Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 1 of 21 PageID 39 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION CORY SEEGMILLER, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiff, vs. THE SCHOOL BOARD OF COLLIER COUNTY AND KATHLEEN CURATOLO, Case No. 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF ) ) ) Defendant(s). ) _________________________________________ ) FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL The Plaintiff, Cory Seegmiller (“Seegmiller”) files this Civil Action and respectfully request this Court to issue injunctive relief, a declaratory judgment and award damages for violations of the United States Constitution, Florida Constitution, and Florida law by Defendants, The School Board of Collier County, Florida (hereinafter “School Board” or “Board”) and Kathleen Curatalo (hereinafter “Kathleen Curatalo” or “Curatalo”) and alleges as follows: JURISDICTION 1. This is an action for injunctive relief, declaratory relief and damages arising under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This is also an action for injunctive and declaratory relief arising under Florida Statute §286.0114. 2. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 3. Venue is proper in the Middle District of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b). Each and all of the acts alleged herein were done by Defendant in Collier County, Florida Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 2 of 21 PageID 40 under the color and pretense of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, policies, procedures, and law of the School Board and/or the State of Florida. 4. This Court is authorized to grant declaratory judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02, implemented through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57, and to issue injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. 5. This Court is authorized to grant Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief regarding costs, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, under 42 U.S.C. §1988 and Florida Statute §286.0114. PARTIES 6. Plaintiff Cory Seegmiller is a natural born person who resides in Collier County, Florida. 7. Defendant School Board is the governing body for public schools in Collier County, Florida, with the authority to sue and be sued, and was at all times material acting within the course and scope of its authority and under color of law. 8. Kathleen Curatalo, is an individual over the age of 18 and resides in Collier County, Florida within the Middle District of Florida. STATEMENT OF FACTS 9. In 2013, the Florida legislature passed a law titled “Public Meetings; reasonable opportunity to be heard; attorney fees.” It was recorded as Florida Statute 286.0114. It is attached as Exhibit 1. 10. Florida Statute 286.0114(2) states that “Members of the public shall be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on a proposition before a board or commission[,]” and that “This section does not prohibit a board or commission from maintaining orderly conduct or proper decorum in a public meeting.” 2 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 3 of 21 PageID 41 11. The opportunity for public comment is subject to the rules of the board so long as those rules only pertain to the areas listed in Florida Statute 286.0114(4). 12. Florida Statute 286.0114(4) allows the School Board to adopt rules to govern the opportunity to be heard, but strictly limits rule adoption to only 4 areas, as follows: 1) limit the amount of time; 2) require one spokesman from a faction instead of each member of the faction; 3) prescribe procedures for an individual to express a desire to be heard; and 4) designate a specified period of time for public comment. 13. Florida Statute 286.0114(5) states that “If a board adopts rules or policies in compliance with this section and follows such rules or policies when providing an opportunity for members of the public to be heard, the board or commission is deemed to be acting in compliance with this section.” 14. The pertinent policy of the School Board is 0169.1 titled “Public Participation at Board Meetings.” It was last revised in 2010, three years before Florida Statute 286.0114. It is attached as Exhibit 2. 15. The School Board has not updated policy 0169.1 since the passing of the Public Comment Statute. 16. Paragraph (G) of policy 0169.1 allows the presiding officer “to interrupt, warn, or terminate a participant’s statement if the statement is “personally directed.” 17. This restriction allows the School Board to quash ALL criticism of its actions and the actions of the superintendent regardless of the tone, language, and civility used to make these criticisms. 3 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 4 of 21 PageID 42 18. On January 13, 2015, during School Board discussion and after the public portion of the meeting had been closed, School Board member Julie Sprague brought several propositions before the School Board. 19. Such propositions presented by Ms. Sprague on January 13, 2015 included: (i) holding a special meeting of the School Board, (ii) School Board participation in master board training, (iii) use of an independent consultant to act as a moderator/facilitator in the event of a special meeting of the School Board, and (iv) the topics and scope of any special meeting of the School Board to include among other things 1) the role of the chairperson, 2) the role of the School Board members, 3) the role of the Superintendent, and 4) public perceptions of dysfunction about the School Board that she alleged had become prevalent in the community. 