IACP NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY CENTER

Use of Force
Concepts and Issues Paper
Originally Published: February 1989
Revised: December 1995, October 1998, April 1999, August 2001, February 2004, February 2006
I.  INTRODUCTION
A.  Purpose of the Document
This paper is designed to accompany the Model Policy
on Use of Force established by the IACP National Law
Enforcement Policy Center. The paper provides essential
background material and supporting documentation
to provide greater understanding of the developmental
philosophy and implementation requirements for the model
policy. This material will be of value to law enforcement
executives in their efforts to tailor the model to the
requirements and circumstances of their community and
their law enforcement agency.
This is the sixth revision of the Model Policy on Use of
Force published originally in 1989. These revisions are due
largely to sometimes subtle changes in law governing use
of force. It is also a response to the ever-increasing number
of nondeadly force alternatives that are being introduced to
law enforcement agencies, thus increasing both the options
and flexibility of alternatives to the use of deadly force.
In this respect, a recurring inquiry of the National
Law Enforcement Policy Center has involved the wisdom
of developing a nondeadly force policy in addition to this
use-of-force model policy. The policy board has considered
this issue each time revisions to this policy have been
undertaken and has arrived at the same conclusion. That is,
police use of both deadly and nondeadly force is governed
by the same legal principles on the use of force. Certainly,
there are differences in the means of applying the varied
types of force options and these should be addressed in
policies, procedures, rules, and training associated with
each method, technique, or force device (e.g., Kubotan,

PR-24, pepper aerosol spray, pain compliance techniques,
and beanbag projectiles).
Police agencies may select to develop separate
nondeadly force policies and procedures for prudent
and sound reasons relevant to their own jurisdiction and
department. Development of individual policies on the use
of specialized force equipment is also a prudent approach.
However, the legal grounds for selection, application,
and removal of any force option applied against a subject
should be based on the same legal principles cited in this
model policy.

B.  Background
Officers must be provided with a clear and concise
departmental policy that establishes guidelines and
limitations on the use of force generally and the use of
deadly force in particular.Officers also require training
in the appropriate and proficient use of all force options,
not just firearms. But probably the most important
component of regulating the use of force by police officers
is first-line supervision. Policies and procedures on use
of force are of little value without the oversight of line
supervisors in particular and command-level personnel
in general to ensure officer compliance and conformity
with such directives. This latter concern also makes it
very important that law enforcement administrators create
formal procedures for reporting and reviewing use-of-force
incidents.
Issues relating to reporting use-of-force incidents,
training of officers in the handling, maintenance, and use
of firearms, investigation of officer-involved shooting
incidents, officer postshooting trauma, and early warning
systems to identify potential personnel problems are dealt

A publication of the IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center
44 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 200, Alexandria, VA 22314
This document is the result of work performed by the IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center. The views and opinions expressed in this document are
sanctioned by the center’s advisory board and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

 with separately in other model polices. This concepts and
issues paper on use of force refers interested readers to the
model policies associated with these important issues and
does not reiterate the information and recommendations of
these other documents.1
In constructing an agency policy on the use of force,
the foregoing related issues are often included. However, a
strong argument can be made to keep a use-of-force policy
as short and simple as possible. It is essential that officers
have a complete understanding and recall knowledge of
their agency policy on this critical issue. But the longer
and more complex the policy the less likely that this is
possible. A use-of-force policy can and should be concise
and incorporate only the essential principles to adequately
guide officer decision making. The remainder of procedural
matters can be addressed through agency training and
by providing links to other agency policies that address
corollary issues of concern in use of force.
Managing uses of force by officers is one of the more
difficult challenges facing law enforcement agencies. The
ability of police officers to enforce the law, protect the
public, and guard their own safety and that of innocent
bystanders is very difficult in the United States where
violent crime is commonplace and firearms are widely
available for both legal and illegal purposes.
The FBI’s annual report of police officers killed and
assaulted reflects part of the vast scope of this problem. In
the year 2004, for example, official statistics indicated that
57 law enforcement officers were feloniously killed, an
increase of five from the prior year. An additional 16,000
were wounded or injured during the same period.
These statistics, as serious as they are, do not reflect
the vast number of unreported and more typical cases in
which police officers confront uncooperative suspects who
are physically resistant. Unless managed properly, such
situations can, and often do, escalate into more serious
confrontations. An officer’s use of force in these or other
circumstances, if justified, must not exceed that which is
reasonably necessary to gain control and compliance of
suspects.

