Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General . . REPORT-OF INVESTIGATION ?"77 . I SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO CIA ACTIVITIES IN HONDURAS IN THE 19803 I August 27, 1997 - Frederick P. Hitz A. R. Cinquegrana Inspector General Deputy Inspector General for Investigations Capy_z?of30 rRet?'?Ei' ngf?gdgor 199st} . Sia??T Selected Issues Relating to CIA Activities in Honduras in the 19805 - August 27, 1997' Errata ?J?f?Paragraph 541 Para-raphs 568 and 569 SEQRET 4f TAB LE OF CONTENTS VPage a "v .1 .5 4?4" Overview of U.S.?Honduras Relations in the 19803 ...u-n ..--.- - - 1w . rn?w . - - . - CIA Policies Regarding Human Rights and Interrogations Between 1976 and 1996 ..16 PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES ..20 . QUESTIONS PRESENTED A, .222 3} FINDINGS ":24 i RANY OIHER CIA EMPLOYEE SSIONS OF OR TORTURE .1 .724 WHAT WAS THE OLANCHO OPERAIIONAND WHO WERE REYES MATAAND FATHER IAMES ..30 WHATD - PO .. CEG - veg-'- ?vga '59. . . REYES MA In DID .. i TO FOLLOW-UP CIA REPORTING THA RESPONSIBLE POR KILLING REYES AND HIS INSLIR SSL INCLLID FATHER - we, Ml DEERMNE CARNEYS FATE 1N VIEW OP REPQ OM CONGRESS AND THE CARNEY "41 {a All WHAT DO EMBASSYAND CIA PERSONNEL RECALL . REGARDING REYES MATA AND ..86 WHAT OTHER LLS. GOVERNME PORTED RELEVANT INEORMAITON REGARDING REYES MATA AND FOLLOW-LIP ON CIA REPORTING CONCERNING REYES - MATAAND WHAT DO CIA AND OIHER 11.5. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL RECALL REGARDING THIS NON- CIA .107 ii 33% . . . In-? sgcg? PROVIDED T: i COMMITMENT .163 a REPORTMISTREATMENT OP m" 1986 EITHERHEADQUARTERS OR SCI .175 DID A CIA EMPLOYEE PROVIDE STATEMENTS REGARDING THE PATE OP FATHER CARNEY TO THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE Cmla193 WHAT WERE THE PINDINGS OP THE HONDURAS WORKING GROUP DOCUMENTARY REVIEW RELATING TO POSSIBLE ACCOUNTABILITY WHAT WERE THE RELEVANT PINDINGS OP THE I INVESTIGATION LN THIS .197 '4 CONCLUSIONS .. .104 RECOMMENDATIONS ..211 My: yer GLOSSARY or TERMS AIC AOG Asset AVS CATF CIA c1c CINC CINCUSACOM CLFL CollaboratingAgent Atlantic Intelligence Command US. Army Operational Group, US. Army Intelligence and Security Command "Any individual or entity with whom CIA has an Operational relationship from which the US. Government derives benefit. Asset Validation System I Honduran Military Intelligence Central American Task Force, Latin American Division, CLA Counterintelligence Central Intelligence Agency Counterintelligence Center, CIA Commander Chief Commander in Chief, US. Atlantic Command Clearance and Foreign Liaison Section, Counterintelligence Center, CIA to tasking: 33% CooperativeLontact- - - DCI DCID DDCI DI DIA DO DOE ELACH EYES ONLY FDN FOIA [sy?r I A- person'who-w-ittingly. responds to certain tasking from controlled to the . pointthat'he/she will accept all tasking. Director of Central Intelligence . Director of Central Intelligence Directive Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Directorate of Intelligence, CIA Defense Intelligence Agency Honduran Department of National Investigations Directorate of Operations, CIA Department of Energy Honduran Anti?Communist LiberatiOn Arm A restrictive indicator used to signify that information is for the exclusive attention of . specific person. Nicaraguan Democratic Force Freedom of Information Act vi SEC - I MFR NFN NSA Honduran NatiOnal Police Force House Permanent Select Committeepn 1 Intelligence, US. Congress Hostage Rescue Force Honduras Working Group, CIA InSpector General Information Management Staff, DO Bureau ofilntelligence and Research, Department of State - US. Army Intelligence and Security Command President's Intelligence Oversight Board U.S. Joint Special Operations Command Latin America Division, DO - I Memorandum for the Record National File Number A unique number used to reference an intelligence source. National Security Agency vii NSC National Security Council OCA vorh'c'e Affairs, CLA occ Office. of General-Counsel, CLA OLL i Ofi?ice of Legislative Liaison, CLA 3 OPS Offiee?of Personnel Security, CLA PCH I Coammr Party of Honduras PCS I - 'i StaffrDOa Secure Vince; Crisis Communications Netwo-i< Central America Revolutionary Workers Par :51? - Honduran Branch SDC - Honduran Superior Defense Council 5 Sensitive Memorandum A method of disseminating intelligence to a Limited number of specific senior US. Government officials due to the extreme sensitivity of the information or source. SFC Special Forces Command, Honduran Aimed Forces SSCI Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, US. Congress - United States Commander in Chief, Southern Command USCINCACOM United States Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command SE;ng OEEICE OE INSPECTOR GENERAL WVEI STIGA TIONS STAEE REPORT OF INVESTIGATION SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO CIA ACTIVITIES IN HONDURAS IN THE 19805 (96-0125-IG) AuguSt 27, 1997 INTRODUCTION 1. (U) Baltimore Sun Allegations. .In June 1995, The Baltimore I "un published a four-part series of articles based upon the results of a r,u_rported 14?month investigation regarding the role of the United States in Honduras inthe 19805. During that investigation, Baltimore un staff correspondents reportedly obtained unclassified and declassified documents and conducted numerous interviews of US. - nd Honduran citizens. The Sun series alleged that: - 4 Hundreds of Honduran citizens suspected of subversion -. had'been kidnapped, tortured and killed in the 19805 by. a Honduran military intelligence unit, known as the 316th Battalion, that was trained and supported by the Central Intelligence Agency - knew of the crimes committed by the 316th Battalion, yet continued to support the unit'and collaborate with its leaders; CIA participated in interrogations and torture of Honduran military prisoners; - - 1 SE ET se/a?r US. Embassy, Tegucigalpa, human rights reports in the early 19805 intentionally understated abuses by. the Honduran Government; and U. S. officials deliberately misled Congress and the US. public about Honduran military human rights abuses in order to maintain US. funding for Honduras in the war against Communism in Central America. 2. Honduras Working Group Findings and Unresolved Issues. ongressional and National Security Council (NSC) interest in The Sun ?3 allegations prompted then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John M. Deutch to direct that a review be conducted of all CIA files to determine CIA's role in Honduras and whether its personnel were linked to human rights abuses there from 1980 to _1995.? The Honduras Working Group was established in July 1995 to conduct this review and published its final report in August 1996. Based upon the written record, selected interviews that were conducted by the Office of Personnel Security (OPS) on behalf of the Honduras Working Group, and responses to questionnaires that the Honduras Working Group prepared and distributed to 34 CIA officers in an attempt to resolve several issues, the review resulted in the following findings: There is no informationm CIA files indicating that CIA officers either authorized orwere directly involved in human rights abuses; The Honduran military committed hundreds of human rights abuses since 1980, many of which were politically motivated and officially sanctioned; CLA reporting linked Honduran military personnel to "death squad" activities; 2 SECAET killings, torture, disappearances, and illegal detentions; 4 CIA reporting corroborated the involvement in human rights abuses of two Hondura ersonne lag-A'n. fir. . . . . 0? reported at all "g was mentioned only A eaqarts from understanding the scope of human rights abuses in Honduras and the culpability CIA reporting to Congress in the early 19805 underestimated Honduranuinvolvement in abuses. By the mid?19803, CIA provided more detailed information to Congress, but some of the noti?cations were inaccurate. SE SI 3. (U) The Honduras Working Group briefed House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Staff members regarding its findings on August 9 and September 17, 1996, respectively. Honduras Working Group members also briefed selected officials of . the NSC, State Department, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the President's Intelligence Oversight Board. 4. (5f Based upon its review of only the written record, Limited interviews and questionnaire responses, the Honduras working Group reported to CIA Executive Director Nora Slatkin that it was unable to resolve the following key issues: - T. pf?, tab50-1-3!" -.. - @mIAemployee 5 present during sessions hostile interrogation or torture in Honduras; Wheth ailed to follow-upin reporting that Hon Seal Forces Battalion - i ad kmed insurgent - I ?tithe insurgents?- I possibly including-American priest Father James Carney; to determine what happened to Carney in view of repeated queries from Congress and - family; why; Headquarters did -.