SEE FLETHFGI GBFIHREI. TD LISA. ISAF. Regional Command Southwest W) - Afghanistan in Summary Periad Covered 18000 19 June ta 11'590 20 June 2011 The overall classificatian at this INTSUM is SECRETHFGI TD USA, ISAF, POE: Fusiun??icer: I'u'lajar at .usmc.srnil.mi at n.:ent:am CE Classi?ed by: ultiple Sau rces Sump: Dada 55m}. an: 25? l'Human Praduced by: Southwest Analysis Center iv" 3; and Anal-{sis Camps ml 2d Intelligence Battalian. MEF Sauthw est Analysis Center Website: Sauthwest Analysis Center Website: Page 1 of 11 SEE Ta use. MAID 2011 SECRET//FGI GBR//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AOI (U) Pakistan After the UBL Raid: Status of U.S. Relations and Internal Strife (SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) • Pakistan continues to suffer from the destabilizing affects of civil unrest and international criticism in the wake of the 2 May Bin Laden raid. • In addition to strained U.S. relations, Pakistan is experiencing a strong backlash from extremist organizations who feel the Government of Pakistan is weak and complicit with Western Powers. (SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Analyst Assessment: Pakistan continues to suffer from the destabilizing affects of civil unrest and international criticism in the wake of the 2 May Bin Laden raid. Key officials from U.S. and Islamabad are undergoing reconciliation talks in an attempt to reaffirm commitments to counterterrorism operations and regain trust. Alterations to U.S. monetary aid will be extremely sensitive for Pakistan due to their current poor economic status and will greatly irritate the current situation. Pakistan’s military will take little to no action to prevent the Taliban from operating in Southern Pakistan along RC(SW)’s border, largely due to their focus against more volatile extremists in Central and Northern Pakistan. The only way Pakistan will action Taliban elements in Southern Pakistan is if they feel they are a threat to the nation’s internal stability, something that current Taliban networks in Southern Pakistan are aware of and avoid. FOCUS ON THE ENEMY (U) The Safean Area of Lashkar Gah Municipal Center (SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) • The Safean area of Lashkar Gah is exploited by insurgents due to its lawlessness, lack of GIRoA influence, and value to the insurgency by being close to the Municipal Center (MC). • Insurgent commanders and fighters have utilized Safean to stage for Close Quarters Attacks (CQA) and to conduct planning, coordination, and staging for Suicide IED (SIED) attacks against the MC. (SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Analyst Assessment: As the Lashkar Gah security transition approaches, Safean will likely be a key area that insurgents will try to exploit in order to retain access to the MC for executing attacks. However, extending development projects and GIRoA presence into the Safean area would have a positive, lasting effect on local nationals’ support for GIRoA, which would essentially degrade the Taliban’s ability to utilize the area for attack planning and staging. FOCUS ON THE POPULATION (U) The District Community Council and Voter Registration Impact in Garm Ser District (SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) • The Garm Ser District Community Council (DCC) will expand to represent the entire district. • District Executive Officer (DEO) • The DCC elections will be held on 22 June, offering a chance to solidify this spring’s gains and tie Southern Garm Ser firmly to GIRoA. Page 2 of 22 organized a successful voter registration drive. SECRET//FGI GBR//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO 2011 SECRETHFGI GERHREL TO USA. ISAF. MAID ADI [Ui Pakistan After the UBL Raid: Status of LLS. Relations and Internal Strife Written on .20 June 2:011: TU USA, ISAF, HATDI Executive Summary: In Pakistan continues to suffer from the destabilizing affects of civil unrest and international criticism in the wake of the 2 May Bin Laden raid. - In addition to strained U.S. relations, Pakistan is experiencing a strong backlash from extremist organizations who feel the Government of Pakistan is weak and complicit with Western Powers. TU USA, ISAF, Fluent Pakistan Attach After 11 September 2001, U.S. relations 1 - with Pakistan became critical to enabling - U5. and CF operations in Afghanistan. Despite a mutual agreement to ?5 prosecute a 1War on Terror centered on 1 Afghani?an al-Claida and the Taliban, tensions between the two countries have ebbed I I and flowed, primarily over Pakistan?s i 5- tacit, and sometimes active, support to I extremist organizations, including the Taliban. While Pakistan has commonlyI - 'l voiced discontent with CF drone strikes I along the border; the 2 May Pakigtan raid into Abottabad, Pakistan against Usama Bin Laden has greatly strained India US. - Pakistan relations. The raid against Bin Laden led to international criticism of Pakistan's military involvement in counterinsurgency I I ISECFIETHRELTCI LISA, operations, followed by accusatlons of the Inter?Service Intelligence Agency providing intelligence that aids militant groups' ability to maintain influence in Afghanistan. As a result of Pakistan's inaction and suspected affiliations, the U.S. passed a bill that limits aid to Pakistan. The US. normally provides annual military funding to Pakistan in order to strengthen their counterterrorism campaign. However, LLS. of?cials believe Pakistan's government has used this monetary