20. On January 13, 2015, during School Board discussion and after the public portion of the meeting had been closed, School Board Chair Kathleen Curatolo also discussed the propositions brought before the School Board by Ms. Sprague and raised a proposition on how the School Board should decide when to set the date and time for the special meeting. 21. On January 13, 2015, during School Board discussion and after the public portion of the meeting had been closed, School Board Chair Kathleen Curatolo cited the issue of public perceptions of School Board dysfunction, centering on allegations that School Board member(s) improperly permitted parents and members of the community to inspect and review textbooks, as a supporting basis for the propositions discussed by School Board Chair, Kathy Curatolo, on January 13, 2015. 4 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 5 of 21 PageID 43 22. On January 13, 2015, during Board discussion and after the public portion of the meeting had been closed, School Board Chair Kathleen Curatolo asked for and obtained consensus for the Board to participate in master board training and authorize Ms. Curatolo to file the paperwork necessary for Board participation in the same, which official action had a financial impact and cost to taxpayers. 23. On January 13, 2015, during School Board discussion and after the public portion of the meeting had been closed, School Board Chair Kathleen Curatolo asked for and obtained consensus for the School Board to participate in and hold a special meeting of the School Board. 24. On January 13, 2015, during School Board discussion and after the public portion of the meeting had been closed, School Board Chair Kathy Curatolo asked for and obtained consensus for the School Board to place the item of a special meeting of the School Board on the February 10, 2015 next, regular School Board meeting to discuss and decide, (i) the date and time for the special meeting, (ii) use of an independent consultant to act as a moderator/facilitator in the event of a special meeting of the School Board, and (iii) the topics and scope of any special meeting of the School Board. 25. On January 13, 2015, during School Board discussion and after the public portion of the meeting had been closed, School Board Chair Kathleen Curatolo asked for and obtained consensus for individual School Board members to provide, within the next two weeks, to the Superintendent topics that School Board members would like to be added to the agenda for the special meeting of the School Board. 26. The School Board took official action on the special meeting proposition before the School Board on January 13, 2015, by voting by consensus to hold a special meeting. 5 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 6 of 21 PageID 44 27. The School Board took official action on the master board training proposition before the Board on January 13, 2015, by voting by consensus to participate in master board training and authorize Ms. Curatolo to file the paperwork necessary for School Board participation in the same. 28. The School Board took official action on the other propositions before the School Board on January 13, 2015 as alleged in Paragraphs 25 and 26 above. 29. At no time before or during the January 13, 2015 meeting and the official action taken by the School Board on January 13, 2105 did the School Board allow for any opportunity to be heard by members of the public on the proposition before the School Board deciding whether or not to hold a special meeting. 30. At no time before or during the January 13, 2015 meeting and the official action taken by the School Board on January 13, 2015 did the School Board allow any opportunity for members of the public to be heard on the proposition before the Board regarding the decision of whether to participate in master board training, and whether to authorize Ms. Curatolo’s filing of the paperwork necessary for School Board participation in the same. 31. At no time before or during the January 13, 2015 meeting and the official action taken by the School Board on January 13, 2015 did the School Board allow for any opportunity to be heard by members of the public on the propositions before the School Board as alleged in Paragraphs 23 and 24 above. 32. The January 20, 2015 School Board workshop/meeting was the first opportunity for the public to comment on the School Board’s official action taken on January 13, 2015 and to address, during the decision-making process, the remaining propositions brought before the School Board by Ms. Sprague and Ms. Curatolo on January 13, 2015. 6 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 7 of 21 PageID 45 33. The remaining propositions brought before the School Board by Ms. Sprague and Ms. Curatolo on January 13, 2015 as alleged in Paragraphs 23 and 24 above, were still before the Board for consideration and decision-making at the time of the January 20, 2015 workshop/meeting. 34. Prior to the January 20, 2015 workshop/meeting, Seegmiller became aware of allegations that the School District Superintendent had met with principals from around Collier County and had misrepresented to them that two board members were stirring up parents to review and censor curriculum, and that teachers should come to the January 20, 2015 board workshop to influence the School Board, comment on public perceptions of dysfunction allegedly created by School Board member(s) improperly permitting parents and members of the community to inspect and review textbooks, and to minimize parental involvement. 