UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY COMMISSION REVIEW
BEFORE THE COURT
K R A U S S , C H I E F J U D G E , S I L L I M A N , D E P U T Y C H IE F J U D G E ,
A N D W E BE R , Appellate Judge

D A V I D M. H I C K S ,
APPELLANT
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLEE
CMCR 13-004
February 18, 2015

Colonel Ralph H. Kohlmann, U.S. Marine Corps, military commission judge.
Baher Azmy, J. Wells Dixon, Shayana D. Kadidal, and Susan Hu, Center for
Constitutional Rights; Joseph Margulies, Cornell Law School; Samuel T.
Morison, and Major Justin Swick, JA, U.S. Air Force, on briefs for Appellant.
Brigadier General Mark S. Martins, JA, U.S. Army; Captain Edward S. White,
JAGC, U.S. Navy; Marc A. Wallenstein, and Danielle S. Tarin, on briefs for
Appellee.
----------------------------------------------------PUBLISHED OPINION OF THE COURT
----------------------------------------------------Opinion for the Court filed by D E P U T Y C H I E F J U D G E S I L L I M A N , in which
J U D G E W E B E R concurs.
C H I E F J U D G E K R A U S S concurring in part and the result.
SILLIMAN, DEPUTY CHIEF JUDGE:
Appellant urges us to set aside his guilty plea to providing material
support to terrorism, in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(25) (2006), and the
sentence based on Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en
banc). Appellant asks that we find his waiver of his right to appellate review

 ineffective, and asserts that once we determine this case is properly before us,
Al Bahlul dictates the outcome in his case.
Appellee counters that appellant’s waiver of his right to appeal is a
jurisdictional bar to our review of his case, and in the alternative, the
government is entitled to specific performance of his pretrial agreement.
Appellee’s Response to Specified Issue 1-5. Should the Court reject these two
contentions and review appellant’s case, the appellee concedes that the Court
should decline to affirm the findings and sentence. Appellee’s Response to
Specified Issue 5-6 (citing Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 29).
We agree with appellant and set aside the findings and sentence.
Statement of Facts 1
Appellant was born in 1975 in Australia. Stipulation of Fact (SF) ¶ 4. In
November 1999, Appellant traveled to Pakistan, and in the middle of 2000, he
joined Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LET), which the United States designated as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization on December 26, 2001, pursuant to Section 219
of the Immigration and Nationality Act. SF ¶ 6. Appellant received two months
of military training at an LET camp in Pakistan, and then joined an attack on
“Indian forces by firing a machine gun at an Indian Army bunker.” SF ¶¶ 12-13.
In January 2001, appellant traveled to Afghanistan with LET’s assistance
to attend al Qaeda training camps. SF ¶ 26. He received basic military and
guerilla warfare training at al Qaeda’s al Farouq camp, which is near Kandahar,
Afghanistan. SF ¶¶ 28-29. Appellant met Usama bin Laden at al Farouq camp.
SF ¶ 30. In June and August 2001, appellant received military training at
Tarnak Farm in Afghanistan and surveillance training in Kabul, Afghanistan.
SF ¶¶ 32-33. Appellant was in Pakistan visiting a friend on September 11,
2001, and they watched television coverage of the attacks on the United States
on that day. SF ¶ 35.
In September 2001, appellant returned to Afghanistan, and in late
September 2001, he joined a group of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters near the
Kandahar Airport. SF ¶¶ 36-39. He was armed with an AK-47 assault rifle, 300
rounds of ammunition, and three grenades. SF ¶ 38. For about a week,
appellant guarded a Taliban tank outside the Kandahar Airport. SF ¶ 40.
In November 2001, appellant brought his AK-47 and ammunition to
Konduz, Afghanistan where he went to the front lines outside the city to join the
ongoing fighting against Coalition forces. SF ¶ 45. However, Coalition forces
overran the al Qaeda and Taliban positions. Id. Appellant sold his AK-47 and
1

The pa r tie s a t app e llant’ s milita r y c o mmis s ion agr eed and s tipu la ted to f a c ts in suppor t
of h is gu ilty p le a. Th is s ta te me n t of f a c ts is take n fro m h is s tipu la tion of fa c t. Pros e cu tion
Exh ib it 1.

