5830
N00
7 Jul 20

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Secretary of the Navy

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA OF 6 DECEMBER 2019

Encl: (1) Vice Chief of Naval Operations, ltr of 28 May 20

1. I concur with enclosure (1) as written and as endorsed by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

2. My point of contact for this matter is CAPT (b) (6)　　　　　, JAGC, USN, who may be
reached at (b) (6)　　　　or e-mail (b) (6)　　　　@navy.mil.

M. M. GILDAY

5830
Ser N09D/20U100831
28 May 20

FINAL ENDORSEMENT on RADM Scott Jones, USN ltr of 12 Mar 20
RADM John Meier, USN ltr of 21 Feb 20

From: Vice Chief of Naval Operations
To: File

Subj: INVESTIGATIONS INTO FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENTS ON PEARL HARBOR
       NAVAL SHIPYARD OF 4 DECEMBER 2019 AND NAVAL AIR STATION
       PENSACOLA OF 6 DECEMBER 2019

Encl: (1) RADM Scott Jones, USN, ltr of 12 Mar 20
       (2) RADM John Meier, USN, ltr of 21 Feb 20
       (3) Investigation side-by-side of 21 May 20

1. I have reviewed enclosure (1) and approve the findings of fact, opinions and
recommendations of the investigating officer as modified by the first endorser, with the
following additional modifications:

    Recommendation 4.1.1: delete "OPNAVINST 5510.13C" and replace with "OPNAVINST
5530.13C."

2. I have reviewed enclosure (2) and approve the findings of fact, opinions and
recommendations of the investigating officer as modified by the first endorser, with the
following additional modifications:

    Paragraph 4 on page 216 of the Report will be redacted in its entirety.

3. The number of recommendations provided in enclosure (3) and the expansive effort
necessary to ensure full-implementation of each demand a whole of Navy approach.

4. Therefore, I direct the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Staff Security
Coordination Board (SCB) to serve as the Echelon-I lead for reviewing and implementing these
recommendations. No earlier than 1 July, the SCB will provide the following for discussion at a
Navy Corporate Forum (NCF) or other similar leadership forum chaired by the Vice Chief of
Naval Operations:

    a. A working group charter, detailing responsible organizations and participants.

    b. A plan of action and milestones, including a recommended battle rhythm.

Subj: INVESTIGATIONS INTO FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENTS ON PEARL HARBOR
NAVAL SHIPYARD OF 4 DECEMBER 2019 AND NAVAL AIR STATION
PENSACOLA OF 6 DECEMBER 2019

5. This effort shall also include a review of the Washington Navy Yard shooting investigation
to assess the status of each recommendation and determine which are complete, which are no
longer applicable, and which should be added into enclosure (3).

6. The safety and livelihood of our Sailors is dependent on this effort. My expectation is
recommendations are enacted within a year. Please direct any questions or concerns to CAPT
(b) (6)　　　, JAGC, who may be reached at (b)(6)　　　　or email:
(b)(6)　　　@navy.mil.

R. P. BURKE

Copy to:
COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA
COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
BUMED FALLS CHURCH VA
OGC WASHINGTON DC
NAVY JAG WASHINGTON DC
NETC PENSACOLA FL
CNIC WASHINGTON DC
COMNAVSEASYSCOM WASHINGTON DC
COMNAVSAFECEN NORFOLK VA
CHNAVPERS WASHINGTON DC
DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV QUANTICO VA

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
U.S. FLEET FORCES COMMAND
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 250
NORFOLK VA 23551-2487

5830
Ser N01L/032
21 Apr 20

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on RADM John F. Meier, USN, ltr 5830 Ser N00 of 21 Feb 20

From: Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command
To: Vice Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

Encl: (1) Command Investigation Report of 21 Feb 20

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded, concurring with the findings, opinions, and recommendations of
the investigating officer, as modified below. U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFFC) was granted
an extension until 24 April 2020 to prepare this endorsement. For awareness, this endorsement
was coordinated solely within USFFC.

2. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) criminal investigation is still ongoing.
Accordingly, this investigation is limited to the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident
to the extent information was available within Navy channels and/or released by the FBI, and on
a "not to interfere" basis with the FBI's criminal investigation. Therefore, if the FBI
investigation develops new information relevant to the scope of this investigation, it will need to
be reviewed and incorporated into the final endorsement, as necessary.

3. I concur with the report's five primary opinions, which drive the associated
recommendations across the chapters, specifically:

   a. **The key to fostering a positive command climate is to set a universal standard of
dignity and respect.** I strongly agree. This is commander's business; commanders are duty
bound to step fully into this responsibility and lead from the front. How we treat each other sets
the tone for the command and impacts morale with a direct effect on mission accomplishment
and unit cohesion. We must hold ourselves to the highest levels of professionalism across all
warfare areas and put aside outdated notions of community identity that no longer meet the
standards expected of our modern force.

   b. **Human factors played a role in this tragedy. Military leaders, government
employees, contracted employees, peers, and civilians knew of isolated events indicating a
potential issue, but remained unaware of the complete picture.** As the investigation
thoroughly identified, unfettered communication across organizational stovepipes is critical to
ensure timely, accurate, and effective factual understanding and risk identification, enabling
commanders to make fully informed decisions. Accordingly, we must implement the

2

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

investigation's recommendations to break down communication barriers at all levels of the
Department of Defense (DoD), whether those recommendations involve policy changes or
organizational realignment in order to implement the most effective command and control of the
International Military Student (IMS) training pipeline.

c. **We owe it to the three Sailors lost, the many wounded, and those who placed
themselves in harm's way on 6 December 2019 to change the appropriate policies, devote
sufficient resources, and assure our force we are doing everything in our power to keep
faith and keep them safe.** I will address resources in the next two opinions. Accordingly, I
want to emphasize the importance that all tenant commands participate in Anti-Terrorism
Working Groups (ATWGs) and Threat Working Groups (TWGs), and conduct Physical Security
(PS) surveys. It is through these venues and efforts that a command will arm itself with the
necessary information to make changes in processes, procedures, or to facilities in order to
provide the maximum level of security and safety for our people.

d. **Naval installations are operational platforms that are managing internal and
external threats on a daily basis. The Department of the Navy must man, train, and equip
installations and tenant commands in the same manner as it would any combat-ready ship,
submarine, or squadron.** I strongly agree. Physical Security (PS), Anti-terrorism (AT), and
Force Protection (FP) is commander's business – it is a no fail mission. Those commands that
continually self-assess through training and exercises identify deficiencies and immediately
correct them or seek needed resources to do so, enabling them to meet mission and mitigate risk.
That said, the Navy must appropriately resource commands, particularly installation commands,
in order for them to protect our most precious resource our people. (b) (7)(F)

e. (b) (7)(F)

Again, I strongly agree. (b) (7)(F)

Accordingly, USFF, in coordination with Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) N46 and Commander, Navy Installations Command
(CNIC) N3 have scheduled a review of the Mission Profile Validation-Protection (MPV-P) Post
validation tool in the summer of 2020. Additionally, USFF and U.S. Pacific Fleet, in
coordination with Navy Personnel Command (NPC), are working on a Shore Duty Manning
Target Levels Notice. (b) (7)(F)

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

4. **Incident Summary.** I concur with the Incident Summary, as written, except for the Recommendations discussed in paragraph 12 (Chapter 10) below. I specifically highlight the following:

In the Findings section, the investigation states "The self-radicalization of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani was the primary cause of this fatal attack. However, his actions and behaviors, along with the organizational environment inherent in the aviation pipeline, likely increased his probability of committing an insider attack. Military leaders, government employees, contracted employees, peers, and civilians knew of isolated events and indicators, but all remained unaware of a complete picture of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's potential threat indicators.... Based upon the information available at the time, no one person or organization knew or could have known 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani would attack active duty service members and civilians at Naval Aviation Schools Command (NASC)."

5. **Chapters 1 through 3 (Introduction, Sequence of Events, and Records Review).** I concur with Chapters 1 and 2 and the findings, opinions, and recommendations of Chapter 3, as written, and specifically highlight the following:

a. Opinion 3.1.2 identified that numerous parallel databases (SAN-WEB and TIMS) and hard copy records decrease the likelihood of commands conducting a holistic review of each student as each transitions from command to command over the course of aviation instruction.

I *strongly concur* with Recommendation 3.1, which recommends Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) (Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity (NETSAFA)) and Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) review aviation records management practices, increase digitalization, and enable single-source records review for both international and U.S. aviation students through enterprise software. In order for commanders to make fully informed decisions, they must have a tool that provides them a holistic overview of the student's progress.

b. Finding 3.3 found that 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani took multiple trips outside the local Pensacola area without his chain of command's knowledge. Additionally, Opinion 3.3.7 states a lack of command ownership of IMS fosters a lax environment for accountability. For awareness, on 13 January 2020, Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Intelligence and Security (I&S) issued a memorandum on Continuous Review for IMS, which required training institutions to establish policies and procedures for oversight of IMS travel during their training programs and to align these requirements with comparable limitations of U.S. students.

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

6. **Chapter 4 (Command Climate).** I concur with the findings, opinions, and
recommendations of Chapter 4, as modified below, and I specifically highlight the following:

a. Finding 4.1 found that the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI)
Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS) exclusion of students at training commands limits a
command's opportunity to accurately assess command climate on all but the assigned staff.

I *concur* with Recommendations 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 recommending NETC and CNATRA
implement a standardized process across subordinate commands to gather and analyze holistic
feedback by IMS.

b. Finding 4.2 found the NASC International Military Training Office (IMTO) created an
adverse working environment.

I *concur* with Recommendation 4.2.5 but *modify* it to read "Recommend the NASC
Commanding Officer (CO), in consultation with NETC and the servicing Human Resource
Office (HRO), investigate the allegations against (b)(6)⬛ and take accountability
action, as deemed appropriate."

c. Finding 4.2.2 found that in December 2019, after the shooting incident, a German Air
Force (GAF) 1st Lieutenant submitted a letter to his commanding officer summarizing the
unprofessional treatment of international students by the NASC IMTO. The investigation also
found that in late Spring 2019, the GAF Second Training Squadron's CO and executive officer
(XO) brought a complaint to (b)(6)⬛ s supervisor, (b)(6)⬛ ; however, no
preliminary inquiry or investigation was conducted, and there is no record of the complaint
documented by NASC.

I *concur* with Recommendation 4.2.2.2, which recommends NETC investigate the failure to
comply with the command's harassment policy in the handling of the complaint raised by the
GAF Second Training Squadron.

d. Finding 4.4 found that 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani filed an equal opportunity complaint against a
Training Air Wing Six (TW-6) ground school contractor instructor. On 25 April 2019, after
collaboration between Commander, TW-6 and CAE USA (contractor's employer) agreed to, and
CNATRA N4 approved, the contractor instructor was issued a Corrective Action Memo.

I *concur* with Recommendations 4.4.1 through 4.4.4 to clarify the applicability of the Equal
Opportunity (EO) Program to IMS. I also *concur* with Recommendation 4.4.5 recommending
CNATRA address the incident with CAE USA, ensuring they understand the importance of a
professional training environment for all students and cultural sensitivity related to IMS, in
particular.

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

7. **Chapter 5 (Force Protection)**. I concur with the findings, opinions, and recommendations of Chapter 5, as modified below, and I specifically highlight the following:

a. Finding 5.1 found that 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani legally purchased a personal firearm under existing federal law, but he violated installation policy by bringing the unregistered weapon onto the installation and into his Public Private Venture (PPV) residence. Subsequent to the incident, on 16 January 2020, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) signed a memorandum prohibiting IMS and their family members from transporting, possessing, storing, or using privately owned firearms and non-official ammunition on DoD installations. Additionally, the memorandum requires IMS participating in DoD training to agree in writing, as a condition of participation, not to bring a privately owned firearm or non-official ammunition with them to the United States, purchase a privately owned firearm or non-official ammunition while in the United States, or possess or use another individual's privately owned firearm or non-official ammunition off of DoD installations. Additionally, on 31 January 2020, the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) released ALNAV 013/20, which implements the 16 January 2020 SECDEF memo within the Navy.

(1) Recommendation 5.1.1 is *modified* to add the following sentence: (b) (7)(F) ███████

███████ "

(2) Recommendation 5.1.2 is *modified* to add the following sentence: "Recommend tenant command commanding officers with oversight responsibilities for IMS and their families ensure these personnel are briefed on the privately owned firearms/non-official ammunition prohibition."

(3) Recommendation 5.1.3 *modified* to add the following sentences: "Recommend CNIC add this recommendation to the Region Assessment (RASS) checklist in the CNIC Training Manual (TRAMAN) for continuous monitoring to ensure compliance. The RASS is a component of the Installation Command Assessment for Readiness and Training (CART)/Final Evaluation Problem (FEP) certification process and provides the Region Commander's acknowledgement of installation FEP preparedness."

b. Finding 5.2 found that installation policy and procedures did not prevent 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani from bringing an unauthorized weapon onto Naval Air Station Pensacola (NASP).

(b) (5)

███

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

(1) Recommendation 5.2.1 is *modified* to add the following sentence: "However, additional armed personnel must be integrated into the installation security forces through an ASF to ensure unity of command is maintained in response to threats."

(2) Recommendation 5.2.2 is *modified* to add the following sentences: "'Proactive' active shooter response training should also incorporate vignettes that encompass multiple situations that prompt different reactions. Vignettes should stimulate decisive actions on whether the trainees should run, hide, or resist/fight."

c. Finding 5.3 found that OPNAV has not issued implementing policy for arming personnel beyond Navy Security Forces (NSF) requirements. (b) (5)

(b) (5)

Additionally, (b) (5)
(b) (5)

(b) (5)   Finally, (b) (5)
(b) (5)
(b) (5)   (b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

(b) (5)

d. Finding 5.4 found that NASC, TW-6, Training Squadron TEN (VT-10), and Training
Squadron EIGHTY-SIX (VT-86) were not in full compliance with AT and PS program and
policy requirements due to gaps in policy, lack of training, and a lack of understanding of who
has ownership of the PS program. Opinion 5.4 states "Tenant commands are not prepared to
develop and implement effective AT and PS programs."

(1) Recommendation 5.4.1 is *modified* to read "Recommend OPNAV develop minimum
PS standards and engage with the Mission Assurance Senior Steering Group (MA SSG) to
ensure alignment across DoD."

(2) Recommendation 5.4.2 is *modified* by deleting the words (b) (5)   (b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(4) Recommendation 5.4.5 is *modified* to read "Recommend USFF, in conjunction with
NETC/Center for Security Forces (CENSECFOR), review the Commanding Officer Anti-
terrorism Training (COAT) curriculum (AT Level III) and update to ensure emphasis on AT and
PS resourcing and program management. NETC would retain curriculum responsibility for

8

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

updates for the AT Level III course of instruction and should retain responsibility for ensuring resourcing and program management are appropriately emphasized."

(5) Recommendation 5.4.6 is *modified* to read "Recommend NPC investigate AT Level III for XO and Officer in Charge (OIC) pipeline training and make final recommendation to CNO after studying possible benefits." (b) (5)

(b) (5)

(6) Recommendation 5.4.7 is *modified* by deleting the words (b) (5)   (b) (5)

(b) (5)

(7) Recommendation 5.4.9 is *modified* to read "Recommend NETC develop a PS course to provide tenant command PS Officers with the requisite knowledge to develop, implement and execute an effective PS program. PS course development should be conducted in concert with Recommendation 5.5.5 (Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Security Training Assistance and Assessment Teams (STAAT) Navy Physical Security Course." (b) (5)

(b) (5)

(8) Recommendation 5.4.11 (Recommend NASC participate in installation ATWGs and TWGs) is *concurred* with as written.

Action Update: At the 23 January 2020 Force Protection Executive Board (FPEB), NAVNORTH directed Region Commanders to engage with Installation Commanders to reinforce tenant participation at subject working groups. This was added to the FPEB Due-out Tasker and each Region Commander has been tasked to provide an update at the 29 May 2020 FPEB Update IPR to CUSFFC.

(9) Recommendation 5.4.12 is *modified* to add the following sentence: "Recommend that NASP consider leveraging the CITADEL SHIELD exercise window annually to exercise tenant and activity AT Plans."

(10) Recommendations 5.4.14, 5.6.1, 5.7.1, and 5.7.2 (Active Shooter Training/Completion Tracking) are *concurred* with as written.

Action Update: U.S. Fleet Forces Command/U.S. Naval Forces Northern Command (NAVNORTH) mandated active shooter training for all Navy forces located in the USNORTHCOM AoR (DTG: 261212Z SEP19). This required instructional training, and the conduct of a Table-Top/Field Training Exercises. This has been a USFF/NAVNORTH annual requirement since FY-16. Commands were encouraged to leverage the CITADEL SHIELD/SOLID CURTAIN AT exercise period to conduct coordinated active shooter training. Following the Pensacola shooting incident, SECNAV directed a Fleet-wide security stand-down. USFF reinforced this requirement by directing all Budget Submitting Office (BSO)

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

60 units to conduct security training on Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAMS), current PS posture, Insider Threats, and Active Shooter validation of pre-planned responses. 100% of BSO 60 units reported completion.

    e. Finding 5.5.1 found that NASC did not complete an annual PS survey. Opinion 5.5.1 states "NASC failed to exercise responsibility for the physical security of its spaces and facility perimeter." Opinion 5.5.2 states "Navy policy concerning PS responsibilities of tenant commands is insufficient."

    (1) Recommendation 5.5.1 is **modified** to add the following sentences: "Efforts to update Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) Standards should be informed by NAVADMIN 026/18, which provided options for security construction standards based on defense in depth and assessed risk. UFC 4-010-01 (Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings) was subsequently updated on December 2018 incorporating these requirements."

    (2) Recommendation 5.5.2 is **modified** to read "Recommend NASC conduct annual PS surveys of facilities and biannual security inspections, as required, and provide the results of the surveys to the installation commander upon completion."

    (3) Recommendation 5.5.6 (Recommend tenant commanders ensure annual PS surveys of facilities are conducted, provided to the installation, and reported annually to the regional commander) is **concurred** with as written.

    Action Update: At the 23 January 2020 FPEB, NAVNORTH directed Region Commanders to engage with Installation Commanders to reinforce mandated tenant command completion of PS surveys and to provide them to their host installations. This tasking was added to the FPEB Due-out Tasker and each Region Commander has been tasked to provide an update at the 29 May 2020 FPEB Update IPR to CUSFFC.

    f. Finding 5.6 found that the Center for Naval Aviation Technical Training (CNATT) ATO did not conduct AT Program Reviews on NASC. I also highlight Opinion 5.6.1 that states "CNATT failed to provide adequate oversight of the AT program at NASC." Recommendation 5.6.2 states "Recommend Echelon II and III commands provide AT program oversight, requirements, and program reviews for subordinate commands." I **concur**.

    (1) Recommendation 5.6.2.1 is **added** and reads "Recommend CNO direct Echelon II Commanders to provide OPNAV N3/N5, at the beginning of each fiscal year, a 3-year plan (updated annually) describing how subordinate AT Program Reviews will be conducted and provide a list verifying subordinate AT Program Review completion to OPNAV N3/N5 by the end of each fiscal year. Recommend updating OPNAVINST 3300.53C (Navy Antiterrorism Program) to codify this requirement."

    (2) Recommendation 5.6.2.2 is **added** and reads "Recommend CNO direct all Navy Component Commanders to conduct Higher Headquarters Operational Assessments (HHOA) and spot checks of their subordinate commands' (up to 10 percent) AT Plans, designated

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

Restricted Areas, and RAM Plans. Recommend updating OPNAVINST 3300.53C to codify this requirement."

Action Update: As a result of the recent Naval Inspector General Command Inspection and Area Assessment of USFF, USFF/U.S. Naval Forces Northern Command, during installation HHOA assessments, will conduct spot checks of tenant commands' (up to 10 percent) AT Plans, designated Restricted Areas, and RAM Plans as a part of each installation assessment. USFF HHOA policy and AT Operational Order will be revised to incorporate this new requirement.

(3) Recommendation 5.6.2.3 is *added* and reads "Recommend CNO update OPNAVINST 3300.53C requiring the "Naval Inspector General verify Echelon II commands are conducting triennial AT Program Reviews of subordinates during Echelon II Command Inspections."

g.   Finding 5.10 found that NASP NSF and ██(b) (7)(F)██
██ I also highlight Opinion
5.10.10 that states the (b) (7)(F)██
████████████████████████████" Therefore, I *strongly concur* with
Recommendation 5.10.4 (Recommend OPNAV establish a single FP resource sponsor to align and provide resourcing for AT, LE, and PS pillars to support the FP mission).

(1) Recommendations 5.10.1, 5.10.2, 5.10.3, 7.5.1, 7.5.2, and 7.9.1 (MPV-P Post Validation Tool – manpower requirements) are *concurred* with as written; however, they must be conducted in parallel to ensure that a consistent output is developed.

(2) **Action Update:** USFF coordinated with OPNAV N46 and CNIC N3 to schedule a review of the MPV-P Post Validation tool in the summer of 2020. This effort will incorporate all manpower-related recommendations (e.g., ROC Level Designation Changes, Emergency Manager functions, etc.) from the investigation to ensure that the total requirement is incorporated into the post validation model.

h.   (b) (7)(F)
██
██
██
██
██
████████████████████████████████████ I *concur*.

(1) Recommendation 5.11.1 is *modified* to add the following sentence: "The NTTP should govern independent ashore responses, independent afloat responses, and an integrated ashore-afloat response."

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

(b) (7)(F)

(b) (5)

j.   Finding 5.13 found that the Navy has not established Small Arms Weapons Simulators
(SAWS) as a Program of Record. Opinion 5.13.1 states "A SAWS Program of Record would
enhance the opportunities for realistic scenario-based simulated training." Opinion 5.13.2 states
"Tactical proficiency, experience and preparedness can only be developed through rigorous and
repetitive exposure to scenario-based training." I *concur* with these opinions.

Recommendation 5.13.1 is *modified* to read "Recommend OPNAV determine which
OPNAV Code/Resource Sponsor is best suited to establish a Small Arms Weapons Simulator
(SAWS) Program of Record in order to facilitate increased small arms training against dynamic
targets for active shooter response preparedness. Currently, SAWS are required for use across
all domains to meet Navy training and proficiency requirements; necessitating a Program of
Record."

(b)
)
(7
)
(F
)

(1) Recommendation 5.14.1 is *modified* to read "Recommend OPNAV and NAVSEA
coordinate with the other armed services to determine if the analysis and benefits from their

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

service pistol transitions translate to the Navy as well. Upon completion of analysis, provide corresponding recommendation to CNO."

(2) Recommendation 5.14.2 is *modified* to read "Recommend CNIC and PMS-408 review existing studies of optical sights conducted by the other armed services and by first responders to quantify their benefit. Upon completion of analysis, provide corresponding recommendation to CNO."

l. Recommendation 5.15.2 (Recommend OPNAV N1 direct the Program Executive Office for Enterprise Information Systems (PEO EIS) to establish the training requirement for Insider Threat in FLTMPS) is *renumbered* to 5.15.3.

8. **Chapter 6 (Screening, Vetting, and Monitoring).** I concur with the findings, opinions, and recommendations of Chapter 6, as modified below, and I specifically highlight the following:

a. Finding 6.1 found that the Navy does not have a codified role in the vetting of IMS; however, the service retains the authority to enhance DoD, Department of State (DoS), and host nation vetting process. Opinion 6.1.1 states "Vetting and screening of IMS is not a function of the DoN; however, it is the responsibility of the service to execute continuous, even if redundant, review of international personnel who are working with U.S. Navy personnel and at U.S. Navy installations in order to minimize risk to mission and risk to force." I *concur*. On 13 January 2020, USD (I&S) signed a memorandum directing implementation of enhanced screening, vetting, and continuous review processes for IMS.

Recommendation 6.1.1.1 is *added* and reads "During the initial vetting process and as a pre-requisite for receiving training, recommend DoS or DoD require IMS to sign a consent to continuous monitoring form, including social media, with adequate time to pre-screen them prior to arrival in the U.S."

(b) (7)(F)

I *concur* with Recommendation 6.2.1 (Recommend DoN IT Hub (Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Policy DUSN(P)) review and validate its concept of operations and data sources as well as evaluate potential capabilities for continuous, social media review for all personnel who hold "sensitive positions" to include all IMS." However, in reviewing and implementing this recommendation, we must ensure the courses of action are legally unobjectionable.

c. Finding 6.4 found that initial mental health screening depends upon self-reporting by personnel. This process is insufficient for the identification of predispositions, which increase an individual's risk to self and to others. Neither SECNAVINST 4950.4B nor DSCA 5105.38

13

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

Manual requires IMS psychological evaluation by a medical provider, and neither instruction requires completion of a psychological battery as part of the IMS medical screening process. Opinion 6.4.1 states "Improved mental health screening mitigates risk caused by personal predispositions." Opinion 6.4.3 states "Because of the high-risk nature of aviation training, additional mental health batteries and screening of IMS [should] occur." I *concur*.

I *concur* with Recommendation 6.4.4 (Recommend DoD and DoS review the feasibility of establishing a universal policy requiring psychological and behavioral batteries for all international military personnel training or working in the United States). Although a psychological battery may not have identified 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani as an insider threat, we need to seriously and carefully consider implementing this recommendation as it may identify someone and prevent a future incident.

9. **Chapter 7 (Emergency Management Response)**. I concur with the findings, opinions, and recommendations of Chapter 7, as modified below, and I specifically highlight the following:

a. Finding 7.1 found that Emergency Management (EM) responders failed to establish unity of command and unity of effort in the provision of emergency services. While a Unified Command Post (UCP) was established, it did not coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the on-scene EM effort. (b) (7)(F) Opinion 7.1.4 states "to achieve unity of effort and unity of command, agencies must regularly conduct training and rehearsal exercises."

(b) (7)(F)

b. Recommendation 7.2.2 is *modified* to delete (b) (5) and replace with "occupied buildings."

c. Recommendation 7.2.3 is *modified* to read "Recommend OPNAV, in coordination with BUMED, require and provide bleeding control training for all DoN personnel, to include contractors, in conjunction with Automated External Defibrillator (AED) training."

d. As previously stated, Recommendations 5.10.1, 5.10.2, 5.10.3, 7.5.1, 7.5.2, and 7.9.1 must be conducted in parallel to ensure that a consistent output is developed.

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

e. Finding 7.6 found that Mutual Aid Agreements (MAA) and Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) between NASP and local agencies were allowed to lapse. Opinion 7.6.2

(b) (7)(F)

" I *strongly concur*.

Accordingly, I *strongly concur* with Recommendations 7.6.1 through 7.6.5 related to
requiring the developing, maintaining, tracking, and exercising of MAAs and MOUs with local
authorities to include law enforcement, emergency services, and medical services. As previously
stated, this is vital to ensuring an effective, coordinated response to any incident and protecting
the safety and welfare of our personnel and family members.

f. Recommendation 7.8.1 is *modified* to read "If legally unobjectionable, recommend
OPNAV promulgate a directive requiring registration of all devices in AtHoc and an attainment
report by all commanders."

g. Finding 7.9 found that the NASP Emergency Operations Center (EOC) failed to achieve
full operational capability (b) (7)(F) . The NASP
Emergency Action Plan did not specify how they would validate and authorize Mission Essential
Personnel (MEP) access, and did not practice emergency ingress. Accordingly, many MEP EOC
personnel experienced difficulty in entering the base, delaying the manning and initialization of
full EOC capabilities. I *strongly concur* with Opinions 7.9.1 through 7.9.4 related to lack of
mission readiness and single points of failure.

Accordingly, I *strongly concur* with Recommendations 7.9.1 through 7.9.6. Additionally,
recommendation 7.9.5 is *modified* to read "Recommend CNIC implement centralized reporting
of EM drills and exercises through its Region Commanders. Recommend CNIC ensure
schedule, execution standards, and requirements are incorporated into the CNIC TRAMAN." I
strongly recommend all installations review and implement these recommendations to ensure
mission readiness.

10. **Chapter 8 (Post-response Support).** I concur with the findings, opinions, and
recommendations of Chapter 8, as modified below, and I specifically highlight the following:

a. Finding 8.1 found that NASC was unable to expeditiously submit a Personnel Casualty
Report (PCR), delaying notification of affected families. Due to the NASC's primary Casualty
Assistance Calls Officer (CACO) being unavailable for personal reasons and the secondary
CACO being on leave, NASC assigned an officer, who was untrained, to perform CACO duties.
The acting CACO encountered issues with reporting because she did not have remote access to
the administrative and personnel records systems at NASC. Accordingly, she requested support
from the staff of Commander, Navy Region Southeast East (CNRSE) to complete the required
PCRs. Initially, CNRSE rejected this request citing it as a parent command responsibility.
However, the CNRSE CACO eventually assisted and submitted the PCRs. Additionally, the

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

NASP Personnel Support Detachment (PSD) denied the acting CACO access to Navy Standard Integrated Personnel System (NSIPS) to protect Personally Identifiable Information (PII). I *strongly concur* with Opinions 8.1.1 through 8.1.7, and specifically highlight Opinion 8.1.4 that states "BUPERS and NASP PSD created barriers to the completion of the required PCR rather than facilitate completion," and Opinion 8.1.7 that states "ISICs are responsible for removing obstacles and providing assistance to their subordinates to enable mission success."

Accordingly, I *strongly concur* with Recommendations 8.1.1 through 8.1.4. The fact that immediate response from the CNRSE CACO and NASP PSD was to raise barriers to assistance rather than find a solution concerns me. Additionally, this incident highlights the importance of selecting the right CACO and the need for leadership to make an informed decision in the CACO selection. This is a no fail mission, and it must be treated as such by leadership and all involved in the process.

b. Finding 8.5 found that post-incident support services were not fully integrated and coordinated across all military and civilian stakeholders. Specifically, that when Naval Hospital Pensacola (NHP) requested a SPRINT team through Navy Medicine East (NAVMEDEAST) to support immediate mental health issues, NAVMEDEAST rejected the initial request because of the perceived adequacy of available local mental health providers in Pensacola. After a follow-on conversation with NHP, NAVMEDEAST authorized SPRINT activation.

(1) I *non-concur* with (b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5) and Recommendation 8.5.1 (b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5) Accordingly, Recommendation 8.5.1 is *modified* to read, "Recommend OPNAV, in coordination with CNIC and BUMED, revise OPNAVINST 3440.17A to state the following: 'In conjunction with the regional medical commander, an installation commander (or their ISIC) shall coordinate a tailored mental health resource response up to, and possibly including, a SPRINT team. The regional medical commander should have the authority to immediately order the initiation of travel for assigned medical personnel for this purpose.'"

(2) Recommendation 8.5.2 is *modified* to read "Recommend BUMED immediately review mental health capacity at NASP and NHP to determine the adequacy of continuing care for individuals impacted by the attack. Additionally, recommend BUMED direct all military treatment facilities to develop a contingency plan to assess and support the continuing care of individuals impacted by future traumatic events somewhere across the Navy."

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
        STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

11. **Chapter 9 (Holistic Review).** I concur with the findings, opinions, and recommendations of Chapter 9, as modified below, and I specifically highlight the following:

   a.   Finding 9.1 found that there are no mechanisms within either the aviation pipeline or the Navy to enable commands to conduct fully informed risk assessments for insider threat and destructive behaviors. I *strongly concur* with Opinions 9.1.1 through 9.1.9 that identify several independent tools and resources being used to track a variety of factors; however, none of them are consolidated to create a holistic view of a student's situation.

   Accordingly, I *strongly concur* with Recommendations 9.1.1 through 9.1.10 to shore up the identified gaps and seams in order to provide commanders a holistic view of a student and enabling the commander to make a fully informed decision.

   b.   Finding 9.2 found the command and control (C2) of the aviation pipeline is divided between NETC and CNATRA. NETC, through Center for Naval Aviation Technical Training (CNATT), exercises chain of command authority over NASC. CNATRA, through TW-6, exercises chain of command authority over VT-10 and VT-86. I *strongly concur* with Opinions 9.2.1 through 9.2.5 that opine on the absence of unity of command in the aviation training pipeline and the inadequacy of an MOU arrangement to establish unity of effort.

   Accordingly, I *strongly concur* with Recommendation 9.2.1 (Recommend OPNAV N1 and Fleet Commanders review the command relationships between NETC and CNATRA and submit an Organization Change Request for NASC to reflect optimal command relationships). Revised command relationships should ensure consolidation of administrative oversight of IMS.

   c.   Finding 9.3 found that all commands within the IMS aviation pipeline do not maintain agreements with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) regarding Country Liaison Officer (CLO) performance standards, expectations, and actionable option for remediating low standards. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Security Assistance Management Manual requires that CLO support and duties, including performance standards, will be identified and stated in an agreement between the unit and sponsoring country. However, SECNAVINST 4950.4B (Joint Security Cooperation, Education, and Training) does not provide actionable options for low standards of performance by the CLO. The investigation identified that the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) CLO rarely attended Navy Tactical Intelligence Center's (NTIC) weekly progress reviews covering KSA IMS at various stages of training. Additionally, the RSAF CLO returned to KSA in September 2019, without an identified relief, resulting in a perceived degradation in grooming standards of the KSA IMS and the failure to conduct weekly housing inspections.

   I *strongly concur* with Opinions 9.3.1 through 9.3.5 and Recommendations 9.3.1 through 9.3.5 to strengthen the Navy's position regarding CLO performance, as the CLO is a vital resource in ensuring the enforcement of good order and discipline and monitoring the IMS's progress throughout training.

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

d. Finding 9.4.2 found that the Navy IMSO program lacks sufficient oversight, requisite cultural training, adequate Security Cooperation Education Training Program (SCETP) training, and adequate resourcing to ensure mission success. The investigation also found that within IMS programs, fellow U.S. students, staff, and contractors are not required to complete cultural awareness/competency training. In light of the cultural insensitivities identified within the NASC IMTO, I *strongly concur* with Opinions 9.4.2.1 through 9.4.2.8 and Recommendations 9.4.2.1 through 9.4.2.12. We need to carefully review the identified issues, develop coordinated solutions, and properly resource those solutions to ensure mission success. Again, this is a no fail mission, and we owe it to our foreign partners, who are sending their personnel to train alongside our personnel.

12. **Chapter 10 (Opinions and Recommendations).** I concur with the opinions and recommendations of Chapter 10 as modified below. I concur that the identified recommendations require immediate action, with the exception of the below recommendations.

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

13. **Accountability Action.** The investigation found that at the time of the attack, NCIS was not aware of any reports indicating a specific, credible threat to Department of the Navy personnel, facilities, or assets in the Florida panhandle. Additionally, the investigation determined the self-radicalization of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani was the primary cause of this fatal shooting incident. Although military leaders, civilian employees, contractors, and peers knew of isolated incidents and indicators, no one possessed a complete picture of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's potential threat indicators that would lead someone to reasonably believe he would commit a violent attack. This lack of a complete picture was partially due to the complexity of command and control of the IMS aviation pipeline. Specifically, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani reported to five separate training commands over his 18-months onboard NASP - some reported to NETC and others to CNATRA. The identified deficiency (potential contributing factor) is that no formal mechanism existed within the training pipeline to share information, thereby inhibiting fully informed risk assessments of IMS.

The investigation also identified deficiencies in the lack of a continuous review policy for IMS, a lack of mental health assessments required for IMS during the screening process, and the approximate 3-month gap of the RSAF CLO (all potential contributing factors). Additionally, the investigation identified instances of noncompliance and/or deficiency related to FP policies, training, doctrine, personnel and facilities (all primary non-contributing factors), including NASC's failure to conduct PS Surveys and active shooter training in FY19; Training Wing 6, Training Squadron 10, and Training Squadron 86 failure to complete active shooter training in

18

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

FY19; NASP NSF manning issues; and a lack of a mutual aid agreement or coordinated active shooter incident response training between NASP and local law enforcement agencies.

The investigation categorized the above instances of noncompliance or deficiencies as either potential contributing factors or primary non-contributing factors, and in my opinion, they were not the result of intentional misconduct or negligence. However, as the above commands fall outside my chain of command, I defer accountability decisions to the appropriate chain of command.

That said, the investigation also identified as a potential contributing factor the alleged maltreatment of IMS by ██████ of NASC's International Military Training Office. Additionally, the investigation found that ██████ 's supervisor failed to comply with NASC's equal opportunity/harassment policy in the handling of a complaint by a German Air Force Training Squadron in late Spring 2019. Accordingly, by copy of this endorsement, these two matters are referred to NETC and NASC, as a matter under their cognizance, for further investigation and action, as deemed appropriate.

Similarly, the investigation identified inappropriate behavior (assigning nicknames to students) by a contractor student pilot instructor at Training Wing 6. While the complaint was adjudicated via equal opportunity channels, by copy of this endorsement, I am referring this matter to CNATRA, as a matter under their cognizance, to further address this matter with the contractor's employer, as necessary.

14. USFFC will take lead and track those recommendations that fall within U.S. Fleet Forces Command's authority, as CNO's Executive Agent for Force Protection or otherwise, to implement, and will coordinate and collaborate, as necessary, with all other designated recommendation leads. Accordingly, USFFC will provide periodic status reports to Echelon I through completion.

15. In closing, I echo the Investigating Officer's overarching opinion that the courage and indomitable spirit of our Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen, and our civilian first responders remains strong. On 6 December 2019, many military, DoN civilian personnel, and local civilian first responders bravely performed under extremely challenging circumstances, many were wounded, and three gave the ultimate sacrifice in the service of their country. We owe it to everyone to carefully review the lessons learned from this investigation and make the necessary changes at all levels of the military and federal government in order to ensure we doing everything in our power to mitigate, and hopefully prevent, a similar tragedy in the future.

C. W. GRADY

Copy to:
CPF
CNAP

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT ON NAVAL AIR
        STATION PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

CNIC
JAG
NCIS
NETC
CNATRA
CNRSE
NASC

COMMAND INVESTIGATION REPORT

FATAL SHOOTING INCIDENT

AT NAVAL AIR STATION PENSACOLA,

FLORIDA ON

6 DECEMBER 2019

February 21, 2020

Table of Contents

Chapter 4—Command Climate

Chapter 5—Force Protection

Chapter 6—Screening, Vetting, and Monitoring

Chapter 7—Emergency Management Response

Chapter 8—Postresponse Support

Chapter 9—Holistic Overview

Incident Summary

At approximately 0640 local on 6 December 2019, 2nd Lt Mohammad Saeed Al-Shamrani, an RSAF flight student, entered Naval Aviation Schools Command (NASC), located in Building 633, Naval Air Station Pensacola (NASP). 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani was armed with a GLOCK-45 9mm handgun and equipped with multiple, extended-capacity ammunition magazines. At 0643, he entered the quarterdeck area and killed two United States Navy watch standers. From 0643 to 0652, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani moved throughout the building, killing one additional Sailor and injuring five other military and civilian personnel. At 0652, NASP Navy security forces (NSF) entered the quarterdeck and engaged 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani in a running gun battle; one NSF civilian police officer was injured. At 0656, Escambia County Sheriff's Office (ECSO) deputies entered the building to assist NSF and immediately engaged 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani. Two ECSO deputies were wounded. At 0658, an ECSO deputy killed 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani with a rifle. (b) (7)(F)

In total, three U.S. personnel were killed and eight injured.

At the time of the incident, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) terrorist threat level for the United States was "SIGNIFICANT," defined by the following conditions: "Anti-U.S. terrorists are operationally active and attack personnel as the preferred method of operation; or, terrorist groups seek to carry out large casualty producing attacks but are operationally limited."1

As of 18 September 2019, NCIS was not aware of any reports indicating a specific, credible threat to Department of the Navy (DoN) personnel, facilities, or assets in the Florida Panhandle.

On December 19, 2019, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) directed Commander, United States Fleet Forces Command (USFFC) to convene a command investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the fatal shooting incident at NASP. On December 20, 2019, USFFC appointed RADM John F. Meier as the investigating officer to complete an investigation into the facts and circumstances to include 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's record; his relationship with the victims; command climate at his associated training commands and squadrons; his weapon acquisition; execution of and procedural compliance with force protection and emergency management programs, policies, and procedures; responsibilities for vetting and onboarding of international military students (IMS); active shooter and insider threat training and response; post-incident response; a holistic overview of international flight training; significant impacts to NASP personnel and their workplace safety concerns; and recommendations for changes in programs, policies, procedures, and manning levels to improve physical security and confidence in workplace security.

RADM Meier assembled an investigation team comprised of subject matter experts (SMEs) in mental health, medical services, force protection, emergency management, installations, law, naval aviation, and other unrestricted line communities. The investigation team employed an interdisciplinary, fact-finding approach and reviewed documents, interviewed witnesses and headquarters SMEs, and conducted field observations. This approach included assessment of personnel and commands across the international student flight training program. *The principal goal of this investigation was to identify means to reduce the likelihood of future, violent acts by insider threats and to rapidly mitigate their*

impact should they occur. The investigation team completed its work on February 20, 2020, and this report documents the team's findings, opinions, and recommendations.

Findings

The self-radicalization of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani was the primary cause of this fatal attack. However, his actions and behaviors, along with the organizational environment inherent in the aviation pipeline, likely increased his probability of committing an insider attack. Military leaders, government employees, contracted employees, peers, and civilians knew of isolated events and indicators, but all remained unaware of a complete picture of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's potential threat indicators. While these indicators are apparent in hindsight, they were not evident in aggregate before 6 December 2019. Based upon the information available at the time, no one person or organization knew or could have known 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani would attack active duty service members and civilians at NASC.

There are six primary reasons a complete picture of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's path to radicalization was not recognized and interrupted. First, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani performed adequately across the aviation pipeline and his record contained neither disciplinary nor significant performance issues. Second, during his time at NASP, he reported to five separate commands over an 18-month period, limiting oversight by individual commanders. Third, his weapon purchase and training remained unknown to U.S. military and civilian leadership. Fourth, his social media presence and radical posts remained unknown to U.S. military and civilian leadership. Fifth, his multiple instances of unauthorized travel within the United States remained unknown to U.S. military and civilian leadership. Finally, a documented equal opportunity complaint was considered closed 7 months before the attack, though likely not to the satisfaction of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani. Based on

existing policies, programs, and procedures, the investigation team could not conclude anyone should have identified 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani as a threat.

