SECRE1'IIrmFORII
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COM81NED JOINT TASK FORCE -101
HEADQUARTERS, REGIONAL COMMAND· EAST
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN

A.PO AE 09354

CJTF-101-DCG-S

18 January 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Executive Summary. Army Regulation (AR) 15-<5 Investigation . 17 Dec 13
UH-<50M •
IOX1 )1'.
DIncident in Zabul Province. Afghanistan

1. ( SIIRUI~jl Summary. At 1455 hours. 17 Dec 13. a UH-60M helicopter! " 1')(1)1.4.
1
call sign I
Ib)llI1.4.
~ was brought down by a blast from an enemy-emp~ced Improvised
Explosive Device (l ED) atop a ridgeline in Shah Jay District. labul Province. Afghanistan.
The UH-60M was hovering at 79 feet above a ridgeline preparing ~o destroy a repeater tower
when the lED detonated. The lED blast impacted the left side of the aircraft and d isabled the
tail rotor causing an uncontrollable spin to the right and crash on a downward slope
approximately 400 meters from the blast site. The crash resu~ed in six U.S. Soldiers killed in
ac~on (KIA) and one U.S. Soldier wounded in action (llVIA).

2. (6 "RJiPi, KIA. WIA. Line of Duty. The following six U .S. Soldiers were KIA and
their deaths were in the line of duty: CW2 Joshua B. SliYenman (Pilot-in-Command);
CW2 Randy L. Billings (Pilot). SFC Omar W. Forde ,Aerial Electronic Warfare Team
(AEWT) NeO IC); SSG Jesse l. Williams (AEWT NCO); SGT Peter C. Bahler (crew chief);
and SPC Terry K.D. Gordon (door gumer).
IbX3J.lbX6)
(AEWT forward
observer) survived the crash and was WIA and his injuries were in the line of duty.

I

3. tSiVPlJ,PI) 17 Dec 13. On Tuesday. 17 Dec

I

13.1

(bX I)" .

I and

(bI11 )1'.
I. two Ul:I-60/>1 helicopters from TF Gunfighter were task organized
with I
(b)(1 )1 .40 "
•
I capability to cond uct a repeater tower
reconnaissance and desfru.ction mission to disrupt enemy communications. After
completing a successful re~eater destruction mission in Ghazni Province . the UH-60Ms
moved to search for t~eir ext target. 1
(bX1)1 .... lbX1)1 .• c
1 During the
movement. enemY intelligence indicated the UH-<50Ms were under visual observation and
11.4.
11.4c
the enemy was preparing some type of obiect.
(b)(1 )1 .48, (b)( 1)1_4c

1455.17 Dec 13. As I {bXI)1 .• • 1hovered at 79 feet above the ridgeline
lbX' )I ' .
l the enemy detonated an lED that had
(bX'). (bX_)
I. the sole
been em placed in the ground near the repeater tower. 1
su ~vor of the crash, heard and experienced a loud explosion and felt the helicopter shake
and when the helicopter started to spin out of control , he blacked out. Circling overhead,
I (b)( l )14 a I crew members saw a large dust plume from the blast rise and then saw I (bX1 ) 1.48 I
start to spin out of control and drop out of sight behind the ridge line. The blast from th is
enemy-emplaced l ED d isab led the tail rotor and caused the aircraft to spin out of control
and crash .
4.

II

.' _. "

USCENTCQM FOIA 14--01n & 14-0 179

5EeRETIINOFOftl~

015

 SE6REl'IINOFORN
CJTF-10 1-DCG-S
SUBJECT: Executive Summary, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, 17 Dec 13
UH-60M ~
IbXl)l..
I Incident in Zabul Province, Afghanistan

5. (6IfRUIN) Enemy. Intelligence gathered before, during, and after the crash all
indicated that the enemy was observing the aircraft and their movements to and then over
the repeater site. When I (bxnl •• Iwas over the repeater site, an order was given to
delonate the lED. Afterwards, an enemy-released propaganda film indicated the enemy
deliberately planned this "trap " approximately fifty days before execution.
6. (s,',cRI,ml) Recovery, RC-S went into an immed iate Fallen Angel battle drill _ W ith no
(bXl),...
remained in an a!,6ofne
place to land on the steep terrain,
overwatch to request MEDEVAC and Attack Weapons Team (AWT) support. Wrthin 20
minutes of the crash, additional air assets were on station. Over the next hour, more air
and ground security foroes arrived on station to secure the site. (b~'),;lb\ll;, was
MEDEVAC'd by hoist and the six Fallen Heroes were treated with digni~ and respect and
flown from the site . Downed aircraft experts arrived at the site to collect critical data such
as the aircraft's black box. After assessing the feasibility of e racting the crashed aircraft
parts, the decision was made to destroy the aircraft in pi ceo

I

I

I

I

LE S
RONALD
BG, US
Inve gating Officer
2
USCEN TCOM FOIA 14-0177 & 14-0179

SESRETIII40FORN

016

 SEGRETIINOFORN
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE ~ 101
HeADQUARTERS, REGIONAL COMMAND . EAST
BAGRAM AIRF IELD, AfGHANISTAN
APO ,I.E 09354

CJTF-1 01 -DCG-S

18 January 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigatio}1,
17 Dec 13 UH-60M I
(b)(1)1.48
D Incident in labul Province, Afgllanistan

1. (S/IRUI~I) Purpose: On 20 Dec 13, I was appointed as an Investiga ing9.jficer (10)
pursuant to AR 15-6 to conduct an informal investigation to determine the facts and
circumstances surrounding a downed helicopter incident on 17 Dec 13 In Regional
Command - South (RC-S) that resulted in the deaths of CW2 Jos))JJa ~ . Silverman
(Pilot-in-Command (PIC)), CW2 Randy l. Billings (Pi(ot (PI», SFC O(l1ar W. Forde
(Aerial Electronic Warfare Team (AEWT) Non-Commissioned QJ!l.cer in Charge (NCOIC)),
SSG Jesse l. Williams AEWT Non-Commissioned Office (NCO), SGT Peter C. Bohler
(crew chief), and SPC Terry K.D. Gordon (door gunner) , aria injury to I
(b)(3), (b)(6)
I
1' )(3), (b)(,,(AEWT forward observer) . Pursuant to AR 600-8-4, I was also appOinted to
conduct a line of duty investigation into in'uries sustained during the incident.
2. (UI/rOUOl Summary.
a. (S/J'RUIII) At 1455 hours, 17 Dec 13, a UH-60M helicopter II
1')(1)14.
~ was
brought down by a blast from an 1'T'~rovlsed Explosive Device (lED) emplaced by the
enemy atop a ridge line in Shah Joy District, labul Province, Afghanistan. The UH-60M
was hovering at 79 feet above t ridgeline preparing to destroy a repeater tower when an
enemy-emplaced I ED next to ttJe tower detonated, The lED blast impacted the left side of
the aircraft and disabled th".",ail rotor causing an uncontrollable spin to the right and crash
on a downward slop The uH-60M came to a stop approximately 400 meters from the
blast site. The crash resulted in six U.S, Soldiers killed in action (KIA) and one U.S.
Soldier wounded in actioh (WIA).

