62-CV-15-1979

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Ramsey County, MN

STATE OF MINNESOTA

DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY OF RAMSEY

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Case Type: Civil Other / Misc.

Anthony Hernandez, Michelle Hughes,
Katelyn Knight, Aberdeen Rodriguez,
Cynthia Cain, Rachel Dietsch, Joan
Dobbert, Skye Hoekstra, Leah Larson,
and Anthony Munsterman,
Plaintiffs,

Civil File No. 62-CV-15-1979
Hon. Shawn M. Bartsh

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS

v.
Minnesota Board of Teaching,
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
The present action involves a challenge by ten individual plaintiffs to the State’s practices
and procedures for issuing Minnesota teaching licenses.

Defendant Minnesota Board of

Teaching (“the Board”) is entitled to dismissal of all of the claims alleged in plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”). Plaintiffs have failed to plead any legally cognizable
claim for relief over which this Court has jurisdiction. The Court should therefore dismiss this
action under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(a) and 12.02(e).
BACKGROUND
Placing plaintiffs’ allegations in context requires a brief overview of the statutory and
regulatory provisions governing teacher licensure in Minnesota. The Board is the state licensing
board granted the statutory authority to adopt rules governing teacher licensure and teacher
preparation programs within Minnesota. Minn. Stat. § 122A.09, subd. 4 (2014). The Board
“consists of 11 members appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate.”

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Id. § 122A.07, subd. 1 (2014). As a non-health-related licensing board, only Board members
who are not employees of the State or employees of a political subdivision within the State
receive compensation for Board activities. Id. § 214.09, subd. 3 (2014). The Board has the
authority to license teachers in Minnesota, but, by statute, all licenses under the jurisdiction of
the Board are issued through the licensing division of the Minnesota Department of Education
(“MDE”). Id. § 122A.18, subd. 1(a), (c) (2014); see Am. Compl. Ex. 11.
The Board approves teacher preparation programs offered within the State and evaluates
these programs on a regular basis to ensure that they provide curriculum, instruction, and
assessment to teacher candidates in the content and pedagogical requirements applicable to
teacher licensure fields. See Minn. Stat. § 122A.09, subd. 4(c) (2014) (“The board must adopt
rules to approve teacher preparation programs.”); Minn. R. 8700.7600 (2013) (“Institutional
Program Approval for Teacher Preparation”); Minn. R. 8710.2000-.5850 (2013) (“Teacher
Standards” rules). In addition to the administrative rules adopted by the Board, the legislature
has prescribed statutory requirements for teacher-preparation programs. See, e.g., Minn. Stat.
§§ 122A.09, subd. 4(d), .18, subd. 2a (requiring teacher-preparation programs to include reading
strategies training).
Issuance of Minnesota teaching licenses to individuals who have completed out-of-state
teacher-preparation programs is allowed by Minn. Stat. § 122A.23, subd. 1 (2014). The statute
gives the Board discretion to issue Minnesota teaching licenses to individuals who have
completed an “essentially equivalent” teacher preparation program in another state:
When a license to teach is authorized to be issued to any holder of a diploma or a
degree of a Minnesota state university, or of the University of Minnesota, or of a
liberal arts university, or a technical training institution, such license may also, in
the discretion of the Board of Teaching or the commissioner of education,
whichever has jurisdiction, be issued to any holder of a diploma or a degree of a
teacher training institution of equivalent rank and standing of any other state. The

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diploma or degree must be granted by virtue of completing a course in teacher
preparation essentially equivalent in content to that required by such Minnesota
state university or the University of Minnesota or a liberal arts university in
Minnesota or a technical training institution as preliminary to the granting of a
diploma or a degree of the same rank and class. For purposes of granting a
Minnesota teaching license to a person who receives a diploma or degree from a
state-accredited, out-of-state teacher training program leading to licensure, the
Board of Teaching must establish criteria and streamlined procedures to recognize
the experience and professional credentials of the person holding the out-of-state
diploma or degree and allow that person to demonstrate to the board the person’s
qualifications for receiving a Minnesota teaching license based on performance
measures the board adopts under this section.
Minn. Stat. § 122A.23, subd. 1.