Utilizing critical path analysis, the investigation team identified contributing factors potentially influencing 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's action. The presence, or in some cases absence, of these risk factors and organizational conditions may have influenced the sequence of events leading to the attack. These factors include:

- Adverse IMS microclimate at NASC
- Harassment by a Training Wing SIX (TW-6)-contracted instructor
- Perceived inadequacy of the resolution of an equal opportunity (EO) harassment complaint
- Inattention and absence of the RSAF country liaison officer (CLO), responsible for good order and discipline
- Perceived inadequacy of religious facilities by Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) IMS and RSAF leadership
- Reported noise infractions at his public-private venture (PPV) residence
- Observation of his attempted weapon purchase by a TW-6-contracted instructor
- Isolated, questionable interactions with instructors and international military student officers (IMSO)
- Self-isolation from other KSA IMS
- Unfulfilled verbal request to complete advanced Undergraduate Military Flight Officer (UMFO) training with his roommate
- Departure of his roommate on leave in November 2019
- Social media network risks

- Absence of a coordinated, risk assessment process
- Numerous instances of unauthorized leave and travel

In addition, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani likely faced additional personal and professional stressors due to a language barrier, cultural differences, and the rigor of high-risk aviation training and academics. Mitigating these individual risk factors may not have stopped 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani from evolving into a hostile insider threat, yet they may have lessened his cumulative load of stress, pressure, and anger. Nonetheless, the majority of these risk factors and organizational conditions are not unique to 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani or IMS writ large. In the absence of proactive leadership, positive command climates, and personalized risk management, they may also apply equally to our own Sailors and civilian personnel.

The specific findings, opinions, and recommendations of the investigation team are included in Chapters 3 through 10 and Appendix B of this report. The findings are grouped into two general categories–potential contributing factors and noncontributing factors. Mitigation of potential contributing factors may have interrupted the critical path leading to the attack. Noncontributing factors did not directly impact the critical path, but should be addressed to prevent or mitigate future attacks, improve our readiness, and assure the safety of our force. In accordance with the convening order, the findings are categorized based on compliance with applicable law, regulation, programs, policies, and procedures; or deficiency in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). All recommendations identify an actionable entity in alignment with its known authorities.

Potential Contributing Factors

On 05 April 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani filed an EO complaint against a TW-6-contracted instructor, who referred to him as "Pornstache." 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani expressed his frustration with the inadequacy of the subsequent apology and the slow time line for remediation (39 days). His assigned chains of command (COC) at TW-6 and Training Squadron TEN (VT-10) never met with him regarding the complaint. **(Noncompliance/Deficiency)**

On 20 July 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani legally purchased a weapon under current federal law. He violated United States Navy regulations and KSA policy by purchasing the weapon, transporting it onto NASP, and storing it in his PPV residence. While a TW-6-contracted instructor was present when 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani applied to purchase the weapon on 11 July 2019, he was unaware of the firearms prohibition for IMS. **(Noncompliance/Deficiency)**

Command climate surveys (e.g., Defense Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (DEOCS)) show positive command climates across the aviation pipeline at NASP; however, these surveys include neither U.S. students nor IMS. The investigation revealed an adverse microclimate for all students at NASC. IMS identified NASC's International Military Training Office (IMTO) as a contributing factor to this adverse command climate. IMTO personnel subjected IMS to derogatory and sometimes abusive comments as well as humiliating public reprimands. While U.S. military and civilian leaders were aware of IMS complaints, they did not proactively intervene and correct the IMTO staff. **(Noncompliance)**

2nd Lt Al-Shamrani reported to five separate training commands over his 18-months at NASP, resulting in an absence of command ownership. VT-10 reviewed him quarterly as part of Human Factors Councils (HFC). Navy

Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity (NETSAFA) International Training Center (NITC) conducted weekly student reviews of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani and other KSA IMS in the aviation pipeline. Neither body briefed or documented any adverse information or human factors impacting 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani. In both cases, members of the various training commands were aware of critical information, yet this information remained unreported in both forums. The HFCs and student review processes operated independently without coordination, cross-organizational participation, and sufficient information sharing. The line of demarcation appeared between commands reporting to Commander, Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) and Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA). No mechanism existed within the aviation pipeline to conduct fully informed risk assessments of international students across the numerous training commands. **(Deficiency)**

In September 2019, the RSAF Country Liaison Officer (CLO), responsible for good order and discipline of RSAF IMS, returned to Saudi Arabia. His billet remained gapped until January 2020. CLO duties also include periodic inspections of IMS residences. His absence created a marked decline in the military bearing of RSAF IMS. While CLO duties are specified by instruction, no agreement exists to enforce CLO performance or even their presence. The presence of a CLO may have provided 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani with better oversight and resulted in proactive intervention by the sponsoring nation. **(Deficiency)**

In response to the NASP attack, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD I&S) enrolled all IMS in continuous review protocol; however, current technology is unable to effectively monitor social media. According to the Department of Justice (DoJ), 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani maintained a social media presence with jihadist, anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli rhetoric. Even with continuous review, this rhetoric may not have triggered action and response. **(Deficiency)**

Primary Noncontributing Factors

NASP NSF responded rapidly to NASC and immediately engaged 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani, preventing the injury of additional staff and students. However, NASP (b) (7)(F) ███████████████████████████████████████ ██ ████████████████████████████████████ (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) ████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ██████████████████████ In the aftermath of the shooting, (b) (7)(F) ████████████ ███ ███████████████████████████████████ **(Deficiency)**

(b) (7)(F) ██ ████████████ The command failed to complete routine PS surveys. (b) (7)(F) ██████████ █████████████████████████████████████ █████████████████████████████████████ ██████████████████████████████████.

Additionally, NASC was constructed in 1921 and refurbished in 2005. Due to the insufficient scale of the previous renovation, (b) (7)(F) ██████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ██████████ While these measures and construction may not have prevented the attack entirely, robust and proactive PS may have deterred 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani from attacking NASC.   **(Noncompliance/Deficiency)**

NASC, TW-6, VT-10, and Training Squadron Eight Six (VT-86), to include both students and staff, failed to complete required active shooter training in FY19. This training provides individuals with tactics, techniques, and procedures in the

event of an active shooter. Completion of this training ensures personnel properly egress, shelter, and blockade if forced to hide, and prepare to attack as required. **(Noncompliance)**

ECSO deputies and Escambia County first responders responded rapidly and heroically to engage 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani and treat injured personnel. (b) (7)(F) ████████ ███ ███ ████████████████████ **(Noncompliance)**

Neither mental health assessments nor psychological batteries are required for IMS as part of their in-country medical screening or as part of the U.S. medical screening for high-risk training. Medical providers depend on self-reporting of current and previous mental health conditions. The absence of mental health assessments and batteries applies equally to Navy accessions at Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS). **(Deficiency)**

The NASP quarterdeck received notification of the active shooter within 6 minutes of the initial 911 call. NASP watch standers failed to properly employ (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F) ████████████████ within the required 2-minute time frame. This delay placed additional personnel at risk. **(Noncompliance)**

Opinions

Based on the findings, five main opinions form the recommendations of this report.

<u>**Opinion 1:**</u> The key to fostering a positive command climate is to set a universal standard of dignity and respect.   Faltering from this standard enables caustic command cultures to flourish on the whole or in a microclimate within a

department, division, or office. Without proactive and engaged leadership at every level, hostile command climates thrive. Commanders must aggressively identify and engage behavior contrary to the shared values of the Navy. When we allow this conduct to remain in our ranks, it metastasizes and places the organization and our personnel at risk.

Opinion 2: Human factors played a role in this tragedy. Military leaders, government employees, contracted employees, peers, and civilians knew of isolated events indicating a potential issue, but remained unaware of the complete picture of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's activities and actions. Based upon the complexity of the IMS aviation pipeline, no coordinating agency had the tools, vision, or mandate to aggregate all of the pieces of the puzzle and conduct a thorough insider threat risk analysis and determination. These risk factors are not unique to IMS. They universally impact Navy personnel in the same way they impact our foreign counterparts. Force preservation, the mitigation of these risks, is a shared responsibility by everyone who works for or with the DoN.

Opinion 3: The courage and indomitable spirit of our Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and our civilian first responders remains strong. Yet, we have asked these patriots to display sacrifice and courage in the most unlikely of circumstances. In the highest traditions of the naval service, individuals selflessly offered their lives to protect and to save the lives of their shipmates. We owe it to the three Sailors lost, the many wounded, and those who placed themselves in harm's way on 6 December 2019 to change the appropriate policies, devote sufficient resources, and assure our force we are doing everything in our power to keep faith and keep them safe.

Opinion 4: Naval installations are operational platforms, managing internal and external threats on a daily basis. This realization requires the entire DoN to

execute a cultural shift in how we address PS, AT, and Law Enforcement (LE) at every naval installation. DoN must man, train, and equip installations and tenant commands in the same manner as it would any combat-ready ship, submarine, or squadron. When properly applied, active PS measures deter adversaries and assure our force. When training is conducted and drills executed, our Sailors and civilians respond appropriately and decisively as required. When commanders train their force and aggressively self-assess, they identify force protection gaps and seams on their own and do not require tragedy to correct. The absence of command ownership of FP degrades the Navy's collective readiness and places our people at risk.

Opinion 5: (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████

████████████████████████ (b) (7)(F) ████████████████

████████████████████████████ DoN must abandon minimum manning thresholds designed to protect **physical assets** and to meet ineffective response times. Instead, installations must be manned to rapidly respond with a preponderance of force at any time to preserve our most precious assets: our **personnel**. Increased security force manning enables presence, deterrence, assurance, and enhanced response. (b) (7)(F) ████████

████████████████████████████████████

████████████████████████████████

████████████████████████████████████

████████████████████████████

████████████████████████████ Increased NSF manning, training, and arming policies support both parts of this time-critical mission.

Recommendations

Recommendations to address Potential Contributing Factors

- Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy for Policy (DUSN (P)) review and validate DoN Insider Threat Hub concept of operations; data sources evaluate capabilities for continuous, social media review for all personnel who hold "sensitive positions," to include all IMS

- Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), in coordination with operational commanders, review Marine Corps Order 1500.60 and implement a force preservation council program across the Navy to include all foreign military personnel programs

- OPNAV N1 update OPNAVINST 5354.1G (Navy Equal Opportunity Program Manual) to require commanding officers to make a positive determination regarding a preliminary inquiry for any allegation against a contracted employee

- OPNAV N1, in coordination with Navy International Programs Office (NIPO), update OPNAVINST 5354.1G to include an EO Program applicability statement for IMS and the process for handling EO complaints filed by IMS

- OPNAV N1 direct the immediate use of available insider threat programs and tools from the Center for Development of Security Education (CDSE) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to meet and enhance annual insider threat training requirements

- NIPO, in coordination with NETSAFA, identify contract vehicles to require CLO presence for training activities conducting large volumes of high-risk IMS training

- NIPO require and properly resource intercultural competency training for all commands associated with the training of IMS

- NETC review course critique guidance and implement a standardized process across training commands to gather holistic feedback on all aspects of training commands to capture both quality of instruction and command climate for all students

- NETC, in coordination with NCIS, develop and implement an insider threat training curriculum which focuses on the insider threat indicators and behaviors, pathways to radicalization and criticality of reporting to the chain of command

- NASC assign new permanent staff to the IMTO and ensure completion of both required and recommended IMSO and cultural competency training prior to assignment

- NASC investigate the failure to comply with the command's EO policy in the handling of EO complaints the complaint raised by the German Luftwaffe's Second Training Squadron.

Recommendations to address Primary Noncontributing Factors

- DoD update UFC for existing buildings and require enhanced physical security features at every DoN facility

- DoD and Department of State (DoS) review the feasibility of establishing a universal policy requiring psychological and behavioral batteries for all international military personnel training or working in the United States

- DoS and DoD review the practice of country-specific standard operating procedure (SOP) for screening/vetting and establish a baseline standard for the screening of all international military personnel assigned to the United States

- (b) (7)(F) ██
  ██
  ██

- OPNAV review and update the Mission Profile Validation-Protection (MPV-P) post validation model, Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) level methodology, and ROC baseline functions to reflect current active shooter and insider threat, Force Protection Condition (FPCON) level, and Echelon I and II AT, LE and PS program requirements

- OPNAV and fleet commanders review command and control of aviation training pipeline

- Surgeon General of the Navy (CNO N093) and Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) review the integration of the Tailored Adaptive Personality Assessment System (TAPAS), or similar personality assessment, as a MEPs and IMS screening requirement

- Echelon II and III commands provide AT program oversight, requirements and program reviews for subordinate commands

- Echelon II and III commands hold subordinate commanders accountable for active shooter and insider threat training completion

- Commander, Navy Installations Command require installation NSF to qualify as Category III/IV weapons-qualified personnel

- CNIC require regional and installation commanders to coordinate with civilian authorities to integrate geographically bounded Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) notifications into SOP for crisis response

- (b) (7)(F)
  ███████████████████████████████████████

- (b) (7)(F)
  ███████████████████████████████████████

- NETC develop proactive active shooter response training for Navy personnel

- Tenant commands ensure annual PS surveys of facilities are conducted, provided to the installation, and reported annually to the regional commander.

---

[1] Defense Intelligence Agency Country Terrorist Threat Level for the U.S.

Chapter 1—Introduction

This chapter provides a brief summary of the incident. Additionally, it reviews the authorization to conduct this investigation, required elements, methodological approach, and chapter overviews. It concludes with general background and information on Security Cooperation, Education, and Training Programs (SCETP), relevant commands, command relationships, and the international student flight training program. Understanding these various relationships underpins all follow-on chapters.

Summary of Incident

At approximately 0640 local on 6 December 2019, 2nd Lt Mohammad Saeed Al-Shamrani, a Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) flight student, entered Naval Aviation Schools Command (NASC), located in Building 633, Naval Air Station Pensacola (NASP). 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani was armed with a GLOCK-45 9MM handgun and equipped with multiple, extended-capacity ammunition magazines. At 0643, he entered the quarterdeck area and killed two United States Navy watch standers.

(b) (7)(A)

NSF, ECSO deputies, and Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) commenced room-to-room clearance of Building 633 and determined that 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani was the lone gunman in the attack. At 0715, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrived on scene and assumed control of the criminal investigation by 0745. In total, three U.S. personnel were killed and eight injured.

Law Enforcement (LE) Disclaimer

USFFC directed that this investigation be conducted in a manner not to interfere with the ongoing FBI investigation. The investigation team coordinated all LE information through NCIS. Specific event times and evidentiary details are in some cases purposely vague to preserve the integrity of the FBI investigation.

Police, fire, and emergency medical services (EMS) from the city of Pensacola and Escambia County provided first-response emergency management services. Any reference to actions by non-DoN first responders is included solely to assist in compiling the sequence of events. This report assessed DoN compliance with requirements to coordinate with local LE and EMS.

Scope of Investigation

In a memorandum dated 19 December 2019, the VCNO directed Commander, USFFC to convene a command investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the fatal shooting incident at NASP of 6 December 2019.

On 20 December 2019 and in response to this memorandum, USFFC appointed RADM John F. Meier, Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), as the investigating officer to complete an in-depth investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the fatal shooting incident. USFFC directed RADM Meier to report findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations in writing to USFFC no later than 21 February 2020.

The convening order tasked the investigating officer with investigating the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the 6 December 2019 shooting incident, including resulting injuries, death, property damage, security, personnel, and other factors related to the incident at NASP.

Per USFFC's direction, this investigation:

- Identifies noncompliance with applicable laws, regulations, programs, policies, and procedures

- Identifies relevant deficiencies in applicable programs, policies, and procedures that ensure the safety and well-being of uniformed and civilian personnel

- Provides detailed recommendations for action, where appropriate, on areas within Navy control and identifies the lead agency with cognizance of areas outside Navy control.

Per USFFC's direction, this investigation specifically:

- Examines the service, medical, mental health, criminal, and performance records of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani for adverse information and/or insider threat indications

- Identifies relationships between 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani and the victims

- Assesses command climate at VT-86 and within NASC and any complaints, equal opportunity-related or otherwise, submitted by 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani

- Identifies how 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani obtained a firearm and was able to bring it on board NASP

- Examines the execution and compliance with programs, policies, and procedures pertaining to the transportation, possession, and storage of privately owned firearms on Navy installations and in PPV housing

- Assesses the execution of and compliance with programs, policies, and procedures pertaining to force protection and emergency response management by command personnel, NSF, local law enforcement, and first responders

- Identifies the Navy organizations involved in the vetting and administrative onboarding of international students

- Assesses the execution of, and compliance with, programs, policies, and procedures pertaining to insider threat and active shooter training, drills, lockdown, and emergency notifications by NASC and VT-86

- Assesses the execution of post-incident response related to emergency medical care; support to victims, survivors, and their families; mission continuity; and communication

- Provides a holistic overview of the details, including command and control (C2), of the Navy's role in the international student flight training program

- Examines significant impacts to personnel and their concerns for workplace safety resulting from this incident

- Provides recommendations for changes in programs, policies, procedures, and manning levels to improve physical security and confidence in workplace security.

Methodology

The investigation team employed a multidisciplinary, fact-finding approach; reviewed documents; interviewed witnesses and headquarters SMEs; and conducted field observations. This approach included assessment of personnel and commands across the international student flight training program. <u>The principal objective of this investigation has been to identify means to reduce the likelihood of future events and to mitigate the impact should they occur.</u> Additionally, RADM Meier discussed the purpose and scope of the investigation with USFFC; CNIC; NETC; CNATRA; Commander, Navy Region Southeast (CNRSE); and Director, NIPO.

Report Organization

The report is organized into chapters that provide findings, opinions, and recommendations aligned with the major elements of the convening order.

- Chapter 2 provides a sequence of events from the selection of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani as an RSAF flight student through the incident and postincident response.
- Chapter 3 analyzes the combined record of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani for insider-threat indicators and adverse information.
- Chapter 4 analyzes the command culture across the international student flight training program, to include relevant equal-opportunity complaints by 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani.
- Chapter 5 analyzes force protection (FP) compliance and deficiencies.
- Chapter 6 analyzes international military student vetting/screening.
- Chapter 7 examines emergency management response.
- Chapter 8 analyzes postincident response.
- Chapter 9 provides a holistic overview of the international student flight training program.
- Chapter 10 offers primary opinions and recommendations. The appendices contain supporting documentation.

The findings of this investigation fall into two categories: **compliance** with applicable law, regulation, programs, policies, and procedures; and **deficiencies** with DOTMLPF. The report also highlights findings recommended for immediate action.

Background

Security Cooperation, Education, and Training Program (SCETP)

The SCETP consists of U.S. military education and training conducted by Department of Defense (DoD) for international personnel from eligible countries in order to effectively advance U.S. security interests and build defense partnerships. Major training programs include international military education and training (IMET) and foreign military sales (FMS). FMS covers the sale of defense articles, services, and training to eligible foreign governments and international organizations.[1] The KSA is an active FMS partner, enrolling more students in U.S. Navy training than any other partner in fiscal year 2019 (FY19).[2] RSAF and Royal Saudi Naval Force (RSNF) flight students receive training under Blanket Orders for Training (BOT).[3] As an RSAF member, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani trained as part of an Air Force Security Assistance and Training (AFSAT) BOT.[4] AFSAT manages FMS training orders for United States Air Force (USAF)-sponsored purchases. Prospective RSAF pilots complete part of their training at NAS Pensacola. Prospective RSAF weapon systems officers (WSOs), like 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani, complete all of their aviation training at NASP. NETSAFA, the implementing agency for DoN's security cooperation (SC) training, manages FMS training orders for RSNF flight students, maintainers, crew, and operators. In FY19, ▮(b) (6)▮ from 176 different countries attended DoN SCETP training in the United States. This total included ▮(b) (6)▮.[5]

Naval Air Station Pensacola (NASP)

NASP is located in Escambia County, Florida. It employs more than 16,000 military and 7,400 civilian personnel. Major tenant commands include NASC, Naval Air Technical Training Center (NATTC), Marine Aviation Training Support Group (MATSG), and the headquarters for NETC, a command providing direction and control of all Navy education and training. Approximately 6,900 military and

civilians reside on the base. The base includes public access to the Naval Aviation Museum, the Pensacola Lighthouse, and the Barrancas National Cemetery. As the hub for U.S. Navy aviation training, an estimated 40,000 personnel attend training at NASP facilities annually.

Naval Aviation Schools Command (NASC)

NASC is an Echelon IV training command, and it reports to Commanding Officer, Center for Naval Aviation Technical Training (CNATT) under NETC.[6] However, NASC is subject to a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Commander, NETC, an Echelon II command, and CNATRA, an Echelon IV command. NASC provides aviation training school (ATS), aviation commanding officers training (AVCOT), aviation enlisted aircrew training, and aviation water survival. ATS includes Aviation Pre-Flight Indoctrination (API), Introductory Flight Screening (IFS), and an IMTO.[7] As part of the aviation pipeline, all student naval aviators and IMS attend NASC. Figure 1-1 provides the command relationship for NASC. The dashed line represents an MOU, signed 26 July 2017 between NETC and CNATRA, shifting curriculum control authorities and management of student loading/throughput from NETC to CNATRA.[8]

Figure 1-1. Naval Aviation Schools Command Relationships

Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity (NETSAFA)

NETSAFA is an Echelon III command reporting to NETC.[9] NETSAFA operates SCETP policies and procedures established by NIPO. The NETSAFA mission is to develop, execute, and manage the DoN's security assistance (SA) and SC training and education programs. NETSAFA is the principal advisor to NETC on all SC matters, and coordinates IMSO and SC training for the Navy. NETSAFA reviews all foreign country training requests, prepares letters of offer/acceptance for training, secures quotas for training, and functions as the case manager for FMS-related training.[10] Additionally, NETSAFA is responsible for coordinating IMSO training and promulgating guidance for the administration of IMS at local

commands. IMSOs are responsible for the execution of IMS administration while assigned to a training activity.[11]

To support these duties, NETSAFA maintains NITC and a NETSAFA Detachment Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC) at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland. This detachment supports Navy-sponsored students executing language training with the USAF.[12] KSA IMS typically attend both DLIELC and NITC as part of the international student flight training program unless English proficiency is such that it is not required.

**NETSAFA International Training Center (NITC)**

NITC is a detachment of NETSAFA under NETC. It is collocated with NASC in Building 633. NITC is responsible for providing preparatory and specialized training to IMS in support of the Navy's SCETP. NITC provides aviation, technical, and specialized training to IMS. NITC maintains a detachment at NAS Whiting Field (NASWF) to support follow-on IMS pilot training. NITC is also the controlling command for KSA CLOs and training liaison teams (TLT) who assist with KSA IMS administration and discipline.[13] Both the RSAF and RSNF maintain a CLO and TLT at Building 633. All KSA flight students attend aviation preparatory courses at NITC. Figure 1-2 provides NETSAFA/NITC command relationships. The dashed line represents the relationship between Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for International Programs (DASN IP), NIPO, and NETSAFA.

Figure 1-2. NETSAFA Command Relationships

Training Air Wings and Squadrons

Training Air Wings (TW) are Echelon V commands under the command of CNATRA.[14] The five TWs are responsible for the administration, coordination, support, and supervision of flight and academic training of assigned training squadrons (VT/HT). At each TW, flight students are assigned to specific squadrons based on platform, type of training (pilot or flight officer), and phase of training (primary, intermediate, or advanced). KSA student WSOs are assigned to TW-6. Strike fighter flight officers complete primary and intermediate flight training at VT-10 and advanced flight training at VT-86. For both rotary- and fixed-wing pilot training, KSA flight students are also assigned to Training Air Wing FIVE (TW-5) at NASWF.[15] Commands with IMS assigned are required to designate an IMSO to serve as the principal administrator and liaison for all IMS. Figure 1-3 provides training air wing command relationships and identifies current commands with IMS.

Figure 1-3. Naval Air Training Command Relationships

Tactical Control (TACON) for Force Protection (FP)

United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) exercises TACON for FP of all DoD elements and personnel in the NORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR) and directs the day-to-day execution of the FP mission through the designated service components, to include USFFC.[16] USFFC is the executive agent (EA) for Navy FP in the USNORTHCOM AOR.[17] Specific responsibilities and authorities inherent in this role include exercising C2 of the operational FP mission for all Navy shore and afloat commands.[18] For Navy forces, facilities, and personnel located in the continental United States (CONUS) regional operational environments, USFFC exercises TACON for FP through the respective CONUS region commanders. CNRSE exercises TACON for FP for all Navy activities in its AOR.[19] Administrative and operational chains of command do not have

TACON for FP implementation.[20] Figure 1-4 provides the TACON for FP with respect to both NASP and its tenant command, NASC.

Figure 1-4. TACON for FP Naval Air Station Pensacola and Naval Aviation Schools Command

International Student Flight Training Program

The international student flight training program is unique for each participant country and dependent on the type of platform (fixed-wing or rotary) and type of operator (pilot or flight officer) desired. 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani was an RSAF WSO flight student. RSAF and RSNF flight students complete training as both pilots and flight officers. The aviation pipeline provided in Figure 1-5 provides the standard aviation pipeline for an RSAF WSO. This pipeline includes the following elements:

1. English Language Training (DLIELC)
2. Specialized English Training (SET) (NITC)

3. Prep for Aviation Pre-Flight Indoctrination (API) (NITC)

4. Aviation Pre-Flight Indoctrination (API) (NASC)

5. Primary and Intermediate Flight Officer Training (TW-6/VT-10)

6. Advanced Flight Officer Training (TW-6/VT-86). [21]

The aviation pipeline for KSA flight students also includes specified leave periods. Before each phase of training and throughout each phase, KSA flight students attend recurring preparatory training at NITC or NITC Detachment Whiting Field. The English language training and NITC preparatory training are unique to IMS. 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's specific training time line is provided in Chapter 2.


Figure 1-5. RSAF WSO Aviation Pipeline

[1] SECNAVINST 4950.4B, Joint Security Cooperation, Education, and Training (03 January 2011) § 1-1.

[2] FY-18/FY-19 DSAMS Report Summary provided by (b) (6) NETSAFA Strategic Planning and Integration (14 January 2020).

[3] Blanket Order for Training RSAF WSO Training/CLO Support between AFSAT and KSA (SR-D-THD) (22 April 2016)

[4] Blanket Order for Training RSNF Aviation Training Support between NETSAFA and KSA (SR-P-TDP) (15 September 2017)

[5] FY-18/FY-19 DSAMS Report Summary provided by (b) (6) NETSAFA Strategic Planning and Integration (14 January 2020).

[6] OPNAVINST 5400.45, Standard Navy Distribution List: Shore Chain of Command (01 January 2020), 18.

[7] NASCINST 5450.1P, Naval Aviation Schools Command Organizational Manual (12 September 2011).

[8] Memorandum of Understanding between Commander, Naval Education and Training Command and Chief of Naval Air Training: Responsibilities and Management of Naval Aviation Schools Command (26 July 2017)

[9] OPNAVINST 5400.45, Standard Navy Distribution List: Shore Chain of Command (01 January 2020), 22.

[10] NETCINST 5450.4D, Missions, Functions, and Tasks of NETSAFA (28 July 2016).

[11] SECNAVINST 4950.4B, Joint Security Cooperation, Education, and Training (03 January 2011) § 10-76

[12] NETSAFAINST 5400.1F, NETSAFA Staff Organization Manual (01 May 2012)

[13] NETSAFAINST 5400.1F, NETSAFA Staff Organization Manual (01 May 2012)

[14] OPNAVINST 5400.45, Standard Navy Distribution List: Shore Chain of Command (01 January 2020), 10.

[15] CNATRAINST 5452.31H, Missions, Functions, and Task of Training Air Wings (25 February 2016)

[16] USNORTHCOM Instruction 10-222 § 1.6 and § 4.5.4

[17] OPNAVINST 3300.53C § 7(g).

[18] Id.

[19] CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14 § 1(d).

[20] USFF AT OPORD 3300-15, Base Order, § 1(d)(7).

[21] NETSAFA International Training Center (NITC) Command Brief (06 JUN 19)

Chapter 2—Sequence of Events

This chapter describes the sequence of events leading up to the shootings at NASP on 6 December 2019. It is divided into two parts: pre-incident and incident/incident response. Records, interviews, and briefings provide a general awareness of timing and sequence of events. Fewer details are known about 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's potential radicalization and his relationship with other KSA IMS.

Law Enforcement (LE) Disclaimer

USFFC directed this investigation be conducted to the extent information is available within Navy channels and/or released by the FBI investigation. The Navy investigation team coordinated all requests for LE information through NCIS.

On 13 January 2020, Attorney General William Barr stated that the NASP shootings were a terrorist attack and that 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani was motivated by jihadist ideology. (b) (7)(A)

For this report, the investigation team assumed 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani did not enter the United States for the express purpose of committing a terrorist act. This assumption is based on several factors, including the length of time 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani spent in the United States prior to the shootings, the date of his weapon purchase (2 years after entry), and the multitude of opportunities that he had to commit an act of terrorism throughout months of training in the United States.

2.1 Pre-Incident Time Line

Figure 2-1. 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani Training and Significant Event Time Line

On 8 August 2017, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani received Invitational Travel Orders (ITO) to the United States. These orders contained his aviation training pipeline.[1]

On 22 August 2017, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani entered the United States.[2]

From 28 August 2017 until 11 May 2018, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani attended DLIELC at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland. From December 2017 to May 2018, DLIELC placed him on academic probation for "lack of growth."

On 17 May 2018, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani reported to NITC at NASP, Building 633, to begin SET and international basic aviation prep.[3]

On 30 May 2018, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani received a medical recommendation for flying (i.e., "upchit") from Naval Aerospace Medical Institute (NAMI).[4]

On 29 October 2018, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani reported to NASC in Building 633 for API. On 13 November 2018, he commenced the API academic syllabus.[5]

On 16 January 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani graduated from API and reported to TW-6.[6]

From 18 January until 24 February 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani traveled to Saudi Arabia on approved leave.[7]

From 25 February until 22 August 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani completed Phase 1 primary flight training at VT-10. During this training, he completed preparatory training with NITC and TW-6 ground school. He remained attached to TW-6. Specific training and cognizant authority was as follows:

- NITC Preparatory Training: 25 February to 15 March 2019
- TW-6 Ground School: 18 March to 9 April 2019
- NITC Contact Prep: 9 April to 15 April 2019
- VT-10 Instrument Ground School: 14 May to 10 June 2019
- NITC Instrument Prep: 11 June to 25 June 2019
- VT-10 Visual Navigation (VNAV) Ground School: 23 July to 30 July 2019
- NITC VNAV Prep: 31 July to 12 August 2019.[8]

From 18 March until 9 April 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani attended TW-6 Ground School. On 5 April 2019, a contracted instructor referred to 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani as "Pornstache." This incident led to both an equal opportunity complaint and the filing of a Navy Inspector General (NAVIG) complaint.[9]

(b) (7)(A)

From 9 May until 12 May 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani and his roommate (b) (6) traveled to Washington, D.C., on authorized leave.[11] Before the trip, the VT-10 IMSO met with the two flight students and discussed the trip, to include cultural differences and the possibility of discrimination. He noted 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani seemed withdrawn from the conversation.[12]

On 14 May 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani received a formal apology from the contracted instructor who referred to him as "Pornstache."[13] The apology was delivered in VT-10 ground school spaces with contract site leads present. 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani characterized this apology as "insufficient." Following the apology, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani vocalized his displeasure with the overall response to the incident with the senior RSAF CLO. The CLO encouraged 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani to accept the apology and move forward.[14]

On 24 May 2019, TW-6 held a safety stand-down for all contract instructors and schedulers. The stand-down focused on cultural sensitivity training and professional behavior in the workplace.[15]

On 27 June 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani failed an instrument navigation event (I3107) at VT-10. However, he passed subsequent events. Throughout the aviation pipeline, he failed only this event.[16]

(b) (7)(A)

Upon

completion of the licensure application, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani ordered a GLOCK 45 9mm pistol.[17]

(b) (7)(A)

On 17 July 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani participated in a VT-10 field study program event. During the tour of historic Pensacola and pizza dinner, the VT-10 IMSO noted 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani and his roommate remained isolated from the group.[19]

(b) (7)(A)

On 22 August 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani completed Phase 1 primary flight training.[21]

From 26 August until 18 September 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani completed Phase 2 primary flight training at VT-10. Specific training and cognizant authority was as follows:[22]

- VT-10 Form Flight Ground School: 28 August to 4 September 2019
- NITC Form Flight Prep: 4 September to 6 September 2019
- VT-10 Form Flights and Instruments: 9 September to 18 September 2019

On 11 September 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani posted on Twitter that "the countdown has begun."[23]

On 21 September 2019, the RSAF CLO [(b)(6)] returned to Riyadh, KSA.

From 23 September until 25 October 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani completed the intermediate phase of flight training at VT-10.[24]

On 24 October 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani completed a visual navigation check-ride (F4590) flight to Hattiesburg, Mississippi.[25] The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) flight instructor described a "non-standard" post-flight incident. 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani confronted the instructor, stood closely, and stated, "You [USMC flight instructor] offended my [Al-Shamrani's] friend [an RSAF 2nd Lt]." While the situation was diffused, the USMC flight instructor and the other instructor pilot were surprised by the confrontation.[26]

On 25 October 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani completed intermediate phase flight training.[27]

From 6 November until 11 November 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani attended Centrifuge-Based Flight Environment Training (CFET) in San Antonio, Texas.[28]

On 13 November 2019, the RSAF TLT contractor attempted to contact 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani regarding a noise complaint filed on 5 November 2019 by his neighbors. On 14 November 2019, the TLT contractor made contact and counseled 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani.[29]

On 13 November 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's roommate, (b)(6) ███████████████, returned to Saudi Arabia for leave.[30] 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani previously articulated his desire to remain in sequence with his roommate.[31]

From 12 November until 29 November 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani completed T-45 preparatory training at NITC.[32]

From 27 November until 1 December 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani and other unidentified KSA IMS traveled to New York City, New York. No leave had been approved or authorized.[33]

On 2 December 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani reported to advanced flight training at VT-86. During this week, a contractor noted seeing 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani carrying his helmet bag around with him everywhere.[34]

On 4 December 2019, a Sailor standing watch at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (PHNSY) conducted an active shooter attack that was widely covered in the media.

On 6 December 2019 and just hours before the attack, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani posted anti-American, anti-Israel, and jihadist messages on social media.[35]

2.2 Incident and Incident Response Time Line

At approximately 0630 on 6 December 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani departed his on-base, PPV residence and drove to Building 1811 (the designated Islamic prayer room) despite having a scheduled simulator training event for 0630 at VT-86.[36]

At 0640, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani entered NASP Building 633, NASC, through the northwest side entrance. The entrance was unlocked and unguarded. He was wearing a flight suit and carrying a pilot helmet bag. He proceeded past the building's quarterdeck and headed to the second floor.

At 0643, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani returned to the quarterdeck and commenced his attack with a GLOCK 45 9mm, equipped with extended ammunition magazines.

(b) (7)(A)

(b) (7)(A)

(b) (7)(A)

At 0644, the initial emergency call (911) was made by a student with a cell phone.

(b) (7)(A)

At 0647, the base security officer (SECO) notified the NASP CO that an active shooter incident was in progress at Building 633. NRSE Regional Dispatch

Center (RDC) dispatched NASP NSF and NASP Fire and Emergency Services (F&ES) to Building 633.

At 0650, NCIS received a report that ECSO was responding to an active shooter event at NASP. At 0650, the NASP fire chief established a unified command post (UCP) near Building 633. Six NASC rescue swimmer instructors provided first aid to wounded personnel in the vicinity of Building 633.

At 0651, NASP CO informed CNRSE of the ongoing incident.

(b) (7)(A) █████████████████████████████████████ At this point, two people were killed and five others injured ((b) (6) ████████ would later succumb to his injuries). Shortly after entering the building, NSF personnel engaged 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani in a shooting battle, injuring one NSF civilian police officer.

At 0652, CNRSE RDC requested civilian emergency medical service and ECSO support.

(b) (7)(A)
███
███████████████████████████████████████
███

███
███
███████████████████

At 0656, local DoN personnel enrolled in the AtHoc Notification System received notification of an active shooter event on board NASP.

(b) (7)(A)

They determined that 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani was a lone shooter and began evacuating personnel.

At 0700, NCIS personnel arrived on scene.

At 0705, the NASP executive officer (XO) arrived on scene.

At 0709, the NASP Giant Voice promulgated word of an active shooter event.

At 0712, three civilian life flight helicopters were requested by the CNRSE RDC dispatch.

At 0715, the NASP Emergency Operation Center (EOC) was activated.

At 0715, the FBI arrived on scene, met with the NASP CO, NASP SECO, and NCIS.

At 0744, life flight arrived for transport.

At 0755, the NASP CO turned over the scene to the FBI, who took charge of the criminal investigation.[37]

1. Naval Aviation Schools Command (NASC) (Building 633)
2. Islamic Prayer Room (Building 1811)
3. ████████████████████
4. Unified Command Post (UCP)
5. Naval Security Force Command Post

•••• 2nd LT Al-Shamrani's Speculated Route

Figure 2-2. NASC Building 633 Overview

1. 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani Entrance
2. NASC Quarterdeck Office
3. International Military Training Office
4. Administrative Office
5. Main Entrance
6. Auditorium
7. South Main Stairwell
8. NASC CO Office
9. Southeast Stairwell
10. (b) (7)(A) ████████████

Figure 2-3. NASC Building 633 First Floor

West
South ⬥ North
East

ROOF
ROOF

NITC

KSA TLT

7 South Main Stairwell
9 Southeast Stairwell
11 RSAF Training Liaison Team (TLT) Office
12 RSNF Training Liaison Team (TLT) Office

13 NETSAFA International Training Center (NITC) OIC

Figure 2-4. NASC Building 633 Second Floor

[1] Invitational Travel Order (ITO) for International Military Student (IMS) ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani (8 August 2017).

[2] Photocopies of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani official Passport and Visa.

[3] SAN-WEB Progress Messages ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani.

[4] Medical Recommendation for Flying or Special Operational Duty ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani (DD FORM 2992) (30 May 2018).

[5] SAN-WEB Progress Messages ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani.

[6] ATJ Summary Card ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani.

[7] SAN-WEB Progress Messages ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani.

[8] NITC Tuesday Morning Meeting Notes (16 October 2018).

[9] SoI (b)(6) , Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (16 January 2020); SoI (b)(6) , Site Manager/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020).

[10] Law Enforcement Briefing.

[11] Signed Leave Request/Authorization, NAVCOMPT FORM 3065 ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani (7 May 2019).

[12] Summary of Interview (SoI) (b)(6) , LT, IMSO VT-10 (14 January 2020).

[13] SoI (b)(6) , GS-9, Ground Training Officer TW-6 (23 January 2020).

[14] SoI (b)(6) , Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (16 January 2020).

[15] SoI (b)(6) , GS-9, Ground Training Officer TW-6 (23 January 2020).

[16] CNATRA 1542/2022, Navy MPTS 27 June 2019, I3107 grade sheet.

[17] So (b)(6) , Contract Instructor, DRG (24 January 2020).

[18] Id.

[19] SoI (b)(6) , LT, IMSO VT-10 (14 January 2020); VT-10 Field Studies Program Student Roster (17 August 2019).

[20] (b) (7)(C)

[21] ATJ Summary Card ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani.

[22] SAN-WEB Progress Messages ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani and ATJ entries.

[23] Attorney General William P. Barr Announces the Findings of the Criminal Investigation into the December 2019 Shooting at Pensacola Naval Air Station (13 January 2020) https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-announces-findings-criminal-investigation-december-2019 Washington, DC ~ Monday, 13 January 2020.

[24] SAN-WEB Progress Messages ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani and ATJ entries.

[25] CNATRA 1542/2022, Navy MPTS F4590 grade sheet (24 October 2019); SoI, (b)(6) , Maj, Operations Officer VT-10 (15 January 2020).

[26] Id.

[27] ATJ Summary Card ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani

[28] SAN-WEB Progress Messages; SoI (b)(6) , Contractor, Booze Allen Hamilton (16 January 2020).

[29] SoI (b)(6) , Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (16 January 2020).

[30] Id.

[31] SoI (b)(6) , Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (21 January 2020).

[32] CDR (b)(6) email, "2nd Lt Al-Shamrani Timeline" (22 January 2020)

[33] SoI (b)(6) , Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (16 January 2020); Law Enforcement Briefing.

[34] SoI (b)(6) , Site Focal/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020).

[35] Attorney General William P. Barr Announces the Findings of the Criminal Investigation into the December 2019 Shooting at Pensacola Naval Air Station (13 January 2020) https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-announces-findings-criminal-investigation-december-2019.

[36] Id.

[37] Navy Region Southeast Chat Log (06 DEC 2019); NAS Pensacola AtHoc Device Coverage Summary (21 Jan 2020); NASP Quarterdeck Log (06 DEC 2019).

Chapter 3—Records Review

This chapter outlines all pertinent record findings for 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani. The records review focused on determining if his record revealed either insider threat indicators or adverse information his chain of command was aware of before the attack. Records believed to be germane to the overall findings of the investigation were not accessible to the investigative team due to the ongoing criminal investigation. Withheld records are annotated below.

Law Enforcement Disclaimer:

USFFC directed this investigation be conducted to the extent information is available within Navy channels and/or released by the FBI investigation. The Navy investigation team coordinated all requests for LE information through NCIS.

Findings, Opinions, and Recommendations

Finding 3.1: This investigation reviewed 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's military service, performance, disciplinary, criminal, medical, and mental health records. His records contain neither adverse information nor insider threat indicators.

Discussion: Prior to arriving in the United States, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani completed human rights screening on 27 April 2017.[1] Results of the human rights screening were not available for review.

On 15 May 2017, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani completed host nation medical screening.[2] No host nation medical records were available for review.

From 28 August 2017 to 11 May 2018, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani attended the DLIELC at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland. From December 2017 until May 2018, he

was placed on probation for "lack of growth." All instructor notes were positive. In May 2018, he passed the English Comprehension Level (ECL) Test with a score of 90.[3] 80 is the prerequisite score for flight officer training.[4]

From May 2018 until December 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani received training at various aviation training commands at NASP.[5] These commands include NITC, NASC, TW-6, VT-10, and VT-86.

On 30 May 2018, he completed a medical flight physical at Naval Aerospace NAMI. No medical or mental health issues were documented.[6]

During NITC's aviation preparatory training, no training or disciplinary issues were documented.[7]

At NASC, he completed Aviation API. His record contained no academic failures.[8]

On 27 June 2019, he failed one instrument navigation event (I3107) during his primary phase of flight training at VT-10. The event critique notes he fixated on tasks to the point of being unable to accomplish the mission without instructor assistance.[9] He passed the follow-on remedial event without issue. His records at VT-10 and VT-86 contained no additional performance or conduct issues.[10]

A review of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's RSAF student file was not conducted. The RSAF TLT maintained this record (b) (7)(A)

No additional performance, disciplinary, or health issues were discovered in 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's Aviation Training Jacket (ATJ), Training Information Management System (TIMS) grade sheets, Security Assistance Network Web (SAN-WEB) profile, ITO, NASC International Military Training (IMT) student

(b) (6)

██ Of note, dates of record for arrival, leave, departure, and completion of requisite courses varied from source to source.

Upon retrieval and transport of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's remains, the Armed Forces Medical Examiner took possession of available hard-copy medical records. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) initially blocked his electronic medical record to maintain privacy and confidentiality.[11] The BUMED unlocked the record on 30 January 2020[12] and a subsequent review revealed no findings of significance. No mental health issues were documented.