2

 used the funds to pay for a taxi in an attempt to flee to Pakistan. SF ¶¶ 48-49.
In December 2001, the Northern Alliance captured appellant in Baghlan,
Afghanistan. SF ¶ 49. Appellant was transferred to U.S. control on December
15, 2001. SF ¶ 50.
Appellant acknowledged that “he is an alien unlawful enemy combatant,
as defined in the Military Commissions Act of 2006,” Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120
Stat. 2600 (2006), codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w, which governed
appellant’s trial by military commission. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1) and (3) (2006).
SF ¶ 2. Appellant further “acknowledge[d] that he has never been the victim of
any illegal treatment at the hands of any personnel while in the custody or
control of the United States.” SF ¶ 50.
Procedural History
On March 30, 2007, appellant pleaded guilty to Specification 1 of the
Charge, providing material support “from in or about December 2000 through in
or about December 2001, . . . to an international terrorist organization engaged
in hostilities against the United States, namely al Qaeda, which the accused
knew to be such an organization that engaged, or engages in terrorism” in
violation of 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(25).
Appellant was sentenced to confinement for seven years. Tr. 245. In
accordance with appellant’s pretrial agreement, on May 1, 2007, the convening
authority suspended all confinement in excess of nine months. A306. On
November 5, 2013, appellant filed an appeal with our Court citing 10 U.S.C. §§
950c(a) and 950f(c) as the jurisdictional basis for our review. Appellant’s
November 5, 2013 Brief 1. Appellant argued his waiver of appellate rights filed
at trial was “irrelevant as a matter of law” because it was not filed within 10 days
after notice of the convening authority’s action. Id. at 5 n.6. We ordered the
parties to simultaneously brief the issue of the efficacy of appellant’s waiver of
appellate review.
Waiver of Appeal
Appellant’s waiver of his right to appeal was negotiated and accepted by
appellant, his counsel, and the convening authority before trial as part of his
pretrial agreement. AE 27 at ¶ 4. The military commission judge discussed his
waiver on the record with appellant during his providence inquiry. Tr. 140-42.
Six years after he received the sentence-limitation benefit of that pretrial
agreement, appellant asks us to set aside his appellate waiver because: he did
not resubmit it within 10 days after the convening authority took action on his
case; the military commission lacked jurisdiction over appellant’s charged
offense of providing material support to terrorism; and appellant’s guilty plea
was involuntary. After determining that we have jurisdiction to decide the

3

 validity of his waiver of his right to appeal, we conclude that his waiver is not
effective and appellant’s appeal is properly before this Court for our review.
Appellant’s Pretrial Agreement and Providence Inquiry
On March 26, 2007, appellant, his defense counsel, and the convening
authority each signed a pretrial agreement. AE 27. Appellant offered to plead
guilty to the Charge and Specification 1, alleging that appellant provided
material support to a terrorist organization. Appellant’s written offer to plead
guilty also stated:
In exchange for the undertakings made by the United States in entering
this Pretrial Agreement, I voluntarily and expressly waive all rights to
appeal or collaterally attack my conviction, sentence, or any other matter
relating to this prosecution whether such a right to appeal or collateral
attack arises under the Military Commission Act of 2006, or any other
provision of the United States or Australian law.
AE 27 ¶ 4.
During the providence inquiry, appellant reiterated his agreement with
this provision in his pretrial agreement. Tr. 140-41. In return for appellant’s
waiver of his rights, including his appellate rights, the convening authority
agreed that she would: dismiss Specification 2 of the Charge with prejudice; not
present evidence in aggravation during sentencing; not approve a sentence of
confinement greater than seven years; suspend confinement in excess of nine
months; and “transfer custody and control of the Accused to the Government of
Australia by not later than sixty (60) days from the date upon which the
sentence is announced.” AE 27, app. A.
Timing of Submission of the Waiver of Appellate Rights
After the members adjudged Hicks’ sentence, the military commission
judge briefly discussed completion of the appellate waiver form with the
prosecutor, appellant, and appellant’s counsel. Tr. 248-49. Appellant signed
the appellate waiver form, and the prosecutor agreed that completion of the
appellate waiver form met the requirements of R.M.C. 1110. 2 Tr. 249.
On May 1, 2007, the convening authority took action on appellant’s case,
approving the sentence of seven years confinement and suspending “that part of
2

