UNITED STATES DISTRICT CO URT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CRIMINAL NO. UNITED STATES OF A..'\1ERICA v. COMMERZBANK AG, and COMJvlERZBANK AG NEW YORK BRANCH, ---- VIOLATIONS: 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy to Violate IEEP A); 31 u.s.c. §§ 5Jl8(g), 5318(11), 5318(i), and 5322(b) (Violations of the BSA) FORFEITURE: 21 U.S.C. § 853(p); 18 U.S.C. § 98I(a)(l)(C): and 28 U .S.C. § 246l(c) Defendants. INFORMATION The Un ited States charges that: General A!legations 1. At all times relevant to this lnfonnation Defendant, Commerzbank AG, ("COivfMERZ") was a financial institution registered and organized under the laws of Gennany. 2. Since in or about 1971 , and at all times re levant to this Information, COMMERZ had a license issued by the state of New York to operate as a fore ign bank branch i11 New York, l\ew York. 3. At all t.im es relevan t to th :s lnfo nnation, COMMERZ conducted U.S. Dollar ("USD") clearing al Defendant Commerzbank AGNew York Branch ("COMMERZ )lEW YORK"), which was located in Manhattan, New York. 4. i\t all times relevant to th is Information, COMMERZ and COMMERZ NEW YORK were subject to oversight and regulation by the Board of Governors ofthe Federal Reserve, including the Federal Reserve Bank of New York ("FRBN Y"), as well as the New York State Department of Financial Services ("DFS"). 5. At all times relevant to this Information, COMMERZ had branches throughout the world and conducted financial transactions in USD at and through COMfviEgz NFW YORK and unafliliated U.S. financial institutions in New York and elsewhere. The Intemational Emergency Economic Powers Act 6. The UniteJ States Depattmenl of the Treasury, Office of foreign Assets Control ("OF AC'} which is located in the District of Columbia, among other things, administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions against certain foreign countries and entities associated with those counlries, includin g in stitutions located in or controlled by Sudan and Iran ("Sanctioned Entities'} At all relevant t imes, OFAC was empowered to authorize transactions with institutions located in, or controlled by, these countries by granting li~.:enses tor transactions. In addition, Of AC administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions against Specially Designated Nationals ("SDNs"). 1 7. Over the years, the United States has employed sanctions and embargos with regard to Sam:tioned Entities and SDNs . Those restrictions arose, in part, in response to repeated support by those nations and entities for international terror against the United States and its allies and , with regard to fran , the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 8. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706, authorized the President of the United States (the "President") to impose economic sanctions on a foreign country in response to an unusual or extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States when the President declared a national emergency with respect to that threat. Pursuant to the authority under IEEPA, the OFAC publishes a Specially Designated National ("SDN'') Li st, which includes individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such as terrorists and weapons of mass deslruction proliferators designated under programs that are not country-specific. 2 President and the executive branch have is~ued orders and regulations govewing and prohibiting certain transact10ns with lran by U.S. persons or involving U.S.-origin goods. 9. Pursuant to 50 U S.C. §1705, it is a crime to wil!fully vi0late, attempt to violate, conspire to violate, or cause a violation of any license, order, regulation. or prohibition issued under TFFP A. The Iranian Sanc:tiuns 10. On March 15, L995, President William J. Clinton issued Executive Order No. 12957, find ing that '·the actions and policies of the Govemment of !Tan constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security. foreign policy, and economy of the L nited States," and declaring ·'a national emergency to dea l with that threat."' I I. Presiden t C lin ton followed this with Executive Order No. 12959, issut:d on May 6, I 995, which imposed comprehensive trade and financial sanctions on Iran. These sanctions prohibit. among other thin gs. the exportation, re-expo rtation, sa le, or supply, directly or indirectly. to Iran or the Government of Iran of any goods, technology, or services from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located. This includes persons in a third country with knowledge or reason to know