UNITED STEELWORRERB OF AMERICA CORPORATE AFFAIRS FIVE GATEWAY CENTER PITTSBURGH, PA 15222 MEMORANDUM October 28, 1996 mo: George Becker, Bernie Kleiman, Ron Bloom PROM: Jerry Fernandez zzpy/ SUBJECT: Liberia Implementation Plan We need to make a decision on.what we are going to do with the Liberia report. As we discussed previously, we should start a surfacing campaign that would last for approximately 30 days. Our goal should be that the surfacing campaign culminate in a high level contact between the USWA. and BPS in which. we inquire concerning the labor dispute and any other issues of concern that affect US-Japanese relations, particularly with regard to operations in 3rd. world countries. Concurrently, we give the report and the digital pictures to an "attack dog" to develop a hard hitting 4 or 5 page color pamphlet designed to be distributed globally. Obviously, this person would be under contract, for control purposes, and have considerable experience developing negative campaign material in the political arena. We would then be geared to a rapid distribution and PR program if challenged to do so by the company. We must also not forget that the Japanese government must be in the loop so that they can gauge some of the trade and international aspects of the actions of one of their biggest corporations. 1. The Carter Letter We send a strong letter to Jimmy Carter raising questions relative to our concern about human and labor rights in Liberia. The letter describes his meeting with Taylor in 1992, his discussion of Firestone and the fact that Carter referred to Taylor as his friend despite numerous documented human rights violations by the NPFL. We would then point to sanctions and ask how Carter could have looked the other way. Also, we need to ask him if he had. any? contact 'with. Firestone. officials, including 1991. and whether he played any role in arranging meetings or conducting negotiations that allowed Firestone to resume operations in Taylor's "Greater Liberia." 2. Dealing with BFS through our international contacts We select two foreign BPS unions to query their local management about one discrete piece of our Liberia investigation. We tell these unions that we are hearing some damaging information about BFS's conduct in the Liberian civil war and that we're not getting answers from U.S. management. We ask them to do this as a favor. The international angle gives the company a foretaste of the international dimensions of this issue. examples of the kinds of questions that can be raised: "illegal" shipments of rubber from Buchanan (exact amounts) in spite of a regional economic embargo. we provide some documentation, perhaps including the videotape of what the ECOMOG soldiers discovered. Payments to Taylor despite sanctions, gross human rights abuses and BFS's denial that they operated in Liberia after 1989. 3. Exploiting the information gleaned from the court cases The court cases we dug up refer to customers of BFS's latex and even US based firms that provided information and services to BFS's Liberian operations when the company was not actually present on the plantation. We could communicate with them innocently enough, in the process of doing an "investigation", including Kroll International, into BFS's role in the Liberian civil war. 4. Having the IMF do a fax to Tokyo We have the IMF fax to tokyo (Kaizaki's attention) a document from our Liberia investigation that directly addresses BFS's collaboration with the NPFL, with a cover note that requests an explanation in light of human rights and IL0 standards to which Japan and Liberia are signatories. we can control this contact to the extent that the IMF understands it is part of our campaign and that it is only a piece of an inconclusive puzzle we are developing concerning role in the Liberian civil war. An additional benefit to this tactic is it reinforces international labor perspectives and it lets the company know that key documents concerning Liberia are in Switzerland. 5. Donation to Liberia peace group After consultation with some of the people we've been talking to about Liberia, we make a financial contribution to a Liberian Peace Group. We issue a one or two paragraph press release about our concern about the situation and we notify certain members of the Congressional Black;Caucus of our action and concerns generally for Liberians. 6. Communication with the US Department of State/US Ambassador to Liberia or other US government entity (the administration?) We cite a 10/31/94 article in "Tire Business" that notes the Clinton Administration "is considering the possibility of offering incentives to BFS and other business interests in Liberia to re- establish operations". We object to Us corporate welfare for BFS on the basis of certain things we have learned about BFS's conduct during the civil war and we cite a few tantalizing examples in our correspondence, and not simply charges made by the Interim government. We point out that BFS activity probably prolonged the war, that what BFS did is, and has been doing, is a major impediment to peace in Liberia, and should not be rewarded. We note that the US State Department said it did not know of things BFS did in Liberia beyond what it had to do to survive and we say we have clear evidence to the contrary. 7. Meeting with Japanese labor attache I schedule a meeting with the japanese labor attache to discuss grave concerns we have about BFS's conduct that has a direct bearing on US/Japanese relations. At the meeting, I outline BFS's role in the Liberian civil war, and offer documentation (only for review on site, not copying). I will be specific and concrete. 8. Delegation of USWA people to Liberia We send a group to Liberia to look into the situation, meet with workers, generally to announce our involvement and concern. We make it a fact finding mission sponsored by the ICFTU or ICEM. all of the above will involve significant planning and coordination. We need to deal with what we have and.make decisions about how we intend to use it. C: John Sellers