PRELIMINARY REPORT:
ROLE IN THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR

Prepared By: United Steelworkers of America
Corporate Campaigns/International Affairs
Department
September, 1996.





16.
17.



Overview.
Charles Taylor Invades Liberia, Occupies Firestone.
1991: Firestone Seeks to Resume Operations.
Firestone: Humanitarians or Corporate Opportunists?
1990-92: Taylor Establishes ?Greater Liberia?
With the Help of Foreign Finns.
1992: Firestone Signs Formal Agreement with Taylor.
What is Charles Taylor?s 
May 1992: Bridgestone/Firestone Chairman Kaizaki Hosts the Liberian Rebels.
June-November, 1992: Firestone Resumes Operations In Earnest.
1992: Taylor Resists Peace While Firestone Resumes Production.
Did Jimmy Carter Look the Other Way?
October, 1992: Taylor?s Operation Octopus Launched From the Firestone Plantation.
A Terrible Consequence of Collaboration - Firestone Bombed.
Firestone Evacuates the Expatriates -- A Second Time
March, 1993: The Interim Government and ECOMOG Recover
the Plantation From the NPFL.
1993: Aftermath.

irestone?s Cover-Up: A Pre-condition to Return?

PAGE

In 1992, Bridgestone/Firestone?s 1 agreement to do business with Liberian warlord
Charles Taylor indirectly and perhaps directly contributed to mass death and destruction in
Liberia, and prolonged the civil war by providing Taylor with badly needed revenue and a base of
operations. Firestone?s collaboration with Taylor included logistical support for his National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) army. This alliance was sanctioned at the highest levels of

Bridgestone/Firestone, for reasons of greed, pure and simple.

The Liberian civil war has claimed at least 150,000 lives since it broke out in late 1989,
15% of the total pre?war population of 2.4 million, and three times the total number of US.
deaths in Vietnam. Although thirteen major and twenty minor peace treaties have been signed by

the warring factions, they have all been broken, and the country still remains divided.

Since 1926, Firestone has been the backbone of the Liberian economy, operating the
world?s largest rubber Plantation in Harbel, Marigi County, by virtue of a concession agreement
and a 99-year lease with the government. The Firestone Plantation covers about 220 square miles
and contains 8 million rubber trees.2 Throughout the civil war, Firestone repeatedly sought to use
the plantation, despite the fact that it has often served as a battleground between rival factions and

peacekeeping troops.

irestone?s conduct during the Liberian civil war cannot be considered in a corporate

vacuum, devoid of its political, economic, and military context. Before the war, Firestone was

 

?Firestone Plantations Company, which operates the Liberian plantation, is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., which is based in Nashville, Tennessee. In turn,
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. is a wholly?owned subsidiary of Bridgestone Corp., based in Tokyo,
Japan.

2Before the war, the Firestone Plantation supplied the US. with 40% of its latex and about
11% of the world?s production of latex. Source: CIGNA interof?ce memo, 4/19/91.

3

Liberia?s largest private sector employer, paying about 8,000 workers with 80,000 dependents to
produce 100 million tons of rubber worth over 100 million dollars annually. Taylor, a ?igitive
from Boston Massachusetts? Plymouth Corrections Institute, has often been seen as the main
obstacle to peace in Liberia. Yet Firestone o?icials described his forces as ?freedom ?ghters,?
made regular payments to him, quartered his tr00ps on its plantation, and supplied his
commanders with logistical support. This took place despite the fact that Taylor?s National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) forces were linked to dozens of atrocities -- before, during, and

after the period of Firestone?s collaboration.

Experts attribute the failure of peace in Liberia to ?the commercialization of war?3 The
Liberian warlords, including Taylor, have utilized foreign commercial partners to gain access to
hard currency that arms their soldiers and sustains their alternative governments. Firestone?s
agreement with Charles Taylor did just that, providing Taylor with the means to resist peace and
launch attacks on other warring factions and peacekeeping troops. Moreover, Firestone
collaborated with Taylor in the face of comprehensive economic sanctions imposed by the
Economic Community of West A?ican States (ECOWAS), sanctions that were endorsed by the
United Nations Security Council. Bridgestone/Firestone?s role in the Liberian civil war is a
stunning example of a transnational arrogance in the pursuit of pro?t, heedless of the human cost

of its actions.

The following report by the United Steelworkers of America (U SWA) is a preliminary
account of its on-going investigation into Bridgestone/Firestone?s involvement in the Liberian
civil war. Firestone?s relationship to the Liberian civil war has not been widely reported in the
media, and the comprehensive treatment provided in this report is not available elsewhere. The
Steelworkers? investigation continues in an attempt to fully document Firestone?s responsibility,

involvement, and witness to the war, and to the many human rights violations caused by the war.

 

3Statement of Dr. Will Reno, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Florida International
University, Before the US. House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on
Africa, 6/6/96.

The goal of this investigation is to make Firestone ?Jlly accountable to the Liberian people and to

the world, in the hope that its exposure will prevent it from happening again.

2. Charles Taylor Invades Liberia, Occupies Firestone.

The Liberian civil war was provoked by tensions among the country?s many ethnic groups.
During the 1980's this small West African nation was ruled by strongman Samuel K. Doe, with
support from the Reagan administration. His ethnic group, the Krahns, progressively exacerbated
ethnic tensions in Liberia while Doe was in power. This provided Taylor with a base of popular
support, especially among the Gio and Mano people. During the 1989-90 invasion of
Liberia, these ethnic tensions broke out in open violence against non-combatants, as NPFL
soldiers massacred Krahn and Mandingos, while troops loyal to Doe killed many Gio and Mano.
In 1990 alone, diplomats estimated that 20,000 Liberians were killed, most of them civilians.
Throughout the war, the major factions have in?icted considerably more harm on non-combatants

than on each other.?

Against this backdrop of bloodshed and ethnic violence, NPFL forces entered the
Firestone Plantation in Harbel on June 5, 1990. News reports out of Liberia during this period
state that ethnic violence surged as the NPFL approached Firestone and the Roberts?eld
International Airport, located at few miles from Harbel.s At the same time in far-off Akron, Ohio,

according to the Associated Press,

a spokesman [Trevor Hoskins] for the Bridgestone-Firestone, Inc. company that runs the
120,000 acre plantation referred to the guenillas as ?freedom ?ghters,? and said the

company wants to keep the plantation operating -- even with rebels.?

 

"'Liberia Human Rights Practices, 1995,? United States Department of State, 3/96.
5"Nine Months of Liberian Con?ict,? Africa News 9/17/90.

5

Hoskins also told the Associated Press that there were no plans to evacuate the Plantation
despite the NPFL occupation. This contradicts Firestone?s later claims that it evacuated all

employees from the Plantation and closed it when the civil war broke out in December, 1989.?5

The questionable wisdom of openly taking sides with one faction in a raging civil war was
underscored when troops loyal to Doc recaptured the Plantation from the ?freedom ?ghters? on
June 8. Moreover, since the Plantation itself was a major battleground, continuing operations
there placed Firestone employees in grave danger. According to Africa News, hundreds of Krahn
and Mandingo people -- hostile to the rebels -- were slaughtered in the NPFL assault on
Firestone. Whether these persons were employees of Firestone or were located directly on

Firestone property is unknown.

The situation on the ground -- not at the US. corporate of?ces -- was precarious.
Firestone plantation manager Don Ensminger kept a journal during this period. His entry for June
13 outlines the dangers of maintaining a presence while the plantation was a contested

battleground:

last night stated [airport] in AFL [Doe] hands -- assumption that also same
control -- everything outside this area apparently control - very awkward 
potentially dangerous for us, our people our assets - will there be confrontations?
Who will control? How to deal with changing [the US.
corporate of?ce] contact -- not very satisfactory. [Firestone manager Ken Gerhart] going

to contact and reinforce Our risk vs. Our loss vs. Their commitment.?

 

?For an example of Bridgestone/Firestone?s revisionist public relations, see estate in
line of Rubber and Plastics News, 3/25/96. The statement in this article that the company
evacuated all employees when the war started is false, since only expatriates were evacuated, and
then, well after the war started since Firestone did not evacuate all expatriates until July 14, 1990.
Although not directly attributed in the article, the evacuation claim can only have come from
Bridgestone/Firestone.

Most of the danger, it turned out, came from NPFL ?ghters. Liberian nationals who
worked for Firestone were beaten, robbed, shot at, detained, and even murdered by Taylor?s rebel
army. This sequence of events culminated on the third day of ?ghting in Harbel when between
1,500 and 2,000 frightened workers, panicked by reports of violent tribal retribution, descended
on Ensminger?s house, pleading for food, pay and physical protection.7 Although the workers
were told to go home after being fed rice, many remained on Ensminger?s lawn overnight. The
company told the gathering of workers that they must leave because Firestone did not have

payroll and could not offer the workers any sanctuary.?

