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Referendums
TO BE HELD ON
SATURDAY, 21 MAY 1977

Proposed laws for the alteration of the constitution have been passed by an
absolute majority of each House of the Parliament.
Before a proposed law to alter the Constitution can be assented to, the proposed
law must be approved in a majority of the States by a majority of electors voting and
by a majority of all the electors voting on that proposed law.
Four proposed laws for the alteration of the Constitution are being put before
electors on Saturday, 21 May 1977,. The proposed laws are entitled:
 CONSTITUTION ALTERATION (SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS)
1977
(To alter the Constitution so as to ensure that Senate elections are
held at the same time as House of Represenatives Elections)
 CONSTITUTION ALTERATION (SENATE CASUAL
VACANCIES)1977
(To alter the Constitution so as to ensure so far as practicable that a
Casual Vacancy in the Senate is filled by a Person of the same
Political Party as the Senator chosen by the People and for the
balance of the his Term)
 CONSTITUTION ALTERATION (REFERENDUMS) 1977
(To alter the Constitution so as to allow Electors in territories, as well
as Electors in the States, to vote at Referendums on Proposed Laws to
alter the Constitution)
 CONSTITUTION ALTERATION (RETIREMENT OF JUDGES)
1977
(To alter the constitution so as to provide for Retiring Ages for
Judges of Federal Courts)
To assist electors to decide whether they approve or do not approve of the proposed
changes to the constitution I am required to have printed and posted to each elector a
pamphlet containing:
 The ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR of each proposed law, being arguments
that were authorised by a majority of those members of both Houses of
the Parliament who voted for each proposed law and desired to forward
arguments to me;
 The ARGUMENTS AGAINST each proposed law being arguments that
were authorised by a majority of those members of both houses of the
Parliament who voted against each proposed law and desired to forward
arguments to me; and
A STATEMENT showing the alterations and additions proposed to be
made to the constitution by the proposed laws.
The ARGUMENTS and STATEMENT are provided in this pamphlet.
VOTING IS COMPULSORY
28 March 1977
K.W. Pearson
Chief Australian Electoral Officer

 Contents
The arguments in favour of the Proposed Laws:
 Constitution Alteration (Simultaneous Elections) 1977
 Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual Vacancies)1977
 Constitution Alteration (Referendums) 1977
 Constitution Alteration (Retirement Of Judges) 1977
The Arguments Against the Proposed Laws:
 Referendum (Simultaneous Elections) 1977
 Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual Vacancies)1977
 Constitution Alteration (Referendums) 1977
Statement showing the Alterations Proposed to be made to the Constitution
Sample of Ballot-Paper

 The Arguments in Favour of the Proposed Laws
THE CASE FOR YES

The Reasons for Voting YES
On 21 May you will have a chance to vote for fairness, justice and commonsense
in Australia’s political system. You can do this by voting “YES” to the four proposed
Constitutional amendments.

The Questions
There will be four questions on the ballot paper. By voting YES to each of them
you will ensure that:





Elections for both the Senate and the House of Representatives are
held on the same day.
Your choice of Parties at a Senate election cannot be changed
except by the voters at the next election.
Australians who live in the Northern Territory and the Australian
Capital Territory are given the basic democratic right to vote in
referendums — the same right you now have.
Federal Judges retire at a specified age in the same manner as
State Judges.

The proposals supported by all Parties represented in Federal Parliament.
The proposals are all fair, practical and sensible measures to reform our
Constitution.

Simultaneous Elections
It is proposed to alter the Constitution so as to ensure
that Senate Elections are held at the same time as House
of Representatives Elections.
A YES vote will ensure elections
for the House of RepresentativeS and
the Senate are held on the same day.
This is a simple matter of
commonsense.

must be backdated to 1 July 1975.
However, the term of Members of the
house of Representatives also elected
on 13 december 975 dates from 17
February 1976.

Houses out of Alignment
At the present time, Senate
elections are not held at the same time
as elections for the House of
Representatives. The two Houses are
out of alignment because, as the
Constitution now stands, the term of
Senators elected on 13 December 1975

Unless this referendum succeeds,
there could be as many as four
federal elections in the next four
years. You will constantly have to go
to the polls even though half the time
you will not be electing a
Government.

 What is Proposed
At present Senators are elected for six
years and Members of the House of
Representatives are elected for not
more than three years.
It is now proposed that Senators will
be electred for two terms of the House
of Representatives.
 The powers and authority of the
Senate will remain unaltered.
 No State will be disadvantaged by
this proposal. The less populous
States will still have as many
Senators as the more populous.
 The Senate will still have the same
power to review, amend or reject
legislation.
 The Senate will more accurately
reflect the latest wishes of the
people and thus have greater

authority to review Government
decisions.
 Simultaneous elections will ensure
that, if the Senate uses its power to
bring about a general election, at
least half the Senators will also
have to face the people at the same
time. The Senate will not be
immune from the consequences
of its actions.
Simultaneous elections will also bring
about substantial savings – about $6
million per election, or at least $24
million over the next 10 years.
It is simply commonsense that
elections for both Houses of
Parliament take place on the same
day. You can help to ensure this
occurs by voting YES.

Casual Vacancies
It is proposed to alter the Constitution so as to ensure so
as to ensure so far as practicable that a casual vacancy
in the Senate is filled by a person of the same political
party as the Senator chosen by the People and for the
balance of the his term.
A YES vote on this proposal will
ensure that your choice of Parties at a
Senate election cannot be changed as a
result of accident, resignation, illness,
or death of a Senator.
If the place, say, of a Liberal,
Labor or National Country Party
Senator becomes vacant, he will be
replaced by another person from the
same Party.
It is fundamental to your rights as
a voter that representation in the
Senate should always reflect the
wishes of the electorate.

A YES vote will guarantee your
rights.
It will confirm the principle that if
a Senator dies ro resigns, a Senator of
the same political party will be
appointed for the remainder of that
Senator’s term.
A YES vote will avoid the present
situation under the Constitution where
the balance of the Parties in the Senate
can be altered against the wishes of the
electorate.

 Territory Vote in Referendums
It is proposed to alter the Constitution so as to allow
electors in Territories, as well as electors in the States,
to vote at Referendums on proposed laws to alter the
Constitution.
The Constitution at present only
allows a vote in referendums to
electors ‘in each State’.
This proposal will allow the
Australian citizens who live in the
Northern Territory and the Australian
Capital Territory to vote in
referendums.
They are currently denied this right
– despite the fact like every other
Australian they pay taxes, and they are
required to obey the same federal laws
as the people in the States.
At the moment, they have no say
in referendums which could
significantly affect their lives.
This is unfair.
The proposal will not interfere
with the rights of the States. It will still
be necessary for the people of four of

the six States – as well as a
majority of all voters – to vote in
favour of an amendment before the
constitution can be changed.
There is nothing new or strange
about this proposal. At the time of
Federation the areas now known as the
Northern Territory and the Australian
Capital Territory were respectively
part of South Australia and new south
Wales and electors in those areas have
votes in referendums. Only when those
areas became Federal Territories did
the electors there lose their right to
vote at referendums. This proposal if
carried would restore that right.
A YES vote will ensure that the
150,000 voters living in the
Territories are given the same basic
democratic right as other
Australians.