Under this statutory requirement, licensure may, in the

discretion of the Board, be granted to individuals who have completed non-Minnesota teacher
preparation programs “essentially equivalent in content” to that required by Minnesota
programs.1 See also Minn. R. 8710.0400, subp. 3.C (2013). The requirements of Minn. Stat.
§ 122A.23, subd. 1, also apply to individuals who complete an alternative teacher-preparation
program in a state other than Minnesota. See Minn. Stat. § 122A.245, subd. 6 (2014).
Applicants for teacher licensure who already hold teaching licenses issued in other states
may seek Minnesota licensure under Minn. Stat. § 122A.23, subd. 2. Subdivision 2(a) of this
statute provides:
Subject to the requirements of sections 122A.18, subdivision 8 and 123B.03, the
Board of Teaching must issue a teaching license or a temporary teaching license
under paragraphs (b) to (e) to an applicant who holds at least a baccalaureate
degree from a regionally accredited college or university and holds or held a
similar out-of-state teaching license that requires the applicant to successfully
complete a teacher preparation program approved by the issuing state, which
includes field-specific teaching methods and student teaching or essentially
equivalent experience.
1

The legislature passed amendments to Minn. Stat. § 122A.23, subd. 1 in the E-12 Education
Finance and Policy Bill in the most recent legislative session. See HF 844, Art. 2 § 18, 89th Reg.
Sess. (Minn. 2015). Governor Dayton vetoed this bill in its entirety. The amendment to
§ 122A.23, subd. 1, proposed by the legislature would require completion of “coursework in
teacher preparation” and would delete the “essentially equivalent in content” language. Id.

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Minn. Stat. § 122A.23, subd. 2(a). The statutory language does not refer to the issuance of a
“standard” teaching license; instead, it directs issuance of “a teaching license or a temporary
teaching license under paragraphs (b) to (e).” Id. (emphasis added); cf. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 30.
Rather than compel the issuance of full licensure to individuals who hold out-of-state teaching
licenses, Minn. Stat. § 122A.23, subd. 2(a), allows the Board to issue temporary teaching
licenses to individuals who have not yet met all Minnesota standards for a full professional
licensure. See also Minn. R. 8710.0400, subps. 4-7.
Chapter 122A of the Minnesota Statutes does not contain any provision authorizing
licensure applicants to enforce its provisions by way of a civil action in district court. Cf. Minn.
Stat. §§ 122A.40, .41 (2014) (granting certain arbitration rights to teachers proposed for
discharge). Instead, State law allows individuals whose applications for licensure have been
denied by the educator licensing division of MDE to appeal the licensing decision to the Board in
a contested case hearing in accordance with Minn. Stat. ch. 14. Minn. R. 8710.0900 (2013).
Under this procedure, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), after an evidentiary hearing, issues a
report and recommendation to the Board. Minn. Stat. § 14.50 (2014); Minn. R. 1400.8100,
subp. 3 (2013). After issuance of the ALJ’s report, the parties to the contested case have the
opportunity to serve and file arguments and exceptions to the Board. Minn. Stat. § 14.61 (2014).
The Board then issues a final written decision. Id. § 14.62; Minn. R. 1400.8200. If the Board
“rejects or modifies a finding of fact, conclusion, or recommendation” in the ALJ’s report, it
must “include the reasons for each rejection or modification.” Minn. Stat. § 14.62, subd. 1. The
Board’s decision after a contested case is subject to certiorari review by the Court of Appeals.
Minn. Stat. § 14.63. Individuals denied issuance of Minnesota teaching licenses have previously
successfully instituted contested case proceedings and sought certiorari review of such denial.

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See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 88-93; see also Beaty v. Minn. Bd. of Teaching, 354 N.W.2d 466 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984).
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Plaintiffs are individuals challenging the State’s policies and procedures in the issuance
of Minnesota teaching licenses. 2 Nine of the plaintiffs are individuals who have completed outof-state teacher preparation programs or hold out-of-state teaching licenses and assert a right to
the issuance of a Minnesota teaching license in broader scope or authority than was issued to
them. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 14, 26, 30, 34, 45-46, 50, 52, 59, 62. One of the plaintiffs has
not submitted any application for Minnesota teaching licensure.

Id. ¶¶ 19-20.

