DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES 1155 DEFENSE FENTAGON WASHINGTON. Dc 20301-1 Jeffrey Kaye, Ph Subject: OSD MDR Case l4>>M-3329 tutt Dear Dr, Kaye: We have reviewed the enclosed documents in consultation with the Joint Staff (IS), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and have declassified them in part. OSD excised information is properly classified under Executive Order 13526. section and and is also protected under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 use. 552 section 10 us (2 ?424, and 15 excised information is still properly classified under section 1 4(a) and and is also protected under FOIA, 5 S.C 552 section CIA excised information is still properly classified under section DIA excised information is exempt under section still properly classified under section and and is also protected under FOIA, US 552 section 10 ?424, and - Section 3 protects information that could be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source, a human intelligence source. a relationship with an intelligence or security service of a foreign govemment or international organization, or a nonhuman intelligence source; or impair the effectiveness of an intelligence method currently in use, available for use, or under development. a Section 1.4(a) protects information that could be expected to reveal military plans, weapons systems, or operations 0 Section I 4(a) protects information that could be expected to reveal intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or 0 Section I 4(e) protects information that could be expected to reveal scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security, 0 Section l,4(g) protects information that could be expected to reveal vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures. projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security, 0 FOIA, S.C. 552(b)(3); lO 424 protects organizational and personnel information for the DIA. the National Reconnaissance Office. and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. 0 FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5) protects inter-agency or intra--agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency I FOIA, 5 552(b)(6) protects information which would constitute a Clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of certain individuals. a OSD stands as the appellate authority and will coordinate any appeals regarding this case. A written appeal must be filed within 60 days explaining the rationale for reversal of the decision. Reference should be made to OSD MDR Case 14-M-3329. Letters of appeal should be sent to the following address: WHS/ESD Records and Declassification Division Attention: Luz Ortiz 4800 Mark Center Drive Suite 02F09-02 Alexandria, VA 22350-3100 If you have any questions, contact me by e-mail at Records.Declassification@whs.mil. Sincerely, Luz D. Ortiz Chief, Records and Declassification Division Enclosures: 1. MDR request 2. Documents 1 and 2 OSD 1.4 ( C ) fl E C R l ] ) g j > ? O P O R N js i-'icaua:) CXA EO 13526 FINAL 1.4(c)<25Yrs REPORT jfiff C JCS External Review of Guantanamo Bay Intelligence ie Operations (U) c s s ?3 16 jgri. S C ll °is g 2=1 S elz s ^ = 1^ a o != BACKGROUWP: j[Sf On 17 JUN 2002 Acting Commander, US Southern Command requested CJCS provide SOUTHCOM assistance with an external review of ongoing Guantanamo BayJ Under guidance provided by Director, Joint Staff, a team ot subjecl matter experts from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the US Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca AZ, was tasked to perform the external review. The external review team received the following mission statement: E c o o « 5^ S ^ 0) 6) (^0 3) ^ — I I- g) §5 o S ^ 15 .a. 3 < The team conducted its external review during the period 14 August through 04 September 2002 with visits and interviews of all involved agencies. The team traveled to SOUTHCOM Headquarters, Miami, Florida, and the US Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from 21-28 August, 2002f a. DECLASSIFIED IN PART O ^ .S Office of the Secretary ofDcfcnse Chief, RDD, BSD, WHS Date: Authority: EO Declassify: Declassify in Part; Reason:i»^ MDR: [1^ Deny Authority: EO 13526 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS AUG 1 5 2014 13 in Full: vJtU WOFORN- -3321 JS QgQ 1.4 ( C ) SECRET WOPORN 5 Id U'S-C- HU( DECLASSIFIED IN PARI Authority; EG 13526 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS Date:AUG 1 5 2014 taf II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS: iSlTIf the United States is to truly conduct a Global War on Terrorism we must adopt a long-term view of that warf We should realize that our nation faces an entirely new threat framework and if we plan to. win this struggle we must invest both human capital and infrastruotur( — 'no orchestrated public aifairs or meoia strategyj There is long term perspective of any "kind. Other problems include a^ifufcated command structure with multiple, parallel, non-supportive chains of command^ ■< 3 B C R I & T N O F O R N JS (-H ('^U5)+ DJi;4 50-5-C.?53CbJ/;iY -JU'S.C.^ZCbKO ,,/V ^sbi.mo •' DECLASSIFIED IN PART SfieMBTifOPORS Authority: EG 13526 Chief, Records & Daclass Div, WHS ™e:AUG 15 m entiremi^ion is woefully undermanned and until a approved, shortages will continue to negatively impact the mission. Th^urren^aolitie^j^uantanamo, to include detention totally Inadequate for a mission 01 such national importance. Similarly, the lack of any US Government ic hoiicy or i-ublic Diplomacy Strategy has damaged the operation. A constant stream of visitors, unfettered media access, and an almost total lack of Public Affairs guidance have " Shortsighted incremental tevelopment and focus has hindered mission success and the lack of long-term perspective is evident. d evaluation team spent a greai aeai oi enort examining the six specific mission tasks included in the SOUTHCOM request. 'BECnST NOPORW- 3 DECLASSIFIED IN PARI 7S CJ/} l.qCc) S \).S-C'9?1^)C'7) Authority: EG 13526 BECREWP yOFORN Chief, Records & Declass DIv, WHS AUG 1 5 2014 S" \)U'Ssi /OU-U-Mlij jfgJ^ RECOMMENDATION: Formalize the efforts of all no-DoD) No formal coordination agreement currently exists between DOD and non-DOD agencies. Coordination is largely informal, tentative and )rimarily the result of individual efforts.] • Several facts serve to "bind" all participating agencies. o The detainees belong to DOD. therefore coordinatio J7 S JI ■ -(1a ) ,/ t V - D fj vD EACu Lt hAoSr S i t IyF: I E EDG I N 1 3P 5A2R6T 5 IJ'S'(.*59'2XW)C'7) ' -eB^tBy-WOPORM Chief,RecordsaDeclassDIv, WHS lO 0'S-C.t(2,y4- ( o)Ls) °®'®=AUG 1 5 2014 Such agreement and organization would codify responsibilities for a greater unity of effort. There is currently no formal relationship betwecnl " " h e J o i n t Ta s k f o r c e s ^r^uEordinate to SOUTHCOM and report through Commander US Southern Command to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense. [and reports directlv to the Secretary of the Army who reports to the Secretary of Defense. ■S E C R E T NOrORN 5 DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority: EG 13526 I )(^jj (ou-^^cmu fiEORE'j Records&& Declass Div, WHS 'S 0 3" 9»0 c rn 50 3; a> A CJ3 - < oo ** ss g-oS tji ^1-* — - SK U (/> C/l € a c —4 B. Inadequate Detention Facilities Observationj reports from Congress nave expressed serious concerns tnat tne current detention facilities_^GTMO degrade th( famng to provide adequate security variation, incentives to encourage detainee cooperation, and sufficient capacity. OperationaHlexibili^^^gauire^brde^nee management, e.g., changing H mm^^^^^^^^^H^^Only one sectionto this units was built with adequateH^^^^^^IHHI Rotations .section provide obvious benefit Facilities flexibility enables the commander to SECRET NOFOBM. J5 f'H(4 Cg) PJV\ 5"^srUhM)) 9 \)<^'0 SS'Z-wC'i') U'5*0 sBGnm-noFORJ* OSD 1.4 ( C 5" U'5.(.$5ZA>)B); contro Recommendations: Direct SOUTHCOM to create a Master Facilities Plan. Such a plan should include the following requirements; - Current military operations necessitate greater capacity overall; a medium security facility might be built for considerably less cost. Building a mediun^ecwih^am^m facilitate more communal living arrangements forj ^^^^^^^^^^^^ or those awaiting potential transfer o Ds n =• ^ = o m ®.ag-g 3»> » - —» c r n o 3 ^. gWgo fi®co z a o &> ( / > U ) o i _ ro3 w would support^^^^^^mH H^^^^^H^m Han^^^s^n^ae^nee operation^ommande^r^unisnm^hosed^tainees who commit misconduct. - An expanded capacity to allow for routine maintenance plan - units completed a few months ago are already rusted near the toilets 86 sinks. The exterior of all the general population facilities is also degraded. The overcrowding restricts the ability for easy maintenance. JJSf C. Transfer/Releases have not occurred despite an approved c / > process jsf Observation: esire to iDegin transferring appropriate detainees immediateh unanimoush JSf Discussion: Leaders at GTMO desire transfer of appropriate persons immediately for several reasons: psD 1.4(6 \(e)^ •QECIU3TUOFORN- S C0'5"(-' 9^m)} These are many other examples of how commanders conld utilize the transfer/ release of some detainees tor (006'C.Hiq - Leaders at GTMO also believe that the longer] detainees remain at GTMO, the greater the chance that they will become hardened jihadistSy thus increasing the risk posed by these individuals to o D> o ^ sre o the United States. m jSf^Thus far, only two detainees have been transferred out from GTMO a> g •• -n — agg tn ^ O W ®®e*>aE ^3 o •** «_ •IS- O ^2 « ® »—s4 eta CO C O - The transfer process is designed to provide the decision-makers in Washington with two recommendations -J Ivi^ECARMY. Once these two & o recommendation^j decision can be made, per the approved policy. H ^^^^Khas provided approximately 20 recommendations tc ^^^^WSECARMY has provided three. Hence,! ■S E C R E T W O F O R N . 11 pJ/1- 5 10 O^.C. qiy OBoniw kofoiin OSD 1.4 ( C ) JSJT Recommendations: Expedite Transfer/Release Processes: _ [This could hasten simxiltaneous forwarding (or nearly simultaneous forwarding) of the recommendations to OSD from both entities. 0 0 > C 9 £2.H:S!3 5P £5.g"g CO o •r* c=> cji 31 m -.. - s s i b> t A t/> - Appropriate DOD officials shoulc risk assessment guidance! Tovide the law enforcement and to facilitate investigations. - Appropriate DOD offidal^hould determine the appropriate standard of investigatiorJB^^Wand provide guidance. jsTD. Public Policy Plan —» Observation: Currently no USG Public Policy Strategy exists. OSDPA, OJCS, SOUTHCOM-PA) and JTFs all operate independently with no S B C O overarching stratei Recommendatlonj SOUTHCOM StJ jD-PA lead effort In coordination wit ito construct "USG Public Diplomacy Strategy."] JBf2. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS: .SECRET NerORN 12 3 vn ^ DECLASSIFIED Authority: AUG IN EG 1 5 PA RT 13526 Chief, Records & Deciass Div, WHS 2014 OT j f /.t/Cc), (e), C5) f OECRBT- WCl"01W ^ ^'^<^^9ZChXi)} [ov-yo DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority: EO13526 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS Date: A(J6 15 2014 eECRETHffOFORN' 14 JS ■S B e R B T ' J J O P e R N ' 5 V)'S<..SKCo)K) taf^B. PSYOPS/IO MtcH /O U'5 — c L o W c n c » r^oe^CO ^S Z oo K t =n of D) —< w > CO v > i/SfRecommendations: 15 01% 5 04039206699!! SZSSI 03 WUOHWV NI (BHISSVTOBG 0-.- s UK. 55z(feK3);/di/s^ i{Z(/ gEORBTBOPeRW. o o M s-B ^ J-5 l-i^ra)/f5)v Cj^ l'H(c) o m fp.ag-P S g^ss . e 3 i ^ «-/ >a ^gCgD ro —_ I-* __ 3 t n c n o *^3 E®*S &> ^ 0 0 0 0 CO OEOREaP ^WFORW. 17 ^ (254. gm :oxea 9Z981 03 =m10tnnv NI 9 1 9W 0 33D-EA: V ^ (O u^.c,i{ZY OEOnSJ-WOFORW . (a\t9)+ 9 O Oa r c^ O m &> wm^ a_3P5; Discussion: OPOrtBT lltPPORN OSD 1.4 ( C )t ? Uis -5-og^i ^C. q(iyb)cs); ^ Recommendation: The concept of flexi^jli^^^ I is effective eind shoixld be continued. Likewise, accommodating transfer of primary interest to another element information on inoividual defaces is developed, is logical and should be continued. The future could allow for participation by organizations not already at GTMO i.e. Treasu^j^^j^^gtoms^[^j^an^ ^^ ^mim^pset8 the o o x > o D> S* S. m SSff^oordinatinp Venue. ^ »3:c/9 ^ o^c/> SS" 5 --iSs ^3 n cn -_ -8S w • —» 9 t o _ Each equity depends to a lesser or greater degree on the other's coopera'tion because practically spealdng the extremely high volume of work demands it and each other's i n f o r m a t i o n r e p o r t s a r e o f v a l u e t o a l l i n t h e J T F. o j5' c/> [Because of the sophistication required in approach and personnel, the numerous legal and procedural issues, cultural familiarization required and skill sets needed by operations personnel across-the-federal board, this venue should be a course of instruction proride^^pera^nal and other key personnel prior to deploymenl^^^^^^^^^^H which is addressed elsewhere in this report. j[8]^Lastly, although the operations commentaiy centered on process, as stated elsewhere in this report, not until changes are made to the physical facility will application of proper interrogation techniques be HMmUEWlOFORM 5" ssL(hK^) t^i- c^owa),w,^^^-sU'H.5siCbK2i;,, ^ ^'^■^9>im);lov^^i'HlH possible. A dormitory atmosphere pervades the general population lockup, which, no matter how austere looking and efficiently managed, )rovided a support structure to the detainees. Thii o » 5n* 5 . ^ F To! •• tZ cn o " 3 t o ep n D> V ) OI —J P Process improvement recommendations related, to detainee interrogations are on balance incremental in nature and should be able to be accomplished with minimum disruption. E. INTELLIGENCE CONTINGENCY FUNDS (IGF) 05p l-qcc)4- 5 O'S-c. %zOoM) :js «BORBTyOFOnW- (0 ■/tovtsi) current and projeete intelligence operations^ [»l-1 c«,i,e),(pp+ o o » » o fi > S * C f T i S o " - -S r ^' of f C 30§;<^ SS"i?S CX3 o 23 s® "3 i.*"S M C/9 C/) ^ Recommendation: Work with HPSCI/SSCI foraj^n^ intelligence appropriation to fund construction jerhaps modeled o: J8f In the interim, investigate the possibUi^^^esignating another large building on Naval Base If a building exists, small amount of construction money m^^ra^cally change this s i t u a t i o n f o r t h e b e t t e r. psTo. J/Sf Observation: hindere( £Sj Discussion: C/> a n d Direct taskings from senior headquarters tol )perations at Guantanamo Bay. a 0^ I'H (-0, Ce;,y)f '•HU),C5) £ 0'5 (6 U-e.Cv^tY O fi > O ^ 9*B S's e g e f f fi T - J w o F O R w mm\(e)A9h J" u <.