35. A portion of such allegations came first-hand from a high-school student who had an interaction with a teacher during class regarding the matter, which report deeply concerned Seegmiller. 36. Seegmiller attended the January 20, 2015 workshop/meeting held by the School Board covering the selection and review processes of curriculum in Collier County, for the purpose of offering public comment on the propositions brought before the School Board on January 13, 2015. 37. Seegmiller properly asked for and received recognition to make a public comment on January 20, 2015 on the propositions before the School Board on January 13, 2015 including, without limitation, commenting on the allegations referenced in paragraphs 33 and 34 above, and the public perception that the Superintendent and other School District 7 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 8 of 21 PageID 46 staff members might be misusing authority and the public perception that the School Board was shirking its duty to inspect and review textbooks/curriculum. 38. Seegmiller’s public comment on January 20, 2015 was directly related to the propositions pending before the School Board as alleged in Paragraphs 23 and 24 above and the official action taken by the School Board on January 13, 2015 as alleged in Paragraphs 25 through 27 above. Specifically, his public comments were intended to address the need and underlying reasoning for a special meeting and master board training, the roles of the Superintendent and the School Board in the curriculum-choosing process, and the allegations of School Board dysfunction and misuse of power. 39. Furthermore, Seegmiller’s request for an investigation of the allegations referenced in Paragraphs 33 and 35 above was a relevant and important topic to be added to the agenda for the School Board to discuss at its special School Board meeting. 40. However, Seegmiller was repeatedly and frequently interrupted by the Chairperson, Kathleen Curatolo, and told not to make remarks about School Board members or the Superintendent and that Seegmiller must only speak about “issues and not people.” 41. During each interruption, Seegmiller raised an objection to the interruption, claiming a First Amendment right. 42. The result of the interruptions and back-and-forth between Seegmiller and Kathleen Curatolo regarding the violation of his rights and the improper censorship by the School Board was that Seegmiller was denied a reasonable opportunity to give a public comment and to be heard on propositions before the School Board. 43. Seegmiller stated during his public comments that he felt the School Board was censoring his comments and others’ comments. 8 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 9 of 21 PageID 47 44. The School Board’s General Counsel, Jonathan Fishbane, interrupted Seegmiller and said that there was no issue of censorship and that Seegmiller should express his general issue of concern and not name individuals in his comment. 45. Seegmiller was harmed by this impedance of his public comment. 46. At no point when Seegmiller was interrupted by Kathleen Curatolo or Johnathan Fishbane had Seegmiller engaged in any conduct that was disruptive or lacking in proper decorum, nor did Kathleen Curatolo or Johnathan Fishbane, at any time, express to Seegmiller that his comments were being interrupted because of any issue with his conduct or decorum. 47. Throughout the public meeting numerous others were censored for criticizing the Board and the Superintendent. 48. The censoring was only injected when it came to criticism of the Board or the Superintendent. 49. Curatolo censored comments which were directed at members of the Board majority or the School District Superintendent, but failed to censor personally directed statements at others. 50. Further, Curatolo failed to censor abusive and obscene speech such as calling Conservative commentators “Racist Bible Thumpers.” 51. The Board’s actions in censoring criticism were made with malicious intent. 52. The plaintiff has retained undersigned counsel and is obligated to pay a reasonable fee for services. COUNT I 9 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 10 of 21 PageID 48 FOR DAMAGES AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT- PLAINTIFF’S FREEDOM OF SPEECH UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION WAS VIOLATED 53. Seegmiller incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1- 52 by reference. 54. The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the Board from abridging Seegmiller’s freedom of speech. 55. The School Board’s actions and policies, on their face and as applied, deny Seegmiller the ability to redress government action and/or improprieties though his protected freedom of speech. 56. The School Board’s actions and policies, on their face and as applied, constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. 57. There is no compelling government interest sufficient to justify the School Board’s actions in applying the policies and censorship in an unconstitutional manner against Seegmiller. 58. The School Board’s actions and policies, on their face and as applied, are not the least restrictive means to accomplish any permissible government purpose sought to be served. 