electronic control weapon (ECW), pepper spray, or other
nondeadly force equipment or tactics.
The variety of coercive options available to police
officers in a confrontational setting is generally referred to
as the force continuum. Force options on this continuum,
ranging from so-called verbal judo and command presence
to the use of a deadly weapon, officers are expected
to employ only the level of force that is objectively
reasonable to gain control and compliance of suspects.
The decision to employ any force, including the use of
firearms, may be considered excessive by statutory law and
departmental policy or both, if it exceeds a degree of force
that reasonably appears necessary in a specific situation.
Such use-of-force decisions are made under exceedingly
varied scenarios and often on a split-second basis. Based
on this fact, state and federal courts have recognized
that police officers must be provided with the necessary
knowledge and training to make such decisions, in addition
to attaining proficiency with firearms and other nondeadly
force equipment and force techniques that may be used in
the line of duty.

D.  Definitions
The model policy employs the terms deadly force and
nondeadly force. Deadly force is defined as “force that
creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily
harm.” The most common example of deadly force is that
which employs the use of a handgun or other firearm in an
encounter with a violently resistant individual. The vast
majority of officers killed in the line of duty during 2004,
for example, were shot to death—36 with handguns, 13
with rifles, and 5 with shotguns.
Nondeadly force is “any force other than that which is
considered deadly force.” The model policy sets a threshold
for force at “any physical effort used to control or restrain
another, or to overcome the resistance of another.” This
would include but is not limited to an officer’s use of comealong holds, pain compliance techniques, manual restraint,
and handcuffs. It would not include verbal commands or
so-called verbal judo.
The difference between deadly and nondeadly force
is not determined simply by the nature of the force
technique or instrument that is employed by an officer.
Many force options may result in the death of a suspect
under certain circumstances. For example, a police baton,
if used properly in accordance with professionally accepted
training guidelines, is not likely to cause death. But it
can, and has, resulted in the death of suspects when used
inappropriately by an officer who lacks training, or in
situations that are chaotic or desperate where blows are
accidentally or even intentionally struck to the head or
other vulnerable area of the body. The same could be said
for a variety of other items in the police arsenal. Therefore,

C.  Scope of Policy
The public generally associates police use of force with
the discharge of a firearm. However, officers recognize that
use of force includes a much wider range of nonconsensual
compliance techniques and devices. These less coercive
but more common uses of force may range from command
presence to hand control procedures such as a firm grip,
escort or pain or pressure compliance holds, or the use
of other more aggressive measures involving a stun gun,
  Copies of these documents may be obtained by contacting the
National Law Enforcement Policy Center, International Association of
Chiefs of Police, Alexandria, Virginia.
1

2

 a key to understanding what separates deadly force from
nondeadly force has to do with the likelihood that a given
level of force will result in death, whether it involves a
handgun or other weapon or even an object that may be
close at hand.
Force that is likely to cause death or serious bodily
harm is properly judged through the eyes of a reasonably
prudent and well-trained police officer under the same
or similar circumstances. This reasonable man or, more
accurately, reasonable officer standard is an objective
test. That is, it is not based on the intent or motivation of
the officer or other subjective factors at the time of the
incident. It is based solely on the objective circumstances
of the event and the conclusion that would be drawn by any
“reasonable officer at the scene.”2
The courts have made it clear that determination
of the need for deadly force as well as the need for and
appropriateness of any level of force is to be judged
on the basis of objective facts in a given situation. The
model policy states in this regard that “in determining
the necessity for force and the appropriate level of force,
officers shall evaluate each situation in light of the known
circumstances, including, but not limited to, the seriousness
of the crime, the level of threat or resistance presented by
the subject, and the danger to the community.”
In determining the proper level of force to use, the
model policy states that officers are authorized to use
deadly force to protect themselves or others from what is
reasonably believed to be a threat of death or serious bodily
harm. Officers must use nondeadly force options where
deadly force is not authorized and may use only that level
of force that is objectively reasonable to bring the incident
under control.