Retirement of Judges
It is proposed to alter the Constitution so as to
provide for retiring ages for Judges of Federal Courts.
Every State of Australia now
requires its Judges to retire at a certain
age. Only in Federal Courts do Judges
hold office for life. There are now
more than 40 Federal Judges and more
will have to be appointed.
A YES vote on this question will
provide that Judges appointed to the
High Court in future will have to retire
when they reach the age of 70.

The Federal Parliament will be
able to fix the retirement age of other
Federal Judges.
Most people have to retire at a
certain age. There are good reasons
for Federal Judges being subject to
the same requirement. They are as
affected by old age as everyone else.

 In addition – particularly in courts
such as the family court – it is
important that Judges remain in touch
with current attitudes and trends in the
community.
The independence of the judiciary
will be maintained. No-one suggests
that State Judges are less independent
because they are subject to compulsory
retirement.

Judges presently on the Bench will not
be affected. The proposal will only
apply to future judicial appointments.
The time for Judges to retire should not
be left to Judges themselves to decide.
If you believe that Australia should
be the best service from its courts,
then vote YES.

The Four Proposals
Your approval of the four proposals will be an important step forward in contitutional
reform and in guaranteeing basic democratic rights for all Australians.
A YES vote in each case will be a vote for fairness, justice and commonsense.
All-Party Support
All these issues were discussed at
the Australian Constitutional
Convention in Hobart last October.
That convention was attended by
representatives of the Federal
Parliament, the States and local
government.

The Convention, including
representatives of all political parties,
discussed all four proposals –
simultaneous elections, filling casual
vacancies in the Senate, right to vote of
citizens in the Territories and
compulsory retirement ages for Federal
Judges. The convention strongly
approved the principles involved.

 Voting YES makes sense
On 21 May, you will have the opportunity to vote
for these four amendments to the Australian
Constitution.
They are all practical, sensible reforms.
To ensure they are put into effect, vote YES by
writing in “YES” on your ballot paper like this –
BALLOT PAPER

BALLOT PAPER

1. Proposed law entitled –
“An Act to alter the Constitution so as to ensure
that Senate elections are held at the same time as
House of Representatives Elections”

3. Proposed law entitled –
“An Act to alter the Constitution so as to allow
Electors in territories, as well as Electors in the
States, to vote at Referendums on Proposed Laws to
alter the Constitution”

DO YOU APPROVE the proposed law? YES

DO YOU APPROVE the proposed law? YES

BALLOT PAPER
2. Proposed law entitled –
“An Act to alter the Constitution so as to ensure so
far as practicable that a Casual Vacancy in the
Senate is filled by a Person of the same Political
Party as the Senator chosen by the People and for
the balance of the his Term”
DO YOU APPROVE the proposed law? YES

BALLOT PAPER
(i)
Proposed law entitled –
“An Act to alter the constitution so as to provide for
Retiring Ages for Judges of Federal Courts”

DO YOU APPROVE the proposed law? YES

ON 21 MAY, VOTE YES FOR FAIRNESS, JUSTICES AND COMMONSENSE

 CONSTITUTION ALTERATION
(SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS) 1977
The Argument Against the Proposed Law

THE CASE FOR NO
This referendum is the same as the one you rejected in 1974.




This referendum will enable any future
government to dissolve half the Senate
whenever the Senate attempts to protect
Australia from measures harmful to the
national interest.
This referendum will not necessarily
reduce the number and cost of elections. It
is deceptive to claim that it will. It is as
likely to result in more frequent elections.




This referendum is not necessary to enable
simultaneous elections to be held.
This referendum will result in a greatly
increased concentration of power in
Canberra and in the hands of all future
Prime Ministers, and less protection for
Australian citizens against the abuse of
that power.

These are the Issues
 If you are not convinced that this referendum is the only way to avoid frequent
elections in the next few years.

Vote NO

 If you believe the timing of elections should not be manipulated to suit the
government of the day

Vote NO

 If you are against centralised political power in Canberra

Vote NO

 If you believe the Senate plays an important role in the way Australia is governed

Vote NO

 If you believe principle is more important than political expediency

Vote NO

 If you value your right to vote

Vote NO

NO MORE POWER TO CANBERRA:
VOTE NO

 Simultaneous Elections – “an Exercise in Deception”
(1) Q. Is this proposal the same as
the one rejected by the Australian
people at a referendum in 1974?
A. Yes. It even uses the same falsely
misleading title. This is one of the
reasons the Liberal and Country Parties
in the NO case issued by those parties
in the 1974 campaign branded the bill
as a “fraud” and “an exercise in
deception”.
In 1974, the Australian people
rejected this proposal. Voters in
Victoria and the “smaller States”
(Queensland, South Australia, Western
Australia and Tasmania) were strongly
against it.

the referendum is defeated is
simply untrue.
(4) Q. Did members of the present
Government actually claim this
Constitutional amendment was
unnecessary – even harmful – when
they were in opposition?
A. Yes.
(5) Q. Did they speak and vote
against it in the Senate and the
House of Representatives?
Yes, four times – 1973 (once), 1974
(once), an 1975 (twice).
(6) Q. On what grounds?

(2) Q. Did the present Federal
Government campaign against this
proposal in 1974?
A. Yes.
In 1974 the present Prime Minister
(Mr Fraser) described it as being “quite
unnecessary”.
State Liberal and National Country
Party Premiers, Sir Charles Court, Mr
Hamer and Mr Bjelke-Petersen, said it
was aimed at undermining the Senate.
(3) Q. Why would Mr Fraser have
said it was “quie unnecessary”?
A. Up to 1961 there is only one
instance of Senate elections being held
at a different time from the House of
Representatives elections. That was in
1953. Subsequently, the elections were
held together.
They got out of step only because
of a snap election for the House of
Representatives alone in 1963. It has
always been possible under the
constitution to bring the elections
together again, but such a course has
not suited the political circumstances
of any Government since then.
For proponents of the bill to say
that separate elections must be held if

A. Senator Withers, the present Leader
of the Government in the Senate, gave
these reasons:
“…I believe that this Bill … is
nothing but an exercise in deception in
which the Government is deliberately
attempting to deceive the people of
Australia, When this Bill was called on
for debate in the [House of
Representatives] it was said that the
title of the Bill was a fraud. In fact, it
was said there also that the title did
not reflect in any way the intent of the
Bill”
(Hansard, 4 December 1973,
p.2398).
(7) Q. Are the supporters of the
“NO” case against holding Senate
and House of Representatives
elections at the same time?
A. No. But this referendum proposal is
the wrong way to achieve it.
The fact is that the Government
has the power now to hold the next and
future Senate and House of
Representatives elections on the same
day if it chooses to do so.

 The Treasurer, Mr P. Lynch, had
this to say (as Deputy Leader of the
Opposition) when the same Bill was
introduced by the Labor Government:
“There is no constitutional
constraint to the holding of
simultaneous elections for both
Houses of the Australian
Parliament.”
(Hansard, 5 March 1974, p.62)
(8) Q. What is meant by saying it is
“the wrong way to achieve it”?
A. The effect this proposal would have
on other aspects of our Parliamentary
system – particularly the functioning of
the Senate – would be serious.
Again in Mr Lynch’s words:
“… its adoption would impair the
proper functioning of our bicameral
system of government. Tying the
Senate to the House of Representatives
in the manner proposed by the Bill
would weaken its independence … In
short the Constitution Alteration
(Simultaneous Elections) Bill is not
simply unnecessary but also is
cunningly deceptive in its intent;”
(Hansard, 5 March 1974, p.63)
(9) Q. Why do supporters of the
proposal claim that they have a duty
to have a referendum on the subject
because it was discussed recently at
a Constitutional Convention?
A. There is no legal or constitutional
requirement whatsoever that matters
discussed at the October 1976
Convention must be put at a
referendum.