that such goods, technology, or serv ices are intended specitically for supply, transshipment, or re-exportation, directly or indi rectl y, to Iran or the Government of Iran . On August 19, 1997, President Clinton issued Executive Order No. I 3059, consolid ating and clarify ing Executive Order Nos. 12957 and 12959 (collectively, the "Executive Orders"). The Executive Orders auLh oriz.ed the U.S. Set;rt:lary uf lhe Trt:asur) to promulgate ruk!i and regulations necessary to carry out the Executive Orders. Pu rsuant to this authority, the Secretary 3 2 of the Treasury promulgated the Iranian Transaction Regulations ("ITRs''), 31 C.F.R. Part 560. implementing the sanctions imposed by the Executive Orders . 12. Wi th the excepti on of certain exempt transactions, the JTRs prohibit, among other things, U.S . depository institutions from servicing Iranian accounts and directly crediti ng or debiLing lnmian accounts One such exception would he transactions for which a validated export li cense had been obtained from OFAC, which was located in the District of Columbia. The ITRs also prohibit transactions that evade or avoid, have the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to evade or avoid the restrictions imposed under the ITRs. The ITRs were in effect at all times relevant to the conduct described below. 13. While the ITRs promulgated for Iran prohibitt:d USD transactions, they contained a specific exemption for USD transactions that did not directly credit or debit a U.S. financial institution. This exemption is commonly k nown as the "U-turn exemption ." 14. TI1e 0-turn exemption permitted banks to process Iranian USD transactions that began and ended with a non-U.S. financial institution, but were clean:d through a U.S. correspondent bank. In relevant part, the ITR provided that U.S . banks were "authorized to process transfers of funds to or fi:om lran , or tor the direct or indirect benefit of persons in Iran or the Government of Iran, if the transfer ... is by order of a foreign bank which is not an Iranian entity from its own account in a domestic bank ... to an account held by a domestic bank ... for a [second] foreign bank which is not an lrdnian entity." 31 C.F.R. §560.516(a)(l). That is, a USD transaction to or for the benefit of Iran could be routed through the Cnited States as long as a non-U.S . offshore bank originated the transaction and the transaction tenninaterl with a nonU.S. offshore bank. These 0-tum tran!'actions were on ly permissible where no U.S. person or Effective October 22, 2012, the Department of the Trea.mry renamed and reissued the ITR as the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations . 4 entity had direct contact with the Iranian bank or customer and were o~herwise permissible (e.g., the transactions were not on behalf of an SDN) . 15. Effective NoHmber 10,2008, OFAC revoked the U-tum exemption for Iranian transactions. As of that date, U.S. depositor)' institutions were no longer authonzed to process Iranian U-turn payments. 7:0e ,)'udanese Sanctions 16. On November 3. 1997, President Clinton issued Executive Order No. 13067, which imposed a trade embargo against Sudan and blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Sudan. Effective July 1. 1998, OFAC issued the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations ("SSR"), 31 C.F.R. Part 538, to implement Executive Order No. 13067. On October 13, 2006, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order No. 13412 (collectively with Executive Order No . 1~Ofi7, the "Sudane<;e Executive Orders"), which continued the comprehensive blocking of the Government of Sudan imposed by Executive Order No. 13067, but exempted the then-regional Government of South Sudan from the definition of the Government of Sudan. The Sudanese Executive Orders prohibit virtually all trade and investment activities between the United States and Sudan, including, but not limited to , broad prohibitions on: (i) the importation into the United States of goods or services from Sudan: (ii) the exportation or re-exportation of any goods, technology, or services from the United States or by a U.S. person to Sudan; and (iii) trade- and service-related transactions with Sudan by U.S. persons, including financing, facilitating, or guaranteeing such transactions . The Sudanese Executive Orders fnrther prohibited "[a]ny transaction hy any U.S. person or within the U.S. that evades or avoids, or has the purposes of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions set forth in [the SSR]." With the exception of cenain exempt or authorized 5 transactions, OFAC regulations implementing the Sudanese sanctions generally prohibited the export of services to Sudan from the United States. The Bank Secrecv Act 17. ~commonly The Cunency and Foreign Transactions Reports Act of 1970, as amended k.nuwn as the Bank Secrec} Act, or ·'BSA''). Jl U S.C. § 'illl , et seq., and its implementing regulations require domestic banks, domestic branches of foreign banks, and certain other financial institutions to establish and maintain programs designed to detect and report susp icious activity, and to maintain certain related records "where they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings. " 3 J U.S.C. § 5311. 