police administrator(s), and in some cases, the governing
jurisdiction in either or both state or federal courts.
In particular, a police officer may be found criminally
liable under 18 U.S.C. 241 where it can be demonstrated
that the officer intentionally violated an individual’s civil
rights. Action may also be initiated under 18 U.S.C. 242 to
establish criminal conspiracy where two or more officers
may have been involved in the same incident.
Typically, plaintiffs pursue civil action under 42 U.S.C.
1983 or section 1985 or both as a civil rights violation
of the due-process clause of the 14th Amendment, as
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, or as a violation of Fourth Amendment
restrictions on seizure of persons. A municipal or county
government may also be named as a defendant under
section 1983. A plaintiff need not exhaust state and local
remedies before pursuing these forms of relief in federal
court. Many attorneys prefer to pursue relief in federal,
as opposed to state, court as federal guidelines allow for
the independent award of attorney’s fees that are often
beyond those contingency fees that would be gleaned from
plaintiffs’ awards for damages.
2. Use of Policy in Court. Courts vary on their
interpretation of the propriety of allowing departmental
policy to be introduced as a standard of conduct analogous
to statutory law. Generally, the fact that an officer failed
to comply with agency policy is important only in
determining agency-imposed discipline. However, in
some cases, it may be permissible to enter at trial the
issue of officer noncompliance for whatever weight and
significance a jury feels appropriate. Police administrators
should not be hesitant to develop comprehensive, strong,
and definitive policies and procedures for fear that they
may prove prejudicial to a future court assessment of an
officer’s conduct. In fact, failure to adopt a use-of-force
policy in clear and unequivocal terms will almost certainly
have more serious consequences for the officer’s agency
and employing jurisdiction.
3. Federal Guidelines for Use of Force. In drafting
policy on the use of force, police administrators should
be aware of the benchmark 1985 decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner. This decision
held unconstitutional the Tennessee deadly- force statute
that permitted police officers to use deadly force to arrest
nondangerous fleeing felons.3
In Garner, a Memphis, Tennessee, police officer,
acting in conformance with state law, shot and killed an
unarmed youth fleeing over a fence at night in the backyard
of a house he was suspected of burglarizing. The Court
held the officer’s action unconstitutional under 42 U.S.C.
1983 stating that “. . . such force may not be used

E.  Legal Considerations
1. Scope of Remedies. Use of force may have
potential civil and criminal consequences in either state
or federal courts or both. As scores of such actions have
demonstrated, the scope and the wording of departmental
policy can be crucial to the final outcome of such cases.
At a minimum, departmental policy should meet
state and federal court requirements and limitations on
the use of force. The U.S. Constitution forms the base
line for civil rights in this and other circumstances.
While the states cannot take away or diminish rights
under the U.S. Constitution, they can, and often do,
expand upon those rights. In such cases, law enforcement
administrators must establish a departmental policy that
meets the more stringent use-of-force guidelines of their
state constitution and statutory or case law. It should be
emphasized, however, that it is sometimes possible for
action to be initiated against an officer, police department,
2

  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).

  Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).

3

3

 unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer
has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the
officer or others.”4
The Court ruled that apprehension by the use of deadly
force is a seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness requirement. Thus, even where an
officer has probable cause to arrest someone, it may be
unreasonable to do so through the use of deadly force. The
principles of this case are essential in the formation of a
sound contemporary use-of-force policy. For example,
the model policy sanctions use of deadly force “to protect
the officer and others from what is reasonably believed to
be a threat of death or serious bodily harm,” (or) “if it is
necessary to prevent the escape of a fleeing violent felon
whom the officer has probable cause to believe will pose a
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the
officer or others.”
4. Defining a Reasonable Use of Force. The ominous,
ever-present potential of civil or criminal litigation
involving deadly-force incidents also necessitates close
scrutiny of the language employed in use-of-force policy
by legal authorities. Police administrators should work
closely with knowledgeable attorneys in determining the
suitability of use-of-force policy to their local conditions,
needs, and perspectives. The deliberations over individual
phrases or word usage may on the surface appear
inconsequential or excessive. However, such terms can, and
do, have significant consequences in an adversarial court
setting.
For example, the model policy employs the
reasonableness standard in describing the limitations on
the use of force: “officers shall use only the force that is
objectively reasonable to bring an incident under control.”
A commonly used alternative wording (which is
not recommended) may direct officers to use only the
minimum force necessary to control such an incident.
The literal wording of this latter directive, however, can
impose an unacceptable burden upon a police officer in a
deadly-force confrontation. For example, attempts to assess
minimum force responses may result in a decision to use
less force than would be legally permissible or effective to
control the situation. These restricted actions could result
in the death or serious injury of the officer or other persons.
On the other end of the spectrum, the subjectiveness
of the minimum-force standard could support an officer’s
belief or contention that his actual excessive use of force
was the minimum force required to deal effectively with
the situation. More importantly, the minimum-force
standard requires an analysis based on knowledge of all
relevant facts. Officers in a shooting incident may not
have all these facts at hand. Generally, all relevant facts
4

