February  23,  2015   An  Open  Letter  to  Members  of  Parliament  on  Bill  C-­‐51   Dear  Members  of  Parliament,   Please   accept   this   collective,   open   letter   as   an   expression   of   the   signatories’   deep   concern   that   Bill   C-­‐51   (which  the  government  is  calling  the  Anti-­‐terrorism  Act,  2015)  is  a  dangerous  piece  of  legislation  in  terms   of  its  potential  impacts  on  the  rule  of  law,  on  constitutionally  and  internationally  protected  rights,  and   on  the  health  of  Canada’s  democracy.       Beyond  that,  we  note  with  concern  that  knowledgeable  analysts  have  made  cogent  arguments  not  only   that  Bill  C-­‐51  may  turn  out  to  be  ineffective  in  countering  terrorism  by  virtue  of  what  is  omitted  from  the   bill,  but  also  that  Bill  C-­‐51  could  actually  be  counter-­‐productive  in  that  it  could  easily  get  in  the  way  of   effective  policing,  intelligence-­‐gathering  and  prosecutorial  activity.    In  this  respect,  we  wish  it  to  be  clear   that  we  are  neither  “extremists”  (as  the  Prime  Minister  has  recently  labelled  the  Official  Opposition  for   its  resistance  to  Bill  C-­‐51)  nor  dismissive  of  the  real  threats  to  Canadians’  security  that  government  and   Parliament  have  a  duty  to  protect.  Rather,  we  believe  that  terrorism  must  be  countered  in  ways  that  are   fully  consistent  with  core  values  (that  include  liberty,  non-­‐discrimination,  and  the  rule  of  law),  that  are   evidence-­‐based,  and  that  are  likely  to  be  effective.     The   scope   and   implications   of   Bill   C-­‐51   are   so   extensive   that   it   cannot   be,   and   is   not,   the   purpose   of   this   letter  to  itemize  every  problem  with  the  bill.    Rather,  the  discussion  below  is  an  effort  to  reflect  a  basic   consensus   over   some   (and   only   some)   of   the   leading   concerns,   all   the   while   noting   that   any   given   signatory’s  degree  of  concern  may  vary  item  by  item.  Also,  the  absence  of  a  given  matter  from  this  letter   is  not  meant  to  suggest  it  is  not  also  a  concern.     We  are  grateful  for  the  service  to  informed  public  debate  and  public  education  provided,  since  Bill  C-­‐51   was  tabled,  by  two  highly  respected  law  professors  –  Craig  Forcese  of  the  University  of  Ottawa  and  Kent   Roach  of  the  University  of  Toronto  –  who,  combined,  have  great  expertise  in  national  security  law  at  the   intersection   of   constitutional   law,   criminal   law,   international   law   and   other   sub-­‐disciplines.     What   follows   –   and   we   limit   ourselves   to   five   points   –   owes   much   to   the   background   papers   they   have   penned,  as  well  as  to  insights  from  editorials  in  the  media  and  speeches  in  the  House  of  Commons.   Accordingly,  we  urge  all  MPs  to  vote  against  Bill  C-­‐51  for  the  following  reasons:   1.   Bill   C-­‐51   enacts   a   new   security-­‐intelligence   information-­‐sharing   statute   of   vast   scope   with   no   enhanced   protections   for   privacy   and   from   abuse.   The   law   defines   “activities   that   undermine   the   security  of  Canada”  in  such  an  exceptionally  broad  way  that  “terrorism”  is  simply  one  example  of  nine   examples,  and  only  “lawful  advocacy,  protest,  dissent  and  artistic  expression”  is  excluded.    Apart  from   all  the  civil-­‐disobedience  activities  and  illegal  protests  or  strikes  that  will  be  covered  (e.g.  in  relation  to   “interference  with  critical  infrastructure”),  this  deep  and  broad  intrusion  into  privacy  is  made  worse  by   the  fact  there  are  no  corresponding  oversight  or  review  mechanisms  adequate  to  this  expansion  of  the   state’s   new   levels   of   information   awareness.   Concerns   have   already   been   expressed   by   the   Privacy   Commissioner,   an   Officer   of   Parliament,   who   has   insufficient   powers   and   resources   to   even   begin   to   oversee,   let   alone   correct   abuses   within,   this   expanded   information-­‐sharing   system.   And   there   is   virtually   nothing   in   the   bill   that   recognizes   any   lessons   learned   from   what   can   happen   when   information-­‐sharing   ends   up   in   the   wrong   hands,   as   when   the   RCMP   supplied   poor   information   to   US   authorities  that  in  turn  led  to  the  rendition  of  Maher  Arar  to  Syria  and  his  subsequent  torture  based  on   that  –  and  further  –  information  coming  from  Canada.     