!aaassseee      111:::111333-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-222444777000000-­-­-KKKMMMWWW                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333333111                  EEEnnnttteeerrreeeddd      ooonnn      FFFLLLSSSDDD      DDDoooccckkkeeettt      000999///111555///222000111555                  PPPaaagggeee      111      ooofff      111333 UNITED STATES DISTRICT CO URT SO UTHERN DISTRICT O F FLORIDA Case No.13-24700-CIV-W ILLIAM S W ILLIAM L.RO BERTS,II,etaI., Plainti ffs, VS. STEFAN KENDAL GO RDY,etaI., Defendants. / O RDER THIS M ATTER is before the Coud on Defendants Stefan Gordy,Skyler Gordy, and Party Rock,LLC'S motionforpadialsummaryjudgmenton CountIllofthe second amended complaint (DE 226),to which Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition (DE 243),and Defendants filed a reply (DE 260). This case involves a copyrightdispute between Plaintiffs,m em bers ofthe recording industry and the purported owners ofthe m usical com position Hustlin', and the Defendants, also m em bers of the recording industry,who sellm erchandise bearing the phrase ''everyday I'm shufflin'j'- a phrase from theirhitsong Party Rock Anthem . ffs assed thatthey ownlthe copyrightto the m usicalcom position Hustlin'. Plainti (DE 158 IN 5,61).The chorus ofHustlin'consists ofthe repeated refrain ofthe phrase ''everyday l'm hustlin''and the words d'hustle''and 'hustlin'''. (Defendants'statementof 1Forthe purposes ofthis Order, the Coud assum es,w ithout deciding,that Plaintiffs are either the Iegal or beneficial ow ners of som e portion of the copyright in the m usical com posi tion Hustlin'. However, ownership of the copyright in the m usicalcom position (forwhich three registrations exist)is a serious,unresolved issue and the subjectoftwo other motions for summaryjudgment. !aaassseee      111:::111333-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-222444777000000-­-­-KKKMMMWWW                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333333111                  EEEnnnttteeerrreeeddd      ooonnn      FFFLLLSSSDDD      DDDoooccckkkeeettt      000999///111555///222000111555                  PPPaaagggeee      222      ooofff      111333 undisputed facts ('iDef,SUF''), DE 226-1 !14).2 Plaintiffs contend that they have copyrightinterests in the three-word phrase 'everyday I'm hustlin','standing alone and divorced from the m usical com posi tion Hustlin', and that the sale of m erchandise featuring the w ords 'leveryday I'm shufflin'''infringes on their copyright in the m usical composi tion Hustlin'.3 (Def.SUF :112' ,DE 158 1162). Following the release ofthe m usical com position Party Rock Anthem in 2011, Defendants launched a highày successfulclothing Iine thatfeatures T-shirts and otherm erchandise bearing the phrase ''everyday I'm shufflin'.''(Def,SUF !è15). ln moving forsummaryjudgment,Defendants are clearthatthey are ''notasking the Coud to find thatdeveryday I'm hustlin''w ith its m elody,is notcopyrightable as itis used the context of the disputed works fparty Rock Anthemj, music videos, (and) perform ances butrather,thatthe sim ple slogan 'everyday I'm hustlin','totally divorced ofaIIofthe musicalcomponents ofthe Hustlin'composi tion,is notcopyrightable.'' (DE 226 at7). Therefore,the Coud addresses the motion within these narrow and Iimited confines. 1. LEG AL STANDARD Summaryjudgmentis appropriate ''i fthe movantshows thatthere is no genuine dispute as to any materialfactand the movantis entitled to judgmentas a matterof 2 Unless otherwise noted, facts from Defendants'statement of materi alfacts (DE 62)are not m aterially disputed. 3Although Plaintiffs initially asserted thatthe sale ofthe m erchandise also constituted tradem ark infringement,they subsequently voluntarily dismissed thatclaim with prejudice. The Court notes that Defendants previously presented records from the U .S.Patentand Trademark Office and the California Secretary ofState dem onstrating that'Hustlin'''has been tradem arked foruse onclothingbya person otherthanPlaintiffs- documentsthe Courttookjudicialnotice of. (See DE 57-1at22-23. ,DE 57-1 at31-32' ,DE 57-1at34* ,DE 143). 