In any case the proposal was
discussed only very briefly at the
Constitutional Convention last
October. But so were other proposals
and the Government has apparently felt
no obligation to have referenda on
them (e.g. a proposal to break the
Nexus, which was also rejected by the
people at a referendum in 1967).
(10) Q. Some supporters of the
referendum have said that those who
oppose it now only want to give
themselves a “life long term” Is this
so?
A. This is an absurd allegation.
A majority of the Senators who
voted in the Senate against this
referendum Bill are due to stand for reelection before the middle of next year.
If the referendum succeeds, despite
their opposition, the immediate effect
could be to prolong their term for up to
an extra 9 months.
It is the “Yes” supporters who seek
to interfere with the present terms of
Senators in order to pick and choose
the time that suits them to face the
voters in an election.
DON”T BE DECEIVED
VOTE NO

The Senate – “States’ House” and “House of Review”,
or “Rubber Stamp”?
(11) Q. Should the Senate be
retained?
A. Yes.

As a “States House” – that is, a
house of parliament with equal
representation for all States – it plays a

 part in national development. It
counteracts the possible harmful
political effects of concentrations of
population, wealth, and power in
Canberra and a few capital cities.
As a “House of Review” it is
important to the people. It has acted
many times throughout our history to
improve legislation. It has often
provided a brake on hasty and illconceived Government action. For
example, last year Senators were able
to obtain a reversal of the
Government’s intention to abolish
Funeral Benefits for Pensioners.
Speaking against this referendum,
when in Opposition, Senator Withers
said:
“…the Senate is not an echo, nor
was it intended to be … Any attempt to
destroy the Senates independence as a
chamber of this Parliament must be
opposed for the good of the Australian
people.”
(Hansard, 4 December 1973, p.2400).
(12) Q. How will the States be
affected if this referendum is
carried?
A. The interests of the State
Parliaments and of the people,
particularly of Queensland, South
Australia, Tasmania and Western
Australia, would be submerged.
Senator F. McManus (then Leader
of the Democratic Labor Party in the
Senate) said in a debate on the same
referendum proposal:
“I believe that the proposal
contained in the Bill would destroy
the independence of the Senate …
It would weaken the Federal
structure”.
(Hansard, 4 December 1973,
p.2402).
Senator J. Carrick (the present
“Minister for Education) in giving the
case for the then Opposition said:
“Any Senator coming from one of
the small States who ties himself

basically to this devise is, indeed,
in dereliction of his duty to the
States … The simple situation is
that the Australian constitution
was formed on the basis that the
less populous States – Tasmania,
Western Australia, South Australia
in particular, and Queensland –
would only come into a
Commonwealth if there were a
Senate and if the constitution of
that Senate were as provided in
the Australian Constitution. Any
senator who gets up and seeks to
destroy the quality of the Senate in
this way ought to be defeated in
his own State.”
(Hansard, 10 June 1975, p.2408).
(13) Q. How would the interests of
the small States be submerged?
A. Only 2 of the 12 “Inner Cabinet”
Ministers come from these 4 “small
States”.
Only 8 of the total of 25 Ministers
come from the small States.
79 of the 127 seats in the House of
Representatives are in New South
Wales and Victoria. (Queensland has
18, Tasmania has 5, South Australia
has 12, Western Australia has 10, the
Northern Territory has 1 and the
A.C.T. has 2). In the “numbers game”
of the House of Representatives, the
small States are less significant for
gaining power than are those two
States which have more than half of
the total number of federal Members of
Parliament.
(14) Q. Won’t the composition of the
Senate, with equal representation for
all States, be sufficient to protect the
small States from being overlooked?
A. No, not necessarily.
With the power to select the dates
of Senate elections, a Commonwealth
Government could manipulate and
control the Senate by proposing
policies which are directed to the

 interests of only a minority of the
States.
(15) Q. Does the Commonwealth
Government have the power to select
the date of Senate elections?
A. No. That power at present is held be
the State Parliaments. This referendum
proposed to transfer it to Canberra.
(16) Q. Is this referendum proposal
also an attack on the Senate's ability
to play the role of a “House of
Review”?
A. Yes.
This has been clearly state by
Senator Button, a “Shadow Minister”
for the present Opposition. He has
said:
“Of course, the real importance and
significance of this proposal from
our point of view in the Opposition
is that it does what many of its
critics say it will do. It limits the
significance and influence of the
Senate ... we do have a very strong
view that the powers of the Senate
should be delimited at every
opportunity. These are the basic
reasons why we will be supporting
the legislation. In saying that we
are being consistent with everything
we have said before.”
(Hansard, 22 February 1977, pp.261
and 262).
In 1973 Senator Withers said:
“… I always have very much in
the forefront of my mind the fact
that it is part of the platform of the
Australian Labor Party to abolish
this chamber. I am more
convinced, as I see the
Government’s referendum
proposals unfold, that this Bill is
but the first step towards carrying
out that plank of that platform. As
I see it, the whole purpose of this
Bill is to lower the status and to

weaken the independence of this
chamber.”
(Hansard, 4 December 1973,
p.2399).
In 1974, Senator Withers said:
“…The Senate has powers under
the Constitution which make it an
equal House of Parliament with
the House of Representatives, and
as far as we are concerned the
Senate is not going to be a spongy
rubber stamp. The independence
of the Senate in the last few years
has given real meaning to the
parliamentary system and I say
that in this role the Senate now
continues.”
(Hansard, 13 March 1974, p.255).
(17) Q. Is that also the Government’s
attitude toward the Senate?
A. It hasn’t been in the past. In fact,
the Liberal Party and the National
Country Party have previously strongly
supported the Senate.
Three years ago, Senator Carrick,
during a debate on this referendum
proposal, defended the role of the
Senate with these words:
“…What the people of Australia
should understand is that the
[Labor] Government wants the
Senate to be always a mirror
image and therefore an automaton
reflection of itself. It does not want
any opposition. It simply wants to
mute the Senate so that the Senate
can rubber stamp its own
decisions. This is the whole idea of
trying to bring elections for the 2
Houses together. Nevertheless, the
aim of the Senate is to review, to
reflect, to amend, to defer, even to
reject. The Senate Committee
system is based on this. All this is
under challenge.”
(Hansard, 13 March 1974, p.268).

 Two years ago, Senator D. Scott,
(now Deputy Leader of the National
Country Party in the Senate) had this to
say on the subject”
“…It seems to be a strange twist of
logic that 29 members of the
Government Party are doing their
utmost to establish conditions
which will virtually say to the
Australian people that the Senate,
as a responsible brake in the
Australian parliamentary system,
is totally unnecessary and we do
not need it. This sort of thing must
follow the implementation of
simultaneous elections.”
(Hansard, 25 February 1975,
p.409).
(18) Q. Will a YES vote make the
Senate a “rubber stamp”?
A. Yes.
This was stated clearly by Senator
Withers in 1975:

“…If the referendum which the
legislation proposes were passed
by some freak mischance, it would
effectively destroy the capacity of
the Senate to act as it now does. It
would be the first step towards
placing all power in the hands of
the House of Representatives and
therefore in the hands of the Prime
Minister for the time being. It
would destroy the Parliament as
we have known the Parliament
since 1900 … He [the Prime
Minister] wants a rubber stamp, a
lame duck and a tame dog. In fact,
he just wants to get his own way.”
(Hansard, 10 June 1975, p.2405).
SAFEGUARD THE SENATE:
VOTE NO

The Balance of Power in Australia
(19) Q. What does the term
“balance of power” mean?
A. When the Australian “Founding
Fathers” wrote the constitution, they
agreed on a method of spreading (i.e.
“balancing”) political power in various
ways – for example, by dividing
certain powers and responsibilities
between the Commonwealth and State
Parliaments, by using the different
bases of representation for the Senate
and the House of Representatives, and
so on.
(20) Q. Why is it necessary to have a
“balance”?
A. So that no single government, group
of people, or Prime Minister can have
overwhelming power over the lives of
individual citizens.