2.  Bill  C-­‐51  enacts  a  new  “terrorism”  offence  that  makes  it  criminal  to  advocate  or  encourage  “terrorism   offences   in   general”   where   one   does   this   being   reckless   as   to   whether   the   communication   “may”   contribute  to  someone  else  deciding  to  commit  another  terrorism  offence.    It  is  overbroad,  unnecessary   in   view   of   current   criminal   law,   and   potentially   counter-­‐productive.   Keep   in   mind   how   numerous   and   broad   are   the   existing   terrorism   offences   in   the   Criminal   Code,   some   of   which   go   beyond   what   the   ordinary   citizen   imagines   when   they   think   of   terrorism   and   all   of   which   already   include   the   general   criminal-­‐law   prohibitions   on   counselling,   aiding   and   abetting,   conspiring,   and   so   on:   advocacy   or   encouragement  of  any  of  these  “in  general”  could  attract  prosecution  under  the  new  C-­‐51  offence.  Note   as   well   that   gestures   and   physical   symbols   appear   to   be   caught,   and   not   just   verbal   or   written   exhortations.     In   media   commentary   and   reports,   there   have   been   many   examples   of   what   could   be   caught,   including  in   some   contexts  advocacy   of   armed   revolution   and   rebellion   in   other   countries  (e.g.   if   C-­‐51   had   been   the   law   when   thousands   of  Canadians   advocated  support   for   Nelson   Mandela’s   African   National  Congress  in  its  efforts  to  overthrow  apartheid  by  force  of  arms,  when  that  was  still  part  of  the   ANC’s   strategy).   So,   the   chill   for   freedom   of   speech   is   real.   In   addition,   in   a   context   in   which   direct   incitement  to  terrorist  acts  (versus  of  “terrorism  offences  in  general”)  is  already  a  crime  in  Canada,  this   vague   and   sweeping   extension   of   the   criminal   law   seems   unjustified   in   terms   of   necessity  –   and   indeed,   the   Prime   Minister   during   Question   Period   has   been   unable   or   unwilling   to   give   examples   of   what   conduct  he  would  want  to  see  criminalized  now  that  is  not  already  prohibited  by  the  Criminal  Code.    But,   perhaps  most  worrying  is  how  counter-­‐productive  this  new  crime  could  be.    De-­‐radicalization  outreach   programs   could   be   negatively   affected.     Much   anti-­‐radicalization   work   depends   on   frank   engagement   of   authorities   like   the   RCMP,   alongside   communities   and   parents,   with   youth   who   hold   extreme   views,   including   some   views   that,   if   expressed   (including   in   private),   would   contravene   this   new   prohibition.   Such   outreach   may   require   “extreme   dialogue”   in   order   to   work   through   the   misconceptions,   anger,   hatred   and   other   emotions   that   lead   to   radicalization.   If   C-­‐51   is   enacted,   these   efforts   could   find   themselves   stymied   as   local   communities   and   parents   receive   advice   that,   if   youth   participating   in   these   efforts   say   what   they   think,   they   could   be   charged   with   a   crime.     As   a   result,   the   RCMP   may   cease   to   be   invited   in   at   all,   or,   if   they   are,   engagement   will   be   fettered   by   restraint   that   defeats   the   underlying   methods  of  the  programme.    And  the  counter-­‐productive  impact  could  go  further.  The  Prime  Minister   himself  confirmed  he  would  want  the  new  law  used  against  young  people  sitting  in  front  of  computers  in   their   family   basements,   youth   who   can   express   extreme   views   on   social-­‐media   platforms.     Why   is   criminalization  counter-­‐productive  here?  As  a  National  Post  editorial  pointed  out,  the  result  of  Bill  C-­‐51   could   easily   be   that   one   of   the   best   sources   of   intelligence   for   possible   future   threats   –   public   social-­‐ media  platforms  –  could  dry  up;  that  is,  extreme  views  will  go  silent  because  of  fears  of  being  charged.   This   undercuts   the   usefulness   of   these   platforms   for   monitoring   and   intelligence   that   lead   to   knowing   not   only   who   warrants   further   investigative   attention   but   also   whether   early   intervention   in   the   form   of   de-­‐radicalization  outreach  efforts  are  called  for.     3.   