2 !aaassseee      111:::111333-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-222444777000000-­-­-KKKMMMWWW                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333333111                  EEEnnnttteeerrreeeddd      ooonnn      FFFLLLSSSDDD      DDDoooccckkkeeettt      000999///111555///222000111555                  PPPaaagggeee      333      ooofff      111333 Iaw.'' Fed.R.Civ.P.56(a). Underthis standard,''Eolnly disputes overfacts thatmight affect the outcome of the suit under the governing Esubstantive) law will properly preclude the entry ofsummary judgment.'' Anderson v.Liberty Lobby,Inc.,477 U.S. 242,248 (1986). And any such dispute is ''genuine''only d 'ifthe evidence is such thata reasonable jury could return a verdictforthe nonmoving padya' Id. t'T he m oving pady bears the initial burden of establishing the nonexistence of a triable fact issue.'' ContinentalCas.Co.?.W endt,205 F.3d 1258,1261 (11th Cir.2000)(ci ting Celotex Corp.v.Catrett,477 U.S.317 (1986)). Ifthe movantestablishes the absence ofa genuine issue ofm aterialfact,the nonm oving party m ust''go beyond the pleadings and by herown affidavits orby the 'depositions,answers to interrogatories,and adm issions on file'designate 'specific facts show ing thatthere is a genuine issue fortrial.'' Ce/ofex, 477 U.S.at324 (quoting FED.R.ClV.P.56(c)). Thus,dslilfthe non-movant...fails to adduce evidence which would be sufficient ...to suppod a jury finding forthe non- movant,summaryjudgmentmay be granted.'' Brooks ?.Blue Cross & Blue Shield,116 F.3d 1364,1370 (11th Cir.1997)(citation omitted). ln evaluating a motion forsummaryjudgment,the Coud considers the evidence in the record, ''including depositions, documents, electronically stored inform ation, affidavi ts ordeclarations,stipulations ...,adm issions,interrogatory answers,orother materials ....'' Fed.R.Civ.P.56(c)(1)(A). The Coud ''mustview aIIthe evidence and aIIfactualinferences reasonably draw n from the evidence in the Iightm ostfavorable to the nonm oving pady,and m ustresolve aIlreasonable doubts aboutthe facts in favorof the non-movant.'' Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Atthe summary judgmentstage,the Coud's 3 !aaassseee      111:::111333-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-222444777000000-­-­-KKKMMMWWW                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333333111                  EEEnnnttteeerrreeeddd      ooonnn      FFFLLLSSSDDD      DDDoooccckkkeeettt      000999///111555///222000111555                  PPPaaagggeee      444      ooofff      111333 task is notto '' w eigh the evidence and determ ine the truth ofthe m atterbutto determ ine whetherthere is a genuine issue fortrial.''Anderson,477 U.S.at249. II. DISCUSSIO N To prevailon a claim of copyright infringement,a plaintiffmust establish:(1) ownership ofa valid copyright,and (2)copying ofconstituentelements ofthe work that are original.Bealv.ParamountPictures Corp.,20 F.3d 454,459 (11th Cir.1994).The plaintiffcan prove copying through directorindirectevidence. Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm l,193 F.3d 1241,1248 (11th Cir.1999). Because directevidence ofcopying is rarely available,a plaintiffmay show copying by demonstrating that: (1)the Defendant had accessto the work inquestion' ,and (2)the works are substantially sim ilar. Id. Regardless of w hether copying is proved by direct or indirect evidence, d'the plaintiffalso m ustestablish specifically thatthe allegedly infringing work is substantially sim ilarto the plaintiff's work with regard to its protected elem ents.'' Leigh v. W arner Bros.,212 F.3d 1210,1214 (11th Cir.2000), .Lifetime Homes,Inc.v.W alkerHomes, Inc.,485 F.Supp.2d 1314,1320 (M .D.Fla.2007)afrd,270 F.App'x 811 (11th Cir. 2008). In orderto establish substantialsimilarity,Plaintiffsm ustsatisfy:(1)an extrinsic, objective test, and (2) an intrinsic,subjective test. See Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1257. ''Underthe extrinsic test,a courtwillinquire into whether,asan objective matter, the works are substantially sim ilarin protected expression.'' Lil'Joe W ein M usic,Inc.v. Jackson,245 F.App'x 873,877 (11th Cir.2007).As pad ofthe extrinsictest,the Coud determ ines whetherPlaintiffs seek to protectuncopyrightable elem ents' ,ifso,the Coud willgrantsummaryjudgmentforthe defendants. Wi th respectto the intrinsictest, the Coud determineswhether,upon