Manua l for Militar y Co mmis s ions ( Jan . 18, 2007), Ru le for Militar y Co mmis s ion
( R. M.C.) 1110(f) (1) ( “W a iver . The a ccu sed ma y s ign a w a iv er of app e lla te rev iew a t an y time
a f te r th e s en tenc e is announ ced . Th e w a iver mu st be f iled w ith in 10 da ys af ter the ac cus ed
or d ef ens e coun se l is serv ed w ith a c op y of th e a c tion under R. M. C. 1107(h) . Upon w ritten
a pp lic a tion of th e a ccu se d, th e conve n ing au thor ity ma y ex te nd th is pe riod fo r good c aus e, b y
no t mo re tha n 30 d a ys .” ).

4

 the sentence extending in excess of nine months.” A306. On May 2, 2007,
notice of the convening authority’s action was served on appellant. Appellee’s
December 19, 2013 Brief 10 (citing A302). The convening authority’s action
explicitly indicated appellant had waived his right to appeal as part of his
pretrial agreement. A306-A307. Appellant did not re-file the waiver of appeal
within 10 days after action, as required by 10 U.S.C. § 950c(b)(3) (2006), but
the convening authority gave appellant notice that she was relying on his
previously-filed waiver. A301; A302; A306. In accordance with appellant’s
pretrial agreement, appellant was transferred to Australia on May 20, 2007.
Appellee’s December 19, 2013 Brief 10 (citation omitted); A311. Appellant
filed his appeal on November 5, 2013.
Jurisdiction to Decide the Validity of Appellant’s Waiver
Although appellant has the burden of establishing that we have subject
matter jurisdiction over his appeal, (see Khadr v. United States, 529 F.3d 1112,
1115 (D.C. Cir. 2008)), the parties agree that we have jurisdiction to decide
whether our Court has jurisdiction to determine whether Hicks’ appeal waiver
was valid. Appellant’s December 19, 2013 Brief 5-8; Appellee’s January 10,
2014 Responsive Brief 7. We agree with the parties that we have authority to
determine the scope and enforceability of appellant’s waiver of his appeal. See
United States v. Laslie, 716 F.3d 612, 616 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (waiver of right to
appeal sentence was enforceable); In re Sealed Case, 702 F.3d 59, 63-67 (D.C.
Cir. 2012); United States v. Accardi, 669 F.3d 340, 344 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (waiver
of right to appeal sentence not enforceable); United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d
1315, 1324-28 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Standard of Review
We review de novo whether an appellate waiver is enforceable. See
United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing United
States v. Cunningham, 145 F.3d 1385, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Appellate
waivers are presumptively valid and enforceable when part of a pretrial
agreement and when the defendant’s “decision is knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary.” Guillen, 561 F.3d at 529 (listing cases from other circuits). See
also In re Sealed Case, 702 F.3d at 63; United States v. McGraw, 571 F.3d 624,
630 (7th Cir. 2009).
Failure to Submit Appellate Waiver After the Convening Authority’s Action
The record plainly demonstrates that appellant’s initial waiver of his right
to appellate review was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. He received a
favorable pretrial agreement in return for his concessions in the pretrial
agreement, and his discussion with the military judge provides no reason to
doubt that appellant’s willingness to waive appellate review was a free and
knowing act.