Plaintiffs

commenced this case in April 2015 alleging claims against the Board under the Minnesota
Constitution, the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (“UDJA”), and “Injunction” against the
Board. Id. ¶¶ 142-71. The predicate for plaintiffs’ claims is their allegation that they have a
statutory right to a licensure-by-portfolio process under Minn. Stat. § 122A.21 or to the issuance
of a license under Minn. Stat. § 122A.23. Id. ¶¶ 145, 151, 158, 160, 168. Because the Amended
Complaint fails to state any legally cognizable claim for relief in this Court, the Board served
and filed a motion to dismiss and motion for a protective order on April 22, 2015. The hearing
on the Board’s motions is scheduled for June 25, 2015.

2

Much of the relief sought in the Amended Complaint is not related to the individual plaintiffs
and instead directed to “applicants” for licensure. Am. Compl. 32 ¶¶ 2-6. Similarly, numerous
allegations in the complaint relate to unidentified “applicants” rather than any plaintiffs in this
case. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 86-93. As the caption for the Amended Complaint notes,
plaintiffs are suing the Board “individually,” and lack standing to bring claims on behalf of
unidentified other applicants who are not parties to this suit.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e), the only question before
the court is whether the complaint states a legally sufficient claim for relief. Martens v. Minn.
Mining & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 739 (Minn. 2000).

In other words, the Court must

determine whether the complaint states a sufficient legal basis for the recovery it seeks.
Brakke v. Hilgers, 374 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). While modern pleading rules
are liberal, they are not “a substitute for substantive law.” N. Star Legal Found. v. Honeywell
Project, 355 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). Dismissal under Rule 12 is appropriate in
cases which are fatally flawed in their legal premises and certain to fail, thereby sparing litigants
the burden of unnecessary pretrial and trial activity.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

326-27 (1989). Although factual allegations are entitled to some deference, legal conclusions
contained in a complaint are not binding on the court. Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80
(Minn. 2010).
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(a) provides for the dismissal of a complaint
where the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. “Whenever it appears by suggestion of the
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss
the action.”

Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.08(c).

“[A]bsent an explicit statutory or appellate rule

authorizing review in the district court, judicial review of all administrative quasi-judicial
decisions must be invoked only by writ of certiorari to the court of appeals.” Tischer v. Hous. &
Redevelopment Auth. of Cambridge, 675 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d
693 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 2005). “Where no right of discretionary review has been provided by
statute or appellate rules for the quasi-judicial decision of an administrative agency or an
administrative law judge, an aggrieved party has the common law right to petition for a writ of

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certiorari . . . .”

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In re Haymes, 444 N.W.2d 257, 259 (Minn. 1989); see also Minn.

Stat. §§ 480A.06, subd. 3, 606.01 (2014).
ARGUMENT
I.

COUNTS I AND II OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CLAIM BECAUSE THERE IS NO PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE
MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION.
Plaintiffs describe Count I of their Amended Complaint as a claim for “Violation of

Plaintiffs’ Procedural Due Process Rights Under the Minnesota Constitution.” Am. Compl. 28.
Plaintiffs allege that the Board has violated their due process rights under the Minnesota
Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 142-46. Similarly, in Count II for “Non-Delegation,”3 plaintiffs allege that
the Board has violated their due process and equal protection rights under the Minnesota
Constitution. Id. ¶ 156. The legal basis for the claims raised in Counts I and II are the Board’s
alleged violations of plaintiffs’ rights arising under the Minnesota Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 146, 156.
In their Prayer for Relief, plaintiffs specifically seek damages for the alleged violations of their
due process rights. Id. at 33 ¶ 7.
Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint must be dismissed, because longstanding
Minnesota law provides that there is no private cause of action for alleged violations of the
Minnesota Constitution. Guite v. Wright, 976 F. Supp. 866, 871 (D. Minn. 1997), aff’d on other
grounds, 147 F.3d 747 (8th Cir. 1998); Bird v. State, 375 N.W.2d 36, 40 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(“[T]here is no tort in Minnesota for deprivation of due process . . . .”); see also Eggenberger v.
3

The constitutional non-delegation doctrine relates to the legislature. See West. St. Paul Fed. of
Teachers v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 70, 713 N.W.2d 366, 376 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (“The nondelegation doctrine has been articulated as follows: ‘The legislature – except where expressly
authorized by the constitution . . . cannot delegate purely legislative power to any other body,
person, board or commission.’”) (quoting Lee v. Delmont, 36 N.W.2d 530, 538 (Minn. 1949))
(omissions in original). Plaintiffs do not allege in the Amended Complaint that Minn. Stat.
§§ 122A.21 or 122A.23 are an impermissible delegation of legislative power to the Board by the
Legislature. Cf. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 147-56.

