RETURN DATE: FEBRUARY 3, 2015 SUPERIOR COURT DONNA L. SOTO, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF VICTORIA L. JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF IAN AND NICOLE HOCKLEY, FAIRFIELD CO-ADMINISTRATORS OF THE - ESTATE OF DYLAN C. WILLIAM D. SHERLACH, EXECUTOR AT BRIDGEPORT OF THE ESTATE OF MARY JOY WILLIAM D. SHERLACH, LEONARD POZNER, ADMINISTRATOR 0F THE ESTATE OF NOAH S. GILLES J. ROUSSEAU, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF LAUREN G. DAVID C. WHEELER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF BENJAMIN A. NEIL HESLIN AND SCARLETT LEWIS, CO-ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF JESSE MCCORD MARK AND JACQUELINE BARDEN, CO-ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF: DANIEL G. MARY ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF RACHEL M. and NATALIE HAMMOND VS. BUSHMASTER FIREARMS INTERNATIONAL, LLC a/k/a FREEDOM . GROUP, INC. a/k/a REMINGTON OUTDOOR GROUP, FREEDOM GROUP, INC. a/k/a FREEDOM GROUP a/k/a FREEDOM GROUP, LLC a/k/a REMINGTON OUTDOOR BUSHMASTER FIREARMS a/k/a FREEDOM GROUP a/k/a REMINGTON OUTDOOR COMPANY, IN BUSHMASTER FIREARMS, FREEDOM GROUP, INC. a/k/a REMINGTON OUTDOOR COMPANY, IN BUSHMASTER HOLDINGS, LLC a/k/a FREEDOM GROUP, INC. a/k/a REMINGTON OUTDOOR . COMPANY, IN REMINGTON ARMS CO., LLC, a/kla BUSHMASTER FIREARMS INT., IN C., a/k/a FREEDOM GROUP, INC. 21an REMINGTON OUTDOOR REMINGTON OUTDOOR COMPANY, INC. a/k/a FREEDOM GROUP, IN CAMFOUR, IN CAMFOUR HOLDING, LLP a/k/a CAMFOUR HOLDING, RIVERVIEW SALES, IN DAVID LAGUERCIA DECEMBER 13, 2014 INTRODUCTION 1. This is a civil action for damages and injunctive relief stemming from the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School on December 14, 2012. 2. In less than five minutes, 20 first?grade children and 6 adults were killed. Two others were wounded. 3. The number of lives lost in those 264 seconds was made possible by the shooter?s weapon of choice: a Bushmaster AR-15 ri?e, model 4. The was designed as a military weapon, and it has always excelled on the battlefield. Born out of the exigencies of modern combat, the AR-15 was engineered to deliver maximum carnage with extreme ef?ciency. 5. The proved to be very good at its job. It has endured as the United States Army?s standard?issue ri?e and has more recently become a valuable law enforcement Weapon. In both contexts, the AR-15 is Subject to strict safety measures, including advanced training and regimented storage. 6. The AR-15, however, has little utility for legitimate civilian purposes. The ri?e?s size and overwhelming firepower, so well adapted to the battlefield, are in fact liabilities in home defense. 7. But there is one tragically predictable civilian activity in which the reigns supreme: mass shootings. Time and again, mentally unstable individuals and criminals have acquired an with ease, and they have unleashed the ri?e?s lethal power into our streets, our malls, our places of worship, and our schools. 8. Defendants makers and sellers of the ri?e have, like all Americans, watched mass shootings become a harrowing yet predictable part of modern life. 9. Defendants know that, as a result of selling to the civilian market, individuals un?t to operate these weapons gain access to them. 10. And defendants know that the military ?repower, unsuited to home defense or recreation, enables an individual in possession of the weapon to in?ict unparalleled civilian carnage. 11. Despite that knowledge, defendants continued to sell the ri?e to the civilian market. 12. In order to continue profiting from the sale of defendants chose to disregard the unreasonable risks the ri?e posed outside of specialized, highly regulated institutions like the armed forces and law enforcement. 13. Plaintiffs seek nothing more and nothing less than accountability for the consequences of that choice. PARTIES 14. Defendant Bushmaster Firearms, also known as B.F.I. and B.F.I., Inc., was a Maine corporation created in 1973 and located in Windham, Maine. Bushmaster Firearms manufactured and sold Bushmaster Firearms is now part of Freedom Group, Inc. 15. Defendant Bushmaster Firearms, Inc. was another Maine corporation that manufactured and sold Upon information and belief, Bushmaster Firearms, Inc. manufactured and sold Bushmaster Firearms, Inc. is now part of Freedom Group, Inc. 16. Defendant Bushmaster Firearms International, LLC was a Delaware corporation that was formed in 2006. (When originally created, it was named Rambo Acquisition, LLC.) According to corporate ?lings, Bushmaster Firearms International, LLC was merged into Remington Arms Company, LLC in 2011. 17. At all relevant times, Bushmaster Firearms International, LLC manufactured and sold 155. 18. Upon information and belief, Bushmaster Firearms International, LLC manufactured the that was used in the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School on December 14, 2012. 19. Defendant Remington Arms Company, LLC is a Delaware limited liability corporation. Defendant Bushmaster Firearms International, LLC was merged into Defendant? Remington Arms Company, LLC in 2011. At all relevant times, Remington Arms Company, LLC manufactured and sold AR-15 s. 20. Defendant Bushmaster Holdings, LLC was incorporated-in 2006 and operated as a holding company for Bushmaster Firearms International, Inc. Bushmaster Holdings, LLC merged into Freedom Group, Inc. in 2009. 21. Defendant Freedom Group, Inc., which is also sometimes called Freedom Group and Freedom Group, LLC is a Delaware corporation originally formed under another name in 2007. Freedom Group, Inc. is one of the world?s largest manufacturers and dealers in ?rearms, ammunition, and related accessories. 22. Upon information and belief, from 2006 on, Freedom Group, Inc. controlled, marketed and sold the Bushmaster brand. Upon information and belief, during this time period Freedom Group, Inc. sold Bushmaster brand products directly to retail stores. 23. Defendant Remington Outdoor Company, Inc. is a corporation formed in 2009 that is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling Freedom Group, Inc., which upon information and belief at all relevant times controlled the Bushmaster brand, was renamed Remington Outdoor Company, Inc. 24. Upon information and belief, Defendants Bushmaster Firearms; Bushmaster Firearms, Inc.; Bushmaster Firearms International, Remington Arms Company, Bushmaster Holdings, Freedom Group, Inc.; and Remington Outdoor Company, Inc. are functionally one entity and are hereinafter referred to as the ?Bushmaster Defendants.? 25. The Bushmaster Defendants manufacture and sell ?rearms and ammunition under the Bushmaster brand name. 26. The Bushmaster Defendants, one or more of them, manufactured and sold the Bushmaster XM15-E28 ri?e that was used in the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School on December 14, 2012. 27. Defendant Camfour, Inc. is a Massachusetts corporation. Camfour, Inc. was at all relevant times a distributor of ?rearms and was federally licensed to deal in firearms. 28. Defendant Camfour Holding, Inc. aka Camfour Holding, LLP is a Massachusetts corporation. Upon information belief, Camfour Holding, Inc. aka Camfour Holding, LLP is functionally the same entity as Camfour, Inc. These entities are hereinafter referred to as the ?Camfour Defendants.? 29. Upon information and belief, the Camfour Defendants purchased the Bushmaster XM15-E2S ri?e that was used in the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School from the Bushmaster Defendants. 30. The Camfour Defendants are qualified product sellers within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. 7903(6). 31. Upon information and belief, the Camfour Defendants sold the Bushmaster XM15-E2S ri?e that was used in the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School to the Riverview Defendants, as described below. 32. Defendant Riverview Gun Sales, Inc. aka Riverview Gun Sales is a retail gun store located in East Windsor, Connecticut. The Bushmaster XM15-E2S ri?e that was used in the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School on December 14, 2012 was purchased from Riverview Gun Sales. 33. Defendant David LaGuercia is or was the federally licensed firearms dealer who through Riverview Gun Sales, Inc. sold the Bushmaster ri?e that was used in the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School. 34. Riverview Gun Sales, Inc. and David LaGuercia are hereafter referred to as the ?Riverview Defendants.? The Riverview Defendants are quali?ed product sellers within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. 7903(6). 