CURRENT STATUS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN MOSSAD AND NIA ?l ?11 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.7 BACKGROUND The MOSSAD was handled b_from 1996 to 2004. At that stage it was the only country in the Middle East that was represented and declared to NIA Relations were always more tense with the MOSSAD than with any other country, solely because of the history between the two countries. The representativ at, was- he was succeeded by? During the time of relations were standard and regular exchange took place. Exchanges regularly took place, mostly on individuals and organizations suspected of terrorism involvement. A counter terrorism expert visit took place in 1996 Background on terrorism modus operandi was shared by them, even before the first PAGAD related bombs explodmestern Cape. Meaningful exchanges became less at the end of term. The MOSSAD at that stage atso indicated they were thinking of a part time representam handling the whole of Africa NIA discarded the idea and subsequently was placed in South Africa, although he regularly traveled to West and East fr where he also was the declared me lations existed with hm? he was handed over to We Examples of exchanges are attached as Annexure A, during the above-mentioned period. During February 2005, ?the MOSSAD Director for Foreign Relations, led a MOSSAD delegation that visited Head Quarters in Musanda Liaison Centre. The objective of the MOSSAD visit was to create a space for dialogue on how cooperation between MOSSAD and NIA can be improved. Mr NJENJE. former DDG led the NIA delegation entioned that non-conventional threats are more worrying to the MOSSAD and the Israeli government. He also mentioned that was priority threat for lsrael because it [ran possessed nuclear capability that could be used against israel and for funding Hezbollah and HAMAS. Mr. NJENJE welcomed the sentiments expressed by ?egarding the need for intelligence Services to cooperate and work together to avert terrorist threats He assured MOASSAD that NIA was a willing partner in the fight to combat international terrorism and proiiferation of weapons of mass destruction. He emphasised the importance of that meeting as having brought to the fore bases for productive c00peration between NIA and MOSSAD in the area of Counter Terrorism and Counter Proliferation There was improvement of information exchange soon after the MOSSAD delegation visit. In May 2006 Counter Proliferation experts delegation visited lsraei. MOSSAD was pushing to unter intelligence area such as the Iranian Name Town." wasin contactwith Hezbollah member based in anon did not provide feedback to MOSSAD on this request. In 2007 MOS SAD provided information on_o MA with the hope that the information would benefit South Africa They expected that would share information with them on what are ?nding of theiWstigation However, ?bluntly tom the Local Representatlv - ted by MA Managem on could not un because MOSSAD provided to information on He stormed out of the meeting. 1.8 -ormer Hm MOSSAD grievance on NiA?s action to refuse to share information on activities a h' rn fr rn SomW get guidance. He was confused by the actions of and sition on cooperation with MOSSAD. The NLC reversed Mr ec se IM to share information on_with MOSSAD. However, ook over from IM 1.9 ?the former DDG instructec?o con?ne cooperation between MA and MOSSAD to Counter Proliferation and Counter Terrorism. 1.10 The political stance of from Minister KASRILS contributed to the perception that MA was not willing to COOperate with MOSSAD because the adversaries of Israel are allies of South Africa. Of course Mr KARSILS has openly demonstrated political differences with lsraei and supported the cause of the Palestinian. He also favoured lran's material support to Palestinians Resistance Movement. He ordered audit of information NIA liaised with MOSSAD. 1.11 Mr. the former 06 paid unof?cial visit to MOSSAD HQ in March 2009. MOSSAD complaint to him about lack of concrete cooperation with According to MOSSAD the situation has not changed. instead it has deteriorated to the ievels which have compelled MOSSAD to withdraw their Representative from South Africa. Hence they have withdrawn their Representative but have not severed the relations from residing in South Africa. Annexure A FEEDBACK We would like to express our appreciation for providing leads on - it is, however, at this stage only possible to provide preliminary feedback. In this regard the following: information that is currently available on -also known as - neither con?rms nor refutes suspected links to terrorism in genera an a - aeda in lar. An accurate assessment of the real or potential threat posed by and his followers is thus not viable at this stage. -is associated with an organisation called Majlis Ul Ulama and a newspaper called the Majlis. The current status of the organisation and the newspaper is being investigated. He is furthermore involved in a project to establish and fund madrassas locally and abroad. Funding of this project has previously been done through two organisations, namely Mujlisul Ulama of South Africa and Servants of Suffering Humanity. The current status of this project, as well as details about the organisations involved, still need to be determined. Details