Although the company eventually evacuated its expatriate staff on June 14 with US.
embassy help, it did not decide to do so until Ensminger was confronted by an armed NPFL
of?cer who threatened to blow up his house unless the commander received vehicles and $1,000
dollars. As for the 8,500 Liberian workers left behind, ?there?s little that could be done,? Hoskins
told the US. media a?er the evacuation,? while Bridgestone/Firestone president George Aucott

asked employees to ?keep our Liberian colleagues in your prayers.?0

 

7Deposition of Charles M. Barbel, 5/1/96, CIGNA Worldwide Insurance Company, et. aI.,
vs. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., pp. 56-63. Ensminger also commented in his deposition about
the incident, stating that was certainly upset when 1,500 people or however many there were
appeared on my front steps. I was certainly upset as regards the implied responsibility that was
trying to be placed upon my shoulders. Beyond that, I would say no, it did not change my belief
as regards that this was a short-term event that would pass us NPFL said] that they had
no intention to destroy our property and/or harm our people. And, in general terms, that was my
belief throughout this entire episode.? Deposition of Donald Ensminger Vol. I, pp. 249-250,
CIGNA Worldwide Insurance Company, et. aI., vs. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.

t?Ensminger journal entry for 6/7/90.
9"Plantation Boss kept his cool,? Akron Beacon Journal, 6/20/90.
10Network, a Bridgestone/Firestone company newsletter, 6/90.

7

3. 1991: Firestone Seeks to Resume Operations.

In 1991, while an unstable cease-?re wavered and a peace accord (known as
Yamoussoukro IV) was repeatedly broken, Firestone remained intent on getting its stored rubber
out of Harbel and in resuming production. To this end, Firestone managers had dealings with
Liberia?s new Interim Government (established and recognized in 1990 under a West A?ican
Regional peace initiative) and Charles Taylor?s NPFL, in an attempt to resume operations at the

earliest possible date.

The difficulty of restarting operations was exacerbated by the division of Liberia between
the NPFL, the Interim Government which had replaced Doe, and a smaller faction known as the
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), led by warlord Prince Johnson.

Under normal conditions, the company would process rubber at Harbel, then transport it
to Monrovia for export. In 1991, however, the Interim Government and peace keeping forces,
known as the Economic Community of West A?ican States Cease?Fire Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) controlled the small enclave around Monrovia, while the NPFL occupied most of
the including the Harbel Plantation. Although it was theoretically possible to move
people and goods across this boundary, the NPFL restricted such movements.ll

Dealing directly with Taylor - and not with the Interim Government -- caused problems,
given the fact that Taylor?s NPFL attacked ECOMOG peace keeping forces, straining regional
attempts to end the war and alienating the international community. Although a new cease-?re
agreement was signed by all warlords in February, 1991, Taylor broke one of its conditions

immediately following the meeting. ?2 In March, 1991, the NPFL further strained peace efforts by

 

?"Mourning and Mopping Up,? Africa News 4/1/91.

?2"Report: Liberian Con?ict, December 1989 Onwards,? Toplis Worldwide [insurance
claim adjustors], no date.

attacking Sierra Leone, a move that underlined the growing international dimension of the war.

Despite these problems, Firestone decided to deal with Taylor anyway. Company of?cials
met with Taylor on July 3, 1991 and agreed on a process to restart operations in Harbel with
NPFL support.13 This arrangement effectively sidestepped the internationally recognized Interim
Government. A September, 1991 letter from John Schremp, a Director of Firestone 
Rubber Latex Company, to Charles Taylor makes clear that the Interim Government was left
out of the deal, since Firestone stated in the letter that it would bring its supplies into NPFL-
controlled Buchanan. In fact, the Interim Government later accused Firestone of deceiving it
about the company?s dealings with Taylor. But the irestone-Taylor agreement never got off the
ground in 1991, due to looting incidents on the Plantation and logistical problems caused by

renewed ?ghting. Firestone would not resume operations in earnest until May, 1992.

Meanwhile, Firestone had more luck dealing with INPFL leader Prince Johnson. Johnson
returned Firestone company trucks he held for ?safekeeping? in the Monrovia area, a?er
plantation manager Ensminger paid him a visit at his Caldwell, Liberia base. In 1990, Johnson
had captured, tortured and executed former president Samuel Doe, recording it on videotape.
This video, distributed throughout West A?ica, reportedly ?shows Johnson chopping off the
former president?s ears, singing a Jim Reeves gospel tune, while sipping a Budweiser.?14 During
Ensminger?s visit to recover the Firestone vehicles, he was invited by Johnson to ?have a beer or
two and watch the video? [of Doe?s ?interrogation]15 Ensminger watched the video -- surely a

ghastly reminder of the price of doing business in war-tom Liberia.

 

13Letter from John E. Schremp, Director, Firestone Rubber Latex Company
to Charles Taylor, 9/13/91.

14Statement of Dr. W111 Reno, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Florida
International University, Before the US. House Committee on International Relations,
Subcommittee on Africa, 6/6/96.

15"Videotape deposition of Donald A. Ensminger, 6/ 14/96, Vol. 4, CIGNA Worldwide
Insurance Company, et. al., vs. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., p. 893-94.

9

A much more serious impediment to Firestone at this time was the attitude of the US.
Government, since the State Department was advising US. companies not to establish
commercial relations exclusively with Taylor. Yet Firestone had factored in US. opposition and
apparently decided to ignore it. A ?Liberian Status Report,? drafted by the company in
December, 1990, outlined an ambitious plan for ?return before year-end? to Liberia, but noted
?State Department consent not expected.? By 1992, when Firestone was ?rlly active in Taylor-

controlled territory, it became aloof and disengaged with US. embassy of?cials in Monrovia.16

4. Firestone: Humanitarians or Corporate Opportunists?

This section addresses Firestone?s obligations to its employees who were left behind in
NPFL territory when Firestone evacuated all its expatriate staff, and whether Firestone
acknowledged or acted on its obligations to the Liberian people in their hour of need. The record
for 1990-92 shows that Firestone addressed humanitarian aid in the context of gaining commercial
advantages from the Interim Government and/or the NPFL. This demonstrates that Firestone?s
main priority in its ultimate collaboration with Taylor was to protect and exploit its assets in

Liberia, not help its employees, as it has privately claimed.l7

On June 5, 1991, Firestone Plantation Company?s controller, John Vispo informed the
Interim Government in Monrovia that the company intended to restart operations at the
Plantation. In addition, Firestone requested clearance, on a duty-free basis, trucks, pick-ups,

rice, medical supplies, industrial chemicals and fuel, valued at $2.3 million.? This request had

 

16Interview with Gerald Rose, former State Department of?cer.

l7That Firestone claimed its main motivation for collaboration with Taylor was to help its
employees is set forth in draft letter ??om Schremp to the Interim Government?s Minister of
Finance, Francis T. Karpeh, dated 7/8/93. This is the private communication referred to above.

1?Memorandum from the Bureau of Concessions of the Government of Liberia, 
Firestone, Historical and Future Relationship -- a Fiscal Policy Perspective,? 3/31/93.

10

been preceded several months earlier by the arrival of a large ocean freighter, the ?Harbel
Tapper,? which was leased by Firestone. The freighter carried several thousand tons of relief
cargo collected in the United States by the Liberian Committee for Relief, Resettlement, and
Reconstruction. The ?Harbel Tapper? also brought in vehicles and other supplies needed to
restart the rubber Plantation at Harbel.

Humanitarian gestures like the ?Harbel Tapper? relief shipment were used as leverage by
the company to gain advantage in its dealings with both the internationally recognized Interim
Government and the NPFL. Firestone communications clearly implied that humanitarian aid was
not its top priority, and that aid to Liberia was conditioned on restarting operations at the
plantation. As an October, 1990 letter from Don Ensminger to Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who served

as an advisor to the Interim Government demonstrates:

?An important subject that has not previously been addressed in our communications are
concerns we have for our employees, their families and all Liberians in this time of need.
[Firestone Plantations Company] recognizes that upon any resumption of operations
it may be necessary to precede any reactivation by a resupply of medical provisions and
rice.?
The company saw the war as a lucrative opportunity to renegotiate its concession
agreement with the Interim Government and the NPFL. Ensminger sent an ?Aide Memoire? ?9 to
the Interim Government and to Taylor on October 10, 1990, demanding revisions to the
agreement that were ?necessary to improve the economic terms of an FPCO investment and to
make possible a fair return on that investment.? Firestone also proposed in the ?Aide Memoire?
that it be exempt from import duties, and that the government .consider granting [it] some relief

or exemption from taxation to encourage new investment.? Other demands included ?monetary

 

l9Aide Memoire is de?ned by Webster ?5 as ?a written summary or outline of important
items of a proposed agreement or diplomatic communication.?