35. On February 7, 2013, Plaintiff Donna L. Soto was appointed Administratrix of the Estate of Victoria Leigh Soto. A copy of the fiduciary certificate is attached hereto as Plaintiffs? Exhibit A. 36. On December 3, 2014, Plaintiffs Ian and Nicole Hockley were appointed Co~ Administrators of the Estate of Dylan Christopher Jack Hockley. A copy of the ?duciary certi?cate is attached hereto as Plaintiffs? Exhibit B. 37. On December 4, 2014, Plaintiff David C. Wheeler was appointed Administrator of the Estate of Benjamin A. Wheeler. A copy of the fiduciary certi?cate is attached hereto as Plaintiffs? Exhibit C. 38. On January 22, 2013, Plaintiff Mary A. D?Avino was appointed Administratrix of the Estate of Rachel Marie D?Avino a/k/a Rachel M. D?Avino. A copy of the fiduciary certificate is attached hereto as Plaintiffs? Exhibit D. 39. On December 8, 2014, Plaintiffs Mark and Jacqueline Barden were appointed Co- Administrators of the Estate of Daniel G. Barden. A copy of the fiduciary certificate is attached hereto as Plaintiffs? Exhibit E. i 40. On March 7, 2013, Plaintiff William D. Sherlach was appointed Executor of the Estate of Mary Joy Sherlach. A copy of the ?duciary certificate is attached hereto as Plaintiffs? Exhibit F. Mr. Sherlach also brings this action in his individual capacity for loss of consortium. 41. On December 9, 2014, Plaintiffs Neil Heslin and Scarlett Lewis were appointed Co-Administrators of the Estate of Jesse McCord Lewis. A copy of the ?duciary certi?cate is attached hereto as Plaintiffs? Exhibit G. 42. On December 10, 2014, Plaintiff Leonard Pozner was appointed Administrator of the Estate of Noah Samuel Pozner. A c0py of the fiduciary certificate is attached hereto as Plaintiffs? Exhibit H. 43. On January 3, 2013, Plaintiff Gilles J. Rousseau was appointed Administrator of the Estate of Lauren G. Rousseauf A copy of the fiduciary certi?cate is attached hereto as Plaintiffs? Exhibit I. 44. Plaintiff Natalie Hammond brings this action in her individual capacity for injuries suffered on December 14, 2012. THE GUN A. The Bushmaster is a Military Weapon 45. Bushmaster?s is an AR-15 ri?e, a weapon adopted by the United States military and other armed forces around the world because of its ef?ciency as a military assault ri?e. 46. After World War II, the U.S. Army?s Operations Research Of?ce analyzed over three million casualty reports from World War I and World War II. In its ?nal report, the group observed that modern combat occurred at short range and was highly mobile. More importantly, they determined that the number one predictor of casualties was the total number of shots fired. 47. These findings led the U.S. Army to develop speci?cations for a new combat weapon: a lightweight ?rearm that would hold a large detachable magazine and rapidly expel ammunition with enough velocity to penetrate body armor and steel helmets. 48. A company called Armalite designed the AR-15 in response. Lightweight, air? cooled, gas-operated, and magazine?fed, the capacity for rapid fire with limited recoil meant its lethality was not dependent on good aim or ideal combat conditions. 49. After extensive testing, the military concluded that a five-man squad armed with had equal or superior ?hit-and-kill? potential in combat situations when compared with an 11?man squad armed with M14 ri?es, the predecessor. Troops field?testing the AR- 1-5 reported instantaneous deaths, as well as routine amputations, decapitations, and massive body wounds. The military ultimately adopted the as its standard?issue service ri?e, renaming it the M16. 50. After Armalite sold its licensing rights, Colt took over its military contracts and began manufacturing the M16. 51. Today, Colt remains the largest supplier of combat ri?es to the military. 52. Bushmaster, meanwhile, holds the distinction of being the largest supplier of combat ri?es to civilians. 53. The is one such ri?e. B. A ?Civilian? Weapon Designed for Combat 54. As an ri?e, the Bushmaster is essentially indistinguishable from its military sibling, the M16. Both weapons are designed for mass casualty assaults. Both share design features of exceptional muzzle velocity, the ability to accommodate large-capacity magazines, and effective rapid ?re. Muzzle Velocity 55. The term ?muzzle velocity? refers to the speed a bullet possesses at the moment it leaves the muzzle of a firearm. 56. The velocity of a bullet on impact is the main determinant of its destructive capacity. 57. Typical handgun muzzle velocities range from approximately 750 feet per second to approximately 1,300 feet per second. 58. Because longer barrels give the ammunition?s propellant more time to work, long guns eject projectiles at signi?cantly higher velocities than short-barreled ?rearms. 59. ri?es like the are capable of propelling ammunition at 4,000 feet per second, which multiplies the lethality of each hit. 60. According to a study by physicians who performed autopsies 011 soldiers killed by gunfire in Iraq, the greater the speed of the bullet on impact, the greater the extent pf tissue deterioration. The study found that rounds with a velocity exceeding 2,500 feet per second cause a shockwave to pass through the body upon impact that results in catastrophic injuries even in areas remote to the direct wound. Large-Capacity Magazines 61. In addition to exceptional muzzle velocity, AR-15 ri?es are also designed to accept large?capacity magazines. 62. Such magazines were first designed and produced for the military in order to increase the firepower of US. infantry by minimizing time spent reloading. 63. ?Civilian? ri?es, including the are manufactured to be compatible with large capacity magazines. Effective Rapid Fire 64. All AR-15 ri?es, including the can empty their magazines with exceptional speed. - 65. The ri?es carried by US. forces are capable of both full automatic and semiautomatic ?re. Full automatic ?re can empty a 30-round magazine in two seconds. Semiautomatic fire can empty the same 30-round magazine in approximately ten seconds. 66. The United States Army considers semiautomatic ?re more effective than automatic ?re in most combat situations. 67. ?Civilian? semiautomatic ri?es like the therefore, are capable of the same rapid fire that the U.S. Army deems optimal for the military theater. 68. Structurally and mechanically, therefore, AR- 15 ri?es remain the progeny and instruments of war. 69. Semiautomatic fire unleashes a torrent of bullets in a matter of seconds; large- capacity magazines allow for prolonged assaults; and powerful velocity makes each hit catastrophic. 70. The net effect is more wounds, of greater severity, in more victims, in less time. 71. This superior capacity for lethality above and beyond other semiautomatic weapons is why the style ri?e has endured as the U.S. military?s weapon of choice for 50 years. C. A ?Civilian? Weapon Marketed for Combat 72. The uniquely military characteristics of the type ri?e are not lost on the Bushmaster Defendants. In fact, they are the weapon?s primary selling point. 73. The Bushmaster Defendants tout Bushmaster ri?e barrels as ?the finest Type Ml6?Type barrels made,? promising that they ?provide the same matte black, non- re?ective ?nish found on quality military?type arms.? - 74. When the Bushmaster Defendants rolled out a new ri?e model, defendants? advertising lauded the gun as ?the uncompromising choice when you demand a ri?e as mission-adaptable as you are.? 75. The Bushmaster Defendant?s 2012 Bushmaster Product Catalogue shows soldiers moving on patrol through jungles, armed with Bushmaster ri?es. Superimposed over the silhouette of a soldier holding his helmet against the backdrop of an American ?ag is text that reads: ?When you need to perform under pressure, Bushmaster delivers.? 76. In the Bushmaster Defendant?s 2011 Bushmaster Product Catalogue, ?rearms like the are advertised with the slogan, ?rnilitary-proven performance.? 77. In 2010, the Bushmaster Defendants promoted one of their ?civilian? ri?es as ?the ultimate combat weapons system.? 78. Invoking the unparalleled destructive power of the weapon, the Bushmaster Defendants? advertising c0py read: ?Forces of opposition, bow down. You are single-handedly outnumbered.? 79. The Bushmaster Defendants? militaristic marketing reinforces the image of the AR-15 as a combat weapon used for the purpose of waging war and killing human beings. 80. This marketing tactic dovetails with the widespread pOpularity of realistic and addictive ?rst-person shooter games most notably ?Call of Duty? that prominently feature and rewards players for ?head shots? and ?kill streaks? among other assaultive and violent ?achievements.? 81. It is widely known that ?Call of Duty? exposes players to intensely realistic tactical scenarios and teaches assaultive weapon techniques such as ?taped reloads,? which allow high capacity magazines to be taped together to reduce reloading time. D. A ?Civilian? Weapon with no Legitimate Civilian Purpose 82. As set forth above, the combination of exceptional muzzle velocity, ability to accept large?capacity magazines, and effective rapid fire has signi?cant utility in the military context. These same features make the weapon ill-suited for legitimate civilian purposes. Self-Defense 83. There is no evidence that semiautomatic ri?es are commonly used for, or necessary for, legitimate self-defense by law-abiding citizens. 84. Semiautomatic rifles? length makes them inferior to smaller guns in the confines of a home. 85. It is handguns, and not long guns, that are widely considered to be the optimal weapon for home defense. 