(b) (7)(E)

██

██████████████████████ regarding 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's criminal history.

NASP base housing and base security forces confirmed 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's neighbors filed multiple noise complaints against him and his two roommates. However, law enforcement neither formally cited nor identified him as the singular source of the noise.[13]

Opinion 3.1.1: 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's record is unremarkable. While it contains isolated academic and performance issues, these issues did not meet a reasonable threshold for concern.

Opinion 3.1.2: The numerous parallel databases (SAN-WEB and TIMS) and hard-copy records decrease the likelihood of commands conducting a holistic review of each student as each progresses from command to command over the course of aviation instruction. Even if derogatory findings were present, they would be difficult to locate and aggregate. The threshold for what is above and below the 'cutline' for inclusion in a record depends upon individual and command perspective and initiative.

Opinion 3.1.3: 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's record contained neither insider threat indicators nor any adverse information.

Recommendation 3.1: Recommend NETC (NETSAFA) and CNATRA review aviation records management practices, increase digitalization, and enable single-source records review for both international and U.S. aviation students through enterprise software.

Finding 3.2: This investigation was unable to establish a relationship between 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani and any of the victims based upon information available to the Navy investigation team.

Discussion 3.2: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

2nd Lt Al-Shamrani spent significant amounts of time in Building 633, the location of the attack. The building houses NASC, NITC, and the RSAF CLOs and TLT.

Opinion 3.2.1: 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani was intimately familiar with the building and many of the personnel who worked within the building.

Opinion 3.2.2: Understanding 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's motive and potential connections to the victims will help inform insider threat risk assessments in the future.

Recommendation 3.2: ████████ (b) (7)(C)

████████████████████

████████

Finding 3.3 (Non-Compliance): This investigation found 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani took multiple trips outside the local Pensacola area. His various COC remained unaware.[14]

Discussion 3.3: 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani received leave authorization for a trip to Washington D.C., in May 2019.[15] ████ (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E)

████████████████████████

████████████████████████

████████ reveal a pattern of noncompliance with prescribed policy and poor oversight of IMS in general.[17] During this period of travel, he was assigned to TW-6 and VT-10.

2nd Lt Al-Shamrani and several other KSA IMS visited New York City ████ (b)(7)

████████████ This period overlapped with the Thanksgiving holiday period. In the previous weeks, he attended T-45 Advanced Prep at NITC. Neither NITC nor TW-6 were aware of his travel.[19] 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani and his fellow KSA travel companions failed to notify the RSAF TLT. The RSAF CLO billet was gapped.[20] Following this travel, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani immediately checked into VT-86 for the advanced phase of flight training. On 2 December 2019, he conducted indoctrination at VT-86.[21]

Following the attack, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed the DoN to implement travel reporting requirements for IMS.[22] This directive required all training institutions to establish policies and procedures for oversight of IMS travel during their training programs and to align these requirements with comparable limitations on U.S. students. As a result, IMS must report any travel

250 miles or greater from the training location to their assigned IMSO.[23] Between consecutive courses, the commander of a training installation or their designated representatives may authorize leave, with living allowance, not to exceed 7 days.[24]

The VT-10 IMSO properly documented 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's previous leave to Washington, D.C., in May 2019. Both the CLO and IMSO signed that leave request.[25] IMSOs are required to enter a progress message documenting leave taken into SAN-WEB within 1 week.[26] No entries are found in SAN-WEB for 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's other travels.[27]

Official record discrepancies exist between entries in 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's ATJ, signed leave chits, and dates of un-authorized travel provided by LE.[28]

On 10 May 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani and an instructor signed and acknowledged the review of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's ATJ. However, on 10 May 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani was in Washington, D.C., on approved leave.

On 23 May 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani and an instructor signed and acknowledged the review of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's ATJ. (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E) The weekly calendar, covering 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's schedule, indicates he was in TW-6 ground school during that week.

Opinion 3.3.1: 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani and his KSA travel companions were aware of the requirement to inform their parent command and the RSAF training liaison team. RSAF personnel previously demonstrated compliance with established leave policy.

Opinion 3.3.2: SAN-WEB was not properly utilized to document authorized leave of IMS in a timely manner and with sufficient detail. SAN-WEB provides a critical capability to document performance, leave, and IMS issues in a single web-based location accessible to all IMSOs. It is insufficiently optimized by deck plate IMSOs.

Opinion 3.3.3: Knowledge and authorization of Al-Shamrani's travel would not have impacted the attack on 6 December 2019. Visiting major U.S. cities is a normal practice for visiting foreign military personnel.

Opinion 3.3.4: Discovery of unauthorized travel by appropriate authority may have provided an indication of suspicious behavior or noncompliance with applicable guidance and regulations.

Opinion 3.3.5: The probability of discovery decreased as a consequence of the RSAF flight student pipeline. 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's training moved him back and forth across multiple schools and commands.

Opinion 3.3.6: Compliance with leave and liberty policies remain issues of integrity. Not unique to the IMS population, U.S. student naval aviators also violate these policies.

Opinion 3.3.7: Lack of command ownership of IMS fosters a lax environment for accountability.

Opinion 3.3.8: The incongruity between travel dates and available documentation indicates further issues with accountability of IMS and draws into question the thoroughness of record reviews.

Recommendation 3.3.1: Recommend NITC, TW-6, and VT-10 review both IMS and U.S. student leave policy with staff.

<u>Recommendation 3.3.2</u>: Recommend all NETC, SYSCOM, and fleet training commands conduct mandatory leave policy review and require signed policy acknowledgements from all students.

<u>Recommendation 3.3.3</u>: Recommend SAN-WEB be used for documentation of all aspects of IMS training, to include individual grade sheets, progress reviews, leave documentation, counseling, etc.

---

[1] Security Cooperation Training Management System, Student Information ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani
(6 December 2019).
[2] Invitational Travel Order (ITO) for International Military Student (IMS) ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani (8 August 2017).
[3] DLIELC Monthly Record Review ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani (6 December 2019).
[4] Id.
[5] Invitational Travel Order (ITO) for International Military Student (IMS) ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani
(8 August 2017).
[6] Medical Recommendation for Flying or Special Operational Duty ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani (DD FORM 2992) (30 May 2018).
[7] NITC Tuesday Morning Training Production Meeting Agenda (16 October 2018).
[8] API grade Summary ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani within Aviation Training Jacket (17 December 2018).

---

[9] CNATRA 1542/2022 Navy MPTS I3107 Instrument Navigation ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani (27 June 2019).

[10] CNATRAINST 1542/90 (REV 5-13) Pink Sheet Summary ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani in Aviation Training Jacket (4 November 2019).

[11] Email correspondence from (b)(6) , BUMED East Command Legal Counsel (30 January 2020).

[12] Id.

[13] SoI (b)(6) , NASP Base Housing Community Manager (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6) , NASP Base Housing resident (22 January 2020).

[14] Law Enforcement Briefing (11 February 2020).

[15] Signed Leave Request/Authorization, NAVCOMPT FORM 3065 ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani (7 May 2019).

[16] Law Enforcement Briefing (11 February 2020).

[17] Id.

[18] NCIS Briefing (11 January 2020).

[19] SoI (b)(6) , Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (16 January 2020); SoI (b)(6) , LT, IMSO VT-10 (14 January 2020).

[20] Summary of Email Correspondence with (b)(6) , NETSAFA N3 (20 February 2020).

[21] SoI (b)(6) , LT, IMSO VT-86 (14 January 2020).

[22] USD (I&S) Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Director, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, and Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) on Continuous Review for International Military Students (13 January 2020).

[23] Continuous Review for International Military Students, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) Information Memorandum (13 January 2020).

[24] SECNAVINST 4950.4B, Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (JSCET) (3 January 2011) § 10–37.

[25] Signed Leave Request/Authorization, NAVCOMPT FORM 3065 ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani (7 May 2019).

[26] U.S. Navy International Military Student Officer Guide 2016-2017 (15 January 2015), App. I–6.

[27] Invitational Travel Order (ITO) for International Military Student (IMS) ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani (8 August 2017).

[28] Signed Leave Request/Authorization, NAVCOMPT FORM 3065 ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani (7 May 2019); Law Enforcement Briefing (11 February 2020).

Chapter 4—Command Climate and Formal Complaints

This chapter outlines the command climate existing in NASC, VT-10, and VT-86 on board NASP from January 2019 to January 2020. While stationed at NASP, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani progressed through each of these commands for aviation training as shown in the time line in Figure 2-1. At each command, active duty and reserve military, federal general schedule (GS) civilian, and defense contractor personnel execute instructional and administrative duties for U.S. and international students. IMS from multiple nations train and interact with all staff on a consistent basis. Civilian staff provide continuity and serve as "corporate knowledge" across military leadership and staff rotations.

This chapter also includes a review of official complaints filed by IMS while receiving aviation training at the commands listed above.

DEOCS of NASC, VT-10, and VT-86 all show positive command climates. To validate the DEOCS results and assess the current climate, the investigation team conducted qualitative interviews and focus groups. At each command, a randomly drawn sample of students gave answers to questions relating to their sense of belonging, stress levels, and how they rated their instructors and class advisors. KSA students were unavailable to be interviewed, but other international military students participated. Overall feedback validated positive command climates despite the academic demands, flying rigor, and the level of high-risk training undertaken.

Regulatory Background

OPNAVINST 5354.1G, Navy Equal Opportunity Program, issues policies and standards to aid in the prevention of harassment and unlawful discrimination throughout the Navy.[1]

SECNAVINST 4950.4B, Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (JSCET), prescribes policies for the education and training of international military students by Department of Navy, Army, and Air Force. [2]

COMTRAWINGSIXINST 5354.2N TW-6, Command Philosophy and Policy Statements, promulgates policies and guidance to reinforce and ensure awareness of the DoN civilian and military personnel standards of conduct with regards to safety, sexual harassment, and the Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO) Program.[3]

NASC CO's Policy Statement Regarding Elimination of Harassment (2016) promulgates policies and guidance to reinforce and ensure awareness of the DoN civilian and military personnel standards of conduct concerning safety, sexual harassment, and the CMEO Program.[4]

CNATRAINST 4355.4C, CNATRA Guidance for Conducting Surveillance of Contract Maintenance, Government Property Administration, and Services, provides guidance to CNATRA and its detachments for the conduct of surveillance of contractor provided services, Quality Assurance (QA), government property (GP) property administration and maintenance processes and procedures.[5]

Background

NASC (Echelon IV) falls under the authority of the CNATT (Echelon III) and NETC (Echelon II).[6] VT-10 and VT-86 are subordinate commands to TW-6 (Echelon V) and CNATRA (Echelon IV).[7] See Figures 4-1 and 4-2 for further detail.

Figure 4-1. NASC Relationships

Figure 4–2. Training Wing SIX Command Relationships

Findings, Opinions, and Recommendations

Finding 4.1 (Deficiency): DEOCS exclusion of students at training commands limits a command's opportunity to accurately assess command climate on all but the assigned staff.

Finding 4.1.1 (Compliance): TW-6, VT-10, and VT-86 command climates supported a professional environment for aviation students with the exception of isolated issues specific to certain contracted employees as documented in this report.

Discussion: DEOCS and course critiques reveal an overall positive command climate.[8] However, interviews of both international and U.S. students at NASC revealed a microclimate that DEOCS and course critiques failed to uncover. In

this report, the term microclimate refers to a set of conditions that differ from those in the surrounding areas. DEOCS and course critiques are excellent tools for assessing command climate. However, failure to include student input in the DEOCS process or to regularly capture command climate feedback from transient students, created a missed opportunity to identify an adverse microclimate within the NASC IMTO office.

By design, the DEOCS captures command climate issues; however, NASC, VT-10, and VT-86 surveys do not capture student input, only staff. No requirement exists for student DEOCS participation at training commands. End of unit course critiques and sit-down sessions with the NASC CO provide an opportunity for students to provide feedback regarding the course of instruction and the instructors. No mechanism exists to solicit or capture anonymous student feedback on administrative support staff or command climate in general.[9] Course critiques focus on course content and instruction and do not ask questions designed to capture command climate concerns.

Opinion 4.1: While not required, the absence of student participation in DEOCS disenfranchises a large number of personnel who comprise a training command. Students' unique "customer" perspective may provide critical feedback and expose shortfalls in a command's performance and climate.

Recommendation 4.1.1: Recommend NETC and CNATRA review course critique guidance and implement a standardized process across subordinate commands to gather holistic feedback such that the quality of instruction and command climate are effectively measured for all students.

Recommendation 4.1.2: Recommend NETC and CNATRA review course critique guidance and implement a standardized process across subordinate

commands to specifically analyze IMS feedback due to the unique nature of the IMS training track.

Finding 4.2 (Noncompliance): NASC IMTO created an adverse work environment for IMS.

Discussion: The IMTO is the primary point of contact for all IMS attached to NASC. The office is staffed by an active duty IMSO, and a full-time GS-5 IMT Clerk. Two to three temporary staff (students awaiting training or on limited duty (LIMDU) supplement the office staff on a rotational basis.

The IMSO is currently ██████████████████ , and the IMT ████ is ████
██████ [10] █████████████ is not an IMSO pursuant to ███ position description (PD), and has not completed in-resident IMSO training.[11] Both ██████████ and ██████████ were responsible for the IMTO on 6 December 2019, but were not in the office at the time of the shooting.

The IMT ████ 's duties include, but are not limited to IMS administrative work, to include: IMS check-in and check-out procedures; making advanced arrangements for IMS lodging and transportation; meet and greet of IMS upon check-in; arrange receipt of identification cards; assist with insurance and Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV); and aid with visa issues.[12] ██████████ described ███ duties as being like a "██████" to the IMS.[13]

The ████ is also responsible for counseling IMS for "specific failures, deficiencies, and infractions." The PD states the position "requires above-average tact and diplomacy and exceptional patience." It also describes the position as requiring the "ability to communicate clearly in written and spoken English demonstrating tact, poise, and diplomacy." All parties interviewed

agreed ████ is effective at the administrative and logistical aspects of ████ duties and responsibilities.[14]

████ reports that as part of the check-in process, ████ verbally informs IMS they are required to adhere to all U.S. grooming and uniform standards. However, students do not receive these rules in writing and they are not codified in any NASC instruction. The requirement to conform to U.S. grooming standards is included in the pre-departure brief provided by the security cooperation officer (SCO) to IMS prior to arrival in the United States. Additionally, ITOs issued to IMS state, "The IMS will comply with all applicable U.S. Military Service regulations." Multiple U.S. staff personnel at NASC rigidly enforce U.S. grooming and uniform regulations with IMS.[15] The enforcement of U.S. military grooming standards has become a point of contention with IMS.[16]

Interviews of NASC students reveal an environment where staff do not treat students like commissioned naval officers.[17] All of the U.S. officers in the program successfully completed accession training through either Officer Candidate School (OCS), Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), or the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA). Some students state NASC staff micromanages them and treats them like "young dumb Ensigns" rather than adults.[18] Staff members issue counseling sheets to students for nonperformance-related matters such as repeated failure to maintain grooming standards. Some NASC staff assertively correct grooming violations in public.[19] Students anecdotally reported friends' leave requests were denied by immediate superiors rather than the commander, even when de-conflicted with class schedules.[20] Some students reported frustration with the mandatory study periods built into class schedules.[21] Tasking assigned while awaiting class-up included sweeping halls and wiping down picture frames. Students did not understand how these activities supported their development as aviators.[22]

Interviews with NASC students, TW-6 students, and NITC staff members, detailed the work environment within the IMTO. NITC staff described interactions with ███ [(b) (7)(C), (b) (6)] as "60 percent negative and 40 percent positive."[23] Three IMS reported that ███ [(b) (7)(C), (b) (6)] made homophobic comments regarding their hairstyles and personal grooming.[24] One student reported that ███ [(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)] referred to him as "the asshole" in front of other IMS and colleagues.[25] Multiple IMS reported overhearing ███ [(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)] tell Saudi students they "stink," including one occasion where ███ [(b)(6)] publically humiliated a student and sent him home to shower.[26] ███ [(b)(6)] told Saudi students, "As long as you don't respect women in your country, I won't respect you either."[27] When discussing an Italian IMS with other students, ██ [(b)(6)] said, ███ [(b)(6)] ."[28]

Within NASC, the overall boot camp microclimate fostered an adverse working environment for IMS assigned to or processing through the IMTO. This environment perpetuated over a period of at least 4 years. In April 2015, Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF) personnel submitted a written complaint to ███ [(b)(6)] ███ [(b)(6)] at NETSAFA to report the unprofessional behavior. [29] In December 2019, members of the German Air Force (GAF) Second Training Squadron submitted an official letter to their CO summarizing the unprofessional treatment of international students by the NASC IMTO.[30]

Opinion 4.2.1: The administrative nuances of settling into the local community around any new duty station is complex for all service members and more so for the IMS. While ███ [(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)] supported this transition, ███ [(b)(6)] intrusiveness combined with the derogatory and sometimes humiliating manner in which ███ [(b) (6)] corrected IMS defined the environment in the IMTO.

Opinion 4.2.2: Subjecting students to a quasi 'boot camp" environment undermines the credibility and mission effectiveness of both NASC and the naval service writ large.

Opinion 4.2.3: Treating all personnel with dignity and respect, while emphasizing discipline and attention to detail, creates an environment that fosters high-level performance both in the schoolhouse and in the fleet.

Opinion 4.2.4: IMTO staff went beyond enforcing grooming standards for IMS by inserting themselves into the personal bathing routines of foreign students.

Opinion 4.2.5: Current policy regarding the grooming standards applicable to IMS should be redrafted for clarity with consideration for the balance between training requirements and unique cultural nuances.

Opinion 4.2.6: The IMT (b)(6) , as the PD is currently written, performs duties at a higher level than the defined duties of a (b)(6) and far above the seniority level of a (b)(6) . This position description does not appropriately describe the duties of a (b)(6) " position. The duties and responsibilities assigned in the PD align with a supervisory position.

Opinion 4.2.7: The IMSO's oversight of the IMT (b)(6) enabled tactless and humiliating comments to become the norm in the IMTO. Unprofessional behavior toward IMS persisted and went uncorrected due to improper oversight by the IMSO.

Recommendation 4.2.1: Recommend NASC assign new permanent staff to the IMTO and ensure completion of both required and recommended IMSO and cultural competency training prior to assignment.

Recommendation 4.2.2: Recommend NASC conduct a staffwide stand-down to review standards of conduct, behavior, policy enforcement, and student employment.

Recommendation 4.2.3: Recommend NETC establish and promulgate written grooming standards and remedial actions for IMS and ensure these standards are briefed during IMS arrival training as required by SECNAVINST 4950.4B.[31]

Recommendation 4.2.4: Recommend NASC review the current IMT ███ (b)(6)
position and re-evaluate both the PD and the GS scale of the position to ensure they reflect the depth and breadth of duties and responsibilities assigned.

Recommendation 4.2.5: Recommend NASC (b) (5) ████████

████████████

████

Finding 4.2.1 (Non-compliance): In April 2015, an anonymous RNoAF student submitted an official letter to the RNoAF summarizing the unprofessional treatment of international students by the NASC IMTO.[32]

(b)(6)
████████████

████████████

████████████

███████████ ████

████████████

████████████

████████████

(b) (7)(C)

Opinion 4.2.1.1: Unprofessional behavior by (b) (6) detracted from the professional learning environment needed for IMS to succeed within the aviation training program.

Opinion 4.2.1.2: This letter documents the beginning of a long history of unprofessional behavior by (b) (6) .

Opinion 4.2.1.3: CO, NASC should have further investigated and documented the issue formally in order to track and manage the issue over time.

Recommendation 4.2.1.1: Recommend NASC leadership conduct a staffwide stand-down to reiterate and reinforce the importance of a professional atmosphere for all students and the critical role of the IMTO as the face of the U.S. Navy and the nation with regard to IMS.

Recommendation 4.2.1.2: Recommend NASC HRO review records' management practices and retain all feedback from IMS regarding command climate and staff performance in the appropriate personnel file.

Recommendation 4.2.1.3: ████(b) (5)████

██

██

████████████████████████████████████

████████████████████

Finding 4.2.2 (Non-compliance): In December 2019, ████(b)(6)████ ████(b) (6)████ submitted an official letter to his CO summarizing the unprofessional treatment of international students by the ████(b) (7)(A)████.[41]

████(b) (7)(C)████████████████████████████████

████████████████████████████ ████████████████

██

████████████████████████

████████████████████

▌ ██
████████████████

▌ ████████████████████████████████
████████████████████

▌ ████████████████████████████████
██████

▌ ████████████████████████████████
██

▌ ████████████████████████████
████████████████████
██████████ ████████████████████
████████████████████

(b) (7)(C)

███

██ ███████

██

████████████████████ ███████████████████████████

██

██ █ ███

██

███ ██

██

██

███ █ ███████████████████████████████████

██████████████████

Naval Aviation Schools Command Commanding Officer's Policy Statement Regarding Elimination of Harassment states:

- Workplace harassment is defined as unwelcome verbal or physical conduct based directly on race, color, religion, national origin, sex (whether or not of a sexual nature), genetic information, sexual orientation, age, disability or reprisal.

- No person in NASC shall commit sexual or nonsexual harassment.

- Managers (civilian or military) are charged with maintaining a professional and nonhostile work environment and will be held accountable for both their behavior and that of their employees. All employees play an important role in maintaining an environment of equal opportunity by treating each other with respect and professionalism.

- Once the matter has been reported, it will be handled in a discreet and confidential manner and promptly and thoroughly investigated. Appropriate disciplinary action will be taken on any substantiated case.[55]

No investigation or preliminary inquiry was initiated and there is no record the complaint was documented by anyone at NASC. The complaint was not mentioned in [redacted] 2019 DoD performance appraisal. [redacted] 2019 review was identical to her 2018 performance appraisal.[56]

Opinion 4.2.2.1: There was a toxic microclimate within the IMTO due to the unprofessional behavior of [redacted]. [redacted] actions equated to abuse and negatively impacted IMS under [redacted] purview.

Opinion 4.2.2.2: Students were reluctant to speak out against [redacted] for fear [redacted] would become personally offended and would seek reprisal.

Opinion 4.2.2.3: [redacted] professional efforts made [redacted] invaluable to the IMTO and NASC. As a result, the command turned a blind eye to [redacted] pervasive, inappropriate behaviors.

Recommendation 4.2.2.1: Recommend NETC remove [redacted] from [redacted] position in the IMTO and assign [redacted] to a position that eliminates contact with students.

Recommendation 4.2.2.2: Recommend NETC investigate the failure to comply with the command's harassment policy in the handling of the complaint raised by the [redacted] Second Training Squadron.

Finding 4.2.3 (Deficiency): Permanent staff at NASC lack appropriate cultural awareness training to effectively execute their duties involving IMS.[57]

Discussion: IMS from different countries arrive at NASC with varying levels of preparation and life experience. On average, they range in age from 18 to 29 with others both older and younger. IMS education levels range from the equivalent of U.S. high school graduates to postgraduate degree holders.[58]

Regardless of age or educational experience, NASC staff routinely disregard their point of view and do not treat them with the dignity and respect required for commissioned officers.[59] NASC staff do not receive cultural awareness training.

Opinion 4.2.3.1: The NASC IMT staff treats all IMS as if they have little life experience, alienating older and more educated IMS, while humiliating the less experienced and younger IMS.

Opinion 4.2.3.2: Additional cultural awareness training for all NASC staff would improve their role in developing strategically relevant partnerships with IMS while in training.

Opinion 4.2.3.3: A greater understanding of various IMS cultures would enable the NASC staff to more effectively take corrective actions when necessary, assist with administrative functions outside of schoolhouse training, and strengthen enduring international cooperation.

Opinion 4.2.3.4: Failing to improve the cultural knowledge base of NASC staff misses an opportunity to improve international relations and fully capture the strategic objectives of the IMET.

Recommendation 4.2.3.1: Recommend NIPO require and properly resource cultural awareness training for all commands associated with the training of IMS.

Finding 4.3 (Non-compliance): NITC, TW-6, and NASC utilized questionable or inappropriate "nicknames" for IMS.[60]

Finding 4.3.1 (Non-compliance): Some nicknames violated the DoN EO policy as they highlighted physical characteristics and national origins.

Discussion: Interviews with NITC contractor (b)(6) ██████████; NASC IMT (b)(6) ██████ (b)(6) ██████████; and TW-6 ground school contract instructor (b)(6) ██████████, revealed that they have assigned nicknames to IMS. (b) (6) ██████████ gave nicknames such as "NATO," "Super Mario Brothers," "Dajuan," "Superman," and "Lucca the Girl." (b)(6) ██ stated that (b)(6) ██ gave nicknames because some names were hard to pronounce. (b)(6) ██ reported the students enjoyed the nicknames. (b) (6), (b) (7) (C) ██████ gave nicknames to assist him in remembering students. He regarded it as "light harassment" and banter to help build "thick skin." (b) (6), (b) (7) (C) ██████ often used some aspect of a person's physical appearance or a person's heritage as the basis for the nicknames he would give, which included: "Pornstache," "Manila," and "AAA." The student called "Manila" was of Philippine heritage, first and last name beginning with the letter "A". Multiple students deemed the nickname inappropriate.[61] The extent of the nicknaming was previously unreported to supervisors or TW-6, although the "Pornstache" comment was reported and handled via regular procedures for disciplining contract instructors.[62]

Per OPNAVINST 5354.1G, "each member of the Navy is entitled to be treated with dignity and respect and to work in an environment free of harassment and unlawful discrimination." It further states, "It is DoN policy to prohibit harassment and unlawful discrimination against persons or groups based on race, color, religion, sex (including gender identity), national origin, or sexual orientation." [63]

In summer 2019, CNATRA issued a call sign policy stating, "call signs shall not be lewd, graphic, or sexual in nature, nor should they be assigned on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or religion."[64] Further, the process for assigning call signs requires multiple, diverse members of a command to assemble, review, and recommend all call signs to the CO for further review and written approval.[65]

Opinion 4.3.1: While the intention behind the nicknames may have been to add levity to the academic environment, they are not call signs and should never be confused for call signs, which are clearly defined in Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF) and CNATRA policy.[66]

Opinion 4.3.2: NASC, NITC, and TW-6 failed to ensure all students were "treated with dignity and respect" and their work environment was free of harassment.

Opinion 4.3.3: In aviation, establishing professionalism and discipline is critical to safety and mission success. "Nicknames" may be seen by students as a milestone in their progression toward a "call sign;" however, "call signs" are professionally adjudicated process.[67] Training commands, training squadrons, and Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS) should treat all aspiring aviators in a professional manner and elevate call sign designation to a fleet milestone for fully qualified aviators in their initial operational squadron. An aviator's call sign should be assigned in the fleet by their fellow warfighters and represent the culmination of their training. Since the goal of training is the development of professional aviators, as well as existing higher-echelon guidance reflecting the cultural, historical, and operational utility of call signs in aviation, training commands should not participate in assigning call signs.

Opinion 4.3.4: Due to the subjectivity of what is considered humorous versus disrespectful, as well as the authority gradient present in an instructor/student interaction, instructors and staff should refrain from assigning nicknames.

Recommendation 4.3.1: Recommend NETC and CNAF promulgate a directive banning the use of nicknames and of pseudo call signs in the aviation training pipeline.

Finding 4.4 (Non-compliance): 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani filed an EO complaint against a TW-6 ground school contracted instructor. The resolution of the process was managed and controlled by the associated defense contractor, rather than the VT-10 or TW-6 commanders.

Discussion: On 5 April 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani filed a written CMEO complaint with (b)(6) ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓, Delaware Resource Group (DRG) Site Manager.[68] The complaint alleged (b)(6) ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓, a contract instructor with DRG, called 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani "Pornstache," in class.[69] That same day, another student submitted an anonymous inspector general (IG) complaint about the "Pornstache" comment through the Commander Naval Forces, Pacific Fleet (CNAP) IG hotline.[70]

Following his meteorology class on 5 April 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani reported that (b)(7)(C), (b)(6) ▓▓ addressed him as "Pornstache."[71] When asking the students if they had any questions, (b)(6) ▓▓▓ forgot 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's name, so he addressed him using the first moniker that came to mind: "Porn Star Mustache."[72] 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani was visibly offended and responded, "What did you say?" (b)(6) ▓▓▓ laughed nervously and asked, "What? Have you not seen an old American porn star before?"[73] 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani did not respond and (b)(6) ▓▓▓ left the classroom.[74]

An American student checked on 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani after the incident and told him that he would help him file a complaint if he wanted to do so.[75] At the beginning of the course, the DRG site manager informed students to inform him if they had an issue with a contract instructor.[76] Accordingly, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani reported the incident to the site manager later that day and the site manager apologized and requested a written version of the complaint.[77] 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani and his U.S. class leader drafted the written complaint, which 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani presented to the site manager an hour later.[78] (b)(6) ▓▓▓, the site

focal (a role similar to a union representative), and the site manager met the same day and ▮(b)(6)▮ admitted to making the comment.[79] DRG and CAE USA (formerly Canadian Aviation Electronics), the parent company of DRG, did not conduct a further investigation of the incident or examine ▮(b) (6)▮ previous classroom conduct.[80]

The site manager contacted the authorized contracting officer (ACO), ▮(b)(6)▮ ▮, at the CNATRA N4 Office.[81] In a discussion between CNATRA N4, DRG, and Commodore, TW-6 (CTW-6), they decided that the complaint did not involve production as it dealt with a specific contract employee.[82] They agreed to handle the complaint through the customer complaint process rather than through the corrective action report process.[83] There is no mention of the customer complaint process in the CNATRAINST 4355.4C and there is no explicit mention of how to address CMEO complaints. CTW-6 is considered the customer for VT-10 contract instructors.[84] Neither the TW-6 nor VT-10 IMSO was notified of the incident.[85]

On 9 April 2019, CAE USA submitted a proposed resolution plan to CTW-6.[86] CAE USA and DRG referred to the complaint as the "incident" and did not inform CTW-6 the complaint's subject line described it as a "CMEO COMPLAINT."[87] After collaboration, CTW-6 and CAE USA agreed to, and CNATRA N4 approved, the following corrective measures:[88]

1. Issuance of a program management memorandum from CAE USA to all of its contract instructors reminding them that unprofessional conduct will not be tolerated.
2. Issuance of a corrective action memorandum (CAM) to ▮(b) (6)▮ addressing his violation of DRG and CAE USA policy.

3. Submission of a formal face-to-face apology from [(b) (6)] to 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani.[89]

On 25 April 2019, [(b) (6)] received the CAM.[90] Between 25 April 2019 and 14 May 2019, both 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani and [(b) (6)] completed prescheduled leave, delaying the face-to-face apology.[91] [(b) (6)] on leave from 6–15 April 2019.[92] DRG scheduled an initial meeting for 6 May 2019, but 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani went on leave on 5 May 2019.[93] Due to various scheduling conflicts between Mr. Day, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani, the ground training officer (GTO), and the site focal, the meeting was not held until 14 May 2019.[94]

During the meeting on 14 May 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani noted that it had taken 2 months for him to receive a formal apology from [(b) (6)].[95] He refused to accept the apology.[96] The GTO asked 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani to "think about what would make this right" and to return later in the day to discuss how to address his remaining concerns.[97]

The GTO met with 2nd Lt Lt Al-Shamrani again and described the options available for further redress, ranging from no further action to the firing of [(b) (6)].[98] 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani said, "I want his hea…I want something to happen to him!" Although 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani didn't finish his sentence, witnesses believed he intended to say, "I want his head!"[99] The GTO asked him to consider the options, consult with his RSAF superior, [(b)(6)], and return to discuss the options further.[100] When the GTO did not hear back from 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani, he reached out to [(b) (6)] as he maintained a close working relationship with [(b) (6)].[101] [(b)(6)] told him that [(b) (6)] had told 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani to, "move on and consider the issue over."[102] No military member or class advisors ever met with 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani to discuss the complaint.[103] The

VT-10 IMSO remained unaware of the event until after the attack on 6 December 2019.[104]

After the incident, ▮▮▮ requested that he not be scheduled for any simulator or classroom events with 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani.[105] With the exception of one day when ▮▮▮ acted as the substitute for a visual navigation course, TW-6 adhered to this request.[106] During a simulator event, TW-6 mistakenly assigned ▮▮▮ to instruct 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani, but ▮▮▮ caught the error and the schedule was changed before the event.[107] ▮▮▮ had no further interaction with 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani.[108]

On 5 April 2019, an anonymous student filed an IG complaint to the CNAP IG Hotline.[109] It alleged the same facts as 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's complaint, but characterized the incident as "unprofessional behavior" rather than a CMEO complaint.[110]

On 9 April 2019, the IG issued a letter to CNATRA requesting a response to the "inappropriate comments … made by the civilian instructor."[111] This letter required a response by 23 April 2019.

On 24 May 2019, ▮▮▮ and the other contract instructors attended workplace and cultural sensitivity training.[112]

On 7 June 2019, CNATRA responded with all of the actions taken to resolve 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's complaint.[113] No further actions were taken as a result of the IG complaint.[114] Neither CNATRA nor the CNATRA IG informed CTW-6 about the existence of the CNAP IG complaint.[115]

<u>Opinion 4.4.1</u>: DRG management's investigation into ███ (b) (6) conduct was insufficient to reveal whether this was an isolated incident or a pattern of behavior.

<u>Opinion 4.4.2</u>: Actions taken by DRG to resolve the complaint were unreasonably delayed exhibited "no sense of urgency" and ultimately left 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani unsatisfied.

<u>Opinion 4.4.3</u>: Despite 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's dissatisfaction with the disciplinary action taken against ███ (b) (6), the action taken, although not timely, was appropriate and proportionate to the allegation, had this incident been an isolated incident.

<u>Opinion 4.4.4</u>: CTW-6, CVT-10, or TW-6 leadership should have met with 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani to inform him of the redress process/status and to answer any questions or concerns.

<u>Opinion 4.4.5</u>: The failure to inform the VT-10 IMSO prevented full situational awareness of human factors affecting 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani.

<u>Opinion 4.4.6</u>: The actions of the class leader and the other U.S. student were timely and appropriate. Their actions gave 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani the tools he needed to report the EO violation to the appropriate authority.

<u>Recommendation 4.4.1</u>: Recommend CNATRA update CNATRAINST 4355.4C, Chief of Naval Air Training Guidance for Conducting Surveillance of Contract Maintenance, Government Property Administration, and Services, to include a process for addressing allegations involving command climate policies, including, but not limited to CMEO, sexual harassment, and sexual assault.

Recommendation 4.4.2: Recommend OPNAV N1 update OPNAVINST 5354.1G, Navy Equal Opportunity Program Manual, to include a provision directing COs to make a determination regarding a preliminary inquiry for any allegation against a contracted employee.

Recommendation 4.4.3: Recommend OPNAV N1, in coordination with NIPO, update OPNAVINST 5354.1G, Navy Equal Opportunity Program Manual, to include an EO program applicability statement for IMS and the process for handling EO complaints filed by IMS.

Recommendation 4.4.4: Recommend NETSAFA update the Navy IMSO Guide to include an EO program applicability statement for IMS and the process for handling EO complaints filed by IMS.

Recommendation 4.4.5: Recommend CNATRA direct CAE USA to reiterate the importance of a professional training environment for students and the cultural differences that exist for IMS via official memorandum to employees and at the next employee training session.

Finding 4.5 (Deficiency): KSA students consider the religious space provided to accommodate the Muslim population on base as inadequate.

Discussion: During discussions with KSA students who returned to their country after 6 December, (b)(6) ████████████████████████████, was told by KSA students they appreciated having a prayer room, but they considered the space set aside for Muslim prayer as too small. There is one bathroom and one sink, and there is not a separate space to accommodate women as required in Islamic custom. The students also felt that the prayer room was unable to accommodate the number of Muslim students on base.[116] The nearest Muslim

worship center is 15 miles from NASP, making prayer at a civilian facility impractical.

When asked about the prayer accommodations for Muslims worshippers on base, the NASP chaplain, ▉(b)(6)▉, indicated the base had not decided on the location of the Islamic prayer room after the 6 December incident.[117] ▉(b) (6)▉ ▉▉ expressed the prayer room needs a permanent location if the base continues having foreign students on base.[118]

Occasionally, the RSAF would send someone from their religious affairs division (i.e., chaplain) to meet with KSA students at NASP in order to check on their morale, answer their religious questions/concerns, provide lectures, and lead some prayers.[119] In May 2019 ▉(b)(6)▉ from the RSAF religious affairs division visited NASP. His visit coincided with the holy month of Ramadan (fasting month). ▉(b)(6)▉ is a graduate of the Navy NFO training program. After his visit with the Saudi Arabian flight students, he met with ▉(b) (6)▉ and discussed the possibility of attaining better/larger prayer spaces for the Muslim students.[120]

Following the NASP attack, the KSA Ministry of Defense (MoD) agreed to enhance its host nation screening/vetting protocols.[121] As part of that effort, KSA will emphasize the importance of their military services conducting periodic visits to their students in order to conduct religious and security program outreach.

The BOT for RSNF Aviation Training Support between NETSAFA and KSA (SR-P-TDP) of 15 September 2017 does not mention religious services, but does not preclude funding of the same under the "Other Services" line item.[122]

Opinion 4.5.1: Religious services provide an outlet for KSA students and staff; however, inadequate spaces may diminish their efficacy.

<u>Opinion 4.5.2</u>: KSA students and staff are not the only Muslims on board NASP. All personnel assigned to NASP are entitled to reasonable religious accommodation.

<u>Recommendation 4.5.1</u>: Recommend CNIC/NASP identify and outfit an adequate space for Muslim practitioners to include separate rooms for male and female worshippers.

<u>Recommendation 4.5.2</u>: Recommend U.S. Navy Chief of Chaplains review demand for religious support at IMS concentration areas and consider contracted or U.S. military imam to support religious practice.

<u>Recommendation 4.5.3</u>: Recommend NIPO and NETSAFA review the inclusion of religious program support in BOTs.

---

[1] OPNAVINST 5354.1G, Navy Equal Opportunity Program Manual (24 July 2017).

[2] SECNAVINST 4950.4B, Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (JSCET) (3 January 2011).

[3] COMTRAWINGSIXINST 5354.2N, Command Philosophy & Policy Statements (28 September 2018).

[4] NASC CO Policy Statement Regarding Elimination of Harassment (21 June 2016).

[5] CNATRAINST 4355.4C, Chief Of Naval Air Training Guidance For Conducting Surveillance Of Contract Maintenance, Government Property Administration And Services (22 July 2019).

[6] OPNAVINST 5400.45, Standard Navy Distribution List Shore Chain of Command (1 January2020), 18.

[7] Id., 11.

[8] 2019 DEOCS from NASC, Training Squadron TEN (VT-10) and Training Squadron EIGHT-SIX (VT-86).

[9] So (b)(6), ENS, Student VT-4 (17 January 2020).

[10] International Military Training Clerk (OA) BPAAY GS-0303-05 (02229).

---

[11] Id.; ████████████ (22 January 2020).

[12] Id.

[13] ████████████ (22 January 2020).

[14] SoI German students (17 JAN 2020); SoI ██████, CDR, NASC Aviation Training Schools Director (16 January 2020).

[15] SoI ██████, CDR, NASC Aviation Training Schools Director (16 JAN 2020); SoI ████████, NASC IMSO (16 January 2020); SoI ████████████ (22 January 2020).

[16] SoI German students (17 January 2020).

[17] SoI ██, ENS, Student VT-4 (17 JAN 2020); SoI ██████, ENS, Student VT-86 (17 JAN 2020); SoI ██████, ENS, Student VT-4 (17 January 2020); SoI ██████, ENS, Student VT-4 (17 January 2020); SoI ██████ ENS, Student VT-86 (17 January 2020).

[18] SoI USN and international students (17 January 2020).

[19] SoI ████████████ (22 January 2020).

[20] SoI ██████, ENS, Student VT-86 (17 January 2020).

[21] SoI German students (17 January 2020).

[22] SoI ██████, ENS, NASC IMT stash (18 January 2020).

[23] SoI ██████, Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (21 January 2020).

[24] SoI German students (17 January 2020).

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] German Student Complaint Letter 2019.

[28] SoI German students (17 January 2020).

[29] Norwegian Student Ltr RE NASC IMSO 2015.

[30] German Student Complaint Letter 2019.

[31] SECNAVINST 4950.4B Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (JSCET) (3 JAN 2011) § 10-12.

[32] Norwegian Student Ltr RE NASC IMSO 2015.

[33] Email chain of ██████ dtd 14 January 2020 Subject "FW NASC IMSO" w/enclosure.

[34] Norwegian Student Ltr RE NASC IMSO 2015.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] Email of ██████, Subject "NASC IMSO" (20 January 2020).

[40] Email of ██████, Subject "NASC IMSO" (26 January 2020).

[41] German Student Complaint Letter 2019.

[42] SoI ██████, LtCol, CO, and ██████, Major, XO, 2nd German Air Force Training Squadron (15 January 2020).

[43] German Student Complaint Letter 2019; SoI German students (17 January 2020).

[44] Id.

[45] Id.

[46] SoI German students (17 January 2020).

[47] German Student Complaint Letter 2019; SoI German students (17 January 2020).

[48] Id.

[49] SoI ██████, LtCol, CO, and ██████, Major, XO, 2nd German Air Force Training Squadron (15 January 2020).

[50] Id.

[51] Id.

[52] Id.

[53] Id.

[54] SoI ██████, CDR, NASC Aviation Training Schools Director (16 January 2020).

[55] NASC CO Policy Statement Regarding Elimination of Harassment, 21 June 2016.

[56] 2018 and 2019 DoD Performance Appraisals of ██████.

[57] SoI ██████, CDR, NASC Aviation Training Schools Director (16 January 2020); SoI ████████, NASC IMSO (16 January 2020); SoI ████████████ (22 January 2020); SoI ██████, ENS, NASC IMT

stash (18 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)████████, NASC IMT stash (18 January 2020) and SoI (b)(6)██████, NASC IMT stash (16 January 2020).

58 SoI German students (17 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)████ Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (16 January 2020).

59 SoI (b)(6)███████████████ (22 January 2020); SoI German students (17 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)██, Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (16 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)███, LtCol, CO, and (b)(6)██████, Major, XO, 2nd German Air Force Training Squadron (15 January 2020).

60 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani Inspector General complaint; German Student Complaint Letter 2019; Norwegian Student Ltr RE NASC IMSO 2015; SoI (b)(6)██ ENS, Student VT-4 (17 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)████ ENS, Student VT-86. (17 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)████, ENS, Student VT-4 (17 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)████, ENS, Student TW-6.

61 So (b)(6)████, Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)███, Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)██████████████ (22 January 2020).

62 SoI (b) (6)███ CAPT, Commodore TW-6 (15 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)████ GS-9, Ground Training Officer TW-6 (23 January 2020).