This is what some Government
Senators said on this referendum
proposal when they were in
Opposition:
Senator Withers:
“…I have been saying ever since
this session commenced that the
Senate is the only institution in
this country which stands as a
barrier to the exercise of arbitrary
power in the hands of the Prime
Ministers.”
(Hansard, 7 March 1974, p.140)
Senator Carrick:
“… I believe that in a world in
which democracy is shrinking; in
a world in which violence and
anarchy are growing; in a world
in which freedoms are under
threat, we should do everything we

 can to preserve the
decentralisation and diffusion of
power. In every way we should do
everything in our power to put a
brake upon centralised
uncontrolled government.”
(Hansard, 13 March 1974, p.268).
Senator Scott:
“…It [the Senate] is in fact, a
brake on would-be dictators no
matter what their political line or
their ideology may be. No
democracy can survive if it has not
a responsible and recognisable
brake within its constitution setup.”
(Hansard, 25 February 1975,
p.409).
(21) Q. How can a referendum on
“simultaneous elections” upset that
balance?
A. The title of the Bill is a false
description. It is not principally a Bill
to enable simultaneous elections. The
Constitution already allows us to have
them if the Government wants them.
The Bill is principally a means
whereby a Prime Minister may
dissolve half the Senate at any time
and for any reason at all.
When in Opposition, Senator
Withers had this to say on the subject:
“Conceivably, a government could
go back to the people time and
time again, forcing election after
election, until it won control of the
Senate. It could keep doing so
until it destroyed the watch-dog
and turned it into a rubber stamp
stacked with its won unquestioning
supporters.”
(Hansard, 10 June 1975, p. 2405).
(22) Q. Therefore, this proposal may
not reduce the number of elections?
A. It will not necessarily reduce the
number of elections.
The fact that the Prime Minister
was not able to call Senate elections at

will acted as a deterrent to holding
“early” elections of the House of
Representatives until 1963.
(23) Q. Do Senator Wither’s words
indicate that there could be more
frequent elections if this referendum
is carried?
A. Yes, that is a distinct possibility.
Giving Prime Minsters the power
to call elections more easily could as
likely result in more elections, not
fewer.
One possible circumstance was
outlined in 1974 by Mr Gordon Freeth,
a former Minister for External Affairs
in a Liberal-Country Party
Government:
“Elections could be more frequent
and not less frequent as intended.
Imagine the case as in December
1972 when Labor won a
convincing victory in the House of
Representatives but faced a hostile
Senate. Flushed with victory and
riding on the crest of the wave of
enthusiasm that followed a new
style of government, the Prime
Minister would have almost
certainly sought a new election
within the first six months. If half
the Senate had been elected at the
December election, the remaining
half would have been subjected to
the surge towards Labor with
every prospect of giving the
Whitlam Government control of
both Houses. If this were to be
followed by a strong political
reaction, giving the Liberals a win
at elections three years later, they
too would find it easier to purge
the Senate by holding another
election quickly. So in four years
there would be four elections for
both the House of Representatives
and the Senate. If indeed the real
object of the change is to achieve
fewer elections someone has
blundered. If the real object is to

 make the Senate conform to the
Lower House – that is another
matter.”
(West Australian, 1 April 1974).
(24) Q. What power does a Prime
Minister have in determining the
timing of elections?
A. He has that power over House of
Represenatives elections.
These elections must be held at
least every three years. However, the
Prime Minister can bring forward an
election date for the House of
Representatives by as many months or
years as suits him, and for any reason
that suits him.
(25) Q. Why would a Prime Minister
do this?
A. For example, he may have been
defeated in the House of
Representatives by reason of defection
of a section of his party. Or he may
consider his majority too small and
claim the right to an election in an
attempt to increase that majority. This
attitude of calling for elections to take
advantage of favourable political
moods is growing – especially as the
public opinion polls develop as an
index of popular feeling.
This present power of Prime
Ministers to dissolve the House of
Representatives at any time is precisely
the power which would enable Senate
and House of Representatives elections
to he held together at any time during
the 12 months ending June 1978.
Therefore, the additional power the
Government is seeking in this
referendum is not necessary for the
purpose it is claiming.
(26) Q. Why do the present
Government and Opposition claim
that Prime Ministers need the power
this referendum would give them?

A. They don’t need it – at least, not for
the purpose of holding simultaneous
elections. It is a ploy to use the
attractive notion of simultaneous
elections as a means of increasing the
Commonwealth Government’s power
over the Senate.
(27) Q. Then this referendum is
really all about power?
A. That is correct.
A “NO” vote will prevent a
substantial transfer of power from the
representative s of the States to the
Cabinet and particularly the Prime
Minister of the day.
(28) Q. What effect will the proposal
have on the conduct of Parliament
and good Government?
A Under the proposed law if the Prime
Minister dissolve the House of
Representatives he would
automatically dissolve one half of the
Senate. His decision could arise out of
circumstances wholly unconnected
with any action of the Senate. The
dissolution could be caused by internal
matters affecting the House of
Representatives alone.
This power of dissolution of the
Senate is quite contrary to its basic
structure. It was made indissoluble
(except by reason of deadlocks leading
to double dissolution) as one of the
basic safeguards of the smaller States
against being overwhelmed by a
Government predominantly
representing the larger States.
(29) Q. What about the claim that
the Senators opposing this
referendum are afraid of elections
and want to live in a “cowards
castle”?
A. They are not afraid of elections.
Their objection is to giving the Prime
Minister of the day the power to
manipulate elections.

 PRESERVE POWER FOR THE
PEOPLE – NOT PRIME
MINISTERS’ VOTE NO

The Cost – The Facts
(30) Q. The supporters of the
referendum say it will reduce the
cost of holding elections. Is this true?
A. Not necessarily. If, as has been
pointed out above, tit leads to more
frequent elections the reverse may be
true.
(31) Q. How much money would the
taxpayers actually save on each
election?
Very little. The total sounds high,
but it has been pointed out the actual
cost of an election per elector is
equivalent to the cost of a couple of
icecreams.
In fact, the supporters of this
referendum should be called upon to
justify holding a separate poll this year
for the proposal, when it could be
voted on at the same time as the next
election due – the half-Senate election
which ought to be held within the next
12 months.
(32) Q. Is this referendum itself
actually resulting in unnecessary
Government expenditure?
A. Yes.
It is not convincing for proponents
of the Bill spending up to $7 million
on this referendum to claim that they
are trying to save money be
eliminating separate elections, when
they could achieve it without the
expenditure of the $7 million. The
power already exists.
(33) Q. Why not hold the
referendum at the same time as the
next year’s Senate Election?
A. Why not indeed! If the “Yes” vote
supporters were consistent that is what

they would do. That reality would save
the millions this referendum is costing
you.
(34) Q. Nevertheless, isn’t it a good
idea to try to reduce the cost this
way?
Not this way – the danger to the
operation of democratic government in
Australia is too high. Both the present
Government and Opposition have
stated that the cost of elections is not a
valid argument. These are some of the
things they have said:
Senator Button:
“… There is the argument relating
to the cost of elections. I would
have thought that that is an
argument of no great principle or
substance.”
(Hansard, 22 February 1977,
p.260).
Senator Withers:
“I would have thought that a
government which claims to be
democratic would have welcomed
elections, because democracy
cannot be measured in monetary
terms.”.
(Hansard, 4 December 1973,
pp.2399-2400).
Senator Scott:
“…Simultaneous elections may be
cheaper and simple, but they
would produce a Senate which
was totally and absolutely
ineffectual. I am convinced that
the people of Austrlaia deserve a
far more responsible watchdog
than would be produced by the
introduction of simultaneous
elections.”