about ssibIe followers are sketchy at this stage, which could be attributed to unpopularity within the broader Muslim community and the animosity between him and his family. There is at this stage no information available pertaining to suspicious money collection, as well as transfers to and from South Africa involving Although the existence of "The Centre Director islamic Information Charitable Trust? could not be continued, the bankng details provided are being followed up. It is suspected that -lravels abroad are linked to the above-mentioned project. He is said to have connections in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Details and confirmation of his trips, however, are stili outstanding. Investigations into the matter continue and any relevant information that may become available would be liased. Thank you for your attention. EVENTS THAT FOLLOWED THE AT THE ISRAELI EMBASSY. l. Liaison report dated 5 June 200i refers. Information regarding the ?waIk-in' was conveyed to NIA on 4 June 2001 as was stated in the re an. All the relevant chief directorates were tasked for information on ?rough 162. It was already established by the liaison of? car that he used a false passport number and that he was not Algerian as he stated. - apparently called the Embassy twice and threatened to blow-up the Embassy if they did not give him money as he requested. As far as established he never personally came to the Embassy again. ife reported to the liaison of?cer while he was in Paris to visit his parents. He di Paris on 25 June 2001 to ask about the situation regardinm He then indicated that-contacted the embassy again and threatened them if they did not pay him. 4. The events that ha pened resulted in the liaison officer of NIA and- - member in the protection unit assigned to the srae 1 assy, making contact on a daily basis. New facts came to light and other Embassies became involved. -The Canadians reported that they received information from Montreal that the Israeli Embassy in Canada could be a target. They reported the info to NIA. They did however not indicate that they also got the information from the Israeli Embassy in Pretoria. They also said that the same person might have walked-in at their Embassy. This information was confu inCr and was followed up by CDCE. The SAPS showed a photo of to them. Only then did they realise that it was the same person. The photo ?as received by NM From the Mossad and given to the SAPS. Il?he America: 4 who met ith inlormation: on 18 June 300i nd gave him the following w- a -- one?Given name} Muslim into the US Embassy in Pretoria offering information on indit idtials allegedly int oh ed in the 1.25 Embassy bombings in 's '1 place of birth as le indicated that he hes a resident 01? -1e appeared to. be. East African, ?as of medium height and built. had a dark complexion and a small amount of facial hair. He provided some information of po ?nteres concerning a former emplo} er in? who claimed was int-oh ed in the US EmbasS} boznbings and is now threatening his life. This information dated to December l998. He also claimed to have attended Janta'at Al? Tabligh meetings in Ca Town. He maintained that he destroyed his?) left his 'esidenQ' permit in he coul not provr any identi?cation. by a ith date and place ofbirth- ?.15 ot?tnedium and nitiall} were unwilling to provide an address or telephone number. here they could be contacted. The\ e\ entualh rot ided the name of the 'laimed that he shared the room ith three other mates. lso at he had a sister who resided just outside admitted to having previously approached the Canadian Embasm? and possibly the Swedish Embassy. Although -stor}' initially appeared reasonably credible. he tater admitted 1) ing, on certain aspects. it was clear that he tried to give information on an ongoing, manner to receixe money in return. He ciaimed on several occasions that his life was in danger from his former emiloier in. one- He was referred to the SAPS on these occasions. ted to that they have worked with ince 0c 0 er . ey indicated to the SAPS that they would assist them in locating him and to lure him to the American Embassy for an interview. The SAPS contacted the liaison of?cer to ask if would be interested in being involved in the interview. This was relayed to CDCE who indicated that they were interested. 5. On Friday, 8 June 2001 the SAPS in Rosebank disabled a pipe bomb that was found at a company named Polaris in Waverly, Johannesburg. On Saturday, 9 June 2001 at 5:00 in the morning a petrol bomb was thrown into the building housing the Polaris Shipping Company and extensive ?re damage was reported. The local representative contacted the liaison of?cer on 9 June 2001, giving the details of the incident and stating that the Polaris Company was connected to a big company in Israel named the Zintek Company. It was however not common knowledge that the Polaris Company was an af?liate of the Zintek Company. The MOSSAD expressed their concern on this issue, seeing that some kind of investigation had to be done by the person who attacked the company, in order to know that it was an Israeli company. This information was given through to the Alert Centre on 9 June 2001. it was later established through the SAPS that the Polaris Company was involved in shipping navigational systems. There is also no South African working at the Company. The SAPS are investigating possible internal personnel problems as well as an insurance fraud scheme. 