63 OPNAVINST 5354.1G, Navy Equal Opportunity Program Manual (24 July 2017) Ch. 1, Par. 2d.

64 CNATRA memorandum, Call Signs Policy (25 July 2019).

65 Id.

66 Id.

67 Id.

68 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani CMEO complaint (05 April 2019); SoI (b)(6)██████, Site Focal/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)████, Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)████, Site Manager/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020).

69 Id.

70 IG Hotline Complaint 201901448 (09 April 2019).

71 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani CMEO complaint (05 April 2019).

72 SoI (b)(6)███, Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020).

73 Id.

74 Id.

75 So (b)(6)████, ENS, Student VT-4 (17 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)███ ENS, Student VT-86 (17 January 2020).

76 SoI (b)(6)██████, Site Focal/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020).

77 SoI (b)(6)███, Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)███████, Site Focal/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)████, Site Manager/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020).

78 So (b)(6)████, Site Manager/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020).

79 SoI (b)(6)████, Site Manager/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)████, Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)██████, Site Focal/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020).

80 Emails regarding incident; SoI (b)(6)██████, Site Focal/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)████, Site Manager/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020).

81 SoI (b)(6)███, Site Manager/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020).

82 SoI (b)(6)███, GS-9, Ground Training Officer TW-6 (23 January 2020).

83 SoI (b) (6)████ CAPT, Commodore TW-6 (15 January 2020).

84 Id.

85 SoI (b)(6)████, LT, IMSO VT-10 (14 January 2020); SoI (b) (6)████ CAPT, Commodore TW-6 (15 January 2020).

86 5 April Complaint CAE Correspondence.

87 Id.

88 SoI (b)(6)██████, Ground Training Officer TW-6 (23 January 2020).

89 5 April Complaint CAE Correspondence

90 IG Hotline Complaint 201901448 (09 April 2019).

91 5 April Complaint CAE Correspondence.

92 5 April Complaint CAE Correspondence.

93 5 April Complaint CAE Correspondence.

94 5 April Complaint CAE Correspondence; SoI (b)(6)██████, Site Focal/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6)████ Site Manager/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020).

---

[95] Sol (b)(6)   , Site Focal/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020); Sol (b)(6)   , Site Manager/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020).

[96] Sol (b)(6)   , Site Focal/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020); Sol (b)(6)   , Site Manager/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020); Sol (b)(6) Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January JAN 2020).

[97] Sol (b)(6)   , Ground Training Officer TW-6 (23 January 2020).

[98] Id.

[99] Id.

[100] Id.

[101] Id.

[102] Id.

[103] Sol (b) (6) CAPT, Commodore TW-6 (15 January 2020); Sol (b)(6)   , Site Focal/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020); Sol (b)(6) Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020).

[104] Sol (b)(6)   , IMSO VT-10 (14 January 2020).

[105] Sol (b)(6) , Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020); Sol (b)(6)   , Site Focal/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020).

[106] Id.

[107] Id.

[108] Id.

[109] IG Hotline Complaint 201901448 (09 April 2019).

[110] Id.

[111] Id.

[112] 5 April Complaint CAE Correspondence; IG Hotline Complaint 201901448 (09 April 2019).

[113] Id.

[114] Id.

[115] Sol (b) (6) CAPT, Commodore TW-6 (15 January 2020); IG Hotline Complaint 201901448.

[116] So (b)(6)   , USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) (22 January 2020).

[117] Sol BK (b)(6)   , Naval Air Station Pensacola (17 January 2020).

[118] Id.

[119] Email (b)(6) Booz Allen Hamilton contractor, NETSAFA International Training Center (22 January 2020).

[120] Id.

[121] Listed Improvements from KSA Ministry of Defense (MoD) provided by CAPT (b) (6)   , Chief of Naval Forces Division, U.S. Military Training Mission to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia via (b)(6)   NETSAFA N3 (14 January 2020).

[122] Blanket Order for Training RSAF WSO Training/CLO Support between AFSAT and KSA (SR-D-THD) (22 April 2016).

Chapter 5—Force Protection

This chapter outlines instances of noncompliance and deficiencies with force protection policy, training, and resourcing at NASP, NASC, TW-6, VT-10, and VT-86. These instances of noncompliance and deficiencies must be balanced against two considerations. First, no specific threat—active shooter or otherwise—existed in Pensacola at the time of the shooting.[1] (b) (7)(F)

██

██ There are no minimum AT construction standards for buildings outside of the UFC construction elements for enhanced AT design. The investigation team acknowledges it is impractical to protect every person aboard an installation at an individual level.

(b) (7)(F)

██

██

Each command has unique local risks, which must be addressed through risk-based decision making in the face of limited fiscal resources and finite personnel.

Regulatory Background

DODI 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism Program, and DODI O-2000.16 Volume 1, DoD Antiterrorism Standards, form the basis for AT programs across the services.[2]

SECNAVINST 3300.2C, Department of the Navy Antiterrorism Program, implements the above DoD instructions and assigns AT responsibilities within DoN.[3]

OPNAVINST 5530.14E, Department of the Navy Physical Security and Law Enforcement Program, implements the DoN physical security and law

enforcement program applicable to all Navy military personnel, civilian employees, contractors, facilities, ships, aircraft, and non-Navy organizations physically located on or aligned to U.S. Navy-controlled installations worldwide.

SECNAVINST 5510.37, Department of the Navy Insider Threat Program, implements the requirement for existing and emerging insider threat training and awareness to be provided to all DoN personnel, or other insiders, who have access to DoN resources.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Section 951, expands the definition of "insider threat" to include commission of a destructive act, which may include physical harm to another in the workplace.

OPNAVINST F3300.53C, Navy Antiterrorism Program, implements the DoD AT program.

USNORTHCOM Instruction 10-222 provides USNORTHCOM's AT policies.[4]

U.S. Fleet Forces Antiterrorism Operations Order, OPORD 3300-17, executes USNORTHCOM's AT policies.

CNRSE AT OPORD, OPORD 3300-19, implements USFFC guidance and applies to all Navy Installations and tenant commands.[5]

UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) DoD MINIMUM ANTITERRORISM STANDARDS FOR BUILDINGS (UFC 4-010-01) provides planning, design, construction, sustainment, restoration, and modernization criteria, and applies to the military departments.[6]

BACKGROUND

Known threat at the time of the shooting on 6 December 2019

The DIA terrorist threat level for the United States was "SIGNIFICANT," and is defined by the following conditions: Anti-U.S. terrorists are operationally active and attack personnel as the preferred method of operation; or, terrorist groups seek to carry out large, casualty-producing attacks but are operationally limited.[7] As of September 18, 2019, NCIS Southeast Field Office was not aware of any reporting indicating a specific, credible threat to DoN personnel, facilities, or assets in the Florida Panhandle. However, recent terrorism events and arrests in the U.S. indicate Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVE) and lone actors remain intent and capable of conducting attacks within the United States. HVEs and lone actors inspired by FTOs such as ISIS and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), pose the greatest and most immediate threat to the DoN.[8] NCIS defines HVEs as individuals inspired—as opposed to directed—by an FTO and radicalized in the countries in which they are born, raised, or reside. NCIS defines a lone actor as an individual who is self-motivated to engage in acts of violence, or who is motivated by one or more violent extremist ideologies and supports or engages in acts of violence to further the ideology or ideologies. HVEs and lone actors are commonly referred to as a lone wolf, or self-directing extremist. FTOs continue to exploit the internet to inspire, enable, or direct individuals in the United States to commit terrorist acts. Reporting did not indicate any current HVE activity in northwest Florida.[9]

Force Protection (FP)–Physical Security (PS) and Antiterrorism (AT)

FP refers to preventive measures designed to mitigate hostile actions against DoD personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information.[10] FP has several supporting components, including combating terrorism (CbT), PS, emergency management (EM), LE, information security (IS), and continuity of operations.[11]

CbT consists of AT and counterterrorism actions taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.[12]

AT, the defensive component of CbT, refers to defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. AT includes rapid containment by local military and civilian forces.[13] AT stresses deterrence of terrorist incidents through common preventive measures across services and geographic areas. AT integrates other defensive actions such as PS, chemical, biological radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE), operations security (OPSEC), and counterintelligence (CI) in a comprehensive program; however, it does not include all FP aspects. Therefore, FP should not be used as a synonymous term with AT.[14]

Physical security encompasses physical measures and procedures designed to safeguard personnel, property and operations; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities/areas, material and information, and to protect against espionage, terrorism, sabotage, damage, misuse, and theft.

Physical security procedures include, but are not limited to, the application of physical measures to reduce vulnerability to a threat; the integration of physical security into contingency plans; the assessment of physical security procedures and measures during the exercise of these plans; the integration of OPSEC, crime prevention and physical security programs to protect against the traditional criminal; the training of security forces in tactical defense against attempted penetrations; and the creation of physical security awareness.

Physical security measures are physical systems, devices, personnel, animals and procedures employed to protect security interests from possible threats. These measures include, but are not limited to, security guards; military working dogs; lights and physical barriers; explosives and bomb detection equipment;

protective vests and similar equipment; badging systems; electronic entry control systems and access control devices; security containers; locking devices; electronic intrusion detection systems; standardized command, control and display subsystems; radio frequency data links used for physical security; security lighting; delay devices; biometrics; and assessment and/or surveillance systems to include closed-circuit television.[15]

Fundamentals of DoD AT Programs

The DoD identifies five core elements of AT programs. The core elements apply to all organizational entities in the DoD, including tenant commands within installations.[16] These elements include:

1) Risk Management (RM)
2) Planning
3) Training and Exercises
4) Resource Application
5) Comprehensive Program Review.[17]

Risk Management (RM). RM permeates all aspects of an AT program. It involves identifying terrorist threats, developing mitigation measures against those threats, and optimizing the allocation of limited resources.[18] RM decisions account for unique vulnerabilities and the criticality of assets at a particular command.[19] The ultimate responsibility for RM rests with the commander, who must determine which assets require the most protection and how resources should be optimally applied.[20]

Planning. Commanders must develop specific AT guidance and execution-oriented instructions for their subordinates.[21] DoD policy requires this guidance to be captured in a command AT plan that is specifically tailored to local conditions.[22] A command's AT plans must cover FPCON measures, execution of

Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAMs), conduct of exercises, use of PS measures, and incident response measures.[23]

Training and Exercises. Training and exercises are critical components of a command's AT program. Under DoD policy, a command's AT plan is incomplete unless it is exercised.[24] Unit-level training and drills allow commanders to identify critical shortfalls and optimize response plans.[25]

Resource Application. After reducing risk as far as possible through local mitigation measures, commanders employ resource application through the existing planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process.[26]

Program Review. Commanders must conduct comprehensive AT program reviews at least annually.[27] These reviews identify deficiencies and vulnerabilities that may be exploited. Reviews should offer realistic solutions to improve the program and strengthen mitigation strategies.[28] Additionally, program reviews should account for changes in the threat environment.[29]

TACON for FP

USNORTHCOM exercises TACON for FP of all DoD elements and personnel in its AOR. USNORTHCOM directs the day-to-day execution of the FP mission through the designated service components to include USFFC (Figure 5-1).[30] The USNORTHCOM AOR is divided into regional and afloat operational environments.

TACON for FP enables the geographic combatant commander (GCC) to order change, modify, prescribe, and enforce FP measures. [31] This relationship includes the authority to inspect and assess security requirements, direct DoD activities to identify the resources required to correct deficiencies and submit

budget requests to parent organizations to fund identified issues. In this case, all active duty, reserve, and DoD civilians were TACON to USNORTHCOM for FP.[32]

USFFC is the CNO's executive agent for Navy FP and the Navy component commander (NAVNORTH) in the USNORTHCOM AOR.[33] Specific responsibilities and authorities inherent in this role include exercising C2 of the operational FP mission for all U.S. Navy shore and afloat commands.[34] For Navy forces, facilities, and personnel located in the CONUS regional operational environments, USFFC exercises TACON for FP through the respective CONUS region commanders. CONUS region commanders are responsible for operational matters related to the FP mission for all Navy installations in their region. CNRSE exercises TACON for FP for all Navy activities in its AOR.[35]

NASP falls under the TACON for FP authority of CNRSE.[36] NASC falls under the administrative authority of CNATT (Echelon III) and NETC (Echelon II).[37] When activated, NASC personnel assigned to the installation's Auxiliary Security Force (ASF) fall under the TACON of NASP Commanding Officer.

Administrative and operational COCs do not have TACON for FP implementing responsibilities.[38]

Findings, Opinions, and Recommendations

Findings concern compliance with Force Protection (FP) programs, policies, and procedures by NASP, NASC, TW-6, VT-10 and VT-86.

Finding 5.1 (Noncompliance): 2nd Lt. Al-Shamrani legally purchased a personal firearm under existing federal law.[39] He violated installation policy by bringing the unregistered weapon onto the installation and into his PPV accommodation.[40]

Discussion 5.1: 2nd Lt. Al-Shamrani did not register his personal weapon with installation security as required. NASP holds no record of any international student ever registering a weapon.[41] Navy installations post restrictions on personal firearms at each entry control point (ECP).[42] NASP had large red and white prohibited-item signs and small placards prohibiting firearms at each entry lane. All RSAF IMS receive an indoctrination form in Arabic explicitly stating, "It's forbidden to purchase or carry a firearm.[43]" An Arabic-speaking contractor of the RSAF TLT reviews the form with each student before it is signed and maintained on file.[44] (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E) 2nd Lt. Al-Shamrani's signed form was unavailable for inclusion in this report.

Additionally, the NITC aviation team lead coordinates with NASP Anti-Terrorism Officer (ATO) for IMS indoctrination support.[45] The security brief, delivered to every IMS, includes active shooter response and the personal weapons policy.[46]

All students assigned to base housing sign a lease referencing an addendum titled "Resident Guide." The Resident Guide includes the requirement to register personal weapons with installation security. Of note, the Resident Guide is a separate document not attached to the lease and does not require immediate review or signature. By signing the lease, residents acknowledge reading and complying with the guide. Following the incident, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) issued a policy memo prohibiting international military students, and their accompanying family members, from transporting, possessing, storing, or using personally owned firearms.[47]

On January 13, 2020, AG William Barr delivered a statement on the findings of the criminal investigation. AG Barr stated, "This was an act of terrorism," and

went on to say the evidence showed the shooter was motivated by jihadist ideology. [48]

Opinion 5.1.1: Protection of personnel from active shooters or insider threats is the responsibility of commanders. Hostile actors from inside the fence line pose a growing threat to both personnel and installations. (b) (7)(F)

Recommendation 5.1.1: Recommend installation commanders and NSF continue to provide base security brief to all tenant commands. Where resource limitations preclude NSF from presenting the brief, use installation antiterrorism working groups (ATWG) to train tenant ATOs and enable self-sufficiency.

Recommendation 5.1.2: Recommend all installation commanders ensure SECDEF Memo of 16 January 2020 and ALNAV msg. 311303Z JAN 20, prohibiting purchase of privately owned firearms and ammunition by foreign military students and their family members is incorporated in the base security briefs provided to IMS.

Recommendation 5.1.3: Recommend Navy regional commanders ensure installations provide tenant commands with applicable security policy and local regulations for indoctrination of new personnel.

Recommendation 5.1.4: Recommend tenant commanders ensure command personnel responsible for indoctrination programs coordinate with installation security for incorporation of relevant policies, restrictions, off-limits areas and emergency response.

Finding 5.2 (Deficiency): Installation policy and procedures did not prevent 2nd Lt. Al-Shamrani from bringing an unauthorized weapon onto NASP.

Discussion: Personnel with valid credentials to access the installation have the opportunity to bring prohibited items through the gate on their person and in vehicles. (b) (7)(F) ██
███
███
███
██
██
██████████████████

Opinion 5.2.1: (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████████████████
███

Once base policy is promulgated, there is a moral obligation on the part of all authorized personnel to follow the weapons restrictions

Opinion 5.2.2: Prohibited items policy alone will not prevent the HVE, lone actor, or insider threat from intentionally violating the restrictions and transporting unauthorized weapons on board installations once they decide to commit a violent act.

Opinion 5.2.3: Prevention can only be enhanced through a more robust FP posture, deterring insider threats, HVEs and lone actors from attempting to bring weapons through the gates.

Opinion 5.2.4: (b) (5) ██████████████████████████████████████
███
██.

(b) (5) ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓

▓▓

▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓ (b) (5) ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓

▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓

Opinion 5.2.5: (b) (5) ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓

▓▓

▓▓

▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓

▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓ (b) (5) ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓

▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓

▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓.

Recommendation 5.2.1: (b) (7)(F) ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓

▓▓

▓▓▓▓▓▓▓

Recommendation 5.2.2: Recommend NETC develop proactive active shooter response training for Navy personnel.

Finding 5.3 (Deficiency): OPNAV has not issued implementing policy for arming personnel beyond NSF requirements.

Discussion: The SECNAV Arming and the Use of Force instruction requires the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) and the CNO to issue implementing policy for the authorization to arm personnel other than on-duty NSF.[49] Only the CMC has issued such policy to date.   In the absence of CNO policy guidance, commanders are constrained by existing policy to arm only qualified NSF in the performance of security duties and credentialed law enforcement officers.[50]

Navy policy on the arming of personnel outside of law enforcement or security duties is at the discretion of the installation commanding officer.[51] Tenant commands cannot approve arming of personnel without the approval of the installation commander.

Both the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force have implemented arming policies for personnel other than security forces.

MARADMIN 719-19 authorizes qualified active Marine Corps LE professionals with valid Law Enforcement Officer Safety Act (LEOSA)[52] credentials to carry concealed privately owned firearms (POF) aboard Marine Corps property in the U.S. and its territories for personal protection not in the performance of official duties.[53]

Following the shooting attacks on the Chattanooga Armed Forces Recruiting Station and Navy Operational Support Center (NOSC) in July 2015, the U.S. Air Force implemented three programs to authorize conceal-carry or open-carry on USAF installations with base commander authorization. The programs are the Unit Marshal Program (UMP), Security Forces Staff Arming (SFSA) and LEOSA programs. SFSA allows the deliberate arming of unit personnel to secure mission assets in their immediate work areas and to augment integrated defense forces. [54]

UMP is the newest of several tools designed to enable commanders at every level, when approved by the installation commander, permission to work with security forces to train Airmen and allow them to open carry an M9 pistol in their duty location.[55] UMP allows the commander to selectively arm designated and trained personnel for immediate work center defensive actions during an active shooter threat. The UMP is an optional tool for installation or equivalent military commanders to mitigate increased risk of workplace violence when USAF

95

personnel or assets could be jeopardized without the presence of armed personnel. The intent of the UMP is to enhance unit/individual survivability during an active shooter threat.[56]

Opinion 5.3.1: A deficiency in Navy policy precludes Navy installations from establishing local policy for arming of additional personnel.

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

Opinion 5.3.5: Installation commanders require additional options for arming qualified personnel for personal protection on Navy installations.

Opinion 5.3.6: Arming additional personnel requires additional training and qualification to ensure competence in weapons handling and employment.

Opinion 5.3.7: Additional resources would be required for training and sustainment to include qualified instructors, noncombat expenditure allowance (NCEA), additional ranges, and additional simulators for sustainment.

(b) (5)

▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮

▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮

▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮

(b) (5)

▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮

▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮

▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮

▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮

General Finding 5.4 (Noncompliance): NASC, TW-6, VT-10 and VT-86 were not in full compliance with AT and PS program and policy requirements.

Discussion: Commanders did not fully implement FP-related programs to include (b) (7)(F) ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ due to gaps in policy; lack of training; noncompliance with existing policy; and a lack of understanding of who has ownership of the PS program.[57]

RM was not uniformly used to inform commanders' AT and PS planning, threat and vulnerability assessments, risk mitigation strategies, training, and resourcing processes. (b) (7)(F) ▮▮▮.

Opinion 5.4: (b) (7)(F) ▮▮ Installation ATOs provide a range of services to tenant

commands who participate in quarterly AT and Threat working groups, (b)(7)(F)

Finding 5.4.1 (Non-compliance): The NASC Commanding Officer did not designate an ATO in writing as required by CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-19.

Finding 5.4.2 (Deficiency): The NASC ATO had not attended AT Level II training.[58]

Finding 5.4.3 (Deficiency): The NASC CO had not attended Commanding Officer Antiterrorism Training (COAT), AT Level III, since 2006.[59] There is no periodicity requirement to attend AT Level III or IV for qualification currency.

Finding 5.4.4 (Deficiency): AT Level IV Executive Seminar (ES) is not documented in Navy electronic training records.

Discussion: DoD AT Standard 9 requires commanders to designate an ATO in writing and attend the appropriate training.[60] OPNAVINST F3300.53C requires the commanding officer of units, ships, squadrons, and other commands to designate an ATO in writing if they are deployable / own a perimeter; execute operational / tactical control of forces; or establish AT policy.[61] Per CNRSE policy, NASC was required to designate an ATO in writing.[62] NASC designated an ATO in writing on 23 January 2020.[63] Per CNRSE policy, NASC should also have coordinated with the host installation to meet AT requirements.[64] Through January 2019, the former NASC ATO participated in the NASP ATWG. During his tenure, the current ATO attended neither a Threat Working Group (TWG) nor ATWG meeting.[65]

USFFC Force Protection Training Continuum states AT Level II training is intended for all nominated ATOs.[66] AT Level II Training does not address the

unique concerns of tenant command AT and physical security responsibilities. ATO Level II course capacity is programmed to validated ATO billets, defined by type commander (TYCOM) instructions and entered in Fleet Training Management and Planning System (FLTMPS). AT Level II qualifies the ATO for a period of three years.[67]

COAT meets the DoD requirement for AT Level III training. The two-day course is designed to provide prospective commanding officers awareness of their responsibilities for implementing a comprehensive AT program and meeting the FP mission. NETC offers seven versions of COAT for prospective aviation, surface, submarine, installation, expeditionary, reserve, and recruiting commanders. [68] The reserve and recruiting COAT courses were created following the 2015 Chattanooga shooting incidents. There is currently no tenant command COAT.

Other warfare communities do not include COAT or AT Level IV in the pre-command pipeline training (e.g., Information Warfare officers screened for command do not receive AT training in their PCS orders).[69] USFFC FP training continuum states AT Level III training is intended for all personnel en route to an executive officer or commanding officer billet.[70]

For commanding officers and commanders without an established pre-command pipeline with COAT, completion of the Navy e-learning Antiterrorism Planning (ATP) course meets the pre-command training requirement.[71] The NASC CO attended COAT in 2006, but he did not receive this training prior to his major command or current assignment.[72] Based on the former and current COAT course identification numbers (CIN), the course was revised to reflect changes in DoD and DoN policy and requirements. The Navy e-learning ATP course was not directed for completion and the course has not been updated since 2016. AT

Level IV ES is taught by the Joint Staff and offered to senior leaders O6 and above. Joint Staff issues a certificate at graduation from the course, but no entry is made to service records.

As a tenant of NASP, NASC reports to the installation commanding officer for all matters related to operational FP.[73] Outside of the operational FP mission, NASC is an Echelon IV command reporting to CNATT. CNATT is responsible for AT program review and administrative functions, which include tracking and completion of required AT Level I and active shooter training. From January 2019 until 06 December 2019, the NASC ATO received no AT program support from the CNATT ATO.[74]

Opinion 5.4.1: The ATO requirements established in CNO AT Standard 9 are more specific and limited than required to meet recent DoD AT policy changes.[75] Commanders, below the installation level, may be justifiably confused as to whether formal designation of an ATO is required. DoN policy must be updated to align with DoD.

Opinion 5.4.2: Designated ATOs who do not complete necessary training are not qualified to advise the commander or manage the AT program. In order to properly execute the functions of an ATO, they must attend the approved training as required by DoD AT Standard 9. A trained ATO will better enable commands to conduct training and planning in AT/PS.

Opinion 5.4.3: The policy of only authorizing AT Level II school quotas for TYCOM validated ATO billets leads to gaps in required ATO training for tenant commands.

Opinion 5.4.4: The NASC CO was not prepared to direct the implementation of a comprehensive AT program and ensure compliance with DoD and Navy AT

requirements. His previous attendance at COAT provided some background; however, 13 years is too long without refresher training.

Opinion 5.4.5: Commanders should attend COAT or AT Level IV prior to each command tour to ensure they have the most current AT requirements, threat updates and best practices. COs should be required to re-attend if it has been more than 5 years since previous training.

Recommendation 5.4.1: (b) (5) ███████████████████

███████████████████████████████████████

███████████████████████

Recommendation 5.4.2: Recommend OPNAV N314 establish the requirement for all commanding officers to attend AT level III (b) (5) ████ prior to assuming command unless training was completed within a five year period.

Recommendation 5.4.3: Recommend OPNAV N46 update AT and PS policy (OPNAVINST F3300.53C and 5530.14E) to align with current DoD program requirements of DODI 2000.16 Vol. I and DODM 5200.08.

(b) (5) ████████████████████████████

████████████████████████████████████

██████████

Recommendation 5.4.5: (b) (5) ████████████████████

█████████████████████████████████████

████████████

Recommendation 5.4.6: (b) (5) ████████████████████

█████████████████████████████████████

████████████████

Recommendation 5.4.7: Recommend Commanders at all levels attend AT Level III (b) (5) ████████ training prior to assuming command.

Recommendation 5.4.8: Recommend NETC develop a tenant command COAT course.

Recommendation 5.4.9: (b) (5) ████████████████████████

Recommendation 5.4.10: Recommend NASC ensure designated ATO attends AT Level II training.

Recommendation 5.4.11: Recommend NASC participate in installation ATWG and TWGs.

Recommendation 5.4.12: (b) (5) ████████████████████████

Recommendation 5.4.13: Recommend NASC provide sufficient resources, staff assistance and authority to implement, manage, and execute an effective AT program.

Recommendation 5.4.14: Recommend NASC conduct required annual active shooter training, report completion for staff and students, and ensure future compliance by establishing a tracking program to identify deficient personnel.

Finding 5.5.1 (Noncompliance): NASC did not complete an annual PS survey.

Discussion: (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████

Approximately 3-4 years ago, a former NASC commanding officer approved the purchase and installation of cameras and a closed-circuit video system with monitors installed at the quarterdeck.[76] During the attack, these cameras and monitors enabled NSF and ECSO deputies to track the movement of 2nd Lt. Al-Shamrani.[77]

(b) (7)(F)

[78] 2nd Lt. Al-Shamrani killed the first two victims while they were standing watch in the Building 633 quarterdeck. (b) (7)(F)

This access enabled 2nd Lt. Al-Shamrani to attack from multiple directions including behind the Building 633 quarterdeck watch standers.[79]

The primary objective of the Navy PS program is to safeguard **personnel**, property, facilities and to enforce laws, rules and regulations at Navy installations, activities and operational commands. Commanding officers of tenant activities shall retain those internal security functions intrinsic to their organizations and missions, which include physical security of personnel and facilities security.[80] (b) (7)(F)

The NASC plan of the week listed a PS Officer.[81] No PS Officer was designated in writing as required by the command PS plan.[82] The last NASC PS Plan was signed in February 2012.[83] Annual PS surveys were not being conducted.[84]

The PS instruction includes a Threat Condition (THREATCON) checklist, which is not aligned with current FPCON measures. It also states officers in the grades of O2 to O3 and Chief Warrant Officers will receive PS training in conjunction with command duty officer (CDO) indoctrination. The investigation team found no evidence of such training.[85]

Prior to 1999, there were no specific standards for force protection in fixed DoD facilities. The UFC system provides planning, design, construction, sustainment, restoration, and modernization criteria, and applies to the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities.[86] UFC will be used for all DoD projects and work for other customers where appropriate. The purpose of this criteria is to establish minimum engineering standards for DoD projects that incorporate AT based mitigating measures not associated with an identified threat or level of protection. UFC for buildings do not require physical security features, systems or barriers for existing structures unless specific rehabilitation, construction or addition project cost estimates are met.[87]

NASC Building 633, the location of the attack, was built in 1941. Following Hurricane Ivan, Building 633 received a renovation in 2005 to include a roof, ceilings, flooring, bathrooms, walkways, theaters, electrical, fire protection, interior/exterior doors, and Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC).

The total project cost was $5.9M.[88] Since 2005, Building 633 has undergone no other significant modification or construction requiring compliance with current UFC AT or PS construction standards.

Following the Chattanooga, TN shootings of 2015, off-installation NOSC and Navy Recruiting facilities were approved for substantial PS enhancements to include ballistic shields, window obscuration, and hardened interior/exterior structures and barriers.[89]

NCIS Security Training Assessment and Assistance Team (STAAT) developed a five day Navy Physical Security Course (NPSC), providing comprehensive instruction for PS Officers.[90] However, this course is not currently required. As of January 2020, STAAT suspended teaching the NPSC pending review and validation of the curriculum.[91]

Opinion 5.5.1: NASC failed to exercise responsibility for the physical security of its spaces and facility perimeter.

Opinion 5.5.2: (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████████████
██████████

Opinion 5.5.3: (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████████████
██
████████████████████████

Opinion 5.5.4: Completion of a physical survey by NASC would have identified critical vulnerabilities that could have been remedied before the attack. Potential corrective actions and their impact are listed below:

Opinion 5.5.4.1: (b) (7)(F) ███████████████████████
██
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████

Opinion 5.5.4.2: (b) (7)(F) ███████████████████████
██
███████████████████████

██
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████

Opinion 5.5.4.4: (b) (7)(F) ███████████████████████
██

(b) (7)(F) ██

████████████

Opinion 5.5.4.5: (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████████

██

████████████████████████████

Recommendation 5.5.1: Recommend DoD update UFC construction standards for existing buildings and require enhanced physical security features for the protection of personnel at every DoN facility.

Recommendation 5.5.2: (b) (5) ████████████████████████████

████████████████████████████

Recommendation 5.5.3: Recommend NASC designate a PS officer and coordinate with installation for training and update of the command PS plan.

Recommendation 5.5.4: Recommend NASC review and update PS plan to align with current NASPCOLAINST 5530.8B.

Recommendation 5.5.5: Recommend NETC, in coordination with NCIS, complete review, update, and reinstatement of the NCIS STAAT Navy Physical Security Course (NPSC).

Recommendation 5.5.6: Recommend tenant commanders ensure annual PS surveys of facilities are conducted, provided to the installation, and reported annually to the regional commander.

Finding 5.6 (Noncompliance): CNATT ATO did not conduct AT program reviews on NASC.[92]

Discussion: As tenant commands of NASP, both NASC and CNATT report to the installation commanding officer for matters related to the operational FP mission.[93] Both tenant commands should coordinate with the installation ATO for annual AT exercises, AT Plan development and physical security surveys. USFF directs the administrative ISIC to conduct AT program reviews and track active shooter training requirements. Active Shooter training completion was not consistently tracked and reported for subordinate commands. The CNATT ATO provided the annual requirements to subordinate commands via an email distro; however, no positive contact occurred after the initial correspondence.[94]

In compliance with the FY20 CNO-directed mandatory security stand-down, the CNATT ATO received and reported active shooter training completion for subordinate commands to NETC. This report included NASC, though it was unclear if reporting was for the staff or if it included the student population. Prior to FY20, CNATT had no records of active shooter training reports for subordinate commands.[95] Prior to the shooting incident on 06 December, the NASC ATO had not been in contact with the CNATT ATO.[96]

Opinion 5.6.1: CNATT failed to provide adequate oversight of the AT program at NASC.

Opinion 5.6.2: Echelon II and III commanders must hold subordinates accountable for completion of required active shooter training.

Opinion 5.6.3: Commanders at all levels must ensure full compliance with the active shooter requirements for the safety of all personnel.

Recommendation 5.6.1: Recommend CNATT ensure NASC completion of annual active shooter requirements for both staff and students.

Recommendation 5.6.2: Recommend Echelon II and III commands provide AT program oversight, requirements and program reviews for subordinate commands.

Recommendation 5.6.3: Recommend Echelon II and III commands hold subordinate commanders accountable for active shooter and insider threat training completion.

Finding 5.7 (Noncompliance): TW-6, VT-10, and VT-86 failed to complete required annual active shooter training.

Discussion: In FY19, USFF required the completion of active shooter training for all personnel. In FY19, VT-10 instructors/staff completed 80 percent of individual active shooter training and 76 percent of practical/tabletop active shooter exercises. VT-86 instructors/staff completed 87 percent of individual active shooter training and 7 percent of practical/tabletop active shooter exercises. TW-6 students (VT-10, VT-4, and VT-86) completed 89 percent of individual active shooter training and 61 percent of practical/tabletop active shooter exercises. TW-6 instructors/staff completed 89 percent of individual active shooter training and 95 percent of practical/tabletop active shooter exercises.[97]

TW-6 publishes an annual training plan applicable to all subordinate commands. It coordinates quarterly stand downs where face-to-face training sessions are conducted. It also directs the completion of computer based training requirements to subordinates.[98] FY19 training completion was reviewed for completion as FY20 active shooter training was not due at the time of the incident.[99] The FLTMPS report reflects current onboard on the date of the report. The true completion rate may vary.

During active shooter training, personnel are encouraged to consider their response and actions during a shooting event to include exits, escape routes, hiding locations, and last resort measures. Personnel are prompted to mentally work through the mechanics of what, where and how to survive the attack.

Opinion 5.7.1: Active shooter training provides a forum and opportunity to think and discuss the increasing reality of an active shooter.

Opinion 5.7.2: Commands failing to ensure 100 percent completion of active shooter training assume undue risk to force and mission. They fail to take responsibility for the safety and well-being of their personnel against a known threat.

Recommendation 5.7.1: Recommend TW-6, VT-10, and VT-86 conduct required annual active shooter training and track squadron personnel completion.

Recommendation 5.7.2: Recommend TW-6, VT-10, and VT-86 commanders ensure compliance by establishing a tracking program to identify deficient personnel and schedule additional training sessions.

Finding 5.8 (Compliance): NASP NSF executed their mission, functions and tasks in compliance with relevant DoN and CNIC programs, policies, and procedures.

Discussion: NASP completed their Command Assessment for Readiness and Training (CART) site visit in September 2018.[100] (b) (7)(F)

CNIC required NASP to develop a Command Improvement Plan (CIP) to correct identified deficiencies. NASP remained in compliance with CART corrective actions and submitted monthly CIP

reports to CNIC. The December 2019 CIP report reflected significant progress in correcting the deficiencies from CART. (b) (7)(F)

███

███

███

███

████████████████████████████ 101

In September 2019, CNRSE completed their Region Assessment (RASS) of NASP NSF, in preparation for their Final Evaluation Problem (FEP). CNRSE assessed NASP NSF as "ready to certify" with a final score of 87 percent. (b) (7)(F)

███

██████ 102

Finding 5.9 (noncompliance): (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████████

██

██

Discussion: (b) (7)(F) ██

██████████████████████████████████ ███████████████████████

████████████ 104

At the time of the shooting on 6 December, NASP was operating under an access control exception, allowing public access to the installation for the Fort Barrancas Lighthouse, Barrancas National Cemetery and the Naval Aviation Museum. Following the shooting incident, USFF temporarily suspended the access control exception for all areas except the cemetery. This directive required all personnel not properly credentialed for installation access to be escorted by NSF.[105] The NASP long-term exception for Barrancas National Cemetery allows access for personnel and vehicles in a funeral procession, but

requires a front and rear escort by a Veterans Affairs (VA) and NSF vehicles, respectively. (b) (7)(F) ███████████████████████████████████

███████████████████████████████████ .

During the investigation, team members observed main gate ECP operations. During this observation, a funeral procession approached the installation with a front VA escort. (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████████

██
█████████████████████████████████████
██
██
███████████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████

(b) (7)(F)
███████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████

██
████████████████████████████

Opinion 5.9: (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████

Recommendation 5.9.1: (b) (7)(F) ███████████████████████
██
(b) (7)(F)
██
████████████████████████████████████
██████

Recommendation 5.9.2: [REDACTED] (b) (7)(F)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Finding 5.10 (Deficiency): [REDACTED] (b) (7)(F)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Discussion: [REDACTED] (b) (7)(F)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FBI statistics on active shooter incidents indicate the majority end within five minutes.[108] [REDACTED] (b) (7)(F)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The 2015 CNO decision to add an additional 1641 NSF personnel attempted to increase manning to MPV-P levels by FY18; however, this initiative was only an "important first step toward meeting minimum requirements."[109] [REDACTED] (b) (7)(F)

[REDACTED]

For security, CONUS sites are resourced to near-Common Output Level Standard (COLS) 4. COLS are subjective risk measures to stratify the level of service provided. COLS 1 enables full performance capability while COLS 4 provides limited capability and incurs higher risk. [REDACTED] (b) (7)(F)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b) (7)(F)

██.[110] This manning assumes risk in functions at locations where ASF and alternative sources of security can fill the programmatic capability gap.[111]

(b) (7)(F)

██

██

████████████████████████████   ████████████

████████████████████[113] NSF post/manpower validation is based on installation ROC levels and CNIC's resourcing strategy of COLS.

Capability requirements and resource levels are established using the approved ROC tiered methodology identifies the baseline security requirements for shore installations.[114]   ROC levels are scaled one to five. ROC level one represents the highest level of asset criticality (e.g., strategic installations/activities) and ROC level five represents the lowest level of criticality (non-installation/off-base organizations/activities/off-base housing).[115] NASP is assigned a <u>lower</u> ROC level and is resourced to the defined level.

ROC level assignments are based solely on physical assets and do not include protection of personnel as a factor.[116]

(b) (7)(F)

██

████████████████████████.[117] Patrol validations are first based on critical assets (not personnel or population) but may be based on geography to provide full coverage of the installation/fence line.[118] If critical assets do not exist, patrol zones are validated based on workload data (i.e., calls for service volume).[119]

(b) (7)(F)

██

██████   NSF post validation for a lower ROC level installation is based on response to a single event.[120]

On 6 December, NSF had a single location to respond to and arrived within 7 and a half minutes (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████████. All available NSF responded to Building 633 and engaged the shooter.

While NASP was found to be in compliance with FP policies, there are several noteworthy deficiencies in Navy NSF policy and manning, training, and equipping.

(b) (7)(F)
██

████████████████████████.[121] NASP has capacity to man installation ECPs and roving patrols to minimum levels. (b) (7)(F) ████████████████

██

████████████████████████████ As a result of minimal manning and the available effective work force, the installation commander is further constrained by using validated patrol section personnel (including supervisors) to perform other NSF program requirements (e.g., PS and AT functions). (b) (7)(F) ████████████████

██

██

██

████████████████████████[122]

The investigating team also discovered NASP NSF equipment in a degraded condition as follows:

- Patrol officer belt kits were worn and broken
- Ballistic protection in-use exceeded the manufacturer's warranty limit
- Ballistic panel size did not match tactical outer carriers (TOC) size.

Many of these equipment discrepancies were identified in the NASP CART report.[123]

Opinion 5.10.1: (b) (7)(F) ███████████████████████████████████████

███████████

Opinion 5.10.2: (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████████████████

██ .

Opinion 5.10.3: (b) (7)(F) ██████████████████████████████████

█████████████████

Opinion 5.10.4: (b) (7)(F) ███████████████████████████████

██

██████████ (b) (7)(F) ███████████████████████

Opinion 5.10.5: (b) (7)(F) ███████████████████████████████

██████████████████████████████████████

██████████████████████████████████████

██████████████████

Opinion 5.10.6: (b) (7)(F) ███████████████████████████████████

███ .

Opinion 5.10.7: Personnel require additional consideration, most especially when in large concentrations, as assets when determining force protection requirements.

Opinion 5.10.8: (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████████████████

██

Opinion 5.10.9: [REDACTED (b) (7)(F)] Additional NSF serve as a RAM, increase response times, and assure personnel.

Opinion 5.10.10: [REDACTED (b) (7)(F)] The three primary pillars of FP, AT, PS, and LE are separated across three codes in OPNAV. N95 is the resource sponsor for NSF; N46 is the resource sponsor for Ashore Security LE policy and resourcing; and N314 is the resource sponsor for AT policy and small arms training, N46 shares responsibility with DUSN for PS policy.

Opinion 5.10.11: [REDACTED (b) (7)(F)]

Recommendation 5.10.1: Recommend OPNAV N4 review and update the MPV-P post validation model to reflect current threat, FPCON level, and Echelon I/II AT, LE and PS Program requirements.

Recommendation 5.10.2: Recommend OPNAV update the tiered ROC level methodology to provide a response capability commensurate with the importance of protecting personnel as a critical asset to the Navy mission.

Recommendation 5.10.3: [REDACTED (b) (7)(F)] [REDACTED (b) (7)(F)]

[REDACTED] 124

<u>Recommendation 5.10.4</u>: Recommend OPNAV establish a single FP resource sponsor to align and provide resourcing for AT, LE and PS pillars to support the FP mission.

<u>Recommendation 5.10.5</u>: Recommend CNIC adequately resource region and installation commanders to provide NSF with critical and necessary tactical and personal protective equipment. Resourcing must be sufficient to sustain equipment at proper functional condition according to manufacturer's specification and warranty.

<u>Finding 5.11 (Deficiency)</u>: (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████
██
██████████████████████████████████

<u>Discussion</u>: There are two separate and distinct Navy tactics, techniques and procedures (NTTP) used by both afloat and ashore NSF in order to develop operational policy (e.g., PPRs, SOPs, etc.) and to train. NTTP 3-07.2.1, Antiterrorism, is managed by Navy Expeditionary Warfighting Development Center (NEXWDC) and was revised in November 2019, and NTTP 3-07.2.3, Physical Security and Law Enforcement, is managed by CNIC and was last revised in 2011. Both NTTPs are applicable to NSF, yet managed by two separate authorities. (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████
██████████████████████████ ██████████████████
██
██
████████████████████████████████████
██████████████. [127]

NSF policy concerning UoF is derived from DODI 5210.56 and promulgated by SECNAVINST 5500.29 (Cancelled by SECNAVINST 5500.37 in May 2019).

OPNAV and CNIC UoF TTP and training documents for NSF personnel were based on these two primary documents.

In June 2014, CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)/Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF)), was promulgated and specifically superseded the UoF policy guidance of DODI 5210.56. Neither SECNAVINST 5500.29 nor OPNAV and CNIC UoF TTP were updated.

In November 2016, DoD re-released DODI 5210.56, Arming and the Use of Force, and changed terms and definitions associated with the use of force (UoF) and expanded guidance concerning imminent threat/imminent danger. However, the re-released DODI 5210.56 (2016) did NOT specifically cancel or supersede the UoF policy guidance of the CJCSI 3121.01B.

In May 2019, SECNAV released SECNAVINST 5500.37, Arming and the Use of Force, cancelling SECNAVINST 5500.29C of August 2003. Although the DODI 5210.56 of 2016 is the basis of the SECNAVINST 5500.37, the instruction contained neither the expanded guidance concerning imminent threat/imminent danger, nor did it cancel or supersede the UoF policy guidance of the CJCSI 3121.01B.

Neither OPNAV nor CNIC updated UoF guidance, TTP, nor training material used by NSF to align with the significant UoF policy guidance promulgated in the DODI 5210.56 of November 2016.