(. S52ftX5); /o y-J-c. l(^y O m s c?3 o ** Z! e n cn - P i t o M « 0 ( / > Discussion; rSBeRBy FJOFORN 2 3 0^5(J'S'C.S5lW)} tV^ASy}H^5Sl(h){^ ■SECRByyOFORK »i/'i-c. 'fz-Y jgfTh authorizes seven CM&D billets; o o > o &tlp •■ , r " 0 ^ gf^i CD g -n - SS e»£»S C9 jE' fl g S B ««« increased connectivity now ayallabife at" Ray sunn trl p.nahle these three people to move forward. 3, TRAINING A. New SkiU Sets: y37 Discussion: ^ C R I M M J O F O R N 2 4 75 1 ^(1) o a> 3- c rn ?2:?p _ S0 3;e/9 ^ €P «g to CD S " 22 -'S-og h ^ _ t-o ®®coz c=3 C3 C?1 ^ - s s s &> CO CO —4 3 : c/> Recommendatlon:g ^^m^fcstab]ish a "Terrorism University" to provide a common orientation curnculum for personnel assigned to ■O E C R E T W O F O R N 2 5 3 KW, b ) OSo W(c-) Pj;^50'K.5rzCbX%); /o U-5.G c/z.c( SECRET ^OFORN. the GTMO operation. *'TU"- training would target all personnel who contact detainees with specific training focus on their particular billet or function. This training should be received prior to their deployment in order to minimize the degradation and impact on the GTMO operation o i» o s 3" » c o m CD CD S' " "-r*® c so o S c voi - S - SCg3 CO S ® ro3 SO Q> conductine^medial training. Interrogators and debriefers who have worked alH BB^fcetention center should be sent to "TU" as advisors/mstnictors. (See Annex A "Curriculum") j^Sf^B. Lessons Learned: Observation: "Lessons Learned" are not being captured at Joint or Gerviqe Levels. C O C O O j^Sf^Recommendations: GO 4. (iSfPERSONNEL A. Tour Lengths Observation: Personnel turbulence caused by the curreni hour lengths severely impacts an( hinderj Discussion: [ To u r balance factors of contin"uity md fle^dbilig^ based upon mission requirements. Key billets -li^d to be staHeu lor long-term contmuit NAVBASE^-'dTOTO has; stated its abili"ty to immediatelyl Jssential personnel shouk "[The balance of personnel (other staff and support personnel) may be assigned on temporary duty tours so long as adequate provisions are eTOBE^fTOFORN- 26 PJA 050 S 0'5.G SjiCbX^J /« '^2-Y+l, 8*5. m £21 ff.afg g;ai=;S o ^ TheJ^Ushould also include "essential" l yeS'lTjij unaccompanied tours) foi ^ and "tempofi 3! "^Sg SboKS •^0^3 2 .«"S &> -H ( / > C/) year PCS accompanie^ours^^i^d indu^ JTF leadership, day TDY tours for junior support (Jl, J4, J6) staff personnel. This ^assignment policy in concert with 100%^Bl^fill will/ Current Ifeyal Bi two-year accom^aniS tours forj S^ignment policies on thej should be consistent for JSfThei tWKiTarimrrpy IfSf B. Force Structure ^jSfobservatlon: SeryiQe.force, structures will continue to encounter continued dtFficxalty' accordance witt^n^pfopos^ Discussion; Service force structures stall reflect "Cold War" threat scenarios and are not optimized to prosecute a Global War On Terrorism. All Services can depend on_^d^should buHd upon a continual future expanding reauiremient fo BEORET ■NOFORN- L JSIWCa),C9) IfOPORN- 0 0 3 > C 3 &> 9" B m S ' -■*? S ' ^E o ■■ B3s;C/> 3s» O.?G0 CT • • ^ Sgg ^ €« 0 _ 8®coaK 5 ^ oS erno g? CO CO CO "4 C/3 Recommendations: 1^eRBT^M[OFORN. to 0-5C ' . K^L lj •n: 1 {)'^K<^n^SUhKi)} K ' ^ / )j 116, 1U 5.C. K(il+\C)jlc^ m^m ii ^iuoV i vi a\ O l US -C-,tLh i^K) ^u)y impossiblei O O ^ O » =■ 5 . m o S'sr S _ so 5; CO ^ 2*^£2 cn o * * mmm 3 - i-Sg s Sss» - sss &>