properinstruction,a reasonable jury could find that 4 !aaassseee      111:::111333-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-222444777000000-­-­-KKKMMMWWW                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333333111                  EEEnnnttteeerrreeeddd      ooonnn      FFFLLLSSSDDD      DDDoooccckkkeeettt      000999///111555///222000111555                  PPPaaagggeee      555      ooofff      111333 the two w orks are substantially sim ilar Id.To show substantialsim ilarity,the plaintiff . m ust establish that ''an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.'' The ultim ate question is ''whethera reasonablejury could find the (two works)substantially similaratthe Ievelof protected expression.'' Oravec ?.Sunny Isles Ltpxtpry Venturest L.C.,527 F.3d 1218, 1224 n.5 (11thCir.2008). Copyright protection does not autom atically extend to every com ponent of a copyrighted work. See Lil'Joe Wein,245 F.App'x at877 (finding thatalthough musical com position was entitled to copyrightprotection as a work,notevery elem ent,such as the Iyric''Go ,it'syourbidhday''were protectable). Originality is '' the sine qua non ofcopyright' ,accordingly,copyrightprotection m ay extend only to those com ponents of a work thatare originalto the author.'' FeistPubl' ns.,Inc.v.RuralTel.Sem Co.,499 U.S.340,348 (1991), .see also Harper& Row,Publishers,Inc.v.Nation Enter.,471 U.S.539,547-48 (''copyrightdoes notpreventsubsequentusers from copying from a priorauthor's work those constituentelements thatare notoriginal...as Iong as such use does notunfairly appropriate the author'soriginalcontributions.''). ''Originalj''asthe term is used in copyright,m eans thatthe work is originalto the author,i.e.,thatitwas independently created by him as opposed to copied from other works, and that it possesses some m inim aldegree ofcreativity. Feist,499 U.S.at345. ' sW ords and shortphrases'are notcopyrightable. 37 C.F.R.j 202.1(a). The overwhelm ing authority is that shod phrases or com mon or ordinary words are not copyrightable. Forexam ple,in Prunte v.UniversalM usic Grp., Inc.,699 F.Supp.2d 15,25-30 (D.D.C.2010),the Coud found thatthe phrases 'fire in the hole,'''so high,'' 5 !aaassseee      111:::111333-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-222444777000000-­-­-KKKMMMWWW                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333333111                  EEEnnnttteeerrreeeddd      ooonnn      FFFLLLSSSDDD      DDDoooccckkkeeettt      000999///111555///222000111555                  PPPaaagggeee      666      ooofff      111333 'getitpoppin''',''wish a m uthafugga would,'''' justrunning theirmouths,''''shootto kill1'' 'I'm a maniac,''and ''that's what's up,''which were contained in the plainti ff's m usical compositions,were simple,shod,common phrases notsubjectto copyrightprotection. Likewise,in Fakea//v.Pepsico;Inc.,14 F.3d 596 (4th Cir.1993),No.93-1237,1993 W L 509876,at*8 (4th Cir.Dec.8,1993),the Foudh Circuitfound thatthe phrase 'You Got the RightOne,Uh-Huh''d'failled)to evince the requisite degree oforiginality to enti tle it to copyrightprotection and is a shod expression ofthe sod thatcourts have uniform ly held uncopyrightable.'' See also Chapm an v.UniversalM otown Records Grp.,No.08 CIV.3255 (LAP),2010 W L 517480,at*4 (S.D.N.Y.Feb.4,2010)(phrase S 'Iean back''in musicalcomposition was notsubjectto copyright). Other couds considering sim ilar phrases and guided by Section 202.1 of the Code of Federal Regulations, have reached the same conclusion - short, ordinary words,phrases,orslogans,are notenti tl ed to copyrightprotection. See,e.g.,Edwards v.Raymond,22 F.Supp.3d 293,298-99 (S.D.N.Y.2014)(the phrase t'caughtup''which was the title of plainti ffs'song 'iis not eligible copyright protection''because itwas a com mon phrase and because it was not originalto the plainti ffs but rather dlused in everyday speech in a variety ofcontextsnl;Boone v.Jackson,206 F.App'x 30,33 (2d Cir.2006) (phrase ''holla back''in musicalcomposition was a common phrase not subjectto copyright protectionl' ,Alberto-culver Co.B.Andrea Dum on,Inc.,466 F.2d 705,711 (7th Cir.1972)(finding thatthe phrase d'mostpersonalsod ofdeodorant''was not copyrightable because itwas S 'm erely a ishod phrase or expression'which hardly qualifies asan 'appreciable amountoforiginaltext.''')