11

restitution? from the Interim Government and the NPFL.20

A smaller company lacking deep historical ties to Liberia might be excused for making
badly-needed aid conditional, but Firestone has no excuse. The company has reaped tremendous
pro?ts from its Liberian operations over the past 70 years. In 1926, Liberia granted Firestone all-
inclusive property rights to lease up to 1 million acres, or 4% of the total land area of the country,
at a cost of 6 cents an acre (.50 an acre by 1976). By the early 1950's Firestone had accrued net
earnings of twice its original investment.21 In 1961, Firestone estimated annual pro?ts of $13
million. Bridgestone/Firestone earned over $15 million from its Liberian rubber estates in 1989,

and in 1992 set the annual earnings potential of its Liberian rubber estates at $10 million.22

While Firestone sought new commercial advantages from the Interim Government and the
NPFL, Liberian children were dying of malnutrition, and the few hospitals operating were
experiencing chronic shortages of drugs and other essential supplies. Outbreaks of cholera,
gastroenteritis and measles in Liberia were also reaching epidemic proportions. Meanwhile, the
UN. reported a ?funding gap? in humanitarian assistance to Liberia of $57 million, and noted that
?Liberia will continue to depend on relief and humanitarian efforts of private institutions and the

international community for the foreseeable ?iture.?23

Certainly, Firestone did provide some humanitarian aid to Liberia. Between June, 1990

and June, 1993, Bridgestone/Firestone reported spending $1.2 million for ?humanitarian rice,?

 

20Letter from D.A. Ensminger to ?Commander-in-Chief? Charles Taylor, National
Patriotic Front of Liberia, 10/3/90.

21Amos Sawyer, The Emergence of A utocracy in Liberia, rageaj/ and Challenge, pp.
248-250, Copyright 1992, ICS Press, San Francisco.

22By comparison, in 1995, the entire Bridgestone/Firestone operation earned $130 million
on over $6 billion in sales.

23"Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Liberia,? United Nations Security
council, 3/12/93.

12

most of it apparently for employees in connection with resuming operations, which it submitted
for reimbursement in an insurance claim.? The real questions are whether irestone?s assistance
was enough given the company?s huge role in Liberia, and whether, by linking aid to resuming

operations, Firestone actually contributed to the destruction of Liberia.
5. Taylor Establishes Greater Liberia? With the Help of Foreign Firms

Foreign companies that have done or continue to do business with Liberia?s warlords bear
a large responsibility for prolonging the civil war in Liberia. This is because the warring factions
directly bene?t from these commercial ties in ways that would not be possible under an
internationally recognized, peaceful and democratic Liberia. As one senior US. State Department
of?cial has observed, lasting peace in Liberia is only possible if export-oriented trade with the

warring factions can be brought to a halt. 2?

Charles Taylor was both the major bene?ciary of business ties to foreign ?rms, and the
major obstacle to peace in Liberia during the early 1990s. During this period he was widely
perceived as a thug both inside and outside Liberia, and he demanded the Presidency.26

At no time was Taylor or NPFL-controlled territory, known as ?Greater Liberia? or
?Taylorland,? ever recognized internationally. By contrast, the Interim Government, headed by
Amos Sawyer, was recognized by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity
(OAU). Yet despite the lack of international recognition, as Africa political expert William Reno
has observed, stands as one of the most recent and extreme examples of rule through

personal control over resources in A?ica, surviving signi?cant international challenge to his

 

24Bridgestone/Firestone Liberian Operations, ?Summary of Insured Property Damage,
Insured Business Interruption Loss, Insured Extra Expense and Insured Interdependency Loss.?

25Conversation with current US. ambassador to Liberia, Bill M.
2?Africa News, ?War?torn Liberia Looks For a Savior to End the Su??ering,? 9/1/90.

13

position and confounding predictions of an early demise.?27 By 1992, Taylor?s NPFL had carved
out a multi-state territory in West Africa, including most of Liberia, parts of Guinea and about
one quarter of Sierra Leone. By enlarging this territory, Taylor had access to abundant natural

resources, such as diamonds, timber, iron ore, gold, and agricultural products such as rubber.

For Taylor, the key to survival -- in the absence of international recognition and a formal
bureaucracy -- was to enter into direct relationships with foreign business interests. Taylor had
gained extensive experience dealing with foreign corporations when he served under Doe as head
of Liberia?s General Services Organization -- the arm of government that procured supplies from
abroad. Later accused of embezzlement by Doc, he ?ed to the US, and was awaiting extradition
back to Liberia when he escaped from a Massachusetts prison. Taylor then surfaced in Libya,
where he received paramilitary training from Qhadda??s regime.28 After launching the civil war,
Taylor?s success in attracting foreign ?rms to ?Greater Liberia? provided foreign exchange to
purchase arms, and, as Reno has noted, allowed Taylor to ?manage various internal con?icts in his

favor.?29

By 1992, a substantial portion of Taylor?s tax revenue was coming from ?rms with foreign
ties such as the Firestone Plantations Company and the Liberian Mining Company, according to
NPFL o?icials.30 An additional source of income and arms came from timber royalties, which

were reportedly arranged through Taylor?s ?Forestry Development Authority.?31

 

27 William Reno, "Foreign Firms and the Financing of Charles Taylor?s Liberian
Studies Journal 2 (1993).

 

28The US. State Department accused Libya in 1990 of providing arms to the NPFL.
29Vifilliam Reno, ?Reinvention of an A?ican patrimonial state: Charles Taylor?s Liberia.?
3oAfrican Business, ?Liberia Two Years After,? 10/ 1/92.

31William Reno, ?Reinvention of an African Patrimonial State: Charles Taylor?s Liberia,
p.114.

14

The commercial ties Taylor personally developed with foreign ?rms like Firestone were
exploited for personal gain and for war making. Through the summer of 1996, Taylor continued
to make arrangements with foreign ?rms to swap natural resources for arms. In NPFL territory,

military aims and commercial activity go hand in hand because:

?Taylor also uses ?rms in NPFL areas to train and supply his Special Forces Commandos.
These collaborations have been crucial for Taylor?s military strategy in the past. Taylor?s
December, 1994 ?Operation Envelope? in which the NPFL recaptured areas from
ECOMOG allies used logging ?rms? communications equipment and facilities. Earlier,
Taylor used Firestone rubber plantation facilities near Harbel to launch his failed

?Operation Octopus? invasion of Monrovia.?32

Firestone was the largest foreign corporation to fall squarely in Taylor?s camp.

6. 1992: Firestone Signs Form_a_l Agreement \Vrth Tavlor

On January 17, 1992, o?icials of Firestone and Charles Taylor?s (NPRAG) government
signed a ?Memorandum of Understanding? that enabled the company to resume operation of its
rubber estates, providing that certain conditions were met. This was in essence a ?secret
agreement,? since the document was not provided to the Interim Government, nor were its

contents ever disclosed publicly.33 Signatories to the agreement included Acting General Manager

 

32Statement of Dr. Will Reno, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Florida
International University, Before the US. House Committee on International Relations,
Subcommittee on A?ica, 6/6/96.

33The belief in this regard is based on the fact that there have never been any
public references to the document. Although there is a very slim chance that the Interim
Government may have seen the Memorandum of Understanding in 1992, the crucial timetable for
resuming operations which are an integral part of this document were clearly withheld, since the
Interim Government claimed in 1993 ?..contrary to such information given the [Interim

15

of Firestone Plantations Company, Gale L. NPRAG Minister of Finance, William E. Dennis
Jr., and NPRAG Minister of Agriculture, Dr. Roland C. Massaquoi.

Attached to the ?Memorandum of Understanding? was a timetable for restarting rubber
production at Firestone. One line of rubber production (approximately 25 tons per day) was to be
readied in three months, followed by an additional three lines at six months. The rubber ?elds
would be completely repaired and open for production after six months, and the ?rst new latex
would be ready for export at nine months. The Firestone-NPRAG agreement used as its baseline
?normal service levels? which established a yearly output of 70 to 100 million pounds of rubber,

reachable a?er nine months.

Firestone promised in the agreement to ?make all necessary arrangements? with Taylor?s
Finance Minister ?for settlement of present and ?iture ?nancial obligations? within 30 days.
Presumably, these payments went to Taylor?s NPFL, NPRAG, or to Taylor directly. Provisions
were also made in the agreement regarding employee bene?ts, such as wages payable in foreign

exchange, and a commitment to examine the feasibility of electrifying employee housing.

Signi?cantly, the Firestone-NPRAG deal spelled out how Taylor?s armed forces would
become an integral part of Firestone?s operations. Section 4 of the agreement stated that
?..within National Security Guidelines, while a plant protection force to assume responsibilities for
securing the company properties is being established, a coordinated arrangement shall be made to
place security on the [Firestone] Plantations under the joint control of Taylor?s area battalion

commander and the plant protection director to be appointed by the Minister of Justice??4 In

 

Government] by Firestone, the latter was actually engaged in rubber production and shipping
operation in the country.? -- Memorandum, Bureau of Concessions of the Government of
Liberia, ?GOL-Firestone, Historical and Future Relationship a Fiscal Policy Perspective,?
3/31/93. The Interim Government had obtained a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding by
June, 1993 as Firestone?s draft letter to the Interim Govt. dated 7/8/93 makes clear.