Opinion 5.11.1: (b) (7)(F)

Opinion 5.11.2: ^{(b) (7)(F)} ██████████████████████████

██

██

██

██

████████████████████████████████

Recommendation 5.11.1: EXWDC and CNIC, in coordination with NWDC, combine NSF NTTP to create an afloat and ashore NTTP with active shooter response.

Recommendation 5.11.2: Recommend OPNAV N46 align NSF policy, TTP, and training material on use of force to current DoD policy.

Recommendation 5.11.3: ^{(b) (7)(F)} ████████████████████████

██

██████████████████████████

NOTE: The above recommendation is in progress, funded, and scheduled for implementation in FY20 (USFF N1SF)

Finding 5.12 (Deficiency): ^{(b) (7)(F)} ██████████████████████

██

██████████████████████████████

██

██

████████████████ ^{(b) (7)(F)} ██████████████████████████

██.[128]

(b) (7)(F)

(b) (7)(F)

[redacted] [133]

(b) (7)(F)

[redacted]

(b) (7)(F)

[redacted].[134]

Opinion 5.12.1: (b) (7)(F) [redacted].

Opinion 5.12.2: (b) (7)(F) [redacted].

Opinion 5.12.3: (b) (7)(F) [redacted] (b) (7)(F) [redacted]

Opinion 5.12.4: (b) (7)(F) [redacted]

Opinion 5.12.5: (b) (7)(F) [redacted].

(b) (5)

[redacted]

Finding 5.13 (Deficiency): (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████
███████████████

Discussion: (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████ (b) (7)(F) ███████████████
██
████████████████████████████ ██████████████
██
████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
███████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████ .[136]

Opinion 5.13.1: A small arms weapons simulator (SAWS) program of record would enhance the opportunities for realistic scenario-based simulated training.

Opinion 5.13.2: Tactical proficiency, experience and preparedness can only be developed through rigorous and repetitive exposure to scenario-based training.

Recommendation 5.13.1: (b) (5) ████████████████████
██
████████████████████████████████

Recommendation 5.13.1.1: (b) (5) ████████████████████
████████████████████████████

Finding 5.14 (Deficiency): (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████
██
████████

Discussion: ██████████████████████████████████ (b) (7)(F)

████████ [137] 2nd Lt. Al-Shamrani was not wearing body armor during the incident and he survived multiple rounds of 9mm ammunition while continuing to engage law enforcement until stopped by a rifle shot to the head.[138] The round which killed the shooter was fired from a rifle with optical sights.[139] Marksmanship accuracy on the range based on a minimum qualification standard does not translate to rounds on target during a close-quarters battle scenario. FBI statistics show trained law enforcement officers miss between 70 and 80 percent of shots fired during a shooting incident.[140]

Target accuracy degrades significantly during combat when both the armed assailant and responders are moving to avoid being hit. Factory-installed iron sights on Navy service pistols and rifles are the least effective tool for target acquisition. As distance increases, effectiveness of iron sights decreases.

Hollow-point/full metal jacket ammunition is the recognized industry standard for home defense and personal protection. A majority of law enforcement agencies use this type of ammunition in issue weapons.[141]

Opinion 5.14.1: ██████████████████████ (b) (7)(F)
██████████████████████████

Recommendation 5.14.1: ████████████████ (b) (5)
██████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████████
██████████████████

Recommendation 5.14.2: ████████████████ (b) (5)
██
████████

Finding 5.15 (Deficiency): The insider threat program was not implemented across the fleet, and insider threat training was not a separate requirement prior to FY20.

Discussion: The insider threat has caused dozens of fatalities and injuries on military installations. The Fort Hood shooter in 2009 (13 killed, 32 injured), the Washington Navy Yard shooting in 2013 (12 killed, 7 injured), the PHNSY shooting in 2019 (2 killed), and the Pensacola shooting (4 killed, 8 injured), all demonstrate the lethal risk of a hostile insider with authorized access.[142] There is no single warning sign, checklist or algorithm for assessing behaviors that identifies a prospective active shooter. According to the FBI, in a study of 63 active shooter cases at least one person noticed a concerning behavior in every active shooter's life, and on average, people from three different groups noticed concerning behaviors for each active shooter.[143] In many instances, the observed concerns remained between the person who noticed the behavior and the shooter. Even in cases where an active shooter displayed a variety of concerning behaviors that might indicate an intent to act violently, the observers of that information did not necessarily report it to anyone. Most active shooters take time to plan for their attack (77 percent) and the majority obtain their firearms legally.[144]

The Navy Insider Threat Program was released in 2015. Current CI awareness training is focused on espionage and intelligence threats to classified and sensitive information rather than the insider as an active attacker. Annual CI training requirements include a brief overview of insiders who commit workplace violence, along with few case studies. To meet the CI training requirement, NCIS provides a brief upon request and has an online CI Awareness training module which meets that requirement. CI Awareness training is documented in Navy personnel electronic training jackets and FLTMPS, but there is not a separate

entry to record and track insider threat training. The FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) expanded the definition of "insider threat" to include commission of a destructive act, including physical harm to another in the workplace.

USFFC FP Training Continuum requires initial (within 90 days of arrival) and annual insider threat and active shooter training.[145] The guidance does not specify the content or minimum requirements for the training. FY20 Navy insider threat policy requires existing and emerging insider threat training and awareness be provided to all DoN personnel who have access to DoN resources.[146]

The CDSE under the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) provides security education, training, certification products, and services to professionalize the security community and to provide security education and training for DoD. CDSE provides insider threat eLearning and curricula with substantive detail.[147] None of its courses are required as part of the Navy's general military training (GMT) curriculum.[148]

Additional resources available for Insider threat training include the "Pathway to Violence" and "Insider Threat" video productions on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) website.[149]

Opinion 5.15.1: (b) (7)(F)

(b) (7)(F)

Opinion 5.15.2: Failure to report concerning behaviors before an attack places the entire DoN team at risk. Individuals observing concerning behaviors must be encouraged to report in order to overcome individual loyalty, disbelief, and fear.

Opinion 5.15.3: There are opportunities before a shooting occurs to recognize concerning behaviors which may indicate a progression toward violence. The identification and recognition of such behaviors requires training on radicalization and critical pathways to violence.

Opinion 5.15.4: Early recognition and reporting of concerning behaviors to the chain of command and law enforcement may provide leaders opportunities to disrupt attack planning and prevent shooting incidents.

Recommendation 5.15.1: Recommend OPNAV N1 direct the immediate use of available insider threat programs and tools from CDSE and the Department of Homeland Security to meet the annual training requirement.

Recommendation 5.15.2: Recommend NETC, in coordination with NCIS, develop and implement an insider threat training curriculum which focuses on the pre-attack concerning behaviors, pathways to radicalization and criticality of reporting to the chain of command.

Recommendation (b) (5): Recommend the OPNAV N1 direct the Program Executive Office for Enterprise Information Systems (PEO EIS) to establish the training requirement for Insider Threat in FLTMPS.

Finding 5.16 (Noncompliance): NASP inadequately employed DBIDs as an access control measure.

Discussion: (b) (7)(F)

(b) (7)(F)

150

(b) (7)(F)

(b) (7)(F)

Opinion 5.16.1: DBIDS use is essential to maintaining a strong FP posture, deterring unauthorized access, and preventing unauthorized access to DoN installations.

Opinion 5.16.2: (b) (7)(F) ██

Opinion 5.16.3: Convenience for personnel does not take precedence over security of personnel and military assets. Utilizing all available DBIDS assets to ensure proper vetting will lead to enhanced safety and security at our installations.

Opinion 5.16.4: DBIDS is a meaningful way to build trust and a sense of security for DoN personnel, residents, visitors, and tenants.

Opinion 5.16.5: DBIDS performance statistics demonstrate effectiveness as a force multiplier in the prevention of unauthorized access and identification of possible threats.

Recommendation 5.16.1: Recommend CNIC issue a directive to employ DBIDS without exceptions for time of day and traffic volume.

[1] NCIS Threat Assessment for the Florida Panhandle (September 18, 2019).

[2] DoDI 2000.12, Department of Defense Antiterrorism Program (01 March 2012) § 1(a); DoDI 2000.16-V1, Department of Defense Antiterrorism Standards (14 June 2001) § 1.1.

[3] SECNAVINST 3300.2C, Department of the Navy Antiterrorism Program (13 August 2018) § 1 and §3(a).

[4] USNORTHCOM Instruction 10-222 Force Protection and Antiterrorism Program (30 September 2013), 1.

[5] CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-19 § 1(d).

[6] United Facilities Criteria_4-010-01_DoD Minimum Standards for Buildings (12 December 2018).

[7] DIA website, Country Terrorist Threat Level for the U.S.

[8] NCIS Threat Assessment for Florida Panhandle (September 18, 2019).

[9] Id.

[10] Joint Publication Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 90.

[11] DoDI 2000.12 Department of Defense Antiterrorism Program, CH2 (15 November 2016) § 4(b)

[12] Id.

[13] Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 14.

[14] USFFC AT OPORD 3300-17 United States Fleet Forces Command Antiterrorism Operations Order § 1(c)(2).

[15] CNIC INSTRUCTION 5530.1, Physical Security Program (01 November 2017).

[16] DoDI 2000.16-V1, Department of Defense Antiterrorism Standards (17 November 2016) § 3.3

[17] Id.

[18] Id. at § 3.5

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id. at § 3.9

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] Id. at § 3.25

[25] Id.

[26] Id. at § 3.32

[27] Id. at § 3.33

[28] Id.

[29] Id.

[30] USNORTHCOM Instruction 10-222, Force Protection and Antiterrorism Program (30 September 2013) § 1.6 and § 4.5.4

[31] USFFC Antiterrorism OPORD 3300-17, Base Order, § 1(e)(1).

[32] Id. at § 1(e)(3).

[33] OPNAVINST F3300.53C, Navy Antiterrorism Program (26 May 2009) § 7(g).

[34] USFFC Antiterrorism OPORD 3300-17, Base Order § 1(d)(5).

[35] CNRSE Antiterrorism OPORD 3300-19 § 1(d).

[36] CNRSE Antiterrorism OPORD 3300-19 § 1(d).

[37] OPNAVINST 5400.45, Standard Navy Distribution List Shore Chain of Command (01 January 2020).

[38] USFF Antiterrorism OPORD 3300-17, Base Order § 1(d)(7).

[39] 18 U.S.C. 922(y)(2), Exception for non-immigrant Visa for valid hunting license or permit, https://www.atf.gov/firearms/qa/may-nonimmigrant-alien-who-has-been-admitted-united-states-under-nonimmigrant-visa (accessed 19 February 2020).

[40] SoI (b)(6)█████, NASP SECO and NSF staff (24 January 2020).

[41] Email From (b)(6)█████, NASP SECO to (b)(6)████████ (18 February 2020).

[42] SoI (b)(6)█████, NASP SECO and NSF staff (24 January 2020).

[43] RSAF Indoctrination form, Firearm prohibition translated by (b) (6)███████████.

[44] Supplemental email from (b)(6)██████ to (b)(6)███████ (30 January 2020).

[45] Email from (b)(6)██████ to (b)(6)███████ (21 January 2020).

[46] NASP Base Security Brief provided to (b)(6)████████ from (b)(6)████████ (17 January 2020).

---

[47] SECDEF MEMO on Prohibition on Personally-owned Firearms by International Military Students (16 January 2020).

[48] Attorney General William P. Barr Announces the Findings of the Criminal Investigation into the December 2019 Shooting at Pensacola Naval Air Station (13 January 2020) https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-announces-findings-criminal-investigation-december-2019 Washington, DC ~ Monday, 13 January 2020.

[49] SECNAVINST 5500.37, Arming and the Use of Force (20 May 2019).

[50] OPNAVINST 5530.14E with CH-3, Navy Physical Security and Law Enforcement Program (20 November 2017) para 0306(g).

[51] SECNAVINST 5500.37, Arming and the Use of Force (20 May 2019).

[52] 18 U.S.C. §926B LEOSA.

[53] MARADMIN 719-19, CONCEALED CARRY OF PRIVATELY OWNED FIREARMS FOR U.S. MARINE CORPS LAW ENFORCEMENT PROFESSIONALS (31 December 2019).

[54] Air Force Guidance Memorandum to AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense (22 January 2020).

[55] Air Force Additional Security Measures, Secretary of the Air Force Command Information (20 January 2016).

[56] Air Force Guidance Memorandum to AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense (22 January 2020), CH 10.

[57] SoI V (b) (6) CAPT, Commanding Officer NASC (21 January 2020).

[58] SoI (b)(6), LT, NASC Antiterrorism Officer, Senior Watch Officer, API Instructor (15 January 2020).

[59] FLTMPS review of CAPT (b) (6) (b) Training History; Email from CAPT (b) to (b)(6) (10 February 2020).

[60] DODI 2000.16-V1, Department of Defense Antiterrorism Standards (14 June 2001).

[61] OPNAVINST F3300.53C, Navy Antiterrorism Program (26 May 2009).

[62] CNRSE Antiterrorism OPORD 3300-19.

[63] NASC CO ATO Designation letter (23 January 2020).

[64] CNRSE Antiterrorism OPORD 3300-19.

[65] SoI (b)(6), NASP SECO and NSF staff (24 January 2020); NASP ATWG minutes.

[66] USFF Antiterrorism OPORD 3300-17, Appendix 2 to Annex C.

[67] OPNAVINST F3300.53C, Navy Antiterrorism Program (26 May 2009).

[68] Catalogue of Navy Training Courses (CANTRAC), Aviation COAT course A-1B-300 description, https://app.prod.cetars.training.navy.mil/cantrac/pages/rpt_cin_detail.html?cin=A-1B-0300&p=1 (accessed 19 February 2020).

[69] PCS Orders, CAPT (b) (6) (28 January 2020).

[70] USFF Antiterrorism OPORD 3300-17, Appendix 2 to Annex C.

[71] Id.

[72] FLTMPS review of CAPT (b) training history; Email from CAPT (b) to (b)(6) (10 February 2020); PCS Orders to NASC (05 December 2017).

[73] USFF Antiterrorism OPORD 3300-17, Annex J Command and Control.

[74] SoI addendum (b)(6), LT, NASC Antiterrorism Officer, Senior Watch Officer, API Instructor (15 January 2020); SoI (b)(6), AGCS, CNATT ATO (27 January 2020)

[75] OPNAVINST F3300.53C Navy Antiterrorism Program, CNO Standard 9 (26 May 2009); DoDI 2000.16-V1, Department of Defense Antiterrorism Standards (17 November 2016) AT Standard 9.

[76] SoI (b)(6), NASC Administration Department Head, Security Manager (15 January 2020).

[77] Written Statement of (b) (7)(C), (b) (6) (06 December 2019).

[78] SoI (b)(6), DCC, NASC N5 Leading Chief Petty Officer (16 January 2020).

[79] Law Enforcement briefing (11 January 2020); Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) (19 February 2020).

[80] OPNAVINST 5530.14E with CH-3, Navy Physical Security and Law Enforcement Program (20 November 2017).

[81] NASC Plan of the Week (PO)W (03-09 December 2019).

[82] Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) (23 January 2020).

[83] NAVCOMSCOLSCOM 5530.1H, NASC Physical Security Plan (13 February 2012)

[84] SoI addendum (b)(6), LT, NASC Antiterrorism Officer, Senior Watch Officer, API Instructor (15 January 2020).

85 Email from LT (b)(6) to (b)(6) (19 February 2020).

86 UFC 4-010-01 12 Dec 2018, DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, *and* USD (AT&L) Memorandum (29 May 2002).

87 Id.

88 Email from CAPT (b) (6) NASP CO to CAPT (b) (b) (06 February 2020).

89 VCNO Letter of 10 November 2015 Approving the Findings, Opinions and Recommendations of the Chattanooga Shooting Incidents Report (Serial N09D/15U112938) and USFFC ORDER 15-039, 272120Z OCT 2015, Directed Force Protection Efforts at Off-Installation Facilities Following the Chattanooga Attacks.

90 NCIS STAAT Navy Physical Security Course Instructor Guide, V16.1.

91 Email from (b)(6) , STAAT LANT to (b)(6) (22 January 2020).

92 So (b)(6) , AGCS, CNATT Antiterrorism Officer (27 January 2020).

93 USFF Antiterrorism OPORD 3300-17, Annex J Command and Control.

94 Id.

95 Id.

96 Sol (b)(6) , LT, NASC Antiterrorism Officer, Senior Watch Officer, API Instructor (15 January 2020).

97 CTW6 FY19/20 FLMTPS reports (17 January 2020).

98 CTW-6 Notice 1500, Annual Training Plans FY18 (20 Feb 2018), FY19 (4 Jan 2019), FY20(1 Nov 2019).

99 Active Shooter Training Requirements for FY20, COMUSFLTFORCOM DTG 271910Z September 2019.

100 CNIC Command Assessment for Readiness and Training (CART) Final Report (October 22, 2018).

101 NASP Command Improvement Plan Report (December 2019).

102 CNRSE RASS report (01 November 2019).

103 FP Directive 19-340; FP Directive 20-044.

104 NASP Physical Security Long Term Exception Request signed by Under-Secretary of the Navy, Dr. Mark A. Livingston (N00204-E01-17) (20 November 2019).

105 USFF FP Directive 19-340.

106 NASPINST 5530.9B, NASP Access Control Procedures (26 August 2019).

107 OPNAVINST 5530.14E with CH-3, Navy Physical Security and Law Enforcement Program, (20 November 2017).

108 FBI and Homeland Security/Secret Service Studies on Active Shooter Incidents in 2017 and 2018.

109 Command Inspection of Navy Installations Command, Naval Inspector General (5 November 2015).

110 Id., CNIC FY20 OPS Plan; CNIC financial training module.

111 CNIC FY20 Base Operating Support OMN/OMNR/FHN and MPN/RPN Operations Plan (31 August 2019) .

112 Id., and OPNAVINST 5530.14E with CH-3, Navy Physical Security and Law Enforcement Program (28 January 2009), 3, Appendix A.

113 USFFC FP Directive 20-044, 132241Z February 2020.

114 OPNAVINST 5530.14E with CH-3 Navy Physical Security and Law Enforcement Program (20 November 2017).

115 OPNAVINST 3400.12, Required Operational Capability Levels for Navy Installations and Activities (29 October 2008).

116 Id., 3.e.

117 OPNAVINST 5530.14E with CH-3, Navy Physical Security and Law Enforcement Program, 3.

118 Id.

119 Id.

120 Id.

121 CNIC Command Assessment for Readiness and Training (CART) Final Report (October 22, 2018).

122 Email from CAPT (b) (6) to CAPT (b) 24 January 2020.

123 CNIC Command Assessment for Readiness and Training (CART) Final Report (October 22, 2018).

124 OPNAVINST 5530.14E CH-3, Navy Physical Security and Law Enforcement Program, Figure 1-1.

125 DHS UPTP training curriculum, Active Threat Response Tactics Lesson Plan (September 2017).

126 UPTP Firearms Training and Qualification hours summary (27 January 2020).

127 MA 'A' School course curriculum, A-830-0011C, Change 4 (05 December 2017).

128 OPNAVINST 3591.1F, Small Arms Training and Qualification (12 August 2009).

129 Navy Security Force Training Manual, CNIC-M 3502.2 CH.1 (6 June 2019).

[130] FLETC letter to ████████ (09 January 2020); Uniformed Police Training Program Firearms Training hours summary, email from ████ to ████ (27 January 2020).

[131] OPNAVINST 3591.1F, Small Arms Training and Qualification (12 August 2009).

[132] Id.

[133] Id.

[134] DoDI 5525.15 Law Enforcement Standards and Training in the DoD; Navy Security Force Community Brief, USFF N1SF (19 February 2020).

[135] OPNAVINST 5530.14E CH-3, Navy Physical Security and Law Enforcement Program.

[136] Expeditionary Combat Skills Curriculum Module 9, Judgment-Based Engagement Training and Tactics, Center for Security Forces, 27 February 2019.

[137] Law Enforcement briefing (11 January 2020).

[138] Id.

[139] Id.

[140] Executive Summary for Law Enforcement Partners, FBI Training Division, 2014; cited from Glock: The World's Handgun, Collector's Guide, Chris McNabb, Amber Books Ltd, 2015.

[141] Id.

[142] Active Shooter Incidents in the United States 2000-2013 (April 2014); AS Incidents in the U.S. in 2018 (April 2019).

[143] A Study of the Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the U.S between 2000-2013, FBI (June 2018).

[144] Id.

[145] USFF AT OPORD 3300-17.

[146] SECNAVINST 5500.37, Arming and the Use of Force (20 May 2019); DoN Insider Threat Program (20 October 2019).

[147] Center for Development of Security Excellence, "Mission" (accessed 26 January 2020).

[148] NAVADMIN 191/19 FY-20 GENERAL MILITARY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

[149] https://www.cisa.gov/pathway-violence-video; https://www.cisa.gov/insider-threat-trailer-and-video, accessed 18 February 2020.

[150] CNIC DBIDS Information Sheet (January 2020).

[151] CNIC January 2020 DBIDS Enterprise Scan Statistics.

[152] DODM 5200.08 VOLUME 3, PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM: ACCESS TO DOD INSTALLATIONS (02 January 2019), 28-29; CNICINST 5530.14A, CNIC Ashore Protection Plan (06 June 2016), 13; CNRSEINST 5530.1B CNRSE FP Plan, 5.

[153] CNIC December 2019 and January 2020 DBIDS NASP Scan Statistics.

Chapter 6—Screening, Vetting, and Monitoring

This chapter outlines responsibility for screening/vetting of IMS. Additionally, it recognizes and acknowledges changes to this process following the attack at NASP. It identifies recommendations for the DoN to further enhance the continuous review process in order to further minimize risk to force and risk to mission. Finally, it identifies gaps and seams in screening which require review by higher authority.

Regulatory Background

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 5105.38M, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), provides DoD-wide guidance to OSD; military departments (MILDEPs); Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff (CJCS)' Combatant Commands' defense agencies; DoD Field Activities; Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs); and all other organizational entities within the DoD engaged in the management or implementation of DoD security assistance and security cooperation programs.

SECNAVINST 4950.4B, Joint Security, Cooperation, Education, and Training (JSCET), prescribes policies, responsibilities, procedures, and administration for the education and training of international military students by the departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force as authorized by the U.S. security assistance legislation.

Findings, Opinions, and Recommendations

Security Screening

Finding 6.1 (Deficiency): The U.S. Navy does not have a codified role in the vetting of international military students; however, the service retains the authority to enhance DoD, DoS, and host nation vetting processes.

Discussion: All IMS receiving training from DoD, regardless of the funding source and the classification level of the training, must complete local security screening and medical screening prior to the issuance of a visa and ITO.[1]

The local screening process must be approved by the Ambassador (Chief of Mission (COM)). The screening must be completed by in-country U.S. officials. The embassy regional security officer, representatives from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), consular section, and other offices research their appropriate databases for evidence of drug trafficking, support of terrorist activity, corruption, criminal conduct, or other activities inconsistent with U.S. policy goals prior to the issuance of a visa and ITO.[2]

SCOs must ensure all foreign units and their commanders, or individuals from a security force, nominated for U.S.-funded training are properly vetted for gross violations of human rights. This human rights screening is typically called Leahy Vetting.[3]

Human Rights Screening (Leahy Vetting) is not required if training is funded with FMS/partner nation funds.[4] The RSAF WSO training is provided under an FMS BOT signed by AFSAT and certified by DSCA.[5] For RSNF student aviators, NIPO is the implementing agency with authority delegated to NETSAFA for standard FMS BOTs. DSCA also certifies these agreements.[6]

The GCC approves the country-specific, Combined Education and Training Program Plan (CETPP) each year. This document provides the student vetting process unique to each country. 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani was screened during FY17.[7] The FY17 screening policy for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia follows:

"Vetting is processed by the U.S. Embassy and coordinated with various U.S. departments. Training advisors coordinate with host nation for security clearance and medical clearance checks and internal character vetting. U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) training officers will not publish and issue ITO to students until all requirements are met, such as security clearance, human rights vetting, and medical clearance. Additionally, USMTM training advisors ensure that each student is briefed before they depart regarding the process of identifying concerns or issues that occur while the student is on temporary duty (TDY)."[8]

Upon completion of his screening, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani received an approval for an A-2 visa. Military personnel coming to the United States for education or training at any armed forces training facility are classified as foreign government officials and issued A-2 visas.[9] Initial visa requests require completion of a Form DS-160, the Online Nonimmigrant Visa Application. This form includes entries on personal details, travel, companions, contact information, passport details, family, work/education/training, and security/background. The security portion contains 55 yes or no questions pertaining to such areas as terrorism, espionage, illegal activity, immigration violations, felony convictions, etc.[10] The submitted A-2 visa application was not reviewed for derogatory material as part of this investigation.

U.S. training installations are directed not to train IMS unless all security requirements are met.[11] 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani received a complete ITO on 8 August 2017.[12] His orders contained a standard annotation from the issuing

SCO that: "Human rights, security, and medical screening have been completed in accordance with E-SAMM."[13]

The SCO identified on the ITO was the USMTM to the KSA and its Air Force Division (AFD).[14] USMTM facilitates most Title 10 DoD activities in the KSA, primarily at the direction of the Commander, United States Central Command, and performs the functions of the SCO within the Saudi Ministry of Defense (MoD).[15]

As the SCO for naval affairs, USMTM's Naval Force Division (NFD) facilitates, screens, and certifies the participation of RSNF in FMS and/or IMET cases.

Following the NASP attack, the KSA MoD agreed to enhance its host nation screening/vetting protocols in the following ways:[16]

1. KSA IMS will submit security application in advance of travel to the United States and include social media, phone, and email accounts for review.
2. Immediate commanders will have ultimate responsibility for nomination of candidates.
3. Guidance and awareness course required for KSA IMS will be enhanced to increase their security, religious, ideological, and cultural awareness.
4. Supervisory officers (i.e., CLOs) will submit monthly reports on every KSA IMS to include any discipline, behavioral, security, or ideological issues of a derogatory nature.
5. Supervisory manning to carry out tasking will be increased.
6. Students will be instructed to report changes in behavior or inclination of colleagues (insider threats).

7.   Supervisory personnel will be at least an O-4 with an excellent record and will be responsible for reporting not only on training progress, but also security, behavior, ideology, and psychological aspects of students.

8.   KSA will maintain a database of all this information.

9.   KSA will emphasize importance of service to conduct periodic visits of students in order to conduct religious and security program outreach.

10. A code of conduct detailing KSA IMS student responsibility will be created, distributed, and continue to be updated.

11. Students will be subject to psychological and behavioral tests by their units or specialists prior to nomination to determine ideological inclinations, anxieties, and social/family issues.

12. Supervisory officers shall monitor the psychological and ideological behavior of students, particularly junior students.

Additionally, USD (I&S) broadened continuous review to include IMS. Continuous review is now a condition for attending training and accessing DoD installations. DoN will immediately implement DSCA personnel screening and vetting data checks, and ongoing installation access screening for IMS.[17]

Opinion 6.1.1: Vetting and screening of IMS is not a function of the DoN; however, it is the responsibility of the service to execute continuous, even if redundant, review of international personnel who are working with U.S. Navy personnel and at U.S. Navy installations in order to minimize risk to mission and risk to force.

Opinion 6.1.2: KSA is actively engaged in improving the vetting and security protocol for IMS who will attend U.S. military training; however, these improvements must be continuously evaluated for adequacy.

Opinion 6.1.3: The practice of country-specific vetting/screening creates downstream risk for all training commands involved in the SCETP.

Recommendation 6.1.1: (b) (5)

Recommendation 6.1.2: (b) (5)

Continuous Review

Finding 6.2 (Deficiency): (b) (7)(F)

(b) (7)(F)

Discussion: (b) (7)(F)

- (b) (7)(F) ███████████████████

  ▌ ██████████████████████████████████

  ▌ ████████████████████████████████████

██
██
███

2nd Lt Al-Shamrani may have utilized a Twitter alias of @M7md_Shamrani. His surname Shamrani reflects his family's lineage within the Shamran tribe, one of the largest in Saudi Arabia. His alias does not directly correlate with his full name. @M7md_Shamrani retweeted content that was critical of both the KSA and the United States.[21] These tweets indicated support for entities designated as terrorists by KSA. On 11 September 2019, @M7md_Shamrani posted on Twitter: "The countdown has begun." On 6 December 2019 and just 2 hours before the attack, @M7md_Shamrani posted a final tweet, expressing hatred for the United States.[22] After the attack, Twitter removed his account. (b) (7)(F) ██████████████ ██████████████████████████████ 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's Twitter feed was not made available for Navy review; therefore, this investigation cannot link potential data points into substantive findings.

(b) (7)(F) ██
██
██
███████████[23]

Per Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Directive 5, collection, use, and retention of publically available social media information is authorized for security background investigations and adjudications by the Security Executive Agent

(SecEA), DNI.[24] This authorization applies to individuals who hold a "sensitive position." A sensitive positions is:

> "Any person within or in support of an agency in which the occupant could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse effect on national security, regardless of whether the occupant has access to classified information and regardless of whether the occupant is an employee, military service member, or contractor.[25]"

This authorization enables heads of agency to inform the SecEA of intent to collect, use, and retain publically available social media in determination of continued eligibility to hold a sensitive position.

In May 2019, the Under Secretary of the Navy established the DoN Insider Threat Analytic Hub to deter, detect, prevent, and mitigate insider threats. Its task is to monitor and audit information for insider threat detection and mitigation.[26] (b) (7)(F)

. The investigation team sought information from the DoN Insider Threat Hub representatives. At the request of DoN Insider Threat Hub representatives, a formal work flow request for information was submitted on 5 February 2020. That request is pending review at the secretariat level and the investigation team may supplement this report upon receipt of a response.

The DoN Insider Threat Analytic Hub Concept of Operations and Implementation lists sources of data, which will be integrated into DoN IT Hub analysis. (b)(7)

The DoD Independent Review of the Washington Navy Yard Attack recommended expanded access to data sources not currently used in personnel

security investigations to include social media. (b) (7)(F)

▮▮

▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮.[28]

Opinion 6.2.1: Common names and social media aliases make authentication of social media accounts difficult.

Opinion 6.2.2: Even with continuous social media review and knowledge of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's alias, the compressed time between his final tweet and the initiation of his attack would have been insufficient to mitigate the threat.

Opinion 6.2.3: If executed, a time-series review of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's social media threads may have revealed items of interest for follow-on risk analysis by DoN IT Hub professionals.

Opinion 6.2.4: (b) (7)(F) ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮

▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮

▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮

Opinion 6.2.5: The necessity to continuously monitor for insider threat indicators is not unique to IMS. This demand applies equally to our own U.S. personnel.

Opinion 6.2.6: (b) (7)(F) ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮

▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮

▮▮▮▮▮

Recommendation 6.2.1: Recommend DoN IT Hub (DUSN (P)) review and validate its concept of operations and data sources as well as evaluate potential capabilities for continuous, social media review for all personnel who hold "sensitive positions" to include all IMS.

Recommendation 6.2.2: Recommend DoN IT Hub (DUSN (P)) review the Army G-2 pilot program and consider development of similar programs.

Recommendation 6.2.3: Recommend General Counsel (GC) of the Navy and the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy review applicability of DNI Directive 5 (12 May 2016) for the collection, use, and retention of public media as part of insider threat continuous review.

User Activity Monitoring (UAM)
Finding 6.3 (Deficiency): DoN policy authorizes user activity monitoring (UAM) on DoN networks; however, U.S. Navy installations across the Navy permit the use of nonappropriated funds (NAF) open-access WIFI.

Discussion: User activity monitoring is the technical capability to observe and record the actions and activities of an individual, at any time, on any device accessing U.S. Government information in order to detect insider threats and to support authorized investigations.[29]

In response to the NASP attack, the DoN is required to monitor IMS use of U.S. Government-furnished information technology systems and devices per established procedures.[30]

DoN personnel with access to U.S. Government-furnished information technology systems already authorize user activity monitoring as part of their daily work activities. These personnel include international military officers and students.

CNIC authorizes NAF goWIFI hubs throughout both CONUS and OCONUS Navy installations. This includes unaccompanied housing sites (barracks), morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) spaces, Navy Lodge, and Navy Gateway Inn and

Suites (NGIS). At NASP, 38 different locations operate on the goWIFI network.[31] While some locations require a login and identifying name, address, email address, and phone number, many areas have unsecured WIFI access allowing individuals to login with anonymity.[32] (b) (7)(F) ███████████████

███████████████████████████████████████

███████████████████████

KSA IMS utilized computer labs at fleet and family support center (FFSC) along with U.S. personnel.[34] All IMS have open access to WIFI across NASP.

CNIC officials stated that continuous monitoring may impact quality of life. Currently, pornographic and gambling sites remain blocked.[35]

Opinion 6.3.1: User activity monitoring requires a delicate balance between security, privacy, and civil liberties.

Opinion 6.3.2: Anonymity prevents accountability and responsibility for actions in both the real and virtual worlds. Individuals in a sensitive position should accept a higher level of scrutiny to mitigate risk to force and risk to mission.

Opinion 6.3.3: Continuous monitoring of MWR WIFI networks does not impact quality of life. Access impacts quality of life.

Recommendation 6.3.1: Recommend OPNAV N2/N6, CNIC, and Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy review the legality of user activity monitoring on NAF networks and provide a risk assessment to the CNO for review.

Medical Screening

<u>**Finding 6.4**</u>: Initial mental health screening depends upon self-reporting by personnel. This process is insufficient for the identification of predispositions, which increase an individual's risk to self and to others.

<u>Discussion</u>: CDSE provides insider threat training which identifies personal predispositions as a factor increasing the risk of destructive insider threat behavior. These predispositions include medical/psychiatric conditions, undiagnosed and untreated medical conditions, social network risks, previous rule violations, personality or social skills issues, and decision-making deficits.[36]

Pre-Arrival Medical Screening

Pre-departure/pre-training medical screening examinations are required to ensure that an IMS is medically qualified for the requested training and to prevent the spread of communicable diseases. After their arrival, if IMS are found to have medical conditions not meeting specific training requirements that cannot be resolved prior to commencement of training they will be dis-enrolled and returned to their country.[37]

All medical examinations, required vaccinations, and any other public health concern with the IMS will be recorded in English on DD Form 2808, Report of Medical Examination, and DD Form 2807-1, Report of Medical History.[38] A partner nation MoD physician/dentist or a licensed, practicing medical authority from the list of qualified practitioners maintained by the U.S. Embassy must conduct examinations.

All IMS attending courses with special medical prerequisites are required to complete the required physical examination in their home countries and meet

specific U.S. military medical standards before entry into the United States and full enrollment in those courses of study.[39]

Neither SECNAVINST 4950.4B nor DSCA 5105.38 Manual requires IMS psychological evaluation by a medical provider. Neither instruction requires completion of a psychological battery as part of the IMS medical screening process.

2nd Lt Al-Shamrani completed his medical examination before arriving in CONUS. His medical examination was completed on 15 May 2017.[40] Neither DD Form 2808, Report of Medical Examination, nor DD Form 2807-1, Report of Medical History, was available for review.

Block 40, DD Form 2808 requires a medical provider to assess the psychiatric condition of a candidate and any personality deviation. Further, medical providers are required to assess this behavior as normal, abnormal, or not evaluated.

Block 17, DD Form 2807-1 is a series of survey questions completed by the patient with respect to mental health. It requires both IMS and U.S. Service Members to report suicidal ideations/attempts, mental health issues, previous counseling, and history of depression/anxiety.

In response to the attack on NASP, KSA agreed to implement prenomination, psychological, and behavioral tests by their units/specialists in order to determine ideological inclinations, anxieties, and social/family issues.[41]

Initial DoN Medical Screening

Commander, Naval Aerospace Medical Institute (NAMI) and multiple flight surgeons reported that they typically receive no medical records from KSA IMS. Forms that they have received are in Arabic script.[42] SCO are required to provide appropriate IMS records to the initial training installation and release information in the IMS's education, training, and medical records to country personnel when appropriate.[43]

Medically screened and certified IMS are exempt from additional medical examinations/screening *except* at and by U.S. military training installations when the associated physical examination is an established prerequisite for admission to training that involves *exceptional physical activity or safety* or by exception when a particular testing capability does not exist in the IMS's country.

NAMI and multiple flight surgeons stated that both U.S. service members and IMS do not provide full and complete information on these forms.[44] Referrals for psychiatric evaluation are based on entries on DD Form 2807-1 and responses to questions on DD Form 2808.

On 30 May 2018, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani completed his DD Form 2992, Medical Recommendation for Flying or Special Operation Duty at NAMI. He was cleared after flight duty medical examination. No remarks or limitations were annotated.

Medical providers depend almost entirely on self-reported medical history. It is well documented that applicants often fail to report critical medical information. Nondisclosed medical conditions account for 40-50 percent of initial MEPS separations across DoD.[45]

Future Screening Options

The Independent Review of the Washington Navy Yard Shooting (November 2013) recommended that DoD "strengthen mental health standards for induction." It recognizes that induction procedures rely on previously annotated mental health diagnosis and an assumption that individuals with mental illness or concerning histories will report these during military processing. Further, it recommends the exploration of noncognitive measures to evaluate domains such as personality, adaptability, and motivation. Specifically, it recommended the use of TAPAS as a means to predict mental health fitness for duty[46]

As part of MEPS, U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Marine Corps require completion of the TAPAS by prospective entrants. The U.S. Navy is the only service without a TAPAS requirement for new accessions.[47] TAPAS was developed by Drasgow Consulting Group (DCG). At the heart of the assessment system is a trait taxonomy comprising 21 facets of five major personality factors to include: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience.[48]

Opinion 6.4.1: Improved mental health screening mitigates risk caused by personal predispositions. These risks include destructive behaviors of all forms.

Opinion 6.4.2: Improved screening of KSA IMS for mental health does not alleviate the duty and responsibility of the DoN to take all available actions to internally screen both IMS and its own personnel.

Opinion 6.4.3: Because of the high-risk nature of aviation training, additional mental health batteries and screening of IMS may occur.

Opinion 6.4.4: While a psychological battery may not have identified 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani as an insider threat, it may have identified critical traits that would

have informed a holistic understanding of his demeanor and associated risk. This opinion acknowledges that he lived in the United States for 28 months and that his psychological disposition may have changed during this time.

Opinion 6.4.5: Psychological battery results are only of value if they reach unit commanders, who can utilize them to inform risk decisions and optimize personnel management decisions.

Recommendation 6.4.1: Recommend Surgeon General of the Navy (CNO N093) and BUMED review the integration of the TAPAS, or similar personality assessment, as a MEPs and IMS screening requirement.

Recommendation 6.4.2: (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████
██
████████████████████████

Recommendation 6.4.3: Recommend DSCA require SCOs to provide translated results of psychological and behavioral tests to initial training installations.

Recommendation 6.4.4: (b) (7)(F) ████████████████
██
██

---

[1] DSCA Manual 5105.38-M § C10.8.1.
[2] Id at § C10.8.3.1.
[3] Id at § C10.8.4.
[4] Id at § C10.8.4.4.
[5] Blanket Order for Training RSAF WSO Training/CLO Support between AFSAT and KSA (SR-D-THD) (22 April 2016).

[6] Blanket Order for Training RSNF Aviation Training Support between NETSAFA and KSA (SR-P-TDP) (15 September 2017).

[7] Invitational Travel Order (ITO) for International Military Student (IMS) ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani (8 August 2017)§ 3.

[8] CENTCOM Combined Education and Training Program Plan (CETPP) for Saudi Arabia Budget Year 2017.

[9] U.S. Department of State, STUDENTS AND EXCHANGE VISITORS 9 FAM 402.5-5(J)(4)(U), https://fam.state.gov/fam/09FAM/09FAM040205.html (accessed 25 January 2020).

[10] U.S. Department of State, DS-160: Frequently Asked Questions, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/forms/ds-160-online-nonimmigrant-visa-application/ds-160-faqs.html (accessed 25 January 2020).

[11] SECNAVINST 4950.4B § 9.9.C.

[12] Invitational Travel Order (ITO) for International Military Student (IMS) ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani (8 August 2017)§ 3.

[13] Id., § 11.A.

[14] Id.,§ 4.A.

[15] United States Military Training Mission (USMTM), https://www.centcom.mil/OPERATIONS-AND-EXERCISES/USMTM/.

[16] Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Enhanced Vetting Protocol provided by NETSAFA DET Riyadh.

[17] USD (I&S) Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Director, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, and Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) on Continuous Review for International Military Students (13 January 2020).

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Attorney General William P. Barr Announcement of the Findings of the Criminal Investigation into the December 2019 Shooting at Pensacola Naval Air Station; (13 January 2020).

[22]Id.

[23] USD (I&S) Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Director, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, and Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) on Continuous Review for International Military Students (13 January 2020).

[24] Security Executive Agent, Directive 5: Collection, Use, and Retention of Publically Available Social Media Information in Personnel Security Background Investigations and Adjudications (12 May 2016).

[25] Id.

[26] Under Secretary of the Navy Memorandum, Establishment of a Single Department of the Navy Insider Threat Analytic Hub" (2 May 2019).

[27] Id.

[28] Department of Defense, "Independent Review of the Washington Navy Yard Shooting" (November 2013), 11-12.

[29] Committee on National Security Systems Directive 504 (CNSSD 504), CNSSD 504 UAM Definition (4 February 2014).

[30] USD (I&S) Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Director, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, and Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) on Continuous Review for International Military Students (13 January 2020).

[31] Viasat goWifi, "Base Location" http://gowifinavy.com/Locations.aspx.

[32] Viasat goWifi, "Privacy Policy" http://gowifinavy.com/.

[33] Viasat goWifi, "Terms and Conditions" http://gowifinavy.com/.

[34] SoI FFSC Director and Support Staff (22 January 2020).

[35] SoI CNIC N6.

[36] Center for Development of Security Excellence, Resources for Behavioral Science in Insider Threat (INT290.16) https://www.cdse.edu/catalog/elearning/INT290-resources.html (accessed on 26 January 2020).

---

[38] DSCA Manual 5105.38-M § C10.8.5.1.

[39] DSCA Manual 5105.38-M § C10.8.5.2.

[40] Invitational Travel Order (ITO) for International Military Student (IMS) ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani (8 August 2017)§ 12.D.

[41] Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Enhanced Vetting Protocol provided by NETSAFA DET Riyadh

[42] SoI (b) (6) CAPT, Naval Aerospace Medical Institute Officer in Charge (25 January 2020); SoI (b)(6) , TW-6 Flight Surgeon (16 January 2020); SoI S(b)(6) TW-6 Flight Surgeon (16 January 2020).

[43] SECNAVINST 4950.4B Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (JSCET), 4-5.

[44] SoI (b) (6) CAPT, Naval Aerospace Medical Institute Officer in Charge (25 January 2020); SoI (b)(6) , TW-6 Flight Surgeon (16 January 2020); SoI (b)(6) , TW-6 Flight Surgeon (16 January 2020).