18. Among other things, the BSA requires that financial imtitutions ·'maintain appropriate procedures to ensure compliance with [the BSA I and regulations prescribed under [the RSA] or to guard against money launderine." 11 U .S C . § 5318(a)(2). Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(l) and 31 C.F.R. § 1020.210, COMMERZ and COMrv1ERZ NEW YORK, the defendants, were required to establish and maintain an anti-money laundering ("AML") compliance program that, at a minimum : a. provided internal policies, procedures, and controls designed to guard against money laundering; b. provided for a compliance officer to coordinate and monitor day-to-day compliance with the BSA and AML requirements; c. provided for an ongoing employee training program; and d. provided for independent testing for compliance conducted by bank personne l or an outside party . 19. l11 addition, the BSA requires financial institution s to "report any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law or regulation. " 31 U.S .C. § 5318(g)( 1). 6 Pursuant to 31 U.S.C . § 5318(g) and 31 C.F.R. § l020.320(a)(2), a fin ancial institution is required to file a Suspicious Activity Report ("SAR") when it ·'knows, suspects. or has reason to suspect'' that a transaction , among other things, involves funds derived from illegal activities or has no apparent business or lawful purpose. 20. The IJSA also requires financial institutions that establish, maintain, administt:r. or manage correspondent accounts in tht United States fur uon-United States persons to establish " appropriate, specific, and, where necessary, enhanced, due diligence policies, procedures. and controls that are reasonably designed to detect and report instances of money laundering through those accounts." 31 U.S.C. § 5318(i)(l). Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5318(i) and 31 C.F.R. § I 0 I 0 .61 0, a financial institution is required to conduct ''enhanced scrutiny" of any correspondent accounr, including any such account maintained for foreign branches or affiliates of that financial institution, "to guard against money laundering and to identify and report any suspicious transact ions ." COUNT ONE (CONSPJRACY TO VIOLATE THE fNTERNA TIONAL El\1ERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT) 21. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 tlu·ough 16 above are hereby repeated. realleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. 22. From in or around January 2002 through in or around December 2008, COMMERZ facilitated USD transactions for a number of Sanctioned Entities and SDNs. At no time did COMMERZ or its co-conspirators apply for, receive, or possess a lice n ~e or authorization from OFAC for any of the criminal conduct set forth below. 7 The Conspiracy and Its Objects 23. From in or around January 2002 through in or around December 2008, the exact dates being unknown to the United States. in the District of Columbia and elsewhere. Defendant COMl\H:RZBANK AG and others, both known and unknown to the United States, unlawfully. willfu ll y and knowingly combined. conspired, confederatc:d and agreed with one another and wi th others to commit offense:> against the United States, tha: IS, to engage in fin ancial tran sactions with Sanctioned Entities and SONs in vio lation of I EEPA, and the executive orders and regulati ons bsued thereunder. Goals ofthe Conspiracy 24. The goal of the conspiracy was for COMMERZ and others, both known and unknown to the United States, to enrich themselves by engaging in a conspiracy and a scheme to violate I EEPA, and the executive orders and regulations issued thereunder. 