Bill   C-­‐51   would   allow   CSIS   to   move   from   its   central   current   function   –   information-­‐gathering   and   associated  surveillance  with  respect  to  a  broad  area  of  “national  security”  matters  –  to  being  a  totally   different   kind   of   agency   that   now   may   actively   intervene   to   disrupt   activities   by   a   potentially   infinite   range   of   unspecified   measures,   as   long   as   a   given   measure   falls   shy   of   causing   bodily   harm,   infringements  on  sexual  integrity  or  obstructions  of  justice.    CSIS  agents  can  do  this  activity  both  inside   and   outside   Canada,   and   they   can   call   on   any   entity   or   person   to   assist   them.   There   are   a   number   of   reasons  to  be  apprehensive  about  this  change  of  role.  One  only  has  to  recall  that  the  CSIS  Act  defines   “threats   to   the   security   of   Canada”   so   broadly   that   CSIS   already   considers   various   environmental   and   Aboriginal  movements  to  be  subject  to  their  scrutiny;  that  is  to  say,  this  new  disruption  power  goes  well   beyond   anything   that   has   any   connection   at   all   to   “terrorism”   precisely   because   CSIS’   mandate   in   the   CSIS   Act   goes   far   beyond   a   concern   only   with   terrorism.     However,   those   general   concerns   expressed,   we   will   now   limit   ourselves   to   the   following   serious   problem:   how   Bill   C-­‐51   seems   to   display   a   complete   misunderstanding  of  the  role  of  judges  in  our  legal  system  and  constitutional  order.  Under  C-­‐51,  judges   may  now  be  asked  to  give  warrants  to  allow  for  disruption  measures  that  contravene  Canadian  law  or   the  Charter,  a  role  that  goes  well  beyond  the  current  contexts  in  which  judges  now  give  warrants  (e.g.   surveillance   warrants   and   search   and   seizure   warrants)   where   a   judge’s   role   is   to   ensure   that   these   investigative   measures   are   “reasonable”   so   as   not   to   infringe   section   8   of   the   Canadian   Charter   of   Rights.   What   C-­‐51   now   does   is   turn   judges   into   agents   of   the   executive   branch   (here,   CSIS)   to   pre-­‐ authorize   violations   of   Canadian   law   and,   even,   to   pre-­‐authorize   infringements   of   almost   any   Charter   right   as   long   as   C-­‐51   limits   –   bodily   harm,   sexual   integrity   and   obstruction   of   justice   –   are   respected.     This  completely  subverts  the  normal  role  of  judges,  which  is  to  assess  whether  measures  prescribed  by   law  or  taken  in  accordance  with  discretion  granted  by  statute  infringed  rights  -­‐-­‐  and,  if  they  did,  whether   the  Charter  has  been  violated  because  the  infringement  cannot  be  justified  under  the  Charter’s  section   1  limitation  clause.    Now,  a  judge  can  be  asked  (indeed,  required)  to  say  yes  in  advance  to  measures  that   could  range  from  wiping  a  target’s  computer  clear  of  all  information  to  fabricating  materials  (or  playing   agent-­‐provocateur  roles)  that  discredit  a  target  in  ways  that  cause  others  no  longer  to  trust  him,  her  or   it:  and  these  examples  are  possibly  at  the  mild  end  of  what  CSIS  may  well  judge  as  useful  “disruption”   measures   to   employ.     It   is   also   crucial   to   note   that   CSIS   is   authorized   to   engage   in   any   measures   it   chooses  if  it,  CSIS,  judges  that  the  measure  would  not  be  “contrary”  to  any  Canadian  law  or  would  not   “contravene”   the   Charter.   Thus,   it   is   CSIS   that   judges   whether   to   even   go   to   a   judge.     There   is   reason   to   be   worried   about   how   unregulated   (even   by   courts)   this   new   CSIS   disruption   power   would   be,   given   the   evidence  that  CSIS  has  in  the  past  hidden  information  from  its  review  body,  SIRC,  and  given  that  a  civil-­‐ servant   whistleblower   has   revealed   that,   in   a   parallel   context,   Ministers   of   Justice   in   the   Harper   government  have  directed  Department  of  Justice  lawyers  to  conclude  that  the  Minister  can  certify  under   the  Department  of  Justice  Act  that  a  law  is  in  compliance  with  the  Charter  if  there  is  a  mere  5%  chance  a   court  would  uphold  the  law  if  it  was  challenged  in  court.  