hill-hnln I Report No. October 23, 2013 Inspector General United States Defense (U) Squadrons Could Improve Reporting of Mission Capability Rates and Readiness l' Classi?Additidnal Copies (U) To obtain additional copies of this report, contact the Secondary Reports Distribution Unit at auditnet@dodig.mil. Suggestions for Audits (U) To suggest or request audits, contact the Of?ce of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing at auditnet@dodig.mil or by mail. Department of Defense Of?ce of Inspector General Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditng ATTN: Audit Suggestions/13F25?04 4800 Mark Center Drive Alexandria, VA 22350-15 00 BF hn'l' IIUI. To report fraud, waste, mismanagement, and abuse of authority. Send wntten Defense Hotllne. The Pentagon. Washington. DC 20301-1900 Phone: 8004249098 e-mail: hotline?dudimll (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations AMCR Aircraft Material Condition Reporting AMSRR Aviation Maintenance Supply Readiness Reporting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual CNAF Commander, Naval Air Forces DECKPLATE Decision Knowledge Prograniming for Logistics Analysis and Technical Evaluation DRRS-MC Defense Readiness Reporting System?Marine Corps GSORTS Global Status of Resources and Training System MCAS Marine Corps Air Station MCO Marine Corps Order MCR Mission Capability Rate MCRT Marine Corps Readiness Tool NAMP Naval Aviation Maintenance Program NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command OHVIA NALCOMIS Optimized Intermediate Maintenance Activity Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System Program Manager Airn275, ?Joint Advanced Vertical Li? Aircraft (V-22) Osprey Program? VMM Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 4300 MARK CENTER DRNE ALEXANDRIA. VIRGINIA 22350?1500 October 23, 2m 3 MEMORANDUM OR COMMANDER, MARINE FORCES COMMAND COMMANDER, MARINE FORCES PACIFIC NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL SUBJECT: MV-22 Squadrons Could Improve Reporting of Mission Capability Rates and Readiness (Report No. DODIG-2014-001) (U) (U) We are providing this report for review and comment. squadron commanders computed the mission capability rates for five of six squadrons reviewed using erroneous aircraft inventory reports and work orders. In addition, squadron commanders submitted incomplete or inaccurate readiness reports for the six squadrons. As a result, the mission capability rates were unreliable, and senior officials could have deployed MV-22 squadrons that were not prepared for missions. (U) We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the ?nal report. Directive 7650.3 requires that recommendations be resolved Comments from the Commander, Naval Air Force, Paci?c and the Deputy Commandant for Aviation, responding for the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations; the Commander, Marine Forces Command; and the Commander, Marine Forces, Paci?c were partially responsive. Therefore, we request additional comments on Recommendations 1, la, 2.b.(l 2.c, 3a,- 3.b, and 3.0 by November 26, 2013. of Directive 7650.3. If possible, send a PDF ?le containing your comments to m? Lmil. Copies of management comments must contain the aetua Signature on authorizing official. We cannot accept the {Signedf symbol in pIaCe of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classi?ed-comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct. questions to me at (703) 604?8866 (DSN 664-8866). (U) Please provide comments that conform to the requirement ?3 Alice F. Carey Assistant inspector General Readiness, Operations, and Support Report No. (Project No. D201 October 23, 2013 Results in Brief: (U) MV-22 Squadrons Could Improve Reporting of Mission Capability - (U) place a continued emphasis on the Rates and Readiness (U) What We Did (U) Our overall objective was to evaluate the accuracy of the aircra? inventory reports and work orders used to compute the MV-22 mission capability rates (MCR) from October 1, 2008, through September 30, 2011. In addition, we evaluated readiness reports to determine whether squadrons reported accurate and complete equipment condition (R-level) and category (C-level) information for the (U) What We Found (U) From FY 2009 through FY 2011, MV-22 squadron commanders computed the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program MCR for ?ve of the six squadrons using erroneous aircraft inventOry reports and work orders. Squadron maintenance personnel: (U) improperly recorded MV-22 aircraft status information 167 of 200 times on aircraft inventory reports for out-of?reporting periods; and 0 (U) did not adequately prepare 112 of 907 work orders that we reviewed. (U) In addition, MV-22 squadron commanders submitted incomplete or inaccurate readiness reports for the six squadrons. For example, squadron operations personnel provided incomplete or inaccurate R-level information for 199 of 265 readiness reports. Furthermore, 5 squadrons did not provide complete C-level information for 127 of 265 readiness reports. (U) This occurred because squadron commanders did not: a (U) adequately train MV-22 maintenance personnel to prepare aircraft inventory reports and work orders nor operations personnel on readiness reports; 0 (U) verify the accuracy of aircraft inventory reports, work orders, and readiness reports; or reliability of data critical to the MCR. (U) As a result, the MCRs were unreliable, and senior and Marine Corps of?cials could have deployed MV-22 squadrons that were not prepared for missions. What We Recommend (U) We recommend the Commander, Naval Air Forces, revise the Commander, Naval Air Forces Instruction 4790.2A, ?Naval Aviation Maintenance Program,? November 10, 2009, to include detailed procedures for maintenance of?cers to verify the accuracy and completeness of aircraft inventory reports and work orders before'submission. (U) We recommend the Commander, Marine Forces Command and the Commander, Marines Forces Paci?c: 0 (U) require MV-22 squadrons track and report on the accuracy and completion of aircraft inventory reports and work orders; and 0 (U) require subordinate organizations and activities, at all levels of the command, to certify the accuracy of readiness reports submitted. (U) Management Comments and Our Response (U) Comments from the Commander, Naval Air Force, Paci?c, responding for the Commander, Naval Air Forces, were partially responsive. Comments from the Deputy Commandant for Aviation, reSponding for the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, the Commander, Marine Forces Command, and the Commander, Marine Forces Paci?c, were partially responsive. Please see the Recommendations Table on the back of this page. SEGREEP Report No. (Project No. D2011-D000LH-0170.000) October 23, 2013 (U) Recommendations Table Management Recommendations Requiring Comment No Additional Comments Required Commander, Naval Air Forces 1 Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations 2.a, 2.c Commander, Marine Forces 3.a, 3b, 3.c Command Commander, Marine Forces 3.a, 3.b, 3.c Paci?c Please provide comments by November 26, 2013. 11 (U) Table of Contents (U) Introduction (U) Objective (U) MV-22 Program (U). Mission Capability Rate Requirement and Calculation (U) Historical Mission Capability Rates (U) Readiness Reporting Guidance (U) Review 'of Internal Controls (U) Finding. MV-22 Squadrons Should Improve Recordkeeping for Mission Capability Rates and Readiness Reporting (U) Better Recordkeeping Could Improve the Accuracy of the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program Mission Capability Rate (U) Training on Preparing Maintenance Documentation Needed Improvement (U) Maintenance Personnel Needed to Verify Data (U) Readiness Reports Adverser Affected Decision Making (U) Training on Preparing Readiness Reports Needed Improvement (U) Squadron Commanders Did Not Verify Readiness Data (U) Emphasis on Data Reliability Needed Increased Focus (U) Accurate Data Should Improve Decision Making (U) Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response (U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response (U) Appendixes (U) A. Scope and Methodology (U) Use of Computer-Processed Data (U) Use of Technical Assistance (U) Prior Coverage . (U) B. Organizations and Squadrons (U) C. Management Comments on the Finding (U) Annex. Classi?ed Information Used in the Preparation of This Report (U) Management Comments Naval Air Force, Pacific U. S. Marine Corps (U) Introduction (U) Objective (U) Our overall objective was to evaluate whether the Osprey ?5 performance met the mission capability rate (MCR) requirements. Speci?cally, we intended to evaluate how the frequency of repairs and the replacement of supply parts affected the V?22?s mission readiness from October 1, 2008, through September 30, 2010. On January 12, 2012, we reannounced the audit objective to include FY 201 1. Although procured two variants of the V-22 (the Marine Corps? MV-22 and the Air Force?s for the purpose of this report, we focused on six Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadrons (VMMs) that operate the MV-22 variant. See Appendix A for a discussion of scope and methodology. (U) This report does not address whether missions were undertaken or completed. In the report, we use the MCR to de?ne the Osprey ?s performance.? The MCR measures the availability and capability of the aircraft to perform a designated mission. During the audit, we identified systemic errors associated with repair and supply parts data used to compute MCRs. As a result, we evaluated the accuracy of aircraft inventory reports and work orders used to support the computation of the MCR. By improving the accuracy of the data used to compute the MCR, the Marine Corps will obtain better information about the mission readiness of the (U) Program (U) The a tiltrotor vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft, was designed in the 19803 for the Marine Corps to perform assault support missions.1 The MV-22 is a tiltrotor aircraft that can take off vertically like a heIiCOpter and transition to a turboprop airplane con?guration. The aircraft transports combat equipped Marines, equipment, and supplies from assault ships and land bases in support of combat and noncombat- operations. The Marine Corps intended for the to replace the CH-46E helicopter and become the only medium-lift aircraft for the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps considered the MV-22 a more effective option than the because it provides the Marine Corps with improved capabilities to perform missions with its greater speed and increased range. (U) The MV-22 home bases are at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) New River, North Carolina; MCAS Miramar, California; and Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland. These bases are home to 13 squadrons that ?y the As of September 2011, the I (U) Assault support missions enhance a commander?s ability to focus and sustain combat power against an enemy as well as take advantage cfopportunities identi?ed during combat. These missions use aircraft to provide tactical mobility and logistical support to the Marine Air Ground Task Force. SEGRESF SEGR-EP (U) Marine Corps accepted delivery of 152 See Appendix for detailed information on the organizations and squadrons. (U) MCR Requirement and Calculation (U) Instruction 3110.05, ?Readiness-based Materiel Condition Reporting for Mission Essential Systems and Equipment,? September 25, 2006, requires Military Departments to establish a materiel condition goal for each type of aircraft and to track mission capability as the primary measure of materiel condition. Additionally, Military Departments are required to report mission capability in support of the Defense Readiness Reporting System. (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3170.01B, ?Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System,? May 11, 2005, states that a capability production document identi?es the warfighter?s required operational capability from a weapon system. The capability production document for the states that aircraft availability is a requirement and that the MCR measures the availability and capability of the MV-22. In the capability production document, the MCR goal was set at 82' percent.2 (U) The Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF), issued two instructions providing policy for tracking and calculating MCRs: CNAF Instruction 4790.2A, ?The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program November 10, 2009; and CNAF Instruction 5442.1, ?Aircraft Material Condition Reperting March 31, 2005. (U) According to the the MCR measures the aircraft material condition of readiness. To determine the MCR, the NAMP requires the Marine Corps to track aircraft status and mission capability information. Squadron maintenance personnel use aircraft inventory reports to document when an aircraft is ire-reporting status or out-afreporting status. An aircra? is in-reporting when the aircraft is available to perform missions and out-of-reporting at all other times (for example, before a new aircraft is delivered to a squadron, while an aircraft undergoes depot-level maintenance, or when an aircra? is placed in long-term storage). Squadron maintenance personnel use work orders to document when an aircraft is non-mission capable.3 2 (U) A MCR requirement of 82 percent means that the MV-22 was available and capable of performing any of its assigned missions for 82 hours of 100 hours. 3 (U) An aircraft is non-mission capable when it cannot perform any missions because of maintenance requirements. SEGRESF 2 (U) Marine Corps information systems aggregate the aircraft inventory reports and work orders to obtain a continuous real-time calculation of the aircraft status and mission capability information for each aircraft, which is called Record Type 794 data. The NAMP MCR formula is: (U) MCR In~Renortinar Hours5 ?-Non-Mission Capable Hours6 In-Reporting Hours (U) Accordingto CNAF Instruction 5442.1A, ?Aircraft Material Condition Reporting,? March 15, 2010, squadron commanders must report the aircraft material condition on a daily basis to support the readiness-based decisions of higher commands. Squadron commanders are required to report their squadron?s AMCR MCR no later than 8:00 am. local time. The AMCR MCR is a snapshot of the availability and capability of the squadron?s aircraft to perform missions. The Defense Readiness Reporting System-Marine Corps (DRRS-MC) uses the AMCR MCR percentage to determine equipment condition (R-level), which is a component used to determine the overall unit readiness? The AMCR MCR formula is: (U) MCR Ill-Reporting Aircraft8 Non-Mission Capable Aircraftg In-Reporting Aircraft (U) Historical MCRs (U) The MV-22 MCR goal was set at 82 percent. However, from FY 2009 through FY 2011, the MCR did not meet the 82 percent requirement. Speci?cally, the ?eet?wide NAMP MCR average was computed at 58 percent in FY 2009, 45 percent in FY 2010, and 57 percent in FY 2011. The ?eet-wide AMCR MCR average was computed at 65 percent in FY 2009, 63 percent in FY 2010, and 66 percent in FY 2011. Senior Marine Corps of?cials and operational commanders rely on the NAMP MCR average and AMCR MCR average to develop improvements for future - operations, including maintenance and readiness assessment. The NAMP MCR average 4 (U) Summary Record,? Record Type 79 is a record that states the aircraft status information, mission capability information, and ?ight data for each aircraft. 5 (U) In-reporting hours are the number of hours in a month that the squadron?s aircraft were available to perform missions. (U) Non-mission capable hours are the number of in-reporting hours in a month that the squadron?s aircraft could not perform any missions because of maintenance requirements. 7 (U) Decision makers use the overall unit readiness to determine the ability of the select unit to undertake wartime missions for which the unit was organized or designed. (U) In-reportin aircraft are the number of aircraft in a squadron that were available to perform missions at the time of the squadron?s daily AMCR report. 9 (U) Non-mission capable aircraft are the number of in-reporting aircraft in a. squadron that could not perform any missions because of maintenance requirements at the time of the squadron?s daily AMCR SEGREEF 3 report. SEGRET (U) was based on aircraft records prepared by squadron maintenance personnel. The AMCR MCR average represents the squadron commanders? assessment of the mission capability of their aircraft. (U) Readiness Reporting Guidance (U) Congress required the Secretary of Defense to establish a readiness reporting system under section 117, title 10, United States Code (10 U.S.C.. 117). The readiness reporting system is required to measure in an objective, accurate, and timely manner the capability of the armed forces to carry out the National Security Strategy prescribed by the President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the defense planning guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. Congress also required the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the Chairman) to plan, advise, and formulate policy under section 153, title 10, United States Code (10 U.S.C. 153). Speci?cally, the Chairman is required to establish and maintain, after consultation with the combatant commands, a uniform system for evaluating the preparedness of each combatant?command to carry out assigned missions. One of the reporting systems the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff created was the Global Status of Resources and Training System Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 3401.02A, current as of June 12, 2008, and Chairman of the Joint Chief Staff Instruction 3401 .02B, ?Force Readiness Reporting,? May 31, 2011, establishes uniform policy, procedures, and criteria for the reporting of authoritative information to the President and Secretary of Defense. GSORTS is a resource and unit monitoring system andan internal readiness management tool that indicates the level of units? select resources and training status required to undertake the mission(s) for which they were organized or designed. To meet 10 U.S.C. reporting requirements, the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations established policies and procedures for reporting authoritative identi?cation, location, and resource information on units and organizations for the Marine Corps within the Marine Corps Order (MCO) P3 000.13D, ?Marine Corps Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) Standard Operating Procedures April 17, 2002; and MCO 3000.13, ?Marine Corps Readiness Reporting Standard Operating Procedures,? July 30, 2010. These policies and procedures include general instructions for SORTS reporting, including data required, reporting frequency, and management responsibilities. The MOD P3000.13D also states, was designed primarily to measure the day-to-day status of operating forces, but has. evolved to become an internal management tool for use by the CJ CS, combatant command, and Services.? MCO P3000.13D and MCO 3000.13 both state that they are the governing 1? (U) GSORT S, the authoritative source, is the single automated reporting system, which contains all services resource level information. Resource level information includes the (Personnel), (Equipment Condition), (Supply and Equipment), and (Training) level information. SEGREEP 4 SEGRET (UMP-GHQ) authority for all Marine Corps SORTS reporting requirements and applies to all Marine Corps readiness reporting organizations. Development or use of any additional software, reporting formats, local standards or de?nitions within any part of readiness reporting requires prior authorization from the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations. (U) In May 2011, Headquarters, Marine Corps, Operations Division, Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations, Readiness Branch created a Marine Corps Commander?s Readiness Handbook. The Handbook assists the commanding of?cers with the readiness reporting process. The Handbook also states the commanding of?cer must ensure that his/her readiness of?cer is familiar with MCO 3000.13. The Handbook states, ?Commander?s should CAREFULLY review readiness reports before submission to ensure accuracy. Without timely and accurate reports, Force Readiness cannot be ascertained.? (UHFOUQ) Based on MCR and readiness reporting guidance, we evaluated aircraft inventory reports, work orders, and readiness reports for six VMMs from FY 2009 through FY 2011. The six squadrons reviewed were VMM-162, VMM-264, and Speci?cally, we evaluated the accuracy of the aircraft inventory reports and work orders used to compute the MV-22 MCR. In addition, we evaluated readiness reports to determine whether MV-22 squadrons reIported accurate and complete equipment condition (R-level) and category level (C-level)1 information for the (U) Review of Internal Controls (U) Instruction 5010.40, ?Managers? Internal Control Program (MICP) Procedures,? July 29, 2010, requires organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provide reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. (U) We identi?ed weaknesses in internal controls over aircraft maintenance operations and readiness reporting. Speci?cally, MV-22 squadron commanders did not adequately train MV-22 maintenance personnel to prepare aircraft inventory reports and work orders nor MV-22 operations personnel on readiness reports. MV-22 squadron commanders did not verify the accuracy of aircraft inventory reports, work orders, or readiness reports. In addition, MV-22 squadron commanders did not place an emphasis on the reliability of the data critical to the MCR. We will provide a copy of the report to the senior of?cials responsible for internal controls at Naval Air Forces; Headquarters, Marine Corps; Marine Forces Command; and Marine Forces Paci?c. (U) The C-level re?ects the condition of the available four resource levels, equipment condition (R-level), equipment and supplies on hand (S-level), personnel (P-level), and unit training status (T?level). C-levels, by themselves, do not project a unit?s combat performance once committed to combat. 