59. The School Board’s actions and policies, on their face and as applied, are not narrowly tailored restrictions on free speech. 60. The School Board’s actions and policies, on their face and as applied, do not serve a significant government interest. 61. The School Board’s actions and policies, on their face and as applied, do not leave open ample alternative channels of effective communication. 62. The School Board’s actions and policies, on their face and as applied, are unreasonable, and impose unjustifiable restrictions on constitutionally-protected speech. 63. The School Board’s actions and policies, on their face and as applied, unconstitutionally chill and abridge the right of Seegmiller to engage in free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. 10 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 11 of 21 PageID 49 64. Seegmiller has no adequate remedy at law to correct the continuing deprivation of his most cherished constitutional liberties. 65. As a direct and proximate result of the Board’s continuing violations of Seegmiller’s First Amendment rights, Seegmiller has suffered in the past and will continue to suffer in the future direct and consequential damages, including but not limited to, the loss of his ability to exercise his constitutional rights. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that the Court grant the relief set forth herein. COUNT II FOR DAMAGES AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT- PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION WAS VIOLATED 66. Seegmiller incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1- 52 by reference. 67. Seegmiller’s right to equal protection under the laws is protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 68. Seegmiller is class of one under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 69. The School Board has intentionally treated Seegmiller differently from others who are similarly situated. 70. The School Board’s actions, policies, and censoring of public commentary, on their face and as applied, are unconstitutional abridgements of Seegmiller’s affirmative right to equal protection of the laws, because they specifically infringe on Seegmiller’s freedom of speech. 71. The School Board’s actions, policies, and censoring of public commentary, on their face and as applied, are unconstitutional abridgements of Seegmiller’s right to equal protection of the law because the Board treats Seegmiller differently from other similarly situated individuals that expressed commentary during the same meeting. 11 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 12 of 21 PageID 50 72. The School Board’s actions, policies, and censoring of public commentary, on their face and as applied, are not supported by a compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify the punishment against Seegmiller. 73. The School Board’s actions, policies, and censoring of public commentary, on their face and as applied, are not the least restrictive means to accomplish any permissible government purpose sought to be served. 74. The School Board’s actions, policies, and censoring of public commentary, on their face and as applied, do not serve a significant government interest. 75. The School Board’s actions, policies, and censoring of public commentary, on their face and as applied, do not leave open ample alternative channels of communication. 76. The School Board’s actions, policies, and censoring of public commentary, on their face and as applied, are irrational and unreasonable, and impose irrational and unjustifiable restrictions on constitutionally protected speech. 77. Seegmiller has no adequate remedy at law to correct the continuing deprivation of his most cherished constitutional liberties. 78. There is no legitimate government interest in restraining all personally directed comments. 79. There is no rational basis in furthering the Board’s policy of restricting all personally directed comments. 80. As a direct and proximate result of Board’s continuing violations of Seegmiller’s equal protection rights, Seegmiller has suffered in the past and will continue to suffer in the future, direct and consequential damages, including but not limited to, the loss of his ability to exercise his constitutional rights. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that the Court grant the relief set forth herein. COUNT III DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT FLORIDA STATUTE 286.0114 WAS VIOLATED 12 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 13 of 21 PageID 51 81. Seegmiller incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1- 52 by reference. 82. Seegmiller contends that the School Board violated Florida Statute 286.0114 on January 13, 2015, by failing to allow any public comment before taking official action by consensus vote to: a. hold a special meeting, b. hold master board training and authorize Curatolo to file the paperwork necessary for School Board participation in the same; and c. take official action on the other propositions before the School Board on January 13, 2015 as alleged in Paragraphs 23 and 24 above. 83. Seegmiller contends that the Board also violated Florida Statute 286.0114 by denying him a reasonable opportunity to give his comments on January 20, 2015. 84. Seegmiller contends that his comments on January 20, 2015, were directly related to the Board’s proposition that it find topics to discuss in its special meeting which address the perceived dysfunction of the Board. 