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West Albany Twp., ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2015 WL 520793, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 9, 2015) (“There
is no authority providing a cause of action for the alleged state constitutional violations.”).4 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals has repeatedly recognized the legal insufficiency of claims seeking
relief under the Minnesota Constitution.

See Laliberte v. State, No. A13-0907,

2014 WL 1407808, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2014) (affirming dismissal of complaint
alleging claims for violation of due-process rights under the Minnesota Constitution under Minn.
R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim and noting that “Minnesota law does not recognize
a private cause of action for violations of the Minnesota Constitution”); Mlnarik v. City of
Minnetrista, A09-910, 2010 WL 346402, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2010) (“We agree with
the district court that “[n]o private cause of action for a violation of the Minnesota constitution
has yet been recognized . . . . Therefore [appellant]’s complaint fails to state a claim.”); Martinez
v. City of St. Paul, No. C4-97-785, 1997 WL 729212, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1997)
(affirming dismissal of equal-protection claim under the Minnesota Constitution and noting that
such a claim “is not cognizable and the district court correctly dismissed it”).
The legal bar on claims like those raised in Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint is
absolute. As the Court of Appeals explained in Davis v. Hennepin County, No. A11-1083, 2012
WL 896409, (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2012):
Regardless of the provision or allegation that appellant relies on to support his
Minnesota constitutional claims, Minnesota does not allow private actions based
on alleged violations of the Minnesota Constitution. Minnesota does not have a
statutory equivalent to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows a private suit for damages
based on violations of the United States Constitution. None of the statutes that
appellant cites authorizes a private cause of action for alleged violations of his
state constitutional right to free speech or equal protection of the laws. Because

4

True and correct copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein are provided as exhibits to the
affidavit of Fiona Ruthven filed herewith.

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appellant’s private cause of action is not authorized by law, the district court did
not err in dismissing his ‘invidious discrimination’ claim.
Id. at *2.

Indeed, such claims are correctly deemed “frivolous.”

See Danforth v. Eling,

No. A10-130, 2010 WL 4068791, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2010) (affirming dismissal of
complaint alleging claim for violation of due-process rights under the Minnesota Constitution
and noting that “[a]s to appellant’s state constitutional claims, ‘there is no private cause of action
for violations of the Minnesota Constitution.’ No legal basis supports appellant’s claims for
violations of the Minnesota Constitution, and the district court correctly dismissed them as
frivolous.”) (quoting Guite v. Wright, 976 F. Supp. 866, 871 (D. Minn. 1997)).
Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint fail to state a claim as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the Court should dismiss these claims under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e).
II.

COUNT III OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE UDJA
IS NOT AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE OF JURISDICTION.
In Count III of the Amended Complaint, plaintiffs request declaratory relief from the

Court related to issuance of Minnesota teaching licenses to out-of-state applicants.

Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 157-64. Plaintiffs demand declarations from this Court relating to statutory licensure
requirements for licensure and Board operations. Id. at 32-33 ¶¶ 1-6.
The Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to issue any of the declaratory relief plaintiffs
seek. Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that the UDJA is a grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to a
court. Id. ¶ 65. The UDJA is not an independent source of court jurisdiction over each and
every claim a party might wish to assert. See Brown v. State, 617 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2000). In Alliance for Metropolitan Stability v. Metropolitan Council, 671 N.W.2d 905
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003), the Court of Appeals explained the limited scope of a court’s jurisdiction
under the UDJA and emphasized that “[a] party seeking a declaratory judgment must have an
independent, underlying cause of action based on a common-law or statutory right.” Id. at 916.
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Under this and related case law, the mere fact that a party seeks a declaration regarding statutory
rights and responsibilities is insufficient to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction if the statute at issue
does not create a right of action. Id. (“There is no private right to enforce the MLUPA, and the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act cannot create a cause of action that does not otherwise
exist.”); see also Vrieze v. New Century Homes, Inc., 542 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)
(rejecting declaratory judgment claim that sought to compel performance of certain official
duties and noting that “of course some recovery theory must underlie a declaratory judgment
demand”).
Chapter 122A does not create any private right of action to enforce its terms. See Shipley
v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 197, No. A06-681, 2007 WL 152228, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
Jan. 23, 2007) (“Because section 122A.40 does not expressly authorize a civil action in district
court, [the appellant’s] only means to challenge the school board’s alleged noncompliance with
section 122A.40 is by writ of certiorari to the court of appeals.”); see also Pazos v. Int’l Union of
Operating Eng’rs, No. C6-96-2222, 1997 WL 471324, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 1997)
(“[T]he mere fact that a statute creates duties [on an administrative agency] does not mandate
implying a private cause of action.”). Plaintiffs cannot use the UDJA to take an end-run around
the Legislature’s decision not to create a cause of action in a trial court to enforce Minn.
Stat. §§ 122A.21, 122A.23.5 Because plaintiffs have not pleaded any legally sufficient cause of

5

Similarly, plaintiffs cannot claim a right to enforce these statutory provisions through the “due
process” theory set forth in Counts I and II of their Amended Complaint. See Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 145,151. The Legislature did not create a right to action to enforce Chapter 122A in
the district court, and plaintiffs cannot avoid this limit through artful pleading.

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action, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over their claim for declaratory relief under the
UDJA.6
A court’s power to adjudicate requires the existence of a justiciable controversy.
See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Franck, 621 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). “If the parties
to a declaratory action present no justiciable controversy, the court is without jurisdiction to
declare rights.” Id. Because Count III fails to state a justiciable claim, it must be dismissed.
III.

COUNT IV OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE AN
INJUNCTION IS A REMEDY, NOT A CAUSE OF ACTION.
Count IV of the Amended Complaint is titled “Injunction.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 165-171.

But “[i]njunctive relief is a remedy and not, in itself, a cause of action, and a cause of action
must exist before injunctive relief may be granted.” Ryan v. Hennepin Cnty., 29 N.W.2d 385,
387 (Minn. 1947). As detailed herein, plaintiffs have failed to plead any legally cognizable
cause of action. As a result, their claim for “injunction” must be dismissed as a matter of law.
See Newman v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2015 WL 321442, at *9
(D. Minn. Jan. 26, 2015) (“Because plaintiff’s underlying claim fails, his claim for injunctive
relief fails.”).
IV.

PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS LIE WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS.
At its core, plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is a challenge to quasi-judicial licensing

decisions.

See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 14, 26, 34, 46, 53, 59, 62, 143, 145, 151, 159, 160.

Longstanding Minnesota case law holds that appeals from agency decisions of this general type
6

The Court of Appeals has further recognized that “[a]n exception to the district court’s broad
jurisdiction exists when a claim that otherwise be proper in a declaratory-judgment action
implicates a quasi-judicial decision by an administrative agency.” Anderson v. County of Lyon,
784 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). It is plain that Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief
implicate quasi-judicial licensing decisions. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 158, 160.

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are the exclusive jurisdiction of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, not the district courts. In re N.
Metro Harness, Inc., 711 N.W.2d 129, 137 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); see also Lund v. Minn. State
Colleges & Univs., 615 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that MnSCU’s
licensure decisions and interpretation of its statutory authority to issue licenses to teaching
personnel constituted a quasi-judicial decision solely subject to certiorari review by the Court of
Appeals, and, thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus). As the
Minnesota Supreme Court has “long held”:
[I]n the absence of an adequate method of review or legal remedy, judicial review
of the quasi-judicial decisions[7] of administrative bodies, if available, must be
invoked by writ of certiorari. Review by certiorari [“]is limited to an inspection
of the record of the inferior tribunal in which the court is necessarily confined to
questions affecting the jurisdiction of the board, the regularity of its proceedings,
and, as to merits of the controversy, whether the order or determination in a
particular case was arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an
erroneous theory of law, or without any evidence to support it.[”]
Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1992) (quoting State ex rel. Ging v. Bd. of
Educ. of Duluth, 7 N.W.2d 544, 556 (Minn. 1942)). The Dietz court held that the limitation on
certiorari jurisdiction “stems not from slavish adherence to hypertechnical rules, but from our
long-standing recognition that when the core discretionary acts of executive bodies are
challenged, the continued vitality of fundamental constitutional principles compels the judiciary

