SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO
2 East 14th Avenue
Denver, Colorado 80203
Appeal from the District Court
Water Division 2, Case No. 09CW142
Water Division 1, Case No. 09CW272
Water Division 5, Case No. 09CW186
Opposers-Appellants:
GRAND VALLEY WATER USERS
ASSOCIATION; ORCHARD MESA
IRRIGATION DISTRICT; UTE WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT ACTING BY AND
THROUGH THE UTE WATER ACTIVITY
ENTERPRISE; COLORADO RIVER WATER
CONSERVATION DISTRICT; BASALT WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT; BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF EAGLE
COUNTY; BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF PITKIN COUNTY; DICK
WOLFE, P.E., STATE ENGINEER; DAVID L.
NETTLES, DIVISION ENGINEER FOR WATER
DIVISION 1; STEVE WITTE, DIVISION
ENGINEER FOR WATER DIVISION 2; AND
ALAN MARTALLARO, P.E., DIVISION
ENGINEER FOR WATER DIVISION 5;
v.
Applicant-Appellee:
BUSK-IVANHOE, INC., a Colorado Corporation

              
  
                     
                          
           !        " " 

COURT USE ONLY

_____________________
Case Number:
2014SA303

 Attorneys for Opposer-Appellee Southeastern
Colorado Water Conservancy District
Name:
Address:

Telephone:
Facsimile:
E-mails:

Stephen H. Leonhardt (#15122)
Spencer W. Williams (#45000)
BURNS, FIGA & WILL, P.C.
6400 South Fiddler’s Green Circle,
Suite 1000
Greenwood Village, CO 80111
(303) 796-2626
(303) 796-2777
sleonhardt@bfw-law.com;
swilliams@bfwlaw.com
ANSWER BRIEF

 C.A.R. 32 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that this brief complies with all requirements of C.A.R. 28
and C.A.R. 32, including all formatting requirements set forth in these rules.
Specifically, the undersigned certifies that:
The brief complies with C.A.R. 28(g).
It does not exceed 30 pages.
The brief complies with C.A.R. 28(k).
For the party responding to the issue:
It contains, under a separate heading, a statement of whether such party
agrees with the opponent’s statements concerning the standard of review and
preservation for appeal, and if not, why not.
I acknowledge that my brief may be stricken if it fails to
comply with any of the requirements of CAR 28 and CAR 32.
Original signature at the offices of
Burns, Figa & Will, P.C.
s/
Stephen H. Leonhardt

 TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.......................................................1

II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................1
A.

Nature of the case and the course of proceedings...............................1

B.

Statement of the Facts ......................................................................2

III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..................................................................5

IV.

ARGUMENT............................................................................................5

V.

A.

Standard of Review..........................................................................5

B.

The Water Court’s Order did not address the jurisdiction
of pre-1969 District Courts to adjudicate transmountain
water rights for uses that may include storage in the
importing basin ...............................................................................6

C.

Southeastern’s transmountain and storage water rights
for the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project were correctly decreed
by District Courts in the appropriate river basins under
the Adjudication Act of 1943 ...........................................................7

CONCLUSION....................................................................................... 15

i

 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Burlington Ditch Reservoir and Land Co. v. Metro Wastewater
Reclamation Dist., 256 P.3d 645, (Colo. 2011)..................................................5
Pueblo West Metro. Dist. v. Southeastern Colorado Water
Conservancy Dist., 689 P.2d 594, (Colo. 1984) ........................................... 4, 13
STATUTES
C.R.S. §§ 37-45-101 ...........................................................................................2
HISTORICAL STATUTES
Adjudication Act of 1943, Act of Apr. 19, 1943,
ch. 190, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 613............................................... 3, 8, 9, 10, 11
1921 Compiled Laws of Colorado, § 1752 ...........................................................9
1921 Compiled Laws of Colorado, § 1755 ..................................................... 9, 11
1921 Compiled Laws of Colorado, § 1756 ...........................................................9
1921 Compiled Laws of Colorado, § 1760 ..................................................... 9, 10
Section 3807, Mills Ann. Stat. (1930) ................................................................. 6
Public Law 87-590, 76 Stat. 389 (1962) ...............................................................4

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Hobbs, "Colorado’s 1969 Adjudication and Administration Act:
Settling In," in The Public’s Water Resource 91, (2d ed. 2010) ..........................8

ii

 Opposer-Appellee Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District
(“Southeastern”) submits this Answer Brief.
I.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This Answer Brief addresses the following issue:
A.