85. Seegmiller further contends that the Board’s policy allowing them to restrain speech that is “personally directed,” as it has been applied, violates Florida Statute 286.0114 . 86. The relief sought is not merely the giving of legal advice or the answer to an inquiry born of curiosity. 87. There is a practical need for this declaration to determine Seegmiller’s rights under Florida Statute 286.0114 in light of the Board’s application of its own policy. 88. The declaration deals with a present, ascertained or ascertainable set of facts. 89. Seegmiller’s right is dependent on the facts or the law applicable to the facts. 90. Seegmiller has an actual, present, adverse, and antagonistic interest in the subject matter. 13 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 14 of 21 PageID 52 91. The antagonistic and adverse interests are all before the court by proper process. 92. Seegmiller has had to retain the undersigned attorney and has obligated to pay reasonable attorney fees. 93. Seegmiller is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 286.0114(7)(a). WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that the Court grant the relief set forth herein. COUNT IV FOR DAMAGES AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT- PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH UNDER THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION WAS VIOLATED 94. Plaintiff incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1- 52 by reference. 95. Article I, Section 4, of the Florida Constitution states that “[e]very person may speak, write and publish sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.” 96. The School Board is an agency empowered by the Florida Constitution and is subject to the provisions of the Constitution. 97. The School Board’s policy of restraining all comment that is “personally directed” violates the Florida Constitution’s guarantee of the right of free speech. 98. One can make a “personally directed” comment without being uncivil or violating basic norms of decorum. Therefore, the Board’s policy violates the Florida Constitution in that it is overly broad and restrains both protected and unprotected speech. 99. Seegmiller contends that public servants may not restrain all speech that criticizes them directly and the Florida Constitution’s guarantee of free speech exists to stop this and other practices that are considered to be dictatorial and undesirable in Florida. 100. There is a bona fide, actual need to for this declaration as Seegmiller is now uncertain what his rights are to speak at Collier County School Board meetings in light of the 14 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 15 of 21 PageID 53 Board’s restraint of public comment under Board Policy 0169.1 and his perceived right under Article I, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution. 101. The declaration deals with a present, ascertained or ascertainable set of facts. 102. Seegmiller’s right of free speech is dependent upon the facts or the law applicable to the facts. 103. Seegmiller has an actual, present, adverse, and antagonistic interest in the subject matter. 104. The antagonistic and adverse interests are all before the court by proper process. 105. The declaration is not merely giving legal advice or answering a question born of curiosity. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that the Court grant the relief set forth herein. COUNT VDECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT COLLIER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD POLICY 0169.1 IS OVERLY BROAD AND VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT 106. Seegmiller incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1- 52 by reference. 107. School Board Policy 0169.1(g) states: “The presiding officer may: (1) interrupt, warn, or terminate a participant’s statement when the statement is too lengthy, personally directed, abusive, obscene, or irrelevant.” 108. The Policy is overly broad, in violation of the First Amendment, because it provides unfettered application of the policy by the Board in limiting and/or prohibiting constitutionally protected speech. 109. The Board impermissibly suppresses lawful speech as a means to suppress unlawful speech. 110. The policy, having been enforced by the Board Chair, Kathleen Curatalo, was enacted 15 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 16 of 21 PageID 54 under color of state law, and has deprived the Plaintiff of rights secured by the First Amendment, as applied by the Fourteenth Amendment. 111. This Constitutional violation is causing irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that the Court grant the relief set forth herein. COUNT VIVIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF FREE SPEECH AGAINST KATHLEEN CURATALO, IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS BOARD CHAIR 112. Seegmiller incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1- 52 by reference. 113. In performing duties as a Board Chair, Kathleen Curatalo violated Seegmiller’s right to free exercise of speech and his ability to petition the Board for a redress of grievances. 114. It is clearly established law in the United States and in the 11th Circuit that regardless of the forum, a person has the First Amendment right to be free from viewpoint-based discrimination. 115. Kathleen Curatalo knew, or should have known, that this right has been so clearly established that in violating this right damages would result. 