-- - .. - on a right?wing paramilitary organization that allegedly committed human rights abuses, in view of DCI Casey's commitment to the Hill to do so. In July 1996, the Executive Director requested that the Inspector General (1G) initiate an investigation to address these key issues. In August 1996, she requested that the IG also investigate alleged conflicts in the testimony given by a CIA employee to HPSCI Staff members and to OPS officers regarding information about the death of the American priest. 5. (U) In July 1996, the Executive Director also assigned a series of potential accountability issues to the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) for consideration. The accountability documents prepared by the Honduras Working Group for the Executive Director and presented to the DDO identified several issues and stated several conclusions based on the efforts of the Working Group. In August 1996," the DDO deferred these accountability issues pending the completion of this IG investigation. The potential accountability - issues that were deferred by the DDO are discussed at the end of this Report. Another memorandum was sent to the Executive Director by the head of the Working Group at the Executive Director's request. This memorandum identified specific individuals whose actions should be reviewed for accountability purposes. The Executive 1 Director also deferred action on that memorandum until this investigation was concluded. That memorandum has been sealed and has not been reviewed by IG personnel, pending the completion of this Report. - a 6.16" Scope of the Inspector General Investigation. The IG investigation has been limited to information relating to the three key issues raised by the Honduras Working Group and the conflicts in testimony that were referred to the IG by the Executive Director in July and August 1996. - SECRET BACKGROUND 7. Overview of U.S.?Honduras_ Relations in the 19805. In order to address the issues presented in this Report, it is necessary to u? -. uwh" understand the political context - - . Honduras were conducted and ho elated to the Honduran Government and its military services. - . 8. (U) The decade of the 19805 was a time of great turbulence for Honduras, Central America's poorest country and the fourth poorest in the Western Hemisphere. At the beginning of the decade, the country was ruled by a military dictatorship that was beginning to cede power to civilian political leaders. This difficult process was complicated by an unsettled external environment. .Bordered'by three stronger and sometinies hostile neighbors?El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala~Honduras has lived with the threat of - foreign attack since becoming independent. This traditional sense of foreign danger. was heightened by the establishment of a revolutionary government in Nicaragua 1111979 and the Outbreak of a leftist insurgency in El Salvador in 1981. -.The emergent threat induced Honduras to cooperate with El Salvador?~a traditional adversary?and to support the expanding armed resistance to the Nicaraguan-regimemThis deepening conunitment strengthened Honduras? traditional security ties to the United States and made it a . key player in US. Central American security policy. - 9. (U) Expanding domestic leftist silrbversive activity in the - 19805 added to Tegucigalpa's sense of vulnerability. Nicaraguan .. - support for militants of the Honduran Communist Party and several like-minded radical groups were the main sources of this political ferment. Beginning with minor bombings, these organizations - - eventually progressed to hijackings and kidnappings. In July 1983, a small unit of Nicaraguan?trained leftist guerrillas crossed the frontier between Honduras and Nicaragua. However, it was ill-equipped, lacked a domestic base of support and was quickly overcome by the Honduran Army during what came to be called "the Olancho - 6 . ss?zifr Operation.? A similar incursion in 1984 also failed to incite the conservative Honduran peasantry. Although marginal, the perceived leftist threat led to an internal security crackdown- According to human rights Organizations, a joint My?p?olice' mammary-um, ?the 316th Battalion, orchestrated a campaign of disappearances and assassinations against Honduran leftists and Salvadoran exiles that at least 100 victims. 10. (U) In 1983, under the leadership of Commander-In-Chief .- of the Honduran Armed Forces (CINC) General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, the Honduran armed forces sought to expand cooperation - with the Salvadoran and Guatemalan militaries. Alvarez's increasing militancy, however, as well as his blatant political ambitions, aroused the hostility of his colleagues, who ousted him in March 1984.- His successor, General Walter Lopez Reyes, adOpted a more reserved stance toward regional military ties and US. policy aims. He closed the Regional Military Training Center, sought to scale back the sc0pe of joint military exercises, and demanded further increases in military aid in return for Honduran c00peration with Washington. A new military assistance accord signed in May 1985 generally scaled back the Honduran commitment to assist U.S. regional military policy. SEC ooll A Odo. r. . LI Rama. l?arMartinezf?Alvare- ttended an Argentine military ac A. nous US. sposored military courses at Fort Fort Bracm North Carolina ?durin the 19505 a - 357:3 . I - - v-?r . 23} In January 1982, Alvarez became the CINC of the Honduran Armed Forces. 'fDuring the period from 1981 through his forced removal from office rival officers on March 31, 1984, Alvarez was heavily involved in, and a strong supporter of, CIA programs in Central America. After his ouster front the position of Alvarez resettled in the United States. "He later "named to Honduras and was assassinated on January 25,1982.- A group known asmthe Popular Libera?on'Movernent claimed responSibility for this act I. . q-j, - . .. . - . .. . . 1. lurHrA-vtiu. ?fl - . I I . . nae-n? CIA Policies Regarding Human Rights?and Interrogations '3 etween 1976 and 1996 . . -.- a. 40. CIA Human Rights Policies. The DC) has issued several sources of guidance since the mid?19705 that explained the ClA's policies regarding human rights to CIA employees. 05-9, 1976,: arters cable-advisedQemployees eepciall sensiti po ramifications of What the does cable also included a estion .- were to be discovere ol': intelligence or security seceb could reasonably be construed to be gross violations internationally recognized human rights. . advised in this cable that, as a general rule .4 - make appropriate efforts to vent or delay such (1 sib legal 1976. This notice stated 5pe r" a personnel were not to participate, directly or indirectly, in violations of human rights. incated a continuing process to prom a -. wading the human rights facto . . . Elements of the must be continually alert to indications that foreign governments _or individuals have taken, are taking, or . plan to take, actions that constitute gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges and trial, or other ?agrant denials of the i right to life, liberty and the security of the person. . . 44. On June 22, 1978, then?DDO John M. MCMahon forwarde a memorum to all diionnd Th?purposeo memoranum was to re Agency I .. -.- c1es on human rights and other. matters to emphasize to'DO the policies were still in effe a 56 personnelthat a (- .. A ovemher Headquarters cab i - I >nn. . 17 SE at!" sepia/er tance of resoecting 5 . . . We all must become sensitized to the imoor I. I'qu . {gut-R re equally sansmve. 9. issue x? lo become more impor ant, and we serve our best, if we remember that if we ignore the importance of the human rights issue in the final analysis we do great damage to our mission. We . A . are under great scrutiny. Aside from thelegal and policy considerations that are constant in any allegation concerning violations of human rights, we also must recognize a basic moral obligation. We are Americans and we a must reflect American values in the conduct of our business. We are all inherently Opposed to the violation of human rights. Those 1 who work with us in one capacity or another must also respect . . .g 'these values. .i 46. The January 31, .. I A . rights violations as acts of torture,, raner egrading treatment or punishment, or prolonged detention without charges or trial- It also includes causing thedisappearance of persons by abduction and clandestine detention of those or other ?agrant denial of the right to life, liberty and security ofithe person. 47; CIA Interrogation Policy. While of policy regarding uman rights were made available to ersonnel in the late 19705 and 19803, no explicit CIA poli t'ent regarding interrogations has been foun - -. 