OIG Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks

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(S) RELATED FINDING 20: ISSUES RELATING TO SAUDI ARABIA

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	(U) Joint Inquiry Discussion	on	
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	(S/ NF) The report emphasized that the JI	(b)(3
	had made "no final determinations as to the reliability or	
	sufficiency of the information" regarding Saudi issues raised	
	by its inquiry.	
(U) Assessmen	t of the Finding	
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(U) Assessmen	(S/ NF) Many of the points of this finding	(b)(3
(U) Assessmen	(S/ NF) Many of the points of this finding relate to the FBI's investigative efforts on the Saudi	(b)(3
(U) Assessmen	(S/ NF) Many of the points of this finding relate to the FBI's investigative efforts on the Saudi intelligence presence in the United States and of Saudi	(b)(3
(U) Assessmen	(S/ NF) Many of the points of this finding relate to the FBI's investigative efforts on the Saudi intelligence presence in the United States and of Saudi officials' contacts with terrorists in the country, and, as such,	(b)(3
(U) Assessmen	(S/ NF) Many of the points of this finding relate to the FBI's investigative efforts on the Saudi intelligence presence in the United States and of Saudi officials' contacts with terrorists in the country, and, as such, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 9/11 Review Team	(b)(3
(U) Assessmen	(S/ NF) Many of the points of this finding relate to the FBI's investigative efforts on the Saudi intelligence presence in the United States and of Saudi officials' contacts with terrorists in the country, and, as such, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 9/11 Review Team defers consideration of these to the Department of Justice	(b)(3
(U) Assessmen	(S/ NF) Many of the points of this finding relate to the FBI's investigative efforts on the Saudi intelligence presence in the United States and of Saudi officials' contacts with terrorists in the country, and, as such, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 9/11 Review Team defers consideration of these to the Department of Justice and the FBI. The Team lacks access to the full range of	(b)(3
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sympathizers within the government may have aided al-Qa'ida. A January 1999 Directorate of Intelligence (DI)/Office of Transnational Issues Intelligence Report on Bin Ladin's finances indicated that "limited" reporting suggested that "a few Saudi Government officials" may support Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) but added that the reporting was "too sparse to determine with any accuracy" such support. None of the Saudi Government officials named in that report was a member of a

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
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
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