3?Before the war, the Plant Protection Director worked directly for Firestone. Under this
new arrangement, the NPFL selected Firestone?s top manager dealing with security on the

16

other words, Firestone was to be militarized while it operated in Charles Taylor?s ?Greater
Liberia.?

7. What is Charles Taylor?s 

Although Taylor?s armed forces have conducted military operations, they should not be
con?ised with the regular army units of nation-states like the US, or even Iraq. More than any
other faction in the Liberian civil war, ?soldiers? of the NPFL are comprised of orphans and
young children. Indeed, the NPFL has a ?Small Boys Unit?? According to the US. State
Department, during 1992, the period of greatest Firestone-NPFL collaboration, credible reports
charged that Taylor?s army had initiated a program of involuntary conscription, including children,
in Nimba County and southeastern Liberia. The State Department also reported claims that
persons who refused to take up arms for the NPFL were beaten and tortured, as were local
of?cials who resisted the involuntary conscription program. During the NPFL ?Operation
Octopus? attack on Monrovia in October, 1992, many of the young soldiers were given mood-

altering drugs, such as amphetamines.36

Once armed and set in motion, the NPFL and other factional armies tended to focus on

non-military pursuits:

?As has been the case throughout the civil war, ??ghting? was an inaccurate description,
for there were few battles between opposing militaries. In fact the waning factions
in?icted considerably more harm on noncombatants than on each other. AFL, NPFL, and

ULIMO ?ghters indiscriminately ransacked villages, abused populations, and con?scated

 

Plantation. This raises questions about whether the also selected other employees
for Firestone, and whether all employees who worked on the Plantation in 1992 did so
voluntarily.

35"Liberia Human Rights Practices, 1992,? US. Department of State, 3/93.
36"Liberia Human Rights Practices, 1992,? US. Department of State, 3/93.

17

scant food supplies. They also murdered innocent civilians and regularly committed

violence against women, including rape??

Although all factions engaged in such terroristic activities, the NPFL led the pack,
according to the State Department:

?All of the warring factions the NPFL being the most frequent and egregious offender --
were implicated in serious human rights violations, e. g. use of excessive force, arbitrary

detentions, forced conscription, torture, or summary executions.?

These were the soldiers who would provide ?security? at the Firestone plantation, and

who, in 1992-93, became essential partners in the company?s operations.

8. May, 1992: Bridgestone/Firestone Chairman Kaizaki Hosts the Liberian Rebels.38

To cement its relationship with Taylor and the NPFL, Bridgestone/Firestone Chairman
Yoichiro Kaizaki (who now heads its Japanese-based parent, giant Bridgestone Corp.) held a
meeting in Akron, Ohio with Acting Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Momolu Sirleaf, and
Acting Minister of Finance, William Dennis, Jr. At the outset of the meeting, Kaizaki made it
clear that Firestone?s real motives for resuming operations were not humanitarian, nor out of

concern for its employees:

 

37914.

38All quotations in this section are taken from: Memorandum of Discussion, Meeting
between Bridgestone/Firestone and the NPRAG Acting Ministers, 5/22/92, in Akron, Ohio.
Attending for Bridgestone/Firestone were Yoichiro Kaizaki, Chairman and Kenji Shibata,
Secretary; Scott Seeley, Senior Counsel; John Schremp, President, Firestone Rubber 
Latex Company; Rick Stupp, Controller, Firestone Rubber Latex Company; and Don
Weihe, President and Managing Director, Firestone Plantations Company.

18

?He [Kaizaki] said that since the plantation?s production had stopped, BFS
[Bridgestone/Firestone] had continued supplying rice and medicine to the workers. These
activities involved costs borne by FPCO without offsetting income. So priority was

to start FPCO operations again at the earliest time so as to obtain some income.?

This need for income, however, should be put in context. In 1992, Bridgestone Corp.
posted net pro?ts of 28.4 billion yen, or roughly 275 million dollars. In humanitarian aid,
Firestone spent $1.2 million over a three year period?. Taylor, on the other hand, was a warlord
linked to dozens of atrocities. If the justi?cation -- as it was later presented -- for coddling
Taylor and the NPFL was Firestone?s belief that the Yamoussoukro IV peace accord would be
implemented and that elections would be held in October, 1992, the prudent decision was to delay
retum until then. This would only have entailed a delay of ?ve months. The obvious answer for
Kaizaki?s rush back to Harbel is that whatever the outcome of the war, whatever the
consequence of supporting a warlord and his gang of teen-aged thugs -- Firestone wanted pro?ts

from the plantation.

To get at those pro?ts, Kaizaki promised Taylor?s representatives that ?he would be
willing to spread the good word about Liberia when a successful restart of operations has been
achieved and pro?table results realized.? The NPRAG of?cials, obviously aware that they had
booked a big ?sh, asked Kaizaki to help them ?look beyond Firestone and establish a direct
relationship with Bridgestone Japan so as to encourage Japanese public (governmental) and

private investment in Liberia.? Kaizaki responded:

?Regarding Japanese he does not represent the Japanese
government or Japanese industry as a whole, Bridgestone is one of the large Japanese
companies that is respected and power?ll and has some in?uence in 

Kaizaki said he believed that there was a substantial possibility to study the feasibility of a

 

39According to its insurance claim.

19

plant in Liberia to produce rubber end products using the good rubber produced in
Liberia. It is dif?cult to make a ?rm commitment as to when such a plant could be
completed..but so long as good high quality latex is available and is competitive with latex
produced elsewhere, and the market demand or economic circumstances are clear, then

there is a good possibility of establishing such a plant.?

Nor can Bridgestone/Firestone claim ignorance of the political signi?cance of its
collaboration with Taylor. The NPRAG Minister for Foreign Affairs told Kaizaki that The goal
of the NPRAG is to create a better political and legal and economics are
inseparable; so a better political system will inevitably lead to a better economic system.? Anyone
remotely familiar with how Taylor?s ?Greater Liberia? operated would have clari?ed Sirleaf? 5
de?nition: a better economic system leads to a better military situation which translates into the

best possible political outcome.

Kaizaki concluded the meeting with the warlord?s representatives by directing Firestone
Plantations Company managing director, Don Wiehe, ?to use every possible e??ort to accelerate

the start up of production and the commencement of paying taxes to the 

9. June-November. 1992: Firestone Resumes Operations in Earnest

Although Firestone had been on its plantation since February, 1992, activities rapidly
escalated following visit with Kaizaki. Production on the rubber estates began in May,
and totaled 10.1 million pounds by October. Between August and October, 1992, 5.3 million
pounds of latex and 3.9 million pounds of block rubber were produced at Firestone. Inventory
and new product were also moved out of Liberia. 4.8 million pounds of latex was shipped

through Buchanan in July, 1992 and 600,000 thousand pounds of block rubber was exported

20

(despite comprehensive economic sanctions) in October.?0

To ful?l its half of the bargain, Firestone also quartered NPFL troops, allowed the NPFL
to set up a radio station on the plantation, and permitted the NPFL to use its vehicles. According
to a deposition given by Jucontee T. Woewiyu, Taylor?s defense minister, after Firestone had
returned to Harbel in 1992, it made the General Manager?s residence [also known as Building 54]
available for use by Taylor. Taylor spent enough time there that the residence became known as

the ?executive mansion.?

By securing the plantation and the general managers?s residence for Firestone, the NPFL
had secured a base of operations for itself. As for NPFL commander in chief Taylor, Woewiyu

explained:

?He was not really interested in the building per se. They [the were interested
more in the security provided by the fact that the place had to be secure. As security they
also provided security for them. It remained under the..Taylor continued to use it all the

way and including [Operation] Octopus_,,42

Woewiyu further stated that Firestone agreed to let NPFL forces occupy company.owned
residences on the plantation and that Firestone fed the NPFL troops.43 Building 53 was converted

to a NPFL radio station, due to an understanding worked out by the NPFL communications

 

1992 Production and Shipments,? Firestone Plantations Company, 4/13/93.

?Woewiyu stated that a number of different residences, including the Firestone residence,
used by Taylor in ?Greater Liberia? became known popularly as the ?Executive Mansion.?

42"Pretrial Examination of Jucontee T. Woewiyu, Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. et. AI. v.
CIGNA Property and Casualty, et. aI., 9/22/95, Vol 2, p. 276

43Woewiyu asserts that this was done to help Firestone ?secure the environment,? but the
thin line between security for Firestone and military security needs for the NPFL is murky -- as
the quotation above amply demonstrates.

21

section and Firestone General Manager Don Wiehe.? This broadcast station was in all likelihood
one of the three NPFL stations that opponents of Taylor have described as ?..reminiscent of
Goebbels of Nazi fame. The diabolical lies and deceptions that ?ow out of those stations are

beyond comprehension. ..These lies have led thousands of young people to their death.?45

Woewiyu stated that Firestone allowed the NPFL to use the radio station because ?it was
information use?il to everybody.?3 According to the US. State Department, these stations
unequivocally supported Taylor and the NPFL. Regarding freedom of the press generally in
?Greater Liberia,? both Liberians and foreign nationals were detained by Taylor and his

supporters for comments about the NPFL.