 (Hansard, 25 February 1975,
p.409).
(35) Q. Are the supporters of the
referendum being genuine when
they use the argument of cost as a
reason for voting “Yes”?
A. Their argument is misleading and
dangerous because:
 both the Government and
Opposition are on record as
having said that cost is not a
valid reason for supporting this
proposal;
 the proposal is not necessary to
enable simultaneous elections
to be held next year;



free, regular elections are the
essential basis of any
democratic system.
In many countries the right to a
free vote is not valued in money.
People are prepared to risk their lives
to fight for the right. People lose their
lives fighting for it.
To talk in terms of money is to
attempt to denigrate democracy in a
way which smacks of authoritarianism
and contempt for the rights of the
individual.
YOUR RIGHT TO VOTE IS
PRICELESS:
VOTE NO

 CONSTITUTION ALTERATION
(SENATE CASUAL VACANCIES) 1977
The Argument Against the Proposed Law

THE CASE FOR NO
 This referendum
(a) takes power from State Parliaments and transfers it to political parties,
(b) will complicate the Constitution and will lead to confusion and conflict,
(c) seeks to complete the process of making the States House entirely a
party political house.

“DON’T COMPLICATE THE
CONSTITUTION” – VOTE NO

1. Q. What is a casual vacancy?
A. A vacancy caused by the death,
disqualification or resignation of a
Senator.
2. Q. How is a casual Senate
vacancy filled?
A. By the vote of all members of the
State Parliament in the State of the
former Senator. The Senate is the
States House.
Q. Are the proposals to change the
method of filling casual vacancies of
any real significance?
Yes, because since the introduction
of proportional representation as the
system of Senate voting in 1949, the
margin for either party majority is
usually very small – sometimes one or
two.
The major parties, therefore,
developed an understanding that upon
the occurrence of a bona fide vacancy,
the state Parliaments would select a
replacement Senator who was a
member of the former Senator’s party.

4. Q. Has that understanding been
generally accepted?
A. Yes:
(ii)
All State Parliaments
acknowledge it.
(iii) Both houses of Federal
Parliament acknowledge it.
(iv)
It was recommended and
approved by all members of
the Constitutional Review
Committee 1959.
(v)
It was approved by the Hobart
Constitutional Convention
October 1976.
Two contentious cases arose:
(i)
the case of Senator Murphy’s
resignation – the new South
Wales Parliament chose a
non-party Senator;
(ii)
in the case of the death of
Senator Millner, the
Queensland Parliament chose
a member of his Party – Mr
Field – but the Labor Party
claimed the right to nominate
the replacement Senator. The
Queensland Parliament
refused to accept the single
nominee of the Party.

 5. Q. What is the argument all
about?
A. It is one thing, to acknowledge it as
a principle of political behaviour – an
understanding between political
parties. It is quite another thing, to
write it into the Constitution as a rigid
constitutional requirement.
6. Both the Constitutional Review
Committee of 1959, and the Hobart
Convention 1976, considered the
question of enacting the principle as a
provision of the Constitution, and
concluded that it was not possible or
appropriate.
7. The Constitution Review
Committee in its report said it was
unable to find a form of amendment
which would satisfactorily express the
objective it had in mind – an
amendment where a replacement
Senator would be of the same party as
the person he was replacing.
(Parl. Paper No. 50 of 1958, p.11
para 59).
8. The committee repeated that view
in its Report in November 1959,
stating that “the difficulties proved to
be insurmountable”. (Parl. Paper No
108, of 1959, p.42 para 287).
9. Standing Committee ‘D’ of the
Constitutional Convention Hobart,
October 1976, stated in its Report to
the Convention that “It is with regret
that this Committee reports that it too
has found the difficulties
insurmountable, and therefore makes
no recommendation to amend this
section.
The Committee, however, suggests
that the Australian Constitutional
Convention expresses its approval of
the above principle” (that the
replacement Senator chosen should be
of the same party) “and echoes the
view of the Joint Committee that it
should continue to be observed without
exception so that the matter may
become the subject of a constitutional

convention or understanding which
political parties will always observe”.
So the Hobart Convention
acknowledged the inappropriateness of
writing any such understanding into
the Constitution.
In the case of resignations, the
Convention, after debate, expressly
decided that State Parliaments would
be expected to observe the rule, only
when the resignation followed bona
fide illness or incapacity; but it would
not apply to cases of political
manoeuvring. The motion was moved
by Sir Charles Court and supported by
all the Commonwealth Government’
delegates (Senators Durack , Withers
and Webster, Mr Ellicott, Q.C., Mr
Sinclair and Mr Wilson).
The present proposal is a new idea.
Some people in Canberra propose to
make the rule a rigid provision of the
Constitution. It is very complex and
will produce intricate questions of
legal interpretation of great difficulty.
(10) Q. What are the objections to
the proposal?
A. (a) The proposal does not make
provision for a number of likely
situations—for example:
(i) where the outgoing Senator
was elected as an independent
(ii) where the party which
endorsed an outgoing Senator
has ceased to exist, changed
its name or amalgamated with
another party,
(iii) where there is not any
member of the original party
“available” to be chosen—
whatever that means!!
(b) Where a political party which
endorsed the out-going Senator has
expelled him, or he resigns from the
party perhaps on a question of
principle, the proposal ironically

 requires the State Parliament to select
as his replacement, a member of his
former party.
(c) The proposal leaves undefined what
is meant by a “political party.”
It does not require registration.
It does not advert to amalgamations.
It raises all the vexed questions of
membership.
(d) But most importantly, the proposal,
in effect, subordinates the State
Parliaments to the dictates of a
political party.
The measure, in terms, requires
the State Parliament to select “a
member” of the out-going Senator’s
party.
But it then, craftily, provides
that, if the selected member “before
taking his seat, he ceases to be a
member of that party” (e.g. “by
expulsion”), the selection shall be
nullified.
It is quite obvious that the political
party only needs to make a rule
expelling any member who accepts
Senate selection by a State Parliament
without party executive approval; and
then, every member selected by the

State Parliament without party
approval will be disowned. The
decision of the State Parliamentarians
is disallowed. The process can go on
indefinitely;
Parliament selects, the party
expels; and the final result is that State
Parliament refuses to fill a vacancy, or
is forced to accept the member
nominated by the party. The political
party will control the nomination, or a
stalemate will be reached.
(e) That position will apply to all
resignations, whether arising from
bona fide illness, or incapacity or not.
(f) The proposed provisions will apply
as rigid inflexible Constitutional
requirements, whether proportional
representation is retained by
parliament as the method of electing
Senators or not.
(11) The result is a dangerous
subversion of the State Parliament in
favour of control by political parties.
Political parties have never been given
such power, virtually to direct State
Parliaments to appoint their nominee,
or to appoint members to Parliament
anywhere in democratic constitutions.
(12) Vote
NO

 CONSTITUTION ALTERATION
(REFERENDUMS) 1977
The Argument Against the Proposed Law

THE CASE FOR NO
Territories Referendum
TERRITORIES ARE NOT STATES: THEIR PEOPLE ARE NOT
SECOND CLASS CITIZENS
1. The Constitution Act recited that “the
people of New South Wales, Victoria, South
Australia, Queensland and Tasmania …have
agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal
Commonwealth under the Crown …and under
the Constitution hereby established.” The Act
made provision for the inclusion of Western
Australia “if the people of Western Australia
have agreed thereto.”
2.