Whether the water court erred in ruling that transmountain water may

be stored in the basin of import for later use without a decreed storage right.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case and the course of proceedings.

Southeastern generally adopts the Statement of Case set forth in the Answer
Brief of Applicant, Busk-Ivanhoe, Inc. (“Applicant” or “B-I”), and adds the
following statement regarding Southeastern’s interest as a party.
Southeastern filed a statement of opposition to B-I’s application in Water
Divisions 2 and 5, in order to protect Southeastern’s water rights and interest in
operation of the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project. Southeastern entered into a
settlement stipulation with B-I on December 13, 2011, and a later supplemental
stipulation, in which Southeastern consented to the entry of a decree consistent
with the Decree ultimately entered by the Division 2 water court (“Water Court”).
Southeastern continued to monitor the case as a party, consistent with its
stipulations, but did not participate at trial. Southeastern participates in this appeal
1

 primarily to respond to the characterization of Southeastern’s water rights decrees
in Grand County’s Amicus Curiae Brief.
B.

Statement of the Facts

Southeastern generally adopts the Statement of Facts in B-I’s Answer Brief,
and adds the following facts relevant to Southeastern’s interest in this appeal.
Like B-I, Southeastern holds decreed rights to divert water from the Roaring
Fork River drainage on Colorado’s Western Slope into the Arkansas River basin
on the Eastern Slope. Southeastern is a statutory water conservancy district (see
C.R.S. §§ 37-45-101, et seq.), which includes within its boundaries most of the
municipalities and irrigated land in nine counties in the Arkansas River Valley in
Colorado. Southeastern holds all water rights for, administers, and repays
reimbursable costs of the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project (“Project”), authorized by
Congress in 1962. 1 Southeastern holds decreed rights for transmountain water,
which the Project carries under the Continental Divide from the Fryingpan and
Roaring Fork River drainages in western Colorado into the Arkansas River

1

The relationship between the United States and Southeastern in operating the
Project is defined by the authorizing legislation for the Project, the Project
Operating Principles, and the Repayment Contract between the United States and
Southeastern.
2

 drainage. The Project water decrees authorize use, reuse and successive use to
extinction of all transmountain Project water within Southeastern’s boundaries.
Water rights for the primary components of the Project were originally
decreed in three separate proceedings in the District Courts for Garfield County,
Chaffee County, and Pueblo County, pursuant to the Adjudication Act of 1943 (the
“1943 Act”) (relevant sections attached as Appendix A). Act of Apr. 19, 1943,
ch. 190, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 613. The supplemental decree in Civil Action No.
4613, Garfield County District Court (“C.A. 4613 Decree”) (Exhibit 4 to Grand
County’s Amicus Brief (“Amicus Brief”)), entered on August 3, 1959, awards
Southeastern a priority in Water District 38 to divert water from the Fryingpan
River and several tributary streams for conveyance to the Arkansas River basin
through the Fryingpan-Arkansas Divide Tunnel (now known as the Boustead
Tunnel). One of Southeastern’s decreed water rights is for diversion from Ivanhoe
Creek, downstream from the Busk-Ivanhoe System and Carlton Tunnel.
Southeastern’s priority under the C.A. 4613 Decree is junior to B-I’s rights, having
been decreed in a later supplemental adjudication of priorities in Water District 38.
The C.A. 4613 Decree also describes Sugar Loaf Reservoir (now Turquoise
Reservoir), Twin Lakes Reservoir, and Pueblo Reservoir, as the “situs of storage
for beneficial use” of waters diverted from the Fryingpan River basin pursuant to
3