Other evidence that is strongly suggestive of Firestone?s military collaboration with the
NPFL is set forth in a March 19, 1992 request memo from Colonel Augustine Wehyee,
Commander of the First Tactical Battalion, to John Vispo of Firestone:

?You are hereby requested to lend us two pick-ups to carry on an important operation in
the interest of NPRAG. I was told [Commander in Chief] Charles Ghankay
Taylor to make this request through the Chief of Security B/Gen Domingo Ramos?7 but
contrary to expectation, he slept out of I am requesting your good

of?ces to assist us for these pick-ups so as to transport our soldiers and their incentives.?

Although it is not clear whether Firestone granted Augustine?s request, an April 15, 1992

 

?"Pretrial Examination of Jucontee T. Woewiyu, Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. et. al. v.
CIGNA Property and Casualty, et. al., 9/22/95, Vol 2, p. 271-274.

""Report on the Liberian Crisis,? no date, no author

4?"Pretrial Examination of Jucontee T. Woewiyu, Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. et. al. v.
CIGNA Property and Casualty, et. al., 9/22/95, Vol 2, p. 273.

"Domingo Ramos -- a nom de guerre -- has been identi?ed by sources as a Gambian
mercenary who is no longer employed with the NPFL.

22

letter from Firestone Employee Relations Manager CM. Barbel to General Ramos, makes clear a
coordination between the military needs and Firestone?s operational needs:

?More and more of our senior staff are returning to the Plantation now as the news
spreads of housing situation is becoming very this regard,
we would appreciate your effort in freeing up as many of the units requested in the 45 area

in order that we may use these units to house the returning 

This correspondence between NPFL of?cers and Firestone managers clearly demonstrate
the NPFL-Firestone quid pro quo set forth in the January, 1992 agreement. Firestone could not
resume production without the involvement; and the NPFL, in turn, bene?tted from
Firestone?s c00peration and assistance. This is military-commercial alliance is corroborated by a
former US. State Department of?cer assigned to Monrovia, who observed a close relationship
between Plantation Manager Don Wiehe and NPFL General Ramos during this period.

Indeed, the military and the company worked hand~in-hand, as Taylor?s June 22, 1992
written order ?Authorization for the Collection of Firestone Plantation Company Equipment,
Machinery and Vehicles? makes clear. The order, distnbuted to ?All Special Forces and
Comanders? and General Issac Mussah, ?Chairman Joint Chiefs of 

?..constitutes authorization for General Ramos Domingo [sic] in collaboration with the
Management of Firestone to form a team for the identi?cation and collection of the
Equipment, Machinery and Vehicles. Furtherance to this order, seizure of equipment,

machinery and vehicles from the company should be abolished.?

Later allegations would be made by the Liberian Interim Government and ECOMOG that
Firestone helped the NPFL manufacture explosives, gave ammunition to the NPFL and let them
stockpile ammunition on the plantation. Although Firestone has denied these charges, physical

evidence recovered from the plantation in March, 1993, would suggest that some of these

23

allegations may have been correct, and that Firestone employees may have in fact been witness to

atrocities on the plantation itself.

10. 1992: Taylor Resists Peace While Firestone Resumes Production.

Supported by his commercial networks and his armed insurgents, Charles Taylor had both
the means and the motive to resist peace. As a result of Taylor?s intransigence, ECOWAS applied
comprehensive economic sanctions against his territory in July, 1992?. Yet Firestone actually
increased production a?er the sanctions were applied, and in October, 1992 exported rubber

through Buchanan -- doing exactly what the sanctions were intended to prevent.

Prior to 1992, hopes for peace were centered on two ECOWAS-sponsored agreements.
First, a cease-?re was signed in Bamako, Mali between the warring parties in November, 1990.
Then, after numerous failed attempts, all factions signed the Yamoussoukro (Ivory Coast) IV
Accord of October, 1991, pledging to disarm under the supervision of ECOMOG as a prelude to
free elections within 12 months.

However, in 1992 Taylor repeatedly violated the terms of Yamoussoukro IV, forcing
ECOWAS to implement comprehensive sanctions against Taylor-controlled territory, which
included the Firestone plantation. Although a signatory to the Yamoussoukro agreement, Taylor
was unwilling to recognize ECOMOG as a neutral force, and he resisted its deployment in NPFL
territory. In April, 1992 Taylor again repudiated an agreement he signed by reneging on his
pledge to disarm the NPFL before elections took place.

None of these violations or failures on Taylor?s part to follow Yamoussoukro IV appear

to have had any impact on Firestone?s willingness to collaborate with Taylor. In December, 1991,

 

?United Nations Security Council, ?Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of
Liberia.?

24

Bridgestone/Firestone?s board of directors was apprised of Taylor?s delays in implementing the
peace agreements, but decided move forward ?as quickly as possible? anyway.?9

The Economic Community of West African States did not share Firestone?s optimism
about Charles Taylor. In view of Taylor?s repeated violations of Yamoussoukro IV, ECOWAS
decided in July 1992, to impose comprehensive economic sanctions against the territory
controlled by the NPFL. The sanctions were subsequently endorsed by the United Nations

Security Council in November, 1992.

Between July and November, 1992, however, Firestone was working aggressively to
resume production at its Plantation and had re-employed thousands of workers. Despite the
ECOWAS sanctions, Firestone made payments by check and in kind to Taylor or his shadow
government between January, 1992 and January, 1993 totaling $235 million -- $534,000 alone
between November 1992 and January, 1993. It is di?icult to image an act more subversive of
international governance than direct payments to a warlord who has been sanctioned at both the

regional and intemational levels.

Credible sources?o also report a document dated November 22, 1992 referencing a
$23 0,000 payment by Bridgestone/Firestone comptroller C.B. Pettit wired to account
at Union Bancair in Geneva, Switzerland (Account 17568). If this report is correct, it raises
questions about what Firestone knew about Taylor?s use of the money, since the payments were

earmarked for employee withholding taxes, social security, and workers? compensation, but were

sent to Switzerland.

Firestone?s ?payments in kind? to Taylor raise further questions. According to a Firestone

 

"Letter dated 12/20/91, from 1.13. Schremp, President of Firestone Rubber 
Latex Company, to Charles Ghankay Taylor.

?This con?dential source is a Time magazine reporter. The memorandum referencing this
payment was discovered at the plantation in 1993 by ECOMOG soldiers.

25

internal document, almost $1 million worth of ?rice, building and equipment? was provided to
NPRAG, raising the possibility that these payments in kind went to the NPFL for military
purposes. (It has already been established, for example, that Firestone provided rice to NPFL
soldiers). Indeed, the Interim Government has accused Firestone of helping Taylor make repairs
to the Roberts?eld International Airport near Harbel, where arms from Libya and elsewhere were
allegedly delivered to the 

What is clear is that, with ECOWAS economic sanctions against Taylor in place, the
militarization of Firestone was made even more necessary. This is illustrated by a description of
how rubber moved from the Firestone plantation to Buchanan for export. William Kwo?e, a
Harbel resident, stated in a deposition that overland shipments of rubber to Buchanan were
accompanied by NPFL heavy artillery mounted on trucks, ?one behind and one in front and the
[rubber] trucks in center.? This was necessary because, according to Kwo?e jet
bomber ?y every time, so they need to be escorted by anti-aircraft gun.?2

11. Did Jimmy Carter Look the Other Way?

 

s?Marches ropicaux, 3/19/93. The article reports that Liberian President Amos Sawyer
discovered documents at the Firestone plantation that allegedly showed that Firestone played ?an
important role in the refurbishing of the international airport of Roberts?eld to facilitate the

import by Taylor of weapons and communication material.? [translated from French]. Firestone
also used Roberts?eld in 1992.

52"Pretrial Examination of William Kwo?e, Bridgesrone/Firestone, Inc. el. al. v. CIGNA
Property and Casualty, et. al., p. 76. Although it is not absolutely clear from the context of
Kwo?e?s statement the date of the NPFL escorts, ECOMOG attacks on overland rubber
shipments are extremely unlikely to have occurred prior to the imposition of economic sanctions
in July, 1992. This places the rubber shipments to Buchanan described by Kwo?e during the
period of Firestone?s operations, because Buchanan was only controlled by the NPFL until
March, 1993. Unauthorized tapping of rubber had already ceased when Firestone reentered the

Plantation in January, 1992, prior to the sanctions. Only ECOMOG has operated air forces during
the Liberian civil war.

