Borbidge Sheldon Election Review
and

Report and Recommendations
28th May 2015

Terms of Reference
‘to conduct a review of the LNP’s 2015 state election campaign, the performance of
the LNP government and party organisation over the previous parliamentary term
and other matters which impacted on the outcome, and to make such
recommendations as considered appropriate.’

 Borbidge Sheldon Review of the January 31 2015 LNP election loss

Messrs Bruce McIver & Gary Spence
President and Deputy President of the Liberal National Party
66-68 Bowen Street
Spring Hill Qld 4004
Dear
Following the January 31 2015 election loss, you invited us ‘to conduct a review of
the LNP’s 2015 state election campaign, the performance of the LNP government and
party organisation over the previous parliamentary term and other matters which
impacted on the outcome, and to make such recommendations as considered
appropriate.’
We have completed the task and submit to you the Review Report and
Recommendations.
The sentiment expressed to us through submissions, conversations with supporters,
former and present members of parliament is for both the parliamentary party and
the organisational wing to listen to the grass roots and voters, build on the sound
policies implemented in government and regain the trust of the people so that the
party will succeed at the next election.
There is goodwill to the party and we wish you and the membership success with
your progress into the future.
Yours sincerely

Rob Borbidge AO

Joan Sheldon AM

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 Borbidge Sheldon Review of the January 31 2015 LNP election loss

1.

Overview

1.1
The Review’s purpose primarily, is to reflect on the loss of the January 31
2015 state election. It considers too, matters that refer to the Liberal National Party
(LNP) and its membership. The views contained in member’s submissions, other
communications and our own political and party experiences have guided our
thinking and are contained in the report and the recommendations below.
1.2
To each member who took the time to make a submission either by email or
letter or spoke privately with us - thank you for your thoughtful and considered
insights and recommendations. In all, between 600-700 communications were made
to us. Each submission was read, salient points and recommendations extracted and
views weighed in the balance in the context of the totality of the comments
expressed and our own political and party understandings.
1.3
Our recommendations are forward-looking and do not seek to apportion
blame.
1.4
The LNP was forged by the rank and file membership on the 25th July 2008 as
a strong, competent and forward thinking grass roots party. Since then and over the
ensuing seven years the party has experienced highs and lows - the joy of winning
government and the disillusionment of election defeats. Along that journey, the
party has become a competent corporate entity in which members can take pride.
At this juncture of the party’s development and following the loss of the election it is
timely to reflect on the processes and policies where the party may improve its
organisational and campaign processes and better serve the membership.
1.5
The overwhelming election win of 2012 led to hubris and a false sense of
security consolidating an energetic and reformist government leadership team but
without parliamentary experience. The huge influx of inexperienced new MP’s and a
leader without parliamentary background contributed to a lack of corporate history
in the conduct of parliament and the party room.
1.6
Broad based disappointment has been expressed with the campaign and the
election defeat. Undoubtedly, the leadership of the government contributed to the
election loss including:
 the breaking of the promise that public servants had ‘nothing to fear’;
 the perception of arrogance arising from not listening to the people;
 pursuing the large scale privatisation of assets to which the majority of
voters opposed or had serious reservations;
 the alienation of key stakeholders in the decision making process; and
 the two year discordant relationship with the organisational wing.
1.7
The campaign itself, the responsibility of the central campaign committee
had inherent problems such as failing to:
 address the perception of the Government’s arrogance and to turn this
weakness into strengths;
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 Borbidge Sheldon Review of the January 31 2015 LNP election loss






promote the government’s considerable achievements in fixing “labor’s
mess’ and growing the state’s economy;
launch an attack program to rebut the deceitful and untruthful propaganda
of the party’s opponents;
engender confidence with local campaign committees; and
manage the expectation that the party with its large majority would hold
government at the poll.

