Case 7:14-cv-07044-CS-LMS Document 69 Filed 09/10/15 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MELISSA REIMER,
Plaintiffs,
- against 14-CV-7044 (CS)
TOWN OF RAMAPO, and CHRISTOPHER ST.
LAWRENCE, NATHAN OBERMAN, MICHAEL
KLEIN, LINDA CONDON, and BETH FINKELSTEIN,
sued individually and in their official capacities,

ORDER

Defendants.

Seibel, J.
Plaintiff Melissa Reimer brings this action against the Town of Ramapo (the “Town”),
and several Town employees alleging, among other things,1 that they retaliated against her for
exercising her First Amendment speech rights. Specifically, Plaintiff, who has been employed
by the Town as its Supervisor of Fiscal Services (or an equivalent position of different name)
since December 2002, (Amended Compl. (“AC”) (Doc. 55) ¶ 7), alleges that Defendants brought
false disciplinary charges against her and suspended her for complaining that the Town and the
Ramapo Local Development Corporation, a related non-profit organization, “employ[ed]
improper fiscal policies,” including fraudulently “overestimat[ing] by over thirty-two million
($32,000,000) dollars revenues [in order] to facilitate the sale of bonds,” (id. ¶¶ 198-99, 206-07).
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. 33.)
Having reviewed the parties’ motion papers, it appears to the Court that the issue of
whether Plaintiff’s speech was made pursuant to her official duties as a public employee is
                                                            
 
1

Plaintiff also brings state-law claims for defamation and abuse of process.

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potentially dispositive. Speech by a public employee is constitutionally protected only when the
employee is speaking as a citizen about a matter of public concern. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547
U.S. 410, 418 (2006). When public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties,
even on matters of public concern, they “are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.” Id. at 421. This is because “[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a public
employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have
enjoyed as a private citizen[, but rather] . . . simply reflects the exercise of employer control over
what the employer itself has commissioned or created.” Id. at 422-23. Therefore, if Plaintiff’s
statements were made pursuant to her official duties, they are not constitutionally protected and
Defendants are entitled to dismissal of her First Amendment claim.2
To determine whether a public employee is speaking pursuant to her official duties,
“[c]ourts must examine the nature of the plaintiff’s job responsibilities, the nature of the speech,
and the relationship between the two.” Ross v. Breslin, 693 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2012). While
the AC contains significant detail about the nature of Plaintiff’s speech, it provides less
information about Plaintiff’s job responsibilities, and the Court is reluctant to rule on the basis of
reasonable inferences from the AC.3 Because the Court cannot analyze the potentially

                                                            
 
2
This issue may also dispose of Plaintiff’s claims for defamation and abuse of process because if the Court
dismisses Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, it will decline in all likelihood to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over these remaining state-law claims. See Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he traditional values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity” weigh in favor of declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction where all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3)).
3

Here the Court is guided by Matthews v. City of New York, in which the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s
dismissal of a First Amendment retaliation claim because the record was “not yet sufficiently developed . . . to
determine as a matter of law whether Officer Matthews spoke pursuant to his official duties when he voiced the
complaints made . . . in the manner in which he voiced them.” 488 F. App’x 532, 533 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary

2

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dispositive issue of whether Plaintiff’s speech was made pursuant to her official duties without
more information about her duties, the Court orders the parties to engage in a sixty-day period of
discovery (under the supervision of Magistrate Judge Smith) limited to the issue of Plaintiff’s job
duties during the period of her alleged protected speech. At the close of that limited discovery
period, Defendants may renew their arguments for dismissal in the form of a motion for
summary judgment. If the case remains viable following that summary judgment motion, the
parties will be permitted to conduct full discovery on the First Amendment claim and the statelaw claims. The schedule is as follows:
1. Limited discovery to be completed by November 9, 2015.
2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment to be filed by December 9, 2015.
3. Plaintiff’s opposition to be filed by January 8, 2016.
4. Defendants’ reply to be filed by January 22, 2016.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to
terminate the pending motion, (Doc. 33.)
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 10, 2015
White Plains, New York

_________________________________
CATHY SEIBEL, U.S.D.J.

                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
order). The Circuit explained that “some discovery . . . is necessary before it can be decided whether Matthews can
or cannot pursue a First Amendment retaliation claim in this case.” Id.

3