26

A?er the NPFL .- in violation of Yamoussoukro IV - detained over 500 ECOMOG
peacekeeping troops in August, 1992, former US. President Jimmy Carter traveled to the
Firestone Plantation to meet Taylor, and success?illy negotiated their release. Carter?s visit to the
plantation, however, raises concerns about US. policy towards Liberia and its connection to
Firestone. As early as October, 1991, Carter had visited the Firestone plantation; this visit is
linked to a November, 1991 Harbel trip by Firestone management, suggesting that Carter paved
they way for Firestone through his well?documented in?uence with Taylor.53

A videotape reviewed by the USWA records Carter?s meeting with Charles Taylor in 1992
at the Firestone plantation, and clearly documents both Carter and then US. Ambassador Bill
Twadell?s interest in Firestone?s resumption of production. In the tape, Taylor describes how
Firestone has re-employed about 6,000 workers to tap its trees and is shipping rubber out through
the NPFL-controlled port of Buchanan. Although this fact on its face would violate the
ECOWAS sanctions and thereby undermine regional peace efforts, both Caner and Twadell
appear satis?ed by Taylor?s report.

Tacit acceptance by a former US. President of irestone?s commercial relationship to the
NPFL could only have strengthened Taylor?s resistance to the return to democracy called for in
the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, which Carter supported. As it turned out, the ?nancial aid and
comfort provided by Firestone to Taylor not only provided him with the means to resist peace,
but also helped him launch a full-scale military offensive against the peacekeepers.

 

?Facsimile Message, From RD. Toplis Monrovia [insurance claim adjustors] to Mr.
John Smith/ Mr. Grahame Lucas, November 1, 1991. The relevant section reads: ?Firestone --
They are gearing up to go into the Plantation 04th Nov. 1991. Monday week, Mr. Timmy Carter,
during his visit went on a side trip thru Firestone Plantation. Will keep you informed of
developments.? Carter had in?uence with Taylor because he criticized ECOMOG peace-keeping
forces and had intervened peace talks at Taylor?s request.

27

 

On October 15, 1992, Taylor launched a major surprise attack against the peacekeeping
forces protecting the capital city, Monrovia. This offensive, known as ?Operation Octopus,? was
launched from the Firestone Plantation in Harbel, and resulted in at least 3,000 deaths. The
assault was preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment that lasted for almost 3 hours, and was
immediately followed by an infantry attack on ECOMOG positions at Mount Barclay, White

Plains and the South Clinic Mission area?4

?Octopus? is perhaps the cruelest result of collaboration between Firestone and the NPFL.
The Interim Government and ECOMOG have credibly accused Firestone of helping Taylor?s
army by allowing it to stockpile weapons on its property and use its communications equipment to
direct the offensive. Moreover, during this period of intense bloodshed, Firestone continued to
ship its product out of Liberia through Buchanan, a port controlled by the NPFL. In spite of the
?ghting and the sanctions, all expatriate employees did not leave the plantation until November
22.?

NPFL atrocities also reached new heights during ?Operation Octopus.? In late October,
1992 -- the month when Firestone produced 4.7 million pounds of latex and block rubber in
Harbel and exported 600,000 pounds of block rubber through Buchanan v- ?ve American nuns
were murdered by NPFL soldiers in Gardnersville, a suburb north of Monrovia. On October, 23,
the rebels came to the nuns? convent and shot Sister Kathleen McGuire, a Lebanese businessman
seeking re?ige for his family, Sister Agnes Mueller and Sister Shirley Kilmer. The killers
mutilated their bodies, hacking at their dead ?esh and limbs with machetes. A few days earlier,

 

?"Liben?a: ECOMOG statement on clashes with BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 10/ 19/92.

SSFirestone Natural Rubber Company presentation to Bridgestone/Firestone?s board,
December 14, 1992: ?Last expatriate le? plantation November 22, 1992.?

28

two other nuns were killed by the NPFL soldiers in an ambush.?

The murder of ?ve nuns brought world-wide attention and a condemnation from
Pope John Paul II. Lesser known NPFL atrocities during ?Octopus? included the abduction of
several hundred orphaned children to NPFL military camps, where reports of mistreatment were
widespread. NPFL troops also reportedly plundered several villages and engaged in torture and
other abuses.? The Interim Government also claimed that NPFL soldiers went house to house in

?a frenzy of violence,? killing hundreds of civilians."

Although the NPFL was not the only faction guilty of atrocities during ?Operation
Octopus? or the civil war, the NPFL was the only faction which bene?tted from Firestone?s
support.

13. A Terrible Consequence of Collaboration -- Firestone Bombed.

A direct and terrible consequence of Firestone?s collaboration with Taylor was the death

of innocent civilians - probably Firestone employees - during ECOMOG bombing raids on the
plantation itself.

ECOMOG Alphajets hit the plantation six times between October 15 and November 28,
1992.? The reason Firestone became a military target, according to ECOMOG Brigadier-General
Victor Malu, was because Taylor?s forces were using the Plantation as a supply depot and staging

area.

 

5?"Lives of Faith,? St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 4/11/93.

s""Liberia Human Rights Practices, 1992,? US. Department of State, 3/93.
?Lb?a

??Nigeria bombs rebels in Monrovia,? The Independent, 11/28/92.

29

This accusation is likely correct. Videotape shot on October 16, 1992 near Gate 15 of the
Firestone Plantation and reviewed by the USWA suggests that a major military Operation is
underway. A truck carrying an armed soldiers and an artillery piece is visrble, and the presence of
Charles Taylor and a number of NPFL omcers suggests that this area served as the command and

control center for the direction of ?Octopus.?

According to Bridgestone/Firestone of?cials, at least 42 ?civilians? were killed during
these bombing raids on the Firestone Plantation. It is dif?cult to understand what so many
?civilians? were doing at the plantation during these raids, if not producing rubber. Indeed,
factory production was maintained on the plantation until the end of October.60 It should be also
recalled that Taylor told former President Jimmy Carter that 6,000 workers had been mobilized to
work on the plantation. Civilian casualties are most likely the result of Firestone?s operations and

certainly a cause of Firestone?s collaboration with Taylor.

Even after the carnage of ?Octopus,? a?er the atrocities, including the brutal
slaying of ?ve catholic nuns, and a?er bombing raids on the plantation itself, Firestone continued
to make payments to Taylor and to operate the plantation - although in ?stand-by mode? after
November 18. It bears repeating that Taylor used payments like irestone?s in order to buy arms
and maintain his opposition to the internationally recognized Interim Government of Liberia and
the peace-keeping force sent in by ECOWAS, which was supported by the United States and the
United Nations. On several levels then, the complicity of Firestone in the tragedy of the L?>erian

civil war is starkly evident.

 

60Firestone ?Work Paper,? 4/ 12/93. Relevant section notes: ?factory production
commenced August 1992 and was stopped end of October.?

30

1 Fir Ex ri Tim

The NPFL attack on Monrovia and the worldwide attention it brought did not change
Firestone?s resolve to support Taylor ?nancially, to utilize Taylor?s military assets, or to return to
full production under the Taylor regime at the earliest possible date. In fact, as the letter below
demonstrates, Firestone executives expressed only gratitude and the desire for further
collaboration with the warlord who directed a bloody attack on the internationally recognized and
UN. supported peace keepers. This letter -- in obvious anticipation that Taylor would drive
ECOMOG forces into the sea goes as far as to proclaim Taylor President of all Liberia

November 18, 1992

Firestone Plantations Company
Harbel, Liberia

His Excellency Charles G. Taylor
President, Republic of Liberia
Gbarnga, Liberia

Dear Mr. President,

I wish to advise you that I have received instructions from Mr. Y. Kaizaki, Chairman of
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. to evacuate the remaining foreign national employees from Lrberia.

As you know Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. is the owner of the Firestone Plantations Company.

Mr. Kaizaki has closely followed our efforts to re-open the Plantation and is very proud of the

work that has been accomplished. He also understands the cooperation and help we have

received from the NPRA Government.

31

We have organised the senior staff of the Plantation so that a responsible individual will be in
charge of each department and activity of the Plantation. Each department manager will have
suf?cient personnel to allow him to protect the assets under his control.

I am asking Mr. William Cooper to assume the additional duties of Chairman of the Executive
Committee of the Plantation. Each of the department managers will be a member of this

committee.

I am ?irther appointing Dr. S. Brisbane to assume the additional duties of Operations Manager of

the Plantation, responsible for the daily operations of the Plantation.

While it is impossible at this time to resume normal operations of the Plantation I am leaving
instructions to continue the essential operations, such as the Duside Hospital, the Harbel Clinic,
the Hydroelectric Plant, waterworks and other essential services. We have suf?cient rice to allow
us to issue one bag per month to each of our employees for the foreseeable future. In addition we
will station a group of our employees in the Ivory Coast to be prepared to coordinate the re-

supply of the Plantations with essential items as they are required.

I am asking that Brig. Gen. Domingo Ramos be allowed to sit as a member of the executive

committee and continue his outstanding work keeping the peace and protecting the assets of the

Plantation.

It is our intent to restart the full operation of the Plantation at the earliest date possible and ask of

your Government to provide whatever security that is possible to protect the assets.

We pray that peace be soon restored to Liberia and that our management, employees and their

families be able to resume their contribution to Liberia.

