный квартал Киева

Януковича в Харькове встречают криками «Зека геть!» /СМИ/

Украинки, взявшие «золото» на ОИ, посвятили свою победу Евромайдану

Загрузка...

ДОБАВИТЬ КОММЕНТАРИЙ

Ваше имя * Ваш email

Комментарий *

Страница < 1 2 > Всего комментариев - 15

30.09.2008 21:05, Bulia:
Ну и какой толк от этой статьи и двух страниц ваших догадок?! Досадно, что страной правит куча пидерастов. И народные деньги на гавно изводят.

29.09.2008 10:44, TERRAPIN:
Лауэр, как всегда, жжот !!! Молодец !!!

28.09.2008 13:23, Volontir:
А че Вы тут так много вопросов задаете, почему груз старый,а по документам новый, почему цены завышенны, почему страховщиком выступает российская страховая компания, почему столь важный груз шел без охраны, почему за сделкой стоит некий друг Игоря Смешко и семьи Ющенко - Йосиф Харес???? Вопросов много - ответ тоже ясен, как ясный день.
На сделке хотели заработать..и заработать здорово. Особенно с возврата экспортного НДН и за сам груз.
В Кении или куда там направлялось оружие, цену за него прекрасно знают и ни копейки больше не дадут. Операция по отмывке денег украинскими мошенниками на государственном уровне отработана по-полной. Российская страховая компания, скорее всего связана с личными банками семьи Петра Ющенко и самого Хареса, кторые находятся в России.
Смысл операции следующий:
Груз завышен баслословно по стоимости. Деньги в Украину за груз дожны пройти и таким же офигенно хитрым способом выйти обратно. Засвечивается только то, что деньги зашли, налоговая проведет проверку и будет начислен НДС около 18%, который необходимо выплатить компании комиссионеру. (Просмотрите, кстати, кто это, чья компания?!!!).
Потом груз обязан был утонуть в море....Именно так проходили многие украинские бизнес операции. В этом случае выплачивает все страховая компания. По утопленному грузу не проверишь, новые то танки были или старые:-)))) Страховики, для виду напрягутся, даже типа, собственное расследование проведут...Но...деньги выплачивать придется....
Но в этом случае...Зачем топить груз то?
Это в других случаях топят сахар или зерно или сеялки вертикального взлета. А здесь...какое-никакое, а все же оружие. Старое или новое, но с него еще можно пострелять. Здесь и необходима была инсценировка захвата пиратами.

Результат:
Груз никто не проверит, оружие попадет именно в те руки, в которые оно изначально и предназначалось!!!, страховку выплатят, откат в виде выкупных за заложников отдадим, из бюджета Украины НДС получим...Все, как "картина маслом".
А Вам, уважаемый лоХторат, преподносится супер-пупер страдания за украинский народец и бюджетец...
Вобщем, если Комиссия ВР Украины поработает с оперативной мыслью, то финал будет Ой-йо-йой!!!!!

28.09.2008 03:35, Druid:
Лауэр прав во многом и много знает, только мало может сказать - подставит источник. По Винскому - Урбанскому он конечно слишком накатил, теряется острота статьи.
Пусть депутаты пошерстят, кто возит оружие из Украины (перевозчик) и кто контролирует порт Октябрьский - прозреют. О том, что Урбанский "чужой в мире оружейных сделок" говорить уже не придется. Винский в своем кругу не раз говорил, что эту тему (перевозку оружия) он никому не отдаст.

28.09.2008 03:09, автор:
как раз с томексом вопрос очень скользкий. одесситы считают его полностью урбанским))) фирма новая 2007 года, кажется. фокус в том, что именно транспортировка оружия и есть "конек" урбанского. урбанский совсем не чужой в торговле оружием, он там в доску свой! это - его!
с укринмашем и спецэкспортом - пусть они сами разбираются, кто кому рабинович.