 Southeastern’s Water District 38 priority. C.A. 4613 Decree, Section II,
pp. 12-14.
Southeastern obtained a separate decree from the Pueblo County District
Court in Case No. B-42135, entered June 25, 1962, that awarded a priority in
Water District 14 for diversions of native Arkansas River water for storage in
Pueblo Reservoir, and recognized Southeastern’s decreed right to store its
transmountain water in Pueblo Reservoir pursuant to the C.A. 4613 Decree. The
Chaffee County District Court entered a decree on July 9, 1969 in Civil Action
No. 5141, awarding Southeastern a priority in Water District 11 for storage of
native Arkansas River basin water in Sugar Loaf Reservoir and Twin Lakes
Reservoir, and recognizing Southeastern’s decreed right under the C.A. 4613
Decree to store its transmountain Project water in those reservoirs. 2 Like the
transmountain diversions, the East Slope storage structures are integral parts of the
Fryingpan-Arkansas Project as authorized by Congress. Public Law 87-590, 76
Stat. 389 (1962) (attached as Appendix B).

2

This Court recognized and discussed Southeastern’s interrelated decrees for the
Project’s transmountain diversions and East Slope storage structures in Pueblo
West Metro. Dist. v. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 689 P.2d
594, 602-03 (Colo. 1984),
4

 III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Water Court’s order does not raise any question concerning jurisdiction

or the validity of the decrees for the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, contrary to Grand
County’s assertion. The Water Court’s narrow conclusion on the geographic limit
of the Garfield County District Court’s authority in 1928 to adjudicate priorities for
water rights was legally and factually valid, but does not impact later decrees
adjudicating transmountain water rights that expressly describe storage in the
importing basin. Southeastern’s transmountain and storage water rights were
correctly decreed under the 1943 Act, which broadened the District Courts’
authority to address issues in water rights adjudications.
IV.

ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review

Southeastern agrees with B-I’s statement of the Standard of Review. While
this Court reviews de novo the water court’s legal conclusions, it accepts the water
court’s factual findings on appeal, unless they are so clearly erroneous as to find no
support in the record. Burlington Ditch Reservoir and Land Co. v. Metro
Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256 P.3d 645, 660-61 (Colo. 2011).

5

 B.

The Water Court’s Order did not address the jurisdiction of pre1969 District Courts to adjudicate transmountain water rights for
uses that may include storage in the importing basin.

Southeastern generally adopts the arguments set forth by Applicant in its
Answer Brief (Section I) and by Denver Water in its Answer Brief regarding the
Water Court’s decision on the lawfulness of East Slope storage of the BuskIvanhoe water rights. In its extensive findings of fact on this issue (Order at ¶ 50,
pp. 20-21, R. at 4362-63), the Water Court explained why such storage was part of
the appropriation contemplated and confirmed by the District Court’s 1928 decree,
despite the silence of the decree regarding such storage. In particular, the decreed
use of providing a supplemental water supply for irrigation of 80,000 acres in the
Arkansas River basin necessarily contemplated storage, so that the water would be
available at times when supplemental irrigation water was needed. Id. at ¶ 48,
p. 20, R. at 4362.
In explaining the silence of the 1928 decree on the question of East Slope
storage, the Water Court took note of the limited scope of the District Court’s
“authority under Colorado statutes as they existed in the 1920’s.” Id. at ¶ 50, p. 20,
R. at 4362 (citing Section 3807, Mills Ann. Stat. (1930)), providing for
adjudication of water rights only within a single irrigation district. Accordingly,
the Water Court noted, the District Court in Garfield County lacked authority to
6

 adjudicate priorities for storage of water in the Arkansas River basin, in a separate
water district and stream system. Id. at ¶ 50.a, p. 21, R. at 4363. Grand County
misconstrues and mischaracterizes this finding as a legal conclusion that the
District Court lacked jurisdiction to provide for East Slope storage in a decree
adjudicating transmountain diversion rights. See Amicus Brief, pp. 2-3 and 13.
However, the only jurisdictional issue addressed in these findings is the undisputed
proposition that an adjudication of priorities in one river basin could not include
adjudication of priorities to store native water in a different river basin. This limit
on the District Court’s authority was simply one of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the 1928 adjudication that explained why East Slope storage, while
part of the appropriator’s plan and intent in adjudicating transmountain diversion
rights for supplemental irrigation, was not explicitly described in the decree.
C.