14, 1985 Headqs I: app be I egarding an interrogation policy. That cable statedInterviewing and interrogation of suspects in custody is a ?j method routinely used by police, security and intelligence services around the world. In many countries, the legal and basic rights the suspect in custody may not be given full consideration, resulting in deprivation of his/her human rights. 18 SE CIA policy is not to participate directly in nor to encourage interrogation that results in use of force, mental or physicalntorture, extremely demeaning indignities orexp?gsuresto inhumane treatment of any kind, as an CIA policy is to actively discourage the use of these methods during interrogations. g?gecshould play a positive role irtinfluencing foreign?liaison?to respect human rights. Section 20 of the January 31,199 j. entitled an Rights Violations and other Pro 4 i 2 provided guidance regarding ClA?s interrogation policy. It stated, in .3 part, that: . . . It is CLA policy to neitherparticipate directly in nor encourage interrogation that involves the use of force, mental or physical torture, extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane treatment interro ation. -. I in tiaon includes being in the foo during interrogation, sitting in an adjoining room monitoring the interrogation or providing questions while an interrogation is in progress intelligence or operational justification for indirect participation in interrogation and reasonable assurance that no human rights violations will occur. . . . The January 31, . distinguishes bemeen an interrogation and a . . . Interrogation is questioning a person who is not free to refuse to answer the questions or leave at will without fear of retribution. A person being questioned who may refuse to cooperate or leave is being debriefed,_not interrogated. 49. Present and former DD managers and officers?state that these CIA human rights-and interrogation policies. are throughout the DO. In support of this, they cite actions such as inclusion of these policies in the Career Trainee program asiexamples" of the DQ's continuing effort to ensure that its of?cers are aware of these policies. PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES 50. Three Investigators, a Research Assistant and a Secretary mitially'were assigned full?time to this investigation. The team was supplemented by_t_wo additional Investigators from January to May 1997 to assist with theresearch and interview phases of the investigation. CIA components were requested to provide copies of all internal and external documents that were relevant to the issues under investigation. This included official and soft files, finished intelligence, taskings, notes, letters, correspondence, communications, cables, and briefing books; all information regarding liaison, interaction and communication between CIA and the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of State, Department of Defense, National Security Agency, other federal agencies, and the Honduran Government and its personnel; and all relevant information concerning liaison, interaction, and communications between CIA and the US. 20 -ht' ,were documents, electronic messages, disls, tapes, notes, and other forms of recorded information. As a result of this request, the 016 Team reviewed over 112,000 pages of material in pursuit of relevant information. . .. -..-. 51. In aditi searches for eifc records were 3 conducte . accountings from January to June 1986 were reviewed. CIA policies and regulations governing human rights and participation in interrogations were also reviewed. . Army operationa 1 es were examme an epartment of State and '3 Department of Defense documents were reviewed and summarized33. E1ghty~four individuals were mtemewed during the course of the investigation, including current and former employees of and r- .. I.-. ?h .- QUESTIONS PRESENTED i 54- if!) This Report addresses the following questions: - IA employee present during sessrons of hostile interrogation or torture in Honduras? What was the Olancho Operation and who were Reyes Mata and Father James Carney? What dine ort concerning Reyes Mata and Father Came ?.Did. . to follow-up as responsible for killing Reyes Mata and his insurgents:possibly including Father Carney? task-go determine Carney's fate in VieW'Of repeated queries from Congress and the Carney family? What do Embassmersonnel recall regarding - Reyes Mata and Carney? What other US. Government assets reported relevant information regarding Reyes Mata and Carney-a - Headquarters task. 0 follow?up on non?CIA 2.2 secizsr raporting concerning Reyes Mata and Carney? What do CIA and other US. Government personnel recall regarding this non?CIA reporting? eport mistreatment of either Headquarters or visiting Did a CIA employee provide con?icting statements. regarding the fate of Father Carney to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the What were the findings of the Honduras Working Group documentary review relating to possible accountability issues? What were the relevant findings of the IG investigation in this regard? Lu.) SE: safe/er FINDINGS - - IA EMPLO r55 PRESENT URING now on roams 0ND (112445? 55. The Origin of the Allegation. lnIanuaiy1996, the Honduras Working Group sent questionnaires toEcurrentand .forrnerCIA employees who Were deemed to be in the best position to answer lingering questions regarding potential human rights abuses by Honduran officials. Qne response contained an allegation that: . - -. pesent duringan a early 19805. According all mmws-g-?r interrogati ra bein toed -- .4 56f Upon?receipt of the allegation that a . have be resent during an abusive interrogation of a prisoner, the Hondas Working Group forwarded a questionnaire to the former; I. ar - to id-1990s, she said, and it was the colleague who . reported thinforrnatin to the Honduras Workinv Group in 1996. - - .3. 'd not mentionwe name of any. - her reSponse to the Honduras Working Group H. . if? mm . . . It.? to? ?tun . a . '0 ll ?fhn A I . . ..I.s..r..fi.int\r . . .4.P?tTJI-iisiqailiilus 68. In Ilka}! 1996, at th reuest of . ?no .p -- .- eroup, tw Inv?es "Gator interviewe? The 1n erv1w cove the Ho ..V ontjnues to deny' the allegation ous t0pics Group's inquiry. During the interview, een present during an interrogation . J-x?g. tates that he never a551ste the Hondurans in conducting interrogations, either directly or indirectly, nor has he ever been involved in inflicting torture on a prisoner cannot Offer an explanation for the allegation that he partic1pa in an abusive interrogation. 27 SE 1review of cables - . re evant ormEftion. Furthermore, no indication has been found in CIA records that any CIA emplOyee participated in any interrogation or torture session in Honduras CONCLUSION ti-a temthe . Twat.? aqua '1 34-. . Hostile int WHAT was THE OLANCHO OPERATIONAND WHO WERE REYES Mara AND Jams Carma? . 74. The 1983 Olancho Insurgency. On July 19, 1983, a 96- member group associated with the Central America Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRTC) marched from Nicaragua into the Olancho Department of Honduras. The PRTC was a leftist extremist group that was originally conceived in 1977 as a regional organization comprised of representatives of the Central American countries and was initiated by the Cubans as a vehicle to spread the Communist revolution. The Honduran branch of the PRTC led by Jose Maria Reyes Mata, was abnost entirely in exile in Nicaraguade 1983-. In July 1983, the Honduran Government became aware that the other leftist extremist groups had decided at a June meeting in Mexico, attended by Reyes Mata, to begin rural guerrilla warfare. 7- 75. E) In early August 1983, the Honduran military became . aware that members of the Honduran branch of the PRTC, trained by the Nicaraguans and Cubans, had entered Honduras and were operating between the Coco and Patuca Rivers in Olancho Department. This information came from two Hondurans who had detected from the group. The defectors indicated that the group was organized into three platoons of approximately 36 individuals each. The members of the group reportedly had been issued uniforms similar to those used by the anti?Sandinista Contras so as to fool border residents into thinking that the members were Nicaraguan counter?revolutionaries. 7 76. According to informatio ;d bass '5 u. - .I a Reyes Mata, the group's leader, inte . . 111 order to recruit and train personnel within Honduras and hOped to obtain much of the support for this subversive movement from local peasants. Offensive operations by the group were to begin during September and October 1983. Reyes Mata was reported to have $100,000 to finance recruiting, prOpaganda and resupply. 