28.09.2008 02:45, автору:
О Бондарчуке.
Я сам его недавно видел на пятом, речь шла о бюджете. Вел он себя совсем неадекватно - на крике, хамски, впечатление очень тяжелое. Скорее всего, это была прессуха на УНИАН (не ручаюсь). Ссылок на нее в интернете - море

разливанное.

28.09.2008 02:37, автор:
заработал сайт укринмаша. вот что пишут на титульной странице. ни слова про укрспецэкспорт, зато явно указывают на минпромполитики. такой себе благостно кастрированный текст из серии"что бы сказать, чтобы ничего не сказать". написан идиотом для идиотов. читайте:

Корпорація "“Укрінмаш”" - багатопрофільне виробничо-торгівельне підприємство з колективною формою власності при Міністерстві промислової політики України.
В процесі реорганізації науково-виробничого зовнішньоторгівельного об”єднання, в 1997 р., була створена корпорація, до якої ввійшли підприємства і організації різних форм власності.
Стаж роботи на внутрішньому та зовнішньому ринках – 14 років.
Одна з основних сфер діяльності – реалізація на внутрішньому та зовнішньому ринках продукціїї підприємств машинобудування України, майна Міністерства оборони України, що відчужується в процесі конверсії та сприяння участі українських науково-дослідних організацій в міжнародній науково-технологічній співпраці.
Корпорація “Укрінмаш” має ділові зв”язки з підприємствами як за кордоном, так і на теренах України, зокрема з підприємствами Міністерства оборони, які займаються ремонтом та відновленням військової техніки.
Здійснюються поставки в Росію, Китай, Чехію, Монголію, Казахстан, Туркменістан, на Кубу та інші держави.
Налагоджені зовнішньоекономічні зв”язки корпорації допомагають українським підприємствам–виробникам та науково-дослідним інститутам здійснювати ділові партнерські відносини із зарубіжними споживачами.
Співробітництво здійснюється через участь в міжнародних виставках, публікації в спеціалізованій літературі та каталогах, використання особистих контактів та міжнародної мережі Інтернет.
Виробнича база корпорації зорієнтована на вирішенні питань реалізації продукції підприємств і майна Міністерства оборони та дозволяє виконувати комплекс робіт, пов”язаний з реалізацією – зберігання, допродажна підготовка, консервація, упакування, транспортування тощо.
Торгівельна діяльність з використанням можливостей власного виробництва, потенціалу підприємств Міністерства оборони України і юридичний супровід, забезпечений одним із учасників корпорації, дозволяє найповніше задовольнити потреби партнерів, які співробітничають з корпорацією “Укрінмаш”.

Запрошуємо до співпраці.
З повагою,

Голова правління корпорації “Укрінмаш”
Дудко Володимир Семенович

28.09.2008 02:33, автор:
по укринмашу я черпал информацию с их сайта. ссылка в статье. за слова еханурова ответить не могу, равно как не сомневаюсь в его знаниях. что коновалюк может копать, когда знаний - ноль? только хвост пружинит перед януковичем. мне пох, кто подаст запрос билозир или сивкович. я бы не стал ссылаться на источники, как газета "завтра" или газета "по-киевски", при всем моем к ним уважении, пусть пишут про проблемы канализации, трамваев и цены на колбасу. опять-таки почему минтранс выбирает перевозчика и страховщика, потому что это "хлеб и бизнес" урбанского, которого "крышует" винский. чтокасается бмп на борту, то скорее всего имелись в виду тягачи обеспечения (ремонтные и прочие). в принципе на борту был полноценный танковый батальон со всеми прибамбасами не только танками. злые языки твердят, что даже пзрк "игла" была на борту, а это уже серьезно. в руках террористов, эта штука обычно метит в пассажирские аэропланы. бондарчук странно и давно болен, поговаривают про отравление (без иронии). p.s. странно, но сейчас ссылка на официальный сайт "укринмаша" не работает (ошибка 404).