(b)(1)1Aa, (b)(1)1Ac

017

USCENTCOM FOIA 14- 0177 & 14-0179

SEGRETA'NOFQRN

 6ECRETHNOFOR'.
CJTF-101 -DCG-S
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation,
(h)11)"'.
I Incident in labul Province, Afghanistan
17 Dec 13 UH-60M ~

c. {SiIAUltij 17 Dec 13 Mission. On Tuesday, 17 Dec 13, as part of Operation

(b)(1)L4a

-

.-

'" J
d _ (SURUIN) After completing a successful repeater destruction mission in Ghazni
Province within RC-E, the two UH-60Ms moved to search for their next targe~ Repeater
I Ib)11)1 4. Iin labul Province ~
Ib)11)1.4.
D, During their ovemen th ~
I (b)(1)1.4a Icrew on I (b)(1)1.4a Iwas monitoring known enemy radio freRue.ncies :At any given
time, the interpreter assigned to the l (b)(1)1.4a I crew monitors
(1i)(11.4a
During their flight, they intercepted enemy intelligence,
(hX1)1Aa,lb)11)14,
('m! 4., I')(~)illliicating that the UH-60Ms were being tracked'Under near:eonstant visual
{b){1 )1.4B, (b){1 )Nc;
observation ,
(b)(1)1.4B, (b){1 )14c

As nothing on the ground
appeared out of the ordinary, the two 1')(1)1", ccrtinued their search for the repeater tower.
b 11.48 (b 1)1.4c

(bJQ)l ~ {b)(1)1 .4c, (bX1)1.4g

f. (u/IFOUO) iii 1455, 17 Dec 13, the following occurred:
(1) (S/!IWI~I}I Ib11111 4. I hovered at approximately 80 feet above the ridgeline (with
(b)I1I1.4.
~
the aircraft at ormal operating parameters) I
(2) (~L TO USA, FVEY) I

,

(b)(1 )1.4a

(b)!1 )1.4a

' 3) J SIIRUIN) As I Ib)11)1.4. Islid left to approach the target, the aircraft's black box
(~dicated an explosion occurred in close vicinity of the aircraft, and one pilot responded
'th "get out of here." The cockpit instrument panel microphone picked up increased
airflow and rotor noise likely because an aircraft window was blown out One pilot is heard
saying "tail rotor, tail rotor. "

USCENTCOM FOIA 14-0177 & 14--0179

2
SECRETIINOFORN

018

 SECRET}'<NOFORN
CJTF-101-DCG-S
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation,
(b)(')14,
~ Incident in Zabul Province, Afghanistan
17 Dec 13 UH-60M ~
(4) (\;~YI~I) According to his interview, I
(bX'). (bX')
I, the sale survivor of
the crash, was seated in the aft facing row in the far right seat (the side furthest from the
likely blast impact) when he heard and experienced a loud explosion and fe~ the helicopte
shake. He looked out the window, saw smoke and noticed they were relatively close te>
the ground ; and then the helicopter started to spin out of control and he blacked 0 .
(5) (SIIRIJIN) I (b)(1)1.48 I was circling overhead and started to turn inbound hen
crew members saw a large dust plume rise approximately 100 feet in the airland then saw
I (bX')1'. I start to spin out of control and drop out of sight behind the ridgeline.
(6) (S>'iRUIN) Immediately after the explosion. I (b)(1)1.4' I enter d an;uncontrollable
right spin . The "black box" in-flight data recorder shows flight control in uts (left pedal) had
no effect on stopping the right spin. I (b)(1)148 Ispun out of c.o~rol and :crashed on the steep
downward slope coming to a stop approximately 400 meters down frem the blast site.

(b)(1 )1.4a, (b)(1 )1.4c:II •

j'

... \ " .

h. (SI/ REL TO USA, F¥EY) SIGINT repo s enemy traffic concerning an attack on an
aircraft. The traffic centers aroundlan attack OR an aircraft in a mountainous reg ion

resulting in casualties.

i. (Uh'FOlJO) Recovery e~orts.
(1) (SliRUIN) I

(b)(1fl.48

, remained in airborne overwatch in order to

make a downed aircraft radia call and to request MEDEVAC I attack support. There was
no place to immediatety land on the sloped terrain and the enemy situation was unclear.

They remained as \'erial ~ecurity until relieved by an Attack Weapons Team (AWT).
(2)
from FOB Apache.
(3)

A~WJi], an Attack Weapons Team (AWT, 2 x AH-64D) launched

) At(Mili]. Close Air Support (CAS, 2 x F18) arrived on station.

(bX1)t4,
I, an armed Intelligence,
(4} 4SIIRUINj At I
Surveilfance and Reconnaissance (ISR) asset with full motion video arrived on station.
(5) ( g,qRUI~jl AtMili]. the Aerial Readion Force (ARF) consisting of 18 dismounts
(Officer in Charge (OIC)/NCOIC. Squad Leader, Radio Telephone Operator (RTO). Medic,
Joint Fires Officer (JFO) , cut team and a ground security force) and the medical evacuation
I 2 x UH-60A+) departed FOB Apache for the crash
(MEDEVAC) aircraft (
Ib)(1)1 .48
site.

USCENTCOM FOIA 14- 0177 B. 14-0119

3
SECRETJ!NOFO~

019

 SEGRETIINOFORN

CJTF-101-DCG-S
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation,
17 Dec 13 UH-60M fj
(b)( 1)14'
DIncident in Zabul Province, Afghanistan

( S"IRYI~I )

(6)

(b)(1)1Aa

At (llliili], the AWT arrived on station, took battle hand-off from
I, and assumed aerial security over the crash site.

(7) (SURlllbI) At(~ the ARF landed approximately 350-400 meters from the
crash site. After maneuvering to the site, the first responder on the ground made contact
with I

(b )(3), (b)(6)

I and determined there were six Fallen Heroes.

(8) (6I1RU"I) I
"blown out of the sky,"
(9)
prepared I

(b)(3), (b)(B)

Itold the first medic on the scene that the aircraft

as

( SI.(RUI~j) At(~ the
(bX3), (bX.)