come to light at a later time. Under questioning in court
and with all the facts then available through investigation
of the incident, the officer may be forced to admit that, in
hindsight, he or she did not use the minimum force that
was necessary as directed by the policy even though at the
time the force that was used appeared necessary.
Thus, while most police officers would understand
the underlying meaning of minimum force, its literal
interpretation in an adversarial court setting could prove
detrimental to a fair determination of an officer’s actions.
The use of other commonly employed terms and
phrases, even though well intentioned, can cause
unexpected and unnecessary consequences for the officer
and the agency. Use of such phrases as “officers shall
exhaust all means before resorting to the use of deadly
force” present additional obstacles to effective defense of
legitimate and justifiable uses of force. These and similar
terms and phrases impose additional burdens on officers
above those required by law.
The use of some preambles to policy statements
can have the same effect if not properly constructed and
limited. Preambles to use-of-force policies often impart
such messages as “the taking of a human life is the ultimate
step in the use of force and represents a measure that may
only be taken if unavoidable, justifiable, and legal.” While
there are few who would argue with the basic intent of this
statement, it establishes standards of care and mandatory
precautions for officers that need not, and should not, be
imposed on them by departmental policy. First, the sanctity
of human life should be self-evident to all officers and
should, in fact, be part of the basis upon which officers are
screened, selected, and trained. The significance of using
deadly force should also be readily apparent to officers.
This issue can also be reemphasized in departmental
training and is more appropriately documented in the
agency’s statement of values, statement of ethics, or code
of conduct. These issues need not, and should not, be
incorporated into the agency’s use-of-force policy.
The foregoing discussion is not meant to suggest that
law enforcement agency policy must be established only
with potential litigation in mind. On the contrary, police
administrators should seek language that helps to properly
guide officer decisions consistent with departmental desires
and values while also protecting the officer, the department,
and the community from unnecessary litigation. But this
discussion is meant to reemphasize the importance of word
selection in establishing policies in general and a use-offorce policy in particular. It is strongly recommended that
this and other policies undergo informed, professional legal
review before they are sanctioned by the agency.
It should also be recognized that a considerable
proportion of officer guidance and direction is established
in the training process. Training should effectively translate

  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).

4

 the general guiding principles of agency policy and
operational procedures into real-world scenarios through
explication and practice. Training shares an equal, if not
greater, responsibility in departmental efforts to control
and manage the use of force and, as such, can have an
independently dramatic impact on an agency’s attempts to
justify actions involving the use of force in court or other
contexts.

standard: an officer can only use that level of force that is
objectively reasonable to bring a subject under control.

B.  Authorized Uses of Deadly Force
The model policy identifies two general circumstances
in which the use of deadly force may be warranted. The
first instance is to protect police officers or others from
what is reasonably believed to be a threat of death or
serious bodily harm. A prior revision of this model policy
eliminated use of the term imminent in reference to the
threat that a suspect may pose to the officer or others in
order to justify the use of deadly force. The term imminent
threat is commonly used by law enforcement agencies
in this context to underscore the need to withhold using
deadly force until certain of the threat. However, this may
impose an added burden upon officers by requiring them
to ascertain how this applies and what imminent means in
specific situations. It may also impose a burden of proof
upon officers in court settings that is unnecessary.
Second, police officers may use deadly force to prevent
the escape of a fleeing violent felon who the officer has
probable cause to believe will pose a significant threat of
death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.
In this case, the more demanding test of probable cause
must be employed before deadly force can be used. In such
cases, a threat of further violence or death must impose
clear justification to use deadly force; for this reason the
model policy uses the term violent felon.
For example, use of deadly force would be justified
in instances where an officer attempts to stop the escape
of a fleeing violent felon whom the officer has identified
him or her as one who had just committed a homicide, and
who is armed or is likely to be armed in light of the crime.
However, the potential escape of nonviolent felons may not
pose the same degree of risk to the public or the officer,
and use of deadly force to prevent his or her escape would
not be justifiable under the model policy.
Because there can be a greater risk of error in these
circumstances, some agencies prefer to disallow or
seriously limit the use of deadly force in the case of
fleeing felons. Those who prefer this approach point to the
problem associated with positive identification of suspects
and that, even in the case of repeat violent offenders, one
often cannot predict an offender’s future behavior. Given
these and related problems, this approach assumes that if
an error is to be made, it is best that it be made on the side
of restraining the use of deadly force where fleeing felons
are concerned.
If a decision has been made to employ deadly force,
a police officer should, whenever possible, identify
himself or herself and demand that the subject stop.
This requirement was made clear in the Garner decision.
Typically, the phrase “stop—police “ can be used, although