5 SEGREIF (U) Finding. MV-22 Squadrons Should Improve Recordkeeping for MCRs and Readiness Reporting (U) From FY 2009 through FY 2011, squadron?commanders computed the NAMP MCR for ?ve of six squadrons using erroneous aircraft inventory reports and Work orders. Squadron maintenance personnel: 0 (U) improperly recorded MV-22 aircraft status information 167 of 200 times on aircra? inventory reports for- out-of-reporting periods; and a (U) did not adequately prepare 112 of 907 work orders that?we reviewed. (U) In addition, MV-22 squadron commanders submitted incomplete or inaccurate readiness reports for six squadrons. For exanmle, squadron operations personnel provided incomplete or inaccurate R-level information for 199 of 265 readiness reports. Furthermore, 5 squadrons did not provide complete C-level information for 127 of 265 readiness reports. (U) This occurred because squadron commanders did not: 0 (U) adequately train MV-22 maintenance personnel to prepare aircraft inventory reports and work orders nor operations personnel on readiness reports; 0 (U) verify the accuracy of aircraft inventory reports, work orders, and readiness reports; or 0 (U) place a continued emphasis on the reliability of data critical to the MCR. (U) As a result, the MCRs were unreliable, and senior DOD and Marine Corps officials could have deployed MV-22 squadrons that were not prepared for missions. (U) Better Recordkeeping Could improve the Accuracy of the MGR (U) 'Marines at five of the six MV-22 squadrons prepared aircraft inventory reports and work orders containing erroneous data. According to chapters 1 and 3 of the NAMP, a squadron commander is responsible for the maintenance and mission capability of the squadron?s aircraft as well as accomplishing the squadron?s mission. Squadron maintenance personnel document maintenance actions and mission capability data on work orders. Squadron personnel also record aircraft status information on aircraft inventory reports. Squadron personnel use mission capability and aircraft status information to compute the NAMP MCR. Chapter 15 of the NAMP states that squadron maintenance personnel must strive for absolutely accurate records. SEGREEP (U) However, squadrons? aircraft inventory reports and work orders contained errors, including the following: 0 (U) improperly recorded aircraft status information; and 0 (U) miscoded mission capability and maintenance information. (U) Aircraft Inventory Reports Contained Incorrect Status Information (U) Squadron maintenance personnel improperly recorded status information 167 of 200 times on aircraft inventory reports for out?of?reporting periods from FY 2009 through FY 201 1. According to chapter 5 of the NAMP, squadron maintenance personnel are required to accurately document on aircraft inventory reports an aircraft?s status information (either in-reporting or The NAMP authorizes squadron maintenance personnel to record an aircraft as out-of?reporting when the aircraft-is either undergoing depot-level maintenance, is lost, or destroyed in an accident.12 According to Chapter 13 of the NAMP, aircraft inventory reports must be - dated within 1 minute of an aircraft status change. However, for 66 of 167 entries, squadron maintenance personnel reported the aircraft as out-of?reporting longer than the required timeframe. For the remaining 101 entries, there were no depot?level records to support whether the aircraft were actually out-of-reporting. (U) For example, VMM-162 maintenance personnel prepared an April 2011 work order that stated aircraft 166736 required repairs to the aircraft?s right engine nacelle. According to records from Fleet Readiness (U) Consequently VMJW 162 Center East, depot-level personnel evaluated maintenance perso?ml recorded the damage on Aprll 18, 2011, and concluded aircra? 166736 as out_0f_rep0mngfor that the alrcraft not requlre depot-level at {east 96 hours longer than the maintenance. However, squadron required time?ama maintenance personnel prepared aircraft inventory reports stating that depot-level repairs began on April 18, 2011, and'were completed on April 22, 2011. Consequently, maintenance personnel recorded aircraft 166736 as out-of?reporting for at least 96 hours longer than the required timeframe. (U) Similarly, in April 2011, maintenance personnel found that aircraft l68005?s nose landing gear collapsed. maintenance personnel prepared work orders to document the damage and the repairs that they performed. Squadron maintenance personnel also prepared aircraft inventory reports stating depot-level repairs began on April 27, 2011, and were completed on June 7, 2011. 12 (U) The Chief of Naval Operations can authorize squadrons to report aircraft as out?ofreporting in additional circumstances on a case-by-case basis. Naval Air Systems Command and Defense Contract Management Agency officials prepare aircraft inventory reports for all other out-of-reporting situations. 8-1361qu 7 SEGRESP (U) However, there were no depot-level work orders that supported the repairs. Without a depot-level work order, the Squadron Commander, could not demonstrate how long the depot-level repairs took to complete or whether the repairs were performed. Consequently, maintenance personnel reported aircraft 168005 as out-of reporting and could not demonstrate that this decision was appropriate. (U) Work Orders Reported Incorrect Data (U) MV-22 maintenance personnel prepared 112 of 907 work orders that we reviewed from FY 2009 through FY 2011 that captured incorrect data. Of the 112 work orders for aircraft, 30 were coded as mission capable when MV-22 maintenance personnel should have coded the aircraft as non-mission capable. The remaining 82 work orders contained various types of errors, such as recording con?icting information on work orders and using non?existent codes. (U) According to chapter 17 of the NAMP, squadron maintenance personnel are to record on work orders whether aircraft are non-mission capable because of an aircraft malfunction. If an aircraft mal?mction prevents safe ?ight, personnel must record the aircraft as non-mission capable in accordance with the Mission Essential Matrix. The Mission Essential Matrix for the MV-22 provides guidance on when an aircra? malfunction prevents the safe? ?ight of an MV-22. I For example, on April 1, 2010, VMM-365 maintenance personnel found that the battery was ?dead? for aircraft 166498. Squadron maintenance personnel replaced the battery by April 14, 2010. When Maintenance documenting this maintenance action, squadron personnel should have recorded maintenance personnel prepared a work order the aircra? as non-mission recording the aircraft as fully mission capable capable because the aircra? did from April 1, 2010, through April 14, 2010. not have a. working battery. However, the Mission Essential Matrix states that an MV-22 cannot ?y safely without an aircraft battery. Maintenance personnel should have recorded the aircraft as non-mission capable because the aircraft .did not have a working battery. (Ill/F939) Similarly, in July 2010, VMM-264 maintenance personnel prepared a work order to document maintenance on the ?ight control system for aircraft 165853, which is necessary for safe ?ight aCcording to the Mission Essential Matrix. Squadron maintenance personnel coded the work order to state that they removed and replaced a leaking ?ight control actuator. However, the maintenance personnel recorded on the same work order that they did not remove the ?ight control actuatOr and only tested for a leak. Consequently, the Squadron Commander, VMM-264, could not demonstrate what maintenance actually occurred or whether this maintenance action would have rendered aircraft 165853 as non-mission capable. (U) Training on Preparing Maintenance Documentation Needed Improvement (U) MV-22 squadron commanders did not adequately train MV-22 maintenance personnel on the preparation of aircra? inventory reports and work orders as required by the NAMP. According to the NAMP, a squadron commander has overall responsibility for ensuring maintenance personnel are trained. Under the direction of the squadron commander, work center supervisors must ensure proper training of squadron maintenance personnel, and maintenance of?cers must ensure training is completed. Squadron commanders conduct training through the Maintenance In-Service Training Program (In-Service Training), which establishes policy, responsibilities, and requirements for training at maintenance activities. In-Service Training modules include lectures, personnel quali?cation standards, and on-the-job training for maintenance of aircraft. The NAMP requires that training records for maintenance personnel be maintained in the Navy?s Advanced Skills Management system. The NAMP also states that indoctrination training for maintenance personnel must be completed within 30 days of reporting to a squadron. (U) Marine Corps maintenance of?cials did not have suf?cient documentation to prove that adequate training existed for all MV-22 maintenance personnel for the six squadrons based on documentation available in the Advanced Skills Management system. Speci?cally, 13 of 40 maintenance personnel from VMM-165, and VMM-166 did not have their training documented in the system! and did not complete their NAMP indoctrination training within 30 days of reporting to their reSpective squadrons. Advanced Skills Management system showed that maintenance personnel aceomplished multiple course levels on the same day and ?nalized a second level course before completing the ?rst level course. Additionally, maintenance officers from VMM-162, VMM-264, and VMM-365 stated that they did not have complete maintenance training documentation for their maintenance personnel. (U) Also, the Navy internal inspection reports identi?ed maintenance personnel training de?ciencies ??om FY 2009 thrOugh FY 2011. For example, inspection reports from FY 2010 through FY 2011 repeatedly stated that VMM-I 61 did not always provide mandatory training, maintain training records for each Marine, or document formal and on-the-job training. These and other training problems resulted in maintenance personnel preparing inaccurate records. For example, the inspectors found that maintenance records for (0) These and other training life-limited parts re?ected inaccurate problems resulted in replacement times. Maintenance personnel maintenance personnel improperly maintained records for explosives preparing inaccurate records. installed on the aircraft and improperly controlled hazardous materials because of inaccurate inventories. Additionally, Marine Corps maintenance of?cials stated in an inspection report that repeatedly ?ew an aircraft although the aircraft was restricted from ?ight operations. maintenance personnel should receive training on how to prepare aircraft inventory SEGREEP 9 SEGRELF (U) reports and work orders, in accordance with the NAMP, on a reoccurring basis to prevent errors in maintenance data. (U) Maintenance Personnel Needed to Verify Data (U) squadron commanders did not verify the accuracy of the information included in the MCR calculation. Speci?cally, squadron maintenance personnel did not verify the accuracy of aircraft inventory reports or work orders. According to chapter 15 of the NAMP, maintenance personnel should prepare complete and accurate documentation. The