(quoting KitchensofSara Lee,Inc. v.M ffy Foods Corp.,266 F.2d 541,544 (2d Cir.1959)). ,Nare//v.Freeman,872 F.2d 6 !aaassseee      111:::111333-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-222444777000000-­-­-KKKMMMWWW                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333333111                  EEEnnnttteeerrreeeddd      ooonnn      FFFLLLSSSDDD      DDDoooccckkkeeettt      000999///111555///222000111555                  PPPaaagggeee      777      ooofff      111333 907,911(9th Cir.1989)(affirming summaryjudgmentbecause i sordinary phrases''such as ''crawling with alligators''and ''cow path''are ''notentitled to copyright protection ' 'l' , . Syrus v.Bennett,455 F.App'x 806,809 (10th Cir.2011)(phrases $'Go Thunder''and 'Let's Go Thunder'were notentitled to copyrightprotection,even though they appeared in plaintiff's originalcomposition, because they were ordinary phrasesl;Salinger v. Random House,Inc.,811 F.2d 9O,98 (2d Cir.1987)($ '(A)cliche oran dordinary'wordcom bination by itself willfrequently failto demonstrate even the m inim um Ievel of creativity necessaryforcopyrightprotection.''). This is notto say thata work thatdoes include 'ordinary''phrases is notentitled to copyrightprotection. As the Second Circuitsuccinctly explained: Copyright protection is available for the association, presentation, and com bination of the ideas and thought which go to make up the (author's)Iiterary composition.Or as we have recently stated,tdW hatis protected is the m anner of expression, the author's analysis or interpretation of events,the w ay he structures his m aterialand m arshals his facts, his choice of words and the em phasis he gives to padiculardevelopments.'The ''ordinary'phrase may enjoy no protection as such, but its use in a sequence of expressive words does notcause the entire passage to Iose protection.And though the d'ordinary''phrase may be quoted without fear of infringem ent, a copier m ay not quote or paraphrase the sequence of creative expression that includes such a phrase. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 98 (internalci tations om ittedl;see also Peter Letterese And Assocs.,Inc.v.W orld Inst.OfScientology Enter.,533 F.3d 1287,1306 (11th Cir.2008) (the inclusion ofuncopyrightable shod phrases 'does notthereby cause the passage in which they are used to Iose protection of its copyrightable elem ents- the original sequence ofthoughts,choice ofwords,em phasis,and arrangement.''). 7 !aaassseee      111:::111333-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-222444777000000-­-­-KKKMMMWWW                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333333111                  EEEnnnttteeerrreeeddd      ooonnn      FFFLLLSSSDDD      DDDoooccckkkeeettt      000999///111555///222000111555                  PPPaaagggeee      888      ooofff      111333 Itis indisputable thatthe m usicalcom position Hustlin'is an original, creati ve w ork subjectto copyrightprotection. Norcan itbe disputed thatthe lyrics ofHustlin',intheir entirety,separate and apartfrom the m usic, are subjectto copyri ghtprotection. See, e.g.,Leadsingen Inc.v.8MG Music Pub.,512 F.3d 522,527 (9th Cir.2008)(finding song Iyrics, in their entirety,were subject to copyright protection and infringement occurred when Iyrics were replicated verbatim ,in theirentirety,on karaoke machinesl; Strafchborneo v.Arc M usic Corp.,357 F.Supp.1393,1405 (S.D.N.Y.1973)(' sEc ords and m usic have been integrated in a single work, the copyright of such work as a m usicalcomposition willprotectagainstunauthorized use ofthe words orIyrics alone, as wellas againstunauthorized use ofthe m usic alone orofa com bination ofm usic and words.''). The question presented,however,is notwhetherthe I yrics of Hustlin',as arranged in theirentirety,are subjectto copyrightprotection. The question is whether the use ofa three-word phrase appearing in the m usicalcom position,divorced from the accom panying m usic,m odified,and subsequently printed on m erchandise,constitutes an infringementofthe m usicalcom position Hustlin'. The answer,quite sim ply,is thatit does not. As setfodh above,the phrase ''everyday I'm hustlin''divorced from the m usical com position Hustlin',Iike the phrases ''you