86. In D. C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008), the Supreme Court of the United States extolled the handgun as the ?quintessential self-defense weapon.? The Court cited several reasons for this: ?It is easier to store in a location that is readily accessible in an emergency; it cannot easily be redirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is easier to use for those without the upper-body strength to lift and aim a long gun; it can be pointed at a burglar with one hand while the other hand dials the police.? These virtues are absent from the 87. Semiautomatic ri?es are not only ill?suited to home defense, they are dangerous when used in that capacity. 88. The velocity and rate of semiautomatic ?re in the home creates a significant risk of what is referred to as ?over-penetration,? where bullets breach walls and doors, putting family members, neighbors, and even passers-by at risk. 89. The military has concluded that use of the M16 in close quarters greatly increases the risk of noncombatant casualties, and trains soldiers accordingly. 90. When a Bushmaster AR-15 was reviewed by Guns Ammo Magazine in 1983, the reviewer commented: ?As a home defense weapon, it certainly possesses ample firepower with a 30-round magazine, but the .223 cartridge is a mite too powerful and penetrating for this use.? It concluded that the ri?e would instead be of value to ?a police S.W.A.T. team in close- quarter encounters with evil?doers.? 91. Moreover, the ability to accept large?capacity magazines, vital for modern combat, is unnecessary for home defense. 92. The National Ri?e Association Institute for Legislative Action maintains a database of ?armed citizen? stories describing private citizens who have successfully defended themselves or others using a firearm. According to a study of all incidents in that database from 1997 to 2001, an average of 2.2 shots were fired by defenders. In 28% of incidents, no shots were fired at all. 93. A similar analysis was performed for the period of 2011-2013 and revealed that defenders fired an average of 2.1 shots. 94. The likelihood of an causing accidental harm when used for home defense substantially exceeds the likelihood that large quantities of semiautomatic fire will be necessary for protection. Hunting and Sporting 95. The Gun COntrol Act of 1968 generally prohibits the importation of firearms into .the United States, but makes an exception for weapons that are particularly suitable for or readily adaptable to sporting purposes. 96. Congress stated that one of the purposes for the law was to stop the in?ux of military-grade weapons, which was turning the United States into ?the dumping ground of the castoff surplus military weapons of other nations.? 97. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATP) is responsible for interpreting the statute and thereby determining the suitability of various ?rearms for sporting or hunting purposes. 98. In 1989, ATP issued a broad suspension of the importation of ?assault?type ri?es? until an analysis of their sporting utility could be undertaken. ATF de?ned this category to include ri?es with three characteristics: a military appearance, a detachable magazine, and the ability to ?re semi-automatically. It referred to this group of weapons as ?semiautomatic assault ri?es.? 99. As part of its analysis, ATF studied advertising and marketing literature, reviewed evaluations of the ?rearms by technical writers, solicited information from the ?rearm importers, 10 and sent questionnaires to licensed hunting guides, state game and fish commissions, local hunting associations, competitive shooting groups, and hunting/shooting magazine editors. 100. In its ?nal report, ATF concluded that semiautomatic assault ri?es were designed and intended for combat and not suited to either sporting or hunting. It prohibited the importation of ri?es with military features other than detachable magazines. 101. Foreign gun manufacturers quickly adapted to the restriction. They began exporting semiautomatic ri?es that had been stripped of all military features except for the ability to accept a detachable magazine. Significantly, these modified ri?es had the ability to accept large-capacity magazines. 102. In 1998, ATF was called upon to evaluate the sporting utility of semiautomatic assault ri?es that accepted large-capacity magazines but lacked other military features. 103. After an equally exhaustive analysis, ATF found it ?clear and compelling? that semiautomatic assault ri?es that accept large?capacity magazines are not suitable for sportng or hunting. 104. ATF concluded that the ability to expel large amounts of ammunition quickly ?serves a function in combat and crime, but serves no sporting purpose.? ENTRUSTMENT OF MILITARY WEAPONS TO THE MILITARY 105. When assault ri?es are sold to the military, the seller entrusts them to a highly regulated institution with expertise in minimizing the risk of physical harm whether criminal or accidental to soldiers or others. 106. Standardized medical fitness standards prohibit induction, enlistment, appointment, or retention in the Armed Forces if the individual suffers from major depression, bipolar disorder, affective or a history of consistent with mental instability that impairs school, social, or work ef?ciency. 107. When the U.S. Government purchases assault ri?es for use by armed forces, it retains ownership of those weapons. 108. Military assault ri?es are issued to soldiers for instruction, training, exercises, and combat. 109. Soldiers are held strictly accountable for their assault ri?e at all times. 110. Assault ri?es must be kept in safety mode when not in use. 111. Soldiers are instructed not to leave their assault ri?e unattended under any circumstances. ll 112. If an assault ri?e cannot be accounted'for, the Army will place an entire base or installation on lockdown until the weapon is located. 113. After the assault ri?e is loCated, an investigation will be conducted and a recommendation made as to the appropriate punishment. 114. In general, the most lenient punishment for the transgression of misplacing an assault ri?e is to lose rank and pay and to be assigned extra duty. 115. If an assault ri?e is misplaced in a combat zone, the soldier may face severe sanctions. 116. Assault ri?es are stored in secure weapons rooms on military bases. Soldiers must sign out their ri?e anytime they remove it so a chain of custody is established. 117. The military requires soldiers to undergo extensive training on the proper use of an assault ri?e, including techniques to minimize the weapon?s potential for in?icting collateral damage. 118. The Department of the Army produces a 400?page manual for commanders, leaders, and instructors devoted exclusively to weapon pedagogy and related safety issues. 119. According to the manual, soldiers are first instructed on the weapon?s capabilities, mechanical training, and the fundamentals and principles of ri?e marksmanship. Live??re applications are scheduled only after the soldier has demonstrated preliminary skills. 120. To ensure safety during live?fire applications, ammunition is issued to firing units immediately before scheduled training exercises and released to troops only when they are on the firing line. 121. Commanders are charged with identifying any ?hazards? to safety by using a complex ?risk assessment matrix? to estimate the probability and severity of an adverse impact. The manual notes that hazards may arise from health or behavioral concerns. 122. Military leadership is empowered to prevent access to combat weapons if circumstances warrant it. ENTRUSTMENT OF MILITARY WEAPONS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 123. When military- grade weapons are sold to law enforcement, the seller entrusts them to organizations and departments that regulate and oversee of?cers? access to firearms and possess expertise in minimizing the risk of physical harm to civilians. 124. Prior to being entrusted with assault ri?es, law enforcement officers undergo extensive training. 12 125. Of?cers are trained on when it is and is not appropriate to use an assault ri?e. 126. For the vast majority of engagements in which it is necessary to draw or use a firearm, law enforcement cOnsiders an officer?s sidearm and not an assault ri?e to be the most appropriate weapon 127. Police leadership is empowered to remove any weapon from an of?cer if circumstances warrant it. ENTRUSTMENT OF MILITARY WEAPONS TO THE PUBLIC 128. The military and law enforcement have a legitimate need for a weapon as lethal as the but they also recognize that strict safety measures are necessary to protect soldiers, police officers, and innocent civilians from physical harm. Consequently, entrusting assault ri?es to these specialized institutions is reasonable. 129. The same is not true for the entrustment of ri?es to civilians. 130. In addition to the lack of utility set forth above, when are entrusted to the public there is no institutional structure in place to oversee the safe and intelligent use of those weapons. 131. are sold to wholesalers and/or dealers who sell directly to civilians. 132. Large capacity magazines that are compatible with are sold to wholesalers and/or dealers who sell directly to civilians. 133. In the overwhelming majority of states, young people can legally purchase an before they are legally permitted to drink alcohol. 