ARF established ground security. 1 he ARF medic
I to be hoisted to the MEDEVAC aircraft.

(10) (SIoIRUIII) At I
to enhance ground security. I

(b)(it"

(b )(3), (b)(6)

.....

I arrived

I was hoiste to ttJe MEOEVAC helicopter.

(11) (SNRUIN) At(~ the MEDEVAC witht

(b X31, (bXB)

Iarrived at FOB Apache.

(12) (Si/RUIN) At(~ ground fo ces assessed that the downed aircraft was
unrecoverable due to catastrophic damage and the Downed Aircraft Recovery Team

(DART) was requested,
(13) ( S"'RY I ~I) A~ the-MEDEVAC with the six Failen Heroes departed for
FOB Apache and arrived there at~
(14) (Sh'RUllj) At~ Task Force 2-2 (2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment,
3d Brigade Combat Team BC1}~ ;~t Infantry Division (1ID)), assumed control of the crash
site , established enhanced ecurity , and continued overnight recovery operations.

(15)
) At~ the Commander, 6015t Aviation Support Battalion
assessed that overnight recovery operations with UH-60 assets were not feasible.

(16) ( li~ lJ~l) At

18 Dec 13, I

(1'7) /'&I~Y I ~I) At

the ARF completed its ex-filtration.

"

(b)(1)L4,

I conducted an internal relief,

( )(1)1.4

\1B)

( 1i1l~YI~I)

At

the DART departed Kandahar Airfield (KAF) for the crash site.

(19) ( 1iJt~1.I 1 ~1 ) At
the DART arrived-ilt the crash site, While the safety
officer and Joint Casualty Assessment Team (JCAT) conducted their assessment and
took photo evidence, the DART OIC assessed the downed aircraft as completely
destroyed and CQuid not be slung with current aircraft position.
(20)

( SIlRI II ~I )

At 0810, the downed aircraft's black box was located and recovered,

USCENTCOM FOIA 14- 0177 & 14--0179

4
SE6RETHNOFORH

om

 SEGRETIIHOFORH

CJTF-l0l-0CG-S
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Anmy Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation,
17 Oec 13 UH-60M l
(bl(l)l .4.
DIncident in Zabul Province, Afghanistan

(21) (SffRUIt<) At 0918, a sensitive items check was completed (see paragraph 4p).
(22) ( SIIR"'I~I) At 1000, helicopters extracted all personnel and recoverable
equipment from the crash site.
(23) (SI/R"'''I) From 1020 to 1100, 18 Oec 13, downed aircraft tail I (b)ll)l'. Iwas
destroyed in place by Combined TF Ouke (3d BCT, 110) using a combinatio~ of fjxe<l and
rotary wing aircraft .

(bK1 )1Aa , (b}( 1)1.4g

(b){1)1 Aa, (b}(1)1 Ag

j. (UI.'FOUO) Enemy I

(b )(6)

I rower Tactics, Tee

i ues,and Procedures (TIPs).

(1) (liIII<Y"I) Ouring combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, Coalition Forces (CF) have
faced a thinking and adaptive enemy. Just as CF have quickly adapted to enemy TTPs,
the,enemy has countered CF TTPs in what ~ as becortle a fast-paced cycle of tactical
action , reaction , and counter-action by Dot sides.
(2) (&'lRUI~l l The mission b disrupting or destroying enemy repeater towers is no
exception and has evolved over time, By 17 Oec 13, the enemy had adapted to the CF
repeater destruction TTPs and erl1ployeci'a new means of attacking CF aircraft seeking to
destroy their repeater towers

(b)(1)1 Aa , (b)(1)1Ac

USCENTCOM FOIA 14- 01TI & 14-0179

5
SECRETIIHOFORH

021

 


SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations. Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation.
17 Dec 13 ii (b)(1)1da Incident in Zabul Province. Afghanistan

 

 

 

)1 

{wages For paragraph 2, see exhibits 2, 4. 5, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14. 15, 16.18.22,
24, 27. 32. 39. 40, 47, 52, 53, 54. 56. 57. 61, 64, 65. 66. 68, 69. 70. 71. 72. 74. 76. 77. 80.
86, 89, 90. 97. 98, 100. 101. 102. 104, 105. 106. 107. 108. 111, 146, 147, 143. 150.154,
155. 156. and 157-

3. (WW) investigative Methodology.
a. The investigative team gathered. reviewed. and analyzed facts and
information from various sources to include, but not limited to: the aircraft (black box.

parts. photographs; simulation); witnesses (see witness list)?. photographs (repeater, and
crater); inteiligenoe; and medical (autopsy).

USCENTCOM FOIA 14-0177 a 14.0179 5 022

 

 

 "o - i I I
 Wu. amp-SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations. Army Regulation (AR) 15- 6 lnvestigation,
17' Dec 13 Uri-60M with: Incident in Zabul Province. Afghanistan

b. .  Witnesses! Intervrews. Over 80 witnesses were interviewed. to include
eyewitnesses. experts, and personnel involved in the mission, from planning to recovery

 

(1)  Eyewitnesses: (bits). (b)(3)130b the onlyE (grilling survivor, and
seven members of [El?j who witnessed the event from above (the two pilots, crew
chief. door gunner? two 1W7 operators, and combat cameraman). in addition to
detailed Intormation about mission planning and execution, these eyewitnesses provrded
accounts of their first hand observations of the blast site and crash.

(2)  First Responders Medics. DART, ARF, JCAT and CAB Safety
experts who took pictures and examined the downed aircraft at the scene. As the first
ground element in, the ARF secured the site and provided initial impressions of the scene.
The DART, JCAT and CAB safety experts at the site provided both on?scene analysis of
the downed aircraft and later examined over 400 photographs from the incident.

(3)  Intelligence personnel: The Division 8.12. the CJZ Director of
Intelligence two SIGINT Specialists.l 49 [operators and TF Paladin personnel
who analyzed the insurgent activity The intelligence teams at all levels of 
provided the investigative team with critical enemy threat assessments in the area en
route to and surrounding the crash srte. intelligence personnel leveraged national. theater.
division, and brigade level intelligence assets to identify the enemy network responsible for
the deliberate targeting and clowning of "mini; In 52a. . TF Paladin (explosrve ordinance
detachment also provided blast site 

(4) it . Aviation personnel: CAB Task Force leaders: master gunners: and
the CAB maintenance officer who examined the aircraft's maintenance data These
avrators provided information on the mission planning and TTPs for repeater targeting,
destruction, and jamming. Lessons learned from this investigation and subsequent expert
analysis wiil refine TTPs throughout the operating environment in Afghanistan.