1.8
Based on our experiences, we know that leadership is both important and
difficult and should not be underestimated. The political tactics of importing a
leader from outside parliament without parliamentary or state leadership
experience and policy knowledge carried inherent risks which were not immediately
apparent and in the short term worked well.
1.9
While criticisms can be levied at the style of government it is without doubt
that much was achieved from 2012 to 2015. Campbell Newman made a significant
commitment to the LNP in resigning as Lord Mayor of Brisbane to contest the
premiership from outside of parliament. His contribution to the conservative politics
in Queensland should be recognised.
1.10 Real progress was made in addressing the State’s economic crisis, making
Queensland safer, cutting red tape, improving basic services in health and education,
sustaining the environment etc. Across all portfolios there were substantial
improvements in service delivery and performance and it is one of the tragedies of
the 2015 campaign that we failed to get this message across to Queenslanders.
1.11 The Springborg/Langbroek parliamentary team will build on the policy
achievements in government and have learnt from the experiences that alienated
voters, the organisational wing and membership. A positive open door partnership
is being pursued with Queenslanders based on sound policy, integrity and trust. Its
relationship with its organisational wing is now being built on one of consultation,
collaboration and respect.
1.12
The criticisms in this report should not detract from the fact that
Queensland was left a far better place than that the LNP inherited when it came to
office in 2012.

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 Borbidge Sheldon Review of the January 31 2015 LNP election loss

The Review Report and Recommendations
1.

Parliamentary party and organisational wing relationship

1.1
A long held practice of the LNP drawn from its antecedent parties is that the
parliamentary party and the organisational wing ‘walk in lockstep’ in the best
interests of the party as a whole and its Queensland constituency.
1.2
The overwhelming election win of 2012 led to a changed dynamic where the
leadership team of the parliamentary party in a sense of hubris isolated itself from
the organisational wing. The primary consequence of the breakdown was the lack
of consultation on policy or political party or campaign matters for the best part of
the crucial first two of the government’s term.
1.3
The relationship between the two wings of the LNP is the single most
important issue that must be addressed to ensure that a trustful relationship is
sustained into the future. We recommend the preparation of and agreement to a
compact that defines the role and responsibilities of the parliamentary and
organisational wings ensuring that goodwill, a constructive, harmonious and positive
working relationship prevails into the future.
2.

LNP in government

2.1
During the first year of the Newman government, it acted quickly with a fast
moving cross portfolio reform agenda to ‘fix labor’s cross portfolio messes’ and the
inherited long term budgetary chaos of debt and deficit.
2.2
People desired ‘labor’s mess’ fixed but wanted stability and minimum
incremental change. They were not in a fast reforming mood and saw the LNP as an
opportunity for an inclusive and consensus government. A number of crucial
decisions made during the early life of the government came at a huge political cost.
2.3
It is a simple fact that no government can function without the co-operation
of the public service. The decision to sack 14,000 public servants and the manner in
which the issue was handled poisoned relations with the people who were needed
to embrace and implement the government’s reform agenda and surprised and
shocked voters. It was contrary with the promises or assurances given prior to the
2012 election. Just as the public service and unease in the voting population helped
destroy the Goss government, history was about to repeat itself.
2.4
There were errors in policy and political judgment such as the members of
parliament pay increase, changes to parliamentary committees and MPs
resignations. In addition there were other distractions that unsettled voters. These
served to fuel the impression of arrogance - a perception which had been around the
government from its earliest days.

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2.5
Over the term, the opinion emerged that the government predominantly was
focused on the south-east corner. Regional communities and the grass roots
members in the provincial cities, regional and rural electorates came to the view that
although regional cabinets were held in selected cities and were represented by
members of parliament in the party room, the south east corner was favoured.
3.

Government decision making

3.1
The government’s haste to implement the reform agenda and the ‘can do’
approach left little room for other views or ‘listening to’ supporters, voters and even
the grass roots of the party. External new ideas or friendly criticism was unwelcome.
3.2
The former government in its reforming zeal and decision making processes
alienated almost every key interest group across the state. The good policy work
done for many stakeholders was lost by the ‘lack of listening’ or a dismissive
arrogant approach which ultimately resonated at the poll.
4.