134. In at least a dozen states, the minimum age for possession of an AR-15 is 14 or 16, or there is no minimum age at all. 135. In the overwhelming majority of states, a license or permit is not required to purchase or own an 136. In the overwhelming majority of states, no safety training is required for the purchase of an 137. There is not a single state that requires a mental health examination of a potential purchaser of an 138. There is not a single state that requires a potential purchaser of an to answer questions about other individuals with whom they intend to share access. 139. More than half of American households with ?rearms do not store them securely. l3 140. Civilians are entrusted with even though they are not suited for legitimate civilian purposes. 141. Civilians are entrusted with whether or not they have a mechanism to safely secure the weapons and ammunition in their home. 142. Civilians are entrusted with even if they have children in the home who can gain access to their weapons and ammunition. 143. Civilians are entrusted with AR-15s even if they intend to make the Weapon available to other persons, including those who may be mentally unstable. 144. Several highly-publicized mass shootings have demonstrated that perpetrators of mass shootings are able to purchase or otherwise acquire THE ROAD TO SANDY HOOK 145. The most chilling legacy of the entrustment of 153 to the general population may be that Americans are no longer shocked when combat weapons are used to kill people as they work, shop, commute, attend school, and otherwise go about their lives. We may be horrified, saddened, even sickened, but we can no longer be shocked. 146. Prior to December 14, 2012, assault ri?es like the XMIS-EZS had been used to kill in department stores and fast food chains, at of?ces and homecoming parties, on courthouse steps, and in schools. 147. Prior to December 14, 2012, assault ri?es like the XMIS-EZS had torn apart communities in California and Massachusetts and Nevada and Washington and Nebraska and Wisconsin and Oregon and Texas and Florida and Washington DC. and Missouri and Alabama. 148. Prior to December 14, 2012, assault ri?es like the had been used to kill elementary school children, high school children, and college students. 149. Yet Bushmaster Defendants continued to entrust the XM15-EZS to the civilian population through wholesalers and dealers. 150. Bushmaster Defendants continued making the XM15-EZS compatible with large capacity magazines. 151. Bushmaster Defendants continued marketing the XM15-E2S and similar ri?es as combat weapons that would make others ?bow down.? 152. Sometime prior to March of 2010, the Bushmaster Defendants entrusted the Bushmaster ri?e to the Camfour Defendants. 14 153. Sometime prior to March of 2010, the Camfour Defendants entrusted the XM15- EZS Bushmaster ri?e to the Riverview Defendants; the Riverview Defendants then entrusted the ri?e to Nancy Lanza in March of 2010. 154. On the morning of December 14, 2012, Lanza retrieved the Bushmaster ri?e and ten 30~round magazines several of which he taped together to allow for faster reload from an unlocked gun closet in the house he shared with his mother and drove to Sandy Hook Elementary School 155. Upon information and belief, Adam Lanza chose the to use in his attack on Sandy Hook Elementary School for its military and assaultive qualities, and in particular its efficiency in in?icting mass casualties. 156. Meanwhile, on the morning of December 14, 2012, Victoria Leigh Soto was a 27? year-old ?rst?grade teacher in classroom 10 at Sandy Hook Elementary School. In fewer than five years of teaching, Vicki had earned the reputation of being a fun, and sometimes zany, teacher. Vicki loved snow and had something of an obsession with pink ?amingos. Vicki began her morning, as she usually did, with a long car ride from Stratford to Sandy Hook. On this particular morning, she had with her all the ingredients and materials for her class to make gingerbread houses for the holidays. - 157. On the morning of December 14, 2012, Dylan Hockley was a six-year-old boy in classroom 10. Dylan had a beaming smile that lit up a room and an infectious laugh. Dylan was a child with autism, but was learning to read and would come home every day from school proudly bearing a new book. He loved the moon, garlic bread, the color purple, cuddling, and bouncing on the trampoline. Dylan idolized his older brother, and best friend, Jake. 158. On the morning of December 14, 2012, Benjamin Wheeler, 6, wasn?t sure if he wanted to be an architect, a paleontologist, a lighthouse keeper or all three at once. Benjamin was a bright, spirited, inquisitive, caring boy who brought joyful energy to his parents and big brother. He was an avid reader and was becoming a very strong swimmer. Each morning he could hardly wait to get to classroom 8. 159. On the morning of December 14, 2012, Rachel D?Avino was a 29?year-old behavioral therapist with a passion for helping children and adults with autism. She was working toward a doctorate, and aspired to help shape the field of applied behavioral therapy. Rachel possessed seemingly limitless patience and empathy for the children with whom she worked; they, in turned, adored her. In eleven days, Rachel?s boyfriend planned to propose. 160. On the morning of December 14, 2012, Daniel Barden was at age 7 one of the older children in classroom 8. Daniel understood things about life in a way that prompted many who knew him to call him an ?old soul.? Daniel was not only bright and loving; he understood what it meant to live life with compassion. Daniel always made an effort to make other children around him feel accepted. He would take notice of children who sat alone and would ask to go sit with them or invite them to join an activity. He gave hugs often, and with abandon. 15 161. On the morning of December 14, 2012, Mary Sherlach was a 56-year-old school at Sandy Hook Elementary School. After 18 years at the school, Mary was planning to retire the following June. On her calendar for retirement was Spending more time with her husband, Bill, to whom she had been married for 31 years, and patiently waiting for one of her two daughters to provide her with a grandchild. Although retirement would allow more time for gardening and reading, Mary still planned on remaining professionally active for the pure joy that she took from helping a child through a dif?cult time. 162. On the morning of December 14, 2012, Jesse Lewis, 6, was a first?grader in classroom 10. The only child of Neil Heslin and Scarlett Lewis, Jesse loved to ride horses, play memory card games for which he was known to be unbeatable, and have books read to him by his mother. He also loved going out for special breakfasts before school with his dad. On the morning of December 14, father and son found time to enjoy a sausage and egg sandwich, polished off by hot chocolate. 163. On the morning of December 14, 2012, Noah Pozner was the youngest ?rst grader in classroom 10, having just turned six only three weeks before. Noah loved costumes, video games, and superheroes especially Spiderman. He was also a budding philosopher, known to stump his parents with spontaneous questions about Creation and the nature of free will. He was, truly, a force of nature. 164. On the morning of December 14, 2012, Lauren Rousseau, 30, headed to Sandy Hook Elementary School, where she had recently landed a permanent substitute teaching job. That day, she was scheduled to teach in classroom 8. Lauren?s warmth, enthusiasm, and creativity made her a natural first-grade teacher. That evening, Lauren planned to see the movie ?The Hobbit? with her boyfriend and then attend a party with friends. Lauren had already made cupcakes for the party, each one featuring a different character from The Hobbit. 165. On the morning of December 14, 2012, Natalie Hammond, 40, began her day as Lead Teacher of Sandy Hook Elementary School. It was special day for Natalie; her daughter was turning 12. 166. Just before 9:30 am, Lanza shot his way into the locked school with the Bushmaster ri?e. It was the weapon he would use to take every life in the school aside from his own. 167. Mary Sherlach and the school?s principal were in a meeting when they heard shots. When they went to investigate, both were killed with the Bushmaster ri?e. Natalie Hammond and another staff member were shot with the Bushmaster ri?e and wounded. 168. Lanza then approached two ?rst-grade classrooms, Classroom 8 and Classroom 10. 169. In Classroom 8, Lanza used the Bushmaster ri?e to kill 15 children and 2 adults, including Daniel Barden, Benjamin Wheeler, Noah Pozner, Rachel D?Avino, and Lauren Rousseau. 16 170. In Classroom 10, Lanza used the Bushmaster ri?e to kill 5 children and 2 adults, including Dylan Hockley, Jesse Lewis, and Victoria Soto. 171. Nine children from Classroom 10 were able to escape when Lanza paused to reload the Bushmaster with another 30?round magazine. 172. The first call to 911 from Sandy Hook Elementary School was made at 9:35am. By 9:40am, Lanza?s massacre was complete. 173. Police collected 154 spent .223 casings that had been expelled from the Bushmaster ri?e. COUNT ONE: 52-555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Victoria L. Soto V. Bushmaster Defendants) 1.?173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and reallege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-17 3 of the foregoing opening section. 