Section 6 of the Act provides—
“ ‘The States’ shall mean …(the original States) …and
such territories as may be admitted into or established by the
Commonwealth as States.”

3. Later sections of the Constitution
provided for the establishment of new States,
and for territories to be formed and to become
States.
4. The Constitution therefore was a
compact, a treaty, an agreement between the
six original States. The Commonwealth
thereby created was “indissoluble”. Therefore
any provision enabling alteration of the
Constitution of the “indissoluble”
Commonwealth was of great importance;
because the Constitution defined the powers
of the Commonwealth on the one hand, and
determined the remaining powers of the
States on the other.
5. Territories were not then established.
They were not parties to the compact. They
were to become products of the compact.
6. For this reason, the only legislature
having authority to make laws in the
territories is the Federal Parliament. No
territorial legislatures exist, except such as are
derived from and created by the Federal

Parliament. Within the Territories the Federal
Parliament has unlimited, sovereign and
exclusive power. It may, and has, created
territory legislatures.
7. But the State Parliaments existed before
the Commonwealth, and it was a term of the
Federal Compact (Sections 106 and 107) that
the State Constitutions, and the powers of
State Parliaments should continue as at the
establishment of the Commonwealth, except
insofar as those powers were exclusively
vested in the Federal Parliament or withdrawn
from the State.
8. The States were the federating partners.
Territories were established by the Federation
later.
9. Constitutional alterations were therefore
the concern only of the peoples of the States–
as parties to the federal treaty. Consequently,
Section 128 provided that proposed
Constitutional alterations “shall be submitted
in each State to the electors.…”
10.

The vital paragraph of Section 128 is–
“If in a majority of States a majority of the electors
voting approve the proposed law, and if a majority of
all electors voting also approve the proposed law it
shall be presented to the Governor-General for the
Queen’s Assent.”

11. The present referendum proposal
provides for future Constitutional
referendums to be submitted to electors, not
only in all States, but also in all. territories
which are represented in the House of
Representatives
12. At the present time, the only territories
entitled to such representation are the

 Northern Territory and the A.C.T.; but what
of the future?
13. It is competent for Federal Parliament, by
its own Act, to provide for other (present or
future) territories to be represented in the
House of Representatives. The present
proposal is therefore not limited to the N.T.
and A.C.T.
14. If and when a territory becomes a new
State, it is included in the existing Section
128; and its electors are counted for the
purposes of both State and overall majorities.
But unless and until a territory becomes a
State, it is inappropriate to permit its
participation in Constitutional referendums.
Constitutional referendums are concerned
with alterations of the Federal Compact—the

agreed Constitution; of which the States are
partners—and the territories are not.
15. When the Northern Territory is created a
State, its electors will be entitled to vote in
Constitutional referendums. There is no
suggestion by anyone that in the interim this
means that they are second class citizens.
16. It is inappropriate that the population of
the Seat of Government, the A.C.T., should
vote on matters affecting the questions of
Commonwealth and State power. The people
of Canberra are not concerned with State
powers, and State electors should not have
their parliamentary powers determined by
voters from Canberra.
17. Vote NO

 Statement showing the alterations proposed
to be made to the Constitution
Four proposed laws for the alteration of the Constitution have been passed by absolute majorities of each House of
the Parliament and are to be submitted to the electors in accordance with section 128 of the Constitution. The short titles
of the proposed laws are:
1.

Constitution Alteration (Simultaneous Elections) 1977;

2.

Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual Vacancies) 1977;

3.

Constitution Alteration (Referendums) 1977;

4.

Constitution Alteration (Retirement of Judges) 1977.

The provisions of the Constitution directly affected by the proposed laws are set out below, and the additions
proposed to be made are indicated as follows:
(i)

words in sections proposed to be inserted in the Constitution are printed in BOLD TYPE;

(ii)

the marginal note in BOLD TYPE opposite each proposed alteration refers to the proposed law by
which the alteration is proposed to be made.

7. The Senate shall be composed of senators for each State, directly chosen by
the people of the State, voting, until the Parliament otherwise provides, as one
electorate.
But until the Parliament of the Commonwealth otherwise provides, the
Parliament of the State of Queensland, if that State can be an Original State, may
make laws dividing the State into divisions and determining the number of
senators to be chosen for each division, and in the absence of such provision the
State shall be one electorate.
Until the Parliament otherwise provides there shall be six senators for each
Original State. The Parliament may make laws increasing or diminishing the
number of senators fore each State, but so that equal representation of the several
Original States shall be maintained and that no Original State shall have less than
six senators.
Constitution Alteration
(Simultaneous Elections) 1977.

The senators shall be chosen for a term of six years, and the names of he
senators chosen for each State shall be certified by the Governor to the GovernorGeneral.

9. The Parliament of the Commonwealth may make laws prescribing the
method of choosing senators, but so that the method shall be uniform for all the
States. Subject to any such law, the Parliament of each State my make laws
prescribing the method of choosing the senators for that State.
Constitution Alteration
(Simultaneous Elections) 1977.

The Parliament of a State may make laws for determining the times and places
of elections of senators for the State.

Constitution Alteration
(Simultaneous Elections) 1977.

The Parliament may make laws for determining the times and
places of elections of senators.

Constitution Alteration
(Simultaneous Elections) 1977.

12. The Governor of any State may cause writs to be issued for election of
senators for the State. In case of the dissolution of the Senate the writs shall be
issued within ten days from the proclamation of such dissolution.

Constitution Alteration
(Simultaneous Elections) 1977

12. (1.) The Governor of a State may cause writs to be issued for
elections of senators for the State.
(2.) The writs shall be issued within fourteen days from the date
on which the places to be filled became vacant.

Constitution Alteration
(Simultaneous Elections) 1977

13. As soon as may be after the Senate first meets, and after each first meeting
of the Senate following a dissolution thereof, the Senate shall divide the senators
chosen for each State into two classes, as nearly equal in number as practicable;
and the places of the senators of the first class shall become vacant at the
expiration of three years, and the places of those of the second class at the
expiration of six years, from the beginning of their term of service; and afterwards
the places of senators shall become vacant at the expiration of six years from the
beginning of their term of service.
The election to fill vacant places shall be made within one year before the
places are to become vacant.