25. A further goal of the conspiracy was for COtviMl:::RZ and others both kJ10\"<·n and unknown to the Uni ted States, to violate executive orders and regulations prohibiting the exportation, directly and indirectly, of services Jrom the United States to Sanctioned Entities and SDNs. Manner and Means of the Conspiracy 26. Among the manner and means by which COMMERL and its co-conspirators carried out the conspiracy were the following: a. COMMERZ intentionally used a non-transparent method of payment messages, known as cover payments, to wnceal the involvement of Sanctioned Entities and SONs in USD transactions processed through COMMERZ NEW YORK and other financial institutions in the United States. 8 b. COMMERZ instmcted other financial institutions not to mention the names of Sanctioned Entities in USD payment messages sent to COMMERZ NEW YORK and other financial institutions in the United States. c. CO:MMERZ followed instmctions from Sanctioned Entities and SDNs not to mention their names in USD payment messages sent to COrvfMERZ NEW YORK anc.J other tinancial instit11tions in the United States. d. COMMERZ rernuve::d infonn. From approxi matel y in or about 1999 through in or about 2000, COMMERZ and its Singapore branch and affiliates were one of the primary banks through which the fraud was operated. 34. During that time period, Olympus executives asked ex.el:ulives from CITS to provide certain false documents to Olympus's auditors, which wou ld have failed to disclose that certain Olympus assets were pledged as collateral f0r loans from COSEA . CITS obtai ned a legal opinion, which, in the words o[ one CTTS executive written to an Olympus executive, "makes clear that our bank could be subj ect to both civil and criminal penalties if we are seen to be assisting or facilitating you in the non-disclosure.'' Although CITS ultimately declined to provide the false documents, its executives suggested a variety of ways in which Olympus could nonetheless fail to disclose the pledge. 35. In or about 2000, Olympus took its business away from ClTS and COSEA and to another bank. In or about 2005, however, Olympus- and its fraud -ret urned to CITS and COS EA. From at least 2008 until at least in or about 20 I 0, C fTS and CO SEA executives expressed strong suspicions about the Olympus transact ions and structure. One ~enior execu tive worried that Olympus would have to "write off[the] full amount" ofthe re levant transactions, and wondered about the effects on CITS if"any negative news is splash (ed] on the front page:' 12 Similarly, a St;Tiior legal and compliance officer respo nsible for COMMERZ's Singapore branch and affiliates wrote at the time th at he was "concerned about fraud, asset stripping, market manipu lation and derivative I ax offenses .... ffthe [Olympus] stmcture and transacti ons cannd [be) explained we must file Suspicious Transa<;ti on report as a malter orlaw and [COMMERZ] policy." Other Singapore-based compliance oCficers wrote about the Olympus business that it was " a very complicated stmcture with o ut any economical rationale." 36. Another senior com pliance officer - who would later become head of compliance at COMMERZ NEW YORK- internally reported that a senior Singapore-based executi 'e at CTTS had stated that "he did not typ ically ask question s of clients as he felt he was at less risk by not knowing. " The compliance officer responded by "repeat[i ng]that it is .unacceptable for senior managers to tum blind eyes or othe~vise remain ignorant." The New York Wires 37. In or about March 2010, two wires in the amounts of approximately $455 million and $67 million, respectively, related to the Olympus scheme were processed by COM:MERZ NEW YORK through the correspondent account for the Singapore branch ofCOMMERZ. Those wires caused COMMERZ NEW YORK's automated A.ML monitoring software to "alert.'' 38. At the time, COMMERZ NEW YORK had conducted no due diligence on the Singapore branch, consistent with CO.l\1MERZ 's policy at that time. In response to the alerts, however, COMMERZ NEW YORK sent a request for information to COMMERZ Frankfurt and COM.l\1ERZ's Singapore branch, inqui ring about the transactions. TI1e Singapore branch responded in a brief e-mail. dated April20, 20 10. referring to the Olympus-related entities involved in the wires: GP A Investments Ltd. ist [sic] a Cayman Islands SPY, Creative Dragons SPC-Sub Fund E is a CITS administered fund both of 13 which arc part of an SPC structure to manage securiti es investments for an FA TF country based "lvlNC. According to the Relationship Manager the payment reflects the proceeds from such securities investments to be reinvested. COMMERZ's S ingapore branch did not relay any of the concerns abou t the Olym pus-sponsored structures and transactions. 