5

 However, we consider whether appellant’s failure to resubmit his
appellate waiver within 10 days after the convening authority provided notice of
action invalidated his appellate waiver. The 2006 MCA § 950c provides:
(a) A U T O M A T I C R E F E R R A L F O R A P P E L L A T E R E V I E W .—Except as
provided under subsection (b), in each case in which the final decision of
a military commission (as approved by the convening authority) includes
a finding of guilty, the convening authority shall refer the case to the
Court of Military Commission Review. Any such referral shall be made
in accordance with procedures prescribed under regulations of the
Secretary.
(b) W A I V E R O F R I G H T O F R E V I E W .—(1) In each case subject to
appellate review under section 950f of this title, except a case in which
the sentence as approved under section 950b of this title extends to death,
the accused may file with the convening authority a statement expressly
waiving the right of the accused to such review.
(2) A waiver under paragraph (1) shall be signed by both the accused
and a defense counsel.
(3) A waiver under paragraph (1) must be filed, if at all, within 10
days after notice of the action is served on the accused or on defense
counsel under section 950b(c)(4) of this title. The convening authority,
for good cause, may extend the period for such filing by not more than 30
days.
(c) W I T H D R A W A L O F A P P E A L .—Except in a case in which the sentence
as approved under section 950b of this title extends to death, the accused
may withdraw an appeal at any time.
(d) E F F E CT O F W A I V E R O R W I T H D R A W A L .—A waiver of the right to
appellate review or the withdrawal of an appeal under this section bars
review under section 950f of this title.
The Military Commissions Act of 2009 retained 10 U.S.C. § 950c without
change in 10 U.S.C. § 950c. See Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801–07, 123 Stat.
2190, 2574-2614 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950t). Section 950(c) is
essentially the same as the appellate waiver provision for courts-martial in 10
U.S.C. § 861, Article 61, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
We look first to the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces (CAAF) and the respective service Courts of Criminal Appeals for
instructive, non-binding precedent on the enforceability of appellant’s waiver of
appeal. See 10 U.S.C. § 948b(c) (2009).
CAAF has consistently held that waiver of appellate rights submitted prior
to the convening authority’s action is invalid, unless “the record demonstrates a
serious, rational, and informed discussion between the accused and defense
counsel after the convening authority’s action, but before the filing of the
waiver.” United States v. Miller, 62 M.J. 471, 474 (CAAF 2006); United States

6

 v. Hernandez, 33 M.J. 145, 149 (C.M.A. 1991). In Miller, CAAF held that in
some instances, a document signed before the convening authority’s action may
serve to demonstrate a provident waiver of appellate review, but CAAF did so in
a much different context, where defense counsel actually submitted a waiver
form immediately after action, but that waiver form had been signed before
action. Id. at 472-73. In Miller, the appellant had specifically reiterated his
desire to waive his appellate rights after the convening authority took action, a
fact well documented in the record. Id. at 473-74. Thus, CAAF held that the
record provided a requisite showing of the providence of the appellant’s postaction waiver. Id. at 474.
The instant case is different from Miller. Here, no waiver of appellate
rights was refiled with the convening authority within 10 days after notice of
the action was served on him and his counsel. There is insufficient indication in
the record that the appellant reiterated his desire not to appeal within ten days
after the convening authority notified him of the action. Thus, we hold that the
waiver was invalid and unenforceable, and appellant’s appeal is properly before
our Court.
Court-martial practice prohibits a pretrial agreement from requiring an
accused to waive his rights to appellate review, while military commissions
practice contains no such prohibition. Compare R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B) with
R.M.C. 705(c)(1). We are aware that by holding an accused’s waiver of the
right to appellate review is not effective if not filed within 10 days after notice
of action, the convening authority may be left with little to no way to
effectively ensure an accused complies with a promise to waive appellate
review. However, precedent in court-martial practice is clear that “Congress
has provided a narrow window in which an accused may waive appellate review
in non-capital cases.” Miller, 62 M.J. at 472. Requiring a similar narrow
window for waivers of appellate review in military commissions practice may
undercut the effectiveness of such pretrial agreement terms, but we presume
Congress mirrored the 10-day window in court-martial practice for a reason, and
it is not this Court’s role to disregard Congress’ clear direction. 3
3