30,/ SEQRET 77. SS) Much of the tactical information obtained by the US i Government regarding the Honduran military Operation acratthis I r" group was obtained from Early on, advised Headquarters that it was limiting its coverage to 3 information in order to avoid duplicative reporting 55-m- . I. 78. On August 26, 1983, the Hondurans provided i .With a list of the insurgents who were in custody. and those who were __reportedly still the field. This list contained a reference to a 2 possible priest whose name was either FaustoMilla or Guadalupe hand" was thought to be 60-65 years old. He was reportedly still in'the f- jungle. Deserters WHoi?werei?ntervieWed by - personnel stated that they had been deceived into joining the and that the group suffered from a food shortage. The guerrillas who had been i captured and who had surrendered were" suffering from severe . malnutrition and expo'sure to the elements. Honduran Special Forces Command (SFC), aided by helic0pters, patrolled the area searching for the guerrillas. 79. 58f The Honduran military found the guerrillas? base camp on September 7, 1983, and, although there was conflicting information, several guerrilla leaders were reportedly in custody and . . being questioned. Reyes Mata reportedly had separated from this i group prior to September 2. In mid?September, the Hondurans. provided-p - with an analysis of insurgent debriefings. This document discussed the infrastructure of the guerrilla group and noted that "Father Carney? had facilitated contacts between the group 1 and the civilian__p0pulation. -v 80. (Sf Although the local media reported Reyes Mata's capture on September 15, 1983, this was not confirmed by Honduran authorities. Honduran officials subsequently reported to - that Reyes Mata had ?been killed on September 18, 1983, along With four of his fellow insurgents, during an encounter with the SFC. On 31 September 19, 1983, the SFC briefed members of the national and international press on the operation and displayed several captured guerrillas and equipment. 81. Involvement of the Hostage Rescue Force. In September 1982, prompted by hostage incidents, discussions between CIA, State Department and senior Honduran Armed Forces officials had been initiated to q: cue Force - . 82. CIN Alvarez and the then?Chief of Inteence for the . crte the "Special Squadron" or "Commando Operaciones Especiales" (COB). The unit was subordinate to the then?newl creted SFC that . Squdro", although -reporting re?ects that commanded this sub?unit. HRF training was held at La Venta military camp, which also served as SFC Headquarters. . 1 'two weeks of st 1983all uding those who were undergoing HRF training, were deployed to Olancho Department in orde Ho ticia -. rgent operation Var unit and it was believed Alvezaoncl 5 - kept him abreast of __the in early September 1983, 7-5: eriodically obtained intelligence from -- ads-gnaw. ers SF concerning the status of the Olancho Operation and the debriefing of a captured guerrilla, and inSpected equipment confiscated by the Honduran military. 5 84. ,(Sf Who was Reyes Mata? According to CIA records, Jose Maria Reyes Mata was a Honduran physician and long?time pro- . Cuban who used the aliases of "Chema" and "Pablo Mendoza." Reyes Mata attended medical schools at the Autonomous University of - Honduras and Havana University. He joined the Communist Party of Honduras (PCH) in 1956 and received guerrilla training in Cuba in 1962.. In 1964, he supplied food, medical supplies and information .concerning. the Honduran military to guerrilla groups in Guatemala. . In 1969, Reyes Mata was involved with guerrilla activities in Bolivia. . 85.4635 Reyes Mata was arrested in Nicaragua for attempting to buy arms but was later released. He also was reported to have arranged guerrilla training for Hondurans in Nicaragua at a training camp staffed by Cuban paramilitary instructors. Reyes Mata returned to Honduras and was imprisoned in connection with the i April 1980 kidnapping of a US. citizen working in Honduras. Reyes Mata had also participated in the firebombing of a San Pedro Sula - a . textile factory. . 86.18)] In September 1980, Reyes Mata was freed under an amnesty program in Tegucigalpa and subsequently became the 1 leader of the In early August 1983, the Honduran intelligence service notified US. Embassy personnel that Honduran guerrillas, led by Reyes Mata and trained in Cuba and Nicaragua, had entered Olanch 3. IV: with the intention of establishing an encampment. . I . October 1983 and June 1995 indicate that Reyes I a a I tured in the course of the Olancho . Operation and executed b)_vhile in the custody of i the Honduran military. . ?f 87. (U) Who was Father Carney? According to media . accounts, James Francis Carney was born in 1924 in Chicago, Illinois and served in World War II. In his 30's, Carney entered: the I priesthood and joined the Jesuit order. In 1964, Carney became a parish priest in the Honduran town of El Progreso and decided to call himself Padre Guadalupe, or Padre Lupe. Carney became committed. . to the plight of peasants, known as campesinos, and an activist for their cause. This resulted in his becoming a controversial figure Within Honduras, including accusations that he was a Communist. In mid?1968, the Honduran Government attempted to deport Carney because of his activism. Then-US. Ambassador to Honduras John Iova reportedly interceded and Carney was allowed to continue his activities in the country. On December 14, 1973, a decree was issued naturalizing Carney as a Honduran. He renounced his US. citizenship on May 14, 1974. In 1979, Carney had a diSpute with the leadership of the National Campesino Association (ANACH) that he accused of using strong?arm tactics, engaging in corruption and receiving support from the US. Embassy and CIA. Carney supported an insurgent candidate for AN ACH president. The Honduran Government considered Carney to be a radical leftist agitator and he was stripped of Honduran citizenship and deported on November 17, 1979. 89. (U) After a short stay in the United States, Carney began working in Nicaragua. According to media reports, Carney and an insurgent force of 96 individuals led by Reyes Mata crossed the Coco River from Nicaragua in mid?July 1983 in the hope of launching a Honduran revolution. During a September 19, 1983 Honduran Government press conference, it was announced that "Padre Guadalupe," who was known to the insurgents as "Companero 7 Mario," had apparently died of starvation after the guerrillas ran out of food. 34 1 SEC 91. The Embassy arranged for the Carney family to meet with the second-ranking officer in the Honduran military?the Chief of Staff?and approximately 20 of the captured guerrillas. The captured insurgents interviewed by Carney's family and according to the DOS, indicated that the priest had become progressively weaker during the march through the jungle and that individual guerrillas had been assigned to assist him. He was reportedly last seen alive on August 30, 1983. 92. (U) During US. Consul General interviews with the captured guerrillas?all of whom claimed that they had deserted from the insurgency-4t was learned that the priest was known to them as "Companero Mario." Many of those interviewed knew of "Padre? Guadelupe" from his work, including educational radio broadcasts. One individual had recognized the priest from a Honduran newspaper article and one knew him from past association at a parish in El Progreso. The Consul General presented a newspaper photograph of Carney to the captured guerrillas and all con?rmed - that this was the priest who had accompanied them. I 93. (U) One of the guerrillas who deserted on August 20 stated that Carney had said that he could not proceed much further and that the march was killing him. Another deserter who saw Carney on as 51-th span/gr August 30, 1983 described the priest as "cadaverous" in appearance and requiring the assistance of others to continue. Several captured insurgents commented that they did not know how he could still be alive, but none could con?rm Carney's death or attribute it to the harsh jungle conditions. None of the interviewed guerrillas had witnessed any combat with the Honduran military. 94. (U) The US. Embassy in Tegucigalpa obtained from the Honduran Government and provided to the Carney family religious items believed to have belonged to the priest, and continued to seek answers to the family members? questions after their departure from . Honduras. In mid-October 1983, the Honduran Government advised in a diplomatic note that it had not located Carney's body, nor did it accept responsibility for the welfare or whereabouts of the priest since he had not entered the country legally. 