 

(5)  DiviSion leadership. to include the DCG-M, 0J3. CJ7, and CM
(Casualty Opera trons). The chain of command provided the operational context for the
planning and execution of Operation Wt The (Information Effects)
staffed the operation through the CJ3 {Qperations) and the DCG-M with final approval
from the ROS Commanding Generalf chitin 4a 

 

 

(bill)! 4a

(6) The Chief of the Fort Rocker Aviation Survivability Development
and Tactics team (ASDAT. also known as the Shoot Down Assessment Team). The
ASDAT team?s expert analysis and comprehensive review of the aircraft's technical and
tactical data aided in the determination of the cause of the downed aircraft and insight on
the employed for repeater targeting and destruction.

 

FQIA l4-fll77 i3 7 

 

 Wilm-
t?r 


SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations. Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 investigation.
17 Dec 13 UH-60M (bun-i 4a 9 Incident in Zabul Province, Afghanistan

 

c. Lin-We- Exhibits/ Evrdence: The investigative team reviewed, analyzed, and
consulted with experts on hundreds of statements, reports, photographs. and other data.
Some of the key conclusive evidence includes:

(1) it:  ASDAT expert analysis of the downed aircraft?s black box data,
including a detailed 37?page report and animation that correlated the voice and data to
reveal that as the crew approached the repeater to mark the location under normal
operating parameters, an explosrve event occurred. The aircraft then entered an
uncommanded, uncontrollable spin to the right and crashed.

(2) ii ASDAT flight simulation to replicate conditions at the time of the
blast to provide investigators an understanding of aircraft operating parameters before,
during and after the blast event with the accompanying crew actions attempting to control
the spinning aircraft.

 

(3) {Lint 31;: . Analysis of the blast crater to determine proxzmate cause of blast
and its effects on the aircraft.

Over 400 hundred pictures and over 100 hours of video footage of
the downed aircraft and the repeater tower and crater site.

 

Technicai and tactical data gathered from the (mint-la 

 

48

 

impact on_the aircraftand the crews? immediate reactions after the blast.

(6i Flight and training records and logs to review crew training and
proficiency for execution of the assigned mission profile.

(7)   Timelines and storyboards

(8) intelligence reports and transcripts to understand the enemy
network's intent to deliberately target coalition aircraft conducting repeater destruction
missions, One 4?page report detailing the aircraft's flight path and location in relation to
the intercept of the enemy?s communications confirmed the enemy network?s ability to
track coalition aircraft operating in Zabul.

 

(9)  Concept of Operations Plans
(10)  Task organization and manifests to understand the manifesting
precess, aircraft/mission assignment, and current procedures.

(11) All documentation surrounding the events leading up to, during,
and immediately after the crash.

uscenrcom mom a l4-Di79 8 out

CJTF-101-DCG-S
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 investigation.
17 Dec 13 UH-SOM (i info-IE? Incident in Zabui Province. Afghanistan

 

(12) I The Armed Forces Medical Examiner?s autopsy findings showing
the cause of death for all six heroes as blunt force injuries.

d. r- investigative efforts that did not yield conclusive results.

 

(1) :1 ?gs a. in the days following the blast, in an effort to gain
additional data about the the crater, and the potential means of detonation. the
investigative team requested and was provrded resources from Task Force Paladin, the
theatre Explosive Ordnance experts,  and Space assets.

 

(2) "car" .  On-the-ground crater analyse. was prohibited due to
its location. Forensic testing and overhead flights did not yield conclusive results as to the
amountor type of explosives used in the Field swab testing done at Kandahar
Air?eld (KAF) on the few recovered aircraft parts (retrieved 400 meters from the biast site)
was negative. Additionally, samples tested at TF Paiadin's forensic lab were negative for
organic. inorganic, and homemade explosive precursors or post-blast residue.

(3) The National Ground intelligence Center 

analyzed Hyper Spectral imagery of the two craters near the crash site ta ken bygmirni 49]

(proth before (9 Nov 13) and after (23. 24, and 30 Dec 13) the crash. The 9 Nov 13
image shows the crater with the foreign object, and a smalier crater located at its 10 o'clock
position. but no antennas appear in this image. The 30 Dec 13 post?crash image shows
the smaller crater increased in size srnce the 9 Nov 13 image and two possible antenna
shadows absent from the 9 Nov 13 image. The imagery analyst cannot determine
the cause of the smaller craters increased size; however, he indicates an EU is the likely
cause. When (b)(1)14a flew over the site six days after the blast on 23 Dec 13, no
explosives were detected within 100 meters of the site. Additionally. no other Space assets
detected explosives in the area.

    

it?

e.  Eliminated Causes. The investigative team definitively ruled out all of
the followrng potential causes for the event: weather, mechanical failure, pilot error,
accidental btade strike, and internal expioswn. The proximate and only cause of the
downed aircraft was an external enemy-initialed expiosron caused when an 
emplaced atop the ridgeiine in the vicinity of a repeater tower detonated and disabled the
tail rotor.

f. i .  Press releases. The RC-S Public Affairs Officer (PAD) made three
initial releases of information regarding this incrdent.



(1) r-  First release (17 Dec 13 at 1558)- listed the crash initially as a
?hard ianding.? and stated that 'there are no reports of insurgents in the area at this time.'

USCENTCOM 14-0177 a metro 9 has

 

&EGRETIINGHlRN
CJTF-l0l-DCG-S
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation,
17 Dec 13 UH-60M (I
(b)(1)14.
, Incident in labul Province, Afghanistan

(2) (U/II"OtlO) Second release (17 Dec 13 at 1806) - stated that six International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) members 'died following an aircraft crash in Southern
Afghanistan today' and the 'cause of the crash is under investigation, however initial
reporting indicates there was no enemy activity in the area at the time of the crash.'
(3) (U/,<fOUO) Third release (18 Dec 13) - in response to a public affairs ql,tery, this
report stated that 'ISAF can confirm that an aircraft experienced a hard landirg in southern
Afghanistan today. Six personnel were killed , and one injured . ISAF officials are conducting
an assessment into the cause of the cras h.' The response did not menti · n enemy activity
but stated 'an investigation is being conducted to determine the caUse. Further information
may be released as appropriate when the investigation has conduded.'
(4) (Ui/rOUO ) For paragraph 3, see exhibits 1, 3, 5., ~, \0 , 11 , 14, 15, 20, 21 , 22,
24,25,26 , 27,28, 29,31,32,33,34,35,36, 38, 39,40, 41 ,42,43,44, 45,46, 47,48,
49,50,51,55, 56,57,61,62,63,64,64,68,70,71,72, 79, 8~ 8G, 89, 90, 97,103,106,
107,108,110,111 , 112,113,114,116,117,118,127,130, 131 , 132, 133, 134, 135,
144,146,148,149,150,154,155,156, and 157.
4 . (UI~OYQ) Findings.
a. (UIIFOtJO) What are the facts an circumstances surrounding the incident,
to include the cause of the crash?