7

Fundamentally, decisions regarding the award of teaching licenses are quasi-judicial ones
because they constitute judicial acts—that is, applications of legal standards to specific presented
facts:
The distinction between a judicial and a legislative act is well defined. The one
determines what the law is, and what the rights of parties are, with reference to
transactions already had; the other prescribes what the law shall be in future cases
arising under it. Wherever an act undertakes to determine a question of right or
obligation, or of property, as the foundation upon which it proceeds, such act is to
that extent a judicial one . . . .
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 99 U.S. 700, 761 (1878) (Field, J., dissenting).

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to exercise limited scrutiny.” Id. at 240-41; see also Anderson, 784 N.W.2d at 81 (recognizing
that the separation-of-powers doctrine “precludes district court review of an administrative
agency’s quasi-judicial decision”). These separation-of-powers principles mean that “[d]istrict
courts should not exercise jurisdiction over matters that intrude into the policy decisions of the
legislative and executive branches.” Zuehlke v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 316, 538 N.W.2d 721, 725
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
Pursuant to statute, “[t]he [Minnesota] Court of Appeals shall have jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari to all agencies, public corporations and public officials, except the Tax Court
and the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals.” Minn. Stat. § 480A.06, subd. 3 (2014); see
also Minn. Stat. ch. 606 (governing writs of certiorari).

Indeed, the Supreme Court has

repeatedly held that, “absent express statutory language vesting judicial review of an agency
action in the district court, the court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over writs of
certiorari.”

Heideman v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, 555 N.W.2d 322, 323 (Minn. 1996)

(emphasis added) (citing Twp. of Honner v. Redwood Cnty., 518 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994)).
In the instant case, there is no “statutory language vesting judicial review of [any Board]
action in the district court[.]” See id. Indeed, the Board’s statutes make no specific provision for
judicial appeals of Board decisions at all.

See Minn. Stat. ch. 122A.

As a result, under

section 480A.06, Dietz, Heideman, and related case law, plaintiffs’ action (and any other court
challenge to licensing decisions of the Board) is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the

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Minnesota Court of Appeals, not the district courts.8 See also Shipley, 2007 WL 152228, at *2
(“Because section 122A.40 does not expressly authorize a civil action in district court, Shipley’s
only means to challenge the school board’s alleged noncompliance with section 122A.40 is by
writ of certiorari to the court of appeals.”).
This conclusion obtains despite plaintiffs’ attempt to end-run the requirements of
certiorari review by styling their action as an action for declaratory and injunctive relief. The
structure of the Amended Complaint notwithstanding, this action is fundamentally a challenge to
licensure decisions—quasi-judicial determinations that present a classic case of certiorari
jurisdiction.

If plaintiffs can avoid certiorari jurisdiction merely by alleging that (1) the

standards on which licensing decisions were based, or (2) the processes by which the Board
reached such decisions, were unlawful, then any party who objects to a quasi-judicial agency
action could avoid certiorari jurisdiction in the same manner. Because certiorari cases are
committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, the instant action is not within
the subject-matter jurisdiction of this Court. As a result, plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint must be
dismissed.

8

As explained in Part V, infra, Plaintiffs’ attempt to seek review in this Court of the Board’s
decisions is further burdened by the fact that Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies provided to them by Minn. R. 8710.0900. As a result, even if this action had been
initiated, as it should have been, as a petition for certiorari in the Minnesota Court of Appeals,
Plaintiffs’ challenges to their individual licensing determinations would still require immediate
dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies through the contested case process of
Minn. R. 8710.0900. See Dietz, 487 N.W.2d at 239 (emphasis added) (holding certiorari
jurisdiction under Minn. Stat. § 480A.06, subd. 3 is only available “in the absence of an adequate
method of review or legal remedy”).

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V.