guidance discusses procedures that supervisors must take to ensure accurate documentation. However, Program Manager Air-27S, ?Joint Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (V-22) Osprey Program,? and Headquarters, Marine Corps officials acknowledged that maintenance personnel manually entered data into multiple systems and did not ensure the data were correct. Although maintenance personnel were required to ensure the accuracy of aircraft inventory reports and work orders, errors occurred repeatedly as discussed earlier. MV-22 squadron commanders should certify that maintenance personnel have veri?ed maintenance information before submission to prevent reporting errors. MV-22 squadron commanders should establish a checklist to validate the correct entry of maintenance information. (U) Readiness Reports Adverser Affected Decision Making (U) MV-22 squadron commanders submitted incomplete or inaccurate readiness reports. Specifically, for the six squadrons reviewed, MV-22 squadron commanders provided incomplete or inaccurate R-level information, and ?ve of the six squadrons did not include complete C-level information. (U) R-Levei Information for Readiness Reporting Needed Improvement (U) MV-22 squadron commanders provided 199 of 265 readiness reports from FY 2009 through FY 2011 with, incomplete R?level information and 23 readiness reports with inaccurate R-level information for the 6 squadrons reviewed. The R?level is one of four resource levels squadron commanders evaluate to determine the overall readiness of a unit. According to the Commander?s Readiness Handbook, the R?level represents, the gear that I actually have, this is how much actually works like it is supposed to.? The R?level is the percentage of aircraft in a squadron?s possession that are in?reporting and mission capable. Squadron operations personnel use the AMCR MCR calculation to 13 (U) PMA-275 is a subordinate organization to Program Executive Office Air Anti-Submarine Warfare, Assault and Special Mission Programs. The Program Executive Of?ce Air Anti-Submarine Warfare, Assault and Special Mission Programs is a subordinate organization to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition). SW 1 0 SEGRET (U) determine the R?level. Table 1 shows the AMCR MCR formula and the criterion for assigning the R-level. Table 1. MCR Formula and Criterion for R?Level (U) Rule. R-l I 12.2 R-3 R-4 In?Reporting Aircraft minus Non-Mission Capable Aircraft . divided by 100-75 74-60 59-50 49?0 In-Reporting Aircraft percent percent percent percent Source: US. Marine Corps Plans, Policies, and Operations, ?Commander?s Readiness Handbook,? May 2011. (U) 3150.02A, ?Global Status of Resources and Training System April 29, 2004, and 3150.02B March 25, 2011, require commanders to submit detailed remarks for each resource level (P, S, R, and level) that has a numerical value of less than one (that is, for example, R-2, R-3, or R-4). At a minimum, the commander?s R?level remarks must include the following data elements: (U) the number of authorized, required, assigned and available equipment; (U) a list of equipment types with problems;_ (U) an explanation of the causes of the problems (if known); (U) assistance already requested; and (U) any further actions required. 0.0 I (U) Commanders of the 6 MV-22 squadrons submitted 265 readiness reports for the 36?month period reviewed. The readiness reports had systemic issues with the completeness and accuracy of the R-Ievel information the squadron commanders reported. For example, 199 readiness reports did not include required data elements or MCR, and 23 readiness reports identi?ed that the commanders? narrative remarkswere inconsistent with the reported R?level. 15 Table 2 (on page 12) shows the number of R?level reports containing incomplete or inaccurate R?level information for each squadron. 14 (U) DRRS-MC is a Marine Corps readiness reporting system consisting of an input and output tool. This output tool pulls both resource level information from the local data collection in DRRS-MC. ?5 (U) Readiness reports that did not include the MCR percentage were also missing data elements. SEGREFF 1 1 SEGREJF Table 2. Readiness Reports Containing Incomplete or Inaccurate R-Level Information by Squadron (U) CU) Inaccurate R?levei Incomplete R-lerel Information Information R?levei Remarks or Number of MCR Were Mv-zz Readiness Missing Data Missing MCR Inconsistent With Squadron Reports Elements Percentage R?level 161 TotalThe number of missing data elements, missing MCR percentage. and remarks inconsistent with MCR. do not equal the total number of readimBSS reports because some items were captured in multiple categories. (U) -I --I- I L. 12 (U) V-22 Squadron Commanders Reported Incomplete C-Level Remarks for Readiness Reports (U) MV-22 squadron commanders provided incomplete and inaccurate C-level information for ?ve of six squadrons reviewed. The C-level re?ects the ability of the select unit to undertake the wartime missions for which the unit was organized or designed (core mission). For 127 of the 265 readiness reports, the commanders? remarks did not support the resource level rating or the commanders? decision to subjectively raise the unit?s C?level rating. (U) According to MCO 3000.13, the commanding of?cers? C-level will equate to the lowest rating of any of the unit?s individually measured resource and training ratings (P, S, R, and T). The only exception to this is if the commanding of?cer subjectively raised or lowered the C-level or Commandant of the Marine Corps directs a unit to report a C-level of a ?ve. The commander?s remarks are required on all C-level assessments to help higher headquarters understand the organization?s mission readiness and capabilities. The commander?s remarks must explain the rating and put them in context. Table 3 (on page 14) illustrates the de?nition of the C-level. 13 SEGREEP Table 3. Category Level (C-Level) De?nition (U) CU) I C-Level I De?nition C-l Could execute ?ll] wartime missions 02 Could execute most of wartime missions I C-3 I Could execute many but not all wartime missions Required additional resources or training in order to execute wartime missions I C-5 I Not prepared to execute wartime missions Source: Marine Corps Order 3000.13, ?Marine Corps Readiness Reporting Standard Operating Procedures,? July 30, 2010. 3150.02, states that the commander must provide a summary when multiple resource levels limit the C-level. Speci?cally, the commander must list the resources with problems; provide the quantities of resources authorized, required, assigned, and available; explain the causes of the problems if known; identify assistance already requested; and highlight any additional actions required. Table 4 shows the number of squadron. readiness reports where the commanders? C?level remarks were inconsistent with the lowest resource rating or the commander?s override. Table 4. Squadrons? Inconsistent C?Level Information (U) (U) Remarks Do Not Remarks Do Not Number of Support the Support the Readiness - Lowest Commanders? MV-22 squadrons Reports Resource Rating Override 161 Total 265 86 41 (U) Training on Preparing Readiness Reports Needed improvement (U) squadron commanders did not ensure squadron Operations personnel received adequate training on preparing readiness reports. A Headquarters, Marine Corps of?cial stated that the high turnover of MV-22 squadron personnel affected the data entry of required readiness reporting information. This caused the squadrons to have a constant learning curve on reporting readiness. In addition, MV-22 squadrons lacked personnel trained in entering required resource level information. (U) According to squadron operations personnel, readiness report training occurred infrequently. Headquarters, Marine Corps personnel stated that they conducted training for squadron operations personnel. Speci?cally, Squadron Commander, VMM-162, stated that during his 2-week Commanders Of?cers? School, he received a 1-hour classroom brief on DRRS-MC readiness reporting, but no hands?on training. The commander stated this was the only readiness reporting training that he received and no refresher training was required. (U) An operations of?cer16 assigned to 62 stated he did not receive either formal or refresher training on readiness reporting. The of?cer received his training through on-the-job training and trial and error. operations of?cer stated the last formal training on readiness reporting that he received was in 2000. In addition, Marine Corps 16 (U) The operations of?cer is the liaison between the operations chief and the squadron commander and reviews the readiness reports for accuracy and completeness before the squadron commander reviews them. 15 (U) operations officials did not have sufficient documentation to prove that adequate training existed for all MV-22 operations personnel for the six squadrons based on documentation available in the Advanced Skills Management system. Speci?cally, all 14 operations personnel reviewed from VMM- l. 61 VMM-165, and did not have their training documented in the system. Therefore, Headquarters, Marine Corps personnel should provide formal and refresher training operations personnel on how .to report readiness in (U) The of?cers assigned to and VMM-264 were not familiar with the Commander?s Readiness Handbook, which Headquarters, Marine Corps personnel designed to assist commanding of?cers with the readiness reporting process. The Commander?s Readiness Handbook addresses the need for accurate and timely readiness reports, which will enable higher headquarters to identify and understand the commander?s squadron shortfalls and move quickly to mitigate or address them. The Commander?s Readiness Handbook also includes the Commander?s Checklist, which is a best practice, to improve reporting accuracy and effectiveness. The Commander?s Checklist includes statements, such as ?[r]emarks should explain the impact of the resource levels on your unit?s readiness for both core and assigned missions; and were personnel and equipment accurately re?ected.? However, the Commander?s Readiness Handbook does not include detailed examples of unit commander?s C-level remarks and resource level remarks. The Commander?s Checklist also does not include checking for the required data elements. In addition, there was no requirement to submit the Commander?s Checklist with the of?cial readiness report to attest to the accuracy of the report. Therefore, the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, should revise the Commander?s Readiness Handbook and Commander?s Checklist to include detailed examples. In addition, Headquarters, Marine Corps personnel should require MV-22 squadron commanders to use the Commander?s Checklist in the preparation of readiness reports. (U) Squadron Commanders Did Not Verify Readiness Data MV-22 squadron commanders did not verify the accuracy or completeness of the readiness reports, including information required for the R-level and C-level. 