116. Defendant, Kathleen Curatalo, has a history of discriminatory conduct as it relates to individuals exercising their right to free speech when critical of the School Board and/or the Superintendent. 117. Kathleen Curatalo knew, or should have known, that her treatment of Seegmiller was unconstitutional. 118. Seegmiller has suffered damages as a result of Kathleen Curatalo’s acts. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that the Court grant the relief set forth herein. 16 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 17 of 21 PageID 55 COUNT VIIVIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AGAINST KATHLEEN CURATALO, IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS BOARD CHAIR 119. Seegmiller incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1- 52 by reference. 120. Seegmiller’s right to equal protection under the laws is protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 121. Seegmiller is class of one under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 122. In performing duties as a Board Chair, Kathleen Curatalo violated Seegmiller’s right to Equal Protection of the Laws by discriminating against Seegmiller when she censored Seegmiller’s personally directed public comments and failed to censor others who were similarly situated and made personally directed comments. 123. There is no legitimate government interest in Curatalo restraining all personally directed comments. 124. There is no rational basis in furthering the Board’s policy of restricting all personally directed comments by Curatalo’s actions. 125. The discrimination Kathleen Curatlao was engaged in is a violation of the United States Constitution and is clearly established in the United States and in the 11th Circuit. 126. Kathleen Curatalo knew, or should have known, that her treatment of Seegmiller was unconstitutional. 127. Seegmiller has suffered damages as a result of this act. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that the Court grant the relief set forth herein. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows: 17 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 18 of 21 PageID 56 1. That this Court issue a preliminary injunction, enjoining the School Board, and its officers, agents, employees, and all other persons acting in active concert with the School Board, from continuing to censor citizen speech which is critical of government action or inaction. 2. That this Court issue a permanent injunction, enjoining the School Board, and its officers, agents, employees, and all other persons acting in active concert with the School Board, from continuing to censor citizen speech which is critical of government action or inaction. 3. That this Court issue a declaratory judgment, declaring that the “personally directed’ provision of the Collier County School Board Policy 0169.1, on its face, violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 4. That this Court issue a declaratory judgment, declaring that the “personally directed” provision of Collier County School Board Policy 0169.1 violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because it is impermissibly overly broad. 5. That this Court issue a declaratory judgment, declaring that Seegmiller’s right to free speech, guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, was violated by the School Board and its agents on January 20, 2015. 6. That this Court issue a declaratory judgment, declaring that Seegmiller’s right to equal protection under the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated by the School Board and its agents through a discriminatory application of Collier County School Board Policy 0169.1 against Seegmiller on January 20, 2015. 7. That this Court issue a declaratory judgment, declaring that the Collier County School Board violated Florida Statute 286.0114 by: a) not allowing any public comment before taking official action on January 13, 2015; b) denying Seegmiller his right to a reasonable opportunity to address, during the decision-making process, the remaining propositions brought before the School Board by Ms. Sprague and Ms. Curatolo on 18 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 19 of 21 PageID 57 January 13, 2015; and c) the School Board’s application of its Policy 0169.1 which was used to deny Seegmiller a reasonable right to be heard on propositions before the School Board on the basis that Seegmiller’s comments were “personally directed” public comments. 8. That this Court issue a declaratory judgment, declaring that Collier County School Board Policy 0169.1, on its face, violates Florida Statute 286.0114, as the policy has not been updated to take into consideration the requirements of Florida Statute 286.0114, and that the “personally directed statement” provision within Policy 0169.1 is contrary to the limited powers granted to the School Board in proscribing citizen speech. 9. That this Court issue a declaratory judgment, declaring that the Collier County School Board Policy 0169.1, on its face, violates Article I, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution. 10. That this Court issue a declaratory judgment, declaring that the “personally directed” provision of Policy 0169.1 violates Article 1, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution because it is impermissibly overly broad. 11. That this Court issue a declaratory judgment, declaring that Seegmiller’s right to free speech guaranteed by Article 1, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution was violated by the School Board and its agents. 