Policy and Reform Agenda

4.1
Budgetary reform and privatisation of large scale assets were the prime
policy foci. These were Commission of Audit recommendations and were adopted
by cabinet and the party room.
4.2
The policy fixation over the term was to secure a mandate at the 2015 state
election to privatise specific large scale assets to pay down debt, to build new
infrastructure to increase productivity and create jobs. It had supporters and
detractors but credence was wasted with policy changes from sale to lease and lease
arrangements from 99 years to 50 years with a 49-year option subject to compliance
with strict conditions.
4.3
Notwithstanding the budgetary crisis the urgent economic and social
infrastructure needs confronting the LNP government left by the former Labor
government, any proposal for large scale asset disposal was fraught with risk.
Queenslanders had proved at the 2012 state election they held an inherent caution
about privatisation and when coupled with the union’s deceitful and ruthless
campaign of opposition, the strategy of seeking a mandate to sell or lease major
assets was ‘a brave decision’.
4.4
The party itself was not engaged in the decision making process for the
campaign policy agenda generally or the privatisation of large scale assets which
were a decision of cabinet following the Commission of Audit. Many LNP policy
committees were not properly engaged in setting the election policy agenda. Policy
proposals came from Ministerial offices with little understanding of the vote driving
the issues. The policy process was protracted and delayed and policies were not
properly tested prior to the campaign.

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 Borbidge Sheldon Review of the January 31 2015 LNP election loss

4.5
The ‘Strong Choices‘ program was the principle campaign policy. External
polling during the election indicated that the privatisation of major assets was not a
strong negative with any groups other than those strongly committed to voting
Labor, and non-greens minor party voters. Exit polling however, indicated that the
plan to sel/lease the state’s asset was the main reason given by 64 per cent of
respondents for their protest vote.
4.6
The privatisation policy from the time of the recommendations of the
Commission of Audit was announced, was undermined by a fierce and ruthless union
led guerrilla war. It was a major mistake not to address the untrue propaganda
populated through the union membership, via social media, rallies and protests to
mainstream voters over more than two years.
4.7
The former LNP government’s non privatisation reform agenda, on the other
hand, was one of achievement in each portfolio. Its legacy is one of policy support
for the private sector and well resourced departments with balanced budgets and
service delivery efficiency.
4.8
Emphasis on the four pillars of tourism, resources, agriculture and the
construction industries in 2012 worked well after years of neglect by the previous
Labor government. Over the term, however, the view of the government emerged
that the new industries, the scientists, the researchers, the innovators and the arts
were sidelined or even excluded.
5.

Election timing

5.1
The calling of the election during the Christmas/New Year holiday period was
a serious mistake and voters resented it. Primarily, the reasons given for the calling
of the early election included:
 The means of providing the state with certainty and avoiding the loss of
momentum due to drawn out election timing speculation;
 The performance of the federal coalition and the resumption of federal
parliament on 9 February; and
 A belief that an early election would take the opposition by surprise and
diminish the willingness of the union movement to campaign over the
holiday period.
5.2
The early election re-enforced the perception that the government was
arrogant.
6.

Central campaign committee and the campaign

6.1
Members in their submissions and supporters conveyed to us dismay with
the poor quality of the campaign and failing to engage with voters on policy matters
of social conscience. Disappointment was expressed with the campaign and about
the defeat of first term LNP government after years in opposition.

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 Borbidge Sheldon Review of the January 31 2015 LNP election loss

6.2
The central campaign committee (including the leaders of both the
parliamentary party and organisational wing) should take responsibility for the
election loss, policy mistakes, the mechanical flaws and general unresponsiveness to
local campaigns that impacted on the outcome.
6.3
The central campaign committee did not explain to the public that unpopular
decisions were needed to ‘fix labor’s mess’ and the ‘can do’ approach was needed.
Despite the negative polling, there was no change in tactics - a quick survey of the
membership would have given a true and accurate reading for the urgent need for
strategic change.
6.4
Members have the view that the central campaign committee allowed the
campaign to be referenda on the former premier, the style of government and
controversial policies, rather than an opportunity for voters to endorse a
government that could acknowledge it had done much to improve the state, reinvigorate the economy and improve government frontline service delivery.
6.5
Rampant throughout all electorates was the campaign of deceit and untruths
propagated by the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the unions on cuts to frontline
services; selling schools and hospitals; and taking away penalties in nurses awards.
There was no fight-back, no attempt to contradict or rebut the blatant untrue ALP
propaganda. It should have been said that the ALP and its union mates would say
and do anything to get into power. Voters should have been reminded that the ALP
had more lessons to learn. Sustained rebuttal would have cut through but without it
the voters believed our opponents.
6.6
Prior to and during the campaign the central campaign committee failed to
emphasise and advertise the considerable achievements in all portfolios and utilise
the ministers (health, education, small business, environment etc.) associated with
these achievements. This is what members and supporters wanted to offset the
party’s opponent’s negative propaganda and blatant deceit and untruths.
6.7
Members in submission and supporters in conversations with us alike
reflected alarm and despair that the LNP did not rebut the blatantly dishonest ALP
print, electronic, flyer and social media advertising campaigns. There was no
counter attack which allowed the ALP to define the LNP. What the party stood for
was lost in the mire of labor deceit and untruths.
6.8
A negative campaign would have been welcomed reminding voters of ‘labor’s
messes.’ This could have been in a compare and contrast style particularly in view of
the LNP government’s significant achievements; or a ‘don’t risk it’ strategy
combining graphs of debt under Labor and the reform and plans of the LNP to
contain the debt; or health waiting lists etc.
6.9
Members were not enamoured with the advertising campaign having views
ranging from ‘below standard’ to ‘weak without a counter punch’. The significance