6. The following counter intelligence information was gathered through liaising with the Police, after the two events and weighing it against information received from the MOSSAD: -The Shin Beth member working with the security at the embassy is- .The EL AL manager at HA is also very involved in the gathering of intelligence. He is the individual that handled the whole issue of the pipe bomb at the Polaris Company. He took a video of the demonstration that took place outside the Israel Trade Centre on 8 June 2001, as well as video footage of the pipe bomb. The video was received by MA. and distributed to the relevant The head of Africa desk at the Shin Beth arrived in South Africa on 11 June 2001 to oversee the situation concerning the security of the Embassy after the two events. (Polaris and MA was not informed of the arrival of the Shin Beth member. -Through liasing with the SAPS it came to the attention that a security committee consisting of the Americans, British, Canadians and the Israelis comes together once a month to discuss any threat or terrorist activity. Previously the SAPS were invited to these meetings. It was on a meeting iike this that the ?rst information on the ?waik-in? was liased with one another. COMMENTS BY LIAISON OFFICER l. investigators and of CDCE and in 35 were already given all the information as the situation evolved. 2. A lot of questions can be asked: ~Was the CIA handling the walk-in as a source? -Did he actually walk-in at the Israeli Embassy or was this staged to ensure more protection by the -Was the bombing incident also staged to attract more attention to safety at the Israeli Embassy and other Israeli Companies? -Why did the GA not inform the SA authorities immediately after the ?rst approach by the walk-in, and why did they not A A L3.) The Americans, Israelis and the Canadians compromised their relationship in the different information that was given to NIA and the SAPS. This was a good exercise for NA and the SAPS and their co?operation in using all the information to our advantage. LIAISON OFFICER 1/5/2 (LS 825) Copy .. of .. Copies LIAISON AND PROTOCOL 2002 September DIRECTOR GENERAL EM 10 DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL EM 30 SENIOR GENERAL MANAGER CI 10 MANAGER IM 20 MANAGER IM 30 LIAISON MEETING: LS 2002 SEPTEMBER 10 AND 12 TIME: 19:00 11:30 VENUE: Giovanni?s Caf? Ba rcelona PERSONS INVOLVED: cal representative for LS 825 iaison of?cer NIA 1.1 1.3 DETAILS OF CONTACT: An urgent meeting was requested on 2002 September 10. He supplied the following informati . A Saudi Arabia travel agent in South Africa issued six plane tickets arriving September i 1 at lA on ?ight AT 402 (Airiines and time unknown) to the following persons from Arabic descent: ALIQEILI SAUDI TRAVEL AGENCY issued the tickets as ?collect tickets? in South Africa. Two of the individuals will travel from Morocco and the other four from Benin. The local representative mentioned that the information was received late September 10. The information is not confirmed. The reason why this issue raises suSpicion is the way in which the tickets were purchased and the fact that they travel together from different locations. A follow-up meeting was requested by -on 2002 September 12. The following additional information was received from LS 825 as a follow- up on the previous information regarding the su5picious travellers from Benin and Morocco: is a Moroccan citizen. Passport Born in Currently livin in Marrakech Moroccan ID i The flight plan for the above-mentioned individual is as follows: Departed Agadir, September 1 to Casablanca on Royal Air Moroc, flight AT 402. Departed Casablanca, September 1 1 to Paris on Air France, ?ight 2497. Depart Paris, September 18 to Johannesburg on Air France, ?ight 990. Depart Johannesburg, September 19 or 20 to Paris. Depart Paris, September 20 to Casablanca on Air France, ?ight 2195 Depart Casablanca, September 20 to Agadir on Inter Air. flight AT 423. REQUESTS 2.1 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 Thirty individuals of the AL AQSA FOUNDATION will leave for Tel Aviv on 2002 September 20. meeting the PLO in GAZA. Additional information is requested on the visit and speci?cally on a member of the HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATION He attracts attention because he has contact wit the West Bank in Palestine. MIA was requested IO indicate if this gmup should be allowed to enter Israel and to indicate if this group will enhance the possibility of a peace process or hamper the possibility in the region The local representative requested a courtesycall with the DG. NIA. The reason is that he has a message from his Service regarding the W550 to convey to the DG, KIA He also wants to use the Opportunity to shortly give a brie?ng on the situation in the Middle East DOCUMENTS EXCHANGED The following documents were exchanged: SIGNIFICANT DATES 1N SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2002 -GULF TENSION -TERRORISM THREAT TO VESSELS COMMENT BY LIAISON OFFICER The initial information was received on September 10 and was forwarded to the National Operational Centre