II.  MODEL POLICY DIRECTIVES
A.  Structure of the Policy
As noted in the introduction to this policy, many
police agencies prefer to develop separate deadly force
and nondeadly force policies. In addition to the comments
previously made on this topic, there are several other
reasons why the model policy combines these into a single
use of force policy.
The first reason pertains to policy organization. That
is, a common problem among law enforcement agencies
is that their policies and procedures are not organized in
a manner that enhances policy usefulness for the officer.
Policies that are interrelated may not be cross-referenced,
or may appear separately under different topical areas.
Differing promulgation dates may create a conflict where
revisions are not continuously made to both policies. Under
such conditions, policies and procedures can prove hard to
digest, integrate, and implement.
Second, and more importantly, integrating both deadly
and nondeadly force guidelines into one policy serves to
illustrate and reinforce for the officer the concept of the
use of force as a continuum. The use-of-force continuum
illustrates the range of uses of force and the appropriate
force necessary to match a given incident. By placing both
sets of guidelines under one heading, an officer consulting
the policy is encouraged to view force on a broader, more
integrated conceptual basis.
As noted earlier, determining whether a use of force
is deadly can be problematic. Even the use of a firearm in
a hostile confrontation results in death in only 50 percent
of shootings. On the other hand, presumably nondeadly
force incidents have on numerous occasions resulted in
death. Therefore, it is the position of the policy center that
use of force is an issue that is best dealt with from this
integrated perspective, recognizing that nondeadly force
situations can, and often do, escalate into deadly force
confrontations. Effective guidance for police officers on
use of force, whether with firearms or by other means or
tactics, must recognize and deal with force in all its forms
and applications.
Finally, from a legal perspective, any use of force,
whether inherently deadly or not, is governed by the same
5

 similar commands that make an officer’s intent clear can be
employed.

protect innocent bystanders should underlie all use-of-force
confrontations.

C.  Shooting to Stop Aggressive Behavior

D.  Warning Shots

Where the use of deadly force is justified, training
should teach an officer to fire his or her weapon to stop
a subject from completing a potentially deadly act. The
phrase “shoot to kill” is not only inaccurate in practice but
generally proves insensitive and prejudicial to the layman
and inflammatory and misleading in a court action where
the policy of the agency is called into question.
The popular cinematic and television characterization
of the police does not reflect the abilities of most officers
under actual combat shooting conditions. Research in
major metropolitan police departments, in fact, reveals
miss rates of between 42 and 82 percent of rounds fired
during actual deadly force confrontations.
Statistics also reveal that about 90 percent of shooting
incidents last three seconds or less. Within this period,
a police officer takes appropriate steps to stop the threat
and rarely, if ever, has the chance to engage in decision
making about the degree of injury that will be inflicted.
The realistic motivation is primarily reactive and designed
to stop the threat or the aggressive behavior and protect
one’s life.
Attempts to shoot to wound, injure, or otherwise
incapacitate a suspect are unrealistic and, because of high
miss rates and poor stopping effectiveness, can prove
dangerous for police officers and others. Under special
conditions, however, it may be necessary to permit or
even direct that shots be fired to kill. Sniper teams used
to extricate a hostage from an armed suspect and other
related scenarios employing special weapons and tactics
may be among those circumstances that constitute such
an exception. Therefore, with these factors in mind, for
maximum stopping effectiveness and minimal danger to
innocent bystanders, the officer should shoot to stop at
center body mass.
When using deadly force, the officer must always
consider the potential risk to innocent bystanders. It
is unacceptable to knowingly risk injury or death to
bystanders in order to apprehend a suspect. On the other
hand, in this as in other cases of use of deadly force, police
officers must be able to balance the ultimate good of action
versus inaction. For example, rare instances may develop in
which failure to react to a serious threat would likely result
in the loss of life. Under such circumstances, it may be
justifiable to accept reasonable risks to others rather than
accept the probable loss of life if no actions are taken.
Officers should not be expected to, nor should they,
act in a manner that will likely result in their or another’s
death or serious injury solely because of concern over
the potential risk to bystanders. Reasonable prudence to