Finally,  it  is    crucial  to  add  that  these  warrant   proceedings   will   take   place   in   secret,   with   only   the   government   side   represented,   and   no   prospect   of   appeal.  Warrants  will  not  be  disclosed  to  the  target  and,  unlike  police  investigations,  CSIS  activities  do   not  culminate  in  court  proceedings  where  state  conduct  is  then  reviewed.       4.   We   now   draw   attention   to   effectiveness   by   noting   a   key   omission   from   C-­‐51.     As   the   Official   Opposition  noted  in  its  “reasoned  amendment”  when  it  moved  that  C-­‐51  not  be  given  Second  Reading,   Bill  C-­‐51  does  not  include  “the  type  of  concrete,  effective  measures  that  have  been  proven  to  work,  such   as   working   with   communities    on   measures   to   counter   radicalization   of   youth   –   may   even   undermine   outreach.”     This   speaks   for   itself,   and   we   will   not   elaborate   beyond   saying   that,   within   a   common   commitment   to   countering   terrorism,   effective   measures   of   the   sort   referenced   in   the   reasoned   amendment   not   only   are   necessary   but   also   must   be   vigorously   pursued   and   well-­‐funded.   The   government  made  no  parallel  announcements  alongside  Bill  C-­‐51  that  would  suggest  that  these  sort  of   measures  are  anywhere  near  the  priority  they  need  to  be.   5.   Finally,   the   defects   noted   in   points   1,   2   and   3   (information-­‐sharing,   criminalizing   expression,   and   disruption)   are   magnified   by   the   overarching   lack   of   anything   approaching   adequate   oversight   and   review  functions,  at  the     same  time  as  existing  accountability  mechanisms  have  been  weakened  and  in   some   cases   eliminated   in   recent   years.   Quite   simply,   Bill   C-­‐51   continues   the   government’s   resolute   refusal   to   respond   to   10   years   of   calls   for   adequate   and   integrated   review   of   intelligence   and   related   security-­‐state   activities,   which   was   first   (and   perhaps   best)   articulated   by   Justice   O’Connor   in   a   dedicated   volume   in   his   report   on   what   had   happened   to   Maher   Arar.     Only   last   week,   former   prime   ministers   and   premiers   wrote   an   open   letter   saying   that   a   bill   like   C-­‐51   cannot   be   enacted   absent   the   kind   of   accountability   processes   and   mechanisms   that   will   catch   and   hopefully   prevent   abuses   of   the   wide  new  powers  CSIS  and  a  large  number  of  partner  agencies  will  now  have  (note  that  CSIS  can  enlist   other   agencies   and   any   person   in   its   disruption   activities   and   the   information-­‐sharing   law   concerns   over   a  dozen  other  government  agencies  besides  CSIS).  Even  if  one  judged  all  the  new  CSIS  powers  in  C-­‐51  to   be   justified,   they   must   not   be   enacted   without   proper   accountability.     Here,   we   must   note   that   the   government’s   record   has   gone   in   the   opposite   direction   from   enhanced   accountability.     Taking   CSIS   alone,  the  present  government  weakened  CSIS’  accountability  by  getting  rid  of  an  oversight  actor,  the   Inspector  General,  whose  job  was  to  keep  the  Minister  of  Public  Security  on  top  of  CSIS  activity  in  real   time.     It   transferred   this   function   to   CSIS’   review   body,   the   Security   Intelligence   Review   Committee   (SIRC),   which   does   not   have   anything   close   to   the   personnel   or   resources   to   carry   this   function   out   –   given  it  does  not  have  sufficient  staff  and  resources  to  carry  out  its  existing  mandate  to  ensure  CSIS  acts   within   the   law.     Beyond   staff,   we   note   that   SIRC   is   a   body   that   has   for   some   time   not   been   at   a   full   complement   of   members,   even   as   the   government   continues   to   make   no   apology   for   having   once   appointed  as  SIRC’s  Chair  someone  with  no  qualifications  (and  it  turns  out,  no  character)  to  be  on  SIRC   let   alone   to   be   its   chair   (Arthur   Porter).     