39. F~ased on its response, COMMERZ NEW YORK closed the alert without taking any further action other than to note that in March 2010 alone, GPA Investments had been involved in six transactions through COM!'vffiRZ NEW YORK totaling more than $522 million. In fact, between 1999 and 20 I 0, a total of more than $1 .6 billion in furlherancc or the Olympus fraud was cleared through COt\-1MER.l NEW YORK. 40. COMMERZ NEW YORK failed to file a SARin the United States concerning Olympus or any of the Olympus-related entities until November 2013 - more than two years aft er the Olympus accounting fraud was revealed. COMMERZ NEW YORK ' s Compliance Deficiencies 41. The same individual served as CO:MMERZ NEW YORKs BSA Officer continuously from approximately 2003 until early 2014. Over those years, she raised concerns about AML compl iance, both to her superiors at COMMERZ 1\TEW YORK, and with CO.MMERZ Frankfurt. 42. Under the BSA , a financial institution is required to detect and report suspicious activity. This is accomplished, in part, through conducting due diligence, and enhanced due diligence where appropriate, of the correspondent relationship - which COMJvlliRZ NEW YORK failed lo do - and by send ing requests for further information to the correspondent bank when potentially suspicious transactions are detected. 14 43. COMMERZ NEW YORK fre4utmtly had difficulties getting rt::spons~;:s to requests for information that were generated in connection with automated transaction monitoring "al erts." Because request s for informati on went unanswe red for as muc h as eight months without SARs being filed , alerts were often closed without any response to the pending request. As a result ufthese deficiencies, COMMER7 NEW YORK cleareJ numerous AML "alerts'' based on its own perfunctory internet searches and searches of public source databases but without ever receiving responses to its requests for information. 44. On or about June 24, 2010, a COMMERZ l'\TEW YORK-based compliance officer who had primary responsibility for automated tran saction monitoring wrote in an e-mail to the BSA Officer and the Head of Compliance in New York (who had previously served as the Head of Compliance in Asia) that ··we currently have 90 alerts a day," with "808 alerts outstanding," which "could lead to a possible back log'' He continued, "I also wanted to make you aware that we have currently over 130 Frankfurt RFis [i.e .. requests for information] outstanding," noting "a decrease in response to the Rfis" from Frank:fUJi. The following day, the Head of Compliance in !'ew York for\Narded the e-mail to Commerz's Global Head of Compliance. adding that "things are not getting better with regards to thr osc l findings. (sec below). 1 will forward you the DRAFT memo on potential revision of staffing needs.,. Although the Global Head of Compliance thereafter instituted new procedures designed to increase the speed of responses to RFTs from New York, problems persisted with the timely fiow of information frorn business units outside the U.S. to compliance officers in New York. 45. At all times relevant to th is lnfonnation , \.OMMF.R7 and \.OMMFR7. NF:W YORK failed to t:onduct adequate due diligence or to obtain "know your customer" information with respect to correspondent bank accounts for COMMERZ's own foreign branches and 15 affiliates. These systemic deficiencies reflected a fai lure lO ma intain adequate policies, procedures . and controls to ensure comp,iance with the BSA and regulations prescribed thereunder and to guard against money laundering. Statutory Allegation 46. from in or about 2008. through in or about 2013, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, the defendant COMMERZBANK AGNEW YORK BRANCH acting through ce1tain employees located in New York , did willfully violate the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S. C. §§ 5318(h) and 5327.. and regulations issued thereunder, that is. 3 J C .F.R . § 1022.210 (a) (fom1er!y Section 103.125(a)), by failing to develop, implement and maintain an effective anti-money laundering program. Specifically, defendant COMMERZBANK i\G :--JEW YORK BRANCH, at a minimum , willfully: (a) failed to adequately conduct investigations of transactions that were deemed potentially suspicious or that "alerted" in COMMERZBANK AG NEW YORK BRANCH's automated AML software, instead closing investigations of potentially suspicious transactions based on no or insufficient information received in response to requests for information; (b) failed to report suspi<.:ious activity including wire transfers through CO:MJvfERZBANK AGNEW YORK BRJ\.NCH that ultimately furthered the Olympus accounting fraud; and (c) failed to adequately monitor billions of dollars in correspondent banking transactions, including by fai ling to conduct any due diligence on COl'vfMERZBANK branches and inadequate due diligence on COMJ\1ERZBANK affiliates. (Title 31, United States Code, Sections 5318(h) and 5322(b) & (c); and Title 31, Code ofFederal Regulations, Section 1020.210). 