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 Borbidge Sheldon Review of the January 31 2015 LNP election loss

of the surf boat advertisements was lost on many voters and lacked local value
particularly in the rural and regional electorates.
6.10 The billboard ‘making your community stronger’ had little to no electoral
appeal as there was no reference to the local candidate. The absence of a consistent
message or advertising on jobs and third party endorsement such as screened at the
campaign launch (Cochlear) concerned both candidates and members.
6.11 Under the campaign strategy, it seems that all seats were deemed targets. It
is our experience that a target seat campaign is a critical tool to winning ‘must hold
seats’ and the LNP had several in this category.
6.12 During the campaign with one or two exceptions, the party was without
support from community groups. The LNP should actively address the lack of
community organisation support through networking and developing closer relations
with those that are in the wider community and affinity with the party’s philosophy
and policies.
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Local Campaigns

7.1
The principle that all politics is local was discarded, usurped by a centralised
presidential style of campaign, and tightly controlled by the central campaign
committee staff with minimal input from local campaign committees. With the
exception of one or two well organised campaigns, there were no genuine local
policy initiatives other than those approved by the central campaign committee.
8.

Polling

8.1
An early issue confronting the LNP was the strong expectation amongst
voters that the LNP would win - although with a decreased majority. It was a force
that drove voting behaviour, encouraging a protest vote. This circumstance showed
up in both internal and external opinion polls between elections and at the Redcliffe
and Stafford by-elections.
8.2
The expectation of an LNP win was a settled view in the community of which
the party was aware for several months leading to the 2015 state election. Yet,
there was no strategy to communicate to voters that the reform measures to fix
‘labor’s messes’ had the political cost of the possibility of losing the election and
ending policies and programs to drive investment in Queensland’s infrastructure and
economy.
8.3
Tacit acknowledgement came during the election with television
advertisements that a ‘hung parliament’ was a possibility but these did not
communicate clearly that the LNP could lose the election or the risk if it did lose.
These advertisements were too weak and too late. A strong message was required
that there was a real possibility that the election would be lost meaning a return to

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 Borbidge Sheldon Review of the January 31 2015 LNP election loss

an ALP government that had failed to pay doctors and nurses properly and
borrowed to pay recurrent expenditure.
8.4
Party polling confirmed that the Premier’s image was a significant problem
prior to and during the election. It is surprising that in view of both longitudinal and
overnight polling available, that campaign tactics were not switched to turn the
former Premier’s vices into virtues or at least neutralise them.
9.

Preferences

9.1
The ‘just vote 1 strategy’ was ineffective and made worse when coupled with
the expectation that the LNP would win. Combined, the effect was to drive votes to
the party’s opponents.
9.2
Polling indicated a consistently high independent and minor party vote and
their reported intention was not to preference the LNP. It is surprising that in the
face of this information that the LNP persisted with and insisted on the just vote 1
strategy. Polling suggested that the party needed a flow of preferences and the vote
1 strategy was inappropriate.
9.3
The party’s major opponent framed their pitch for preferences in the
negative protest framework of appealing to voters to put the LNP last. This had the
effect of putting the ALP somewhere closer to first and worked with the mood of the
electorate.
9.4
In the end preference flows made the difference between winning and
losing. The LNP finished first in 51 seats - losing nine - ten seats due to the lack of a
flow of preferences. If the party had been open to the distribution of preferences,
the outcome of the election may have been different.
10