Southeastern’s transmountain and storage water rights for the
Fryingpan-Arkansas Project were correctly decreed by District
Courts in the appropriate river basins under the Adjudication Act
of 1943.

The Water Court’s conclusions on the authority of a District Court in 1928,
under the adjudication laws then in effect, do not “call into question the validity

7

 of” Southeastern’s transmountain and storage water rights for the FryingpanArkansas Project as Grand County asserts. Amicus Brief, p. 10. 3
Southeastern’s rights were correctly decreed by District Courts in the
appropriate river basins under the 1943 Act. The 1943 Act was enacted following
entry of the 1928 decree for the Busk-Ivanhoe water rights; those rights were
decreed pursuant to the adjudication provisions of the 1921 Compiled Laws of
Colorado (“1921 Adjudication Laws”) C.L. (1921) (relevant sections attached as
Appendix C). The 1943 Act gave District Courts broad authority to address all
issues involved or connected with water rights adjudications. Southeastern’s
decrees for its transmountain and storage water rights were entered in compliance
with the 1943 Act, and within the clear authority of the issuing District Courts. See
Act of Apr. 19, 1943, ch. 190, § 2, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 613, 614.
The 1943 Act re-organized and updated the previous adjudication statutes,
expanding the authority of District Courts to address issues arising in water rights
adjudications. See HOBBS, “Colorado’s 1969 Adjudication and Administration
Act: Settling In,” in The Public’s Water Resource 91, 96-98 (2d ed. 2010)
3

Southeastern also adopts the arguments set forth by Denver Water in Section
IV.B of its Answer Brief, and by the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District in Section III of its Amicus Brief, regarding additional reasons to disregard
or reject Grand County’s improper assertions with reference to decrees outside of
the record in this appeal.
8

 (providing a summary and background of the 1943 Act). The 1921 Adjudication
Laws limited District Courts to hearing and adjudicating questions concerning the
priorities of appropriation of water between “owners of ditches” diverting water
within the water district where the District Court had jurisdiction. § 1752, C.L.
(1921) (emphasis added); see also id. § 1756 (regarding “owner or owners” of
non-irrigation rights). Consistent with this limitation, the 1921 Adjudication Laws
only allowed owners of ditches, canals, or reservoirs to file statements of claim and
petitions to adjudicate water matters before the District Courts. Id. § 1755
(describing claimants in statements of claim as those claiming ownership of any
ditch canal or reservoir); id. § 1760 (“any [] persons . . . interested as owners of
any ditch, canal, or reservoir . . . shall present to the district court . . .” a petition).
The 1943 Act abandoned this “ownership” restriction in its successor
provisions by granting the District Courts authority over water matters between
“owners and claimants of water rights,” and by allowing such owners or claimants
to file statements of claim and petitions to adjudicate rights in the District Courts.
Act of Apr. 19, 1943, ch. 190, § 2, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 613, 614 (stating that
District Courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate matters concerning the priority of
appropriation of water between owners and claimants of water rights); id. §§ 3 and
7, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 615 and 618 (stating that any owner or claimant of a
9

 water right may petition the court to initiate an adjudication); id. § 8, 1943 Colo.
Sess. Laws at 619 (requiring owners or claimants of water rights to file statements
of claim). These changes significantly broadened the District Courts’ authority to
adjudicate water rights where the claimant sought confirmation of a water-use
appropriation, but did not own in fee the physical diversion, conveyance, or
impoundment structures.
The 1943 Act also described the District Courts’ authority to hear evidence
and enter decrees in terms much more broad than the 1921 Adjudication Laws.
The 1921 Adjudication Laws limited District Courts to hearing evidence and
entering decrees determining and establishing priorities for ditches, canals, or
reservoirs in the water district over which the District Court had jurisdiction.
§ 1760, C.L. (1921). The 1921 Adjudication Laws did not provide authorization or
guidance for a District Court to address issues that were related or relevant to the
adjudication of priorities, but outside of the water district under its jurisdiction. In
contrast, the 1943 Act did not contain any evidentiary limitations, and generally
provided for District Courts to describe storage works in decrees. As a threshold
matter, the 1943 Act required that statements of claim identify the location of “any
storage works” associated with the claim, and District Courts were required to
make findings on “all pertinent matters, including findings upon all matters
10