95. (U) The August 4-11, 1984 edition of The Nation magazine published an article entitled "The Mysterious Death of Father - Carney" that described the efforts by the Carney family to learn details surrounding his fate. The article also contained allegations that US. intelligence and military personnel took part in the counterinsurgent Operation and may have been present when Carney died. It was alleged that a deserter from the group, who was subsequently "shot trying to escape," had talked to his relatives during a prison visit regarding certain events that were alleged to have taken place at El Aguacate Air Base- His story was provided to. the Christian Human Rights Commission of Honduras. That group later released this information and alleged that US. advisers identified as "Lieutenant West Blank" and "Major Mark KelVi" were directly involved in torture and interrogation that culminated in the murder of Carney and other revolutionary leaders. These actions were purported to have occurred-in underground cells at El Aguacate. According to The Nation, no further evidence had come to light about the CIA's presence at El Aguacate and US. officials declined to make any comments. 96. (U) In response to an October 1, 1984 letter to DCI Casey from Carney?s family, the Agency's Director of Public Affairs sought to assure the family members that CIA had no involvement in the fate of the priest as alleged in The Nation. With reference to the . purported involvement of "West Blank? and "Mark Kelvi," the family was advised that it was CIA policy not to confirm or deny the employment of Specific individuals. In a January 3, 1985 letter to the '5 Carney family, the Agency's Director of Public Affairs advised that ."Blank" and "Kelvi" were not employed by CIA. Previous CIA Investigations Regarding Carney 97; Office of General Counsel's 1988 Investigation. 5 A March 24, 1988 report prepared by CIA's Office of General Counsel (QC-3C) summariZed its review of the circumstances surrounding the - '1983 disappearance of Carney and the Agency's handling of his family's 1984'Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requestf This review was prompted by a January 4, 1988 letter to then?DCI William Webster suggesting that CIA had been involved in Carney's - disappearance and that CIA had information in its possession concerning his fate. On February 4, 1988, Carney's family filed a 1' lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against CIA several other agencies alleging violations of the FOIA. was based upon a review of documents and conversations with DO personnel who were familiar with the 2.7: - issue or Carney's disappearance. The review found that information in IA's ossesson concerning Carney was obtained from a "i ~c ebriefing of deserters in Honduras, - i oduran military?officials and press re orts. . One or the deserters who talked in? -. mentioned that a priest was with the group and was in especially poor physical condition due to starvation. The deserter offered his opinion that the priest did not live much longer after the deserter had left the group. i. 37 l? 7 was informed by the Hondura' a badly decomposed body in the jungle with religious effects nearby. The Honduran military did not attempt to recover this body, and that of two others found in the vicinity, reportedly because of the terrain and the Honduran rnilitary's desire to pursue the group. It had been concluded that the body near the religious articles was that of a priest, presumably Can?eY- . . - L. . that a representative of -. res onse informatin Ce 5 portedly understood that most nova-57ormtion Came from 7 . The Nomination him 3 obtained by i. . A . indicated thatCarney did of starvation. infoation ha reportedly been shared with interested members-ofCongress. - 101.467 The OGC review concluded that CIA was not in planning or carrying out the Olancho Operation, had no connection with Carney and had learned of his fate after the fact. The OGC review further concluded that the information that had been reviewed strongly suggested that Carney died of starvation. Finally, the OGC review concluded that CLA's handling of the Carney family's FOIA requests was consistent with standard CIA procedures, and applicable case law. 102. (U) DCI Webster advised the Carney family in an. April 7, 3 1988 letter of the OGC conclusions that CIA did not know exactly what became of Carney and that he most likely perished in the Honduran jungle from starvation and exposure. The DCI's letter also advised that CLA had no evidence or information indicating that Carney had been tortured or murdered. The Carney family replied in .- an April 26, 1988 letter that they continued to believe that Carney $9941" was executed at El Aguacate with . . CIA knowledge, complicity, if not actual involvement. . . 3 investigate the matter. and that the DCI should further 103. (U) CIA's Office-of Inspector General's 1988 Investigation. In response to a June 5, 1988 New York Times Magazine article containing allegations by Florencio Caballero, a former member of the Honduran military, CIA Inspector General William Donnelly initiated an investigation on June 9, 1988. Caballero alleged CIA complicity in human rights abuses perpetrated by the Honduran military. In one specific claim, Caballero indicated that he had been trained in interrogation techniques by CIA and had interrogated - interviewed 21 indiviua 'includin CIA Offi responses to congressional inquiries also were reviewed, as was - Carney. Additionally, Caballero claimed that the priest and 70 2 captured guerrillas had been executed. - 104. (67 In the course of the 1988 investigation, IG rsonnel the March 1988 OGC report concerning the circumstances of Carney's disappearance. 105. (U) The August 24, 1988 Report of Investigation that was issued at the end of the OIG inquiry concluded as to the Carney issue 1 that CIA learned of Carney's fate only after the fact and that the priest's death resulted from starvation. The OIG Report also indicated that information available to CIA concerning Carney's fate had been provided to Congress in 1983-1984. 106- (U) The SSCI was not satis?ed with the 1988 OIG investigation's findings regarding CIA's alleged complicity in human nights abuses in Honduras and subsequently conducted its own investigation into that lssue. During this process, follow?up questions were directed to CIA and Caballero testified before the SSCI. Transcribed testimony before the SSCI in November 1988 indicates that Caballero told the Committee that, contrary to the 39 WET statements attributed to him in the June 5., 1988 New York Times article, he . . did not see Father Carney, meet him, nor interrogate Ill . J1- MALTA AND HIS i forwarde .5 is 3 - The arcle re orted the death inan ambush of Reyes Mata and, according to? the . . presumed death by starvation . of another leader of the group, former Jesuit priest Guadalupe PORT CONCERNING REYES MALTA . FAIL TO CIA AS RESPONSIBLE FOR KILLING REYES . . . -. SSLY INCLUDING FATHER 11 FAIELV .. . m? .h {fur-g? la-dl': 0. PROM CONGRESS AND THE CARNEY Relevant Reporting, Follow-up and Ta'sking Regarding Reyes Matagand Father Carneysue .Q. _.Carney." 108:; ii?heiEl Tieinpo article also cited an unspecified i Hondurarig'AE?my spokesman. who was located in Nueva Palestina and involved in the Olancho Operation as reporting that ReyesMata had died in combat.? His body could not be recovered since the location was inaccessible and the patrol that had killed him had not yet left the jungle. Reyes Mata, described as thin due to the shortage of food, was identi?ed by the patrol as he was well known and had unmistakable characteristics. Pictures and fingerprints of the insurgent were taken. for use. in. media. - additional summaries of32 - -, 3,1. 109i - According to the El Tiempo article of September 20, 1983, deserter; said that ffFather Guadeloupe Carney" had died of I - ection are only those that include information relating to Reyes Mata or Fa hr Cae. .. a ert of Investigation contains - -. . .0 .- n. .I-o starvation at the end of June 1983 in an area called Somotines between Bocay and Tablazo. The deserters further indicated that "they had to carry Father Guadeloupe for two days but ?nally he died, given his serious condition due to inanition.? The article gave a synopsis of Father Guadalupe's service in Honduras, his deportation 2 I from that country, his eventual travel to Nicaragua, and his return to 'l the United States in 1979 where he recovered his US. citizenship. g; ?11 .J 110468? According mfg-3? j_ guerrillas had been killed 1 in encounterswith theH'onduranArmy, 23 had been captured or deserted, 1'0?were reported to have died of starvation the I mountains and one was reportedly-executeduby the guerrillas. '1 Another guerrilla was believed to have returned to Nicaraguaess (AP) story of same day cocrning eiican priest who had joined leftist -- guerrillas [and] died of exhaustion while trying to??ee Honduran . troops." The AP story stated that "Colonel Cesar Elvir Sierra said that James Francis Carney, 48, a 'Roman Catholic priest from St. Louis, died while trying to escape with a rebel force in the jungles of Olancho Province during a government sweep of a mountainous'area near the Nicaraguan border." Elvir also reported that Reyes Mata had been killed during the operation. 