28.09.2008 01:13, вторая нестыковочка, роковая:
Почему подбором грузоперевозчика – ЧАСТНОЙ фирмы – должен заниматься Минтранс? Логично было бы, чтобы с ним напрямую договаривался отправитель, т. е. Укрспецэкспорт или Укринмаш. Скорее

всего, так оно и было.
Тогда приходится признать, что вся разоблачительная статья написана ради Винского-Урбанского, а «добрая Фаина» в ней - лишь для затравки, для лохов.
Да, вот еще: другие сайты говорят, что Укринмаш подчиняется Укрспецэкспорту т не имеет отношения к Минпромполитики. Так что и в этом случае наш автор, мягко говоря, ошибся (думаю, по привычке, сознательно) :-)
Все вопросы - к Бондарчуку.

28.09.2008 01:02, нестыковочка:
В статье Лауэра "продавец железа" Укринмаш подчиняется Минпромополитики. А Еханувров почему-то полагает, что Укрспецэкспорту. Кто из них некомпетентен, я не знаю.

Страница < 1 2 > Всего комментариев - 15

НОВОСТИ УКРАИНЫ НОВОСТИ СНГ МИРОВЫЕ НОВОСТИ
Заява Президента України Віктора Януковича
01:30 Путин заявил Обаме о важности работы с украинской радикальной оппозицией
00:33 Самооборона Майдана контролирует весь правительственный квартал, - Парубий
00:25 Основатель соцсети "ВКонтакте" Дуров поддержал Украину и Майдан
23:04 На Майдане Независимости митингуют не менее 30 тыс. людей
22:09 Лидер "Правого сектора" заявил о продолжении революции
22:09 Андрій Клюєв: Ми повинні зробити усе для збереження єдності України
РАБОТА
Загрузка...
Лучший украинский сайт о рыбалке
© 2005—2014 Интернет-газета «Трибуна», e-mail: 3buna@tribuna.com.ua

redactor.tribuna@gmail.com

© 2007—2014 Vis-a-vis — Разработка сайтов design agency

Все права на материалы, размещенные на сайте tribuna.com.ua, охраняются в соответствии с законодательством Украины. При использовании материалов сайта ссылка или гиперссылка (hyperlink) на tribuna.com.ua обязательна. Редакция не несет ответственности за достоверность фактов, изложенных в материалах, подготовленных и опубликованных на других сайтах и републикованных на страницах tribuna.com.ua с соответствующей гиперссылкой (hyperlink) на первоисточник.

free counters

bigmir)net TOP 100 Rambler's Top100

ENGLISH
TRANSLATION

Society

Who really did capture the old «FAINA»

Evgeniy Lauer, 27.09.2008, 18:30

Last Friday, another joyless message for Ukraine appeared in press - the seizure of ship with peaceful name «Faina»by Somali pirates. The record number of our citizens were captured by the pirates - 17 persons with three Russians and one Latvian citizen.

At this time, the situation was really problematic. According to the information, which was subsequently confirmed by Yuriy Yekhanurov, Minister of Defense, the vessel was transporting the crawler towing and repair machines, and numerous small arms and ammunition. All these items were sold to Kenya by "UkrSpetsExport" and "Ukrinmash" on the basis of a legal contract that was emphasized by Mr. Yekhanurov. Sorry, but are there illegal contracts? Tell us more about them! It is unclear why the situation with this cargo was not commented by "UkrSpetsExport", or Ministry of Transportation, or "Ukrinmash" who were the sales providers. By the way, Yekhanurov noted that "UkrSpetsExport" and "Ukrinmash" are the owners of the cargo. This suggests that the contract was signed under CIF terms when the transport and cargo insurance is the seller's liability. Typically, the bank letter of credit is finally revealed when the delivered weapons are brought to a condition that is disposable for service. There is no reason to doubt the words of Minister of Defense, so Ukraine eventually lost the payment for a tank battalion and numerous different weapons. However, there is another opinion concerning the owner of the cargo. People say that the goods are already the property of the Ministry of Defense of Kenya. That's what some unnamed sources of BBC state. Whom to believe? Ukrainian officials have a soviet habit to hide the information understanding that they "have a finger in the pie" and obviously fear their own people.