[45] Report on Section 593 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, (Public Law 114-92).

[46] Department of Defense, "Independent Review of the Washington Navy Yard Shooting" (November 2013), 22-29.

[47] USMEPCOM Regulation 611-1 Personnel Selection and Classification Enlistment Qualification Tests (10 January 2019).

[48] United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, "Development the Tailored Adaptive Personality Assessment System (TAPAS)" https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a564422.pdf (Accessed 26 January 2020).

Chapter 7—Emergency Management Response

This chapter examines the emergency management response to the 6 December 2019 incident at NASP. This investigation did not assess the detailed tactical responses of the various responding agencies. Instead, it focused on compliance and deficiencies from an EM perspective, to include DoN coordination with external agencies. The findings reveal the critical importance of aligning the DoN EM program with national response guidance. Our nation uses a standard framework and unified system to guide the response to any emergency.[1] By utilizing unified EM principles, Navy installations can effectively respond to any and all emergencies. Applying these principles also requires careful synchronization and the recognition of the interdependence of the DoN, local, and regional EM partners. While DoN provides primary EM response to installation activities, Escambia County Emergency Management Services (ECEMS) and ECSO responded swiftly and heroically in support of NASP NSF and the DoD fire department. The civilian response highlights the significance of synchronizing TTP with military counterparts to ensure complimentary efforts during mutual aid situations.

Regulatory Background

DODINST 6055.17, DoD Emergency Management Program, establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for developing, implementing, and sustaining the Installation Emergency Management (IEM) program at DoD installations worldwide.[2] This instruction provides the regulatory basis for EM programs for installations and individual tenant commands.

DODINST 1322.24, Medical Readiness Training (MRT), establishes the requirement to record Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) certification in service designated training tracking systems. TCCC is the DoD standard of care

for first responders (medical and non-medical) and the All Service Member TCCC course replaces Service trauma skills currently taught in first aid and self-aid buddy care courses.

Section 708 of Public Law 114-328, NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017, develops a standardized combat casualty care instruction for all service members. The instruction includes the use of standardized trauma training platforms and establishes a requirement to record TCCC certification in service-designated training tracking systems.

OPNAVINST 3440.17A, Navy Installation Emergency Management Program, addresses the Navy IEM Program and provides policy and guidance to develop, implement, and maintain an IEM program on Navy installations.

CNICINST 3440.17, Navy IEM Program, provides CNIC guidance for the EM Program for U.S. Navy installations.

CNRSEINST 3440.2D, CNRSE EM Plan, provides guidance for the Region Southeast EM Program in alignment with the CNICINST and OPNAVINST 3440 series instructions.

NASPNCLAINST 3440.4B, NASP EM Program, provides NASP EM Program guidance.

BUMEDINST 1510.25A, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Tactical Combat Casualty Care Program, outlines training within Navy medicine for point of injury care.

NAVAVSCOLSCOMINST 5530.2B, NASC AT Plan, details policy and guidance for NASC.

NAVAVSCOLSCOMINST 5100.2B, NASC High Risk Training Emergency Action Plans, outlines and establishes policies and procedures to reduce the probability of mishap, and identifies appropriate and effective responses to emergencies and natural hazards, along with proper and timely reporting for these occurrences during high-risk training evolutions.

Emergency Management Response

This section provides an overview of known EM response events. Figure 7-1 provides an overview of notification, dispatch, and on-scene arrival**.**


Figure 7-1. Emergency Management Response to NASP Building 633

On 6 December 2019 at 0643, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani fired the first shots in Building 633.

At 0644, Escambia County Dispatch received the first 911 call and notification of an active shooter from a cell phone on NASP.[3]

At 0645, Escambia County Dispatch transferred the 911 call to CNRSE RDC in Jacksonville, Florida. This transfer reflected established RDC Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).[4]

At 0647, CNRSE RDC dispatched both NSF and NASP federal fire department. NSF personnel arrived on scene immediately due to close proximity.[5]

At 0650, NASP quarterdeck was notified of the shooting incident.[6]

At 0650, the federal fire chief arrived on scene and established a UCP with NSF near Building 633.[7]

At 0655, ECSO deputies arrived on scene.[8] ECSO operates a police substation approximately 1.5 miles outside the NASP main gate. The timing of the event aligned with a shift change, enabling a response from both offgoing and oncoming personnel, effectively doubling the ECSO capacity to respond.[9]

Between 0644 and 0658, six rescue swimmer instructors assigned to NASC received notification from evacuees that an active shooter event was in progress. They responded with their first aid kits, providing immediate medical attention to wounded personnel exiting Building 633.[10]

At 0656, NASP transmitted an AtHoc notification of an active shooter.[11]

(b) (7)(A)

At 0709, NASP transmitted a base-wide Giant Voice notification of an active shooter event.[12]

Findings, Opinions, and Recommendations

Finding 7.1 (Noncompliance): (b) (7)(F) ███████████████████

██ ████

██

█████████████████

Discussion: (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████████

██████████████ ████████████████████████████

██

██████████████████████████████████

██

████████████████████████████

███████████████████████████████████

██████████████████████████████████████

█████████████████████████████████████

█████████████████████████████████████

██

█████████████████████████████████████

███

██

██████████████████████████ ███████████████████

██████████████████████████████████

███████████████████████████████████

███████████████████████████████████████

████████████████████████████████████

██

███

(b) (7)(F)

Opinion 7.1.1: The immediate actions of individual responders prevented the UCP from coordinating, integrating, and supervising the response.

Opinion 7.1.2: ██
██
████████████████████

Opinion 7.1.3: ██
████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████

Opinion 7.1.4: To achieve unity of effort and unity of command, agencies must regularly conduct training and rehearsal exercises.

Opinion 7.1.5: Trained bystanders, such as the NASC rescue swimmer instructors, represent a valuable resource during initial casualty response; however, for their own safety, they should be relieved by fully trained and equipped EMS personnel as soon as possible.

Recommendation 7.1.1: ████████████████████████████████████
██

Recommendation 7.1.2: Recommend CNIC N30 provide guidance regarding integration of trained bystanders into EM SOP for installation F&ES.

Finding 7.2 (Deficiency): NASC rescue swimmer instructors provided critical on-scene first-aid to injured personnel. Their selfless actions saved lives and minimized casualties despite insufficient first aid kit availability.

Discussion: Per DoN policy and FY19 and FY20 Active Shooter GMT, upon notification of an active shooter event, personnel on-base are instructed to "Run, Hide, Fight."[23] While conducting physical training at Building 623, NASC rescue swimmer instructors received notification from evacuees of an active shooter event at Building 633 (across the street).[24] Six military and civilian instructors

immediately secured their students inside Building 623; retrieved their rescue swimmer medical bags; and responded directly to Building 633. The individuals were trained at various levels of advanced first aid.[25] While NSF entered and actively engaged 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani, the six NASC rescue swimmer instructors helped remove wounded from the building and rendered critical first aid in the street in front of Building 633 and well inside the perimeter established by the NASP federal fire department.[26]

These instructors provided direct care to the wounded quarterdeck watch and moved one individual into a patrol car for immediate transport to the hospital. In addition, they provided critical care to an injured Sailor and a civilian who sustained multiple gunshot wounds. They provided critical and life-saving medical care to at least one individual prior to official EMS responders arriving on scene.[27] The rapid, overwhelming response of ECSO deputies allowed non-engaged personnel to assess injuries, remove the injured, and relieve NSF already engaging the threat.[28]

While providing care to the victims in front of the building, the NASC rescue swimmer instructors exhausted the medical supplies in their emergency bags and sent personnel into surrounding buildings to find more.[29] They also used the limited medical supplies dropped by the NSF and ECSO deputies as they entered Building 633.[30]

The NASC rescue swimmer instructors noted traditional EMS personnel staged outside the perimeter and remained there. Per National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) protocol, the EMS teams avoided entering the perimeter to treat or transport injured personnel until the scene was deemed safe.[31] The six NASC rescue swimmer instructors expressed frustration that EMS did not immediately approach and administer care to the wounded.[32]

DoD components must comply with the federal regulatory standards distributed by Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) at all nonmilitary-unique DoD operations and workplaces (e.g., office buildings and schools).[33] Per OSHA regulations, requirements for first aid kits vary by industry. No specific standard exists for office buildings and schools. Title 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.151(b) requires that persons shall be adequately trained to render first aid and that "adequate first aid supplies shall be readily available."[34] This standard does not specify the composition of the first aid supplies or kits. First aid kits are not included in F&ES tenant command inspection requirements. Governing Navy safety instructions do not include a requirement for specific first aid supplies or kits; however, it does require OSHA compliance insofar as practicable.[35] Naval Safety Center (NAVSAFECEN) requires the presence of first aid kits as part of ashore safety inspection criteria; however, the governing reference is listed as the OSHA standard.[36] Thus, first aid kits may or may not contain medical grade tourniquets, Emergency Trauma Dressings (ETD), compressed gauze, and trauma sheers.

The Navy executes a robust Automated External Defibrillator (AED) program integrating the BUMED and F&ES installation AED coordinator oversight with OPNAV N46 resourcing. [37] A similar program does not exist for first aid kits.

In 2015, President Barack Obama sponsored the Stop the Bleed campaign in conjunction with private and public stakeholders in order to improve the public's ability to stop or slow life threatening bleeding and to promote access to bleeding control kits.[38] A person who is bleeding can die from blood loss within 5 minutes; therefore, it is important to quickly stop the blood loss. Those nearest to someone with life-threatening injuries are best positioned to provide initial care.[39] Despite this program, no requirement exists for DoN facilities to maintain bleeding control kits.

Opinion 7.2.1: The NASC rescue swimmer instructors, in conjunction with ECSO deputies and NSF, performed critical on-scene care and saved the lives of multiple personnel.

Opinion 7.2.2: In deviating from active shooter training and policy, the six NASC rescue swimmer instructors assumed great personal risk, yet brought necessary capability and competency to the scene. Their heroic actions represent the finest traditions of the Naval Service.

Opinion 7.2.3: Bystanders play a critical role in enabling the immediate treatment of injured personnel and serve as the frontline medical response in any event. No matter how rapid the arrival of professional emergency responders, bystanders will always be first on the scene.

Opinion 7.2.4: The lack of appropriate medical supplies in NASC and adjacent buildings hampered the emergency medical response and endangered the lives of injured personnel.

Opinion 7.2.5: Bleeding control kits are critical in mass casualty events.

Recommendation 7.2.1: Recommend installations conduct a critical skills survey and integrate trained life-saving personnel tenant commands into base-wide emergency training evolutions and response.

Recommendation 7.2.2: Recommend OPNAV, in coordination with BUMED, NAVSAFECEN, and CNIC, require the standardization of first aid kits to include multiple sets of bleeding control kits at each ^{(b) (5)} ███████████ .

Recommendation 7.2.3: ^{(b) (5)} ████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
██████████

Recommendation 7.2.4: Recommend CNIC revise Emergency Action Plan (EAP) instructions to require the inclusion of first aid equipment locations in installation and command EAPs.

Recommendation 7.2.5: Recommend CNIC mandate all Navy installation commands revise indoctrination sessions to include instruction of the command/unit EAP and the locations of first aid equipment.

Finding 7.3 (Deficiency): NASP federal fire department received insufficient quantities of ballistic protective equipment to outfit F&ES personnel and received no formal training for Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response (ASHER).

Discussion: All DoN F&ES training programs shall be developed and implemented per NFPA standards. In 2018, NFPA released Standard 3000 for an ASHER. This standard requires Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) to provide appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to personnel exposed to ballistic risks or other hostile threats per expected duties.[40] Specifically, it requires National Institute of Justice Level III-A ballistic vests for operation in proximity to a known threat.[41] Additionally, Rescue Task Force (RTF) personnel (i.e., those directly integrated into LE response) should also be outfitted with ballistic helmets and Individual First Aid Kits (IFAK).[42] The deployment model for the PPE shall be determined by the AHJ.[43] CNIC N30 is the Navy's AHJ for F&ES.[44]

ASHER training shall be based on risks assessed by the CNIC N30, tasks to be performed, time available for training, and financial commitment.[45]

In August 2019, CNRSE F&ES Program released Hostile Event Rescue Team (HERT) procedures to align with NFPA 3000. Care provided in any threat zone

is conditional on first responder training (e.g., ASHER training), available equipment (e.g., PPE), local protocols, and medical director approval.[46]

In October 2018, the NASP federal fire team received 10 body armor kits from CNRSE. As of 6 December 2019, NASP F&ES Department was scheduled for, but had not yet completed required ASHER training.

NASP F&ES is scheduled for ASHER training in April 2020.[47]

Opinion 7.3.1: The lack of ASHER training for first responders hampered the ability for F&ES to safely treat and extract injured personnel from the scene.

Opinion 7.3.2: The lag between material provision of PPE and training is insufficient to meet the current threat environment for F&ES.

Opinion 7.3.3: If properly trained and equipped, F&ES personnel would have been able to relieve unprotected bystanders and provide immediate medical treatment and capability in the warm zone (indirect threat) outside Building 633.

Opinion 7.3.4: The utility of hostile emergency response capability is conditional on robust, integrated training with NSF and local police authorities.

Opinion 7.3.5: Training and outfitting F&ES responders is a critical FP requirement.

Recommendation 7.3.1: Recommend CNIC immediately review and expedite Navy alignment and compliance with NFPA Standard 3000 (ASHER).

Recommendation 7.3.2: Recommend CNIC N30 expedite NFPA Standard 3000 (ASHER) training for all DoN F&ES personnel and report status to OPNAV.

Recommendation 7.3.3: Recommend CNIC N30 immediately review the adequacy and roll-out of PPE to ensure 100% F&ES protection and report status to OPNAV.

Finding 7.4 (Deficiency): NASC EAP execution did not function adequately to ensure the safety of students and staff.

Discussion: The NASC EAP requires students to muster for all emergencies across the street from Building 633. The EAP states, "evacuation plans and routes will be posted and include a mustering point for NASC personnel to check-in."[48] NASC's mustering location is fully exposed without shelter. On 6 December 2019, student and staff from Building 633 attempted to egress safely. Personnel sought shelter wherever possible; however, many personnel milled about in surrounding fields, roads, and parking lots exposed to potential threat. The NASC EAP required "evacuation to a safe location."[49]

As he crossed the base, NASP Emergency Management Officer (EMO) notified personnel at the outlying fields of the active shooter situation.[50] NASP F&ES provided vehicles to block traffic and keep personnel away from the immediate scene. [51] These actions required on-scene and EM personnel to divert attention from their primary efforts in order to direct personnel to shelter.[52]

Opinion 7.4.1: The open and unsheltered muster location assigned by the EAP for NASC Building 633 placed students and staff at risk.

Opinion 7.4.2: Appropriate muster locations vary by event type. EAPs must be tailored to the specific incident.

Opinion 7.4.3: The assignment of unprotected muster locations reflects compliance rather than a standard of excellence in emergency response. If

properly and regularly drilled, the inadequacy of this location may have been identified.

Recommendation 7.4.1: Recommend CNIC direct Navy installations and tenant commands to validate EAP mustering locations to ensure they are safe, secure, and protected.

Recommendation 7.4.2: Recommend CNIC direct Navy installations and tenant commands to review and revise their EAP guidance instruction to include event-specific evacuation directions and mustering locations.

Recommendation 7.4.3: Recommend OPNAV direct training facilities to complete regular, periodic drills to ensure student populations properly respond to egress plans.

Finding 7.5 (Deficiency): (b) (7)(F)

Discussion: (b) (7)(F)

(b) (7)(F)

Opinion 7.5.1: The absence of the F&ES Chief did not impact emergency response; however, a gapped F&ES Deputy billet continues to place NASP and adjoining facilities at risk.

Opinion 7.5.2: Manning critical EM leadership positions is critical to mission planning and execution. A deputy or assistant must be assigned and trained in the event of an incident during the principal agent's absence.

Recommendation 7.5.1: Recommend CNIC direct installations to review the status of all EM positions to determine critical personnel gaps resulting in single points of failure in EM response.

Recommendation 7.5.2: Recommend CNIC and Navy Regions develop and promulgate critical manning Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) for EM personnel manning.

Finding 7.6 (Noncompliance): MAAs and MOUs between NASP and local agencies were allowed to lapse.[58]

Discussion: MAAs and MOUs resolve resource gaps and share capabilities to enable daily operations and to respond effectively to emergencies. MAAs and MOUs enable joint planning and training.

Required F&ES capabilities may be organic, regionalized, consolidated, installation, or provided by Federal, State, local, or private agencies and departments. F&ES departments shall develop plans to include mutual aid response to meet F&ES requirements.[59] Installation F&ES chiefs are responsible for facilitating, developing, implementing, and periodically reviewing all MAAs,

MOAs, and MOUs with other federal, state, local, or private agencies and departments to promote efficiency and economy per established regional policy.[60] All MAAs shall be reviewed every three years and updated at least once every 10 years.[61] Regional F&ES Chiefs are required to provide oversight of this process.[62]

F&ES scope of service analysis determines appropriate F&ES capabilities to protect assets at risk. In addition, scope of service analysis identifies mutual aid requirements to meet minimum response capabilities. Regional F&ES Chiefs are required to review the scope of services annually for installations.[63] CNIC N30 reviews each installations scope of service through Program Compliance Assessments (PCAs) every five years.

The Navy IEM Program does not explicitly require the completion of MAAs and/or MOUs with civilian authorities. However, it recognizes required EM capabilities may be organic, regionalized, or provided by Federal, State, local, and private agencies and departments through appropriate support agreements.[64]

The Navy Medicine Force Health Protection EM Program requires all BUMED commanded activities (i.e., Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF)) to develop an MAA or MOU with civilian first/emergency responders, including local hospitals and EM agencies. BUMED commanded activities shall also coordinate with CNIC and/or regional and installation level EM resources, as well as the local civilian EM community in the development of MAAs.[65]

The Navy PS and LE Program requires the provision of LE response capability for each installation. However, LE capability may be provided by nearby installations or through MOA/MOU with local LE.[66] The instruction does not provide an explicit requirement to maintain MOAs/MOUs.

In 2013, ECSO and NASP signed a Mutual Aid Voluntary Cooperation Agreement; however, it expired in 2017. The NASP EAP does not direct the usage or continuance of an MAA or MOU.[67] Following the incident, CNRSE, NASP, and ECSO signed an MOU on 23 December 2019.[68]

NASP and Naval Hospital Pensacola (NHP) do not have emergency care facilities on their installations. In 2014, NHP was downgraded by removing their emergency room and replacing it with an urgent care capability.[69]

Opinion 7.6.1: Lack of oversight by CNRSE and NASP enabled MAAs and MOUs between NASP and local agencies to lapse.

Opinion 7.6.2: (b) (7)(F)

Opinion 7.6.3: (b) (7)(F)

Opinion 7.6.4: (b) (7)(F)

Opinion 7.6.5: (b) (7)(F)

Opinion 7.6.6: (b) (7)(F)

Opinion 7.6.7: ^{(b) (7)(F)} ████████████████████████

██

████████████████████████████████████ (b) (7)(F)

██████████████████████

Recommendation 7.6.1: ^{(b) (7)(F)} ████████████████████

██

████████████████████████

Recommendation 7.6.2: Recommend CNIC require installations to periodically exercise MAAs and MOUs with local authorities to include LE, emergency response, and MTFs.

Recommendation 7.6.3: Recommend CNIC establish a three-year periodicity for all MAAs and MOUs, and centrally track status of these agreements through regional commanders.

Recommendation 7.6.4: Recommend CNIC N30 require Regional F&ES Chiefs to review applicable MAAs and MOUs annually and require integrated MAA and MOU training with signatories.

Recommendation 7.6.5: Recommend NASP, in coordination with BUMED tenants, F&ES, EM, and NFS, to establish, maintain, and exercise MAAs and MOUs for all relevant services.

Finding 7.7 (Noncompliance): The EM response underutilized the NHP Branch Health Clinic (BHC) capabilities and capacity.

Discussion: At 0652, the NHP BHC Officer in Charge (OIC) received notification the clinic had received a patient with a gunshot wound. Per NHP BHC EAP, the OIC ordered the clinic to go on lock down. The arrival of this gunshot victim

served as NHP BHC's only notification of an active shooter on the base.[70] The clinic personnel provided critical care and prepped the gunshot wound victim for transport. The clinic called EMS for pick up and the victim was transported shortly thereafter.[71] Aside from the care they provided to one wounded patient, NHP BHC was not utilized for any medical care despite having doctors, nurses, and corpsmen in close physical proximity to Building 633 (Figure 7-2).

1 Naval Aviation Schools Command (NASC) (Building 633)
2 Naval Hospital Pensacola Branch Health Clinic (Building 3000)

Figure 7-2. NASC and NHP BHC Proximity

By instruction, tenant MTFs and non-MTF activities shall coordinate with host installation EM program managers. This coordination shall include active participation in EM preparedness, response, and recovery efforts, as required by CNIC and/or host installation EM programs.[72] NHPC BHC is a Tier-4 MTF, required to provide minimal EM response capabilities.[73] While not required to

maintain a mass casualty plan, NHPC BHC is required to participate in the NASP EM program and complete training.

Opinion 7.7.1: If properly integrated into NASP EM response, the capacity and the professional skill set of the personnel at NHP BHC could have provided additional medical support to injured personnel and first responders.

Opinion 7.7.2: If properly integrated, NHP BHC could have provided necessary medical kits (i.e., tourniquets and dressings) to first responders and bystanders.

Recommendation 7.7.1: Recommend CNIC require the integration of trained life-saving personnel into installation EM Plans, in order to facilitate immediate and broader emergency responses to mass casualties.

Recommendation 7.7.2: Recommend NASP, in coordination with NHP, revise its EM Plan to account for BHC capabilities.

Finding 7.8 (Noncompliance): NASP failed to activate installation-wide notification systems in a timely manner. Personnel on the installation failed to receive timely notification of the active shooter event.

Discussion: DoD requires alert Mass Warning Notifications (MWN) within 2 minutes of incident notification and verification. These alerts must be issued to the affected DoD population, regardless of DoD component affiliation within appropriate geographic regions.[74] Within 10 minutes after initiation, MWN systems must reach a target audience of 90 percent or more of the protected population with specific protective action recommendations and 100 percent of assigned EM resources, including first responders, first receivers, and emergency responders.[75] The specific standards, requirements, and applications for all MWN are contained in the UFC.[76] Giant Voice represents the original standard for mass notification on DoD installations.[77] DoN utilizes AtHoc to

provide MWN through an automatic telephone notification system and a computer desk notification system.[78] AtHoc can be coupled with other personal communication devices, such as text messaging and social networking sites.

At 0644 on 6 December 2019, Escambia County received a 911 call reporting an active shooter on NASP.

At 0645, RDC was notified by Escambia County of an active shooter at NASP Building 633.[79]

At 0647, RDC sent notification simultaneously to NASP Security and Fire Dispatch via Enterprise Land Mobile Radio (ELMR) system.[80]

At 0650, NASP EMO received a personal call from Escambia County Fire Chief notifying him of an active shooter at NASP Building 633. The EMO called and notified the NASP Quarterdeck.[81]

At 0656, NASP EOC issued an AtHoc alert via the Quarterdeck. (+9 minutes from initial notification of CNRSE RDC).[82]

At 0709, NASP transmitted a base-wide Giant Voice notification of an active shooter event (+22 minutes from initial notification of CNRSE RDC).[83]

CNRSE established an RDC to upgrade, standardize, and ensure interoperability for dispatch throughout CNRSE AOR. However, RDC cannot provide the same MWN services to installation populations that were previously provided by local dispatch centers at individual bases.[84]

(b) (7)(F)

(b) (7)(F)

100% of eligible personnel are registered to receive AtHoc work email notifications; however, most students do not have dedicated computer access.[86] At the time of attack, most personnel were in transit to work.

(b) (7)(F)

The WEA system is a public safety system that allows customers who own compatible mobile devices to receive geographically targeted, text-like messages alerting them of imminent threats to safety in their area (i.e., Amber alerts, flash flood warnings, etc.). WEA enables government officials to target emergency alerts to specific geographic areas. WEA alerts only cover critical emergency situations as follows:

1. Alerts issued by the President of the United States

2. Alerts involving imminent threats to safety or life

3. Amber alerts about missing children

4. Alerts conveying recommendations for saving lives and property[88]

Opinion 7.8.1: The layered system of AtHoc and Giant Voice failed to fully and adequately inform all military, government, and civilian personnel at NASP, placing additional personnel at risk.

Opinion 7.8.2: Employment of the WEA aligns closely with DoD requirements for immediate, all-component, geographically-bounded notification.

<u>Opinion 7.8.3</u>: Centralization of dispatch authority may also require centralization of AtHoc and WEA capability due to anticipated delays at the local level.

<u>Opinion 7.8.4</u>: AtHoc is only effective if eligible participants are full registered. It is a command imperative to ensure complete registration of both home and work devices.

<u>Opinion 7.8.5</u>: (b) (7)(F)

<u>Recommendation: 7.8.1</u>: (b) (5)

<u>Recommendation 7.8.2</u>: Recommend CNIC require regional and installation commanders to coordinate with civilian authorities to integrate geographically bounded WEA notifications into crisis event response plans.

<u>Recommendation 7.8.3</u>: Recommend CNIC require all installations to ensure full integration of and participation by tenant commands into the AtHoc system.

<u>Recommendation: 7.8.4</u>: Recommend CNIC, in coordination with regional commands, determine technical feasibility of centralized MWN and if possible, implement centralized AtHoc and WEA notifications from RDCs for time-critical incidents.

<u>Recommendation: 7.8.5</u>: Recommend NASP conduct technical evaluation and groom of the Giant Voice to ensure clarity throughout the installation.

<u>Recommendation: 7.8.6</u>: Recommend CNIC develop a standardized Giant Voice series of alarms and warnings similar to shipboard alarm signals.

<u>Finding 7.9</u>: (b) (7)(F)

Discussion: (b) (7)(F)

.91

(b) (7)(F)

. (b) (7)(F)

(b) (7)(F)

███

██████████████████████████████████.92

(b) (7)(F)

███

███

██████████████████████████████████ █████████████

███

█████████████████████████████████████

███

███

█████████████████████████████████████94

Opinion 7.9.1: (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████████

███

██████████

Opinion 7.9.2: (b) (7)(F) ███████████████████████████████████

██

████████████████████

Opinion 7.9.3: The absence of an NASP MEP ingress plan significantly delayed manning and initialization of the EOC.

Opinion 7.9.4: Integrated, full-spectrum EM exercises and drills may have identified MEP ingress deficiencies and EOC shortfalls.

Recommendation 7.9.1: Recommend CNIC conduct manpower analysis and direct installations to conduct a local risk assessment to determine the feasibility and necessity of 24/7 operations centers.

Recommendation 7.9.2: Recommend installations conduct routine operational checks of the EOC and maintain EOC systems and hardware in a fully operable status for immediate use.

Recommendation 7.9.3: Recommend CNIC collect and disseminate best practices to facilitate rapid MEP ingress during emergencies.

Recommendation 7.9.4: Recommend CNIC implement a standardized digital means of identifying and verifying MEP to prevent delays in emergency response.

Recommendation 7.9.5: (b) (5) ████████████████████████

████████████████████████████

Recommendation 7.9.6: Recommend installation commands and their PAOs utilize pre-recorded responses to incoming calls in order to manage the volume of inquiries during an emergency response.

---

[1] National Response Framework 4th Edition (28 OCT 2019), 7, 24, 36.
[2] DoDI 6055.17, Emergency Management Program (13 FEB 2017).
[3] CNRSE CHAT LOC 06 DEC 2019 - Navy Region Southeast Chat Log (16 DEC 2019).
[4] CNRSEINST 3440.2E Emergency Management Program.
[5] Id.
[6] NASP Quarterdeck Log (06 DEC 2019).
[7] Id. / SOI (b) (6) ████, NASP Fire Department Fire Chief (20 JAN 2020).
[8] CNRSE CHAT LOC 06 DEC 2019 - Navy Region Southeast Chat Log (16 DEC 2019) Id.
[9] SOI (b)(6) ████, NASP Fire Department Fire Chief (20 JAN 2020) / SOI (b)(6) ████ & (b)(6) ████, NAS Pensacola Emergency manager & Installation Training Officer (15 JAN 2020).
[10] SOI (b)(6) ████, (b)(6) ████, (b)(6) ████, (b)(6) ████ Training Safety Observer and High Risk Instructor Swim Instructors (17 JAN 2020).
[11] Navy Region Southeast Chat Log (06 DEC 2019); NAS Pensacola AtHoc Device Coverage Summary (21 Jan 2020); NASP Quarterdeck Log (06 DEC 2019).
[12] Id.
[13] SOI (b)(6) ████, NASP Fire Department Fire Chief (20 JAN 2020).
[14] DoDI 6055.17, DoD Emergency Management Program (13 FEB 2017).
[15] OPNAVINST 3440.17A.
[16] Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Incident Command System Resources; https://www.fema.gov/incident-command-system-resources (accessed on 10 February 2020).

---

[17] HERT SOP CNRSE, Hostile Event Rescue Team Procedures Commander Navy Region South East (08 AUG 2019) National Fire Protection Association 3000 (PS), Standard for an Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response (ASHER) (2018).

[18] CNRSE CHAT LOC 06 DEC 2019   Navy Region Southeast Chat Log (16 DEC 2019) / /); SOI (b)(6) ▮▮▮, NASP Fire Department Fire Chief (20 JAN 2020).

[19] SOI (b)(6) ▮, (b)(6) ▮, (b)(6) ▮, (b)(6) ▮ Training Safety Observer and High Risk Instructor Swim Instructors (17 JAN 2020) Id.

[20] SOI (b)(6) ▮, NASP Fire Department Fire Chief (20 JAN 2020).

[21] OPNAVINST 11320.23G, Navy Fire and Emergency Service Program (04 February 2013).

[22] Id.

[23] FY 2019 NAVY GMT Active Shooter Training per (NAVADMIN) 226/18, (12 SEP 2018) / DoD Instruction 5525.15, Law Enforcement Standards and Training in the DoD (01 JUN 2019).

[24] SOI (b)(6) ▮, (b)(6) ▮, (b)(6) ▮, (b)(6) ▮ Training Safety Observer and High Risk Instructor Swim Instructors (17 JAN 2020).

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] DoD Instruction 1322.24, Medical Readiness Training. (16 MAR 2018) /);DoDI 6055.17, DoDI 6055.17 DoD Emergency Management Program (13 FEB 2017) / BUMED Instruction 6055.17 EM Emergency Management (13 FEB 2017) /. BUMEDINST 1510.25A., Tactical Combat Casualty Care Program (December 7, 2016) /);SOI (b)(6) ▮, (b)(6) ▮ NASP Clinic OIC and Clinic Manager (14 JAN 2020)

[28] SOI (b)(6) ▮, (b)(6) ▮, (b)(6) ▮, (b)(6) ▮ Training Safety Observer and High Risk Instructor Swim Instructors (17 JAN 2020) / SOI (b)(6) ▮, NASP Fire Department Fire Chief (20 JAN 2020)

[29] SOI (b)(6) ▮, (b)(6) ▮, (b)(6) ▮, (b)(6) ▮ Training Safety Observer and High Risk Instructor Swim Instructors (17 JAN 2020).

[30] Id.

[31] National Fire Protection Association 3000 (PS), Standard for an Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response (ASHER) (2018).

[32] Id.

[33] DoDI 6055.01, DoD Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Program (14 October, 2014), 12.

[34] Title 29 Code of Federal Regulation 1910.151(b).

[35] OPNAVINST 5100.23G Navy Safety and Occupational Health Program (21 July 2011), 1-5.

[36] Navy Safety Center (NAVSAFECEN) Ashore Safety Personnel Workplace Inspection Check-sheet; https://www.public.navy.mil/navsafecen/Pages/safety-officer/so-ashore.aspx (accessed on 10 February 2020).

[37] OPNAVINST 5100.29A Navy Installation Automated External Defibrillator Program (May 2019).

[38] White House Official Press Release, "Factsheet: Bystander "Stop The Bleed" Initiative" (06 October 2015) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/06/fact-sheet-bystander-stop-bleed-broad-private-sector-support-effort-save (Accessed 10 February 2020).

[39] Department of Homeland Security, Stop the Bleed Campaign, https://www.dhs.gov/stopthebleed (Accessed on 10 February 2020).

[40] National Fire Protection Association 3000 (PS), Standard for an Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response (ASHER) (2018), 14.2.1.

[41] Id.,14.2.3.

[42] Id.,14.3.2.1.

[43] Id., 14.2.4.1.

[44] OPNAVINST 11320.23G , Navy Fire and Emergency Service Program (04 February 2013), 1-4

[45] National Fire Protection Association 3000 (PS), Standard for an Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response (ASHER) (2018), 15.2.

[46] CNRSE F&ES Hostile Event Rescue Team (HERT) Procedures (08 August 2019).

[47] National Fire Protection Association 3000 (PS), Standard for an Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response (ASHER) (2018) / SOI (b)(6) ▮, NASP Fire Department Fire Chief (20 JAN 2020) SOI Fire Chief (b)(6) ▮.

[48] NAVAVSCOLSCOMINST 5530.2B, Naval Aviation Schools Command Antiterrorism Plan (24 AUG 2018).

[49] SoI (b)(6) , (b)(6) , (b)(6) , (b)(6) Training Safety Observer and High Risk Instructor Swim Instructors (17 JAN 2020) / SOI (b)(6) , NASP Fire Department Fire Chief (20 JAN 2020) / SOI (b)(6) , Senior NASP SAR Swimmer School Instructor (15 JAN 2020) / NAVAVSCOLSCOMINST 5100.2B Naval Aviation Schools Command High Risk Training Emergency Action Plans (03 OCT 2019.

[50] SoI (b)(6) & (b)(6) , NAS Pensacola Emergency manager & Installation Training Officer (15 JAN 2020).

[51] *Id* /; SOI D (b)(6) , NASP Fire Department Fire Chief (20 JAN 2020).

[52] SoI (b)(6) , (b)(6) , (b)(6) , (b)(6) Training Safety Observer and High Risk Instructor Swim Instructors (17 JAN 2020).

[53] SoI (b)(6) , NASP Fire Department Fire Chief (20 JAN 2020).

[54] SoI (b)(6) , NASP Fire Department Fire Chief (20 JAN 2020).

[55] OPNAVINST 11320.23G, Navy Fire and Emergency Service Program (04 February 2013), 4-2.

[56] SoI (b)(6) , NASP Fire Department Fire Chief (20 JAN 2020).

[57] Id.

[58] Mutual Aid Voluntary Cooperation Agreement COMNASP and ECSO (20 JUN 2013) / Memorandum of Understanding CNRSE COMNASP ECSO (23 DEC 19).

[59] OPNAVINST 11320.23G, Navy Fire and Emergency Service Program (04 February 2013), 2-5.

[60] OPNAVINST 11320.23G, Navy Fire and Emergency Service Program (04 February 2013), 1-13.

[61] Id., 1-13.

[62] Id., 1-11.

[63] Id., 2-5.

[64] OPNAVINST 3400.17A CNO Navy Installation Emergency Management Program (AUG 2014).

[65] BUMEDINST 3440.10, Navy Medicine Force Health Protection Emergency Management Program (26 JUN 2015),19.

[66] OPNAVINST 5530.14E CH-3, Navy Physical Security and Law Enforcement Program (20 November 2017), 4-1.

[67] Id.; SoI (b)(6) & (b)(6) , NAS Pensacola Emergency manager & Installation Training Officer (15 JAN 2020).

[68] Memorandum of Understanding CNRSE COMNASP ECSO (23 DEC 19).

[69] SoI (b)(6) , (b)(6) NASP Clinic OIC and Clinic Manager (14 JAN 2020).

[70] Id.

[71] Id.

[72] BUMEDINST 3440.10, Navy Medicine Force Health Protection Emergency Management Program (26 JUN 2015), 4-5.

[73] Id., 8-11.

[74] DoDI Instruction 6055.17, Department of Defense; Installation Emergency Management Program, Washington, D.C. (13 JAN 2009), 30.

[75] Id.

[76] DoD Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual, Unified Facilities Criteria 4-02-01, Design and O&M: mass Notification Systems, Dec 18, 2002. (11 SEP 2008).

[77] NASP Giant Voice Pre Planned Recording Scripts 2019.

[78] DoDI_6055.17_DOD EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (EM) PROGRAM (FEB 2013) / NAS Pensacola AtHoc Device Coverage Summary (21 Jan 2020).

[79] CNRSE CHAT LOC 06 DEC 2019   Navy Region Southeast Chat Log (16 DEC 2019).

[80] Id.

[81] SoI (b)(6) & (b)(6) , NAS Pensacola Emergency manager & Installation Training Officer (15 JAN 2020).

[82] Id.

[83] CNRSE CHAT LOC 06 DEC 2019   Navy Region Southeast Chat Log (16 DEC 2019).

[84] CNRSEINST 3440.2E, Emergency Management Program (21 May 2018), 100-102.

[85] NAS Pensacola AtHoc Device Coverage Summary (21 Jan 2020).

[86] Id.

[87] SoI (b)(6) , (b)(6) NASP Clinic OIC and Clinic Manager (14 JAN 2020) / SOI (b)(6) & (b)(6) , NAS Pensacola Emergency manager & Installation Training Officer (15 JAN 2020).

---

[88] FCC/FEMA Wireless Emergency Alerts Guide updated 2019.

[89] SoI (b)(6) & (b)(6) , NAS Pensacola Emergency manager & Installation Training Officer (15 JAN 2020).

[90] Id.

[91] Id.

[92] CNRSE CHAT LOC 06 DEC 2019   Navy Region Southeast Chat Log (16 DEC 2019).

[93] NASPCOLAINST 34440.4F NASP EM PLAN FAA 15 TO SECTION II Public Affairs.

[94] SoI (b)(6) NAS Pensacola Public Affairs Officer (17 JAN 2020).

Chapter 8—Postresponse Support

This chapter focuses on post response related to support of victims, survivors, and their families. Casualty Assistance Calls Officers (CACO), medical providers, mental health providers, and PAOs provided necessary care and information to DoN personnel. Mass casualties dramatically impact the capability of a single command and a single installation to execute their normal missions, functions, and tasks. A mass casualty requires cooperation and engagement from superior, tenant, and adjacent commands in order to support the families of the deceased, wounded victims, and their families and command personnel emotionally and physically affected by the event.

Regulatory Background

DODI 1300.18, DoD Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures, assigns responsibilities and establishes uniform personnel policies and procedures across DoD components for reporting, recording, notifying, and assisting families whenever DoD casualties occur.

OPNAVINST 1770.1B, Casualty Assistance Calls and Funeral Honors Support Program, establishes the requirements for providing and coordinating casualty assistance and funeral honors for active duty and retired military members and their families.

SECNAVIST 5720.44C, DoN Public Affairs Policy and Regulation, provides basic policy and regulations for carrying out the public affairs and internal relations programs of the DoN.

Findings, Opinions, and Recommendations

Finding 8.1 (Deficiency): NASC was unable to expeditiously submit a Personnel Casualty Report (PCR), delaying notification of affected families.

Discussion: The Casualty Assistance Calls Program (CACP) requires designation of a trained, uniformed, U.S. Navy representative to assist the Primary Next-of-Kin (PNOK) and the Secondary Next-of-Kin (SNOK) of Sailors who have suffered a casualty.[1] Functioning as the official representative of the SECNAV, the CACO provides information, resources, and assistance to the PNOK and SNOK. Unless prevented by circumstances outside the Navy's control, personal notifications to the PNOK and SNOK are required within 12 hours of the military service headquarters receiving the casualty report.[2] Upon activation to perform CACO duties, performance of the assigned mission becomes the full-time responsibility of the CACO – providing direct support and assistance to families–until all benefits and entitlements are received.[3]

On 6 December 2019, NASC's Active Duty Human Resources Officer (HRO) (Lieutenant/O-3), assumed the role as the command representative for the personnel casualty. She was neither trained nor qualified to perform the assigned missions, functions, and tasks of a CACO. The primary NASC CACO was unavailable to execute his duties because his spouse witnessed 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's attack and required attention. The secondary NASC CACO was on leave.

Off-base when notified of the shooting, the NASC acting CACO proceeded to Baptist Hospital, where some victims were being treated. The acting CACO encountered immediate issues with reporting because she did not have remote access to the administrative and personnel record systems at NASC. The acting CACO requested support from CNRSE to complete required PCRs since she did

not have access to either Navy Family Accountability and Assessment System (NFAAS) or Navy Standard Integrated Personnel System (NSIPS) at Baptist Hospital. CNRSE initially rejected this request while citing the parent command's responsibility to complete the PCR.[4] CNRSE CACO did finally take required information over the phone and submitted the PCRs for the deceased NASP personnel in Defense Casualty Information Processing System (DCIPS). NHP (MEDCOG) submitted the PCRs for those who were injured and sent to civilian hospitals in the Pensacola area.[5]

Post-incident, the FBI took custody of Building 633 as an active crime scene. NASC Official Military Personnel Files (OMPF) remained unavailable. A limited number of NASC staff maintained access to human resource systems and the personnel administrative data.[6] The NASC acting CACO could access neither personnel databases nor the DCIPS since she was not an actual CACO. NASP Personnel Support Detachment (PSD) and Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) denied the acting CACO access to NSIPS to protect Personally Identifiable Information (PII).[7] Within NSIPS, two of the deceased's profiles contained incomplete OMPF data as they were in transit to their first permanent duty station.

Within hours of the attack, eight trained CACOs from other NASP tenant commands arrived voluntarily at Baptist Hospital and provided onsite guidance to the NASC acting CACO. The NRSE CACO formally assigned three CACOs to perform the duties of notifying the families and NASC acting CACO coordinated with these individuals in support of their duties.

After realizing his friend may have been a casualty, ENS Watson's college roommate, (b)(6) , arrived at Baptist Hospital. He notified ENS Watson's parents in Alabama and requested they come to Pensacola; however, he did not

inform them of their son's status. Due to the lack of CAC identification or other identification on ENS Watson, the roommate ultimately made the positive identification.[8]

Rather than allowing Baptist Hospital to inform ENS Watson's family, NASC's CO directed one of the qualified CACOs to formally notify the family with support of the NASC chaplain.[9] Notification occurred at 1145 on 6 December 2019.

Before the family arrived at Baptist Hospital, ENS Watson's remains were sealed for transport to the Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME) at Dover Air Force Base. The NASC acting CACO and other supporting CACOs were unable to facilitate the family's initial request to view their son's body; however, the NASC CO worked with senior leadership to authorize the request.[10] Similar requests by other families were not honored.

On 6 December, CACOs completed the PNOK notifications for Petty Officer Third Class Walters at 2130 ([b)(6]   ) and 2142 ([b)(6]   ). Petty Officer Third Class Haitham's [b)(6]   was also notified at 2130. On 8 December at 1100, Petty Officer Third Class Haitham's [b)(6]   was finally notified. The delay resulted from his address being listed as "Unknown" on the service member's Page 2.