And,   as   revealed   in   a   recent   CBC   investigation,   the   government   has   simply   not   been   straight   with   Canadians   when   it   constantly   says   SIRC   is   a   robust   and   well-­‐resourced   body:   its   budget   is   a   mere   $3   million,   which   has   flat-­‐lined   since   2005   when   the   budget   was   $2.9   million,   even  as  its  staff  has  been  cut  from  20  in  2005  to  17  now.    Without  an  integrated  security-­‐intelligence   review   mechanism,   which   should   also   include   some   form   of   Parliamentary   oversight   and/or   review,   and   with  especially  SIRC  (with  jurisdiction  only  over  CSIS)  not  a  fully  effective  body,  we  are  of  the  view  that   no  MP  should  in  good  conscience  be  voting  for  Bill  C-­‐51.     Above,  we  have  limited  ourselves  to  five  central  concerns,  but  it  is  important  to  reiterate  that  some  or   all   of   the   signatories   have   serious   concerns   about   a   good   number   of   other   aspects   of   C-­‐51   –   and/or   about  detailed  aspects  of  some  of  the  concerns  that  were  generally  expressed  in  the  above  five  points.     The  following  are  some  (but  only  some)  of  those  concerns,  in  point  form.  They  are  included  by  way  of   saying   that   signatories   believe   these   all   need   to   be   looked   at   closely   and   rigorously   during   House   of   Commons  committee  study  of  C-­‐51,  now  that  it  has  passed  Second  Reading:   -­‐     C-­‐51   radically   lowers   the   threshold   for   preventive   detention   and   imposition  of   recognizance   with   conditions   on   individuals.     Only   three   years   ago,   Parliament   enacted   a   law   saying   this   detention/conditions   regime   can   operate   if   there   is   a   reasonable   basis   for   believing   a   person   “will”  commit  a  terrorist  offence.    Now,  that  threshold  has  been  lowered  to  “may.”    There  has   been   a   failure   of   the   government   to   explain   why   exactly   the   existing   power   has   not   been   adequate.   In   light   of   the   huge   potential   for   abuse   of   such   a   low   threshold,   including   through   wide-­‐scale   use   (recalling   the   mass   arrests   at   the   time   of   the   War   Measures   Act   in   Quebec),   Canadians   and   parliamentarians   need   to   know   why   extraordinary   new   powers   are   needed,   especially  when  the  current  ones  were  enacted  in  the  context  of  ongoing  threats  by  al-­‐Qaeda  to   carry  out  attacks  in  Canada  that  seem  no  less  serious  than  the  ones  currently  being  threatened   by  entities  like  ISIS  and  al-­‐Shabab.     -­‐  C-­‐51  expands  the  no-­‐fly  list  regime.  It  seems  to  have  simply  replicated  the  US  no-­‐fly  list  rules,   the   operation   of   which   has   been   widely   criticized   in   terms   of   its   breadth   and   impacts   on   innocent  people.  Is  this  the  right  regime  for  Canada?     -­‐    C-­‐51’s  new  disruption  warrants  now  allows  CSIS  to  impinge  on  the  RCMP’s  law  enforcement   role,   bringing   back   turf   wars   that   were   eliminated   when   intelligence   and   law   enforcement   were   separated   in   the   wake   of   the   RCMP’s   abusive   disruption   activities   of   the   late   1960s   and   early   1970s.  But,  even  more  important  than  turf  wars  is  the  potential  for  CSIS  behaviour  in  the  form   of   disruptive   measures   to   undermine   both   the   investigation   and   the   prosecution   of   criminal   cases  by  interfering  with  evidentiary  trail,  contaminating  evidence,  and  so  on.   -­‐   C-­‐51,   in   tandem   with   C-­‐44,   permits   CSIS   to   engage   not   just   in   surveillance   and   information-­‐ gathering   abroad,   but   also   in   disruption.   There   are   many   questions   about   how   this   will   work.   The   danger   of   lawlessness   seems   to   be   significantly   greater   for   CSIS   activities   abroad,   in   that   CSIS   only   needs   to   seek   approval   for   disruption   under   C-­‐51   where   Canadian,   not   foreign,   law   could   be   breached   or   where   the   Charter   could   be   contravened   (with   Canadian   law   on   the   application  of  the  Charter  outside  Canada  being  quite  unclear  at  the  moment).  And  there  is  no   duty  for  CSIS  to  coordinate  with  or  seek  approval  from  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  such   that   the   chances   of   interference   with   the   conduct   of   Canada’s   foreign   affairs   cannot   be   discounted.  