W e agr ee with Ch ief Judg e Kr aus s th a t th e 10- d a y pos t-a c tion r equ ir eme n t fo r f iling a
w a iver of app ea l in MCA § 950c(b )(3) (2006) do es no t add re s s th e us e of app e lla te w a iv ers
a s a p re tr ia l agr ee me n t prov is ion in R. M. C. 705( c)(2)( E) (2007, 2010, 2012). Howe ver , w e
d ec lin e to jo in w ith h im in d ec lar ing R. M.C. 705( c)(2)( E) to b e in consis ten t o r inco mp a tib le
w ith MCA § 950 c(b)(3 ) (2006) . The S e cre tar y of Def ens e in consu lta tion w ith the A ttorn e y
G ener a l h a s d isc re tion to es tab lish “ [p ]r e tr ial, tr ia l, and pos t- tr ia l proce dure s. ” MCA §
949 a(a ) (2006). “Su ch pro cedu re s s ha ll, so far a s th e S ec re tar y cons ide r s p rac ticab le or
c ons is ten t with m ilita ry o r in te llig en ce ac tiv itie s , app ly the pr in c ip le s of law and th e ru les of
e v iden c e in tr ia l b y g ene ra l cou r ts-ma r tia l. ” Id . (e mp ha s is add ed) . App e lla te w a iv ers in
gu ilty p lea n ego tia tion s ar e co mmo n in U.S . D is tr ic t Cou r ts . Andr ew D ean , Cha lle ng ing
App ea l Wa iv e rs , 61 Buff a lo L. Rev. 1191 , 1197 ( De c. 2013) (c ita tions o mitte d). See a lso F ed.
R. Cr im. P. 11(b)(1 )(N). Mor eover th er e ar e sound po lic y argu me n ts for per mitti ng an
a c cus ed to re c e iv e a bene f it for wa iv ing h is appe lla te r igh ts. John F . O’ Connor, Foo lish
Cons is ten c ie s and the App e lla te R ev ie w o f Cour ts- Mar tia l, 41 Akron L. Rev. 175, 191
(2008) .

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 The convening authority erred when she applied the premature appellate
waiver. Appellant waited six years to complain about this error, and we
recognize that a right “may be forfeited in criminal . . . cases by the failure to
make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to
determine it.” Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 9 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “This fundamental principle of appellate review generally bars a party
who failed to preserve an argument in a lower tribunal from raising it on appeal
absent plain error or exceptional circumstances.” Id. (citing United States v.
Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 159 (1936); Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. Dist. of
Columbia, 602 F.3d 431, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). Thus, by not complaining
earlier of the convening authority’s failure to forward his case for our review,
appellant may be said to have forfeited his right to do so now.
However, this Court enjoys broad authority under 10 U.S.C. § 950f(d) to
“affirm only such findings of guilty, and the sentence or such part or amount of
the sentence, as the Court finds correct in law and fact and determines, on the
basis of the entire record, should be approved.” 4 Section 950f(d) mirrors 10
U.S.C. § 866(c), which grants similar authority to the service Courts of Criminal
Appeals. A Court of Criminal Appeals’ Article 66(c), UCMJ, authority has been
characterized as an “awesome, plenary de novo power of review.” United States
v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 144 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citations omitted). More
specifically, this broad authority allows the service Courts of Criminal Appeals
to not apply forfeiture or waiver of errors and instead review those matters on
the merits. United States v. Riley, 47 M.J. 276, 279 (C.A.A.F. 1997); United
States v. Lloyd, 46 M.J. 19, 22 (C.A.A.F. 1997); United States v. Moore, 32 M.J.
170, 173 (C.M.A. 1991); United States v. Claxton, 32 M.J. 159, 162 (C.M.A.
1991); United States v. Evans, 28 M.J. 74, 76 (C.M.A. 1989).
Congress was well aware of how the Courts of Criminal Appeals applied
their Article 66(c) authority when 10 U.S.C. § 950f(d) was enacted in 2009. We
assume in this instance that Congress wanted our Court to adopt “the previous
judicial interpretations of the wording” by the service Courts of Criminal
Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. See Carolene Products
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26 (1944). See also 10 U.S.C. § 948b(c)
(2009). We therefore conclude that we have discretion not to apply forfeiture to
the appellant’s failure to earlier complain that the convening authority did not
forward his case for our review. We elect to apply this broad authority in this
case, and therefore hold appellant did not forfeit his right to raise his premature
appellate review waiver.
Having concluded that the appellant’s case is properly before us for
appellate review, both parties agree that the appellant’s conviction cannot stand
on the merits. In 2014, our Superior Court determined “it was a plain ex post
4