174. The Bushmaster Defendants knew, or should have known, of all of the foregoing information alleged at Paragraphs 1-10, 45?173. Based on this and similar information, the Bushmaster Defendants knew, or should have known, that the sale of assault ri?es, including the in the civilian market posed an unreasonable and egregious risk of physical injury to others. 175. The Bushmaster Defendants knew, or should have known, of the civilian population?s poor track record of safely securing weapons. 176. A mass casualty event, such as the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School, was within the scope of the risk created by the Bushmaster Defendants? manufacture and sale of the for the civilian market. 177. The Bushmaster Defendants knew, or should have known, of the unreasonably high risk that the would be used in a mass shooting to in?ict maximum casualties before law enforcement was able to intervene. 178. The Bushmaster Defendants knew, or should have known, that schools are particularly vulnerable to and frequently targets of mass shootings. 179. The Bushmaster Defendants knew, or should have known, that the utility of the for hunting, sporting or self?defense was negligible in comparison to the risk that the weapon would be used in its assaultive capacity. 180. The Bushmaster Defendants knew, or should have known, that the XM15 when used in its assaultive capacity, would be likely to in?ict multiple casualties and serious injury. .17 181. The Bushmaster Defendants, as those who deal in ?rearms, are required to exercise the closest attention and the most careful precautions in the conduct of their business. 182. The Bushmaster Defendants have for years sold AR-15s in a manner that foreseeably leads to the use of those weapons by unauthorized and unsafe users. 183. The Bushmaster Defendants have had the ability for years to design and manufacture for the civilian population with safety mechanisms that prevent the weapon from being ?red by someone other than the purchaser. 184. The Bushmaster Defendants have had the ability for years to design and manufacture for the civilian market that do not accept large capacity magazines. 185. The Bushmaster Defendants? conduct had a continuing inherent or natural tendency to create danger and in?ict injury, was offensive to public policy, and posed a serious risk to public health. 186. The Bushmaster Defendants? conduct interfered with the right of the public to be safe in their communities, and, more particularly, of children to be safe in their schools. 187. In this case, on information and belief, the Bushmaster Defendants supplied the to the Camfour Defendants for resale to the civilian population. 188. The Bushmaster Defendants knew, or should have known, that the Camfour . Defendants? use of the product the supply to the civilian market involved an unreasonable risk of physical injury to others. 189. The Bushmaster Defendants? conduct as previously alleged constituted a public nuisance. 190. Upon information and belief, the Bushmaster Defendants? conduct as previously alleged constituted a knowing violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Connecticut General Statutes Section 42-110a et seq. 191. The Bushmaster Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factorresulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Victoria Soto, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 192. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff?s decedent, Victoria Soto, suffered the following injuries and losses: Terror; ante-mortem pain and suffering; destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; destruction of earning capacity; and 18 e. death. 193. As a result of the injuries and death of Victoria Soto, the Estate of Victoria Soto incurred funeral expenses to its financial loss. COUNT TWO: 52-555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Victoria L. Soto v. Camfour Defendants) 1.-173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and reallege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1?173 of Count One. a 174. The Camfour Defendants knew, or should have known, of all of the foregoing information alleged at Paragraphs 1-10, 45?173 of Count One. Based on this and similar information, the Camfour Defendants knew or should have known that the sale of assault ri?es, including the in the civilian market posed an unreasonable and egregious risk of physical injury to others. 175. The Camfour Defendants knew, or should have known, of the civilian population?s poor track record of safely securing weapons. 176. A mass casualty event, such as the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School, was within the scope of the risk created by the Camfour Defendants? sale of the to the civilian market. 177. The Camfour Defendants knew, or should have known, of the unreasonably high risk that the XM15-E2S would be used in a mass shooting to in?ict maximum casualties before law enforcement was able to intervene. 178. The Camfour Defendants knew or should have known that schools are particularly vulnerable to and frequently targets of mass shootings. 179. The Camfour Defendants knew, or should have known, that the utility of the for hunting, sporting or self-defense was negligible in comparison to the risk that the weapon would be used in its assaultive capacity. 180. The Camfour Defendants knew, or should have known, that the when used in its assaultive capacity, would be likely to in?ict multiple casualties and serious injury. 181. The Camfour Defendants, as those who deal in firearms, are required to exercise the closest attention and the most careful precautions in the conduct of their business. 182. The Camfour Defendants have for years sold in a manner that foreseeably leads to the use of those weapons by unauthorized and unsafe users. 19 183. The Camfour Defendants? conduct had a continuing inherent or natural tendency to create danger and in?ict injury, was offensive to public policy, and posed a serious risk to public health. 184. The Camfour Defendants? conduct interfered with the right of the public to be safe in their communities, and, more particularly, of children to be safe in their schools. 185. The Camfour Defendants are a qualified product seller within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 7903(6). 186. In this case, on information and belief, the Camfour Defendants supplied the to the Riverview Defendants for resale to the civilian market. 187. The Camfour defendants knew, or should have known, that the Riverview Defendants? use of the product supplying it to the civilian population involved an extreme and unreasonable risk of physical injury to others. 188. The Camfour Defendants? conduct as previously alleged constituted a public nuisance. 189. Upon information and belief, the Camfour Defendants? conduct as previously alleged constituted a knowing violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Connecticut General Statutes Section 42-110a et seq. 190. The Camfour Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Victoria Soto, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 191. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff?s decedent, Victoria Soto, suffered the following injuries and losses: Terror; ante-mortem pain and suffering; destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; destruction of earning capacity; and death. 99.0.5?? 192. As a result of the injuries and death of Victoria Soto, the Estate of Victoria Soto incurred funeral expenses to its financial loss. COUNT THREE: 52-555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Victoria L. Soto v. Riverview Defendants) 1.-17 3. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and reallege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 20 174. The Riverview Defendants knew, or should have known, of all of the foregoing information alleged at Paragraphs 1-10, 45-173 of Count One. Based on this and similar information, the Riverview Defendants knew or should have known that the sale of assault ri?es, including the in the civilian market posed an unreasonable and egregious risk of physical injury to others. 175. The Riverview Defendants knew, or should have known, of the civilian population?s poor track record of safely securing weapons. 176. A mass casualty event, such as the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School, was within the scope of the risk created by the Riverview Defendants? sale of the XM15-E2S to Nancy Lanza. 177. The Riverview Defendants knew, or should have known, of the unreasonably high risk that the would be used in a mass shooting to in?ict maximum casualties before law enforcement was able to intervene. 178. The Riverview Defendants knew, or should have known, that schools are particularly vulnerable to and frequently targets of mass shootings. 179. The Riverview Defendants knew, or should have known, that the utility of the XM15-E2S for hunting, sporting or self-defense was negligible in comparison to the risk that the weapon would be used in its assaultive capacity. 