112. We AP story stated that Carney, a Jesuit priest, had been expelled from Honduras in 1979 after being accused of trying to organize a peasant revolt. Sources at the Jesuit Missouri Province in St. Louis were cited as saying that their records showed Carney was still a member of the es nd ad been reassied to the Central Carney's ight respond to anticipate congressional queries. . I Ix.) - . . we - . . - - Vise ble informati concerning Carney led to the eptember 21, 1983 ?mm- . ho confirmed that -- authories did not know where 'to and that there was very little likelihood that the body would be ?found. What was known of Carney's fate had reportedly been provided by one of three deserters who were involved in a news conference at ueva Palestine on September 19, 1983. I 114. he deserter reported at ueva Palestina that Carney had been weakened by starvation to the point that he had been unable to walk for two days: As a result, he was beincr carried in. -. relays by the stronger of the remaining guerrillas . commented that it was unlikely that this could have continued for long since all in the group were near starvation. The three deserters reported'last seeing Carney deep in the Cordillera Entre Rios. I .dvisedfthat . 115. hical information 3 contained in the September 21, 198 .- extent of its knowledge concerning Came 3 that, under the name of "Guadalupe," Carny a wr1 en a book on the Honduran peasant movement that was published in Nicaragua I. and Cuba. In September 1981, Carney reportedly attempted to obtain guerrilla traininor but was denied the opportunity, possibly because bioap of his agapeferenced a DOS message stating- that . Carney's sis er a inquired about her brother and gave his birth year as either 1927 or 1930. The Embassy had no information that Carney had reacquired his US. citizenship. - - 117. 6) indicated that it did not have the resources - to devote to the tas requested by egroponte and that the US. military had devoted ention of three officers to report on 4 - theOlancho Operation if; ad stopped extracting and refining key information . *luminous material US. military had already reported the same information - 23, 19suable. ?advised that it agreed in principle to the idea of focused sf lano ?errilla carrying out a more moVement. that task was accomplished, a decision would be made reg 0 whether additional efforts were warranted. '119.\M8eptember 28, 1983 Headquarters Memorandum. ClA's OLL forwarded a eoand to theiDirector'ate of Operations .27., . ?mum? mm: that Chairman Edward P. Boland of the HPSCI was personally interested in CIA information concerning the fate of Carney. HPSCI Chief Counsel Michael O'Neil reportedly advised that the DOS had indicated that the Honduran Government claimed not to know about - 7 Carney's fate. - - 12-0. Lil-October 3, 1983 Headquarters Memorandum. The Acting Chief of pre ared a draft response to Boland's inquiry. The draft indicate . eporting substantiated yr the press accounts of Carney's death and that Honduran debriefings of deserters revealed that Carney had been weak and died of starvation. The Hondurans also believed that there was little likelihood that his body would be recovered. The draft response, whose final disposition is unknown, was forwarded through DO components to OLL. 121. 187 October 6, 198": I ., eptember 22,1983re l-concerrung the Olancho insurgency . a avele toecigal a. On October 6, he reported his ?ndings 7 reviewed documents isg of cisf unmarke maps; general lessons on guerrilla warfare; lists of medical supplies; inventories of equipment carried by some members of the group; guides to explosives and incendiary devices; books and other material on Marxism-L?minism, "capitalism and political economics; pamphlets on how to reconcile Marxism and Christianity; the diary belonging to Reyes ?Mata; lists of radio frequencies; an apparent code; lecture notes; and personal material such as poems and songs. 12.6.noted in the cable that the 88?page diary found i on Reyes Mata was missing pages 75?82 and recorded the hardships, 5 lack of food, desertions, and personal disappointments of the author. 'pad the opportunity to interview several of the deserters and escribed them as young, uneducated and somewhat disoriented. "_They all claimed to have been tricked into participating in the 3 guerrilla Operation. 123. 487/1n that the documents, - debrie?ngs, local studies, and the deserters themselves all demonstrated little cause to devote time and resources to a mbre in? depth analysis. Although it was likely that additional attempts at guerrilla infiltration would occur, he believed that there were insufficient documents or high level deserters to warrant additional esources at that time. According to the Hondurans, only three 45 SE ES {lilT check for any additional documen igbe uncovered in this 5- a, or other cachesinsurgency as crushed that it failed to become a - This was in part due to bad planning by the guerrillas, but . . also Honduran Airmobile . . -- .oein'.> 4had received information indicating that PRTC guerrillas WED had been captured by the Honduran Armed Forces in 5- Olancho Department had been summarily executed by Honduran Anny officers after being debriefed. Among those'executed was i Reyes Mata, his Deputy Commander ?Commandante Zaata," and a Nicaraguan advisor,WhoLh'ad accompanied the guerrilla force: The If T?executions reportedly were initiated-after the "field commander" in. I Olancho?not otherwise identified?received an order from the Armed Forces General Staff to f'search and destroy." This -, order was construed as meaning that no prisoners were to be taken alive? The order came after 23 prisoners had been captured and evacuated from the area- I I 128. The executions reportedly were carried out by of?cers I in an isolated area away from?the enlisted troops. The deaths were later reported to the media as ha 5" guerrillas resisting capture the justification within the vincr occ of the - *tated that tarry or xecutions was that the initial 23 low-level and ideologically uncommitted guerrillas who had deserted or been taken prisoner were sufficient for exploitation purposes. The remaining guerrillas were judged to be dedicated revolutionaries who were beyond rehabilitation. It was also reasoned that the combination of impotent Honduran law and the protestations of leftist peace groups would result in the early 3 release of the guerrillas who would then resume their activities. sometime between September and earlyOctober 1983, guerrillas were captured and then executed by the Honduran Armed Forces. Three of theSe guerrillas had been debriefed and displayed for the international news media at a press conference held in ueva Palestina: The families of the three guerrillas were beginning to inqirire about their family members' whereabouts. As a result, the Honduran military hierarchy recognized that it now would face the threat of a disastrous international scandal for human rights violations. 131. CINC Alvarez had reportedly told officers involved in the counterinsurgent Operation that he did not expect any more deserters from the remaining guerrillas in the area. The CINC further stated that any guenillas turning themselves over to the authorities at this stage of the Operation would be doing so because they were dying of hunger." It was not known whether the CINC had ordered the executions or lower ranking 'officers had taken it upon themselves to issue such an order. 132. After being executed,'some of the guerran bodies were deposited in the Patuca River and were beginning to wash 1 . ashore in populated areas. The Honduran mihtary disclaimed .- knowledge relating to these bodies. .. - reportedly believed that . . pie ofdays before being executed, but 5 he had no evidence to 511 ort this beef. Regarding the documents 9.. l: . tated that the diary had been a I sing pages ,were removed by 136. 153 October'- iiBased on the reporting from oncernmg prisoner executions in Olancho, CIA included 11 this topic in the President's _eported that at least three, and possibly as many as nine, prisoners had been executed after Honduran ?eld units captured and interrogated members of the Cuban?trained guerrilla-force that infiltrated from Nicaragua in July 1983.? - - 137. The Carney family gas-noted. to be pressing the US. Embassy in Tegucigalpa and local?ciifficials for'iriformatjon on the priest's fate and planned to bring the case to congressional attention. An analytical comment indicated that exposure of the incident would focus sharp criticism on Tegucigalpa, which had one of the region's best human rights records. 