gotthe rightone,uh-huhj''''holla back,''Sfwe 9et it poppin',''and 'scaught up''is d'a shod expression of the sort that couds have uniform ly held uncopyrightable.'' See Fakea//, 1993 W L 509876,at *8. ,Salinger,811 F.2d at98 (d$(A)n 'ordinary'word-com bination by itselfwillfrequently failto demonstrate even the minimum Ievelofcreativity necessary for copyrightprotection.nl;O' Brien v. Chappel & Co., 159 F.Supp. 58,59 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (1tIt is well established that 8 !aaassseee      111:::111333-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-222444777000000-­-­-KKKMMMWWW                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333333111                  EEEnnnttteeerrreeeddd      ooonnn      FFFLLLSSSDDD      DDDoooccckkkeeettt      000999///111555///222000111555                  PPPaaagggeee      999      ooofff      111333 copyright or literary rights do not extend to w ords or phrases isolated from their context.'). M oreover, Defendants have set fodh unrebutted evidence that the term s 'hustling''or''hustlin'''have been used in num erous songs priorto Plaintiff's creation of Hustlin'and thatat Ieastone song pre-dating Hustlin'has the exactIyric S 'everyday I'm hustlin''in it. (See DE 226 at4-5. ,Def.SUF.!118. ,DE 226-3 IN 6-11).Specifically,Dr. M unro states that severalsongs released priorto Hustlin,contain Iyrics such as 11 We hustlin'every G od dam ned day,''''I'm hustlin',''''I'm Iivin'everyday Iike a hustle'',and 'Every day I'm hustlin',every nightl'm hustlin'''. (See Exped Reportor Dr.Pamela Munro,DE 226-3 at66-67 % 12). Likewise,Dr.Munro's repod identifies atIeastseven songs, released prior to Hustlin',share the title ''Hustlin'''. (/d.).Such repods are appropriate considered by the Coud in evaluating the extrinsic test for substantial similarity. See Lil'Joe W ein Music,245 F.App'x at877,879 (considering defendants evidence regarding the use ofthe phrase priorto plainti ff's use and concluding that''the disputed phrase is unprotectlalble because ituses a common musicaland Iyricalphrase thathas been use in otherpriorworks.''l, 'see also Acuff-Rose Music,Inc.v.Jostens, /nc.,155 F.3d 140,144 (2d Cir.1998)(phrase thatenjoyed robustexistence in public dom ain prior to plaintiff's use in a song title and Iyrics was not entitled to copyright protectionl;Boonet206 F.App'x at33 (affirming districtcoud's finding thatd'holla back'' was not protectable and discussing undisputed evidence subm itted by defendants that thidysongs had used ''holla back''around thesame time as plaintiff'ssong). Couds regularly - without exped assistance - determ ine that specific shod phrases m ade up ofcom m on and ordinaryterm s are notentitled to copyrightprotection. 9 !aaassseee      111:::111333-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-222444777000000-­-­-KKKMMMWWW                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333333111                  EEEnnnttteeerrreeeddd      ooonnn      FFFLLLSSSDDD      DDDoooccckkkeeettt      000999///111555///222000111555                  PPPaaagggeee      111000      ooofff      111333 See Chapman,No.08 CIV.3255 (LAP),2010 W L 517480,at*4 (phrase ' llean back''in musicalcomposition was notsubjectto copyrightl' ,PredaforInt'l,Inc.v.Gamo Outdoor USA, lnc.,No.09-CV-00970-PAB-KMT,2014 W L 321069,at *3 (D.Colo.Jan.29, 2014)(phrase l iunsurpassed performance''standing alone,was notentitled to copyright protectionl;Moody v.Morris,608 F.Supp.2d 575,579 (S.D.N.Y.2009) aff' d,407 F. App'x 434 (Fed.Cir.2011)(finding thatthe trademarked phrase 'W here W ords Come Alive' 'was notentitled to copyrightprotection because ''itis axiom atic thatwords,shod phrases, titles, and slogans are not subject to copyright, even they can be trademarkedv''l, 'Davis v.W altDisney Co.,393 F.Supp.2d 839,847 (D.Minn.)aff'd, 430 F.3d 901 (8th Cir.2005)(the term d'Eadh Protector''was notcopyrightablel;Reece v.Marc Ecko Unltd.,No.10 CIV.02901 JSR DF,2011 W L 4112071,at*9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.19,2011)reportand recomm endation adopted,No.10 CIV.02901 JSR,2011W L 4069637 (S.D.N.Y.Sept.9,2011)(finding that'sdDipism'is as much an unprotectible word (even if itis nota word found in the dictionary)as $Dip'''and thatal though the words 'dip' and 