Nor  can  we  ignore  the  likely  tendency  for  disruption  measures  abroad  to  be  more   threatening   to   individuals’   rights   than   in   Canada:   for   example,   Parliament   needs   to   know   whether   CSIS   agents   abroad   can   engage   in   detention   and   rendition   to   agencies   of   other   countries  under  the  new  C-­‐51  regime.   We   end   by   observing   that   this   letter   is   dated   February   23,   2015,   which   is   also   the   day   when   the   government   has   chosen   to   cut   off   Second   Reading   debate   on   Bill   C-­‐51   after   having   allocated   a   mere   three   days   (in   reality,   only   portions   of   each   of   those   days)   to   debate.   In   light   of   the   sweeping   scope   and   great   importance   of   this   bill,   we   believe   that   circumventing   the   ability   of   MPs   to   dissect   the   bill,   and   their   responsibility   to   convey   their   concerns   to   Canadians   at   large   before   a   Second   Reading   vote,   is   a   troubling   undermining   of   our   Parliamentary   democracy’s   capacity   to   hold   majority   governments   accountable.  It  is  sadly  ironic  that  democratic  debate  is  being  curtailed  on  a  bill  that  vastly  expands  the   scope   of   covert   state   activity   when   that   activity   will   be   subject   to   poor   or   even   non-­‐existent   democratic   oversight  or  review.   In  conclusion,  we  urge  all  Parliamentarians  to  ensure  that  C-­‐51  not  be  enacted  in  anything  resembling  its   present  form.   Yours  sincerely,   Abell   Jennie   Attaran   Amir   Bakht   Natasha   Bangsund   Clayton   Associate  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Common  Law,  University  of   Ottawa     Associate   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Common  Law  ,  University  of    Ottawa   Associate  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Common  Law,  University  of   Ottawa   Assistant  Professor,  College  of  Law,  University  of  Saskatchewan   Beare   Margaret   Professor  of  Law  and  Sociology,  York  University   Bhabha   Faisal   Assistant  Professor,  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School,  York  University   Bond   Jennifer   Bouclin   Suzanne   Assistant  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Common  Law,  University  of   Ottawa   Assistant  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Civil  Law,  University  of  Ottawa   Boyd   Susan   Buhler   Sarah   Busby   Karen   Byers   Michael   Cameron   Angela   Chapdelaine   Pascale   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Manitoba,  and  Director,   Centre  for  Human  Rights  Research   Professor  and  Canada  Research  Chair,  Global  Politics  and   International  Law,  University  of  British  Columbia   Associate  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Common  Law,  University  of   Ottawa   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Windsor   Chartrand   Larry   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Common  Law,  University  of  Ottawa   Christians   Allison   Cossman   Brenda   H.  Heward  Stikeman  Chair  in  Tax  Law,  Faculty  of  Law,  McGill   University   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Toronto   Professor,  Peter  A.  Allard  School  of  Law,  University  of  British   Columbia   Assistant  Professor,  College  of  Law,  University  of  Saskatchewan   Coughlan   Stephen   Professor,  Schulich  School  of  Law,  Dalhousie  University   Crépeau   François   Cyr   Hugo   Hans  &  Tamar  Openheimer  Professor  in  Public  International  Law,   Faculty  of  Law,  McGill  University   Professor  of  Law,  University  of  Quebec  in  Montreal   Dalton   Jennifer  E.   Deckha   Maneesha   Assistant  Professor,  School  of  Public  Policy  and  Administration,  York   University   Associate  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Victoria   Desrosiers   Julie   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  Laval   Dietsch   Peter   Douglas   Stacy   Drummond   Susan   Associate  Professor,  Department  of  Philosophy,  University  of   Montreal   Assistant  Professor,  Department  of  Law  &  Legal  Studies,  Carleton   University   Associate  Professor  of  Law,  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School,  York  University   Duplessis   Isabelle   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Montreal   Farson   Stuart   Adjunct  Professor,  Political  Science,  Simon  Fraser  University   Ferguson   Gerry   Distinguished  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Victoria   Findlay   Leonard   Flood   Colleen   Gélinas   Fabien   Professor,  College  of  Arts  and  Science,  University  of  Saskatchewan,   and  Director,  Humanities  Research  Unit   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Ottawa;  Research  Chair  in   Health  Law  &  Policy   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  McGill  University   Gilbert   Daphne   Girgis   Jassmine   Grant   Isabel   Grégoire   Marie  Annik   Henderson   Sakej   Hernández   Gleider  I.   