The facts and circumstances surroundin!1 the crash are described in paragraph 2. The cause
of the crash was the blast from th~enemy-emplaced lED which disabled the tail rotor.
b. (UI/rOUO) Who were the

ersonnel in the UH-60 and are they accounted for?

The seven personnel on the helicopter weTe all accounted for and they were: (1) CW2

Joshua B. Silve(lTlab (Ply) (KIA), (2) CW2 Randy L. Billings (pilot) (KIA), (3) SFC Omar W.
Forde (AEWT ~COIC) (KIA), (4) SSG Jesse l. Williams (AEWT NCO) (KIA), (5) SGT
Peter C. Babler (crew chief) (KIA), (6) SPC Terry K.D. Gordon (door gunner) (KIA), and (7)
I
(bXn (b)(6) ,
I(AEWT forward observer) (WIA). See exhibits 14, 26,55,63,
70. 71 90, and 91.

c.
~ UO) What was the crew mix and their experience level? Include each
Soldi!!!'s training history, total flight hours (day and night), pre-deployment
training, and time in country.
(1) (U/lfOUO) CW2 Joshua B. Silverman, pilot-in-command (left seat).

(a) (Ul/l"OUO) CW2 Silverman enlisted in September 2005 and became a
warrant officer on 1 Sep 09. He completed flight school in July 2011, w ith an initial
assignment to Sinai, Egypt. Following a transition course for the UH-60M at Fort Rucker
he was as signed to Fort Riley, Kansas in November 2012.
USCENTCOM FOIA 14-01TI B. 14-0119

10

IlIiCRmlNOFORN

026

 5EeRETII'iOFORH
CJTF-l0l-DCG-S
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation,
17 Dec 13 UH-60M II
IbX1)1 ' .
DIncident in Zabul Province, Afghanistan

(b) (u/rOUO) CW2 Silverman was on his first deployment. He deployed to
Afghanistan in August 2013. GW2 Silverman had 469 total flight hours, of which 81
hours were with night-vision goggles. He flew 9.2 hours in the last 14 days, 20 hours 'n
the last 30 days, and a total of 154 hours in the last 6 months prior to 17 Dec 13.
(2) (u/iF'OYO) CW2 Randy l. Billings, pilot (right seat).
(a) (U/IfOUO) CW2 Billings entered the service in May 1997 and became a
warrant officer on 24 Oct 07. He completed flight school in July 2009, with a 'hilial
assignment at Fort Riley, Kansas. He completed UH-60M qualification a Fort Rucker.
(b) (UI/I"OUO) CW2 Billings was on his fourth deployment. His fir:st three deployments
included: (1) Iraq, February 2004 for four months; (2) Afgnanislan, Ap,ri12006 for 12 months;
and (3) Iraq, March 2011 for 12 months. For his fou'1'l..combat tour; GW2 Billings deployed
to Afghanistan in August 2013. GW2 Billings had 1251 otal flight hours; of which 303 hours
were with night-vision goggles. He flew 22 hours in the lasl 14 days, 35 hours in the last
30 days, and a total of 190 hours in the last 6 months prior to 17 Dec 13.
(c) (UI/rOYOj He attended Ihe Maintenance Officer Qualification course in
December 2012 following his deploymenHo OIF. He completed a unit-led Mountain
Qualification Course that followed the High Altitude Mountainous Environment Training
(HAMET) Program of Instruction (POI) dated 2010 (4 hours day 12 hours night logged). All
required Common Core Training (CGT,) and right-seat train ing (both academic and flight)
are annotated as complete.
(3) (UNFOUO) S

Peter 6. Bohler, crew chief (right side).

(a) (UllfOIJO SG
ohler entered the service in August 2007 and was promoted
to Sergeant on 1 flug 12. Ae served in Germany from May 2008 until he was assigned
to Fort Riley in February'zOll ,

(b) ~) SGT Bohler was on his second deployment. His first deployment
was to Af~ ha",stan in December 2009 for eight months. For this tour, he deployed to
Afghanistan ir,t)\ugust 2013. He was in the right crew chief seat behind CW2 Billings.
SG Bohlll' h~d 667 total flight hours; of which 170 were with night-vision goggles, He
flew 6 6 liours in the last 14 days, 17 hours in the last 30 days, and 246 total hours in the
las 6 months prior to 17 Dec 13.
(c) (UI~OYO) SGT Bohler had previous flight experience; however his flight
records could not be located. His training was completed within required time frames,
Gunnery tables I thru X were comp leted prior to deployment.

USCENTCOM FOIA 14- 0177 & 14-0179

11

!lie; ~IH'II~IOF'O R loa

027

 SECRET'INOEO RN

CJTF-101-DCG-S
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation,
17 Dec 13 UH-60M (I
(b)(1)1.4'
t Incident in Zabul Province, Afghanistan

(4) (U.tIf'{lYQ) SPC Terry K.D. Gordon, door-gunner (left side).
(a) (UNFOYO) SPC Gordon entered the service in August 2011 and he was
assigned to Fort Riley in February 2012.
(b) (UI/FOYO) SPC Gordon was on his first deployment. He deployed to
Afghanistan in August 2013. He was in the left crew chief seat behind CW2 Silverman.
SPC Gordon had 254 total fiight hours, of which 25 hours were with night-visiory.gqggles.
He flew 36 hours in the last 14 days, 52 hours in the last 30 days, and 254 total1lOurs in
the last 6 months prior to 17 Dec 13.
(c) (UI/FOYO) As a door gunner, SPC Gordon conducted his training stateside and
while deployed. His training fiight hours, timelines and ac ~e~ic reqtJi ements were all
within slandard. His OEF CCT, right-seat academics , ~nvironmental flight requirements ,
and Gunnery Tables I thru VIII were all complete.
(5) (UII~OWOl SFC Omar W. Forde, AEWT NCOIC (right side).
(a) (UJ,CFOYO) SFC Forde entered the service tn January 2005 and he was
assigned to Fort Riley in January 2012.
(b) (UI/FOYO) SFC Forde was on his t~ird deployment. He deployed to Iraq twice
(in October 2008 for 12 months an in July 2010 for 12 months). He deployed to
Afghanistan in July 2013. He was on th 1i9ht side of the aircraft in the rear row facing
forward . There was one seall:ietween:SFC Forde and the right door.
(6) (Ul/roUG) SSG Jes~ l. Williams, AEWT NCO (left side).
(a) (UIIFOYe}' SSG Williams entered the service in February 2006 and he was
assigned to Vilsec Ge any in July 2013.
(b)
) SSG Williams was on his third deployment. He deployed to Iraq in
June 200 for 14 months and to Afghanistan in May 2010 for 12 months. He deployed to
Afgha ~sta in · ~Iy 2013. He was on the left side of the aircraft in the rea r row facing
forward. hie was seated next to the left door.