<u>Opinion 8.1.1</u>: NASP tenant command CACOs acted with exceptional initiative and dedication by reporting to Baptist Hospital.

<u>Opinion 8.1.2</u>: Assigning an officer without access to required personnel records and systems to complete a PCR is unreasonable. The acting CACO's remote location, the NASP basewide lockdown, insufficient access to OMPF databases, and the closure of Building 633 prevented her from completing the PCR in a timely fashion.

Opinion 8.1.3: Allowing families to view the remains of their Sailor is a reasonable request that should be honored by default, whenever possible.

Opinion 8.1.4: BUPERS and NASP PSD created barriers to the completion of the required PCR rather than facilitate completion.

Opinion 8.1.5: Lack of system access prevented NASC from submitting PCRs in a timely fashion. This lack of access delayed notification of families.

Opinion 8.1.6: A command experiencing an active shooter mass casualty, dislocation, and restricted base access should not be expected to execute non-standard tasks such as CACO duties without some assistance.

Opinion 8.1.7: ISICs are responsible for removing obstacles and providing assistance to their subordinates to enable mission success.

Recommendation 8.1.1: Recommend tenant commands create a Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) to ensure access to critical files, systems, and connectivity is maintained.

Recommendation 8.1.2: Recommend CNIC, CNRSE, and installations develop protocols to integrate and assure a collaborative response to mass casualty events. Conduct exercises annually to test process execution.

Recommendation 8.1.3: Recommend installation CACOs coordinate with EM to increase opportunities for live training events, to include CACO response.

Recommendation 8.1.4: Recommend BUPERS and each PSD location identify a specific crisis action officer to support non-standard support requirements in the event of a mass casualty.

Finding 8.2: No MOA/MOU exists to designate key personnel to serve in critical liaison roles (e.g., medical and PAO) with civilian medical facilities during crisis events.

Discussion 8.2: When notified U.S. Navy casualties were being sent to Baptist Hospital, the NASC flight surgeon reported to the hospital in order to provide critical medical updates to his COC and to ensure continuity of care following release.[11] In addition, the NASC flight surgeon facilitated access for the NASC acting CACO in support of her PCR completion.[12] The volume of people arriving at Baptist Hospital and requesting information overwhelmed hospital resources. Baptist Hospital provided the NASC flight surgeon and acting CACO with a space to set up a NASC command center to help manage the requests for information.[13]

Following the event, Baptist Hospital administration and staff identified the necessity for enhanced coordination, planning, and training with local military facilities. Citing the absence of an emergency room capability at local MTFs, Baptist Hospital personnel stressed the need for the Navy to update and/or ratify MAAs and MOUs with all civilian emergency medical facilities.[14]

Opinion 8.2.1: The nature of this mass casualty event quickly outstripped the capacity of available MTFs and necessitated treatment of service members at civilian facilities. Baptist Hospital was ill-positioned to handle the volume of personnel, security, and media control issues accompanying the event.

Opinion 8.2.2: Personal initiative by NASC personnel ensured the command retained a forward presence and situational awareness at Baptist Hospital.

Opinion 8.2.3: The presence of a medically trained military liaison directly supported injured DoN personnel and occurred without instructional guidance.

<u>Opinion 8.2.4</u>: During the treatment of military service members at civilian facilities, uniformed liaisons ensure a consistent and smooth transition of support between civilian and military health care.

<u>Opinion 8.2.5</u>: Civilian medical facilities may have neither the knowledge nor the capability to deal with military related issues stemming from intense public media interest. These issues include personnel security, operations security, and the circumstances and proper release of details from an on-going investigation.

<u>Opinion 8.2.6</u>: While in the care of the civilian facility, uniformed liaisons assist with media interest, access to military medical records, and family support.

<u>Recommendation 8.2.1</u>: Recommend CNIC require Navy installations to establish MAAs/MOUs with adjacent civilian medical facilities. They should cover the designation and assignment of a uniformed, medical liaison officer and a PAO to civilian treatment facilities during military-related incidents.

<u>Finding 8.3</u>: Following the incident, primary care providers did not have required access to service member Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application (AHLTA) medical records, preventing continuity of care.

<u>Discussion</u>: NASC flight surgeons were responsible for the primary follow-up care of NASC personnel once discharged from Baptist Hospital. However, postincident they were unable to access applicable medical records in the AHLTA medical record system. NASC flight surgeons regained access approximately three weeks after the incident. NHP staff were unable to determine who removed the records. Restricted access prevented physicians from digitally prescribing medications, ordering labs, and referring patients to follow-on care. These issues resulted in delays in medical service provision to injured personnel.[15] Later, NHP learned DISA secured access to these records

as part of a technical safeguard of protected health information.[16] Medical providers were unable to identify a BUMED or OPNAV instruction or policy regarding the security of protected health information.

Opinion 8.3.1: Restricting access to medical records within the AHLTA system protected the privacy of the injured and the deceased; however, this decision created significant roadblocks for physicians with a need-to-know, and put patients at risk with ongoing treatment not being properly documented in their electronic medical record.

Recommendation 8.3.1: Recommend BUMED, in coordination with DISA and the Military Health System, review policy of partitioning/quarantining victim records following an incident.

Recommendation 8.3.2: Recommend BUMED promulgate emergency access procedures and policy for DoN medical providers in order to enable records access and continuity of care.

Finding 8.4: PAO services and practices are not fully interoperable across all military commands, resulting in delays in local PA messaging.

Discussion: PA principles include accountability to the public, full disclosure, expeditious release of information, alignment, and professional ethics. Information will be released as expeditiously as practical and from the lowest possible level, consistent with release policies and required reviews. Required reviews include categories of information having the potential to become an item of national/international interest, concerns a subject of potential controversy with other Federal agencies, or affects national security policy or foreign relations.[17]

All naval installations are assigned a dedicated PAO. Depending on mission and scope of responsibility, some tenant commands also have a dedicated PAO,

whereas others employ a collateral-duty PAO. The Navy installation commander is responsible for controlling message content and release tempo to provide timely, proactive messages. Commanders will ensure the dissemination of accurate and timely information with appropriate consideration for security, accuracy, and propriety—adhering to the principle of "maximum disclosure, minimum delay."[18] The NASP PAO is required to provide nonclassified information to the public and media concerning any incident/casualty that occurs on board NASP.[19] The NASP PAO also serves as the coordinating agent for tenant command PA efforts.

During the first 72 hours following 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's attack, more than 34 PAOs were involved. This factor created substantial difficulty in identifying and synchronizing the desired message.[20]

The NASP PAO was required to route all information releases through the Chief of Naval Information Officer (CHINFO). As a result, NASP PAO did not feel adequately empowered to make decisions and produce local communications supporting the strategic message.[21] The review process delayed release of NASP base information by upwards of 72 hours.[22]

Opinion 8.4.1: Ineffective and untimely messaging created a sense of uncertainty and confusion amongst NASP personnel and residents, regarding their overall safety and security.

Opinion 8.4.2: The installation commander was neither empowered nor entrusted to disseminate basic updates. This created unnecessary delays conveying critical information; moreover, it took ownership out of the hands of the commander.

Opinion 8.4.3: CHINFO assumed control of all messaging rather than limiting its scope to specific items requiring review.

Opinion 8.4.4: Centralization of PAO release authority limited rapid on-scene PAO action. The process is neither dynamic nor agile enough to effectively disseminate the message.

Opinion 8.4.5: The establishment of a lead on-scene PAO would have enabled PA unity of effort during the mass casualty response.

Recommendation 8.4.1: Recommend CHINFO reevaluate response protocols to mass casualties and delegate specific PA release authorities to the local on-scene commanders.

Recommendation 8.4.2: Recommend installation PAOs establish a PA working group and coordinate with installation EMOs to ensure proper alignment.

Recommendation 8.4.3: Recommend CNIC, in conjunction with CHINFO, review the process of PAO augmentation in response to major or catastrophic events.

Recommendation 8.4.4: Recommend PAO participate in annual mass casualty exercise.

Finding 8.5: Post incident support services were not fully integrated and coordinated across all military and civilian stakeholders.

Discussion: In the aftermath of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's attack, mental health care and support services were initiated. On the day of incident, DoN, state, and local mental health providers surged to support. FFSC staff, NHP, Special Psychiatric Rapid Intervention Team (SPRINT), Florida state providers, and NASP chaplains cared for victims and bystanders. However, once external providers departed,

the responsibility for continued care relied on NASP and NHP military and civilian providers.[23]

Initially the NASP chaplain offices were included as part of the crime scene perimeter preventing access to counseling and auxiliary spaces. Even as the crime scene footprint reduced, the FBI used the chaplain spaces to conduct interviews throughout the investigation. Chaplains, however, remained in the facility for the execution of their duties.[24] Chaplains continued to offer regular religious services at the base chapel, which was approximately 400 yards from Building 633.

Because their building was located within the perimeter of the FBI crime scene, FFSC staff were unable to utilize their facilities, yet continued to provide care and services. To provide immediate support and care services, FFSC set up an Emergency Family Assistance Center (EFAC) at the NASP NGIS Conference Center. The FFSC previously developed a COOP and conducted training on its employment throughout the year.[25] In addition to organic training, FFSC conducted biannual EFAC training with local civilian support. The last EFAC drill was conducted in April 2019 and attended by 40–50 personnel from various tenants on base and community stakeholders.[26]

NHP Mental Health Lead (Lieutenant Commander/O-5) coordinated the mental health response plan across NASP. This coordination included the development of a mental health response and support plan including FFSC, chaplains, and the requested SPRINT. NHP requested SPRINT through Naval Medicine East (NAVMEDEAST) to support immediate mental health issues. NAVMEDEAST rejected the initial request because of the perceived adequacy of available local mental health providers in Pensacola. SPRINT activation breaks continuity of care for patients assigned to team members. NAVMEDEAST authorized

SPRINT activation after follow-on conversations with NHP. SPRINT is most commonly mobilized at the request of a CO following a disaster or traumatic event that may negatively impact command personnel (e.g., training accident, terrorist attack, natural disaster). SPRINT activation is not mandatory and requires a request by the affected command. No Navy-wide formal policy exists for activation and response of a SPRINT; however, formal policy is in development by the medical community.[27]

On 6 December, Florida State mental health providers also responded to the scene. As they worked in and around the NASP chapel annex, they articulated concerns about providing care and counseling to personnel in such close proximity to the location of an active crime scene where remains of deceased personnel were still present.[28]

While there was ample mental health support immediately following the incident, this support decreased after the initial response.[29] On 14 December 2019, SPRINT departed. NHP Mental Health Department and local civilian mental health services provided continuing care.

Locally based military and civilian providers were unable to provide adequate support to new patients due to pre-event patient loading. Before the attack, local mental health service was operating at full capacity. The additional caseload created delays in accepting, processing, and treating new patients.[30] As a stopgap measure, NASC Flight Surgeons, NHP BHC, and NHP medical staff provided ad hoc Care Bridging, providing limited mental health care services until appointments with mental health care provider could be arranged.[31]

<u>Opinion 8.5.1</u>: In the absence of specific SOP, individual initiative and foresight enabled mission success.

Opinion 8.5.2: Medical professionals, counselors, and chaplains operated independently without a coordinating agent.

Opinion 8.5.3: Requiring victims to return to the area of an active shooter event risks further psychological trauma.

Opinion 8.5.4: Establishing COOPs, away from the incident location, minimizes the likelihood of further psychological trauma.

Opinion 8.5.5: Adequate, separate accommodations must be made for mental health counselors, religious ministries, and law enforcement personnel to avoid the retraumatization of victims.

Opinion 8.5.6: The transition from surge supported services to baseline services created a seam in mental health provision and placed personnel at risk.

Opinion 8.5.7: The previous high patient load for civilian and military mental health providers hindered access to care for incident victims.

(b) (5)

Recommendation 8.5.1: (b) (5)

Recommendation 8.5.2: (b) (5)

Recommendation 8.5.3: Recommend all tenant commands and support services (e.g., FFSC and chaplains) review COOP plans and identify specific parameters for activation.

Finding 8.6: Members of the NASP community continued to articulate concern about safety, security, and re-integration of KSA IMS even after multiple leadership engagements, VIP visits, and public affairs initiatives.

Discussion: Following the incident, NETC CO, NASP CO, and NASC CO conducted multiple All Hands Calls and town halls to communicate with the military community. The command briefs occurred immediately following the event and upon conclusion of the holiday period.

The PAO made multiple social media posts regarding policy changes and leadership responses to the attack. These posts included comments and briefs by the acting SECNAV, CNO, CNRSE, Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) and the Governor of Florida.[32]

After the shooting, acting SECNAV, U.S. Senator Mark Rubio, U.S. Senator Rick Scott, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, CNIC, and the MCPON all visited NASP to show their support.

On 7 December, NASC conducted an All Hands Call for enlisted personnel to include a muster for accountability. On 9 December, NASC conducted an All Hands call for officers. However, in both instances, the base remained closed, effectively limiting attendance. After these events, participants remained of the opinion that nothing had changed as a result of the attack. They remained unaware of measures enacted to enhance security and felt insecure.[33] On Sunday, 8 December, the NASP chaplain held religious services at the base chapel. Military personnel and dependents expressed a general concern about

their safety. Parishioners also articulated concern about KSA IMS returning and living on board NASP.

On 15 January 2020, NETC, RADM Kyle Cozad, and NASP CO, CAPT (b) (6) ███████ (b) (6) ██████ facilitated a community town hall meeting at NASP. During the brief, leadership stressed "getting back to normal."[34] The town hall event was attended by a small number of people from the community, who asked pointed questions about what had changed and what improvements had been made to improve security.[35] To assure the attendees of their safety, the commanders highlighted the following actions:

- (b) (7)(F) ██ ██████ ███ ██████████
- Release of new DoD guidance on IMS training and vetting
- Absence of current, credible threat against NASP
- Continued base access restrictions for civilian visitors
- Re-evaluation of housing accommodation for KSA IMS
- Increased presence of NSF in PPV housing.

Opinion 8.6.1: Commanders have an inherent obligation to ensure the safety and well-being of their personnel. The perception of safety and security on NASP remains suspect. Perception is reality. Visible actions are required to assure the force.

Opinion 8.6.2: The NASP community has not been effectively assured of its safety.

Opinion 8.6.3: (b) (7)(F) ████████████████████████

██

████████

Opinion 8.6.4: Traditional town halls provide an inadequate forum in the social media age. Social media live streaming and online surveys reach a broader audience.

Opinion 8.6.5: Because of the complexity of the response, commanders require standardized products that cover and explain the whole-of-government response to the attack.

Recommendation 8.6.1: Recommend OPNAV develop a standardized command brief for NASP covering post-event actions taken to improve security from both a DoD and DoN perspective.

Recommendation 8.6.2: Recommend NETC and NASP continue to conduct public and social media forums to engage and assure NASP personnel and residents.

Recommendation 8.6.3: Recommend NASP and tenant commands continue to engage and assure DoN personnel through visible force protection and physical security measures combined with targeted, specific messaging to a broader community.

Recommendation 8.6.4: Recommend NASP augment the standardized OPNAV brief with NASP specific actions taken to improve the installation security.

Recommendation 8.6.5: Recommend tenant commands augment the standardized CHINFO and NASP brief with specific actions taken to improve PS and FP.

Finding 8.7: To restore minimum functionality, Building 633 requires significant repairs, totaling an estimated $6 million.[36]

Discussion: Throughout Building 633, interior walls, interior/exterior doors, windows, and ceilings require either significant repairs or replacement. Additionally, the quarterdeck, IMTO, and administrative offices all require significant refurbishment. As discussed in Chapter 5, the building does not meet UFC for AT. Upgrading the building to meet UFC for AT would significantly increase the total cost of the required repair and significantly increase the amount of time required for the project.

Opinion 8.7.1: Requiring students and staff to return to the location of a mass shooting requires the highest level of sensitivity and preparation in advance of their return.

Opinion 8.7.2: Wherever possible, physical security of Building 633 should be enhanced to meet UFC standards.

Opinion 8.7.3: Wherever possible, spaces where individuals were injured or killed should be reconfigured to create a new spatial dynamic (e.g., moving dividers, doors, and nonsupporting walls).

Opinion 8.7.4: Because of the focus of the attack on the quarterdeck, this area should be significantly reconfigured and/or moved to a different entrance. In either case, the quarterdeck must be re-enforced and fortified to protect future watch standers.

Recommendation 8.7.1: Recommend CNIC determine courses of action for rehabilitation of NASP Building 633.

---

[1] OPNAVINST 1770.1A CNO Casualty Assistance Calls and Funeral Honors Support Program Coordination (07 MAY 2007).

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] SoI (b)(6), PHR NASC Transitions DH (16 JAN 2020) / OPNAV 3400.17A CNO Navy Installation Emergency Management Program (01 AUG 2014).

[5] Email from (b)(6), CNRES CACO 03 February 2020.

[6] SoI (b)(6), PHR NASC Transitions DH (16 JAN 2020)..

[7] SoI (b)(6), PHR NASC Transitions DH (5&13 FEB 2020).

[8] DOD Instruction 5154.30 Armed Forces Medical Examiner System Operations (21 DEC 2017).

[9] SoI (b)(6), PHR NASC Transitions DH (5&13 FEB 2020).

[10] DOD Instruction 5154.30 Armed Forces Medical Examiner System Operations (21 DEC 2017).

[11] SoI (b)(6), NASC Flight Surgeon (16 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), NASC Flight Surgeon (16 JAN 2020).

[12] Id.; SoI (b)(6), PHR NASC Transitions DH (16 JAN 2020)..

[13] Id.

[14] SoI (b)(6), Baptist Hospital Team (22 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), Baptist Hospital Team (22 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), Baptist Hospital Team (22 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), Baptist Hospital Team (22 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), Baptist Hospital Team (22 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), Baptist Hospital Team (22 JAN 2020)..

[15] SoI (b)(6), NASC Flight Surgeon (16 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), NASC Flight Surgeon (16 JAN 2020)

[16] Email from NHP General Counsel.

[17] SECNAVINST 5720.44C (21 FEB 2012).

[18] SECNAVINST 5720.44C (21 FEB 2012), 3-1.

[19] NASPCOLAINST 3440.4F EMP.

[20] SoI (b)(6), NAS Pensacola Public Affairs Officer (17 JAN 2020).

[21] SoI (b)(6), NAS Pensacola Public Affairs Officer (17 JAN 2020).

[22] SoI (b)(6), NAS Pensacola Public Affairs Officer (17 JAN 2020).

[23] SoI (b)(6), NASC Flight Surgeon (16 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), NASC Flight Surgeon (16 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6) Clinical Supervisor (16 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6) FFSC Director (16 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), Chaplain, Naval Air Station Pensacola (17 JAN 2020).
SoI (b)(6), NHP Senior Mental Health Executive (15 JAN 2020).

[24] SoI (b)(6) Chaplain, Naval Air Station Pensacola (17 JAN 2020).

[25] SoI (b)(6) Clinical Supervisor (16 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6) FFSC Director (16 JAN 2020).

[26] SoI (b)(6), NHP Senior Mental Health Executive (15 JAN 2020).

[27] SoI (b)(6), Chaplain, Naval Air Station Pensacola (17 JAN 2020).

[28] SoI (b)(6), Clinical Supervisor (16 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6) FFSC Director (16 JAN 2020).

[29] SoI (b)(6) NASC Flight Surgeon (16 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), NASC Flight Surgeon (16 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6) Clinical Supervisor (16 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6) FFSC Director (16 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), NHP Senior Mental Health Executive (15 JAN 2020).

[30] SoI (b)(6), NHP Senior Mental Health Executive (15 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), NASC Flight Surgeon (16 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), NASC Flight Surgeon (16 JAN 2020).

[31] SoI (b)(6), NASC Flight Surgeon (16 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), NASC Flight Surgeon (16 JAN 2020).

[32] NASP PAO Social Media Time Line.

[33] SoI (b)(6), NASC Flight Surgeon (16 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), NASC Flight Surgeon (16 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6) PHR NASC Transitions DH (16 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), NASC Training Safety Observer (17 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), NASC High Risk Instructor Swim Instructor (17 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), NASC High Risk Instructor Swim Instructor (17 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), NASC High Risk Instructor Swim Instructor (17 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6), NHP Senior Mental Health Executive (15 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6) Chaplain, Naval Air Station Pensacola (17 JAN 2020).

[34] Id.

[35] SoI K Cozad, RADM, Commander NETC, NASP TOWNHALL (15 JAN 2020); SoI (b)(6); SoI (b)(6); SoI (b)(6) CAPT, Commodore TW-6, NASP TOWNHALL (15 JAN 2020).

[36] CNRSE, NAS Pensacola B633 Recovery Decision Brief (28 JAN 2020).

Chapter 9—Holistic Overview

This chapter provides a comprehensive assessment of the IMS aviation pipeline. It begins with an overview of the RSAF WSO training continuum, then examines how critical IMS information is shared and coordinated across different commands. This examination of the information-sharing process focuses on human factors, production, force preservation, and insider threat risk management. From there, the chapter analyzes C2 and identifies key areas and recommended changes to improve unity of command and effort in the aviation pipeline. Finally, the chapter reviews overarching issues with the IMSO and CLO programs, impacting the organizational environment for IMS.

Regulatory Background

DSCA 5105.38M, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), provides DoD-wide guidance to OSD, MILDEPs, CJCS, GCCs, defense agencies, DoD field activities, SCOs and all other organizational entities within the DoD engaged in the management or implementation of DoD Security Assistance and Security Cooperation programs.

SECNAVINST 4950.4B, Joint Security, Cooperation, Education, and Training (JSCET), prescribes policies, responsibilities, procedures, and administration for the education and training of IMS by the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as authorized by the U.S. security assistance legislation.

Background

IMS Aviation Pipeline

IMS must demonstrate sufficient English language proficiency in order to attend aviation training. IMS must score an 80 on the English Comprehension Level (ECL) test to proceed with aviation training. IMS English speaking proficiency minimum is 2-2, denoting limited working proficiency in listening and speaking.[1] If unable to score an ECL of 80 or meet minimum English speaking proficiency in their home nation, IMS receive orders to the USAF DLIELC at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, Texas. The length of this course varies, and is conditional on performance and aptitude. During this period of language study, IMS are assigned to the USAF 37th Training Wing, 637th International Support Squadron. NETSAFA Detachment DLI supports this squadron as the military training management flight, supporting administrative and disciplinary functions.

The aviation pipeline for KSA Student Aviators (SA) is both service and platform specific. KSA SAs with low English proficiency receive additional instruction, support, and coursework to enable success following DLIELC training. NITC Aviation Training Division (ATD) provides this supplementary training to not only KSA SA, but also other non-English speaking IMS.[2] Participation depends upon the specifics agreed upon in the BOT signed between the sponsoring nation and NETSAFA (USN)/AFSAT (USAF).

Upon completion of DLIELC training, KSA SNFOs/WSOs/SNAs report to NITC at NASP for International Basic Aviation Prep. The International Basic Aviation Prep portion of training includes: 1 week of indoctrination, 9 weeks of Specialized English training (SET) provided by a DLI Instructor, and 12 weeks of tailored preparation for API. In total, IMS SNFOs/SNAs spend a notional 22 weeks at NITC.

The NITC ATD program supports:

1. IMS Naval Flight Officers (SNFOs)
2. RSAF Student Weapons Systems Officers (SWSOs) for strike fighters
3. RSNF Student Naval Aviators (SNAs) for MH-60 helicopters
4. RSAF Undergraduate Pilot Preparation (UPP) students for strike fighters
5. Non-KSA International Military Students (IMS) who complete one of the above training pipelines (i.e., Mexico, Algeria, Bahrain).

SNFOS/SWSOs follow an identical pipeline as U.S. SNFOs with continuous NITC ATD support throughout training. RSNF SNAs follow an identical pipeline as U.S. helicopter SNAs with continuous NITC support throughout training. RSAF UPP students complete an abridged pipeline as they return to USAF training facilities for primary, intermediate, and advanced aviation training.[3]

Upon completion of International Basic Aviation Prep, KSA SWSOs/SNAs report to NASC at NASP for API, a 6-week course. Upon completion of API, IMS SNFOs/SWSOs/SNAs are authorized a 30-day leave period, allowing them to return to their sponsoring nation. At the conclusion of post-API leave, SNA and SNFO/SWSO pipelines diverge.

The specific pipelines for RSAF UPP and RSNF SNA are provided in Appendix D.

### *IMS SNFO and RSAF SWSO Specific Pipeline*

Figure 9-1. RSAF WSO and IMS NFO Pipeline

Upon completion of leave, SNFOs/SWSOs report to TW-6 for 21 weeks of Primary Strike Fighter Undergraduate Military Flight Officer (UMFO) training at VT-10.[4] NITC ATD provides 8 additional weeks of initial and intermittent preparatory training before each phase in the curriculum.[5] During this NITC ATD training, students remain assigned to TW-6 and VT-10.

Upon completion of primary UMFO, SNFOs/SWOs complete 4 weeks of Intermediate Strike Fighter UMFO at VT-10.[6] NITC ATD provides one additional week of initial preparatory training. During this NITC ATD training, students remain assigned to TW-6 and VT-10.

Upon completion of Intermediate Strike Fighter UMFO, SNFOs/SWSOs are normally authorized another leave period of variable length.[7]

Returning from their second authorized leave, SNFOs/SWSOs assigned to the strike fighter pipeline (e.g. KSA SNFO/SWSOs) must successfully complete the

one-day, Centrifuge-Based Flight Environment Training (CFET) Program. NETSAFA is responsible for coordinating all logistical requirements for IMS to attend a CFET Program including scheduling, funding, and ITO issuance. NETSAFA arranges for any CFET training through USAF facilities and coordinates with wing and squadron IMSOs as necessary.[8]

Upon completing CFET, SNFOs/SWSOs remain attached to TW-6 and report to NITC ATD for 2 to 3 weeks of additional T-45 prep. Upon completion of the T-45 prep, they report to VT-86 for 32 weeks of Advanced Strike Fighter UMFO.[9] NITC ATD provides six additional weeks of intermittent training. During Advanced Strike Fighter UMFO, students remain assigned to TW-6 and VT-86.

Upon completion of Advanced Strike Fighter UMFO, SNFOs/SWSOs earn their wings and return to their sponsoring nation. Notionally, the RSAF/RSNF WSO/NFO pipeline is 109 weeks to include 5 weeks of planned leave.

During the SA pipeline, RSNF/RSAF IMS receive orders and report to six separate commands (DLIELC (637th ISS), NITC, NASC, TW-6, VT-10, and VT-86). During these training assignments, they intermittently return to NITC on 10 separate occasions, totaling 17 weeks of instruction.

Findings, Opinions, and Recommendations

Finding 9.1 (Deficiency): There are no mechanisms within the either the aviation pipeline or the Navy to enable commands to conduct fully informed risk assessments for insider threat and destructive behaviors

Discussion: While in the aviation pipeline, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani reported to and interacted with U.S. military personnel, government civilians, and contractors across six different commands (DLIELC, NITC, NASC, TW-6, VT-10, and VT-86).

Insider Threat Indicators

On 5 April 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani reported he was publicly harassed by a DoN-contracted instructor during a TW-6 ground school class. 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani refused the instructor's initial attempt to apologize. 39 days later, on 14 May 2019, a formal apology was issued by the DoN-contracted instructor. During this portion of the syllabus, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani was assigned to VT-10. The VT-10 IMSO was unaware of the event even though the VT-10 IMSO met with 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani on an individual basis at least 12 times from January to November 2019 to review his aviation training jacket (ATJ).[10] Resolution of the incident was completed without participation by 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's assigned chain of command (TW-6/VT-10).

Before an authorized trip for KSA IMS to Washington, D.C., from 9 May to 12 May 2019, the VT-10 IMSO conducted pretrip counseling with KSA IMS. He observed 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani appeared withdrawn.[11]

In May 2019, an RSAF chaplain (O-6) visited NASP and raised concern about the adequacy of the facility allocated for the Islamic Prayer Room on board NASP. He believed the facility was too small for the number of personnel assigned.[12] By multiple accounts, 2nd LT Al-Shamrani was a devout Muslim and served as a prayer leader for KSA IMS.[13]

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E)

In early July 2019, a TW-6 DoN-contracted instructor observed 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani at a local gun shop applying to purchase a firearm. The DoN contractor did not report the event. The contractor did not know the purchase of a firearm by an IMS violated regulations.[15] (b) (7)(A)

On 26 October 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani confronted an instructor pilot whom he felt had belittled a fellow KSA IMS. No annotation of this atypical behavior was made in his TIMS grade sheet for the event.[17] The VT-10 CoC and IMSO were not notified of the issue.

On or about 5 November 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's neighbor in PPV housing filed a noise complaint against 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's unit.[18] (b)(6) ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ the RSAF TLT administrator, received notification and subsequently counseled 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani.[19] Neither TW-6 nor VT-10 COCs were notified of the noise complaint.

On 13 November 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's roommate departed for leave in Saudi Arabia. 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani had previously articulated his concern of being out of sync with his roommate and on-wing. He expressed his desire to progress to advanced training at VT-86 with his roommate.[20]

(b) (7)(A)
▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ Neither TW-6, VT-10, nor the RSAF TLT were notified.

With one exception, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's RSAF TLT, CLO, instructors, fellow U.S. students, IMSOs, and CoCs remained unaware of his unauthorized travel, his weapons purchase/training, and his social media activity. One TW-6-contracted instructor knew of his attempt to purchase a firearm.[22]

Due to the ongoing criminal investigation, neither RSAF nor RSNF IMS were interviewed as part of this investigation. Their knowledge of these factors remains unknown.

NITC Production Process

NITC conducts a weekly student progress review of each KSA IMS within the aviation training pipeline (commonly referred to as the "Tuesday meeting" or "Wednesday meeting"). NITC has conducted this meeting in various forms since the 2010 to 2011 time frame.[23] The review covers new arrivals, operational and medical issues, disciplinary problems, and performance issues. Participants include the NITC OIC, NITC Deputy OIC, representatives from AFSAT, lead NITC contract representatives, CLOs (RSAF/RSNF), TLT administrators, NETSAFA Country Program Managers (CPMs), NASC IMTO.[24] The meeting only covers IMS in aviation related training.[25]

While NETSAFA DET DLIELC and NETSAFA DET Whiting Field provide information for production purposes, they do not actively participate in the student progress review. Training commands under CNATRA, to include TW-6, VT-10, and VT-86 IMSOs, do not participate. No security personnel, mental health, or medical professionals attend the progress reviews.[26] Current participants view the review as sufficient with all relevant participants at the table.[27]

The progress review is not mandated by applicable instructions or by a DoN organization.[28] It is not explicitly required in NITC's assigned missions, functions, and tasks.[29] Instead, the progress review perpetuated as a "best practice."

From May 2018 until December 2019, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's progress and status was briefed at this weekly progress review. No adverse factors, indicators, events, or behaviors were documented or discussed.[30]

In addition to this weekly review, the lead NITC contractor creates a monthly report on all KSA aviation students. No instructional basis for this report was provided. NITC OIC approves the report and submits it to NETSAFA, AFSAT,

CLOs, the Saudi Arabia Assistant Defense Attaché Naval Activities (ADANA), and others.[31]

SAN-WEB is a pre-existing tool where information about each IMS is maintained and shared with agencies and individuals involved in processing, tracking, and training IMS.[32]

In the case of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani, the level of detail provided during this weekly review exceeded the detail entered into his SAN-WEB record.[33]

Data entry into SAN-WEB is an IMSO function.[34] The wing and squadron IMSOs responsible for data entry do not attend the weekly progress review.

CNATRA Human Factors Process

Human factors are a constellation of personal and professional characteristics correlating with an individual's ability to perform effectively. These human factors may be physiological, psychological, social, and/or professional. Examples include medical conditions, psychological and emotional stressors, interpersonal relations, performance trends, training, currency, and motivational factors. These human factors influence performance in the aircraft and may jeopardize safety of flight by impacting crew coordination, air discipline, judgment, professionalism, leadership, and basic flying skills.[35]

In order to minimize the probability of mishaps related to human factors, CNATRA requires training wings and squadrons to conduct HFC and Human Factors Boards (HFB). This human factors process ensures COs are aware of human factors that place an individual at an increased safety risk. Corrective measures taken at the command level can arrest undesirable trends; ensure personnel are properly trained, directed, or counseled; and minimize potential problems adversely impacting safety and operational readiness. Information

developed by HFCs and HFBs should be used by the unit commander for the enhancement of flight safety. As a matter of policy, the information developed is considered sensitive, kept strictly confidential and shall not be used for disciplinary action.[36] HFC notes are retained and protected.

Per CNATRAINST 5420.13H, VT-10 conducted quarterly HFCs. Additionally, VT-10 conducted HFBs when the situation required.[37] 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's HFCs occurred on 25 June 2019 and 30 September 2019. No human factors issues were identified.

CNATRAINST 5420.13H does not require the presence of the assigned IMSO or CLO at either HFCs or HFBs and does not address IMS. No requirement exists for the board to include IMS; however, it does require flight students from a "suitable cross section" of the syllabus.[38]

No requirement exists to document completion of HFC/HFB in SAN-WEB or to explicitly identify potential human factors in the database.

Marine Corps Force Preservation Process
Marine Corps Order 1500.60 establishes a Force Preservation Council (FPC) program to optimize the potential of its force by identifying risk factors and applying holistic risk mitigations. FPCs are conducted to provide the commander a better understanding of the overall well-being of unit personnel and to recommend risk mitigation measures as appropriate. The Marine Corps conducts FPCs on every Marine on a monthly basis.[39] To further enable force preservation, the Marine Corps implemented a force preservation council handoff tool in order to facilitate the handoff of Marines from one command to another and to provide the gaining commander relevant FPC information. The application resides on Marine Online (MOL), the service-equivalent of My Navy Portal (MNP).[40]

Center for Development of Security Excellence Insider Threat Approach

CDSE provides security education and training across DoD. The CDSE curriculum utilizes critical-path analysis of processes to identify the interrelationship of processes and behaviors leading to a hostile insider act. Critical-path analysis provides categories for assessing if a given person of concern could be on a destructive path. The four elements of the critical path are personal predispositions, stressors, concerning behavior, and problematic organizational responses.[41] These elements indicate heightened risk of an insider threat. To deter, detect, and respond to an insider threat, CDSE recommends the establishment of an interdisciplinary working group comprised of relevant stakeholders within the organization.[42]

Factors Along the Critical Path to Insider Risk

| Personal predispostions +	Stressors +	Concerning Behaviors +	Problematic Organizational Responses	H O S T I L E A C T
–Medical/psychiatric conditions	–Personal	–Interpersonal	–Inattention	
–Personality or social skills Issues	–Professional	–Technical	–No risk assessment process	
–Previous rule violations	–Financial	–Security	–Inadequate investigation	
–Social network risks		–Financial	–Summary dismissal or other actions that escalate risk	
		–Personnel		
		–Mental health/additions		
		–Social network		
		–Travel		

Figure 9-3. Critical Path to Insider Risk

Opinion 9.1.1: During his time at NASP, 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani experienced factors, indicators, events, and behaviors, likely heightening his risk for destructive behavior. ▮(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E)▮

▮

▮ Figure 9-4 provides an assessment of these factors, indicators, events, and behaviors. Mitigating insider threats requires knowledge of

indicators, reporting indicators, and coordinating knowledge of these indicators across relevant stakeholders to inform risk decisions.

Unknown
- Social Network Risk (Twitter-KSA IMS)
- Unauthorized travel (KSA IMS only)
- Previous rule violations: weapons purchase/training (Gun Shop / KSA IMS)

Known
- Interpersonal (VT-10 flight instructor confrontation)
- Attempted weapons purchase (TW-6 Contractor)
- Separation from roommate (NITC contractor)
- Emotional detachment (VT-10 IMSO)

Reported
- Previous rule violations (Noise complaint)
- Inattention (Absence of RSAF CLO / Religious Facilities Adequacy)
- Inadequate investigation result for complainant (EO Complaint)
- Hostile work environment (NASC IMTO / TW-6 Ground School Harassment)

Coordinated
- No cross-organizational risk assessment process

Figure 9-4. 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani Insider Threat Indicators and Awareness

Opinion 9.1.2: Training for IMS aviators is split across three distinct entities (NITC, NASC, and specific training wings/squadrons). Commanders perform partially informed, stovepiped processes to mitigate human factors issues, destructive behaviors, and hostile insider acts.

Opinion 9.1.3: The existence of NITC's weekly progress review represents a dedicated commitment by military leaders, government civilians, and contractors to ensure the success of IMS within the aviation pipeline. However, it remains an uncodified requirement. While it is a necessary production tool, it remains

insufficient as a force preservation tool. NITC relies on contractor personnel to maintain a tracker for all KSA aviation students, but has not formalized and codified the process. The meeting does not include active participation from all relevant stakeholders who interact with IMS over a 2-3 year training continuum.

Opinion 9.1.4: SAN-WEB is underutilized as a database for the transfer of information useful in informing commander's risk decisions. Training wings, squadrons, and NITC do not have a designated person to aggregate critical indicators from SAN-WEB and assess overall risk.

Opinion 9.1.5: Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) remain undefined for IMS. Participants in the NITC meeting share relevant information as they know it. For example, significant issues were not briefed to include noise complaints at 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's residence, his emotional detachment, confrontation with an instructor, and his on-going harassment complaint.

Opinion 9.1.6: At the training wings and squadrons, HFCs for IMS do not require the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders to include other IMS, IMSOs, CLOs, and NITC.

Opinion 9.1.7: Command ownership of, and involvement with, IMS is a critical mission enabler. IMS are part of our force while assigned to U.S. Navy training just as any other student aviator.

Opinion 9.1.8: The critical path for destructive behaviors and hostile insider threats applies not only to IMS within the aviation pipeline, but also to IMS at individual training facilities throughout the Navy. It also applies equally to every DoN member.

Opinion 9.1.9: Force preservation is a shared responsibility; it is not limited to technical and security experts. Human factors likely played a role in this tragedy. Military leaders, government employees, contracted employees, peers, and subordinates were aware of isolated events, but unaware of the holistic picture. Continuous, proactive involvement by leadership at all levels is essential to identify and mitigate the stressors, affecting the daily lives and performance of both IMS and DoN personnel.

Recommendation 9.1.1: Recommend ASN RD&A review the concept of an IMS force preservation council and determine future inclusion within SECNAVINST 4950.4B (Joint Security Cooperation Education Training).

Recommendations 9.1.2: Recommend OPNAV in coordination with operational commanders review Marine Corps Order 1500.60 and implement a force preservation council program across the U.S. Navy to include all foreign military personnel programs.

Recommendations 9.1.3: Recommend OPNAV N2/N6 review the Marine Online Force Preservation Hand-Off Tool and determine cross-applicability.

Recommendation 9.1.4: Recommend NETC and CNATRA review the feasibility and employment of student review/force preservation councils for all students.

Recommendation 9.1.5: Recommend NETC and CNATRA mandate full command participation in student review/force preservation councils for IMS in the aviation pipeline.

Recommendation 9.1.6: Recommend CNATRA revise CNATRAINST 5420.13H HFC and HFB composition for IMS Naval Flight Students (NFS) to require participation of peer-IMS, IMSOs, CLOs, and an NITC representative.

Recommendation 9.1.7: Recommend NETSAFA revise the IMSO Guide to emphasize the criticality of documenting IMS issues within SAN-WEB.

Recommendation 9.1.8: Recommend NETSAFA review all extended IMS training pipelines to determine cross-applicability of a production/force preservation council.

Recommendation 9.1.9: Recommend NETSAFA implement formal progress reviews/force preservation councils into all IMS training pipelines to include the KSA case for the purchase of the Multi-Mission Combatant (MMC).

Recommendation 9.1.10: Recommend NITC codify the requirement for weekly progress reviews into a weekly production/force preservation council. Formalization should include identification and full-integration of all training activities within the aviation pipeline; identification of CCIRs for IMS to establish reporting requirements; designation of records management responsibility through SAN-WEB; and inclusion of a security professional to holistically examine IMS risk factors.

The findings, opinions, and recommendations above support the follow-on findings in this chapter.

Finding 9.2 (Deficiency): C2 of the aviation pipeline is divided between NETC and CNATRA.

Discussion: Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.[43] Unity of effort requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective. Unity of command is central to unity of effort.[44]

Unity of command is strengthened through adherence to the following C2 tenets: clearly defined authorities, roles, and relationships; information management and knowledge sharing; timely decision-making; coordination mechanisms; responsive, dependable, and interoperable support systems; situational awareness; and mutual trust.[45]

Organization of command and control should be guided by the principles of simplicity, span of control, and unit integrity. Simplicity requires an unambiguous chain of command, well-defined command relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities and authorities. Span of Control is based on many factors including the number of subordinates, number of activities, capabilities, complexities of the tasking, and method of control (centralized or decentralized). Unit integrity considerations recommend forces/units should remain organized as designed to maximize effectiveness. Recommendations to reorganize component units should be done after careful consultation and coordination.[46]

NETC is an Echelon II command and, through CNATT, exercises chain of command authority and responsibility for NASC. CNATRA is an Echelon IV command, reporting to CNAF.[47] See Figure 9-5.

Figure 9-4. Aviation Pipeline Command and Control Relationships

**Figure 9-5. RSAF WSO Pipeline and Command Authority**

CNATRA serves as CNAF's deputy for Aviation Training and is responsible for management of the Naval Aviation Production Process (NAPP) for prospective pilots and Naval Flight Officers (NFOs). For officers, this responsibility begins from Introductory Flight Screening (IFS) through Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) training. For Naval Aircrewmen, this responsibility begins from service accession through FRS training.[48]

CNATRA develops and implements the Pilot and NFO Integrated Production Plan (IPP) and the Naval Air Crewman IPP to meet aviator/aircrew production requirements established by the CNO's training requirements letter.[49] CNATRA is responsible for the review and approval of all curricula for commands in the IPP, to include the FRSs.[50]

NASC supports NAPP and IPP, administering initial ground and flight training to fulfill CNO aviation training requirements. These requirements support undergraduate pilot, NFO, and aircrew candidate pipelines.[51]

With concurrence from CNATRA, CNAF, CNP, and OPNAV N98, CNATT previously submitted an official change request (OCR) in 2016; however, no change occurred.[52] In July 2017, NETC and CNATRA executed an MOU, whereby CNATRA assumed certain authorities over NASC. Specifically, CNATRA was given authority over curriculum control for all NASC courses. Based on this MOU, NASC was also required to route all training recommendations and modifications of existing training to CNATRA for review and approval. The MOU is silent on other aspects of C2 concerning NASC.[53]

(b) (5)

The MOU required CNATRA and NETC to make a joint request to Commander, Navy Personnel Command requesting the CO of NASC be issued orders

reflecting an Additional Duty (ADDU) relationship with CNATRA.[56] The current CO of NASC was issued orders reflecting this ADDU relationship.[57]

The MOU states that once ADDU orders are written, a concurrent FITREP will be submitted from CNATRA to CNATT. As stated by Captain (b) (6) , CNATRA CoS, due to confusion, a concurrent FITREP was never submitted on CAPT (b) (6) the current CO of NASC.[58]

NETC submitted an Operational Change Request to Commander, United States Pacific Fleet (CPF) via CNAP, to move NASC under CNATRA in August 2018. CNAP ultimately withdrew the request due to the challenges of different budget submitting offices (BSO) for NETC and CPF.[59]

CAPT (b) (6) expressed confusion as to whom he reported to (CNATRA or NETC) and for what aspects of his command.[60] CAPT (b) (6) expressed frustrations with the C2 relationship developed between NASC, NETC, and CNATRA. He expressed additional frustration with the very limited interaction he has with both his NETC and CNATRA chains of command.