Earlier versions of the Model Policy on Use of Force
advocated the prohibition of warning shots. This and
the previous revision of the original model policy, while
discouraging the use of warning shots, take the position
that there are circumstances in which warning shots may
be justified and a blanket prohibition is not justifiable. With
this recognition, it is more prudent to provide allowances
for such contingencies in a use-of-force policy along with
appropriate safeguards.
However, before proceeding, it should be emphasized
that warning shots are a highly risky undertaking and they
should be used only under the most extreme circumstances.
Nothing in the position of the model policy is meant
to imply that warning shots should be considered as a
generally acceptable and reasonable option for use-offorce encounters. On the contrary, warning shots, while
permitted under the model policy, should be regarded as
extreme measures that may only be taken under highly
unusual circumstances and generally when all other
reasonable alternatives have been exhausted or would be
perceived as unacceptable.
While a large majority of police departments prohibit
warning shots, some permit their use under restricted
conditions. In many cases, these are agencies that operate
in rural environments where the potential harm to innocent
bystanders from warning shots is minimal. A shot fired in
the air may also serve as a call for assistance by an officer
where a life-threatening situation exists or when attempts
are being made to prevent the escape of a dangerous felon.
In addition, in extraordinary situations, warning shots have
been used to successfully defuse escalating and potentially
life-threatening assault situations. One example is the
use of a warning shot to impress upon a hostile crowd an
officer’s intent to employ deadly force to protect himself or
herself or others.
Police departments that permit warning shots must
provide sufficient training to officers to ensure their
appropriate use. Police officers must be cautioned that
the use of warning shots, if later deemed inappropriate,
may make the officer subject to disciplinary action, civil
litigation, or both.
These cautions are even more important in urban
and suburban environments where there is added danger
of errant shots striking innocent bystanders. In addition,
warning shots can and have been mistaken for a shooting
exchange that precipitates the use of gunfire by other
officers or the suspect(s). Once the first shot is fired in a
hostile confrontation, it is often difficult to control other
shooting reactions.
6

 On the basis of these and related considerations, the
model policy takes the position that “Generally, warning
shots should not be fired.”

There are circumstances in which trained tactical
officers with appropriate weaponry may take such actions
if deemed appropriate by command personnel. Even
under these circumstances, such actions should be taken
only if the action does not permit an unreasonable risk to
officers or others, when reasonable alternatives have been
exhausted, when failure take such action would probably
result in death or serious bodily harm, and then only when
due consideration has been given to the safety of innocent
bystanders. In many cases involving the discharge of
firearms at a moving vehicle, it is based on the contention
that the driver was intentionally attempting to run the
officer down. One of the simplest alternatives to the use
of a firearm in this instance is to move out of the vehicle’s
path and seek cover.