Th is prov ision, wh ich b ec a me eff ec tive in 2009, app lies to our r ev iew o f app e lla n t’s
c a se . Un ited S ta tes v . A l Bah lu l, 820 F.Supp .2d 1141 , 1158 ( US CMCR 2011) , vac a ted in
pa rt, A l Bahlu l v. Un ited S ta tes , 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir . 2014) (en ban c).

8

 facto violation” to try Al Bahlul by military commission for the offense of
providing material support to terrorism. Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 29. “The error
is prejudicial” and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
“vacat[ed] Bahlul’s material support conviction.” Id. (citations omitted). We
are aware that Al Bahlul’s case has important differences from appellant’s case,
as Al Bahlul pleaded not guilty and did not waive his right to appeal his case to
our Court, but those differences do not dictate a different result.
The findings of guilty are set aside and dismissed, and appellant’s
sentence is vacated.

K R A U S S , C H I E F J U D G E (concurring in part and in the result).
I write separately to address the dubious validity of Rule for Military
Commission (R.M.C.) 705(c)(2)(E) 5 permitting the waiver of appellate review as
a term or condition of a pretrial agreement. Because appellant did not execute
and deliver an appellate waiver after trial, post-action, in this case, the question
is whether his pretrial waiver is valid in and of itself.
The majority here, and the parties to this litigation, struggle to reconcile
R.M.C. 705 with R.M.C. 1110(f), the latter being relative to post-action
submission of waiver of appellate review. The problem is that the rules are
irreconcilable. They are inherently incompatible, and the one does not
contemplate the other.
This problem is borne of the fact that Congress never intended, and the
Military Commissions Act (MCA) does not contemplate waiver of appellate
review as part of a pretrial agreement. Instead, exactly like the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, the MCA contemplates only the possibility of post-trial,
post-action waiver of appellate review.
The MCA 2006 and 2009 both contain the same statutory authority
permitting post-action waiver of appellate review, § 950c. This provision
effectively mirrors the present version of Article 61, UCMJ, promulgated by
Congress as part of the Military Justice Act of 1983. There, Congress quite
consciously limited the possibility of waiving appellate review to the post-trial
process and intentionally maintained the prohibition against pretrial provisions
that involved waiver of the right to appellate review. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 9853, at 22-24 (1983).
That statutory limit was manifested through Rules for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M.) 705 and 1110. The former prohibiting waiver of appellate review as a
term of pretrial agreements, the latter permitting a post-trial waiver.
5

Ru les for Milita r y Commis s ions (R. M. C.) 705( c)(2)( E) and R. M.C. 1110(f) a re
un chang ed in th e 2007 , 2010, and 2012 v er s ions of th e Manu a l for Milita r y Co mmis s ion s.