aid to improve their defense against India by advancing their nuclear capabilities rather than increasing their counterterrorism efforts. In mid June, legislation was approved by the House Appropriations Committee for this yea r?s defense budget, stipulating that PS percent of the $1.1 billion in U.S. aid will be withheld until Pakistan reports to the LLS. Congress on how the monetary aid is to be used. Following international and domestic criticism of Pakistan military's counterterrorism efforts, General Kayani, the Pakistan Army Chief, cut the number of U.S. troops stationed in Pakistan and halted US. training programs for Pakistani soldiers. Furthermore, in early June, General Kayani reiterated a common complaint by Pakistan, telling U.S. commanders that drone strikes in the tribal areas near the AFG-PAIE border we re not acceptable under any circumstances. Inna vii-1 '51. TD USA, ISAF, In addition to strained relations, Pakistan is experiencing a strong backlash from extremist organizations who feel the Government of Pakistan is weak and complicit with Western Powers. As a result, persistent attacks throughout Pakistan have begun to raise suspicion as to whether the Pakistan military has become complacent or incapable of conducting effective counterterrorism operations. Attacks by Tehrik?e Taliban Pakistan and other groups that seek to conduct operations against the Government of Pakistan and the U.S. in retaliation for the killing of Bin Laden, have been on the rise. {in 22 May, approximately ll] to 15 militants infiltrated the Page 5 of 11 cameo To usa, ISAF. NATO sou SECRET//FGI GBR//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO Mehran Naval Station in Karachi, Pakistan. These militants initiated an attack that lasted approximately 18 hours, resulting in the destruction of a P 3C Orion aircraft and death of 10 to 12 Pakistan military personnel. On 1 June, heavily armed militants besieged a remote Pakistani post in Peshawar, Khyber Agency, killing at least one policeman. The Pakistan Army was forced to launch attack helicopters to prevent the 40 man outpost from being overrun. Later, on 12 June two separate suicide bombers detonated in an area of Peshawar that is home to political offices and army housing. The first explosion was reportedly small and used to draw in police officials and first responders for the second bomber, who drove into the area on a motorcycle packed with approximately 22 pounds of explosives. This coordinated attack resulted in the 34 killed and approximately 100 wounded (results of this attack did not specify between civilian, military personnel, or government officials). Though no insurgent group has taken responsibility for the attack yet, the incident was rumored to be in retaliation for U.S. raids against Bin Laden. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (U) The TTP formed from a number of Islamist groups present in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in resistance to the Pakistani State. Formed in December 2007, their ultimate goal is to enforce their interpretation of Sharia law and instate Islamic rule. There is no clear leadership affiliation between the Taliban and the TTP, although both harbor a desire to attack U.S. troops. TTP has claimed responsibility for the 1 May 2010 failed Times Square bombing. However, TTP still almost exclusively targets Pakistani government and security infrastructure within Pakistan to further their goal and forego any pact with the Taliban in Afghanistan. (SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Analyst Assessment: Pakistan continues to suffer from the destabilizing effects of civil unrest and international criticism in the wake of the 2 May Bin Laden raid. Key officials from U.S. and Islamabad are undergoing reconciliation talks in an attempt to reaffirm commitments to counterterrorism operations and regain trust. Alterations to U.S. monetary aid will be extremely sensitive for Pakistan due to their current poor economic status and will greatly irritate the current situation. Pakistan’s military will take little to no action to prevent the Taliban from operating in Southern Pakistan along RC(SW)’s border, largely due to their focus against more volatile extremists in Central and Northern Pakistan. The only way Pakistan will action Taliban elements in Southern Pakistan is if they feel they are a threat to the nation’s internal stability, something that current Taliban networks in Southern Pakistan are aware of and avoid. (Philadelphia Inquirer, House Panel Votes To Slow Down U.S. Aid To Pakistan, 20110615; Philadelphia Inquirer, Pakistan Ties Vital, Say Mullen And Gates, 20110617; Financial Times, US Defends Support For Pakistan, 20110511; Atlanta Journal-Constitution, CIA Chief On Visit To Repair Ties With Pakistan, 20110611; Arizona Republic (Phoenix), Blasts Kill 34, Injure 98 In Pakistan, 20110612; McClatchy Newspapers, Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace Commission Meets, 20110611; Washington Post, Pakistan's Top General Asks U.S. To Divert Aid To Civilians, 20110610; Wall Street Journal, Pakistani Army Pleads For Respect, 20110610 Wall Street Journal, Karzai To Press For Pakistan To Back Peace Talk, 20110609; Boston Globe, US Strikes Kill 23 In Pakistan, 20110609; Washington Post, Pakistan Relations Reach A New Low, 20110616; SAP20110601012001; SAP20110618114008; SAP20110618950055) Page 6 of 22 SECRET//FGI GBR//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO 2011