180. The Riverview Defendants knew, or should have known, that the XM15-E2S, when used in its assaultive capacity, would be likely to in?ict multiple casualties and serious injury. a 181. The Riverview Defendants, as those who deal in firearms, are required to exercise the closest attention and the most careful precautions in the conduct of their business. 182. The Riverview Defendants for years sold in a manner that foreseeably led to the use of those weapons by unauthorized and unsafe users. 183. The Riverview Defendants? conduct had a continuing inherent or natural tendency to create danger and in?ict injury, was offensive to public policy, and posed a serious risk to public health. 184. The Riverview Defendants? conduct interfered with the right of the public to be safe in their communities, and, more particularly, of children to be safe in their schools. 185. The Riverview Defendants are a qualified product seller within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 7903(6). 186. The Riverview Defendants began the process of selling the XMIS-EZS ri?e to Nancy Lanza on March 15, 2010. '21 187. The Riverview Defendants transferred the ri?e to Nancy Lanza on March 29, 2010. 188. The Riverview defendants knew, or should have known, that Nancy Lanza?s receipt and possession of the involved an unreasonable risk of physical injury to others. 189. The Riverview Defendants? sale of the involved an unreasonable risk of physical injury to others. 190. The Riverview Defendants? conduct as previously alleged constituted a public nuisance. 191. Upon information and belief, the Riverview Defendants? conduct as previously alleged constituted a knowing violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Connecticut General Statutes Section 42?110a et seq. - 192. The Riverview Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Victoria Soto, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 193. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff? decedent, Victoria Soto, suffered the following injuries and losses: Terror; ante-mortem pain and suffering; destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; destruction of earning capacity; and death. 9999?!? 194. As a result of the injuries and death of Victoria Soto, the Estate of Victoria Soto incurred funeral expenses to its financial loss. COUNT FOUR: 52?555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Dylan C. Hockley v. Bushmaster Defendants) 1.?173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 174?190. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174?190 of Count One. 191. The Bushmaster Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Dylan Hockley, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 22 192. On December 14, 2012, plaintiffs? decedent, Dylan Hockley, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; b. ante-mortern pain and suffering; c. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; d. destruction of earning capacity; and e. death. 193. As a result of the injuries and death of Dylan Hockley, the Estate of Dylan C. Hockley incurred funeral expenses to its financial loss. COUNT FIVE: 52-555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Dylan C. Hockley v. Camfour Defendants) 1.-17 3. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 174.?189. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-189 of Count Two. 190. The Camfour Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Dylan Hockley, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 191. On December 14, 2012, plaintiffs? decedent, Dylan Hockley, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; b. ante-mortem pain and suffering; c. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; (1. destruction of earning capacity; and e. death. 192. As a result of the injuries and death of Dylan Hockley, the Estate of Dylan C. Hockley incurred funeral expenses to its ?nancial loss. COUNT SIX: 52?555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Dylan C. Hockley v. Riverview Defendants) 1.-173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. l74.?191. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-191 of Count Three. 23 192. The Riverview Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Dylan Hockley, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 193. On December 14, 2012, plaintiffs? decedent, Dylan Hockley, suffered the following injuries and losses: Terror; ante?mortem pain and suffering; destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; destruction of earning capacity; and death. 9999?s? 194. As a result of the injuries and death of Dylan Hockley, the Estate of Dylan C. Hockley incurred funeral expenses to its financial loss. COUNT SEVEN: ?52~555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Mary Joy Sherlach v. Bushmaster Defendants) 1.-l73. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1?173 of Count One. 174.?190. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174?190 of Count One. 191. The Bushmaster Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Mary Joy Sherlach, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 192. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff?s decedent, Mary Joy Sherlach, suffered the following injuries and losses: Terror; ante?mortem pain and suffering; destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; destruction of earning capacity; and death. 9999?!? 193. As a result of the injuries and death of Mary Joy Sherlach, the Estate of Mary Joy Sherlach incurred funeral expenses to its financial loss. 24 COUNT EIGHT: ?52?555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Mary Joy Sherlach V. Camfour Defendants) 1.?173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 174.-189. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-189 of Count Two. 190. The Camfour Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Mary Joy Sherlach, as further described in the following two paragraphs. - 191. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff?s decedent, Mary Joy Sherlach, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; b. ante?mortem pain and suffering; c. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; d. destruction of earning capacity; and 6. death. 192. As a result of the injuries and death of Mary Joy Sherlach, the Estate of Mary Joy Sherlach incurred funeral expenses to its financial loss. COUNT NINE: ?52-555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Mary Joy Sherlach v. Riverview Defendants) 1.?173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 174.-191. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-191 of Count Three. 192. The Riverview Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Mary Joy Sherlach, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 193. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff?s decedent, Mary Joy Sherlach, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; b. ante-mortern pain and suffering; c. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; d. destruction of earning capacity; and e. death. 25 194. As a result of the injuries and death of Mary Joy Sherlach, the Estate of Mary Joy Sherlach incurred funeral expenses to its ?nancial loss. COUNT TEN: Loss of Consortium (William D. Sherlach V. Bushmaster Defendants) 1.?173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 174.-190. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-190 of Count One. - 191. The Bushmaster Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Mary Joy Sherlach. 192. At all times mentioned herein, the plaintiff William D. Sherlach was the husband of Mary Joy Sherlach. 193. As a result of the aforesaid occurrences to Mary Joy Sherlach, the plaintiff William Sherlach has been deprived of the companionship and society of his wife, all to his damage. COUNT ELEVEN: Loss of Consortium (William D. Sherlach v. Camfour Defendants) l.-l73. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1?173 of Count One. 174.?189. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re~allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-189 of Count Two. 190. The Camfour Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Mary Joy Sherlach. 191. At all times mentioned herein, the plaintiff William D. Sherlach was the husband of Mary Joy Sherlach. 192. As a result of the aforesaid occurrences to Mary Joy Sherlach, the plaintiff William Sherlach has been deprived of the companionship and society of his wife, all to his damage. 26 COUNT TWELVE: Loss of Consortium (William D. Sherlach v. Riverview Defendants) l.?173. Plaintiff hereby incorporates and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs l-l73 of Count One. l74.-l9l. Plaintiff hereby incorporates and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-191 of Count Three. 192. The Riverview Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Mary Joy Sherlach. 193. At all times mentioned herein, the plaintiff William D. Sherlach was the hquand of Mary Joy Sherlach. 194. As a result of the aforesaid occurrences to Mary Joy Sherlach, the plaintiff William Sherlach has been deprived of the companionship and society of his Wife, all to his damage. COUNT THIRTEEN: 52?555 Wrongful Death (EState of Noah S. Pozner V. Bushmaster Defendants) 1.?l73. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs l-173 of Count One. l74.?190. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174?190 of Count One. 191. The Bushmaster Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Noah Pozner, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 192. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff?s decedent, Noah Pozner, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; b. ante-mortem pain and suffering; c. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; (1. destruction of earning capacity; and e. death. 193. As a result of the injuries and death of Noah Pozner, the Estate of Noah S. Pozner incurred funeral expenses to its ?nancial loss. 27 COUNT FOURTEEN: 52-555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Noah S. Pozner v. Carnfour Defendants) 1.-173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1?173 of Count One. 174.-189. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-189 of Count Two. 190. The Camfour Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Noah Pozner, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 191. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff?s decedent, Noah Pozner, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; b. ante?mortem pain and suffering; c. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; d. destruction of earning capacity; and e. death. 192. As a result of the injuries and death of Noah Pozner, the Estate of Noah S. Pozner incurred funeral expenses to its financial loss. COUNT FIFTEEN: 52-555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Noah S. Pozner V. Riverview Defendants) 1.?173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 174.?191. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-191 of Count Three. 192. The Riverview Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Noah Pozner, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 193. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff?s decedent, Noah Pozner, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; b. ante?mortem pain and suffering; c. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; (1. destruction of earning capacity; and e. death. 28 194. As a result of the injuries and death of Noah Pozner, the Estate of Noah S. Pozner incurred funeral expenses to its financial loss. COUNT SIXTEEN: 52?555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Lauren G. Rousseau v. Bushmaster Defendants) 1.-173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. - 174.?190. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-190 of Count One. 191. . The Bushmaster Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Lauren Rousseau, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 192. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff?s decedent, Lauren Rousseau, suffered the following injuries and losses: Terror; ante-mortem pain and suffering; destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; destruction of earning capacity; and I death. 9999?s 193. As a result of the injuries and death of Lauren Rousseau, the Estate of Lauren G. Rousseau incurred funeral expenses to its financial loss. COUNT SEVENTEEN: 52-555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Lauren G. Rousseau V. Camfour Defendants) 1,-173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 174.?189. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174?189 of Count Two. 190. The Camfour Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Lauren Rousseau, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 191. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff? decedent, Lauren Rousseau, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; 29 b. ante-mortem pain and suffering; c. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; d. destruction of earning capacity; and e. death. 192. As a result of the injuries and death of Lauren Rousseau, the Estate of Lauren G. Rousseau incurred funeral expenses to its ?nancial loss. COUNT EIGHTEEN: 52?555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Lauren G. Rousseau V. Riverview Defendants) 1.-17 3. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1?173 of Count One. 174.-191. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-191 of Count Three. 192. The Riverview Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Lauren Rousseau, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 193. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff? decedent, Lauren Rousseau, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; b. ante-mortem pain and suffering; c. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; d. destruction of earning capacity; and e. death. 194. As a result of the injuries and death of Lauren Rousseau, the Estate of Lauren G. Rousseau incurred funeral expenses to its ?nancial loss. COUNT NINETEEN: 52?555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Benjamin A. Wheeler v. Bushmaster Defendants) 1.-173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 174.-190. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set fOrth herein Paragraphs 174-190 of Count One. 191. The Bushmaster Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Benjamin Wheeler, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 30 192. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff?s decedent, Benjamin Wheeler, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; b. ante?mortem pain and suffering; c. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; (1. destruction of earning capacity; and e. death. 193. As a result of the injuries and death of Benjamin Wheeler, the Estate of Benjamin A. Wheeler incurred funeral eXpenses to its financial loss. COUNT TWENTY: 52?555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Benjamin A. Wheeler V. Camfour Defendants) 1.-173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 174.-189. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-189 of Count Two. 190. The Camfour Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Benjamin Wheeler, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 191. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff?s decedent, Benjamin Wheeler, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; b. ante-mortem pain and suffering; c. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; (1. destruction of earning capacity; and e. death. 192. As a result of the injuries and death of Benjamin Wheeler, the Estate of Benjamin A. Wheeler incurred funeral expenses to its ?nancial loss. COUNT 52?555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Benjamin A. Wheeler v. Riverview Defendants) 1.-173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 174.-191. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-191 of Count Three. 31 192. The Riverview Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Benjamin Wheeler, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 193. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff?s decedent, Benjamin Wheeler, suffered the following injuries and losses: Terror; ante-mortem pain and suffering; destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; destruction of earning capacity; and death. 9999?s 194. i As a result of the injuries and death of Benjamin Wheeler, the Estate of Benjamin A. Wheeler incurred funeral expenses to its financial loss. COUNT TWENTY-TWO: 52?555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Jesse McCord Lewis V. Bushmaster Defendants) 1.-173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1?173 of Count One. 174,?190. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174?190 of Count One. 191. The Bushmaster Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Jesse McCord Lewis, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 192. On December 14, 2012, plaintiffs? decedent, Jesse McCord Lewis, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; b. ante?mortem pain and suffering; c. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; d. destruction of earning capacity; and e. death. 193. As a result of the injuries and death of Jesse McCord Lewis, the Estate of Benjamin A. Wheeler incurred funeral expenses to its ?nancial loss. COUNT TWENTY-THREE: 52?555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Jesse McCord Lewis v. Camfour Defendants) 1.-173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 32 174,?189. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-189 of Count Two. 190. The Camfour Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Jesse McCord Lewis, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 191. On December 14, 2012, plaintiffs? decedent, Jesse McCord Lewis, suffered the following injuries and losses: Terror; ante-mortem pain and suffering; destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; destruction of earning capacity; and death. 192. As a result of the injuries and death of Jesse McCord Lewis, the Estate of Jesse McCord Lewis incurred funeral expenses to its financial loss. COUNT TWENTY-FOUR: 52?555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Jesse McCord Lewis V. Riverview Defendants) 1.