 required to be set out in statements of claim.” Act of Apr. 19, 1943, ch. 190,
§§ 8(d) and 11, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 613, 619 and 621. The 1943 Act
specifically provided for descriptions of “the location of reservoirs and other
structures for storing water” in decrees, without limitation on the water district
where the structure was located. See id., § 13, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 622. The
1921 Adjudication Laws did require statements of claim to address “reservoirs,”
but only those over which the claimant claimed ownership and sought to adjudicate
priority. § 1755, C.L. (1921).
The 1943 Act retained the District Court’s limited authority to adjudicate
priorities within the Water District over which it had jurisdiction. But otherwise,
the 1943 Act greatly expanded the District Courts’ ability to address other
pertinent matters, including identification of storage structures associated with the
claim. Thus, the 1943 Act explains why subsequent decrees were more likely to
identify storage structures associated with a claim, even if located in a different
water district. Moreover, Southeastern agrees with Denver Water’s argument (in
Part IV.C of its Answer Brief) that due to the legal characteristics of transmountain
water, whether decreed under the 1943 Act or prior law, any description in the
decree of storage locations in the importing basin (or omission of such description)

11

 does not preclude storage at other locations in the importing basin in managing
transmountain water supplies.
The District Courts in Garfield County, Chaffee County, and Pueblo County
entered Southeastern’s decrees for the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project water rights
pursuant to the broad authority granted by the 1943 Act. The Garfield County
District Court entered the decree for Southeastern’s transmountain water rights in
Civil Action No. 4613, which granted a priority for diversions from the West Slope
for use on the East Slope, including storage in reservoirs that Southeastern had the
right to use, but did not own. The C.A. 4613 Decree adjudicated a priority for
diversions from several tributaries of the Fryingpan River by the Project’s West
Slope collection system located in Water District 38, consistent with the Garfield
County District Court’s exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate priorities within that
water district. The decree does not adjudicate any priority for diversion or storage
of water originating on the East Slope, which clearly would have been outside of
the Garfield County District Court’s jurisdiction. Rather, the C.A. 4613 Decree
describes the “situs of storage for beneficial use” in Sugarloaf, Twin Lakes, and
Turquoise Reservoirs on the East Slope in which Southeastern intended to store its
transmountain Project water pursuant to contract with the owner of those
reservoirs, the United States. C.A. 4613 Decree, Section II, pp. 12-14.
12

 Southeastern identified these East Slope storage locations in its statement of claim,
and the Garfield County District Court made findings in its decree as to the storage
locations, consistent with the specifications of the 1943 Act. Id.
In separate proceedings, the Chaffee County and Pueblo County District
Courts entered decrees on Southeastern’s claims, granting separate priorities for
storage of native Arkansas River basin water. The decree in Civil Action No. 5141
(Chaffee County) adjudicated priorities in Water District 11 for the diversion and
storage of native Arkansas River water in Sugar Loaf and Twin Lakes Reservoirs,
and recognized Southeastern’s previously decreed right to store its transmountain
sources in those reservoirs. Likewise, the decree in Case No. B-42135 (Pueblo
County) adjudicated a priority in Water District 14 to divert and store native
Arkansas River water in Pueblo Reservoir, and also acknowledged Southeastern’s
decreed right to store transmountain water in Pueblo Reservoir. 4
The Water Court’s narrow conclusion on the limits of the 1921 Adjudication
Laws does not bear on Southeastern’s water rights decreed pursuant to the 1943
Act, which significantly broadened the scope of issues that could be addressed in a
water rights adjudication. Grand County’s contention that the Water Court’s
4