J

7~ (U//FOYO)

,I

,(b...
X,,3) .• ,(b..X.B,,)

.~ AEWT forward observer (right side) .

(b)13), (b)IB)

USCENTCOM FOIA 14- 0177 & 14-0179

12
SECRETJINOFORN

028

 

SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15?8 investigation.

 

17 Dec 13 i in Zabui Province, Afghanistan

L11 48

WW For 4c, see exhibits 26. 82. 125.126. 127. 128. 136. and 149.

d. -  What was the mission at the time of the incident?

 

4B

 



Grimm.-. m. 
(pilot), SGT Bohier (crew chief) and SPC Gordon (door gunner). Passengers: Aerial
Electronic Warfare Team - SFC Forde, 886 Williams, and iman 

mmwl): Crew: CW2 Silverman (PIC), CW2 Billings

 

(bit ill 43, (mm)

14-0177 8. 14?0179



 

SECRETIINOFORH
CJTF-101-DCG-S
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation.
17 Dec 13 UH-60M 0
Ib)(1)14'
DIncident in Zabul Province, Afghanistan

(6) (liItRYIN) Pre-mission: At 0540, 17 Dec 13, the crews received an Operations
and Intelligence (0&1) brief which included an S2 brief focused on Ihe Surface-la-Air fires
(SAFIRE) Ihreat for Iheir area of operations. The briefing also included a warning order of
a possible mission change upon arrival at FOB Apache . At 0555, I IOX3).IOX") l the Ai
Mission Commander (AMC) fo~
(b)(1)1.4'
l initiated a team brief which inciuded
mission specifics such as flight routes, time on target, flig ht formations, contingencies ar,d
composite risk management. By 0745, each crew had conducted their own ,aIrcraft
preftight and crew briefs. The team departed KAF at 0834 enroute to FOB Apache.>

{b)(1)Ua, (b)(1)f\4c

(10) (UlIFOYO, forlld, see exhibits 5, 6, S, 9, 14, 18, 19, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 35, 38,
52, 54, 55, 58, 63, 6 5) 68, 70, 7 1, 72, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 94, 145, and 154.
e. (U/If'OUI'5) W<lS an Up-Io-date threat analysis and risk assessment completed?

(1) ~U/~ Yes. On 15 and 16 Dec 13, the DA Form 5484 (Da ily Mission
Schedul Brief) and t he Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW) was signed by both PICs,
thef,MC , and the Mission Briefing Officer (MBO), and approved by the Mission Approval
authorities/ The terrain ftight was properly briefed in the mission complexity block of the
RAW. Tasks were properly briefed in the mission block. Although the numbers were
IDtaled incorrectly, the overall risk value and approval authority would not have changed.
(2) (SlJRYI~j) At 0540, 17 Dec 13, the crews' Operations and Intelligence (0&1)
brief induded an S2 brief, primarily focused on the SAFIRE threat for their area of
operations that day and a warning order for a possible mission change upon arrival at
FOB Apache. At 0555, I (bIl3), (bll") I(AMC) inrtiated a team brief. At 0720, I (OX3). (OX') I
received his final weather update briefing from the Staff Weather Officer (SWO). At 0745,
the aircraft preflight checks were complete.
USCENTCOM FOIA 14-0177 B. 14-0119

14
SEGREl'NNOFORN

030

 SEGRETIINOFORN
CJTF-l0l-DCG-S
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation,
17 Dec 13 UH-60M I
(b)(1)1'.
IIncident in Zabul Province, Afghanistan

(3) fS/.'RUilO At 0930, al FOB Apache, all pilots (except CW2 Billings, who
remained wilh the aircraft to prepare for mission) received the mission change brief from
CTF Duke. During the brief, no additional threat information was given on CTF Duke's or
RC-E's AO where the repeater engagements were planned.
(4) €~YI~l j The team launched without I Ib113),lbX'1 I (AMC) informing their MBO
or Final Mission Approval Authority (FMAA) of the mission change and its parameters.
Regardless, this oversight had no impact on the mission .
(5) (SIIRUlr4) Some interviewees expressed a general concern rega ing potential
risk associated with the TIPs used to destroy enemy repeater towers I I~M1114.,lbX1 1"g I

I
I

IbX111.' •. (bX11",. (bI11)1.'9

,l

I

IbX'I" ' ,lbX'I"g
I prior to 17 Dec 13,( Tna! possibility, however,
was one of many potential threats to repeater tower engagementS and, at the time, was
not a confirmed methodology of the enemy. As noted inihe recommendations section,
repeater tower engagement TIPs should be reevaluated after consideration of the
information gathered during the course of this inv'estigation; however, the TIPs employed
on 17 Dec 13 had, to that point, proven ~ective ih aCl:omplishing the mission I (b)11)1"

I

I

Ibl(111"
....

(6) (U1/FOUO) For 4e, see
and 127,

!iL

ex ~i b its

5, 19, 20, 39, 52, 59, 60, 62, 65, 68, 82 , 84, 85,

f, (U/lFOUO) Was a we-mission briefing conducted? If so, did the briefing
address dangers in the area the mission was going to be conducted?
g. (Sl/RUIUI Tpec rewsYeceived an 0&1 brief on the morning of the incident at
approximately 0540. Th)S did include an S2 brief, primarily focused on the SAFIRE
th reat for their rea of sperations that day. At this briefing the team was also briefed of a
possible mission c~ange upon arrival at FOB Apache. Upon arrival at Apache the team
was informed tHere was a change of mission. During the change of mission brief by
CTF P ke , no additional S2 threat brief was provided nor was there any increased

empfuasis given to the repeater locations in Ghazni Province or the Shah Joy District in
Zabul revince.
(1) (iOl.I);WI ~Il l IbX31.lb)!'1 Iinrtiated a team brief at approximately 0555. The team
!l.rief is mission-specific and covers items such as flight routes , time on target, flight

formations. contingencies and composite risk management. Each crew then conducted
their own aircraft preflight and crew briefs by 0745. AU rehearsals, if any , were verbal.
(2) (U/lFOI IO) For more specific recommendations on threat briefings, see
paragraph 5, recommendations (I) and (m).