 For the purposes of this section the term of service of a senator shall be taken
to begin on the first day of July following the day of his election, except in the
cases of the first election and of the election next after any dissolution of the
Senate, when it shall be taken to begin on the first day of July preceding the day
of his election.
Constitution Alteration
(Simultaneous Elections) 1977

13. (1.) Subject to this Constitution, the term of service of a senator
expires upon the expiry or dissolution of the second House of Representatives
to expire or be dissolved after he was chosen or, if there is an earlier
dissolution of the Senate, upon that dissolution.
(2.) As soon as may be after the first meeting of the Senate following a
dissolution of the Senate, the Senate shall, divide the senators chosen for each
State into two classes.
(3.) In the case of each State, where the number of senators to be divided
is an even number the number of senators in each of the two classes shall be
equal and where the number of senators to be divided is an odd number the
number of senators in the first class shall be one more than the number in the
second class.
(4.) sub-section (1.) of this section applies to senators included in the first
class, but the term of service of senators included in the second class expires
upon the expiry or dissolution of the first House of Representatives to expire
or be dissolved after they were chosen.
(5.) Where, since the election of senators for a State following a
dissolution of the Senate but before the division of the senators for that State
into classes in pursuance of this section, the place of a senator chosen at that
election has become vacant, the division of senators shall be made as if the
place of that senator had not so become vacant and, for the purposes of
section fifteen of this Constitution, the term of service of that senators shall
be deemed to be, and to have been, the period for which he would have held
his place, in accordance with this section, if his place had not so become
vacant.
(6.) In the case of a senator holding office at the commencement of this
section—
(a) if his term of service would, under the provisions in force before that
commencement, have expired on the thirtieth day of June, One
thousand nine hundred and seventy-eight, his term of service shall
expire upon the expiry or dissolution of the first House of
Representatives to expire or be dissolved after that commencement
or;
(b) if his term of service would, under the provisions in force before that
commencement, have expired on the thirtieth day of June, One
thousand nine hundred and eighty-one, his term of service shall
expire upon the expiry or dissolution of the second House of
Representatives to expire or be dissolved after that commencement
or, if there is an earlier dissolution of the Senate, upon that
dissolution.

Note: If the Constitution
Alteration (Senate Casual
Vacancies) is approved,
sub-section (7) and subsection (8) will not take
effect, in which case the
last paragraph of the new
section 15 inserted by that
Constitution Alteration
will apply.

(7.) Notwithstanding sub-section (6) of this section, where, at the
commencement of this section, a senator chosen or appointed under the first
paragraph of section fifteen of this Constitution, in consequence of a vacancy
that had at any time occurred in the place of a senator chosen by the people
of a State, was holding office—
(a)

if he was chosen by the Houses of Parliament of the State, he shall
be deemed to have been chosen to hold office until the expiry or
dissolution of the first House of Representatives to expire or be
dissolved after that commencement; or

(b)

if he was appointed by the Governor of the State, he shall be
deemed to have been appointed to hold the place until the
expiration of fourteen days after the beginning of the next session
of the Parliament of the State that commenced or commences
after he was appointed and further action under section fifteen of
this Constitution shall be taken as if the vacancy in the place of
the senator chosen by the people of the State had occurred after
that commencement.

(8.) For the purposes of the election, in accordance with the second
paragraph of section fifteen of this Constitution, of a successor to a senator
chosen by the people of a State, before the commencement of this section,
who had a term expiring after that commencement but whose place became

 vacant before that commencement, that senator shall be deemed to have had
a term expiring at the time when his term would have expired by virtue of
sub-section (6.) of this section if his place had not become vacant.

15. If the place of a senator becomes vacant before the expiration of his term
of service, the Houses of Parliament of the State for which he was chosen shall,
sitting and voting together, choose a person to hold the place until the expiration
of the term, or until the election of a successor as herein after provided, whichever
first happens until the next expiry or dissolution of the House of
Representatives. But if the Houses of Parliament of the State are not in session
at the time when the vacancy is notified, the Governor of the State, with the
advice of the Executive Council thereof, may appoint a person to hold the place
until the expiration of fourteen days after the beginning of the next session of the
Parliament of the State, or until the election of a successor, until the next expiry
or dissolution of the House of Representatives, whichever first happens.

Constitution Alteration
(Simultaneous Elections) 1977
Note: If the Constitution
Alteration (Senate Casual
Vacancies) is approved, the
amendments propsed to this
section will not take effect, in
which case the new section 15 to
be inserted by that Constituiton
Alteration will have effect.

At the next general election of members of the House of Representatives, or at
the next election of senators for the State, whichever first happens, At the next
election of Senators for the State, a successor shall, if the term has not then
expired, be chosen to hold the place from the date of his election until the
expiration of the term.
The name of any senator so chosen or appointed shall be certified by the
Governor of the State to the Governor-General.
15. If the place of a senator becomes vacant before the expiration of his term
of service, the Houses of Parliament of the State for which he was chosen shall,
sitting and voting together, choose a person to hold the place until the expiration
of the term, or until the election of a successor as herein after provided, whichever
first happens. But if the Houses of Parliament of the State are not in session at the
time when the vacancy is notified, the Governor of the State, with the advice of
the Executive Council thereof, may appoint a person to hold the place until the
expiration of fourteen days after the beginning of the next session of the
Parliament of the State, or until the election of a successor, whichever first
happens.

Constitution Alteration (Senate
Casual Vacancies) 1977

At the next general election of members of the House of Representatives, or at
the next election of senators for the State, whichever first happens, a successor
shall, if the term has not then expired, be chosen to hold the place from the date of
his election until the expiration of the term.
The name of any senator so chosen or appointed shall be certified by the
Governor of the State to the Governor-General.

Constitution Alteration (Senate
Casual Vacancies) 1977

15. If the place of a senator becomes vacant before the expiration of his
term of service, the Houses of Parliament of the State for which he was
chosen, sitting and voting together, or, if there is only one House of that
Parliament, that House, shall choose a person to hold the place until the
expiration of the term. But if the Parliament of the State is not in session
when the vacancy is notified, the Governor of the State, with the advice of the
Executive Council thereof, may appoint a person to hold the place until the
expiration of fourteen days from the beginning of the next session of the
Parliament of the State, or the expiration of the term, whichever first
happens.
Where a vacancy has at any time occurred in the place of a senator
chosen by the people of a State and, at the time when he was so chosen, he
was publicly recognized by a particular political party as being an endorsed
candidate of that party and publicly represented himself to be such a
candidate, a person chosen or appointed under this section in consequence of
that vacancy, or in consequence of that vacancy and a subsequent vacancy or
vacancies, shall, unless there is no member of that party available to be
chosen or appointed, be a member of that party.

Where—
(a)

in accordance with the last preceding paragraph, a member of a particular political
party is chosen or appointed to hold the place of a senator whose pace had become
vacant; and

(b)

before taking his seat he ceases to be a member of that party (otherwise than by reason
of the party having ceased to exist),

 he shall be deemed not to have been so chosen or appointed and the vacancy shall be again
notified in accordance with section twenty-one of this Constitution.
The name of any senator chosen or appointed under this section shall be certified by
the governor of the State to the governor-General.
If the place of a senator chosen by the people of a State at the election of senators last
held before the commencement of the Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual Vacancies) 1977
became vacant before that commencement and, at that commencement, no person chosen by
the House or Houses of Parliament of the State, or appointed by the Governor of the State, in
consequence of that vacancy, or in consequence of that vacancy and subsequent vacancy or
vacancies, held office, this section applies as if the place of the senator chosen by the people of
the State had become vacant after that commencement.