This Court has held that the decrees in Case Nos. B-42135 and C.A. 5141 both
recognize and include storage of Southeastern’s transmountain water decreed in
C.A. 4613 in East Slope Project reservoirs. Pueblo West, 689 P.2d at 602-03.
13

 conclusions call into question the decrees for the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project
water rights, among other transmountain water rights decrees that address storage
in the basin of import, is unwarranted and unfounded. As described above, the
decrees for the Project water rights fit squarely within the water rights adjudication
system established by the 1943 Act. While adjudicating priorities only in the water
districts from which native water would be diverted, these decrees also provide
considerable description of the intended use of the rights, including storage of the
transmountain water in the basin of import.
Contrary to Grand County’s assertion, the differences between the Project
decrees and the Busk-Ivanhoe decree do not challenge the Water Court’s
conclusion that the 1921 Adjudication Laws’ narrow grant of authority helps to
explain the Garfield County District Court’s silence on the intended East Slope
storage of the Busk-Ivanhoe water rights. Rather, the provisions of the 1943 Act
provide reason for the inclusive descriptions of storage structures in the Arkansas
River basin in the Project’s decree that adjudicated priorities in Water District 38.
By contrast, the more limited nature of the 1921 Adjudication Law explains the
absence of a comparable description of East Slope storage in the Busk-Ivanhoe
decree. But nowhere did either the 1943 Act or previous laws require adjudication

14

 of storage rights as a prerequisite to storing transmountain water in the receiving
basin.
V.

CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the Water Court’s findings and conclusions with

regard to storage of transmountain water, and should reject Grand County’s
suggestion that part of the Water Court’s Order “calls into question” subsequent
decrees entered by district courts on the Western Slope.
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of February, 2015.
BURNS, FIGA & WILL, P.C.
**Original signature at the offices of
Burns, Figa & Will, P.C.**
By: s/
Stephen H. Leonhardt (#15122)
Spencer W. Williams (#45000)
Attorneys for Opposer-Appellee
Southeastern Colorado Water
Conservancy District

15

 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 17th day of February, 2015, a
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing ANSWER BRIEF was served on
the following via ICCES or by depositing a copy of same in the United States mail,
postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Austin C. Hamre, Esq.
John Marshall Dingess, Esq.
Ryan P. McLane, Esq.
Hamre Rodriguez Ostrander and
Dingess PC
Attorneys for Busk-Ivanhoe, Inc.

Katherine Abbott Daniels Ryan, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Paul Louis Benington, Esq.
First Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for the State and Division
Engineers

Christopher L. Geiger, Esq.
David Carl Hallford, Esq.
Scott A. Grosscup, Esq.
Balcomb & Green PC
Attorneys for Basalt Water
Conservancy District, Board of County
Commissioners of Eagle County, and
Colorado River Water Conservation
District

Anne D. Bensard, Esq.
Jennifer M. Dilalla, Esq.
Timothy James Beaton, Esq.
Wittemyer, Harrison and
Woodruff, P.C.
Attorneys for Board of County
Commissioners Pitkin County

Veronica A. Sperling, Esq.
Buchanan and Sperling, P.C.
Attorneys for Centennial Water and
Sanitation District

Casey S. Funk, Esq.
Daniel John Arnold, Esq.
Denver Water
Attorneys for Denver Water

David C. Taussig, Esq.
Mitra Marie Pemberton, Esq.
White & Jankowski, LLP
Attorneys for Amicus Grand County
Board of County Commissioners

Kirsten Marie Kurath, Esq.
Mark Allen Hermundstad, Esq.
Williams Turner and Holmes PC
Attorneys for Grand Valley Water Users
Association, Orchard Mesa Irrigation
District, and Ute Water Conservancy
District Acting by and through the Ute
Water Activity Enterprise
16

 Robert Frederick Krassa, Esq.
Krassa and Miller LLC
Attorneys for High Line Canal
Company
**Original signature at the offices of
Burns, Figa & Will, P.C.**
s/Michelle G. Trujillo
Michelle G. Trujillo

17