NETC requires commanders to conduct area visits to subordinate commands triennially.[61] CNATT conducted an area visit to NASC in 2014 and again in September 2018.[62] Area visits are designed to evaluate readiness, quality of life, and identify systemic problems. Programs receiving zero recommendations (i.e., zero deficiencies) included Manager's Internal Control Program (MIC-P) to include the IMSO program, CMEO, and Antiterrorism Force Protection.[63] Significant problems were identified in Finding 4.2 and 5.6. These issues existed during the inspection window, yet were not documented in the formal report.

Issues with coordinating and communicating IMS issues between NETC and CNATRA subordinate commands were identified in Finding 9.1.

CNATT, the NASC Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC), commands 24 different units, detachments, and sites across both OCONUS and CONUS locations.


Figure 9-6. CNATT Commands

NASC is divided into four principal schools/departments:

- Aviation Training School (ATS)

- Aviation Enlisted Aircrew Training School (AEATS)

- Aviation Survival (AS)

- Aviation Commanding Officers Training (AVCOT).

AVCOT is a CNAF requirement and curriculum. NITC supports IMS participation in training at each of these schools with the exception of AVCOT. ATS provides

API and IFS training, directly supporting the NAPP and IPP. Figure 9-7 provides NASC organization and C2 relationships.


Figure 9-7. NASC Organizational Relationships

NITC is divided into three principal divisions:

- Aviation Training Division (ATD)

- Technical Training Division (TTD)

- Specialized Training Division (STD).

TTD supports mostly technical training (mechanical, electrical, electronics, and logistics). The STD provides swimming and physical fitness training.[64] NITC also supports SET provided by DLI. Throughout the IMS aviation pipeline, KSA IMS return to NITC's ATD for preparatory training and instruction. Before API, they work with STD in order to meet physical training requirements.[65] Figure 9-8 provides NITC organization and command relationships.

Figure 9-8. NITC Organization

Opinion 9.2.1: An effective NAPP and IPP require unity of effort and unity of command.

Opinion 9.2.2: In all facets, NASC curriculum directly supports CNATRA's NAPP and IPP responsibilities.

Opinion 9.2.3: In the absence of unity of command, unity of effort requires identification of specific command relationships and additional coordination and cooperation to achieve the desired end state.

Opinion 9.2.4: The limited scope of the MOU signed by NETC and CNATRA, did not adequately define the authorities, roles, and command relationships required for NASC to successfully complete its mission.

Opinion 9.2.5: CNATT span of control is extensive and focuses mostly on technical and enlisted training. NASC's mission, functions, and tasks do not closely align with CNATT subordinate commands.

Recommendation 9.2.1: Recommend OPNAV N1 and Fleet Commanders review the command relationships between NETC and CNATRA and submit OCR for NASC to reflect optimal command relationships.

Finding 9.3 (Non-compliance): All commands within the IMS aviation pipeline do not maintain agreements with the KSA regarding CLO performance standards, expectations, and actionable options for remediating low standards.

Discussion: A CLO, the CLO's military subordinates, and contracted administrative support comprise the KSA TLTs. CLOs assist U.S. training activities with student administration. Use of foreign liaison personnel is authorized only after the implementing agency (i.e., NETSAFA or AFSAT) has acknowledged the need for assistance.[66] The KSA RSNF TLT originated when the KSA flight training program began in the mid-1980s. With the initiation of RSAF WSO training in 1994, the RSAF established a TLT at NASP.[67]

NITC originated as a preparatory school for KSA student pilots and evolved to meet increased requirements and production demands. Both the RSAF and

RSNF TLTs remain collocated with NITC. NITC's support contract provides administrative support and dependent support services for both students and the TLT.[68]

RSNF and RSAF report to separate command authorities–ADANA and Assistant Defense Attaché Air Force Activities (ADAAFA), respectively.

The CLO's controlling command designates the location where the CLO will perform their duties.[69] The designated location for the CLO was the second deck of Building 633, the location of the attack.[70]

The USAF utilizes a formal CLO request process to formally document command relationships, position descriptions and justification for the position. This process includes periodic re-validation of the CLO position prior to expiration of the extended visit authorization. The DoN policy for CLO requests is not formalized in a similar way.[71]

DSCA Security Assistance Management Manual requires that CLO support and duties *will* be identified and stated in an agreement between the unit and sponsoring country. Performance standards and expectations will be clearly stated and agreed with actionable options for low standards.[72]

CLO duties and responsibilities include::

- Serve as the contact between the IMSO and the IMS
- Ensure IMS adhere to appropriate regulations
- Assist in correcting problems associated with dress, personal appearance, grooming standards, and IMS indebtedness
- Be responsible for whatever action is necessary in connection with breaches of discipline involving IMS

- Assist in routine inspections of IMS and quarters

- Act as nonvoting members of a faculty or administrative board as required. Commanders will advise the CLO of the time and place of meetings. CLO will inform the commander whether they plan to attend.

- Advise the IMSO of any customs and traditions that should be recognized

- Make routine administrative reports as required by their government

- Assist in the orientation of IMS.[73]

SECNAVINST 4950.4B, Joint Security Cooperation, Education, and Training, does not provide actionable options for low standards of performance by the CLO.[74]

BOTs do not specify CLO performance standards.[75] The FMS case does not cover the requirement for a CLO or their standard of performance.[76] An FMS case is only required to cover associated support expenses (e.g., leased office space and phone) for a CLO.[77]

NITC, NASC, TW-6, VT-86, and VT-10 were unable to provide any formal agreement with the KSA outlining CLO standard of performance and actionable options for low standards of performance. Even if such an agreement existed, NIPO officials stated the agreement would be nonbinding.[78]

CNATRAINST 1500.4J, Naval Flight Student Training Administration Manual, provides duties and responsibilities for assigned CLOs, yet does not reference an agreement between the sponsoring nation and the command.[79]

Due to the need for CLO accountability, all CLOs are required to report to the IMSOs for in/out processing in addition to notifying IMSOs of any departure from assigned duty location (i.e., leave, TDY, etc.).[80] CLOs adhere to any IMS

administrative requirements to ensure accountability for their safety and welfare.[81]

Because 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani was an RSAF officer, he fell under the oversight of the RSAF CLO. During absences of the RSAF CLO, a RSNF CLO was present. He executed some duties as a joint CLO, but no formal agreement existed.[82] Observers noted a perpetual discord between RSAF and RSNF personnel.[83]

In early June 2019, the RSAF CLO, (b)(6) ███████████████, departed on leave. He shipped his household goods on his own, as he believed he was to transfer back to the KSA. NITC conversely believed he would return.[84]

On 12 June 2019, (b)(6) ███████████████, the deputy RSAF CLO at NITC, detached as planned. KSA failed to identify a relief.

On 19 August 2019, (b)(6) █████████ returned to Pensacola, Florida. He worked for only a few consecutive days.[85]

On 29 August 2019, (b)(6) █████████ returned to Riyadh, KSA.[86]

In the latter half of September, the RSAF TLT administrator informed the NITC OIC that (b)(6) ████████ had returned to Riyadh, KSA, and would not return. NITC received RSAF CLO updates from the TLT civilian contractor rather than from RSAF CLO himself.[87]

In late October 2019, an RSAF IMS student had an incident with (b)(6) ██████ in the NASC IMT Office, in which (b)(6) ███ stated, "There is nobody in your office who is going to help you."[88]

On 16 September 2019, (b)(6) ████████ returned to Pensacola, but he did not report to his office. He directed the TLT administrative contractor to call him as

required. He requested all official correspondence be forwarded to a hotel in Orlando.[89]

On 21 September 2019, ███████ returned to Riyadh, KSA. However, his orders indicated a detachment from NITC in early November. He did not return to Pensacola, Florida.

███████ rarely attended NITC's weekly progress reviews covering KSA IMS at various stages of training. He did not attend any meetings after ███████ ███████, the deputy CLO, departed.[90]

During the week of 4 November 2019, the current and prospective executive directors of AFSAT, NETSAFA's USAF counterpart, visited NASP. NETSAFA provided a tour of NETSAFA, NITC, and TW-6 to review AFSAT RSAF FMS case equities. NETSAFA and AFSAT discussed the need for a replacement RSAF CLO.

The KSA TLT administrator attempted to maintain good order and discipline. However, this role exceeded those defined in his PD agreed upon by his employer and the U.S. Navy.[91] Grooming and personal conduct standards d amongst the KSA cohort and weekly housing inspections were no longer completed.[92]

Issues with the availability and engagement of the RSAF CLO were known, yet not formally reported.[93] NIPO received no formal notification of an issue with RSAF CLO performance and/or presence.[94] AFSAT, the implementing agency for RSAF WSO training, was verbally notified during an NITC weekly production meeting and during a visit to NASP in November 2019.[95]

Opinion 9.3.1: CLO duties and responsibilities require presence. In the absence of a CLO, good order and discipline is at risk. KSA CLOs are supporting high-risk training, requiring constant awareness of people and their unique human factors. Good order and discipline for RSAF students deteriorated as a result of sub-standard CLO performance.

Opinion 9.3.2: CLO accountability is a matter of safety and welfare for the CLO and the IMS who depend upon their support. Unauthorized or irregular absences require formal notification to cognizant authority. In this case, the controlling command was NITC.

Opinion 9.3.3: The absence of corrective action for substandard CLO performance undermined the program.

Opinion 9.3.4: Interservice rivalry prevents the employment of a Joint Senior Ranking Officer (SRO) CLO for the KSA IMS. The mere presence of a service-specific CLO could mitigate this issue.

Opinion 9.3.5: Requiring individual training commands to establish a nonbinding international agreement with respect to CLO duties and responsibilities is unrealistic.

Recommendation 9.3.1: Recommend DSCA review the SAMM and the requirement for unit-level agreements with sponsoring nations for CLO performance.

Recommendation 9.3.2: Recommend ASN RD&A revise SECNAVINST 4950.45 JSCET to formalize both the CLO request process and the reporting process for CLO performance issues.

Recommendation 9.3.3: Recommend NIPO, in coordination with NETSAFA, identify and establish the controlling command for each CLO and facilitate agreements on CLO standards of performance and recourse for poor performance.

Recommendation 9.3.4: Recommend NIPO, in coordination with NETSAFA, identify contract vehicles to require CLO presence for training activities conducting large-volumes of high-risk IMS training.

Recommendation 9.3.5: Recommend NIPO/NETSAFA require the presence of a CLO as a requirement for the execution of training in high-density IMS pipelines, such as aviation.

Finding 9.4.1.1 (Deficiency): DoN Insider Threat Training does not adequately present the full spectrum of potential threats.

Finding 9.4.1.2 (Deficiency): Specialized insider threat training is not part of the required courses for IMSOs.

Discussion: Per NAVADMIN 293/19, commands are required to conduct Insider Threat Training as part of a SECNAV and CNO-directed, fleetwide security stand-down.[96] Before FY20, no stand-alone Insider Threat Training was required.

The DoN Insider Threat Training is under the cognizance of Director of NCIS, in coordination with Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare (OPNAV N2/N6).[97] Training for insider threat focuses on cyber security awareness (OPNAV N2/N6) and counterintelligence (NCIS). Annual counterintelligence training requirements include a brief overview of insider threats who commit workplace violence and associated case studies. To meet the training

requirement, NCIS provides public briefings and an online counter intelligence awareness training module. Annual Information Assurance Awareness (IAA) training includes an insider threat module with focus toward cyber security. Navy policy requires insider threat training and awareness for all DoN personnel who have access to DoN resources.[98] The FY17 NDAA expanded the definition of insider threat to include commission of a destructive act, which may include physical harm to another in the workplace.[99] Current training does not emphasize the complexity of the hostile insider threat.

CDSE, under DCSA, provides security education, training, certification products, and services to professionalize the security community and provide security education and training for DoD personnel. CDSE provides insider threat eLearning and curricula with substantive detail.[100] None of its courses are required as part of the Navy's GMT curriculum.[101]

IMSOs provide the overall administration of IMS at their respective commands.[102] The IMSO is a host, administrator, counselor, expeditor, diplomat, and primary point of contact for IMS at their command.[103]

Per a 13 January 2020 memorandum from the Undersecretary of Defense (I&S), DoN shall include IMS in their Counter Insider Threat (C-InT) programs within 60 days.[104] In addition, IMSOs will implement C-InT training to ensure both IMS and individuals interacting with IMS acknowledge their responsibilities regarding C-InT and understand how to report issues of concern.[105]

Beyond the FY20 safety stand-down, no requirement exists for IMSOs to complete any advanced or specialized C-InT training.

Knowledge of insider threat indicators and reporting requirements/procedures variedamongst IMSOs. IMSOs articulated concern about the negative repercussions of falsely reporting an insider threat.[106]

Opinion 9.4.1.1: IMSOs play a critical role in aggregating and sharing pertinent IMS information within a command and across other cognizant commands. They are the frontline leadership enabling an effective program and must be adequately trained to recognize insider threat indicators before they can train others.

Opinion 9.4.1.2: The segmentation of C-InT training between information assurance and counterintelligence yields fragmented training inadequate to address the depth, breadth, and overall complexity of the insider threat problem.

Recommendation 9.4.1.1: Recommend NCIS, OPNAV N1, and OPNAV N2/N6 revise GMT requirements for C-InT by requiring specific, annual full-spectrum insider threat training. Recommend alignment of this training with CDSE's comprehensive insider threat curriculum.

Recommendation 9.4.1.2: Recommend NCIS immediately release a special notice to all DoN IMSOs regarding insider threat indicators and reporting in order to support DoD required training.

Recommendation 9.4.1.3: Recommend NETSAFA revise the IMSO guide to include insider threat indicators and reporting.

Recommendation 9.4.1.4: Recommend NETC, in coordination with NCIS, develop and implement new full-spectrum insider threat GMT course.

Finding 9.4.2 (Deficiency): The Navy IMSO program lacks sufficient oversight, requisite cultural training, adequate SCETP training, and adequate resourcing to ensure mission success.

Discussion: The IMSO is a host, administrator, counselor, expeditor, diplomat, and summarily, the official U.S. Government representative who serves as the primary point of contact (POC) for the IMS attending courses of instruction at U.S. military installations in the United States.[107]

IMSOs are required wherever international training occurs. Specifically, Fleet Commanders, system commands (SYSCOMs), and NETC are required to ensure subordinate commands appoint an IMSO.[108] The relevant governing instructions do not discuss further oversight or inspection of IMSO programs. Both CNATRA and NETC have included the IMSO program in periodic assist visits. No instructional distinction is made between higher-echelon command IMSOs (supervisory) and lower-echelon (direct-contact) IMSOs, who have day-to-day interaction with IMS.

Per the U.S. Navy IMSO Guide, COs should appoint either an officer or government employee as IMSO. The designated IMSO should be tactful and mature, sensitive to myriad cultural differences, exhibit sound judgment, and communicate effectively both orally and in writing.[109] IMSOs vary in military pay-grade and GS level, conditional on their respective command's echelon. Training squadron IMSOs (i.e., VT-10 and VT-86) typically hold the position as a collateral duty for a period of one year. These active duty officers are typically on two to three year orders. Per SECNAVINST 4950.4B, IMSOs will be appointed for a minimum of two years, when possible, and will receive the necessary training to perform this important function.[110]

NETSAFA coordinates required training for IMSOs and conducts the DoN IMSO Workshop.[111] This workshop enables IMSOs to share knowledge and experience gained from daily contact with IMS and solutions to problems individual IMSOs have experienced. The DoN IMSO workshop is funded by DSCA and NIPO rather than the parent command of the attendees.[112] The event was previously held on an annual basis; however, funding shortfalls shifted this event to an 18-month periodicity.[113]

IMSOs are required to complete formal training.[114] Formal IMSO training includes Intermediate IMSO (XSPT-221), focusing on administration of the IMS, Field Studies Program objectives, and use of the SAN-WEB and the Security Cooperation–Training Management System (SC-TMS). The course is conducted in two phases comprised of 16 hours of distance learning and 4 days in-residence training at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. As a prerequisite, prospective IMSOs are required to complete Introduction to Security Cooperation Course (SC-101), a 12-hour online course. This IMSO training is funded by DSCA and NIPO, not the parent command. This course is offered only twice in 2020.[115]

The U.S. Navy IMSO Guide also recommend requirement completion of the Intercultural Competencies Course (ICSOF) through the USAF. The course is one week in duration and is designed to improve communication skills of DoD personnel engaged in liaison with international military personnel, while sensitizing them to differing cultural values, behavior, assumptions and perceptions. The course is activity funded and resourced through NIPO for per diem and travel, but there is no tuition cost.[116]

Within IMS programs, fellow U.S. students, staff, and contractors are not required to complete cultural awareness/competency training.

Seven IMSOs were interviewed across six commands and detachments (NETSAFA DET DLIELC, NITC, NASC, TW-6, VT-10, and VT-86). None of the IMSOs had completed the recommended cultural competency course and only four of the seven had completed the required IMSO training. All IMSOs believed cultural competency/immersion training would significantly enhance their ability to execute their IMSO duties and responsibilities.[117]

Personnel at NETSAFA DET DLIELC, to include both the former OIC and now acting OIC, have not completed required IMSO training.[118] The designated IMSO at NASC completed the required IMSO training.[119] The GS-5, IMTO administrator never completed the formal training.[120] The GS-09, TW-6 IMSO, completed the required training; however, IMSO duties are only 25% of his PD.[121] The VT-10 IMSO completed required IMSO training.[122] The VT-86 IMSO, appointed in November 2019, is in the process of completing the prerequisites for the required IMSO training.[123]

Processes and procedures exist to report both significant and minor IMS issues.[124] A " RSNF Student Incident Report" is available for reporting infractions or problems involving RSNF students not warranting special incident reporting.[125] Neither process was utilized during 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's harassment complaint against the contracted civilian instructor during TW-6 ground training. The VT-10 IMSO responsible for incident reporting was never informed of the 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's harassment complaint.[126]

IMS sponsorship programs exist at DLIELC.[127] No IMS sponsorship programs were identified at NITC, NASC, TW-6, VT-10, or VT-86. The U.S. Navy IMSO guide discusses but does not require a sponsorship program.[128] CNATRAINST 1500.4 requires TRAWING commanders to assign a squadron or wing officer to host each IMS. No individual IMS sponsor assignments were made at the wing

or squadron levels. Instead, IMSOs acted in their official capacity and as class advisors to the KSA cohort assigned to their squadrons.[129]

IMS eligibility for DoN Programs (i.e., DAPA, CMEO, and SAPR) is not specifically defined.

No requirement exists for briefing commanders, staff, and contractors on IMS training principals, standards, and the strategic significance of SCETP. No requirement exists for IMSOs to brief their duties, responsibilities, and reporting requirements to commanders, students, staff, and contractors. Commodore, TW-6 stated he had never heard of the IMSO program before arriving at the wing and he received on-the-job training on the program.[130] He viewed the IMSO program as administrative in nature. Commander, VT-10, classified the IMSO as a reasonably important or "middle of the road" collateral duty.[131]

Opinion 9.4.2.1: Without formal inspection guidance, the IMSO program lacks an established standard for oversight.

Opinion 9.4.2.2: Periodicity of DISCS' IMSO training is too infrequent to support adequate training opportunities for active duty military officers on two to three year orders.

Opinion 9.4.2.3: NETSAFA plays a critical function in training and informing all echelons of IMSOs. The DoN IMSO workshop is held too infrequently to cover the gap created by infrequent required training.

Opinion 9.4.2.4: Because cultural competency training is only recommended by instruction, the training is underutilized by IMSOs, undermining their ability to effectively execute their duties and responsibilities.

<u>Opinion 9.4.2.5</u>: Cultural competency is whole-force SCETP initiative. Training of commanders, IMSOs, students, staff, and contractors ensures IMS are treated with dignity, respect, and according to custom. Further, this training enables identification of cultural/behavioral deviation, requiring command intervention.

<u>Opinion 9.4.2.6</u>: The practice of rotating collateral duties within a squadron is a detriment to the execution of an effective, fully informed IMSO program. Commanders rotate the IMSO position because they are unaware of its significance and expansive requirements. IMSOs have one of the most challenging and demanding jobs in the SCETP. Treating IMSO duties as a collateral duty reduces its significance to the overall mission.

<u>Opinion 9.4.2.7</u>: General knowledge of IMS reporting and IMSO functions and tasks is inadequate. A fully informed IMSO ensures alignment between the command, sponsoring nation, and SCETP organization.

<u>Opinion 9.4.2.8</u>: To execute the duties and responsibilities of command, commanders must have full awareness and understanding of relevant DoN IMS programs and their authorities.

<u>Recommendation 9.4.2.1</u>: Recommend DSCA restore quarterly periodicity of the Intermediate IMSO (XSPT-221) course and continue NIPO funding for IMSO participation.

<u>Recommendation 9.4.2.2</u>: Recommend DSCA expand its Intermediate IMSO (XSPT-221) course to include cultural competency training and inclusion of pre-requisites in the in-resident class.

Recommendation 9.4.2.3: Recommend ASN RD&A revise SECNAVINST 4950.4B to specify duties and responsibilities for IMSO Program oversight and inspection criteria.

Recommendation 9.4.2.4: Recommend ASN RD&A revise SECNAVINST 4950.4B to distinguish between supervisory IMSO and direct-contact IMSO.

Recommendation 9.4.2.5: Recommend NIPO coordinate and resource with OPNAV N1 to establish standing, dedicated IMSO billets within training commands with high volumes of IMS.

Recommendation 9.4.2.6: Recommend NIPO restore annual periodicity of the DoN IMSO conference and continue to fund IMSO participation.

Recommendation 9.4.2.7: Recommend CNATRA review and revise AVCOT to include CO's duties and responsibilities for both IMS and Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) Officers.

Recommendation 9.4.2.8: Recommend NETSAFA identify all high-volume, IMS training sites and coordinate replacement of collateral duty military IMSOs with either permanent duty military or civilian IMSOs.

Recommendation 9.4.2.9: Recommend NETSAFA require IMSOs to conduct periodic, command-wide briefs (NETSAFA developed) covering SCETP; IMSO duties and responsibilities; IMS standards of performance and discipline; DoN program access; incident reporting; and cultural awareness.

Recommendation 9.4.2.10: Recommend NETSAFA adopt a standard student incident report and applicable procedures applicable to all IMS.

<u>Recommendation 9.4.2.11</u>: Recommend NETSAFA require IMSOs to provide periodic (monthly) updates to commanders on the status and progress of IMS.

<u>Recommendation 9.4.2.12</u>: Recommend NETSAFA provide IMSO inspection criteria and check-sheets for all NETC, SYSCOM, and fleet commanders.

---

[1] SECNAVINST 4950.4B, Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (JSCET) (3 January 2011), 5-1 and 5-11.
[2] NETSAFA International Training Center (NITC) Command Brief (06 June 2019).
[3] Id.
[4] CNATRAINST 1542.162B, Primary Naval Flight Officer Training System Curriculum (11 October 2019).
[5] NETSAFA International Training Center (NITC) Command Brief (06 June 2019); Invitational Travel Order (ITO) for International Military Student (IMS) ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani (8 August 2017).
[6] CNATRAINST 1542.163, Intermediate Naval Flight Officer Training System Curriculum (11 October 2019).
[7] NETSAFA International Training Center (NITC) Command Brief (06 June 2019).
[8] CNATRAINST 1500.4J, Training Administration Manual (13 February 2019).
[9] CNATRAINST 1542.164A, Advanced Naval Flight Officer Training System Curriculum (11 October 2019).
[10] SoI (b)(6), Site Manager/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6), Site Focal/Contract Instructor, DRG (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6), LT, IMSO VT-10 (14 January 2020).
[11] SoI (b)(6), LT, IMSO VT-10 (14 January 2020).
[12] SoI (b)(6), Chaplain, Naval Air Station Pensacola (17 January 2020); SoI (b)(6), Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (16 January 2020) .
[13] SoI (b)(6), Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6), Contract Swim Instructor, Booz Allen Hamilton (22 January 2020).
[14] Law Enforcement Briefing (17 January 2020).
[15] SoI (b)(6), Contract Instructor, DRG (24 January 2020).
[16] Law Enforcement Briefing (17 January 2020).
[17] SoI (b)(6), Major, Operations Officer VT-10 (15 January 2020).
[18] SoI (b)(6), NASP Base Housing Community Manager (21 January); SoI N(b)(6), NASP Base Housing resident (22 January 2020).
[19] SoI (b)(6), Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (16 January 2020).
[20] SoI (b)(6), Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (21 January 2020).
[21] Law Enforcement Briefing (17 January 2020).
[22] SoI (b)(6), Contract Instructor, DRG (24 January 2020).
[23] SoI (b)(6), GS-12, NITC Deputy Officer in Charge, NITC IMSO (21 January 2020)..

[24] SoI (b)(6) , Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6) , CDR, NITC Officer in Charge (24 January 2020); Field Observation (22 January 2020).

[25] So (b)(6) , CDR, NITC Officer in Charge (24 January 2020).

[26] Field Observation (22 January 2020).

[27] SoI (b)(6) , Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6) , CDR, NITC Officer in Charge (24 January 2020); SoI (b)(6) GS-12, NITC Deputy Officer in Charge, NITC IMSO (21 January 2020).

[28] SECNAVINST 4950.4B, Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (JSCET) (3 January 2011); NETSAFAINST 5400.1G NETSAFA Staff Organization (01 November 2018).

[29] NETSAFAINST 5400.1G, NETSAFA Staff Organization (01 November 2018), VII-I.

[30] Summary of Field Observation NITC Production Meeting (22 JAN 20); SoI (b)(6) , CDR, NITC Officer in Charge (24 January 2020); SoI (b)(6) , Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6) , GS-12, NITC Deputy Officer in Charge, NITC IMSO (21 January 2020).

[31] SoI (b)(6) , Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (21 January 2020).

[32] SECNAVINST 4950.4B, Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (JSCET) (3 January 2011); U.S. Navy International Military Student Guide 2016-2017 (15 January 2015).

[33] SAN-WEB PROGRESS MESSAGES ICO 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani; NITC Tuesday Morning Meeting Notes (16 October 2018).

[34] U.S. Navy International Military Student Guide 2016-2017 (15 January 2015).

[35] CNATRAINST 5420.13, HUMAN FACTORS COUNCILS AND HUMAN FACTORS BOARDS (29 November 2012).

[36] CNATRAINST 5420.13, HUMAN FACTORS COUNCILS AND HUMAN FACTORS BOARDS (29 November 2012.)

[37] SoI (b) (6) (14 January 2020); (b) (6) 10 (14 January 2020).

[38] CNATRAINST 5420.13 HUMAN FACTORS COUNCILS AND HUMAN FACTORS BOARDS (29 November 2012), 3.

[39] Marine Corps Order 1500.60 Force Preservation Council Program (25 July 2016).

[40] MARADMIN 675/16 Force Preservation Council Hand-Off Tool (21 December 2016).

[41] Center for Development of Security Excellence, Resources for Behavioral Science in Insider Threat (INT290.16) https://www.cdse.edu/catalog/elearning/INT290-resources.html (accessed on 26 January 2020).

[42] Center for Development of Security Excellence, Establishing an Insider Threat Program for Your Organization Student Guide (INT122). https://www.cdse.edu/catalog/elearning/INT122-resources.html (accessed on 26 January 2020).

[43] JP-I with Change 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (12 July 2017), V-I.

[44] JP-I with Change 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (12 July 2017), V-I

[45] JP-I with Change 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (12 July 2017), V-14.

[46] JP-I with Change 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (12 July 2017), V-18.

[47] Id.; NETCINST 5450.12B Missions, Functions, and Tasks of Center for Naval Aviation Technical Training (17 November 2017).

[48] NETCINST 5450.12B Missions, Functions, and Tasks of Center for Naval Aviation Technical Training (17 November 2017).

[49] Id.

[50] Id.

[51] Id.

[52] Navy Organizational Change Request (OCR) ICO NASC (03 MAY 2016).

[53] Memorandum of Understanding between Commander, Naval Education Training Command (NETC) and Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) (26 July 2017).

(b (6

[56] Memorandum of Understanding between Commander, Naval Education Training Command (NETC) and Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) (26 July 2017).

[57] CDR (b)(6) email of 9 March 2018.

[58] CAPT (b) (6) email of 27 January 2020.

[59] CAPT (b) (6) email of 27 January 2020.

---

[60] SoI (b) (6) , NASC Commanding Officer (14 January 2020).

[61] CNATT 5041.1B CNATT Area Visit Program (12 March 2018).

[62] CNATT Area Visit to NASC Report (30 OCT 18).

[63] Id.

[64] NITC Master Brief June 2019.

[65] SoI (b)(6) , Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6) , Contract Swim Instructor, Booz Allen Hamilton (22 January 2020).

[66] Electronic Security Assistance Management Manual (access 20 January 2020), 10.20.8.

[67] Summary of Email Correspondence with (b)(6) , NETSAFA N3 (20 February 2020).

[68] Id.

[69] SECNAVINST 4950.4B Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (JSCET) (3 January 2011), 10-7.

[70] Summary of Email Correspondence with (b)(6) , NETSAFA N3 (20 February 2020).

71 SECNAVINST 4950.4B Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (JSCET) (3 January 2011), 10-98.

[72] Electronic Security Assistance Management Manual (access 20 January 2020), 10.20.8.

[73] SECNAVINST 4950.4B Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (JSCET) (3 January 2011), 10-7.

[74] SECNAVINST 4950.4B, Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (JSCET) (3 January 2011).

[75] Blanket Order for Training RSAF WSO Training/CLO Support between AFSAT and KSA (SR-D-THD) (22 April 2016).

[76] SoI (b)(6) and (b)(6) , NETSAFA CPMs (15 January 2020).

[77] Electronic Security Assistance Management Manual (access 20 January 2020), 10.20.8.

[78] SoI (b) (6) CAPT, NIPO CENTCOM Dir (23 January 2020).

[79] CNATRAINST 1500.4J Naval Flight Student Training Administration Manual (13 February 2019), 9-6.

[80] Electronic Security Assistance Management Manual (access 20 January 2020), 10.20.8.

[81] Electronic Security Assistance Management Manual (access 20 January 2020), 10.20.8.

[82] SoI (b) (6) CAPT, Commanding Officer NETSAFA (24 January 2020); SoI (b)(6) , GS-14, NETSAFA Executive Director (24 January 2020)

[83] SoI (b)(6) and (b)(6) , NETSAFA CPMs (15 January 2020).

[84] Summary of Email Correspondence with (b)(6) , NETSAFA N3 (20 February 2020).

[85] Id.

[86] Id.

[87] SoI (b)(6) , GS-12, NITC Deputy Officer in Charge, NITC IMSO (21 January 2020); SoI (b)(6) , CDR, NITC Officer in Charge (24 January 2020.)

[88] Summary of Email Correspondence with (b)(6) , NETSAFA N3 (20 February 2020).

[89] Id.

[90] Id.

[91] (b)(6) Position Description, per (b)(6) email of 27 January 2020

[92] SoI (b)(6) , Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (16 January 2020).

[93] SoI (b) (6) CAPT, Commanding Officer NETSAFA (24 January 2020); SoI (b)(6) , GS-14, NETSAFA Executive Director (24 January 2020); SoI (b)(6) , Contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton (21 January 2020)

[94] SoI (b) (6) CAPT, NIPO CENTCOM Dir (23 January 2020)

[95] Summary of Email Correspondence with (b)(6) , NETSAFA N3 (20 February 2020).

[96] NAVADMIN 293/19 Fleet-wide Security Stand-down (17 December 2019).

[97] OPNAVINST 5510.165A, Navy Insider Threat Program (01 October 2015); SECNAVINST 5510.37A, Department of the Navy Insider Threat Program (28 October 2019).

[98] Id.

[99] SECNAVINST 5510.37A, Department of the Navy Insider Threat Program (28 October 2019).

[100] Center for Development of Security Excellence, "Mission" (accessed 26JAN2020).

[101] NAVADMIN 191/19 FY-20 GENERAL MILITARY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS (13 August 2019).

[102] SECNAVINST 4950.4B, Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (JSCET) (3 January 2011).

[103] U.S. Navy International Military Student Guide 2016-2017 (15 January 2015).

[104] USD (I&S) Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Director, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, and Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) on Continuous Review for International Military Students (13 January 2020).

[105] USD (I&S) Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Director, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, and Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) on Continuous Review for International Military Students (13 January 2020).

[106] SoI (b)(6), LT, IMSO VT-10 (14 January 2020); SoI (b)(6), LT, IMSO VT-86 (14 January 2020).

[107] U.S. Navy International Military Student Guide 2016-2017 (15 January 2015), 1-1.

[108] SECNAVINST 4950.4B, Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (JSCET) (3 January 2011), 14-16.

[109] U.S. Navy International Military Student Guide 2016-2017 (15 January 2015), 1-2.

[110] SECNAVINST 4950.4B, Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (JSCET) (3 January 2011), 193.

[111] U.S. Navy International Military Student Guide 2016-2017 (15 January 2015), 1-3 to 1-4.

[112] U.S. Navy International Military Student Guide 2016-2017 (15 January 2015), 1-4.

[113] SoI (b) (6) CAPT, Commanding Officer NETSAFA (24 January 2020); SoI (b)(6), GS-14, NETSAFA Executive Director (24 January 2020)

[114] U.S. Navy International Military Student Guide 2016-2017 (15 January 2015), 1-3.

[115] Defense Security Cooperation University, "Course Info: XSPT-221 Intermediate International Military Student Office (IMSO)" (accessed 01 February 2020).

[116] U.S. Navy International Military Student Guide 2016-2017 (15 January 2015), 1-4.

[117] SoI (b)(6), LT, NETSAFA Detachment DLIELC Officer in Charge (18 January 2020); SoI (b)(6), Capt, NASC IMSO (16 January 2020); SoI (b)(6), GS-5, NASC IMT Clerk (22 January 2020); SoI (b)(6), LT, IMSO VT-10 (14 January 2020); SoI (b)(6), LT, IMSO VT-86 (14 January 2020); SoI (b)(6), GS-9, Student Control Officer, IMSO TW-6 (15 January 2020).

[118] SoI (b)(6), LT, NETSAFA Detachment DLIELC Officer in Charge (18 January 2020).

[119] SoI (b)(6), Capt, NASC IMSO (16 January 2020); SoI (b)(6), GS-5, NASC IMT Clerk (22 January 2020).

[120] SoI (b)(6), GS-5, NASC IMT Clerk (22 January 2020).

[121] SoI (b)(6), GS-9, Student Control Officer, IMSO TW-6 (15 January 2020).

[122] SoI (b)(6), LT, IMSO VT-10 (14 January 2020).

[123] SoI (b)(6), LT, IMSO VT-86 (14 January 2020).

[124] U.S. Navy International Military Student Guide 2016-2017 (15 January 2015), 2-27-2-31.

[125] U.S. Navy International Military Student Guide 2016-2017 (15 January 2015), 2-28 and Figure 2-12.

[126] SoI (b)(6), LT, IMSO VT-10 (14 January 2020).

[127] SoI (b)(6), GS-14, NETSAFA Executive Director (24 January 2020).

[128] NETSAFA U.S. Navy International Military Student Guide 2016-2017 (15 January 2015), 2-11.

[129] SoI (b)(6), LT, IMSO VT-10 (14 January 2020); SoI C Morgan, LT, IMSO VT-86 (14 January 2020).

[130] SoI (b) (6) CAPT, Commodore TW-6 (15 January 2020).

[131] SoI (b) (6) (14 January 2020); (b) (6), Executive Officer VT-10 (14 January 2020).

Chapter 10—Opinions and Recommendations

This chapter provides the investigation's primary opinions and recommendations. Appendix B provides a complete listing of Findings, Opinions, and Recommendations.

10.1 Opinions

There are five opinions that inform this report's recommendations. First, commanders must foster a command climate built upon dignity and respect. Second, commanders must actively engage in force preservation to proactively mitigate risk in the lives of their Sailors. Third, our Sailors will respond to any threat, yet it is commander's responsibility to ensure that this heroism is preserved for conflict and warfare rather than day-to-day operations at home. Fourth, the Navy must treat its installations as warfighting platforms with each tenant commander actively and aggressively striving for FP and PS excellence.

(b) (7)(F)

Opinion 1: The key to fostering a positive command climate is to set a universal standard of dignity and respect.   Faltering from this standard enables caustic command cultures to flourish on the whole or in a microclimate within a department, division, or office. Without proactive and engaged leadership at every level, hostile command climates thrive. Commanders must aggressively identify and engage behavior contrary to the shared values of the Navy. When we allow this conduct to remain in our ranks, it metastasizes and places the organization and our personnel at risk.

Opinion 2: Human factors played a role in this tragedy. Military leaders, government employees, contracted employees, peers, and civilians knew of

isolated events indicating a potential issue, but remained unaware of the complete picture of 2nd Lt Al-Shamrani's activities and actions. Based upon the complexity of the IMS aviation pipeline, no coordinating agency had the tools, vision, or mandate to aggregate all of the pieces of the puzzle and conduct a thorough insider threat risk analysis and determination. These risk factors are not unique to IMS. They universally impact Navy personnel in the same way they impact our foreign counterparts. Force preservation, the mitigation of these risks, is a shared responsibility by everyone who works for or with the DoN.

Opinion 3: The courage and indomitable spirit of our Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and our civilian first responders remains strong. Yet, we have asked these patriots to display sacrifice and courage in the most unlikely of circumstances. In the highest traditions of the naval service, individuals selflessly offered their lives to protect and to save the lives of their shipmates. We owe it to the three Sailors lost, the many wounded, and those who placed themselves in harm's way on 6 December 2019 to change the appropriate policies, devote sufficient resources, and assure our force we are doing everything in our power to keep faith and keep them safe.

Opinion 4: Naval installations are operational platforms, managing internal and external threats on a daily basis. This realization requires the entire DoN to execute a cultural shift in how we address PS, AT, and Law Enforcement (LE) at every naval installation. DoN must man, train, and equip installations and tenant commands in the same manner as it would any combat-ready ship, submarine, or squadron. When properly applied, active PS measures deter adversaries and assure our force. When training is conducted and drills executed, our Sailors and civilians respond appropriately and decisively as required. When commanders train their force and aggressively self-assess, they identify force protection gaps and seams on their own and do not require tragedy to correct. The absence of

command ownership of FP degrades the Navy's collective readiness and places our people at risk.

Opinion 5: ^{(b) (7)(F)} ████████████████████████████████

██

████████████████████████████████████ DoN must abandon minimum manning thresholds designed to protect physical assets and to meet ineffective response times. Instead, installations must be manned to rapidly respond with a preponderance of force at any time to preserve our most precious asset, our personnel. Increased security force manning enables presence, deterrence, assurance, and enhanced response. ^{(b) (5)} ████████

██

██████████████████████████████████

██████████████████████████████████████

██████████████████████████████

██

████████████████████████████████████

██████████

10.2 Recommendations.

To directly address the findings and opinions most relevant to strengthening the DoN and DoD posture against active threats, the Navy must take the **immediate** actions below:

Recommendations to Address Potential Contributing Factors
- Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy for Policy (DUSN (P)) review and validate DoN Insider Threat Hub concept of operations; data sources evaluate capabilities for continuous, social media review for all personnel who hold sensitive positions, to include all IMS

- OPNAV, in coordination with operational commanders, review Marine Corps Order 1500.60 and implement a force preservation council program across the Navy to include all foreign military personnel programs

- OPNAV N1 update OPNAVINST 5354.1G, Navy Equal Opportunity Program Manual, to require COs to make a positive determination regarding a preliminary inquiry for any allegation against a contracted employee

- OPNAV N1, in coordination with NIPO, update OPNAVINST 5354.1G to include an EO program applicability statement for IMS and the process for handling EO complaints filed by IMS

- OPNAV N1 direct the immediate use of available insider threat programs and tools from the CDSE and the DHS to meet and enhance annual insider threat training requirements

- NIPO, in coordination with NETSAFA, identify contract vehicles to require CLO presence for training activities conducting large volumes of high-risk IMS training

- NIPO require and properly resource intercultural competency training for all commands associated with the training of IMS

- NETC review course critique guidance and implement a standardized process across training commands to gather holistic feedback on all aspects of training commands to capture both quality of instruction and command climate for all students

- NETC, in coordination with NCIS, develop and implement an insider threat training curriculum which focuses on the insider threat indicators and behaviors, pathways to radicalization and criticality of reporting to the chain of command

- NASC assign new permanent staff to the IMTO and ensure completion of both required and recommended IMSO and cultural competency training prior to assignment
- NASC investigate the failure to comply with the command's EO policy in the handling of EO complaints.

Recommendations to Address Primary Noncontributing Factors

- DoD update UFC for existing buildings and require enhanced physical security features at every DoN facility
- DoD and DoS review the feasibility of establishing a universal policy requiring psychological and behavioral batteries for all international military personnel training or working in the United States
- DoS and DoD review the practice of country-specific SOP for screening/vetting and establish a baseline standard for the screening of all international military personnel assigned to the United States
- CNO provide uniform policy for commanders to arm qualified NSF personnel and other individuals for personal protection not related to performance of an official duty or status
- OPNAV review and update the MPV-P post validation model, ROC level methodology, and ROC baseline functions to reflect current active shooter and insider threat, FPCON level, and Echelon I and II AT, LE and PS program requirements
- OPNAV and fleet commanders review C2 of aviation training pipeline
- Surgeon General of the Navy (CNO N093) and BUMED review the integration of the TAPAS, or similar personality assessment, as a MEPs and IMS screening requirement
- Echelon II and III commands provide AT program oversight, requirements and program reviews for subordinate commands

- Echelon II and III commands hold subordinate commanders accountable for active shooter and insider threat training completion

- CNIC require installation NSF to qualify as Category III/IV weapons-qualified personnel

- CNIC require regional and installation commanders to coordinate with civilian authorities to integrate geographically bounded WEA notifications into an SOP for crisis response

- CNIC require regions and installations to develop, maintain, and track MAA and MOU with local authorities for law enforcement, emergency response, and medical facilities

- CNIC issue a directive to employ DBIDS across installations, without exception, at each ECP

- NETC develop proactive active shooter response training for Navy personnel

- Tenant commands ensure annual PS surveys of facilities are conducted, provided to the installation, and reported annually to the regional commander.