3150.02 identi?es the information required for the readiness reports. However, we identi?ed that from FY 2009 through FY 2011, MV-22 squadron commanders signed and submitted readiness reports that did not contain all of the required elements. For example, Headquarters, Marine Corps Plans, Policies, and Operations personnel stated that although the squadron received a R?l without possessing an aircraft, the Squadron Commander, reported an overall C?level of C-5. Headquarters, Marine Corps Plans, Policies, and Operations personnel stated the C-5 level indicated the unit was either activating, deactivating or redesignating. 16 According to 3150.02A, the Service Chiefs? must monitor GSORTS data reporting for accuracy, timeliness, and validity within their respective assigned responsibilities, and initiate corrective action, as required. Additionally, MCO P300013 states that the Commanders, Marine Forces and Major Subordinate Commands must also monitor SORTS data for accuracy, timeliness, and validity and initiate corrective actions as required. Lastly, MCO P300013 requires commanding officers to validate the accuracy of units? SORTS reports by signing each SORTS report submitted. There were no instances where commanders at higher levels required squadron commanders to resubmit any of the readiness reports we reviewed to correct errors in reporting. The Commander, Marine Forces Command and Commander, Marine Forces Paci?c, should require subordinate organizations and activities to certify the accuracy and completeness of the readiness reporting information before submission to prevent incomplete or incorrect information from being reported. (U) Emphasis on Data Reliability Needed Increased Focus (U) Marine Corps squadron commanders were aware of a lack of emphasis on the reliability of data critical to the however, the issue still existed. According to chapter 3 of the NAMP, ?generating high standards of quality in a maintenance organization demands a sincere interest on the part of the CO [Commanding Of?cer] which must be evident to everyone in the command.? However, in a Marine Corps policy letter dated October 30, 2007, the Commanding General, Marine Aircraft Wing, stated, am concerned for the safety of personnel, equipment, aircraft, and the fundamental lack of Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) knowledge among key maintenance department personnel.? At that time, the commanding general also noted, ?an insuf?cient emphasis on quality technical training.? (Si-1 (U) Despite emphasis from the Commanding General, 2? Marine Aircraft Wing, Marine Corps of?cials did not emphasize the reliability of data critical to the MCR. I7 According to Headquarters, Marine Corps Plans, Policy, and Operations personnel, the Commandant of the Marine Corps is their Service Chief. 7 SEGRELP (U) For example, MV-22 o?icials acknowledged that the submission of aircraft inventory reports were at the wrong times and may contain errors. According to one squadron commander, the squadrons have many priorities and, as a result, personnel may ?le the records late. Another MV-22 of?cial stated that squadron personnel usually did not prepare all required aircraft inventory reports when they transfer aircraft for depot-level maintenance. MV-22 of?cials also stated that some MV-22 squadron personnel did not focus on the accuracy of information recorded on work orders. Although Marine Corps leaders identi?ed these issues in 2007, they still existed. Marine Corps of?cials should track and report on the accuracy and completion of aircraft inventory reports, work orders, and readiness reports to demonstrate an increased focus on data reliability. (U) Accurate Data Should improve Decision Making (U) Marine Corps officials did not ensure the MV-22 maintenance records and readiness reports were complete and accurate because the Marine Corps did not suf?ciently train maintenance and operations personnel and did not verify that the data were correct. Consequently, the MCRs for the six squadrons were unreliable ?'om FY 2009 through FY 2011. Senior and Marine Corps of?cials run the risk of deploying squadrons to multiple contingency operations simultaneously based on inadequate maintenance and readiness data. Marine Corps of?cials should place an increased emphasis on the reliability of the data critical to the MCR and readiness reporting to ensure that the reporting of the data is without error, so decision makers have valid information. (U) Management Comments-on the Finding and Our Response (U) The Commander, Naval Air Force, Paci?c and the Deputy Commandant for Aviation provided commentson the ?nding. See Appendix for the Commander?s and Deputy Commandant?s comments on the ?nding and our response. (U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response 1. (U) We recommend the Commander, Naval Air Forces, revise the Commander, Naval Air Forces Instruction 4790.2A, ?Naval Aviation Maintenance Program,? November 10, 2009, to include detailed procedures for maintenance of?cers to use to verify the accuracy and completeness of aircraft inventory reports and work orders before submission. Commander, Naval Air Forces, Paci?c Management Comments (U) The Commander, Naval Air Forces, Paci?c, responding for the Commander, Naval Air Forces, agreed with the recommendation. The Commander, Naval Air Forces, Paci?c, stated that improvements in the NAMP are needed for procedures and responsibilities for verifying Aircraft Inventory Readiness Reporting System and work SEGRET 18 SEQ-1E1: (U) - orders. The Commander, Naval Air Forces, Paci?c, will incorporate the following changes in the NAMP. Speci?cally, the NAMP will include the additional responsibility for the maintenance material control of?cer to validate the accuracy of Aircra? Inventory Readiness Reporting System before submission. The additional responsibility of the collateral duty inspector, work center supervisor, maintenance control desk supervisor, maintenance master chief petty of?cer, maintenance material control of?cer, and maintenance of?cer to emphasize of importance of verifying the correct Equipment Operational Capability code to be used on work orders. In addition, the NAMP will include an additional responsibility for the maintenance of?cer to review aircraft readiness rates and validate that correct reporting procedures are being followed. The NAMP changes are estimated to be completed by September 15, 2013. Lastly, the Commander, Naval Air Force, Paci?c, provided additional information on improvements to Aircraft Inventory Readiness Reporting System that will affect the tracking of time on all active work orders and will require approval from the aircraft controlling custodian before acceptance of the aircraft inventory report making errors more identi?able. The improvementsto the Aircraft Inventory Readiness Reporting System are expected to be completed in December 2013. (U) Our Response (U) Comments from the Commander, Naval Air Forces, Paci?c, were partially responsive. We agree that the Commander, Naval Air Forces, Paci?c?s, incorporation of the changes to the NAMP will add internal controls and a segregation of duties to the maintenance process. However, the response did not include detailed procedures for maintenance of?cers to use to verify the accuracy of completeness of aircraft inventory reports and work orders. In addition, the NAMP changes that will require the maintenance material control of?cer to validate the accuracy of Aircraft Inventory Readiness Reporting System before submission will not resolve the recommendation because it is a change that focuses on the system output. However, our recommendation focuses on the system inputs by addressing the issue of erroneous Aircraft Custody/Status Change Reports (aircraft inventory reports) used to compute the mission capability rate. Therefore, we request that the Commander, Naval Air Forces, Paci?c readdress Recommendation 1 and provide additional comments in response to the ?nal report. (U) Commander; Marine Forces Command Management Comments (Unsolicited) (U) Although not required to comment, the Deputy Commandant for Aviation responding for the Commander, Marine Forces Command, agreed with Recommendation 1. The deputy commandant will coordinate with Commander, Naval Air Forces to include detailed procedures for maintenance of?cers to verify the accuracy and completeness of aircraft inventory and work orders before submission beyond what already exists in the Commander, Naval Air Forces Instruction 4790.2A, ?Naval Aviation Maintenance Program,? (NAMP) paragraphs 3.5.3, 3.5.4, and 5.2. 19 (U) Our Response (U) The Deputy Commandant for Aviation provided an unsolicited response to Recommendation 1. We agree with the Deputy Commandant?s response to Recommendation 1. 2. (U) We recommend the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations: a. (U) Require mandatory training and establish refresher training for all MV-22 operations personnel on how to complete readiness reports in the Defense Readiness Reporting System?Marine Corps. b. (U) Revise the Commander?s Readiness Handbook, January 2012 to include at a minimum: (1) (U) Detailed examples of the commander?s category level remarks and equipment condition level remarks. (2) . (U) In the Commander?s Checklist, the equipment condition data elements and a requirement for the commander?s signature on the readiness reports to attest to the accuracy of information provided. c. (U) Require submission of the revised Commander?s Checklist with the readiness report. (U) Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations Management Comments (U) The Deputy Commandant for Aviation provided responses to Recommendations 2.a, and 2.0 on behalf of the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations. (U) The Deputy Commandant for Aviation agreed with Recommendations 2.a and but did not provide any actions to implement the recommendations. The deputy commandant partially agreed with Recommendation The deputy commandant stated that there should be no requirement for commanding officers to sign readiness reports and there is no Joint Staff, or Service readiness directive requirement for commanding of?cers to sign or maintain paper copies of readiness reports. He stated that the cost of electronic signatures would outweigh the bene?t to implement electronic signatures into DRRS-MC or DRRS-Strategic. The deputy commandant stated that Marine Corps of?cials will reemphasize that commanding of?cers are responsible for the accuracy of their reports. The deputy commandant disagreed with Recommendation 2.0. He stated that the Commander?s Readiness Handbook identi?es the importance of using MCO 3000.13, ?Marine Corps Readiness Reporting Standard Operating Procedures,? as the source of detailed instructions for readiness report submission. The deputy commandant also stated that there is no requirement from DOD, Joint Staff or Services SW 20 SEGREEF (U) readiness directives for a checklist to be included with readiness reports. He stated that the cost would outweigh the bene?t to incorporate a checklist for submission into DRRS-MC or DRRS-Strategic. (U) Our Response (U) Comments from the Deputy Commandant for Aviation on Recommendations 2.a and were partially responsive because although they agreed with the recommendations, no actions to implement the recommendations were provided. Comments from the deputy commandant on Recommendation and were partially responsive. The deputy commandant did not address incorporating the equipment condition data elements into the Commander?s Checklist and-did not explain how the deputy commandant would reemphasize the accuracy of the commanding of?cers readiness reporting. In this regard, the deputy commandant did not provide any cost- bene?t analysis to demonstrate that the cost of electronic signatures would outweigh the bene?t of requiring squadron commanders electronic sign readiness reports in DRRS-MC or DRRS-Strategic. Comments from?the deputy commandant on Recommendations 2.c were nonresponsive. We still maintain that the Commander?s Checklist should be required with the submission of the readiness report to increase the effectiveness of the readiness guidance by adding another control mechanism to ensure prOper reporting of readiness. Therefore, we request that the Deputy Commandant for Aviation readdress Recommendations 2.a, and 2.0 and provide comments on the ?nal report. 