Professor,  University  of  Saskatchewan,  Research  Director,  Native  Law   Centre  of  Canada   Senior  Lecturer  in  Public  International  Law,  Durham  Law  School   Hewitt   Steve   Senior  Lecturer,  Department  of  History,  University  of  Birmingham   Associate  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Common  Law,  University  of   Ottawa   Associate  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Calgary   Professor,  Peter  A.  Allard  School  of  Law,  University  of  British   Columbia   Associate  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Montreal   Hodgson   Louis-­‐Philippe   Associate  Professor,  Department  of  Philosophy,  York  University   Hoehn   Felix   Assistant  Professor,  College  of  Law,  University  of  Saskatchewan   Hughes   Jula   Associate  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  New  Brunswick   Hutchinson   Allan   Imai   Shin   Distinguished  Research  Professor  of  Law,  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School,   York  University   Associate  Professor  of  Law,  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School,  York  University   Jackman   Martha   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Ottawa   Johnson   Juliet   Associate  Professor,  Political  Science,  McGill  University   Johnson   Rebecca   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Victoria   Kalajdzic   Jasminka   Associate  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Windsor   Kamphuis   Charis   Assistant  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  Thompson  Rivers  University   Keyes   John   Adjunct  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Ottawa   Kianieff   Muharem   Associate  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Windsor   King   Jeff   Senior  Lecturer,  Faculty  of  Laws,  University  College  London   Koshan   Jennifer   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Calgary   Larocque   François  J.   Lafontaine   Fannie   Lampron   Louis-­‐Philippe   Associate  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Common  Law,  University  of   Ottawa   Associate  Professor,  Canada  Research  Chair  on  International   Criminal  Justice  and  Human  Rights,  University  Laval   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  Laval  University   LaViolette   Nicole   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Common  Law,  University  of  Ottawa   Leclair   Jean   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Montreal   Levy   Ed   Retired  Professor  of  Philosophy,  University  of  British  Columbia   Lewis   Brian   Professor  of  History,  McGill  University   Liew   Jamie   Assistant  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Common  Law,  University  of   Ottawa   Lu   Catherine   Associate  Professor,  Political  Science,  McGill  University   Macklin   Audrey   MacLachlan   Alice   Professor  of  Law  and  Chair  in  Human  Rights  Law,  Faculty  of  Law,   University  of  Toronto   Associate  Professor,  Philosophy,  York  University   Magnusson   Warren   Professor,  Department  of  Political  Science,  University  of  Victoria   Mahoney   Kathleen   Manikis   Marie   Professor  of  Law,  University  of  Calgary;  Fellow  of  the  Royal  Society  of   Canada   Assistant  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  McGill  University   Manwaring   John   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Common  Law,  University  of  Ottawa   Marin   Michael   Assistant  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Common  Law,  University  of  Ottawa   Mayeda   Graham   Associate  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Common  Law,  University  of  Ottawa   McIntyre   Sheila   Professor  Emerita,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Common  Law,  University  of  Ottawa   M'Gonigle   Michael   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Victoria   