'dipism ' are not them selves protectable, the plaintiff's adwork, containingthose words,was). M oreover, Plaintiffs do not assed that the phrase 'everyday I'm hustlin''' originated with them . (See genera//y DE 243). In Lil'Joe W ein,the Eleventh Circuit,in concluding thatthe phrase was a com m on,unoriginal,and noncopyrightable elem entof the com position,considered the factthatthe plaintiffhad failed to offerany evidence to suggestthatthe phrase '$Go ,it's yourbidhday' 'was originalto his com position. Lil' Joe Wein,245 F.App'x at 879-880 (distinguishing from a case where the plaintiff affirmatively asseded he was '' the creator of a common hip-hop chant''l' ,see also 1O !aaassseee      111:::111333-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-222444777000000-­-­-KKKMMMWWW                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333333111                  EEEnnnttteeerrreeeddd      ooonnn      FFFLLLSSSDDD      DDDoooccckkkeeettt      000999///111555///222000111555                  PPPaaagggeee      111111      ooofff      111333 Prunte,699 F.Supp.2d at27 (noting thatPlaintiffdid notcontend thatthe phrase ''getit poppin''' originated with him and finding that dlget it poppin''' is not protectable by copyrightl' ,Currin v.Arista Records,Inc.,724 F.Supp.2d 286,292-93 (D.Conn.2010) (finding the term ''frontin'''was a non-protectable element ofplaintils'song because evidence was presented showing term was used in hip-hop priorto plaintiffs'use and plainti#sdid notpresentevidence thattheiruse ofthe term '' frontin'''wasoriginall.4 Even ifthe phrase 'deveryday I'm hustlin'''were copyrightable,Plaintiffs stillfail the intrinsic test. The average Iay observer would not confuse t-shids bearing the phrase 'everyday l'm shufflin''' with the m usical com position Hustlin' nor, without reference to Party Rock Anthem and Hustlin',would an average Iay observerrecognize the m erchandise as having been appropriated from Hustllh'. See LII'Joe W elh,245 F. 4 Plainti ffs assert that defendants have failed to provide sufficient evidence of prior usage, contending: ''Defendants have not presented any other prior usage ofthe phrase. See, e.g., Tufhmerica,Inc.v.Diam ond,968 F.Supp.2d 588,604 (S.D.N.Y.2013)(issue is notwhether 'say w hat' is a com m on phrase now butw hether itw as a com m on phrase at the tim e ofthe recordingl.''(DE 243 at2). Notwithstanding that'e.g.'is appropriate when numerous authori ties support the proffered proposition and Plainti ffs have offered no such other authori ties, Tufhm erica, Inc. v. Diam ond is inapposite. First,that coud explicitly stated that the issue of whether 'say what''was a common phrase subject to copyright protection should not be resolved on a m otion to dism iss,w hich w as before thatcoud,but rather at a Iaterstage in the proceeding where evidence regarding its usage could be presented. Second, the court in TufAm erica,w as addressing the phrase ''say what''in the context of Iicensed m usic sam pling, not,as the Coud does here,in the contextofcopyrightseparate and apad from the m usic and the sound recording. Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that because Dr.Ferrara conducted a prior ad search in three other cases not before the Coud, but did not do so here,som e adverse inference should be drawn. (See DE 243 at 2).This argum ent is unavailing. Dr. Munro presented unrebutted evidence ofpriorusage of'hustlin''d'hustling''and d'everyday I'm hustlin'n. To the extentthatPlainti ffs contend Mr.Ricigliano's report(DE 226-3 at86-89)creates a genuine issue of m aterialfact on this point,it does not. M r. Ricigliano does notdispute that songs identified exist and contain the Iyrics identified by Dr. M unro. Rather, M r. Ricigliano attem pts to distinguish those songs on the basis that they are m elodically different. M r. Ricigliano contends thatDr.M unro's reportavoids or ignores the com bination oflyric,m elodic (pitch/rhythm)and instrumentalsimilarities between Hustlin and Party Rock Anthem. (Id.j.But thatis notthe question before the Coud.As explained supra,the Coud is not concerned with the tw o m usicalcom positions! butwith whetherm erchandise bearing the ,phrase ''everyday I'm shufflin,,, can constitute an infrlngem enton the m usicalcom position Hustlin . Itcannot. 