3. (U) We recommend the Commander, Marine Forces Command, and the Commander, Marine Forces Paci?c: a. (U) Implement mandatory training and establish refresher training for all MV-22 maintenance personnel on how to complete aircraft inventory reports and work orders outlined in Commander, Naval Air Forces Instruction 4790.2A, ?Naval Aviation Maintenance Program,? November 10, 2009. b. (U) Require squadrons track and report on the accuracy and completion of aircraft inventory reports and work orders. c. (U) Require subordinate organizations and activities, at all levels of the command, to certify the accuracy of readiness reports submitted. (U) Commander; Marine Forces Command Management Comments (U) The Deputy Commandant for Aviation provided responses to Recommendation 3.a, 3.b, and 3.0 on behalf of the Commander, Marine Forces Command. The deputy commandant did not state whether he agreed or disagreed with Recommendations 3 The deputy commandant stated that maintenance material controi of?cers, maintenance control, and maintenance administration Marines are required to attend training courses for Optimized Organizational Maintenance Activity Naval Aviation Logistics Command 21 (U) Management Information System aircraft inventory reporting and Work orders documentation in accordance with the NAMP. He stated that mandatory refresher training is provided through technical training in accordance with the Squadron Maintenance Plans. All training is entered into Advanced Skills Management that assists leadership in verifying and validating all personnel are quali?ed to execute appropriate tasks based on their ability. (U) The deputy commandant did not state whether he agreed or disagreed with Recommendations 3.b. The deputy commandant stated he would recommend a NAMP change request to specify that the maintenancematerial control of?cers must validate all Capability Impact Reporting related work orders before reporting and to clarify that the maintenance material control of?cers must establish procedures to monitor Aircraft Inventory Readiness Reporting System. He stated that a long-term solution will be the ?elding of ?One which will reintroduce the squadron work center supervisor and squadron data analyst to the work order validation process before Aircraft Inventory Readiness Reporting System and DECKPLATE uploads for squadrons in FY 2017. (U) The deputy commandant did not state whether he agreed or disagreed with Recommendations 3.0. The deputy commandant stated that the NAMP change request addresses the accuracy and certi?cation at the squadron level. The Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron oversight of squadron out of reporting aircraft adds another layer of veri?cation. The deputy commandant stated that the Commander, Marine Forces Command would recommend a NAMP Change to the Aircraft Records and Reports program to increase the frequency of Aircraft Maintenance Of?cer Certi?cations. The deputy commandant stated the Commander, Marine Forces Command regularly screens unit reports and direct any resubmissions through the chain of command. Commanders are required to approve their unit reports in DRRS -MC. (U) Our Response (U) Comments from the Deputy Commandant for Aviation on Recommendations 3.a, 3.b, and 3.0 were nonreSponsive. Speci?cally, for Recommendation 3a., the Finding demonstrated that squadron commanders did not adequately train maintenance personnel on the preparation of aircraft inventory reports and work orders as required by the NAMP. For Recommendation the deputy commandant stated they would request changes to the however, these changes will not address the recommendation to track and report on the accuracy and completion of aircra? inventory reports and work orders. The ?elding of ?One in FY 2017 is not a timely solution for ensuring the accuracy and completion of aircraft inventory reports and work orders. For Recommendation the deputy comniandant stated. they would request changes to the NAMP, however, these changes do not address the recommendation to require all subordinate organizations to certify the accuracy of readiness reports in Although, the deputy commandant stated they screen subordinate unit readiness reports, our Finding demonstrated that MV-22 squadron commanders were not adequately screening unit readiness reports as evidenced by the large number of SEGREEP 22 SEGRET (U) incomplete or inaccurate readiness reports submitted. Therefore, we request that the Deputy Commandant for Aviation readdress Recommendations 3.a, 3.b, and 3.0 and provide additional comments in reSponse to the ?nal report. (U) Commander; Marine Forces, Pacific Management Comments (U) The Deputy Commandant for Aviation provided responses to Recommendation 3.a, 3b, and 3.0 on behalf of the Commander, Marine Forces, Paci?c. (U) The deputy commandant agreed with Recommendations 3.a. He stated all Optimized Organizational Maintenance Activity work center supervisors, in accordance with the NANLP, should complete the Naval Aviation Organization Maintenance Activity Work Center Supervisor?s course that teaches the basics forwork order documentation. The implementation of Optimized Organizational Maintenance Activity removed the work center supervisor?s signature block from work orders, but this does not take away the responsibility to screen for adequate documentation. The implementation of ?One in FY 2017 will bring work center supervisors back in the sign off chain. Until then, the collateral duty inspector will have the responsibility for adequate documentation at the work center. The deputy commandant recommends revising the collateral duty inspector?s training syllabus in Advanced Skills Management to include formal training of the collateral duty inspector before signing work orders. (U) The deputy commandant agreed with Recommendations 3.b. The deputy commandant requested that the recommend to the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center to ?x the interface between Optimized Organizational Maintenance Activity and DECKPLATE to ensure all Aircraft Custody/ Status Change Reports replicate properly which can improve the overall accuracy of aircraft inventory reports. The deputy commandant highlighted that the transition to Optimized Organizational Maintenance Activity made information output faster and increased the collateral duty inspector?s role, but decreased the squadron analyst?s role by taking away the ability to review and correct improper work order documentation. The collateral duty inspectors are last in the process to ensure work orders are correctly documented. (U) The deputy commandant agreed with Recommendations 3.0. He stated the Commander, Marine Forces, Paci?c regularly screens unit reports and directs resubmission through the chain of command. Commanders are required to approve their unit reports in DRRS-MC. (U) Our Response (U) Comments from the Deputy Commandant tier Aviation on Recommendations 3.a, 3b, and 3.c were partially res?ponsiVe. The deputy commandant?s responses to the recommendations were partially responsive because he did not provide Speci?c actions that will be taken to address the recommendations. For Recommendation the work center supervisors were already required to complete the Naval Aviation Organization Maintenance Activity Work Center Supervisor?s course for preparing work orders and the training 'was ineffective as evidenced by the numerous errors identi?ed in the Finding 23 SEGREEP (U) with the work orders in the report. According to the NAMP, the work center supervisor is responsible for ensuring that the work order is accurate and complete and should be involved in the sign off process for work orders. For Recommendation the deputy commandant did not specify how the increase in the collateral duty inspector?s role with work orders will implement the recommendation to track and report on the accuracy and completeness of work orders. For Recommendation 3.0., the Finding demonstrated that there were numerous errors with the readiness reports submitted in DRRS-MC and the commanders screening efforts did not discover those errors. Therefore, we request that the Deputy Commandant for Aviation readdress Recommendations 3.a, 3.b, and 3.0 and provide additional comments in response to the ?nal report. (U) Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations Management Comments (Unsolicited) (U) Although not required to comment, the Deputy Commandant for Aviation responding for the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, agreed with Recommendation 3.c. The deputy commandant agrees if the intent was for the responsibility for accuracy of readiness reports to fall under the organizations? commanders and the organizations develop an audit program to periodically check the accuraCy of readiness reports. The Marine Forces Command and Headquarters Marine Corps regularly review unit reports and direct any corrections and remarks through the chain of command. Higher headquarters reviews of subordinate units? reports before submission should not be required. (U) Our Response. (U) The Deputy Commandant for Aviation provided an unsolicited response to Recommendation 3.0. The deputy commandant?s response did not meet the intent of Recommendation 3.c. Speci?cally, due to the severity and frequency of the inaccurate or incomplete readiness reports identi?ed in the Finding, a need exists for higher headquarters to review readiness reports prior to submission. 24 SEGREEF (U) Appendix A. Scope and Methodology (U) We conducted this performance audit from June 201 l-through July 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain suf?cient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our ?ndings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our ?ndings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. (U) We met with of?cials from PMA-275, Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland; Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, Marine Aircraft Group 26, MCAS New River, North Carolina; Fleet Readiness Center East, MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support, Philadelphia, and Defense Logistics Agency Aviation, Richmond, Virginia, to obtain documentation for this audit. Speci?cally, we obtained aircraft maintenance data from PMA-27S and Fleet Readiness Center East. We also obtained supply requisitions and data from Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support; Defense Logistics Agency Aviation; Headquarters, Marine Corps; and Marine Aircraft Group 26 supply personnel. Finally, we obtained aircra? inventory data from PMA-275 and readiness reports from Headquarters, Marine Corps personnel. (U) There were 13 MV-ZZ squadrons during our audit scope. Of the 13 squadrons,. 