Milton   Cynthia   Associate  Professor,  Department  of  History,  University  of  Montreal   Moon   Richard   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Windsor   Mossman   Mary  Jane   Professor  of  Law,  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School,  York  University   Mummé   Claire   Assistant  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Windsor   Mykitiuk   Roxanne   Associate  Professor  of  Law,  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School,  York  University   Noreau   Pierre   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Montreal   O'Toole   Darren   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Ottawa   Panaccio   Charles-­‐Maxime   Associate  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Ottawa   Penney   Steven   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Alberta   Reaume   Denise   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Toronto   Resnick   Philip   Professor  Emeritus,  Political  Science,  University  of  British  Columbia   Robinson   Darryl   Associate  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  Queen's  University   Robitaille   David   Rodgers   Sanda   Professor  of  Constitutional  Law,  University  of  Ottawa  and  trustee  at     the  Quebec  Center  for  Environmental  Law   Professor  Emerita,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Ottawa   Ryder   Bruce   Saberi   Hengameh   Sandborn   Calvin   Savit   Steven   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Victoria,  Legal  Director,     UVic  Environmental  Law  Centre   Professor,  Department  of  Philosophy,  University  of  British  Columbia   Schulz   Jennifer   Associate  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Manitoba   Scott   Dayna   Semple   Noel   Associate  Professor  of  Law,  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School,  York  University,  and   Graduate  Program  Director   Assistant  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Windsor   Shaffer   Martha   Associate  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Toronto   Sheehy   Elizabeth   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Common  Law,  University  of  Ottawa   Sheptycki   James   Stewart   James   Professor  of  Criminology,  Faculty  of  Liberal  Arts  and  Professional  Studies,     York  University   Assistant  Professor,  Peter  A.  Allard  School  of  Law,  University  of  British  Columbia   Stuart   Donald   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  Queen's  University   Sylvestre   Marie-­‐Eve   Tanguay-­‐ Renaud   Tanovich   François   David   Associate  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Civil  Law,  University  of  Ottawa,  and   Vice-­‐Dean,  Research  and  Communications    Associate  Professor  of  Law,  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School,  York  University,  and   Director,  Nathanson  Centre  on  Transnational  Human  Rights,  Crime  and  Security   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Windsor   Tappolet   Christine   Professor,  Department  of  Philosophy,  University  of  Montreal   Templeton   Saul   Assistant  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Calgary   Trapp   Kimberley  N.   Van  Harten   Gus   Senior  Lecturer  in  International  Law,  Faculty  of  Laws,     University  College  London   Associate  Professor  of  Law,  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School,  York  University   Associate  Professor  of  Law,  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School,  York  University,     And  Academic  Director,  Anti-­‐Discrimination  Intensive  Program   Assistant  Professor  of  Law,  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School,  York  University       Vandervort   Lucinda   Professor,  College  of  Law,  University  of  Saskatchewan   Waluchow   Wilfrid   Waters   Christopher   Professor,  Senator  William  McMaster  Chair  in  Constitutional  Studies,     Department  of  Philosophy,  McMaster  University   Professor,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Windsor   Pue   Wesley   Professor,  Peter  A.  Allard  School  of  Law,  University  of  British  Columbia   Whitaker   Reg   Wiseman   David   Distinguished  Research  Professor  Emeritus,  York  University,  and     Adjunct  Professor  of  Political  Science,  University  of  Victoria   Assistant  Professor,  Faculty  of  Law  –  Common  Law,  University  of  Ottawa   Wood   Stepan   Professor,  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School,  York  University