51 sg?gsr 141. Additionally, the Alvarez correspondence addressed ?2 issues relating to Carney family requests for a chronology of the insurgents' activities, tactical and administrative information I regarding the insurgents and more details on the death of Reyes Mata. With regard to Reyes Mata, it was indicated that he was killed' in a confrontation with the "Patuca Task Force" on September _18 near 5' Piedras Aznles. Alvarez indicated that the Hondurans did not have confirmation that Carney participated in the insurgency although the guerrillas at the press conference mentionedthat he may have died of hunger. Alvarez indicated that he would meet with the Carney .family, without the presence of the media, if a requestwere properly I submittedits reporting =-from Qctober 16 to 31, 1983 and advise i -- at the reports the executions of insurgents addressed a topic of, 'raded considerable interest to the intellience communi were . ,as "excellent" and "good." - Wprovided information that appeare a ovember 25, 1-9 Tribumz neWSpaper article. The article reported that some parents of -- ?a the guerrillas were beginning to protestbecause the Honduran authorities would not allow themto visittheir sons: Additionally, the article indicated that three of the guerrillas who had been . presented to the news media previously had been killed on October 3, 1983 when they reportedly attempted to escape. :2 . 144. (,S?PNovember 29, 1983 Intelligence Report" reported that, as of mid-November 1983, CINC Alvarez had initiated 53 ssg?r \x moans: 0m 9m mEmMmm 9mm 9n 9m: Sno?m 9m 05590 mamob it .I P. me . [It Hawm 150. 6 March 1, 1984 Headquarters Memorandum. - . a. According to a March 1984 OLL Memorandum for the RecOrd, a 'c0p of a Eebma:ry23 letter addressed to Congressman Broomfield from Virginia Smith, Carney'sgsister, had beenforwardgd to PCS, for comment in?preparation-for? respohl?'? i . to Broomfieldi?The letter alleged carney was interrogated-f . Ii- tortured and at El Aguacate; The letterfurther - alleged that Carney?s interrogation was witnessed by US. military and CIA perSonnel and _Alvarez. Ms. Smith detailed her family's efforts?jin determining'thekircumstances of the priest's fate . f. and asked that 'B'room'?eld investigate the incident. I .5 - .151; ?65-;March 2, 1984 Headquarters Memorandum. An OLL Membrandu?for the Record?described a meeting between HPSCI I Staff member Steve ?l3erry and LA Division Chief .Duane Clanidge._ i Berry reportedly advised that the minority members of the and House Foreign Committee'were concerned about the I February 23, 1984 letter from carn'?'yis sister to Broom?eldl', According to the memorandum, Clarridge explained that LA was collecting information concerning Carney. Clarridge also told -: Berry that?the' letter was not accurate and that inSurgerits .- deserted the group had stated that Carney was'emaciatedand in a weakened ?condition; The Honduran Army had subsequently-.3 discoy'ered a body of 'a non?Central American that was in' a hammock religious literature near the corps?,? -- a i Putting all the stated, the . Hondurans concluded that the body was that Qt Carney, No effOrts 1 were-made to recover the body at _of discoveryand later I efforts 'to?locat'e it allow . Agency 9f?CE??mh0 had interviewed Meei'o?f the'deserters, to brief Broomfiel on what he had learned about Carney's fate. 56 SEC U3 ['11 152,6 'March 2, 1984 Headquarters Memorandum. In an {apparent response to inquiries by DCI Casey, CATF's Special Assistant provided Chief, with information concerning the rOlancho Operation and Carney. The meodum, drawn from i8eptember 22, 1983 and October 6, 198 eports concerning Carney and the Olancho Operation, state. reviews of captured :documents, debriefings of the insurgents and Honduran studies - 1 demonstrated little cause for devoting time and resources to a more in-depth anal sis. Regarding Carney, the memorandum state '47? ad substantiated press accounts that Carney had died of starvation. Additionally, prisoner debriefings conducted by the Hondurans revealed that the priest had been carried in relays by I the stronger members of his group. Finally, it stated that the Hondurans believed that there .was little likelihood that the priest's body wOuld be found. 153.j8fMarch 13, 1984 Headquarters Memorandum. On I March 13, 1984, a meeting was held between Congressman Broomfield, House Foreign Affairs Committee Minority Staff Director Everett Bierman an The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Carney. A arch13, 1984 OLL Memorandum for the Record re ared by an OLL representative who also attended indicated that poke for about 20 minutes based on his travel to Honduras, and advised that the deserters had said that the group ran out of food and became primarily concerned with survival rather than anti? . regime activities. aid he learned from the deserters that, three days before the deser'ters left the group, the priest was in such poor physical condition that he had to be carried. The deserters, said ??doubted that Carney had survived. I 154. 3' According to the Memorandum for the Record- also said he had learned from the Honduran military that it had come across a body of a non-Central American lying in a hammock. The body was badly decomposed and it was difficult to determine the individual's identity. As some religious materials were found near the hammock, it was assumed that the body was that of the priest. 57 1" SW Because access to the area was very difficult, the Hondurans made no effort to recover the body. When the Honduran Government realized .. that the priest was an American and that his family was seeking his body, it made an unsuccessful effort to relocate it. 155. Broomfield reportedly explained that he had, . attempted to obtain from Smith the evidence of US. Government complicity in Carney's death that she claimed to have in her r, possession. However, she had refused to provide such information. r- . - -- v- .zmu-rl I i 156. 1984 4.- equested I . - til-7:252? - copy of an article entitled 3? ysterious Death of Father Carrie August 4?11, 1983 edition of The Nation newspaper. I tated that the article 5? indicated that two US. military intelligence officers?one named were involved in the Olancho Operation and that a CIA officer at Aguacate was called "Wescito," meaning "Little Wes." Prompted by a second letter from the Carney family to DCI asey, dated December 5, 1984 - as asked whether it was aware of "Colonel, Major, or 157. MDecember 31, 1984. I West Blank, in charge of US. r. Intelligence at Aguacate, where [Carney] was held; and Major Mark- Kelvi, second in command there." It was requested that_ -i - mediatl if anyone ?tting these descriptions during the period of Carney's urn-1.. pu- .3. 158. Manuary 1, 198 'j ?o response to the December 31, 1984 . 241w; 1.357337 - dvised that Ca was never held specifically at El Aguacate or anywhere else. . did not comment on the individuals referenced as "West an "Mark Kelvi." 159. ?(January 3, 1985 Headquarters Memorandum. In response to the Carney family's December 5, 1984 correspondence to 58 55931? -- DCI Casey, the Director of Public Affairs wrote that the perception ("that CIA had information that it was unwilling to share with the family was incorrect. The family was informed again that CLA was r_not involved in Carney's disappearance. Moreover, the family Was told that "Blank" and "Kelvi" were never employed by CIA. The family was referred to DOS for assistance in seeking information from {Tithe Honduran Government. 160. 63 March 20,193 was i informed that CATF continue re "Mm cve congressrona inqs _concerning the alleged commission of human rights excesses by the Honduran Government and FDN. As a result, CATF was attempting . to determine the validity'and scope of these reported abusesby ?surfacing as many specific cases as possible. Relevant Headquarters? 1,1981 were being reviewed I- - - . information as possible -regarding a number 0 individuals, including several clergymen who had been killed in Honduras. Camey's name was not included. I . 161. 58f reporting relevant to the fate of Father Carney or Reyes Mata has been found to have been generated between March 1985 and May 1995. tted an FOIA request in - ?the past cit,? advised when more Electronic Messaaes .. . .- -- . ?nk-163. {83? une919 . I I WI questd a status report and sear or records 1 reatin to the family's 1988 FOLA Litigation. A response from the Directorate of Administration's Information, Privacy and . 59 y?r 5% if- Classification Review Division indicated that 19 documents, consisting of 87 pages, had been released to the family. The FOIA . litigation initiated by the family in 1988 had been closed on May 30, i 1991. . 164. 0 June 12, 1995' Headquarters Draft Response. prepared a draft reply to certain allegations made in a June 8, 1995 letter from CongreSsman Robert G. Tonicelli, HPSCI, to the National Security Advisor. Tonicelli's letter asserted that information he . received indicated that Carney had been captured, held at E1 . 