10 squadrons perform operational missions, and the other 3 squadrons were for training or test and evaluation. To accomplish our audit objective, we nonstatistically selected 6 of the 10 operational missions? squadrons to review MCRs and supporting documentation from FY 2009 through FY 2011. The six MV-22 squadrons were composed of three squadrons from the MCAS Miramar, California, and three squadrons from MCAS New River, North Carolina. The Table below lists the six squadrons. See Appendix for a list of all Squadrons. Table. Squadrons Reviewed (U) w) I Squadrons Location VMM-161 MCAS Miramar, CA VMM-162 MCAS New River, NC I MCAS Miramar, CA I I MCAS Miramar, CA i MCAS New River, NC I VMM-365 MCAS New River, NC (U) SEGREEP 25 (U) We were provided access to data from the Decision Knowledge Programming for Logistics Analysis and Technical Evaluation system, which PMA-275 of?cials stated contained all maintenance records requested by the audit team. Using DECKPLATE, we obtained 527 aircraft inventory reports; 104,183 work orders;19 the Record Type 79 data; and supply requisition data. During our discussions, MV-22 of?cials acknowledged that the records used to compute NAMP MCRs contained errors. We performed analytical procedures on the 527 aircraft inventory reports and 104,183 work orders to determine the scope of erroneous maintenance records and found that maintenance personnel were improperly recording mission capability data. 'From the 527 aircraft inventory reports, we identi?ed that maintenance personnel recorded MV-22 aircraft as out-of?reporting 200 times. We assessed the reliability of this aircraft status information. We used maintenance information recorded on the 104,183 work orders to identify 1,548 maintenance actions that should have caused MV-22 aircraft to be non-mission capable. We non-statistically reviewed 907 of these 1,548 work orders to determine whether maintenance personnel improperly recorded mission capability data. We recalculated the NAMP MCRs using the Record Type 79 data and found that MV-22 officials provided incorrect NAMP MCRs. We alerted the MV-22 of?cials who agreed with our calculation explaining that they used incomplete historical data. (U) Based on our recalculation of the NAMP MCRs, we requested information for the AMCR MCRs from'the Marine Aircraft Group 26 personnel responsible for the information. The Marine Aircraft Group 26 personnel provided additional AMCR MCR information and explained how to obtain summary data from the Aviation Maintenance Supply Readiness Reporting system to calculate the AMCR MCRs. We obtained summary data, recalculated the AMCR MCRs, and found that the ?eet-wide AMCR MCR averages were not precisely calculated. We alerted the Marine Aircraft Group 26 personnel who agreed with our conclusion that AMCR MCR percentages were not precisely calculated for one speci?c squadron. ?3 (U) DECKPLATE is the repository for aircraft maintenance and usage data. DECKPLATE provides users the ability to obtain data in real-time, as well as historical data for trend analysis and records reconstruction. DECKPLATE stores record data transferred from Optimized Organizational Maintenance Activity Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System. Optimized Organizational Maintenance Activity Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System provides a real time, responsive, computer?based management information system that is intended to increase aircraft readiness by providing local maintenance and supply managers with timely and accurate inforrnation required in their day-to-day management and deciSion making process. 19 (U) Fleet Readiness Center East of?cials provided an additional 103 work orders because they did not transfer their work orders to DECKPLATE. 20 (U) AMSRR is the preferred method for updating, creating, releasing, and submitting the required aircraft material condition reports in support of readiness-based decision making. SEGREEF 26 SEGRELP (U) We obtained and reviewed all 265 readiness reports in DRRS-MC and the Marine Corps Readiness Tool We obtained access to DRRS-MC and MCRT through the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network. We retrieved readiness reports from both DRRS-MC and MCRT systems to determine whether the resource data entered into the systems were similar in both readiness reports. Within each and MCRT readiness reports, we focused on the R?level used to calculate the MCR to determine whether operations personnel calculated the R?level correctly. ,We also focused on the commander?s C-level remarks within each readiness report to determine whether each remark was consistent with the lowest resource rating or the commander?s decision to subjectively raise the unit?s C-level rating. (U) Headquarters, Marine Corps also provided a list of 1,474 MV-22 maintenance and operations personnel. We nonstatistically selected 64 maintenance and operations personnel to identify whether training documentation existed. Marine Corps personnel provided access to Advanced Skills Management system to review the training records for the maintenance and operations personnel. (U) Use of Computer-Processed Data (U) We obtained computer-processed data from DRRS-MC, MCRT, DECKPLATE, AMSRR, Optimized Intermediate Maintenance Activity Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System (OIMA NALCOMIS), and Aviation Financial Ana'lySis Tool. Speci?cally, we obtained readiness reports from DRRS-MC and MCRT, work orders, aircraft inventory reports, supply requisitions, and Record Type 79 data from mission capability information from and supply requisitions from OIMA NALCOMIS and Aviation Financial AnalySis Tool. Based on our review of these records and discussions With of?cials, we concluded that aircraft inventory reports and work orders contained erroneous data and readiness reports were incomplete and inaccurate as discussed in the ?nding. (U) Use of Technical Assistance (U) We relied on the technical assistance of Of?ce of Inspector General Quantitative Methods Division to assist our review of work orders. Quantitative Methods Division used data querying software, Audit Command Language, to support our analysis of work orders. As discussed in the ?nding, we found the data were unreliable; 21 (U) MCRT is an output tool that extracts all Marine Corps resource-level information. SEGRELP 27 (U) Prior Coverage (U) During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued two reports discussing the MV-22 Aircraft and Marine Corps readiness reporting. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at (U) GAO (U) GAO Report No. GAO-11626, ?Army and Marine Corps Reporting Provides Additional Data, but Actions Needed to Improve Consistency,? June 3, 2011 (U) GAO Report No. GAO-09-482, ?Assessments Needed to Address V-22 Aircraft Operational and Cost Concerns to De?ne Future InVestments,? May 11, 2009 28 (U) Appendix B. Organizations and Squadrons (U) Several organizations help to develop and support the For the purpose of this audit, we fecused on Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Program Manager Air-275 Marine Aircraft Wing, and 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing. (U) NAVAIR provides the Navy and Marine Corps life-cycle support of naval aviation airCraft, weapons, and systems. NAVAIR provides support (for example, people, processes, tools, and training) to Naval Aviation Program Executive Officers and their program managers. They were responsible for meeting the cost, schedule, and performance requirements of their assigned programs. Under NAVAIR, PMA-275 manages the development, support, ?elding, and disposal of the MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft program for the Marine Corps. The two main Marine Aircra? Wings that operate the are the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing and the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing. The 211d Marine Aircraft Wing is home to Marine Aircraft Group 26 located at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina. The 3rd Aircraft Wing is home to Marine Aircraft Group 16 located at Marine Corps Air Stations Miramar, California. Both Marine Aircraft Wings provide combat ready assault support teams to conduct air operations. Marine Corps Air Stations Miramar and New River are home to 1'0 squadrons that ?y MV-22s inoperational missions. The Table (on page 30) identi?es all squadrons that ?ew during our audit scope. 29 SEGRESF Table. Aircraft Squadrons With (U) (U) Squadron Location Mission VMM 161 MCAS Miramar, CA Assault Support VMM-ISS MCAS Miramar, CA Assault Support VMM-166 MCAS Miramar, CA Assault support .. MCAS Miramar, CA Assault Support VMM-162 MCAS New River, NC Assault Support MCAS New River, NC Assault Support VMM-263 MCAS New River, NC Assault Support VMM-264 MCAS New River, NC Assault Support MCAS New River, NC Assault support MCAS New River, NC Assault Support Marine Medium Tiltrotor Fleet Replacement Training Squadron 204* MCAS New River, NC Squadron (Training) Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Operational Test and Squadron 22* MCAS New River, NC Evaluation Air Test and Evaluation . Naval Air Station Developmental Test Squadron 21* Paxtuxent River, MD and Evaluation Marine Medium Tiltrotor Training Squadron 204, Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron 22, and Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 21 do not fly operational missions. According to PMA-275 of?cials, only squadrons that ?y operational missions were considered when calculating MCRs. (U) 30 (U) Appendix C. Management Comments on the Finding (U) The Commander, Naval Air Force, Paci?c and the Deputy Commandant for Aviation, responding for the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations; and the Commander, Marine Forces Command provided the following comments on the ?nding. For the full text of the Commander, Naval Air Force, Paci?c and Deputy Commandant for Aviation?s comments, see the Management Comments section of the report. (U) Naval Air Force, Pacific Management Comments on the Finding (U) The Commander, Naval Air Force, Paci?c identi?ed the following concerns with the report sections regarding readiness data and requirements. Speci?cally, he stated that the source of data for mission capable and fully mission capable was not the correct source. The Instruction 3110.5 [?Materiel Condition Reporting for Mission Essential Systems and Equipment,? September 14, 1990] should be the reference document used in determining readiness data and requirements and not AMSRR. The NAMP guidance provides for a 24 hours a day, 7 days a week metric when reporting aircraft readiness. However, AMCR guidance