I wish to personally thank you for your kind understanding of our operations, including our many

32

problems as well as our successes. I look forward to being able to quickly return to restart our

operations.
Very truly Yours,

Don L. Weihe
President and Managing Director

15. March. 1993: The Interim Government and ECOMOG Recover the Plantation from the
NPFL.

After evacuating its expatriate employees a second time, Firestone operated its plantation
according to the ?stand-by mode? plan outlined in Vfiehe?s November 18 letter to Taylor. On
December 14, 1992 Bridgestone/Firestone held a board meeting in which the status of the
plantation was discussed. At the meeting, Firestone Plantations Company management
recommended a ?forward plan? to Bridgestone/Firestone that involved a continued presence on
the plantation using Liberian employees, continued attempts to reduce costs, and a ?return to
operations as soon as safe?? This strategy obviously involved further collaboration with the
NPFL, since one of the plan?s advantages was that it would ?safeguard assets,? an impossible task
without the help of the NPFL.

During 1993, however, Firestone?s ?forward plan? fell apart because of the changing
political and military situation in Liberia. Although Taylor had as Firestone anticipated -- come
close to capturing Monrovia during ?Operation Octopus,? ECOMOG peace keepers
subsequently reinforced and managed to drive the NPFL backwards through the opening months

 

?Firestone Natural Rubber Company presentation to Bridgestone/Firestone?s board,
2/14/92, ?Forward Plan.?

33

of 1993. In late February, troops loyal to the Interim Government recaptured the Firestone
plantation and turned it over to ECOMOG forces. ECOMOG conducted a thorough search of
the plantation, discovering a NPFL repair facility in Firestone?s technical workshop, a stockpile of
unused explosives, and the existence of the radio station in one of irestone?s office

buildings.

More shocking was the discovery of mass graves on the plantation, which were believed
to contain the bodies of persons murdered by the NPFL for being members of an anti-Taylor
ethnic group.?2 The graves were reportedly located near the Firestone factory itself, which
ECOMOG commanders believed would have been hard to conceal from company employees.?3
In March, 1993, Interim President Amos Sawyer also toured Firestone and later reported what he

found there at a press conference in Monrovia, which was recorded on videotape:
Reporter?s Question:

?During your last visit to Firestone, the first in three years, it was discovered that the
Firestone Plantation Company reportedly aided the NPFL in its Oct. 15 attack on the city
of Monrovia. From what you saw during that visit, what would be the Interim

Government?s position towards Firestone, in case the manager of Firestone wants to come
back and resume operations??

Sawyer?s Response:

?Well, from what we saw there, Firestone had been engaged in major production. Two

Firestone facilities had been an integral part of Mr. Taylor?s war machine -- there's no

 

?Statement of ECOMOG Colonel Akhigbe on location on the northern end of the
Firestone complex. Recorded on videotape, March, 1993.

?"The Firestone Factor,? West Africa, 4/11/93.

34

kidding around. I?m no military expert, but from what I saw there Mr. Taylor?s work shop
- the initial repair plant where the guns were disassembled and good parts taken from old
guns and put on other guns and all that - it's all there in Harbel Hills, crates and crates of

explosives.

Firestone's communication system was at his disposal. I mean, for God's sake, what other
conclusion does one draw but complicity? This is what I will say - that there are some
questions that the Firestone people will have to discuss with us. And we have informed
them accordingly, and it is our understanding that they are sending a team here, and we
will sit down and talk about these things. But we cannot pretend as if nothing has

happened.

At the same time it does not change our policy, our commitment to free enterprise, it
doesn?t change our commitment to foreign investment. It doesn't even change our
commitment to perhaps working along with the Firestone Rubber and Tire Corp. But it
means that there are some clari?cations to be made. You know, the manager will have to
answer some questions. The president of the corporation will have to answer some

questions. October 15 [the launching of ?Operation Octopus?] saw lots and lots of people
getting killed.

It is not a fact that it [the plantation] was closed down and Mr. Taylor was there doing
these things. Or, when Mr. Taylor moved in, Firestone of?cials le?. No, they were there.
They were operating, if not in cooperation, surely side by side - reinforcing each other.
And this kind of thing is ridiculous. They owe us an explanation and they should give the
Liberian people an explanation. Firestone has been in this country since 1926. It has been
at the bedrock of our economic activities here. It has been one of the largest employers
here. It has reproduced its pro?ts four times. It owes the Liberian people an explanation.
Common decency requires that and for all those who think we are moving away from

policies and becoming hostile to business enterprises, no. Please understand. We are not

35

changing policies. We are only insuring that there is accountability in all the actions that
have led to the death and destruction of our country.?

The USWA has reviewed videotaped evidence which appears to con?rm Sawyer?s
allegations. The video, shot in March, 1993, clearly shows stockpiles of artillery shells and gun
parts on the plantation, as well as a substantial quantity of processed rubber, packed and awaiting
shipment. Although Firestone has denied involvement or knowledge of NPFL military operations,
it should be re?emphasized that the company continued operating the plantation in ?stand-by?
mode well after the expatriates ?ed in November, 1992. Before ?eeing, plantation manager Don
?Wiehe had requested that the General Ramos serve on the plantation?s ?Executive
Committee.? Wiehe had also requested that Taylor ?..provide whatever security that is possible
to protect the These requests were made during the thick of the ?ghting between the
NPFL and ECOMOG. It is hard to believe that Firestone could have avoided being witness, if
not accomplice, to the military operation Sawyer described.

16. 1993: Aftermath

In the spring of 1993, it brie?y seemed as if a full accounting of Firestone?s role in
supporting Taylor?s war effort would be disclosed to the world. A few published reports in the
international press repeated Sawyer?s charges that Firestone had stockpiled ammunition and
provided communications facilities to the NPFL as a prelude to ?Operation Octopus.?64 Other
Interim Government sources went ?irther, accusing Firestone of supplying NPFL troops with
ammunition and claimmg that two individual members of Bridgestone local staff manufactured

explosives for the NPFL by using chemicals on hand at the plantation." These explosives were

 

6?For example, ?The Firestone Factor,? West Africa, 4/11/93;chhes ropicaux,
3/19/93.

65Rubber and Plastics News, 2/28/94. Liberian Minister of Information Lamini A Waritay
made these allegations on 2/8/94 while speaking at the National Press Club in Washington DC.

36

 0 M0 6
allegedly molded into satchel charges and used against P8151, and Interim Government forces.

And the economic dimension of Firestone?s collaboration was given further credence
when ECOMOG forces recaptured Buchanan port in April, 1993. At the dockside, ECOMOG
Brigadier-General Mudjakperhuo showed the press six containers full of rubber, bearing the
Firestone insignia, that stood awaiting shipment abroad. This is documented on videotape that
has been reviewed by the USWA.

But the Interim Government decided to approach the Firestone matter mainly through
private negotiations with the company. It had already concluded that Firestone had deceived
them about its relationship with Taylor and had violated ?the general spirit and intent of its
Concession Agreement with GOL [government of Speci?cally, the Interim
Government found that ?contrary to information given that Firestone was simply carrying out
rehabilitation and maintenance operation at the Plantation, the company has been found actually
producing and shipping rubber.?

As a general policy towards companies like Firestone that had exported the country?s
natural resources from NPFL territory, the Interim Government decided to seek ?nancial
restitution. For Firestone speci?cally, the Interim Government proposed ?in view of the reported

involvement of Firestone in the Liberian civil con?ict?

0 Re-opening Firestone?s Duside hospital to be operated by international relief agencies like

Medicine Sans Frontiere;

 

The source on the precise method used to manufacture these explosives is a con?dential Interim
Government source.

?The source for this statement and the remainder of this section is ?Memorandum, GOL-
Firestone, Historical and Future Relationship -- A Fiscal Policy Perspective,? Bureau of
Concessions, 3/31/93.

37

 Securing crated rubber for export from Firestone to provide funding for Interim

Government Operations; and

0 Occupation of the plantation by the Interim Government to ensure that [Firestone
Plantations Company] makes ?tll payment of tax obligations to enable the GOL
[government of Liberia] pay for the urgent services rendered as a result of the NPFL

activities in the area.?

In June, 1993 the Interim Government sent Firestone a letter, which accused the company
of allowing the NPFL to use Firestone facilities for military purposes and of violating the
concession agreement by paying taxes to Taylor?s NPRAG. The letter asked Firestone for an
explanation of its relationship with the 

Firestone?s response, spelled out in a draft letter dated July 8, 1993 from 1E. Schremp to
Interim Government Minister of Finance Francis T. Karpeh, deserves careful scrutiny, because it
amounts to a defense of its conduct in doing business with Taylor. In the letter, Firestone offers

three main justi?cations for its conduct, which are analyzed below:

A Firestone claimed that its employees asked it to return to Harbel, in order to help
alleviate their suffering. 0 do so meant huge expenditures for rice and medicine,
"amounting to millions of dollars, which required the company to restart operations to
make money. Yhis need for income was made more acute by the fact that

Bridgestone/Firestone itself was losing money.