-173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1?173 of Count One. 174.-191. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraph-s 174-191 of Count Three. 192. The Riverview Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Jesse McCord Lewis, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 193. On December 14, 2012, plaintiffs? decedent, Jesse McCord Lewis, suffered the following injuries and losses: Terror; ante-mortem pain and suffering; destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; destruction of earning capacity; and death. 194. As a result of the injuries and death of Jesse McCord Lewis, the Estate of Jesse McCord Lewis incurred funeral expenses to its ?nancial loss. 33 COUNT TWENTY-FIVE: 52-555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Daniel G. Barden v. Bushmaster Defendants) 1,?173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 174.-190. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re~allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-190 of Count One. 191. The Bushmaster Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Daniel Barden, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 192. On December 14, 2012, plaintiffs? decedent, Daniel Barden, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; b. ante?mortem pain and suffering; c. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; (1. destruction of earning capacity; and 6. death. 193. As a result of the injuries and death of Daniel Barden, the Estate of Daniel G. Barden incurred funeral expenses to its financial loss. COUNT TWENTY-SIX: 52-555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Daniel G. Barden V. Camfour Defendants) 1.?173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 174.-189. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-189 of Count Two. 190. The Camfour Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Daniel Barden, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 191. On December 14, 2012, plaintiffs? decedent, Daniel Barden, suffered the following injuries and losses: Terror; ante-mortem pain and suffering; destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; destruction of earning capacity; and death. 9999?s? 34 192. As a result of the injuries and death of Daniel Barden, the Estate of Daniel G. Barden incurred funeral expenses to its financial loss. COUNT TWENTY-SEVEN: 52?555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Daniel G. Barden V. Riverview Defendants) 1.-173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re?allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 174.-191. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-191 of Count Three. 192.. The Riverview Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Daniel Barden, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 193. On December 14, 2012, plaintiffs? decedent, Daniel Barden, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; b. ante?mortem pain and suffering; c. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; (1. destruction of earning capacity; and e. death. 194. As a result of the injuries and death of Daniel Barden, the Estate of Daniel G. Barden incurred funeral expenses to its financial lo'ss. COUNT TWENTY-EIGHT: 52-555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Rachel M. D?Avino v. Bushmaster Defendants) 1.-173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1?173 of Count One. 174.?190. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-190 of Count One. 191. The Bushmaster Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Rachel D?Avino, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 192. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff?s decedent, Rachel D?Avino, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; 35 b. ante-mortem pain and suffering; c. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; d. destruction of earning capacity; and e. death. 193. As a result of the injuries and death of Rachel D?Avino, the Estate of Rachel M. D?Avino incurred funeral expenses to its ?nancial loss. COUNT 52-555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Rachel M. D?Avino V. Camfour Defendants) 1.-17 3. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 174.-189. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-189 of Count Two. 190. The Camfour Defendants? conduct as previOusly alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Rachel D?Avino, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 191. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff?s decedent, Rachel D?Avino, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; b. ante?mortem pain and suffering; c. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; (1. destruction of earning capacity; and e. death. 192. As a result of the injuries and death of Rachel D?Avino, the Estate of Rachel M. D?Avino incurred funeral expenses to its financial loss. COUNT THIRTY: 52-555 Wrongful Death (Estate of Rachel M. D?Avino V. Riverview Defendants) 1.?173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1?173 of Count One. 174.-191. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-191 of Count Three. 192. The Riverview Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries, suffering, and death of Rachel D?Avino, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 36 193. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff?s decedent, Rachel D?Avino, suffered the following injuries and losses: Terror; ante?mortem pain and suffering; destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; destruction of earning capacity; and death. 9999?s 194. As a result of the injuries and death of Rachel D?Avino, the Estate of Rachel M. D?Avino incurred funeral expenses to its financial loss. COUNT THIRTY-ONE: 52?555 Wrongful Death (Natalie Hammond V. Bushmaster Defendants) 1.-173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 174-190. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-190 of Count One. 191. The Bushmaster Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries and suffering of Natalie Hammond, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 192. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff, Natalie Hammond, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; b. pain and suffering; c. severe, permanent and painful injuries to her left calf, left foot, left thigh and left hand; d. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; and e. destruction of earning capacity. 193. As a result of such injuries, Ms. Hammond incurred medical expenses to her financial loss. COUNT THIRTY-TWO: 52-555 Wrongful Death (Natalie Hammond V. Camfour Defendants) 1.-173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 174,-189. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege asif fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174?189 of Count Two. 37 190. The Camfour Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries and suffering of Natalie Hammond, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 191. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff, Natalie Hammond, suffered the following injuries and losses: a. Terror; b. pain and suffering; i 0. severe, permanent and painful injuries to her left calf, left foot, left thigh and left hand; (I. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; and e. destruction of earning capacity. 192. As a result of such injuries, Ms. Hammond incurred medical expenses to her financial loss. COUNT THIRTY-THREE: 52-555 Wrongful Death (Natalie Hammond v. Riverview Defendants) 1,?173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 1-173 of Count One. 174.-191. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege as if fully set forth herein Paragraphs 174-191 of Count Three. 192. The Riverview Defendants? conduct as previously alleged was a substantial factor resulting in the injuries and suffering of Natalie Hammond, as further described in the following two paragraphs. 193. On December 14, 2012, plaintiff, Natalie Hammond, suffered the following injuries and losses: a Terror; b. pain and suffering; 0. severe, permanent and painful injuries to her left calf, left foot, left thigh and left hand; d. destruction of the ability to enjoy life?s activities; and e. destruction of earning capacity. 194. As a result of such injuries, Ms. Hammond incurred medical expenses to her ?nancial loss. 38 WHEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFFS CLAIM DAMAGES IN EXCESS OF FIFTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS AND THE FOLLOWING RELIEF AS FURTHER SET FORTH BELOW: Plaintiffs seek relief as follows: A. Monetary damages; B. Punitive damages; C. Attorneys? fees; D. Costs; E. Injunctive relief. This matter is within the jurisdiction of this court. 39 Of this writ, with your doings thereon, make due service and return. Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this I 3 If of December, 2014. THE PLAINTIFFS By Josh?a D. Voskoff Alin . Sterling Katie Mesner-Hage Koskoff, Koskoff Bieder, RC. 350 Fair?eld Avenue Bridgeport, CT 06604 Juris No. 032250 Tel: 203?336-4421 Fax: 203-368-3244 PLEASE ENTER THE APPEARANCE OF: Koskoff, Koskoff Bieder, PC. 350 Fairfield Avenue Bridgeport, CT 06604 for the Plaintiffs 40