11 !aaassseee      111:::111333-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-222444777000000-­-­-KKKMMMWWW                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333333111                  EEEnnnttteeerrreeeddd      ooonnn      FFFLLLSSSDDD      DDDoooccckkkeeettt      000999///111555///222000111555                  PPPaaagggeee      111222      ooofff      111333 App'x at 880. Notably,nowhere do Plaintiffs address substantial sim ilarity in their briefing. Indeed, Plaintiffs' briefing m akes clear that their argum ent regarding the m erchandise is predicated entirely on their position thatthe m usicalcom posi tion Party Rock Anthem infringeson the musicalcomposition Hustlin'.(See DE 243 at6 (''Itisthe com m ercialsuccess ofthe infringing song,PRA,that allows LM FAO to m arkett-shids with 'everyday I'm shufflin''on them at all,specifically based on the Iine taken from Hustlin'''j. Butthe question before the Courtis notwhetherthe t-shidscan be traced to Party Rock Anthem ,butwhetherthey,standing alone,constitute an infringem enton the copyrightto the m usicalcom position Hustlin,5 No reasonabl e jury,properly instructed, . could conclude thatthe m usicalcom position Hustlin'and the Defendants't-shids and m erchandise are substantially sim ilar. M oreover,Plaintiffs have not putforward,nor has the Coud been able to find, any statutory basis orprecedentsupporting the conclusion thata shod,m odified,setof words1 such as ''everyday I'm shufflin'''printed on merchandise can infringe on the copyrightfora m usicalcom position w hich features the Phrase ''everyday I'm hustlin'.' Indeed,anothercourt,considering Iyrics from a copyrighted song reproduced verbatim on a class ring, persuasively rejected the proposition that a m usical composition copyrightholder's rights extend as faras Plaintiff's argue here: Plainti ff in essence contends that none of its Iyrics m ay appear in com m ercial settings without its perm ission, regardless of the content of those Iyrics. But if Iwere to acceptplaintiff's position,every unoriginalphrase,once used in a m usicalcom position would allow the copyrightholdera 5The Coud does notdeterm ine whetheror notthe sale ofsuch m erchandise m ight be properly considered in a dam ages calculation i f Plaintiffs prevailon their copyright infringem ent claim s relating to the m usicalcom position Party Rock Anthem . 12 !aaassseee      111:::111333-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-222444777000000-­-­-KKKMMMWWW                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333333111                  EEEnnnttteeerrreeeddd      ooonnn      FFFLLLSSSDDD      DDDoooccckkkeeettt      000999///111555///222000111555                  PPPaaagggeee      111333      ooofff      111333 m onopoly overthe cliché's use regardless ofthe contextin which it is used in the song or in the allegedly infringing material. (Plaintifrs) copyright (in a musicalcom position) does notgrant itsuch an expansive m onopoly overm aterial in the public dom ain. Acuff-Rose Music,Inc.?.Jostens,Inc.,988 F.Supp.289,295 (S.D.N.Y.1997)afrd, 155 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 1998), 'see also O' Brien, 159 F. Supp.at 59 (''The plaintiff apparently thinks thathe can getsole rights to the use ofthe phrase dnightand noon'no matterin w hatcontextthe phrase is used.Such a com m on phrase in and ofitselfis not susceptible ofcopyright nor ofappropriation by any individual.'). Consequently,the Courtfinds thatthe phrase ' deveryday I'm shufflin'r''printed on t-shirts,standing alone, and divorced from any m usicalcom position,does notconstitute an infringem enton the m usicalcom position Hustlin,6 . 111. CONC LUSIO N Accordingly,it is hereby O RDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants'm otion forpadialsummaryjudgmenton CountIII(DE 226)isGRANTED. DONE AND ORDERED i n chambers in Miami,Flori da,this / dayof Septem ber,2015. KAT EEN M .W ILLIAM S UNITED ST TES DISTRICT JUDGE 6 As M r. John Lennon observed: 'Everybody's hustlin'for a buck and a dim e ...AIIIcan tell you is it's aIIshow biz.' Big Seven Music Corp.v.Lennon,554 F.2d 504,505 (2d Cir.1977) (quoting J.Lennon,''Nobody Loves You (W hen You're Down and Out)''(1973),recorded on the album '$ W aIIs and Bridges.''). 13