The question of Firestone?s ?nances or even thi its wartime losses in Liberia must be
considered in the context of Firestone?s longstanding relationship to the country, as well as the
size and pro?tability of its ultimate parent, Bridgestone Corp. Since 1926, Firestone has
recouped its investment in Liberia many times over. A?er Firestone Tire and Rubber was sold to

Japanese?based Bridgestone Corp. in 1988, the owner of the Liberian rubber estates became a

38

corporate giant that has earned net pro?ts of close to $3 billion dollars over the past ten years.?7
While it is true that the Bridgestone/Frrestone subsidiary was not making a pro?t during this
period, experts have unanimously attributed those losses to the carrying-costs of massive debt
(over $2 billion) incurred by Bridgestone when it substantially overpaid for Firestone. That is
surely not the fault of the Liberian people, nor an excuse for a transnational company like

Bridgestone to aid and abet a vicious warlord.

Moreover, Firestone did not need to return to Harbel as a commercial enterprise in order
to arrange the distribution of humanitarian aid to its employees. This is demonstrated by the fact

that, throughout 1991, before any resumption of production, it repeatedly delivered rice to the
plantation.

B. Firestone claimed that returning to operations was necessary in order to protect the
assets of the plantation. Unauthorized tapping of the rubber trees was taking place, and
its property was being stolen. Yhis put the entire investment at risk, and the corporation

could not afford these losses.

This is perhaps Firestone?s best rationalization for its appalling conduct in Liberia, but it
fails to pass the minimum requirements for good corporate citizenship in several respects. As a
large transnational corporation, or indeed any corporation, Firestone had an obligation to comply
with regional economic sanctions endorsed by the United Nations. This is simply because the
pro?ts that Firestone makes all over the world are dependant on the ?goodwill? of people all over
the world, including the governments that comprise the Economic Community of West African
States. Indeed, as has been noted above, even prior to economic sanctions, the US. State
Department advised companies not to set up exclusive commercial arrangements with Taylor.
This is because the political and military situation in Liberia was precarious, only held together by
the presence of ECOMOG peace keeping forces whom Taylor opposed. Taylor, in fact, was the

 

?Bridgestone Corp. Annual Report, 1995.

39

main obstacle to peace in Liberia during 1991-92. Firestone?s decision to do business with Taylor

then, was nothing less than a policy that its commercial interests were more important than peace
for a nation of about 2.4 million people.

It is beyond dispute that the unauthorized tapping of rubber vexed Firestone. Yet the
truth is that the tapping was done by Firestone employees themselves. A?er the expatriates left
the plantation in 1990, and Firestone cut off pay to their workers, a company called Marcos was
set up by a number of employees at the suggestion of a Liberian doctor named S. Brisbane, who
operated a feeding center near the plantation with the help of international relief agencies like
Catholic Relief Services. One of these Firestone employees, Ligori Sekajipo, stated in a
deposition that he told fellow workers the formation of Marcos was not wrong: told them if
Firestone has to come and ?re me they should ?re my living body. I should not be dead by
starvation and tell me posthumously that I am ?red.?68 The clear implication of Sekajipo?s
statement is that Firestone could have avoided the unauthorized tapping of its rubber trees by
ensuring that adequate relief supplies were distributed to its workforce.

There is no evidence that Taylor or the NPFL ever threatened Firestone that it would
starve its employees unless commercial relations with the warlord were established. In fact, it is
evident only that Taylor wanted payments in exchange for Firestone resuming commercial

operations on the plantation.

C. The Yamoussoukro I VAccord arranged by EC 0 WAS, essentially recognized the
territorial status quo of a divided Liberia until elections, i. e. the ?nal implementation of
the Yamoussoulao peace agreement. The company had reason to believe that those
elections would take place, and therefore it seemed the civil war, or ?con?ict? would

come to an end

 

6"Deposition of Ligori Sekajipo, 7/4/95, p. 143. Bridgestone/Firestone, et. al. vs. CIGNA.
40

Of course when Firestone entered into its agreement with Taylor, it was well understood
by anyone following events in Liberia that Taylor was failing to comply with Yamoussoukro IV.
To do business with Taylor at that point would have amounted to de?facto acceptance of Taylor?s
position that Yamoussoukro wouldn?t work. Accordingly, Taylor delayed opening the roads in
late ?91 and renounced the disarmament provisions of Yamoussoukro in April, 1992. These
events took place prior to the Akron, Ohio meeting between NPRAG of?cials and
Bridgestone/Firestone. Fighting was also rampant. In May, 1992 NPFL soldiers engaged in
combat with ECOMOG peace keeping forces; and in August, renewed ?ghting broke out between
the ULIMO faction and the NPFL, which generated 20,000 refugees ?eeing to Monrovia, as well
as the outbreak of widespread atrocities. If Firestone truly believed that a peaceful resolution to
the civil war was at hand in 1992, there is no credible explanation why it did not wait until the
peace agreement was fully implemented before resuming production at the plantation. In fact, the

real reason Firestone returned to operations in 1992 was its unbridled desire for pro?t.

One of irestone?s many excuses to the Interim Government for returning to Harbel and
collaborating with Taylor was that, in essence, the company was a person, different than
Liberian citizens who lived in areas under NPFL control.? While this rationalization may have
arcane legal merit, it stands as a gross insult to the hundreds of thousands of Liberians who have
truly suffered in the civil war, whether they were killed, starved, beaten, abducted, raped, tortured
or unjustly imprisoned ?all sufferings which have been amply documented. What has heretofore
been undocumented is how Firestone preyed, and continues to prey, upon the destruction of

Liberia in order to turn a fast buck.
17. The Cover-Up: A Pre-condition to Return?

As of this writing, Firestone plans to resume operations in Liberia as soon as agreements
are reached with the new Transitional Government (formed in 1995 as a result of the Abudja,
Nigeria peace accord), and when the country becomes stable enough to permit its return. In

March 1996, news reports indicated that Firestone management was back in Liberia, registering

41

up to 1,000 workers for possible employment. These plans were temporarily shelved, however,
when ?ghting erupted again in April, forcing 470 Americans to ?ee Monrovia.

The new managing director of Firestone Plantations Company, Richard Stupp, has
publicly indicated that Firestone is in the process of concluding top-level agreements with the
Transitional Government. What Stupp has not disclosed is a company campaign of
misinformation, apparently designed to cover-up Firestone?s complicity in the civil war, and the

company?s hard-line stance in negotiations with Liberia?s government.

In conjunction with its recent efforts to resume production in Liberia,
Bridgestone/Firestone has repeatedly claimed to the media that it ceased operations at the war?s
onset, and that it evacuated all its employees during the civil war, both foreign and native.69 In
fact, Firestone evacuated only its expatriate sta?? in 1990 and 1992, and left its Liberian employees
behind in NPFL controlled territory. Moreover, a?er ?eeing Harbel in 1992, the company
actually put its Liberian employees in the care and custody of the NPFL, in order to continue
reduced operations with the assistance. In another falsehood, Bridgestone/Firestone has
also claimed that it closed down its rubber estates in 1989]0 or in other versions, stated that it
shut down ?at the onset of the war.? These claims ignore the company?s return to production in
1992 and the avoid the embarrassing truth that it attempted to remain on the plantation in June,

1990, despite a raging battle on its property.

Recently, Firestone has also sought to use Liberia?s desperate desire for foreign
investment to its advantage. Since Firestone ?rst came to Liberia in 1926, the country has
depended economically on its export-oriented trade in natural resources. Firestone?s ownership
of the world?s largest rubber plantation in Liberia makes it potentially that nation?s largest private-

sector employer, should it decide to return.

 

69See estate in line of Rubber and Plastics News, 3/25/96.
70See ?War keeps plantation closed,? Rubber and Plastics News, 5/27/96.

42

In 1994, Firestone outlined its attitude towards resuming operations in a letter to an
Interim Government of?cial." In the letter, the company demanded ?an entirely new concession
agreement approach,? one that would take into account the company?s need to market high-
quality Liberian latex at a ?deep discount? in order to lure back customers who now utilize Far-
Eastern latex sources. The letter went as far as to claim that Bridgestone/Firestone ?has no ability
or economic incentive to make long-term plans [in Liberia].? In the meantime, since the Company
has maintained that a ?force majeure?72 still exists in Liberia, it has not paid taxes to the Liberian

government.

The letter also exhorted Liberia to make its rubber industry competitive in the world
marketplace, and threw out seventy years of history with the claim that ?today, Firestone
Plantations Company operations must justify themselves from a business standpoint on a stand-
alone basis? and must allow the company ?to be competitive on a world-wide basis with other
rubber producing companies, particularly in the Far-East.? It was as if Firestone?s lucrative 99-

year lease for hundreds of thousands of acres of Liberian soil did not exist.

 

71Letter from RF. Stupp, Acting Managing Director, Firestone Plantations Company, to
Wilson Tarpeh, Minister of Finance, Interim government of National Unity.

72Force majeure is a legal term which describes an event or effect that cannot be
reasonably anticipated or controlled. Under Section 22 of Firestone?s 1976 Concession
Agreement with the Liberian Government, notice of force majeure by either party suspended the
obligations under the Concession Agreement of the notifying party.

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