12. That this Court enter a declaratory judgment, declaring that Kathleen Curatolo, in her individual capacity, violated Seegmiller’s right to free speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 13. That this Court enter a declaratory judgment, declaring that Kathleen Curatolo, in her individual capacity, violated Seegmiller’s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by discriminating against Seegmiller by censoring his use of personally directed speech during public comment at the January 20, 2015 School Board workshop/meeting, while not similarly censoring 19 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 20 of 21 PageID 58 personally directed statements made by others who also made public comments at the January 20, 2015 School Board workshop/meeting. 14. That this Court enter judgment in favor of Seegmiller against Kathleen Curatolo in her individual capacity, and award Seegmiller actual damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees and court costs. 15. That this Court enter judgment in favor of Seegmiller against Kathleen Curatolo in her individual capacity for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and award Seegmiller actual damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees and court costs. 16. That this Court adjudge, decree, and declare the rights and other legal relations with the subject matter here in controversy, in order that such declaration shall have the force and effect of final judgment. 17. That this Court retain jurisdiction of this matter for the purpose of enforcing this Court’s order. 18. That this Court award Plaintiff such damages as are just and appropriate under 42 U.S.C. 1983. 19. That this Court award Plaintiff reasonable costs and expenses of this action, including attorney’s fees, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 1988. 20. That this Court award Seegmiller reasonable attorney’s fees, in accordance with Florida Statute 286.0114(7)(a). 21. That this Court grant such other and further relief as it deems equitable and just under the circumstances. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Plaintiff requests a jury trial on all issues so triable as a matter of law. Alan Hamisch, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff Seegmiller 20 Case 2:15-cv-00087-SPC-DNF Document 5 Filed 02/24/15 Page 21 of 21 PageID 59 By: /s/ Alan. F. Hamisch Alan Hamisch, Esquire Florida Bar No. 088647 5659 Strand Court, Suite 108 Naples, Florida 34110 Tel: (239) 216-4783 Fax:(239) 206-4155 alan@hamischlaw.com Certificate of Service I HEREBY CERTIFY that I electronically filed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system on February 24, 2015 and a true and correct copy of this document was sent on the 25th day of February, 2015 by U.S. Mail to the parties indicated below: The School Board of Collier County c/o Kathleen Curatalo, Chair 5775 Osceola Trail Naples, FL 34109 Alan Hamisch, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff Seegmiller By: /s/ Alan. F. Hamisch Alan Hamisch, Esquire Florida Bar No. 088647 5659 Strand Court, Suite 108 Naples, Florida 34110 Tel: (239) 216-4783 Fax:(239) 206-4155 alan@hamischlaw.com 21 Case Document 5-1 Filed 02/24/15 Page 1 of 2 PageID 60 213/2015 Chapter 286 Section 0114 -2013 Florida Statutes- The Fbtida Senate EXHIBIT The Florida Senate 2013 Florida Statutes Title XIX Chapter 286 SECTION 0114 PUBLIC BUSINESS PUBLIC BUSINESS: Public meetings; reasonable MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS opportunity to be heard; attorney fees. Entire Chapter 286.0114 Public meetings; reasonable opportunity to be heard; attorney fees.? (1) For purposes of this section, "board or commission? means a board or commission of any state agency or authority or of any agency or authority of a county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision. (2) Members of the public shall be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on a proposition before a board or commission. The opportunity to be heard need not occur at the same meeting at which the board or commission takes official action on the proposition if the opportunity occurs at a meeting that is during the decisionrnaking process and is within reasonable proximity in time before the meeting at which the board or commission takes the official action. This section does not prohibit a board or commission from maintaining orderly conduct or proper decorum in a public meeting. The opportunity to be heard is subject to rules or policies adopted by the board or commission, as provided in subsection (4). (3) The requirements in subsection (2) do not apply to: An of?cial act that must be taken to deal with an emergency situation affecting the public health, welfare, or safety, it compliance with the requirements would cause an unreasonable delay in the ability of the board or commission to act; An official act involving no more than a ministerial act, including, but not limited to, approval of minutes and ceremonial proclamations; A meeting that is exempt from s. or A meeting during which the board or commission is acting in a quasi?judicial capacity. This paragraph does not affect the right of a person to be heard as otherwise provided by law. (4) Rules or policies of a board or commission which govern the opportunity to be heard are limited to those that: Provide guidelines regarding the amount of time an