There were 33 T-72 tanks on board of «Faina». Note that the average cost of a modified tank (NATO - standard, African design, new systems of communication, defense, and armament) that was bought by Kenya, varies from 1.5 to 2 million dollars. The complaints of Konovalyuk, the former staff officer of Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, who now is a national deputy concerning the different cost of tanks of one modification can be attributed only to his illiteracy in arms sales. There are no similar tanks, as there are no similar BMW cars. All Konovalyuk's attempts to compete with the "great and terrible» Sivkovich usually fail.

If the Ministry of Industrial policy, the owner of "Ukrinmash" is keeping quiet, then it is weird that the Ministry of Transport does not make any official statements. There is no doubt that the selection of the carrier and the insurer for such "goods" was under their competence. "Tribuna" has already written about the uncrowned king of transportation of weapons by sea, Deputy Minister of Transportation, Mr. Igor Urbanskiy. Urbanskiy, moreover, is also a successful businessman, combining the public service with the management and de facto ownership of the whole family of companies "Kaalbye." His vessels were involved in smuggling schemes of arms shipments to Africa; they were the carriers for the ill-fated Kh-55 cruise missiles to Iran. So, Urbanskiy is really experienced in marine weapon scams. This simple scheme - "one ship - one managerial Company" - allowed him to lead almost all of Ukrainian fleet to the offshore (for

example, «Faina» sails under the flag of Belize) and allows not to pay a penny to the budget from the very favorable tax transactions related to the carriage of goods. According to our data, Ukrainian (?) managerial company "Tomax Team Inc." which controlled the ill-fated «Faina», represents just an "interlayer" and is directly related to Urbanskiy.

Generally, at the moment Vinskiy and Urbanskiy work together successfully. With the approval of Mr Vinskiy (which was undoubtedly abundantly supported by financial funds) – the Minister of Transport with the mentality of the provincial agriculturist - many gloomy scams appeared in the transportation market. Not only the sea transportations but the railway transportations as well were utilized by the thieving administration of Ministry of Transport. Actions of Vinskiy and his clique already result in the dissatisfaction of his own political coterie as due to his demand some successful companies of his party members are being eliminated, moreover, after his amateurish and boorish remarks some aviation industries phase down their production.

This "modest" member of YTB has already successfully completed the construction of his "unpretentious" little houses which "Tribuna" and some other media have already discussed. We doubt that Vinskiy spent his ministerial salary on a mansion in the heart of Kiev, and by authoritative rumors, bought himself a piece of land near Kiev. However, "if the stars are lit, then somebody needs it " – that is how we can evaluate the lack of the current prime minister's reaction on all critical publications about Vinskiy, Urbanskiy, and his accomplices. The party fee paid by Vinskiy for YTB expenses far outweighs his antics in the sphere of corruption and theft. Moreover, YTB values its funders beyond all criticism - they are just considered to be sinless.

The party leader has no reason to condemn Vinskiy for his activities. As he may tell the society about the hustles of YTB administration in the field of party building. He can reveal, for example, how he and his accomplice Alexander Turchinov (sorry, not accomplice but rather a respected person - first deputy of Tymoshenko 's party), "the Holy Father" and the preacher, were cheating people collecting their money. "Selling" " the positions in the election list for seven million dollars each, and then erasng from this list without giving their money back . "Tribuna" has already written about this issue referring to the deputy's request of Grigoriy Omelchenko... So, Julia Tymoshenko forgives the silly ex- socialist even the story with the memorable Mercedes of S-Class which resulted in the considerable scandal that threatened to become a corruption brangle...