E.  Shots at or from Moving Vehicles
Another modification addressed in revisions of the
Model Policy on Use of Force involves shots fired at
or from moving vehicles. Generally, the likelihood of
misses and subsequent risks of errant shots harming
innocent parties is increased under these conditions. It
is also improbable that an officer could stop a vehicle
or its operator in this manner without causing death or
serious injury. Therefore, these are among the factors that
counsel against such actions other than in the most extreme
circumstances.
The model policy takes the position that “Firearms
shall not be discharged from a moving vehicle, except
in exigent circumstances and in the immediate defense
of life.” It is understood that this policy may not cover
every situation that may arise. In all situations, officers
are expected to act with intelligence and exercise sound
judgment, attending to the spirit of the policy. Any
deviations from the provisions of the policy shall be
examined rigorously on a case by case basis. The involved
officers must be able to articulate clearly the reasons for
the use of deadly force. Factors that may be considered
include whether the officer’s life or the lives of others were
in immediate peril and there was no reasonable or apparent
means of escape.
Again, training is essential in implementing this
policy. Officers must recognize that such actions are only
permitted under extreme circumstances and, because
they generally involve a higher potential risk, they
carry a higher burden of justification for use. It must be
understood that the use of firearms under such conditions
often presents an unacceptable risk to innocent bystanders.
Handguns are generally ineffective in attempts to disable a
motor vehicle, if in fact this is the intent of their use. And
even if successfully disabled, the vehicle will most likely
continue under its own power or momentum for some
distance thus creating another hazard. Moreover, should the
driver be wounded or killed by shots fired, the vehicle will
almost certainly proceed out of control and could become a
serious threat to officers and others in the area.
Most conventional police firearms, in fact, will
normally fail to penetrate automobile bodies, or steelbelted automobile tires that are in motion, and frequently
do not penetrate auto safety glass. Again, as in the case
of the use of warning shots, firing at a motor vehicle
is an extreme measure that may only be taken under
highly unusual circumstances and generally when all
other reasonable alternatives would be perceived as
unacceptable.

F.  Nondeadly Force
Where deadly force is not authorized, officers may
use only that level of force that is objectively reasonable
to bring a subject under control. This is the same objective
standard used in determining whether deadly force is
warranted.
As noted in the prior discussion of the force
continuum, use of force can range widely from verbal
coercion to the use of deadly weapons. Therefore,
police officers must have at their disposal a variety of
equipment and techniques that will allow them to respond
appropriately to resistant or dangerous individuals. These
include, but are not limited to, skills in verbal persuasion,
unarmed self-defense tactics, use of come-along holds,
use of restraint and physical compliance measures, and
use of departmentally approved nondeadly weapons such
as pepper spray, the stun gun, PR-24, baton and related
devices. Without these and other alternatives at their
disposal, there is a greater likelihood that officers may
employ tactics that are inappropriate or excessive or that
serve to aggravate or escalate a confrontation.
Police agencies must provide specialized training
with equipment and force techniques authorized by their
agency if they are to minimize the risk of complaints of
excessive force. In this context, departmental training in
this area should include a segment on handgun retention
tactics and techniques. Statistics on police officers killed
feloniously over more than a decade reveal that about 15
percent of police homicides were perpetrated by assailants
using the officer’s own handgun. This fact underscores
the importance of developing skills necessary to thwart
such attacks.5 It also suggests that departments should be
cognizant of holster selection and allow use only of those
that balance ready access to the handgun with security of
  “Handgun Retention,” Training Key #373, International Association
of Chiefs of Police, Alexandria, Virginia (1988).
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 the firearm. Trick holsters and loose-fitting holsters should
not be authorized. A proper holster should hold the firearm
snug to the hip and have a reasonably tight safety strap.
Design of the holster should allow the officer to grip the
handgun so that it will be ready to be fired when removed.
The National Law Enforcement Policy Center does not
advocate the use of any specific nondeadly force weapons.
The appropriateness of any such weapon depends largely
on the needs and desires of each police department in
the context of the community in which it operates and in
accordance with the service demands and typical force
scenarios faced by its police personnel. In addition,
nondeadly weapons and techniques are being continuously
introduced, refined, and updated. As such, police
administrators must routinely assess current equipment and
make judgments on selection and use that are appropriate
to their department. A critical element of that decisionmaking process is an assessment of the limitations of
each device or technique, and the potential for its abuse or
failure. A synopsis of these factors was developed in regard
to several of the more popular nondeadly force weapons by
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.6
The National Law Enforcement Policy Center
recommends however, that police departments ban the
use of several types of weapons. These include slapjacks,
blackjacks, brass knuckles, nunchucks, fighting stars, and
other martial arts weapons. In addition, police agencies
should consider serious limitations on the use of the police
flashlight as an impact weapon.

regard, law enforcement agencies must be prepared not
only to conduct a professional investigation of the force
incident but also be prepared to deal effectively with any
emotional trauma affecting involved officers and other
agency personnel.
The above two concerns are addressed in the IACP
Model Policies on Officer-Involved Shooting Investigations
and Post- Shooting Incident Procedures. It is recommended
that agencies involved in the development or refinement of
use-of-force policies obtain a copy of these two policies for
reference and guidance.