individual has to address the board or commission; Prescribe procedures for allowing representatives of groups or factions on a proposition to address the board or commission, rather than all members of such groups or factions, at meetings in which a large number of individuals wish to be heard; Prescribe procedures or forms for an individual to use in order to inform the board or commission of a desire to be heard; to indicate his or her support, opposition, or neutrality on a proposition; and to indicate his or her designation of a representative to speak for him or her or his or her group on a proposition if he or she so chooses; or Designate a specified period of time for public comment. (5) If a board or commission adopts rules or policies in compliance with this section and follows Such rules or policies when providing an opportunity for members of the public to be heard, the board or commission is deemed to be acting in compliance with this section. (6) A circuit court has jurisdiction to issue an injunction for the purpose of enforcing this section upon the filing of an application for such injunction by a citizen of this state. Whenever an action is filed against a board or commission to enforce this section, the court shall assess reasonable attorney fees against such board or commission if the court determines that the defendant to such action acted in violation of this section. The court may assess reasonable attorney fees against the individual filing such an action if the court finds that the action was filed in bad faith or was frivolous. This paragraph does not apply to a state 14 112 Case Document 5-1 Filed 02/24/15 Page 2 of 2 PageID 61 Chapter 286 Search 0114 - 2013 Fbiida Statutes?The Senate attorney or his or her duly authorized assistants or an of?cer charged with enforcing this section. Whenever a board or commission appeals a court order that has found the board or commission to have violated this section, and such order is affirmed, the court shall assess reasonable attorney fees for the appeal against such board or commission. (8) An action taken by a board or commission which is found to be in violation of this section is not void as a result of that violation. History.?s. 1, ch. 2013-227. Disclaimer: The information on this system is unverified. The journals or printed bills of the respective chambers should be consulted for of?cial purposes. Copyright 0 2000- 2015 State of Florida. 14 Case Document 5-2 Filed 02/24/15 Page 1 of 2 PageID 62 EXHIBIT 2l8I201 5 0169.1 The School Board of Comer County Public Participation at Board Meetings The School Board recognizes the value to school governance of public comment on educational issues and the importance of allowing members of the public to express themselves on school matters of community interest. In order to permit the fair and orderly expression of such comment, the Board shall provide a period for public participation at those public meetings of the Board during which action may be taken and publish rules to govern such participation in Board meetings. The presiding of?cer of each Board meeting at which public participation is permitted shall administer the rules of the Board for its conduct. The presiding of?cer shall be guided by the following rules: A Public participation shall be permitted as indicated on the order of business and before the Board takes cf?dal position on any action item under consideration. B. Attendees must register their intention to participate in the public portion of the meeting. C. Participants must be recognized by the presiding of?cer and will be requested to preface their comments by an announcement of their name. D. Each statement made by a participant shall be limited to three (3) minutes duration, unless changed by the presiding of?cer. Persons wil be recognized in the order in which the requests were received. E. All statements shall be directed to the presiding officer: no person may address or question Board members individually. Staff members shall not be expected to answer questions from the audience unless called upon by the Board Chair or the Superintendent. F. Tape or video recordings are permitted under the following conditions 1. No obstructions are created between the Board and the audience. 2. No intewiews are conducted in the meeting room while the Board is in session. 3. No commentary. adjustment of equipment, or positioning of operators is made that would distract either the Board or members of the audience while the Board is in session. G. The presiding of?cer may: 1. interrupt. warn, or terminate a participant's statement when the 112 Case Document 5-2 Filed 02/24/15 Page 2 of 2 PageID 63 2(612015 The School Board of CoherCounly statement is too personally directed. abusive. obscene, or irrelevant; 2. request any individual to leave the meeting when that person does not observe reasonable decorum; 3. request the assistance of law enforcement of?cers in the removal of a disorderly person when that person's conduct interferes with the orderly progress of the meeting; 4. call for a recess or an adjournmentto another time when the lack of public decorum so interferes with the orderly conduct of the meeting as to warrant such action. No Board action shall be taken on requests made during public discussion unless the Board declares the matter to be an emergency in accordance with current law. Any other requests that the Board chooses to take action on shall be placed on an agenda for a subsequent meeting. 212