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
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Ramsey County, MN

PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO EXHAUST THE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AVAILABLE
TO THEM.
Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief fails as a matter of law for the separate reason that

an adequate remedy at law exists. See Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux (Dakota) Cmty. v. Minn.
Campaign Finance & Pub. Disclosure Bd., 586 N.W.2d 406, 409 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (“A
party seeking an injunction must first establish that the legal remedy is inadequate[.]”); see also
Lund, 615 N.W.2d at 424 (holding that certiorari review of licensing decision at Court of
Appeals was an adequate remedy at law that precluded the grant of equitable relief in the form of
a writ of mandamus). Minnesota law vests the Board with the authority to refuse to issue a
teaching license for failure to meet licensure requirements. Minn. Stat. § 122A.20, subd. 1(a)(4).
“All persons denied issuance or renewal of licenses granted by the Board of Teaching . . . are . . .
entitled to a hearing pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, chapter 14, on such denial and to a final
decision by the Board of Teaching.” Minn. R. 8710.0900. “Failure to file a written request for a
hearing within 30 days constitutes a waiver of the individual’s right to a hearing.” Id.
Plaintiffs allege that they have no adequate remedy at law because “the authority of the
Executive Director of the Board of Teaching is unrestricted by the findings of an administrative
law judge.” Am. Compl. ¶ 169. This allegation lacks a legal basis, and plaintiffs appear to
fundamentally misapprehend the administrative contested-case process. After a hearing before
an impartial ALJ, the Board, and not the Board’s Executive Director, issues a final order. Minn.
Stat. § 14.62. Like any other final order issued under chapter 14, the Board’s order is subject to
judicial review by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. See Part IV, supra; Minn. Stat. § 14.63

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(“Any person aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review of the
decision under the provisions of sections 14.63 to 14.68 . . . .”).9
The mere fact that plaintiffs prefer to avoid the administrative process set out in
Minnesota law does not give them the right to sidestep that process. Zaluckyj v. Rice Creek
Watershed Dist., 639 N.W.2d 70 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (“Generally, a party must exhaust its
administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief unless the remedies are inadequate or
nonexistent.”).

Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies to challenge the

licensing determinations made under Minn. Stat. § 122A.23 separately bars this Court from
exercising jurisdiction in this action.

See Centra Homes, LLC v. City of Norwood Young

America, 834 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (reversing trial court’s denial of motion to
dismiss and holding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over claims for
declaratory judgment, mandamus, and injunctive relief where plaintiffs failed to exhaust
available administrative remedies before seeking judicial review).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have not asserted any legally cognizable cause of action over which this Court
may properly assert jurisdiction. Pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(a) and
(e), Defendant Minnesota Board of Teaching respectfully requests that all of the claims in
plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint be dismissed.

9

Plaintiffs cannot establish that pursuing their administrative remedies would have been futile.
The futility exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement “does not . . .
permit a party to rely on its personal belief that it would not have been successful if it had
followed the procedures.” In re Board Order, Kells (BWSR) v. City of Rochester,
597 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)

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Dated: May 28, 2015.

Filed in Second Judicial District Court
5/28/2015 3:55:10 PM
Ramsey County, MN

Respectfully submitted,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of Minnesota

/s/ Fiona B. Ruthven
FIONA B. RUTHVEN
Assistant Attorney General
Atty. Reg. No. 0333761
NATHAN J. HARTSHORN
Assistant Attorney General
Atty. Reg. No. 0320602
445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1800
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2134
(651) 757-1248 (Voice)
(651) 282-2525 (TTY)
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
MINNESOTA BOARD OF
TEACHING

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 62-CV-15-1979

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Ramsey County, MN

MINN. STAT. § 549.211 ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The party on whose behalf the attached document is served acknowledges through its
undersigned counsel that sanctions, including reasonable attorney fees and other expenses, may
be awarded to the opposite party or parties pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 549.211 (2014).
Dated: May 28, 2015

Respectfully submitted,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of Minnesota

/s/ Fiona B. Ruthven
FIONA B. RUTHVEN
Assistant Attorney General
Atty. Reg. No. 0333761
NATHAN J. HARTSHORN
Assistant Attorney General
Atty. Reg. No. 0320602
445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1800
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2134
(651) 757-1248 (Voice)
(651) 282-2525 (TTY)
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
MINNESOTA BOARD OF TEACHING

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