A senator holding office at the commencement of the Constitution Alteration (Senate
Casual Vacancies) 1977, being a senator appointed by the Governor of a State in consequence of
a vacancy that had at any time occurred in the place of a senator chosen by the people of the
State, shall be deemed to have been appointed to hold the place until the expiration of fourteen
days after the beginning of the next session of the Parliament of the State that commenced or
commences after he was appointed and further action under this section shall be taken as if the
vacancy in the place of the senator chosen by the people of the state had occurred after that
commencement.

Subject to the next succeeding paragraph, a senator holding office at the
commencement of the Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual Vacancies) 1977 who was chosen
by the House or Houses of Parliament of a State in consequence of a vacancy that had at any
time occurred in the place of a senator chosen by the people of the State shall be deemed to have
been chosen to hold office until the expiration of the term of service of the senator elected by the
people of the State.

If, at or before the commencement of the Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual
Vacancies) 1977, a law to alter the Constitution entitled “Constitution Alteration (Simultaneous
Elections) 1977” came into operation, a senator holding office at the commencement of that law
who was chosen by the House or Houses of Parliament of a State in consequence of a vacancy
that had at any time occurred in the place of a senator chosen by the people of the State shall be
deemed to have been chosen to hold office—

Constitution
Alteration
(Retirement of
Judges) 1977

(a)

if the senator elected by the people of the State had a term of service expiring on the
thirtieth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-eight-until the expiration
or dissolution of the first House of Representatives to expire or be dissolved after that
law came into operation; or

(b)

if the senator elected by the people of the State had a term of service expiring on the
thirtieth day of June, One thousand nine hundred and eighty-one until the expiration
or dissolution of the second House of Representatives to expire or be dissolved after
that law came into operation or, if there is an earlier dissolution of the Senate, until that
dissolution.

72.

The Justices of the High Court and of the other courts created by the Parliament-

(i)

Shall be appointed by the Governor-General in Council:

(ii)

Shall not be removed except by the Governor-General in Council, on an address from both
Houses of the Parliament in the same session, praying for such removal on the ground of
proved misbehaviour or incapacity:

(iii)

Shall receive such remuneration as the Parliament may fix; but the remuneration shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office.

The appointment of a Justice of the High Court shall be for a term expiring upon his attaining
the age of seventy years, and a person shall not be appointed as a Justice of the High Court if he
has attained that age.
The appointment of a Justice of a court created by the Parliament shall be for a term expiring
upon his attaining the age that is, at the time of his appointment, the maximum age of Justices of
that court and a person shall not be appointed as a Justice of such a court if he has attained the age
that is for the time being the maximum age for Justices of that court.

 Subject to this section, the maximum age for Justices of any court created by the Parliament is
seventy years.
The parliament may make a law fixing an age that is less than seventy years as the maximum
age for Justices of a court created by the Parliament and may at any time repeal or amend such a
law, but any such repeal or amendment does not affect the term of office of a Justice under an
appointment made before the repeal or amendment.
A Justice of the High Court or of a court created by the Parliament may resign his office by
writing under his hand delivered to the Governor-general.
Nothing in the provisions added to this section by the Constitution Alteration (Retirement of
Judges) 1977 affects the continuance of a person in office as a Justice of a court under an
appointment made before the commencement of those provisions.
A reference in this section to the appointment of a Justice of the High Court or of a court
created by the Parliament shall be read as including a reference to the appointment of a person
who holds office as a Justice of the High court or of a court created by the Parliament to another
office Justice of the same court having a different status or designation.

128. This Constitution shall not be altered except in the following manner:Constitution
Alteration
(Referendums)
1977

Constitution
Alteration
(Referendums)
1977

The proposed law for the alteration thereof must be passed by an absolute majority of each House of the
Parliament, and not less than two nor more than six months after its passage through both Houses the
proposed law shall be submitted in each State and Territory to the electors qualified to vote for the election
of members of the House of Representatives.
But if either House passes any such proposed law by an absolute majority, and the other House rejects or
fails to pass it, or passes it with any amendment to which the first-mentioned House will not agree, and if
after an interval of three months the first-mentioned House in the same or the next session again passes the
proposed law by an absolute majority with or without any amendment which has been made or agreed to by
the other House, and such other House rejects or fails to pass it or passes it with any amendment to which the
first-mentioned House will not agree, the Governor General may submit the proposed law as last proposed by
the first-mentioned House, and either with or without any amendments subsequently agreed to by both
Houses, to the electors in each State and Territory qualified to vote for the election of the House of
Representatives.
When a proposed law is submitted to the electors the vote shall be taken in such manner as the Parliament
prescribes. But until the qualification of electors of members of the House of Representatives becomes
uniform throughout the Commonwealth, only one half the electors voting for and against the proposed law
shall be counted in any State in which adult suffrage prevails.
And if in a majority of the states a majority of the electors voting approve the proposed law, and if a
majority of all the electors voting also approve the proposed law, it shall be presented to the GovernorGeneral for the Queen’s assent.
No alteration diminishing the proportionate representation of any State in either House of Parliament, or
the minimum number of representatives of a State in the House of Representatives, or increasing,
diminishing, or otherwise altering the limits of the State, or in any manner affecting the provisions of the
Constitution in relations thereto, shall become law unless the majority of the electors voting in that State
approve the proposed law.

Constitution
Alteration
(Referendums)
1977

In this section, ‘Territory’ means any Territory referred to in section One hundred and twenty-two
of this Constitution in respect of which there is in force a law allowing its representation in the House
of Representatives.

 SAMPLE BALLOT- PAPER ONLY
BALLOT-PAPERS
AUSTRALIA
Referendum (Constitution Alteration) Act

This is A
SAMPLE
ballot-paper
only,

STATE OF

Submission to the Electors of Proposed Laws
for the alteration of the Constitution

DO NOT mark
your vote on it

_____________
DIRECTIONS TO VOTER
In respect of each of the proposed laws, mark you vote on the
ballot-paper for that proposed law as follows:
If you APPROVE the proposed law, write the word YES
in the space provided opposite the question.
If you DO NOT APPROVE the proposed law, write the word NO

REMEMBER THAT ON
SATURDAY, 21 MAY
1977, YOU MUST VOTE
IN RESPECT OF EACH
PROPOSED LAW.
VOTING IS
COMPULSORY

in the space provided opposite the question.
______________________________________________________

BALLOT-PAPER
1. Proposed law entitled“An Act to alter the Constitution so as to ensure that
Senate Elections are held at the same time as House of
Representatives Elections.”
DO YOU APPROVE the proposed law?
______________________________________________________

BALLOT-PAPER
2. Proposed law entitled“An Act to facilitate alterations to the Constitution and to
allow Electors in Territories, as well as Electors in the States,
to vote at Referendums on Proposed Laws to alter the Constitution.”
DO YOU APPROVE the proposed law?
______________________________________________________

BALLOT-PAPER
3. Proposed law entitled“An Act to alter the Constitution so as to ensure that the
members of the House of Representatives and of the
Parliaments of the States are chosen directly and democratically
by the People.”
DO YOU APPROVE the proposed law?
______________________________________________________

BALLOT-PAPER
4. Proposed law entitled“An Act to alter the Constitution to enable the Commonwealth
to borrow Money for, and to grant Financial Assistance
to, Local Government Bodies.”
DO YOU APPROVE the proposed law?

R76/1119
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