USCENTCOM FOIA 14-0177 & 14-0179

15
SI!C~I!TII"'O"O~"

031

I

 SEeREffl,mFORH
CJTF·101-DCG-S
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation,
Ib)(1)1.4.
DIncident in Zabul Province, Afghanistan
17 Dec 13 UH-60M ~

(3) (UI/FOIJO) For4f, see exhibits 19, 25, 52, 59, 65, 82, and 127.
h. (UNFOUO) What was the size, disposition, and activity of any enemy force?

(b)(1)lAa, (b)(1)1Ac

(2) (SIJRIOl TO U5A. F\lEYJ Intelligence sources disco ered, om SIGINT that
insurgents from the l (bX1)14•. (b)(1)14' Ihad nearly-consta')Plsu'll observation and tracking
of the aircraft. to include numerous reports immediately oef e and after the explosion.

(b)(1)1Ail, (bJ{f)1 4 ~

(4) (UIIFQ\,IQ) On 5 Jan
, a TB Website, ·Voice of Jihad", posted links to a
12-minute video of an alleged shoot d0"fn of a US helicopter in Zabul's Shah Joy District.
The Open Source Center weps~e posted a description and translation of the video and
the unidentified video ann,ouncer st ates that "US Forces were using air force in their
operations in Zabul and were launching air strikes from a low altitude." The announcer
adds "Taliban installed an-.antenna on the Red Hill near Ibrahim Khel village of Shah Joy
District to activate thel mobile communication system : He says ~ In order to achieve this
goal. they repeated It Cll ied out air strikes on the antenna. Mujahideen of the Islamic
Emirate took aClvantlge of the situation and made a plan to shoot down enemy
helicopters osed to, target the antenna from a low altitude. They planted remote control
mines near the anlenna. The mines move forward for hundreds of meters after they are
detonate~an<i
use heavy destruction . When a US helicopter lowered. mujahideen
deto"latea the mines. The mines hit the helicopter and as a result it crashed and all
Soldiers on board were killed."

USCENTCOM FOIA 14- 0177 & 14-0179

16

SEGR£TIIHOFORN

032

 SiECRETJINOFORW
CJTF·101·DCG·S
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15·6 Investigation,
(0)(1)14'
ilncident in Zabul Province, Afghanistan
17 Dec 13 UH·60M ~

(5) (UI/FOUOj The video translation states that short interviews were conducted
with Mr. Amin , a TB official in the area, and with a TB mine expert. Mr. Amin states,
"The enemy aircraft used to carry out strikes on the antenna. They also dropped a
special device in order to bug the area. Mujahideen devised a plan to target the enem 's
aircraft. The plan took about 50 days. Taliban installed a fake antenna on the hill as a
trap. When the enemy helicopters arrived there, Taliban attacked them. I organized tfie
plan. We spent money in order to provide accommodation , transportation, ar d other
logisbc support to mujahideen. We used a certain material in the attack whictj; was
expensive." When asked if US forces tried to remove the aircraft wreckagop the
unnamed TB mine expert replied , "Yes, they made an attempt to remoVei ne wreckage
of their helicopter; however, it was not possible. Later they bombardec1ltoe.wreckage of
the helicopter and their equipment remained in the area."
(6) (UI/FOYO) See exhibits 19, 20, 34 , 59, B4 !l3, 96, 99, 109, and 152.

i.

(UII~OYOI

Did the pre·mission brief include we_ther conditions? What were
the weather conditions at the time of the incident?
Yes . On 17 Dec 13, weather conditions wer~ fa\lorable for aviation operations. No weather

sensors exist at the location of the incident At 0600, and at the 0720 update, the SWO
briefed visibility was 5 miles, limited by dust;~ na there was no ceiling, with few clouds at
25,000 feet and winds out of the south·west Were about 10 knots, See exhibits 59 and 127,
j, (U/~OYO) Describe the manifn! procedures.
(1) ( U/I~OYO) A crew a d passenger manifest is required for all flights (See AR 95·1,
Aviation Flight Regulations, Chapter 5, para. 5·2, d(5)} , For tactical or tactical training flights,
the passenger manifest:will be prepared and retained by the supported unit.

(b){1)1 Aa

USCENTCOM FOIA 14- 0177 & 14-0179

17
5ECRET".,OFORN

033

 SEGRHNNOFORN
CJTF-101-DCG-S
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation,
(' )(1)1.4.
~ Incident in Zabul Province, Afghanistan
17 Dec 13 UH-60M a

(b)( l )1Aa

(5) (UIIFOUO) See exhibits 14, 55,63, 70, 71,72, 75, 90, 95 , 127, an 149.
k. (UI/FOUD)
Were all individuals wearing appropriate I!ersonal protective
equipment for the situation and following all applicable op",ating RJ'ocedures,
safety guidelines, and other related policies and regulations1- If ott why not?
Yes. All crew members wore the appropriate flight related unifoffns and all Aviation Life
Support Equipment (ALSE) was current. PAO video take at FOB Apache and I (')(3), (')(6) I
confirmed all passengers wore their PPE during flight. After-the crash, I 1')(3).1' )(6) I removed
his Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV) in order to breathe more easily.

I. (UJlFOUO) What was the cause of death'il Were any KIAIWIAs the result of
combat, enemy action, attack by terrorists, or.-antagonistic forces, or via fr i endly~fire?
(1) (U/IFOUOj According lo:th~inal Aulopsy Examination Reports, the cause of
death for CWZ Joshua B. SilvermaQ, Cvy.2 Randy L. Billings, SSG Jesse L. Williams, and
SPC Terry K.D. Gordon was multiple blunt force injuries. The cause of death for SFC
Omar W . Forde was m u lti ~ le injuries and for SGT Peter C. Bohler it was blunt force injuries.
(2) (U/!FOUO 'The lhanner of death for all KIA is listed as homicide.

(3) LI~~~'~~\~_________I~b)~13~).~lb~)16~)__________________~
) See exhibits 26, 119,120, 121 , 122, 123, 124,129,130,131 , 132,

~ (~OWO)

Howwas the medical treatment, if any, provided to the Soldiers?

(1) (:;I!RYIN) Based on the tactical situation, the MEDEVAC procedures were
timely and appropriate. I
(' )13), (bXB,
I the ARF mediC, was the first to arrive at
the scene. He made contact with Ib)13).lb)(6) and soon determined six personnel were
deceased. (b}(3), (b}(6) conducte a rapl rauma assessment and initial stabilization
procedures on (b ){3), (b l(6) and noted he was responsive , had suffered a cut to his head,
and was experiencing pain on his right side.