Vetting process and preselections

10.1 Applicant review, better known as the vetting processes for applicant
endorsement, has emerged as a community concern. Whilst no process can be
perfect, the LNP introduced ahead of the 2013 federal election additional
procedures following the experiences with some former members of parliament.
These new procedures seek to reduce the political risk to the party requiring that all
applicants for endorsement provide a series of official records including:
 State and national police records
 Taxation records
 Driver’s license and traffic records - if applicable
 Military record
 Financial details
10.2 The party too, should take into consideration the applicant’s standing and
record in the party, understanding of the party’s philosophy and policies and if
necessary crosschecked with the specific state electorate council (SEC) executive.
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 Borbidge Sheldon Review of the January 31 2015 LNP election loss

11.

The LNP

11.1 Members were disillusioned with the campaign, the defeat of the party at
the January 31 state election, and feel that over the past three years there has been
the loss of connectivity between central headquarters (CHQ) and the grass roots. At
this time, morale is low and members feel neglected, but their belief in the party, its
philosophy, its values and what it stands for is enduring.
11.2 Members overwhelming desire is for the party to regain its ethos of
‘listening to’ the grass roots. Members recognise that unlike its major opponent that
is dominated by the unions for policy, funding and campaign support, the LNP is a
well managed successful corporate entity totally reliant on its membership and
supporters for policy and funding with its leadership team resolute in its belief of the
party.
11.3 Executives who represent the party units at state executive must be mindful
that they are the member’s conduits for information to and from such fora.
11.4 The party’s convention and council could be made more ‘friendly’ with
increased interaction between members of parliament and delegates and
shadows/ministers present and engaged in their portfolio resolutions.
11.5 It would be timely, that now out of government that the CHQ organisational
structure be reviewed to improve efficiency with emphasis on communications,
policy development, and service delivery to members so that it is ready for any
political circumstance that may arise.
11.6 It is our belief that now is the time for:
 the CHQ to nurture the grassroots and the grassroots to shape the character
of the party following the election defeat;
 for the membership base to be widened;
 for party units to be empowered;
 for the gender balance in executive roles improved; and
 for the desire to reinstate the party in government reignited by regaining
the confidence and trust of the people so that they can accept the party’s
goals and policies as being good and right for them.
12.

Social Media

12.1 Social or digital media is emerging as a game changer medium and an opinion
maker due to its immediacy. The party’s social media is not in the space where it can
offset its opponent’s diversity.
12.2 There are members with skills in the use of social media and it would be wise
to utilise these.
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 Borbidge Sheldon Review of the January 31 2015 LNP election loss

Recommendations
1. The Borbidge Sheldon review report and recommendations must be
released to party units at the same time it is given to the state executive
and made public thereafter.
2. The review committee notes the actions taken by the parliamentary party
to address the lessons learned from the 2015 election defeat.
3. The review committee notes the over-riding need to improve the
relationship between the parliamentary and organisational wings of the
party and recommends:
 The parliamentary party members retain the right to select their
leader from within their own ranks.
 A compact be established to define the relationship between the
parliamentary and organisational wings of the party.
o That the compact be prepared by a party member nominated
by the parliamentary leader who should be a previous
parliamentary leader of the LNP, the liberal party or the
national party, a party member nominated by the state
president who should be a former president of the LNP, the
liberal party or the national party and one other, jointly
nominated by both.
o That the compact be agreed to by the parliamentary party and
the state executive and signed by the parliamentary leader
and the party president.
4. That the state executive address as an urgent priority meaningful
connectivity and communications with the grassroots membership.
5. That the LNP Integrity Paper should be updated and implemented and all
candidates should be required to acknowledge and accept its
requirements. That the LNP in government or opposition be required to
adhere to the principles which include:
o broken promises will not be tolerated by the public;
o corruption and lack of accountability will not be tolerated;
o the institutions of state must be respected.
6. That major policy issues proposed by the parliamentary party where
possible be subjected to debate at either the state council or the state
convention or, if found to be urgent, be considered by the president’s
committee/state executive for comment.
7. That a party platform detailing the party’s principles and policies be
finalised for distribution to members as a matter of urgency.
8. That the president and the state director, in the LNP Annual Report
indicate that the administrative, organisational, financial and policy
responsibilities as required under the LNP’s constitution has been
complied with.