16 COL"NT THREE (Violation of the Bank Secrecy Act: Failure to h ie a Suspic io us Activity Report) The United SLates further charges: The allegations contair.ed in paragraphs I through 20 , 22, 24-27, and 29-45 above 47 . are hereby repeated, realleged and incorporated by rekren~.:t as if fully set forth herein . From in or about 2008 through in or about 2013. in the Southern District of 'l"ew 48 . York and elsewhere, the defendant COMMERZBANK AG ~EW YORK BRANCH acting through certain employees located in New York, did wtllful!y fail to report suspicious transactions relevant to a possible violation of law or regulations, as required by the Secretary of the Treasury, to wit. COYI.Ml:X.L~ANK ACi NEW YORK BRANCH the defendant. failed to file Suspicio us Activity Reports in the United States with respect to correspondem banking transaction s. (Title 31, United States Code, Sections 53 18(g) and 5322(b) & (c); and Title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 1020.320). COUNT FOUR (Violation of the Bank Secrecy Act: Failure to Conduct Due Diligence on Corw;pondent Ranking Accounts) The United States further charges: 49. The allegation s contained in paragraphs l througl; 20 , 22 , 24 -27, and 29 ~45 above are hereby repeated, realleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. 17 50. From in or about 2008, through in or about 2013, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, the detendant COMMERZBANK AGNEW YORK BRANCH acting through certain employees located m New York, did willfully fail to conduct due diligence on correspondent bank accounts for non-United Sta tes persons, tn wit, COJ\-Th{ERZBANK AGNEW YORK BRANCH failed to obtain adequate due diligence or "know your customer" infonnalion on foreign institutions owned by or affiliated with CO.MMERZBANK AG for which COM1v1ER7:RANK AGNEW YORK BRANCH maintained ~;orrespondent accounts, information that if collected and maintained would have reasonably allowed for the detection and reponing of instances of money laundering and other suspicious activity through those accounts. (Title 31, United States Code, Sections 5318(i) and 5322(d); and Title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, Section l 0 I 0.61 0). FORFEITURE ALLEGATIO)J S l. Upon convicLion of Lhe offense alleged in Count One, COMMERZ BANK AG sha ll forfei t w the l Jnited States any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to this offense, pursuant to 18 U .S.C. § 981 (a)( l )(C) and 28 U.S. C. § 2461 (c). The United States will seek entry of a forfeiture money judgment in respect of Count One in the amount of at least $263,000,000. 52. lf any of the property described above as being subject to forfeiture, as a result of any act or omission of the defendant: a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; b. has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party; c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the Court; 18 d. has been substantially diminished in value; or e. has been commingled with other property that cannot be divided withou t difficulty: COMMERZBANK AG shall forfeit to the United States any other jJTOperty of COMMERZBANK AG, up to Lhe value of the property described above, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(p). (Criminal Forfeiture, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 9R 1(a)(l )(C), Title 28 United Sates Code, Section 246l(c), and Title 2l. United States Code, Section 853(p)) 19 RO .ALD C. MACHEN JR. UNTTED STATES ATTORNEY FOR THE DJSTRJCT OF COLLM131A 3-\)--7 '~ DATE 7Judl ~ Matt Graves, D.C. Bar No. 481052 Maia Miller, VA Bar No. 73221 Assistant United States Attomeys 555 Fourth Street, l\.W. Washington, D.C. 20530 (202) 252-7762 (Graves) (202) 252-6737 (Miller) matthew.graves@usdoj.gov maia.mi ller@usdoj .gov LESLIE CALDWELL ASSISTA\lT ATTOR.NEY GENERAL CRIMNAL DIVISION M. KENDALL DAY ACTf\!G CHIEF, ASSET FORFETTURE AND MONEY LAVNDER.ll\G SECTION I Sarah Devlin Trial Attorney Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section DATE PREE'l BI-LARARA UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR TJ IE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DATE ~p Assistant United States Attorney 20