provides for a snapshot in time when reporting aircraft readiness and material condition. The Record Type 79 data is Aviation Maintenance Material Management data and accounts for and depicts 24 hours a day, 7 days a week material degradation of aircraft and systems. There is no correlation exists between AMCR data and Record Type 79 data. Lastly, no speci?c readiness reports were identi?ed in the audit report; therefore, the Commander, Naval Air Force Paci?c was unable to substantiate the ?ndings referencing readiness reports. For the complete text of the Commander, Naval Air Force, Paci?c?s technical comments, please refer to page 36. (U) Our Response (U) The Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific?s concerns have already been addressed or considered in the report. Speci?cally, the Instruction 3110.05, ?Readiness-based Materiel Conditibn Reporting for Mission-Essential Systems and Equipment,? September 25, 2006 cancelled Instruction 3110.5. The Instruction was properly cited in the report on page 2. The mission capability rate was de?ned as a ?continuous real?time calculation? meaning 24 hours a day 7 days a week and AMCR mission capability rate as a daily snapshot, meaning a snap shot in time. Although the Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific was concerned that the report presented a correlation between Record Type 79 data and AMCR data. The report distinguishes the differences between the Record Type 79 data (NAMP mission capability rate) and the AMCR mission capability rate on pages 2 and 3. Lastly, the Commander, Naval Air Force, Paci?c?s concern that the report did not speci?cally identify which readiness reports were reviewed during the assessment is not valid. The report speci?cally identi?es on pages 10 and 25 that the readiness reports reviewed SEGREEP 31 SEGRET (U) included all 265 readiness reports for squadrons VMM-161, VMM-166, VMM-264, and from DRRS-MC and MCRT during the FY 2009 through FY 2011 time period. In addition, pages 12 and 1-5 of the report speci?cally identi?ed examples of readiness reports. (U) U. S. Marine Corps Management Comments on the Finding (U) The Deputy Commandant for Aviation provided comments on behalf of the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations and the Commander, Marine Forces Command. (U) Plans, Policies, and Operations Management Comments (U) The Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, identi?ed the following concerns with the report background and Finding sections. The Deputy Commandant for Aviation cited the draft report for documenting guidance without including clarifying remarks that one guidance cancelled the former, documenting improper guidance for readiness reports, identifying the incorrect resource level, incorrectly identifying the number of readiness reports in two tables, and not including the actual de?nition for C-levels. For the complete text of the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations? technical comments, please refer to pages 45 and 46. (U) Marine Forces Command Management Comments (U) The Commander, Marine Forces Command, identi?ed the following concerns with the report Background and Finding sections. The Deputy Commandant for Aviation cited the draft report for improperly quoting the MCO P3 000. 1 3D and joint policies, identifying the incorrect resource level, improperly interpreting DRRS-MC resource percentages, and insufficient support to the ?nding that MV-22 Squadron Commanders did not verify the accuracy and completeness of readiness reports. For the complete text of the Marine Forces Command technical comments, please refer to pages 46 and 47. (U) Our Response (U) In reference to draft report concerns from the Deputy Commandant for Aviation, responding for the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, information in the draft report was clear and accurate. Speci?cally, we cite both MCOs because during the timeframe of our review FY 2009 through FY 201 1, both MCOs were in place. The MCO 3000.13 addresses the readiness reporting requirements in the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.02. The MCO 3000.13 discusses the requirements on how to categorize aircraft based on the percentage that are mission capable and we followed the guidance when reviewing the readiness reports. In addition, through discussions with Plans, Policies, and Operations of?cials, the R-level was cited as the appropriate level to use when assessing mission capability of an aircraft. Although, Plans, Policies, and Operations of?cials know the DRRS-MC system defaults to 100 percent when a squadron has no aircraft, the system default improperly allows the squadrons to report erroneous squadron readiness and portrays an inaccurate picture of the squadron?s true readiness. We accurately stated the number of readiness reports . 32 SEGREEF (U) reviewed from both DRRS-MC and Marine Corps Readiness Tool. Plans, Policies, and Operations of?cials neither provided the readiness reports nor supplied procedures on how to obtain the readiness reports. The information we included in the C-level table in the report accurately re?ects the bolded and underlined information in the C-level de?nitions identified in MCO 3000.13. (U) In reference to draft report concerns from the Deputy Commandant for Aviation, responding for the Marine Forces Command, information in the draft report was clear and accurate. Speci?cally, we properly cited the MCO 3000.13 throughout the report. The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.02 is addressed in the MCO 3000.13 that addressed the Service policies. We did not recommend changes to US. Marine Corps policies. The 3150.02 outlines detailed elements required to be included in the commander?s narrative. However, Plans, Policies, and Operations of?cials did not provide nor were we able to obtain the Squadron VMM-161 DRRS-MC report that contained the required elements. In addition, the Squadron MCRT report we obtained did not identify any of the required elements. The MCO 3000.13 discusses the requirements on how to categorize aircraft based on the percentage that are mission capable and we appropriately followed the guidance when reviewing the readiness reports. Although, the DRRS-MC system defaults to 100 percent when a squadron has no aircraft, the system default improperly allows the squadrons to report erroneous squadron readiness and portrays an inaccurate picture of the squadron?s true readiness. The commander?s subjective upgrade to a C-l was not justi?ed with the response provided because the remarks were not descriptive and did not provide details of the squadron?s mission readiness. The severity and frequency of errors identified in the report demonstrated that squadron commanders did not verify the accuracy or completeness of readiness reports. 33 (U) Annex. Classified Information Used in the Preparation of This Report (U) Source 1: SORTS Reports (Document classi?ed SECRET) Declassify On: 20360929 Date of Source: 29 Sep 2011 (U) Source 2: Unit Status Reports (Document classi?ed SECRET) Declassify On: 20360929 Date of Source: 29 Sep 2011 34 SEGRELF Naval Air Force, Paci?c Comments DEPAHIMENTOFTHENAVY communes mmhgula?mnc More Box SAN DIEGO, 554F051 4790 Sal' maze/136 23 Jun 13 From: Commander, naval Air Force, Pacific To: Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General Ref: DODIG Report, Project No. D2011-D000LH-017D.000 (S) CDMNAVAIRFURINST 4790.23 Change 1, 15 Jun 2013 1. Reference recommended Commander, Naval Air Forces revise reference (b1, the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program to include detailed procedures for Maintenance officers to use to verify the accuracy and completeness of Aircraft Inventory Reports and Work Orders before submission. 2. COMNAVAIREAC and COMNAVAIRLANT concur the direction in the RAMP regarding procedures and responsibilities for verification of Aircraft Inventory Readiness Reporting System (AIRRSJ and Work Orders should be improved. The following changes will be incorporated: a. Specific responsibility to validate accuracy of AIRRs before submission will be added to the responsibilities of the Maintenance Material Control officer. b. An increased level of detail and emphasis of importance of verifying the correct Equipment Operational Capability (E00) code to be used on WOs will be included in the NAME responsibilities of the Collateral Duty Inspector, Work Center Supervisor, Maintenance Control Desk supervisor, Maintenance Master Chief Petty officer, Maintenance Material Control officer, and maintenance Officer. c. The specific responsibility to review aircraft readiness rates and validate that correct reporting procedures are being followed will be added to the responsibilities of the Maintenance Officer. 3. Estimated completion date for changes to the NRMP is 15 September 2013. Changes will be promulgated via Naval Message as an Interim Change in advance of publishing the next formal change to' COMNAVRIRFORINBT 4790.28. Point of contact for chan as is NIEZZC, NAME Plans and Polidv. 4. Relevant to AIRRS, NEHAIR 6.8 is in-work on improvements to AIRRS that will automate changes in aircraft status from In Reporting to Out of Reporting, and.vice verse, bas?d on xaars submitted and replicated This improvement also automatically changes the upwline via OOMA. . 35 tracking of time on all active Work Orders at the time of receipt of the m2. Additionally, the new procedures require ACE approval before acceptance of mare. and make errors in aircraft status more evident. These improvements to AIRRS are expected to be completed in December 2013 . 5. In addition to the change proposal recommended, COMNAVAIRLANT and CONVAIRPAC reviewed reference comments regarding readiness data and requirements._ We found the suggested source of data referenced throughout the document was not the correct sourca of data for MC and as defined by the reference requirements document. The DOD 3110.5 should be the reference document utilised in determining readiness data/requirements and not the AMBER. Additional specific concerns regarding readiness data referenced in the document are as follows a. Aircraft Readiness Data Reporting. The RAMP provides guidelines and policy for a 24/7 weighted metric used to report aircraft readiness data in accordance with the requirements outlined in'the DOD 3110.5 via NAVAIR DECKPLATE to OPNAV. The on the other hand is a snap shot in time of- aircraft readiness/material condition, which is used by the TYCOM to manage fleet readiness using Ready for Tasking (EFT) as the definitive metric. data is data and accounts for b; Record Type (RT) 79 data. There and depicts 24/7 material degradation of aircraft and systems. is no correlation to it and the AMCR data. c. Readiness Reports. Throughout the document, reference was made to readiness reports without specifically identifying which readiness reports were used during the assessment. without properly identifying the readiness reports used, we were unable to substantiate the findings that referenced ?readiness reports provided." 6. soc for-Aviation Material Readiness: Director of Aviation Material Readiness Code N423, non-secure email: ?secure - CONNAWIRPAC P00 f