But the conspiracy part of the story reminds about the "hot" days in the 80s in Africa and Latin America, as these kinds of tricks with weapons were known to them long before Minister Vinskiy even started his carreer...

The aircrafts loaded with weapons "accidentally" performed an emergency landing in the territories controlled by some rebels, as the country, the "looser" of weapons, does not want to officially recognize the cooperation with these groups of people. The convoys with trucks brim full of small arms and heavy infantry weapons got lost in savannas, moreover, sometimes the crews left the brand new tanks and APCs with full ammunition allegedly fearing "roars of the desert". Small vessels were found abandoned near the fishing villages controlled by the guerrillas, and there were some other plans designed by the Main Intelligence Directorate (Russia), the KGB, Muharabat, CIA, Mossad, or by the other similar offices.

So, in this case the question arise, whether a dashing pirate attack 160 miles off the coast was a well-planned act of transfer of a tank battalion into the hands of Somali guerrillas? Experts say that this is possible. Especially due to the fact that Kenyan authorities are not quite indifferent to their neighbors - Somali rebels and would be really glad to send them the "humanitarian aid". And insurance will cover any damages. But the same experts say that this trick would be impossible to perform without the consent and participation of vendors and especially the carriers. Since it is clear that the vessels with a similar load do not announce the contents of their holds in the press and do not hang the advertising slogans on board. Probably someone sympathetic from Nikolayev port informed someone in Zhovtneviy port where these "secret" goods are usually being loaded and instructed the right companions concerning the details of «Faina's» voyage. Average price of a modified T-72 varies from 1.5 to 2 million. So, Iosif Vinskiy is expected to buy new hectares of land and arrange some additional turrets to his existing Palazzo. And for how long will Ukrainian ships be sailing under the foreign flags of hot Liberia, Belize, and Panama? How much will our State earn from such traffic? Is it time for our deputies to ask Mr. Urbanskiy concerning the details of his schemes and secrets of commercial success? It would also be interesting to find out who exactly was insuring the cargo and the transaction itself, what damages Ukraine will suffer due to the piracy - or corruption - raid near the East coast of Africa. Why all the officials except for Yekhanurov keep quiet regarding this issue even in the context of a global coverage of the incident? Why Sergey Bondarchuk who almost distanced himself (or was eliminated?) from the administration of "UkrSpetsExport", is being sick for such long time? So many secrets... Such confusion and silence would be understandable in case of a suddenness of the occurrence. But the possible situation was repeatedly and publicly discussed. Whether the captain understood that the aforementioned area was dangerous and full of pirates? Whether the Ministry of Transportation's officials knew that a French squadron which monitors the pirates' activities was somewhere not far from their ship? Whether the officers knew about the existing danger? So, should we let their bosses do whatever they want to do? Or will we wait until the appearance of the Russian frigate "Fearless" in order to ask the Russians for help in crew rescuing? I must remind you that the Russian experience in combating pirates slightly reminds the experience of the Papuans in the hunt for polar bears.

At one point, in London, the legendary General Vasiliy Krutov was trying to make things hum on the liberation of Ukrainians from captivity. So, at the moment the husband of the famous singer can act the same in order to release the Ukrainian sailors. Or once again the IL-76 with the Ukrainian underwater commandos will try to cross swords with the terrorists. Interestingly, how these troops will look like from the point of special operations' tactics? This situation really does look stupid! So, the leaders of our intelligence service failed to control their special forces. What are we talking about since they could not prevent the breech in security, and transporting of cargo worth hundreds of millions of dollars was entrusted to the steamer from Belize controlled by a mysterious company? Or someone wants to say that the pirates accidentally found that cargo ship 160 miles off the coast, full of weapons as a military warehouse? SO, they managed to disgrace themselves in the eyes of the world! But it was neither the first, nor the last time!

Certified Translation
InWhatLanguage.com
Certified Translation