I.  Training
The issue of firearms training has been purposely
excluded from the Model Policy on Use of Force as it
is addressed in depth in the Model Policy on Firearms
published by the policy center. However, the importance
of training in the appropriate use of both deadly and
nondeadly force necessitates that several key points be
made in this regard.
First, civil rights litigation has made it abundantly
clear that law enforcement agencies have a responsibility
to ensure that police officers are adequately trained in
the use of all weapons that they are permitted to carry
on and off duty. This includes not only firearms but all
nondeadly force equipment such as pepper spray. Police
administrators, departments, and parent jurisdictions may
be held liable for the actions of their officers should they
be unable to verify that appropriate and adequate training
has been received and that officers have successfully
passed any testing or certification requirements. Police
departments must provide responsive training, and all
records of training received by officers must be maintained
accurately for possible verification later.
Backup handguns and other firearms should be subject
to the same procedures for departmental registration,
routine inspection, training and qualification as the on-duty
handgun.
Finally, firearms training with respect to the use
of deadly force cannot be limited to routine firearm
qualifications and proficiency testing. It is recommended
that all officers authorized to carry firearms be required
to qualify with each authorized firearm on at least a
semiannual basis. Quarterly qualification is a desirable
objective. But, in addition to proficiency testing, it is
strongly recommended that police agencies provide (1)
routine instruction and periodic testing on the agency useof-force policy and (2) instruction and practical exercises
in making decisions regarding the use of deadly force.
In the latter instance, it is important that an element of
firearms training include realistic use-of-force simulation
exercises. This includes night or reduced light shooting,
shooting at moving targets, strong-hand or weak-hand

G.  Reporting Use of Force
Accurate and timely reporting of use-of-force incidents
is an essential part of the process of monitoring and
controlling such responses. The immediacy and mechanism
for such reporting should depend on the nature of force
used and the degree of injury involved. The National Law
Enforcement Policy Center has developed a model policy
on use-of-force reporting that is available upon request.

H.  Departmental Response to Uses of Force
Use of deadly force has serious departmental and
community implications. The integrity of a police
department and its relationship to the community are often
measured by the professionalism and impartiality that it
brings to investigations of police uses of force in general
and deadly force in particular.
Involvement of law enforcement officers in deadly
force encounters can also have debilitating emotional
effects upon not only the officers directly involved but
those who may have indirect contact with the incident,
such as emergency communications personnel. In this
  “Use of Force Tactics and Non-Lethal Weaponry,” Alert, No. 3,
Americans for EffectiveLaw Enforcement, Inc., Chicago (1988).
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 firing, and combat simulation shooting. Firearms training
should attempt to simulate the actual environment and
circumstances of foreseeable encounters in the community
setting, whether urban, suburban, or rural. A variety of
computer-simulation training is available together with
established and recognized tactical, exertion, and stress
courses. In essence, acceptable firearms training and
evaluation are no longer limited to target practice. Scrutiny
of firearms training will normally include an evaluation of
the relevance and utility of such instruction.

Every effort has been made by the IACP National Law
Enforcement Policy Center staff and advisory board to
ensure that this document incorporates the most current
information and contemporary professional judgment
on this issue. However, law enforcement administrators
should be cautioned that no “model” policy can meet all
the needs of any given law enforcement agency. Each law
enforcement agency operates in a unique environment
of federal court rulings, state laws, local ordinances,
regulations, judicial and administrative decisions and
collective bargaining agreements that must be considered.
In addition, the formulation of specific agency policies must
take into account local political and community perspectives
and customs, prerogatives and demands; often divergent law
enforcement strategies and philosophies; and the impact of
varied agency resource capabilities among other factors.

This project was supported by a grant awarded by
the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The Bureau of Justice
Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs,
which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the
National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention, the Office for Victims of Crime,
and the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring,
Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking. Points of view or
opinions in this document are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice or the IACP.
IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center Staff:
Philip Lynn, Manager; Sara Dziejma, Project Specialist;
and Vincent Talucci, Executive Director, International
Association of Chiefs of Police.

© Copyright 2006. International Association of Chiefs
of Police, Alexandria, Virginia U.S.A. All rights reserved
under both international and Pan-American copyright
conventions. No reproduction of any part of this material
may be made without prior written consent of the copyright
holder.

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