Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, P.L. 111-259, Section 334, which states: “The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.” (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense As of 1 October 2010, 598 detainees have been transferred out of Department of Defense (DoD) custody at the U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) detention facility. The Intelligence Community assesses that 81 (13.5 percent) are confirmed and 69 (11.5 percent) are suspected of reengaging in terrorist or insurgent activities after transfer. Of the 150 former GTMO detainees assessed as confirmed or suspected of reengaging in terrorist or insurgent activities, the Intelligence Community assesses that 13 are dead, 54 are in custody, and 83 remain at large. On 22 January 2009, the President signed Executive Order 13492, calling for a comprehensive interagency review of the status of all individuals currently detained at Guantanamo Bay. Every decision to transfer a detainee to a foreign country under this review was made after a full assessment of intelligence and threat information. Since the implementation of Executive Order 13492 and under the enhanced interagency review process, 66 of the 598 detainees noted above have been transferred. Of those 66 individuals transferred since January 2009, 2 are confirmed and 3 are suspected of reengaging in terrorist or insurgent activities. (2a) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism The Intelligence Community assesses that the number of former detainees identified as reengaged in terrorist or insurgent activity will increase. A February 2010 review of GTMO detainees’ release dates compared to first reporting of confirmed or suspected reengagement shows about 2.5 years between leaving GTMO and the first identified reengagement reports. Based on trends identified during the past 6 years, the Intelligence Community further assesses that if additional detainees are transferred from GTMO, some of them will reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities. (2b) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations It is not unusual for former GTMO detainees to communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning future terrorist operations). Correspondingly, the Intelligence Community assesses that additional former GTMO detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Based on trends identified during the past 6 years, the Intelligence Community further assesses that if additional detainees are transferred from GTMO, some of them will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Definition of “Terrorist” or “Insurgent” Activities For the purposes of this assessment, activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations, etc. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations— including other former GTMO detainees—on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing over shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-U.S. books or articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda statements. Reporting Qualifications for “Confirmed” A preponderance of information identifying a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Reporting Qualifications for “Suspected” Plausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity.  Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states: "The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of, (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations." (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense. Reengagement of Former GTMO Detainees as of 29 December 2011 Total Pre-22 January 2009 1 Post-22 January 2009 Detainees Transferred 599* 532 67 Confirmed of Reengaging 95 of 599 (15.9%) 92 of 532 (17.3%) 3 of 67 (4.5%) Dead - 12 of 95 12 0 In custody - 28 of 95 28 0 Not in custody - 55 of 95 52 3 70 of 532 (13.2%) 2 of 67 (3%) Dead - 2 of 72 2 0 In custody - 26 of 72 26 0 Not in custody - 44 of 72 42 2 Suspected of Reengaging 72 of 599 (12.0%) *An additional eight detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was convicted, and is now imprisoned in Colorado. 1 Executive Order 13492 was signed on January 22, 2009, to determine the disposition of the 240 detainees then remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (2) (a) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism. Based on trends identified during the past 9 years, we assess that if additional detainees are transferred without conditions from GTMO, some will reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities. Posing a particular problem are transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as active recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations. (2) (b) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees transferred in the future also will communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations - including other former GTMO detainees - an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged. Definition of "Terrorist" or "Insurgent" Activities. Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations--including other former GTMO detainees-- on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing antiU.S. books or articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda statements. Definition of "Confirmed." A preponderance of information which identifies a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Definition of "Suspected." Plausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. 2 Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states: (a) "The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of, (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. (b) Updates - Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection (a) and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station." Sec. 307 (a) (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense. Reengagement of Former GTMO Detainees as of 19 July 2012 Total Pre-22 January 2009 1 Post-22 January 2009 Detainees Transferred 602* 532 70 Confirmed of Reengaging Dead - 15 of 95 95 of 602 (15.8%) 92 of 532 (17.3%) 15 3 of 70 (4.3%)** 0 In custody - 24 of 95 24 0 Not in custody - 56 of 95 53 3 72 of 532 (13.5%)** 2 1 of 70 (1.4%)** 0 In custody - 28 of 73 28 0 Not in custody - 43 of 73 42 1 Suspected of Reengaging Dead - 2 of 73 73 of 602 (12.1%) *An additional eight detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was convicted, and is now imprisoned in Colorado. **One detainee in each of these categories was transferred pursuant to a court order. 1 Executive Order 13492 was signed on January 22, 2009, to determine the disposition of the 240 detainees then remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Sec. 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism. Based on trends identified during the past ten years, we assess that if additional detainees are transferred without conditions from GTMO, some will reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities. Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as active recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations pose a particular problem. Sec. 307 (a) (2) (cont.) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees transferred in the future also will communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations--including other former GTMO detainees--an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged. Definition of "Terrorist" or "Insurgent" Activities. Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations--including other former GTMO detainees--on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-U.S. books or articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda statements. Definition of "Confirmed." A preponderance of information which identifies a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Definition of "Suspected." Plausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. 2 Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states: (a) -The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of, (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.? (b) Updates - Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection (a) and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station.? Section 307 (a) (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense. Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detainees as of 14 January 2013 Total Pre-22 January 2009a Post-22 January 2009 Detainees Transferred 603* 532 71 Confirmed of Reengaging 97 of 603 (16.1%) 94 of 532 (17.7%) 3 of 71 (4.2%)** Dead - 14 of 97 14 0 In custody - 25 of 97 25 0 Not in custody - 58 of 97 55 3 70 of 532 (13.2%)** 2 of 71 (2.8%)** Dead - 2 of 72 2 0 In custody - 26 of 72 26 0 Not in custody - 44 of 72 42 2 Suspected of Reengaging 72 of 603 (11.9%) *An additional nine detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was convicted, and is now imprisoned in Colorado. **One detainee in each of these categories was transferred pursuant to a court order. a Executive Order 13492 was signed on January 22, 2009, to determine the disposition of the 240 detainees then remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism. Based on trends identified during the past ten years, we assess that if additional detainees are transferred without conditions from GTMO, some will reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities. Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as active recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations pose a particular problem. Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees transferred in the future also will communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations-- including other former GTMO detainees--an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged. Definition of "Terrorist" or "Insurgent" Activities. Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations--including other former GTMO detainees--on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-US books or articles, or making anti-US propaganda statements. Definition of "Confirmed." A preponderance of information which identifies a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Definition of "Suspected." Plausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. 2 Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states: ?The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassi?ed summary of, (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Updates Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassi?ed summary consisting of the information required by subsection and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are con?rmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station.? Section 307 (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense. Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detainees as of 15 July 2013 Total Pre-22 January 2009a Post-22 January 2009 Detainees Transferred 603* 532 71 Con?rmed of Reengaging 100 Dead-170f100 17 0 In custody custody 56 of 100 53 3 Suspected of Reengaging Dead 2 of 74 2 0 In custody custody 4 7 of 74 43 4 *An additional nine detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was convicted, and is now imprisoned in Colorado. **One detainee in each of these categories was transferred pursuant to a court order. 3 Executive Order 13492 was signed on January 22, 2009 to determine the disposition of the 240 detainees then remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Section 307 (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism. Based on trends identi?ed during the past ten years, we assess that if additional detainees are transferred without conditions from GTMO, some will reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities. Transfers to countries with ongoing con?icts and internal instability as well as active recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations pose a particular problem. Section 307 (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some detainees transferred in the ?rture also will communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations? including other former GTMO detainees?an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged. De?nition of ?Terrorist? or ?Insurgent? Activities. Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, ?nancing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations?including other former GTMO detainees?on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-US books or articles, or making anti-US propaganda statements. De?nition of ?Con?rmed.? A preponderance of information which identi?es a speci?c former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this de?nition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. De?nition of ?Suspected.? Plausible but unveri?ed or single-source reporting indicating a speci?c former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this de?nition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba ?The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states: The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassi?ed summary of, (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Updates Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassi?ed summary consisting of the information required by subsection and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station.? Section 307 (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense. Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detainees as of 14 January 2014 Total Pre-22 January 2009a Post?22 January 2009 Detainees Transferred 614* 532 82 Con?rmed of Reengaging 104 of614 99 of 532 5 of 82 Dead 20 0f104 20 0 In custody custody 57 of 104 52 5 Suspected of Reengaging Dead 2 0f 74 2 0 In custody custody 48 of 74 46 2 *An additional nine detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was convicted, and is now imprisoned in Colorado. **One detainee in each of these categories was transferred pursuant to a court order. Executive Order 13492 was signed on January 22, 2009 to determine the disposition of the 240 detainees then remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Section 307 (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism. Based on trends identi?ed during the past eleven years, we assess that if additional detainees are transferred without conditions from GTMO, some will reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities. Transfers to countries with ongoing con?icts and internal instability as well as active recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations pose a particular problem. Section 307 (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees transferred in the future also will communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations? including other former GTMO detainees?an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged. De?nition of ?Terrorist? or ?Insurgent? Activities. Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, ?nancing terrorist Operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations?including other former GTMO detainees?on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti?US books or articles, or making anti-US propaganda statements. Definition of ?Confirmed.? A preponderance of information which identi?es a speci?c former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this de?nition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Definition of ?Suspected.? Plausible but unveri?ed or single-source reporting indicating a speci?c former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this de?nition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states: (a) "The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of, (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. (b) Updates - Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection (a) and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station." Section 307 (a) (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense. Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detainees as of 15 July 2014 Total Pre-22 January 2009a Post-22 January 2009 Detainees Transferred 620* 532 88 Confirmed of Reengaging 107 of 620 (17.3%) 101 of 532 (19.0%) 6 of 88 (6.8%)** Dead - 23 of 107 22 1 In custody - 25 of 107 25 0 Not in custody - 59 of 107 54 5 76 of 532 (14.3%)** 1 of 88 (1.1%)** Dead - 2 of 77 2 0 In custody - 14 of 77 14 0 Not in custody - 61 of 77 60 1 Suspected of Reengaging 77 of 620 (12.4%) *An additional nine detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was convicted, and is now imprisoned in Colorado. **One detainee in each of these categories was transferred pursuant to a court order. a Executive Order 13492 was signed on January 22, 2009 to determine the disposition of the 240 detainees then remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism. Based on trends identified during the past eleven years, we assess that some detainees currently at GTMO will seek to reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities after they are transferred. Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as active recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations pose particular problems. While enforcement of transfer conditions may deter reengagement by many former detainees and delay reengagement by others, some detainees who are determined to reengage will do so regardless of any transfer conditions, albeit probably at a lower rate than if they were transferred without conditions. Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees transferred in the future also will communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations-- including other former GTMO detainees--an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged. Definition of "Terrorist" or "Insurgent" Activities. Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations--including other former GTMO detainees--on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-US books or articles, or making anti-US propaganda statements. Definition of "Confirmed." A preponderance of information which identifies a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Definition of "Suspected." Plausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. 2 Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states: (a) "The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of, (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. (b) Updates - Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection (a) and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station." Section 307 (a) (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense. Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detainees as of 15 January 2015 Total Pre-22 January 2009a Post-22 January 2009 Detainees Transferred 647* 532 115 Confirmed of Reengaging 116 of 647 (17.9%) 110 of 532 (20.7%) 6 of 115 (5.2%)** Dead - 25 of 116 24 1 In custody - 23 of 116 23 0 Not in custody - 68 of 116 63 5 68 of 532 (12.8%)** 1 of 115 (0.9%)** Dead - 2 of 69 2 0 In custody - 12 of 69 12 0 Not in custody - 55 of 69 54 1 Suspected of Reengaging 69 of 647 (10.7%) *An additional nine detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was convicted, and is now imprisoned in Colorado. **One detainee in each of these categories was transferred pursuant to a court order. a Executive Order 13492 was signed on January 22, 2009 to determine the disposition of the 240 detainees then remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Intelligence Community reviews available information about the post-detention activities of Guantanamo detainees on an ongoing basis to determine the detainees' reengagement status. The numbers above represent the consensus view of the Intelligence Community with one exception; as of the March 2015 release, one agency judges that one additional detainee is suspected of reengagement. That detainee's status will be continually evaluated and may be reflected in future reports, depending on the information available and the views within the Intelligence Community at that time. Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism. Based on trends identified during the past eleven years, we assess that some detainees currently at GTMO will seek to reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities after they are transferred. Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as active recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations pose particular problems. While enforcement of transfer conditions may deter reengagement by many former detainees and delay reengagement by others, some detainees who are determined to reengage will do so regardless of any transfer conditions, albeit probably at a lower rate than if they were transferred without conditions. Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees transferred in the future also will communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations-- including other former GTMO detainees--an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged. Definition of "Terrorist" or "Insurgent" Activities. Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations--including other former GTMO detainees--on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-US books or articles, or making anti-US propaganda statements. Definition of "Confirmed." A preponderance of information which identifies a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Definition of "Suspected." Plausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. 2 Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba The Director of National Intelligence submits this siJmmary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states: ?The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassi?ed summary of, (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Updates Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an Unclassi?ed summary consisting of the information required by subsection and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are con?rmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station.? Section 307 (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense. Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detainees as of 15 July 2015 Total Pre?22 January 200921 Post?22 January 2009 Detainees Transferred 653* 532 121 7 Confirmed of Reengaging 117 121 Dead?29 0f117 28 1 In custody 25 0f117 25 0 Not in custody 63 0f117 58 5 Suspected of Reengaging 121 Dead 2 of 79 2 0 In custody .custody 59 of 79 53 6 *An additional nine detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was convicted, and is now imprisoned in Colorado. **Each of these categories includes detainees who were transferred pursuant to a court order. a Executive Order 13492 was signed on January 22, 2009 to determine the disposition of the 240 detainees then remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Section 307 (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism. Based on trends identi?ed during the past eleven years, we assess that some detainees currently at GTMO will seek to reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities after they are transferred. Transfers to countries with ongoing con?icts and internal instability as well as active recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations pose particular problems. While enforcement of transfer conditions may deter reengagement by many former detainees and delay reengagement by others, some detainees who are determined to reengage will do so regardless of any transfer conditions, albeit probably at a lower rate than if they were transferred without conditions. - Section 307 (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees transferred in the future also will communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations? including other former GTMO detainees?an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the metives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged. Definition of ?Terrorist? or ?Insurgent? Activities. Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizationswincluding other former GTMO detainees?on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-US books or articles, or making anti-US propaganda statements. De?nition of ?Con?rmed? Activities. A preponderance of information which identi?es a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Definition of ?Suspected? Activities. Plausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a speci?c former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states: (a) "The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of: (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. (b) "Updates - Not less frequently than once every six months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection (a) and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station." Section 307 (a) (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense. Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detainees as of 15 January 2016 Total Pre-22 January 2009a Post-22 January 2009 Detainees Transferred 676* 532 144 Confirmed of Reengaging 118 of 676 (17.5%) 111 of 532 (20.9%) 7 of 144 (4.9%)** Dead - 30 of 118 29 1 In custody - 25 of 118 25 0 Not in custody - 63 of 118 57 6 74 of 532 (13.9%)** 12 of 144 (8.3%)** Dead - 4 of 86 3 1 In custody - 17 of 86 17 0 Not in custody - 65 of 86 54 11 Suspected of Reengagingb 86 of 676 (12.7%) *An additional nine detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was convicted, and is now imprisoned in Colorado. a Executive Order 13492 was signed on January 22, 2009 to determine the disposition of the 240 detainees then remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. b The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses five additional detainees are suspected of reengagement. **Each of these categories includes detainees who were transferred pursuant to a court order. Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism. Based on trends identified during the past eleven years, we assess that some detainees currently at GTMO will seek to reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities after they are transferred. Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability, as well as recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations, could pose problems. While enforcement of transfer conditions may deter reengagement by many former detainees and delay reengagement by others, some detainees who are determined to reengage will do so regardless of any transfer conditions, albeit probably at a lower rate than if they were transferred without conditions. Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees transferred in the future will also communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations-- including other former GTMO detainees--an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged. Definition of "Terrorist" or "Insurgent" Activities. Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations--including other former GTMO detainees--on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-U.S. books or articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda statements. Definition of "Confirmed" Activities. A preponderance of information that identifies a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Definition of "Suspected" Activities. Plausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating that a specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. 2 Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states: (a) "The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of, (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. (b) Updates - Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection (a) and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station." Section 307 (a) (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense. Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detainees as of 15 July 2016 Total Pre-22 January 2009a Post-22 January 2009 Detainees Transferred 693* 532 161 Confirmed of Reengaging 122 of 693 (17.6%) 113 of 532 (21.2%) 9 of 161 (5.6%)** Dead - 30 of 122 29 1 In custody - 25 of 122 25 0 Not in custody - 67 of 122 59 8 75 of 532 (14.1%)** 11 of 161 (6.8%)** Dead - 3 of 86c 2 1 In custody - 18 of 86 18 0 Not in custody - 65 of 86 55 10 Suspected of Reengagingb 86 of 693 (12.4%) *An additional nine detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was convicted, and is now imprisoned in Colorado. **Each of these categories includes detainees who were transferred pursuant to a court order. a Executive Order 13492 was signed on January 22, 2009 to determine the disposition of the 240 detainees then remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. b The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses five additional detainees are suspected of reengagement. c Due to a coding error this number was previously reported as 4. Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism. Based on trends identified during the past eleven years, we assess that some detainees currently at GTMO will seek to reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities after they are transferred. Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations could pose problems. While enforcement of transfer conditions may deter reengagement by many former detainees and delay reengagement by others, some detainees who are determined to reengage will do so regardless of any transfer conditions, albeit probably at a lower rate than if they were transferred without conditions. Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees transferred in the future also will communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations--including other former GTMO detainees--an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged. Definition of "Terrorist" or "Insurgent" Activities. Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations--including other former GTMO detainees--on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-US books or articles, or making anti-US propaganda statements. Definition of "Confirmed" Activities. A preponderance of information which identifies a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Definition of "Suspected" Activities. Plausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states: (a) "The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of, (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. (b) Updates - Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection (a) and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station." Section 307 (a) (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense. Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detainees as of 15 January 2017 Total Pre-22 January 2009a Post-22 January 2009 Detainees Transferred 714* 532 182 Confirmed of Reengagingb 121 of 714 (16.9%) 113 of 532 (21.2%) 8 of 182 (4.4%)** Deceased - 31 of 121 30 1 In Foreign Custody - 22 of 121 22 0 Not in Foreign Custody - 68 of 121 61 7 74 of 532 (13.9%)** 13 of 182 (7.1%)** Deceased - 3 of 87 2 1 In Foreign Custody - 15 of 87 15 0 Not in Foreign Custody - 69 of 87 57 12 Suspected of Reengagingc a 87 of 714 (12.2%) Executive Order 13492 was signed on January 22, 2009 to determine the disposition of 240 detainees remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. b The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses three additional detainees are confirmed of reengagement. c The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses seven additional detainees are suspected of reengagement. *An additional nine detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was convicted, and is now imprisoned in Colorado. **Each of these categories includes detainees who were transferred pursuant to a court order. Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism. Based on trends identified during the past eleven years, we assess that some detainees currently at GTMO will seek to reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities after they are transferred. Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations could pose problems. While enforcement of transfer conditions may deter reengagement by many former detainees and delay reengagement by others, some detainees who are determined to reengage will do so regardless of any transfer conditions, albeit probably at a lower rate than if they were transferred without conditions. Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees transferred in the future also will communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations-- including other former GTMO detainees--an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged. Definitions Terrorist Activity: Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations--including other former GTMO detainees--on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-US books or articles, or making anti-US propaganda statements. Confirmed Activities: A preponderance of information which identifies a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Suspected Activities: Plausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. 2 Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states: ?The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of, (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Updates Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station.? Section 307 (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense. Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detainees as of 15 July 2017 Total Pre?22 January 2009? Post?22 January 2009 Detainees Transferred 728* 532 196 Confirmed of Reengagingb 122 196 Deceased Foreign Custody 22 0f122 22 0 At Large 67 0f122 61 6 Suspected of Reengagingc 196 Deceased 4 0f 90 2 2 In Foreign Custody 16 0f 90 15 1 At Large 70 of 90 57 13 additional nine detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was convicted, and is now imprisoned in Colorado. 3 Executive Order 13492 was signed on January 22, 2009 to determine the disposition of 240 detainees remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses one additional detainee is con?rmed of reengagement. The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses two additional detainees are suspected of reengagement. **Each of these categories includes detainees who were transferred pursuant to a court order. Section 307 (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism. Based on trends identified during the past 14 years, we assess that some detainees currently at GTMO will seek to reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities after they are transferred. Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations could pose problems. While enforcement of transfer conditions may deter reengagement by many former detainees and delay reengagement by others, some detainees who are determined to reengage will do so regardless of any transfer conditions, albeit probably at a lower rate than if they were transferred without conditions. Section 307 (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees transferred in the future probably would communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations?including other former GTMO detainees?an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged. Definitions Terrorist Activities: Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host?nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations?including other former GTMO detainees?on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-US books or articles, or making anti?US propaganda statements. Con?rmed Activities: A preponderance of informationw?biometrics (fingerprints, conclusive photographic match, or other similar information) and/or reliable, veri?ed, or well-corroborated intelligence reporting?which identifies a speci?c former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Suspected Activities: Plausible, but unverified, or single?source reporting indicating a speci?c former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Cuba The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states: The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of, (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Updates Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station.? Section 307 (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense. Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detainees as of 15 January 2018 Total Pre-22 January 2009a Post-22 January 2009 Detainees Transferred 728* 532 196 Confirmed of Reengagingb 123 196 Deceased 33 of I23 31 2 In Foreign Custody 22 of 123 22 0 At Large 68 of 123 61 7 Suspected of Reengaging196 Deceased 4 0f 94 2 2 In Foreign Custody 18 0f 94 17 5' Executive Order 13492 was signed on January 22, 2009 to determine the disposition of 240 detainees remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses one additional detainee is confirmed of reengagement. The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses two additional detainees are suspected of reengagement. Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detainees as of 15 January 2018 At Large 72 0f94 59 13 *An additional nine detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was convicted, and is now imprisoned in Colorado. **Each of these categories includes detainees who were transferred pursuant to a court order. Section 307 (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism. Based on trends identified during the past 15 years, we assess that some detainees currently at GTMO will seek to reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities after they are transferred. Transfers to countries with ongoing con?icts and internal instability as well as recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations could pose problems. While enforcement of transfer conditions may deter reengagement by many former detainees and delay reengagement by others, some detainees who are determined to reengage will do so regardless of any transfer conditions, albeit probably at a lower rate than if they were transferred without conditions. Section 307 (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees to be transferred in the future probably would communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations?including other former GTMO detainees?an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged. (U) De?nitions Terrorist Activity: Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host?nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations?including other former GTMO detainees??on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non?nefarious activities, writing anti-US books or articles, or making anti-US propaganda statements. Confirmed Activities: A preponderance of information?biometrics (?ngerprints, conclusive photographic match, or other similar information) and/or reliable, veri?ed, or well-corroborated intelligence identifies a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this de?nition, engagement in anti?US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Suspected Activities: Plausible, but unverified, or single?source reporting indicating a speci?c former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti?US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states: (a) "The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of, (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. (b) Updates - Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection (a) and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station." Section 307 (a) (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense. Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detainees as of 15 July 2018 Total Pre-22 January 2009a Post-22 January 2009 Detainees Transferred 729* 532 197 Confirmed of Reengagingb 123 of 729 (16.9%) 114 of 532 (21.4%) 9 of 197 (4.6%)** Deceased - 34 of 123 32 2 In Foreign Custody - 23 of 123 23 0 At Large - 66 of 123 59 7 82 of 532 (15.4%)** 17 of 197 (8.6%)** Deceased - 4 of 99 2 2 In Foreign Custody - 18 of 99 17 1 Suspected of Reengagingc a 99 of 729 (13.6%) Executive Order 13492 was signed on January 22, 2009 to determine the disposition of 240 detainees remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. b The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses one additional detainee is confirmed of reengagement. c The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses two additional detainees are suspected of reengagement. Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detainees as of 15 July 2018 At Large - 77 of 99 63 14 *An additional nine detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was convicted, and is now imprisoned in Colorado. **Each of these categories includes detainees who were transferred pursuant to a court order. Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism. Based on trends identified during the past 15 years, we assess that some detainees currently at GTMO will seek to reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities after they are transferred. Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations could pose problems. While enforcement of transfer conditions may deter reengagement by many former detainees and delay reengagement by others, some detainees who are determined to reengage will do so regardless of any transfer conditions, albeit probably at a lower rate than if they were transferred without conditions. Section 307 (a) (3) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees to be transferred in the future probably would communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations--including other former GTMO detainees--an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged. Definitions Terrorist Activity: Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations--including other former GTMO detainees--on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-US books or articles, or making anti-US propaganda statements. Confirmed Activities: A preponderance of information--biometrics (fingerprints, conclusive photographic match, or other similar information) and/or reliable, verified, or well-corroborated intelligence reporting--which identifies a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. Suspected Activities: Plausible, but unverified, or single-source reporting indicating a specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. 2