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 Borbidge Sheldon Review of the January 31 2015 LNP election loss

9. That the central campaign committee be restructured to include party
policy and decentralised representatives as determined by the president
and parliamentary leader.
10. The position of campaign director should be separate from the state
director and report to the state president.
11. The review committee notes that a limited number of federal issues
impacted adversely on the state campaign, in particular the controversy
over the awarding of knighthoods, the GP co-payment and the defence
pay issue and recommends:
o That close consultation be establish between the central
campaign committee and the federal leadership to minimise
adverse impacts on state campaigns of federal issues and that a
liaison unit be established between central headquarters (CHQ)
and the federal leader’s office.
12. That a central campaign strategy allow increased decision making for
local campaigns.
13. That state elections be avoided during the month of January as it is a
recognised holiday period.
14. The review committee notes with concern:
 The absence of a marginal/target seats campaign at the 2015
state election and recommends that the strategy be reinstated for
future state elections,
 the absence of a negative advertising campaign, the want of the
central campaign committee to exploit the weaknesses of the
prime opponent, and
 the lack of third party endorsements in support of the party’s
policies and actions in the campaign.
It is recommended that such strategies be included in future state
election campaigns.
15 Sitting MPS, recontesting the poll should be permitted to handle PVA’s
for his/her electorate, whilst candidates PVAs should be managed by the
central campaign.
16 It is essential that booth advertising material should arrive prior to
prepolling; booth signs should be of a size that enables them to be easily
and safely transported.
17 The centralised banking system and the campaign funding/ budgeting
process should be reviewed specifically to provide party units with
increased financial control and campaign committees with the latitude to
make funding decisions - whilst maintaining the link to CHQ
budget/systems/agreements. It recommended that:
 That the treasurer report to state convention or council, as a
matter of urgency, on measures that can be implemented to
provide SEC’s with greater responsibility for their funds and
budgets.
18 The Just Vote 1 strategy should be reviewed to ensure that it is applicable
to the political and election circumstances.

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 Borbidge Sheldon Review of the January 31 2015 LNP election loss

19 The review committee notes the enhancements to the applicant review
process for the endorsement of candidates and recommends that the
processes be monitored to ensure they are robust to meet any issue that
may emerge.
20 Plebiscites should be the preferred method for the selection of
candidates.
21 That the CHQ organisational structure be reviewed to improve efficiency
with emphasis on communications, policy development, membership
services and the delivery thereof.
22 That the gender balance of the state executive be a consideration of
members when electing persons to roles on this body.
23 That all appointments made by the state president or the state executive
be subject to confirmation by state council.
24 That the composition of the president’s committee be widened to include
the parliamentary leader or his nominee.
25 That members of state executive recognise the responsibilities associated
with their dual roles of governance and communications to and from
party units and ensure they act as conduits of information.
26 That a membership customer relations manager be appointed.
27 A permanent strategic research office should be established in CHQ to
undertake electorate and policy research.
28 A membership development strategy should be developed to grow the
membership which should include the introduction of online membership
applications.
29 A new category of family membership should be introduced.
30 State convention or state council resolutions be categorised to reflect the
three levels of government so that the responsible
minister/shadow/councillor or other office holder may be present for the
duration of the debate.
31 State convention and state council attendance by the parliamentary
leader and members of parliament be required unless in extenuating
circumstances.
32 Meetings of the LNP state council and state convention and shadow
cabinet meetings should be held, where practicable in regional centres as
well as the capital city.
33 That ministers/shadows meet regularly with party policy chairs and their
committees and attendance or otherwise conveyed to the parliamentary
leader and the state president.
34 That CHQ prepare a data base of membership expertise as a resource for
MP’s and policy committees.
35 That the LNP establish an independent review of its social media strategy
and its effectiveness compared to our political opponents.
36 That social media training should be introduced for MP’s, senior staff and
party members.
37 That an ongoing social media strategy be developed.
38 That members of parliament and candidates not be directly involved in
the soliciting of funds.
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 Borbidge Sheldon Review of the January 31 2015 LNP election loss

39 That the LNP consider the full public funding of election campaigns and
the banning of trade union and corporate donations.
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