Case Document 466-3 Filed 04/24/15 Page 1 of 2 Page D# 4482 The Honorable Judge Leonie M. Brinkema United States District Judge United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia Albert V. Bryan US. Courthouse, 401 Courthouse Square Alexandria, VA 22314 April 23, 2015 Re: United States v. Sterling Dear Judge Brinkema: My name is David J. Manners. I served as an Operations Of?cer in the US. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for nearly 20 years. My major ?eld assignments included tours as the senior of?cer directing operations in Prague, Czechoslovakia and in Amman, Jordan. During one assignment in CIA headquarters, I was responsible for sensitive human intelligence and technical collection operations aimed at the Soviet nuclear weapons program, including their facilities at Arzamas l6 and Chelyabinsk. On another headquarters tour, I was Chief of the Iran Task Force and thus had responsibility for our worldwide operations against the Iranian target, including their efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Lastly, I served one rotational assignment as Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director of the National Security Agency. I have 3.3. degree from the US. Naval Academy and an MA. from Georgetown University. The government originally designated me as a witness in this case but did not call me as a witness at trial. I know James Risen, consider him a friend, and admire his work. I know Jeffrey Sterling from his days as a trainee working in the Iran Task Force. I was aware of the genesis of the contact between Risen and Sterling and shared this information with the government. However, I could not con?rm to the government that Risen had identi?ed Sterling as the source of the information that appeared in his book. I have read the sentencing memorandum submitted by the government, and I write to share with you some observations I have about it based solely on what is in the public record. I was in Prague when revolution swept through Eastern Europe, and the Soviet empire quickly unraveled. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and collapse of its economy, US. and Russian leaders had deep concerns that suddenly impoverished nuclear scientists could sell their skills and knowledge to other nations with nuclear ambitions. Outgoing Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev personally appealed to President George H. W. Bush for help in dealing with this problem. The US. Congress responded by passing the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, which provided funding to assist the post-Soviet states in denuclearization, including 3 EXHIBIT Case Document 466-3 Filed 04/24/15 Page 2 of 2 Page D# 4483 ?nancial support for their scientists and weapons laboratories. This eventually led to a 1992 formal agreement between Los Alamos National Laboratories and Arzamas 16 to collaborate closely in groundbreaking new research. At the time when this collaboration began, both sides recognized that each would learn previously unknown information about their respective weapons programs, but both agreed that the risks posed by this were minimal. This is a matter of public record. Against the above background, while I don't doubt that Merlin provided useful information to the United States, it seems unlikely that this information was as singularly vital as the government suggests in its sentencing memorandum. Similarly, despite the government's dark suggestions, Merlin and his family are not in danger from the Russians. The Russians are not going to harm an ?migr? scientist, one of many such scientists who relocated to the US, who worked at a facility that has been open to us since the 1992. It also is not credible to suggest that the public disclosure of a human asset "severely undermines" our ability to recruit other foreign assets. While such disclosures are never helpful, they happen all the time (and sometimes the United States quietly endorses the disclosure - read some of Bob Woodward?s books, or look at Agency collaboration on the ?lm about the Bin Laden raid). I note that Merlin was "recruited" not too long after Aldrich Ames was arrested as a Soviet/Russian spy. The nightmarish revelations of what Ames did (which were trumpeted around the world) seem not to have affected Merlin's willingness to work with us. Nor did it impede us from recruiting other foreign assets. The program at issue in this case was fundamentally a "deception" Operation. Such operations date back at least to the Trojan War; they surely are ongoing in many different forms and venues, and they will continue be conducted in the future. Deception Operations are conducted against the United States all the time, and it is something that any competent intelligence service guards against. The Iranian intelligence service is competent and reasonably sophisticated. They are quite good at deception and certainly are aware that it can be used against them. I do not think that they or anyone else in the world would be surprised that the United States is capable of conducting sophisticated counter-proliferation programs. Witness Stuxnet, the disclosure of which seems to have been quietly blessed by the Administration, possibly because it appears to have been successful. The purpose of this letter is not to condone leaks of classi?ed information. Nor is it to suggest that the leak at issue in this case did no harm. Rather, my purpose is simply to put the issues in proper context so that the Court can base its decisions on fact, rather than overwrought hyperbole. Thank you for your consideration. Sincerely,