USCENTCOM FOIA 14-01TI & 14-0119

18

5ECRETlitlOFORN

034

 ii,CRilll"O~ORN

CJTF-101-DCG-S
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation,
17 Dec 13 UH·60M I
Ib)(1)L4.
I Incident in labul Province, Afghanistan

.t

=

(3) (U/IFOI. 'O) See exhibits 7, 11,17, 43 , 119, 120, 121,122,123, and!1 24.
n. (UIIHlIdQj What were Ihe MEDEVAC response times anil details regarding
lime of injury and 9~ine request?

(0)(1 )1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(f1)

(8)
o.

{UI,II"9~ )

See exhibits 17, 43, 66, 77,119,1 20, 121,122, 123, and 124.

Ht-OUOI What efforts were made to recover the downed aircraft and

pOJ8. nnel? We,e they in accordance with TTPs and SOPs? Whal is the detailed
time line of the response and all events that occurred?
1 e paragraph 2i for a detailed limeline and description of the recovery efforts. Efforts of
all personnel on the ground were in accordance with the current 1st CAB, 601 st ASB
Aircraft Recovery Standard Operating Procedures, dated 20 Nov 13. See exhibits: 50,
74,83, and 137.

USCENTCOM FOIA 14-0177 8. 14-0179

19

gECRHlI.. g~ORN

035

  llr'  

.or' ?iT


SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations. Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation.

17 Dec '13 UH-BOM  (bjllil 4a Incident in Zabul Province. Afghanistan

 

 

p_ What is the nature and extent of any and all injuries. Were the
injuries in the line of duty?

Six personnel chi??Murm?lwere KIA: CW2 Joshua B. Silverman (PIC),

CW2 Randy L. Billings (pilot). SFC OmarW Forde (Aerial Electronic Warfare Team
NCOIC), SSG Jesse Williams (AEWT NCO). SGT Peter Bohler (crew chief). and
SP0 Terrv K.D. Gordon (door dunner). One Soldier was wounded-inaction:

(bil3l. mile; 
. The six deaths and one
wounded Soldier were in the line of duty as they were a result of enemy action.

(See AR 600-8?4, para. See exhibits 129. 130, 131. 132. 133. 134, and 135.

 

q. Were there any missing or damaged sensitive items?

 

 

I 

pom 14-0177 23 14mm 20 {130

?rmware?. Haifa-w .m - 

- 

ILL- arit?iu. 

 

6EGRET»NOFORN
CJTF-101-DCG-S
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation,
17 Dec 13 UH-60M II
Ib)(l )L' .
I Incident in Zabul Province, Afghanistan

(b)(1)1.4B

~----------------------~ ~

r. (UIIFOUOI What matters, not covered by the questions, do you deem relevant?
(1 ) (SNRUIN) All seven personnel aboard I
(bXl )l.' .
,1~ I, tb!> six
Fallen Heroes and I IbK31.1bK6) I heroically served their country in the lit)~f tluty on

I'moo" Tho,~. ~ o~••'" ,.. :,~~m"~".~::'"

~ ., ~m",'"

(2) (U/,q;OWO) All casualties were recovered with honor. Due to the downed
aircraft's location and position on a steep slope ana in mountainous terrain , an HLZ
could not be established near the site. Each Faile Hero was secured in a SKEDKO
flexible rescue litter and ARF members ifted Ihe PaliEln Heroes into the MEDEVAC.
The TF Gunfighter Chaplain covered each Fal en era with an American fiag and
blessed them once they were secured aboa,d he aircraft.
(3) ( SIiRU l t~J The site wasm eU-documented through pictures and reports from
Safety, DART and JCAT experts 0 the ground who ultimately determined the aircraft
was non-repairable and non-recoverable. Their recommendation to destroy it was based
on a risk assessment of the terrain and the lack of a safe and suitable HLZ for a CH-47
Chinook helicopter landing ini he Vicinity of the site . Based on the circumstances, the
commanders' decision to destroy the aircraft in place and avoid further risk to Soldiers
based on the th re~t assessment in the area was prudent and appropriate.

(4) (
Coalition Forces must remain vigilant and mindful of the enemy's
capability to Qbserve, detect, and capitalize on CF patterns. These lessons and the
counter easures focused on enemy action, re-action and counter-action must be
passed on to incoming units during rel ief in place (RIP) and transfer of authority (TOA)
ope tions, Threat-based altitudes, airspeeds, maneuver and CF task organization are
all crifica components to the risk analysis.
(5) (SliRU I~I ) The enemy network responsible for this deadly attack should be
targeted and defeated in support of building a safe and secure environment for the AN SF
and the local Afghan population.
(6) (UIIFOUO) See exhibits 5, 37, 52, 64, 65, 68, 86, 111 , 146, 148, 149, and 150.

USCENTCOM FOIA 14- 0177 & 14-0179

21
SeCRIO+UNOFORN

037

  


SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 156 Investigation.
17 Dec 13 UH-SOM (i 413 Incident in Zabui Province, Afghanistan

 

5.  Recommendations. include recommend changes to TTPs as a resuit
of this incident.

 

(5H5)

 

 

FOIA 1-1-0177 8 i4?Bl79  038
{j'o m" .i n"  1?5, 2" 
wax?

CJTF-101-DCG-S
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations. Army Reguiation (AR) 15-6 Investigation,
17 Dec 13 UH-60M (Dim)! 4a 0 Incident in Zabui Province, Afghanistan

 

43. WNW

qr - . For paragraph 5, see exhibit 2.

 

 

 

6. The investigative team included two detailed assistant investigating of?cers
and voting members,  M3, {but}; i, and two non-voting
members,?_ i The FCC for this memorandum is the
undersigned at (mm (mm) @afghan.swa.army.mii.



I 
I I
I

 
[36. USA
I investigating Officer

24

mm 14-01.77 a 14mm  1-4-11

CJTF-101-DCG-S
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations. Army Reguiation (AR) 15-6 Investigation,
17 Dec 13 UH-60M (Dim)! 4a 0 Incident in Zabui Province, Afghanistan

 

43. WNW

qr - . For paragraph 5, see exhibit 2.

 

 

 

6. The investigative team included two detailed assistant investigating of?cers
and voting members,  M3, {but}; i, and two non-voting
members,?_ i The FCC for this memorandum is the
undersigned at (mm (mm) @afghan.swa.army.mii.



I 
I I
I

 
[36. USA
I investigating Officer

24

mm 14-01.77 a 14mm  1-4-11