and to the HA of?ce for follow-up on the same day. Although the information is uncon?rmed and not a speci?c threat, one could not ignore the information of this nature especially on the 11?h of September. The ?ight plan of-aises suspicion in the sense that he travels from very far and with a lot of effort to get to Johannesburg to stay only one day. It also needs to be highlighted again that the reason why the group of suspicious travellers attracted attention was that there tickets were bought in South Africa and were collected at their places of departure. It was indicated to the local representative that the DG, NIA is very busy, but that the request for a courtesy call will be forwarded to his of?ce. LIAISON OFFICER 5 COMMENT BY CI 13 Even though the information was not con?rmed, it could not be ignored especially that the travelling arrangements casts some suspicion. It is a protocol procedure to allow a local representative to convey a message from his Service to the Director General. HEAD FIS LIAISON C113 Cepy 1 of2 copies 1/5/2 Of?ce oftlte Manager DZ: National Analysis (IMIZO) 3 4 2002 October 04 Head Foreign Intelligence Service Liaison (CH3) FEEDBACK TO REQUEST BY LS 825: AL AQSA FOUNDATION MEETING WITH PLO IN GAZA Your letter (LS 825) dated 2002 September 19 (entitled MEETING: LS 825 (MOSSAD): 2002 SEPTEMBER 10 AND 12) refers. l~J Directorate IMZO would like to respond as follows to the request for information regarding a meeting between the Al Aqsa Foundation (AAF) and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Gaza. with speci?c reference to one - member of the South African Human Rights Organisation who would be part ol?the South African delegation: 2 Meeting hemeen AAF and PLO 7, ii. nit-cling; tlic Kl" Illc I.- ll\. ilnuzzi er. (limit-clini- Filc ?le u: tip; ai?. ul c; ch?lii?dlie'?ld' Iii? w? :0 is possiny identical to ?Iscc Anncxui'c for photo). who is n? lie is closcly associated with the organisation ?eople Against and Drugs (PAGAD). a staunch anti-American and involved in Muslim organisations. including SAHRO. lie ?:15 invoked in demonstrations in from 01th:: USA Consulate in Durban from to 19 April 2002. It is not known at [his stage to individuals in other countries. It would be appreciated if 875 could indicatc ?licilicr _is indeed identical to_ if 50. information on his contact itli the \N?est Bunk. Palestine. would be appreciated. Kindly place the above information in a format that is suitable for liaison purposes. 5. Thank you for your cooperation. MAN A GE NATIONAL ANA LYSIS DisTr?ibufion: Copy no 1: CI13 (via GroupWise.) Copy no 2: RECORD CHECKS: was obtained UH and - Their rmw/ confirm (Km! hut/?1 personx' {'inch Sam/7 A?'ic'a (inboard {be same ling/2: an 300'! and rummed r0 Sum!) A?'ica nrzbourc?f {he .x'cmw'fiighl on 3001-07-31. Hu'x cm?nc'idax with {he Supplied regarding {heir czl?r?egcd aciivitim in Jm'dmr. Swim anally/1mm?. -n'c bath linked to the ('enn?u! {alumna- S'u/zon] in Praim'iu and {he Review Nem?on?s?. herewith the person-u}! particulars: L'rmzf'zcmy [inks and (Jami/ed (rural recol?ds? afrle hm individuals: to positively identify The ?rst mentioned may be identical} but according to the available information the iauer is a South African citizen and not a Palestinian as indicated. Attcm 15 are still being7 made Thank you. RECORD CHECKS 1.1 PERSONAL D211: )i?lOI? to 2001 unliscd SA iricrnii} l?ii} sicni undress 1.2 LINKS - Prixai-c conipnn} registered as a Financial Insurance. Real Estate Business company. Appointed )ir-mior on 2000 1'18 31. A Llil R2352 Registered as mien 21 compan} ve 111 631111 and Soda] ?mix, Appnirncd 1b Director on 3000 1 V: Address: Registered us Article 21 company involved in Social and Services. Appointed 'recior on 1952111015. shidrc?s: 1.3 TRAVEL RECORD 0 Departed from Johannesburg, international Airport unheard Airline "iligln EK46-1 on and arrived back from Dubai (inboard Souih African AirWu}S ilight SA 1 51 on Dcparted with British flight Bx-?xfil?i on 109951080 from Johannesburg intemaiional Airport and arrived back onboard ?ight 011 i il'll . - Dari-Lined from .lolianncsinrrg international Airpori Lmbuarci Emirara Airline ?ight on 1111/26 and. arrived back onbozn'il {light 15 K4 on 1 51,1: 5139. L.) Departed from Johannesburg International Airport onboard Emirates Airline flight EK464 on 2001/04/21 and arrived back outboard flight Eliw?ti} on - Depart-ed from .loi'tanneslinrg International Airport onltonrtl {Egypt Air flight RISES "on letfil and {it?t'chtl hack onhonrd ?ight X18879 on 2001.307: PERSONAL PARTICULARS Date 01? Birth: rt: i?iliscd SA passport lcletitit'} number: address: Postal addrens: COMPANY LINKS Registered as Aniele 3! company im-?olved in Comm unit}: Social and Personal Scnices. Appointed Address: TRAVEL RECORD 0 [Departed through the Beitbridgc border post betwe it So I - ?21 and Zimbabwe on 2993/1204 in a which: registered as - Depntted from Johannesburg international Airport onbonrd South African Aimays tligitt SAE76 to on and arrived back onhutn'tl ?ight on l099/03Jtll. 0 Departed from Johannesburg International Airport (inboard Egypt Air ?ight \15878 on and arrived back (:it'tboarti ?ight on Departed from Johannesburg internatit?vnal Airptn?t (inboard Egypt Air ?ight on 200l.?07?07 and arrived back onboard ?ight on 200 1 107/2 1.