9

 Fulfilling their rulemaking responsibility under MCA §949a, successive
Secretaries of Defense promulgated a Manual for Military Commissions
(M.M.C.) modeled on the Manual for Courts-Martial. In both the M.M.C. that
applied at the time of appellant’s trial and the M.M.C. that applies now, the
Secretary promulgated R.M.C. 1110 to define the process by which one
convicted by military commission might waive appellate review after action.
This rule mirrors R.C.M. 1110.
The MCA generally requires that the rules for military commissions
mirror the rules for courts-martial. Departure from this general requirement is
permitted only if explicitly provided for in the MCA or if military or
intelligence operations require otherwise. In any event, rules promulgated by
the Secretary may not be contrary or inconsistent with the MCA. See 2006 MCA
§ 949a(a) and 2009 MCA §949a(a) and (b).
Departing from the Manual for Courts-Martial (M.C.M.) and contrary to
R.C.M. 705, the Secretary promulgated R.M.C. 705 permitting waiver of
appellate review as part of a pretrial agreement. This departure is valid, under
the 2006 MCA, only if: (1) it is not contrary to or inconsistent with the MCA,
and, (2) if practicable or consistent with military or intelligence activities.
2006 MCA § 949a(a). Under MCA 2009, this provision was revised to permit
exceptions to the MCA, if required by the unique circumstances of the conduct
of military and intelligence operations during hostilities or by other practical
need consistent with the MCA. 2009 MCA § 949a(a) and (b).
The 2007, 2010, and 2012 editions of the M.M.C. are prefaced with a
conclusory statement from the Secretary essentially averring that any rule
therein different than that applicable at courts-martial is warranted by the
practical requirements of military or intelligence operations. There is no further
reason articulated that describes waiver of appellate review before trial as
required by the unique circumstances of military or intelligence operations. Nor
is there any explanation as to how prohibiting waiver of appellate rights before
trial is somehow impracticable in the military commission system.
Indeed, the benefits to the system enjoyed under the UCMJ would seem to
be equally beneficial to the system of justice under the MCA, most importantly,
independent appellate scrutiny to encourage and verify that any plea of guilty is
provident, to ensure a fair hearing on sentence and to ensure the propriety of the
proceeding generally. 6 See United States v. Jones, 23 M.J. 305, 307 (C.M.A.
1987); United States v. Mills, 12 M.J. 1, 4 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v.
Green, 1 M.J. 453, 456 (C.M.A. 1976); Analysis to R.C.M. 705, M.C.M. (2012
Ed.) at A21-40 to A21-42; see also United States v. Miller, 62 M.J. 471
(C.A.A.F. 2006). Never has there been any indication that the prohibition
6

L imiting sub mis s ion of an app e lla te w a iver until af ter ac tion a lso pe rmits a n ac cu sed to
a s se ss the va lue of appea l in ligh t of th e f ind ing s and s en ten ce a c tua lly approv ed by th e
c onven ing au thor ity.

10

 against an appellate waiver in a pretrial agreement under the UCMJ is
impracticable in light of military or intelligence operations.
The amount of deference we need render the blanket practicability
assessment prefatory to the M.M.C. may be an open question. See Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 623 (2006); Id. at 640 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part). In any event, the provision permitting waiver of appellate review as part
of a pretrial agreement in R.M.C. 705 is plainly inconsistent with the MCA.
Congress essentially adopted the same appellate review waiver procedure
housed in the UCMJ for purposes of military commissions. That procedure
carries with it, by definition, a limit to post-action waiver only: the case must
first be subject to appellate review, meaning, under the MCA, a case in which a
final decision that includes a finding of guilty is approved by the convening
authority, before a person tried by military commission is permitted to waive
that review.
I would therefore hold that appellant’s waiver under R.M.C. 705 is
invalid. Otherwise I concur with the majority opinion.
FOR THE COURT:

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