3- Aguacate for interrogation by the 316th Battalion, ?own by helicopter . to mountains near the Patuca River, and throWn out. Tonicelli?s i letter also alleged that the Honduran military officer responsible for I Carney's execution was a paid CIA agent. Additionally, the letter indicated that US. intelligence officers were present at the mee?ng when CIN Alvarez ordered Carney captured and also at Carney's interrogation. Torricelli had also posed questions concerning Carney 2 . to CIA of?cers during a May 23,1995 briefing of HPSCI members on Guatemalan issues. I - no?; 165. The 130/ LA draft reply indicated that the DO had no relevant information after 1987, but that the DI was being tasked to review its records for additional information. The Tonicelli allegations had not been corroborated a LA review of the 1988 OIG Re ort?f estiationpaper on the 316th Battalion, according to and 130/ LA considered the Torricelli allegations to be a restatement of charges that had been made on several occasions since 1984. DCI Deutch advised the National Security Advisor on June 23, 1995 regarding the Torricelli allegations that CIA only learned of Carney's death after it occurred. . 60 ?r 166. J6) A June 28, 1995 letter to Torricelli from CLA's Director got Congressional Affairs formally responded to the questions that i had been posed by Tonicelli at the May 23 brie?ng and in his June 8, ,r 1995 letter. ThefreSpon'se, based on" the 130/ LA draft, "State'd'that a review of available information indicated that CIA had no knowledge of any plans to capture?Carney, only learned of his likely death after (it had occurred, and had no direct or indirect involvement in his death. The letter also stated that the circumstances surrounding Carney's death remained uncertain, but that the 1988 016 a investigation had found no CIA involvement in the matter. The letter . further noted that the 1988 OIG Report of Investigation had been reviewed by both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees and that they did not take issue with the sections relating to Carney. -- 'Finally, thehletter stated that CLA had been directed by DCI Deutch to undertake a review of CLA records that might bear on possible allegations of human rights abuses during the relevant period; eportedly provided details of the 1983 OlanChO . - ?may: ?again? - Operan, in eating that the insurgents were tired, hungry and too . weak to offer resistance and that capture en ere "v ocers, pssibly of?cers were .- mettle, but 'some refused to take part. The SFC reportedly executed 70 of the insurgents in the vicinity of the Patuca River, 20 more . eared" and the-rest were presented to the press. . :gva?ri-ht "Janat, according to a Honduran - tary report itten at?the time of .. 3 the Olancho Operation, Carney was Suffering from malariaormaon cocerrun a ea Reyes Mata, Carney's absence from the group when it encountered the SFC, and the Honduran a 's blif that he assuffering . from malaria ed I, new. I requested ent to feet to as to why theweeg advised of information regarding a 1983 event. 3 - ., . -- - if indicated that both REyes Mata and Carney had'died of starvation and malaria and that there had been no confrontation between the insurgents and SFC. The analysis was based on information that initially appeared in the press and did not draw upon first?hand 3? accounts from the participants in theOlancho Operation. Then?omadonwas? as-an Intelligence Reporta .- .11uni-f .- c1 at henot know of ey's fate, that the priest had separated from the main group as was?rorted "the q' of?cial Honduran version of the incident. instructions as to the conclusions he'should reach and that Honduran Military Intelligence intended to use the analysis to influence public opinion. th? as Working Group, Eu: any indication . . . . a. additional information relating to amey; .. or 178. (5(Iuly 14, 199S?Intelligence Report a an additional account of Camey's death .- .. at aeabeen 64?: SE l? . . . .u . (sh-31: . -.. r_she ha rece1ve_ insurgents Carney at the time of his capture. It was not specified Whether these A witnessed the killing of Carney or had only heard . insurgents it. i? had been ptur 'l v- i - I killed we in Hondur cdy- . . . .u ..0. "HO-?uwoov: for alleged huma r1 ts abuses~?dob- - i - .- .. . ..- . . . . .. y?hf1984 ecscoplaint,'Ra been killed during an encounter with Honduran Special Forces. The 1984 com an alleged participant in the encounter, accuse of L. . in removing approximately $15,000 from the bodies of several insurents an ot submt?ng the 7" money to his superiors. elievedr 3 that all documents related 0 the encounter, including the Ethics complaint, had probably been destroyed. . . - 3.. ~Mata and Carney. He sa? had been id by ?iends the military that Came was killed. clicated that 7? oa on and added to that ?fm?egarding the ethics complaint. . 15, 1995 Intelligence Report. The information 1983 US. Arm intelligence and Command . .. Army Operations Group (AOG) information4 to form a .- single intelligence report. Theintelligence report indicated that -- INSCOM had no record of disseminating the 1983 A06 information. i This information concerned the execution of Reyes Mata by . Carney's body being covered by leaves and left A. in the jungle a young guerrilla. Additionally, the combined intelligence report ated that the Honduran Inspector General 1 was investigating dividing among his troop money seized in the course of Olancho Operation. Headquarters 4 (C) The ADC information is dismssed in detail in the next section of this Report of investigation. . . . .- p-Q-o--..-. a. I- . . . 186. September 14, 1995 Congressional Notification. Members of the SSCI, HPSCI, Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, and the National Security Subcommittee of the House Committee'on Appropriations were notified by CIA officials on September 14, 1995 regarding CIA c: reporting relating to the death of Carney. According to a September 14, 1995 Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA) backoro a er the CL had received one report if?? indicating that Carney was ed during encounters betw military and the insurgent group. A second repormdicated that Carney was tortured to . f. death an membere the Hondurans. Other scenarios in earlier reports were that Carney had starved to death or was thrown from a helic0pter. The CIA officials reportedly indicated that the Agency had not been able to establish or rule out any of these - . . -. 2,0 was i "1 accounts. The CIA of?cials also noted that a full report of the review rof CIA activities in Honduras would be provided to the Committees 1 when completed. 1 187. (gr/October 11, 1995 Congressional Notification. Members of the SSCI, HPSCI, Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, and the National Security Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations were - noti?ed by CIA 1995 rearding the a involvement 0 . . the execution of Reyes Mata. report indicated that the execution had occurred. This report corroborated 1983 AOG information that had been provided by an sf source but was not disseminated." . I 188. he CLA officials reportedly. indicated that an October 1983 CIA intellience re ort ha includ the srmation and etin execu Reyes . ight have had to the corroborate thereports of his volv g' Mata and to identify any 1? - i death of Carney. .L-zr-et" :1 I orma on re.?.1..12.dll.?1 the disamelagrance . .. .13; .Li gents reportedly recovered a pistol and piece of clothing that they said belonged to the priest and these items were turne oer to onduran ta. Intelligenc - . .. 1 had indicate I at Hoduanlicoptersirvere unable to Carney based upon information from captured insurgents. . . 69 ET wan-u- -J.-. I . -mp1?; A leftist had entere nduras with Carne priest as poor physical condition before the border crOssing. The leftist reportedly said that he and others had to carry the priest for two da 5 amock before leaving him behind in the jungle. - -5 - . I not say whether the leftist had . ?1n cate I at arney ws alive or dead when left behind. The - information was disseminated as an Intelligence Report . o' ?to find that Carney had died in his sleep. The insurgents left Carney's body in the hammockthe helicopter that was I .. Came '5 body after captured insurgents ere unable,_according to- exactly where they had' searched for . L: originally scheduled to el With '5 3. gr described Carney as being in poor'physical condition prior to the start of the'jour-ney. 194.16Kju1y 9, 1996 Intelligence Report. This report was issued by CIA as an addendum'to the May 31, 1996 Intelligence Report - A It provided the recipients of the previous intellie u" the additional informatio I a his slee sod left in a mock. I . 2-. ~ij 4235onduran Special Forces had 1'v'captured an aide to Carney who was in possession of the priest's stole and chalice. The aide said that he had left Carney in a hammock in the jungle. The guerrillas reportedly had not eaten for more than identi?ed as Carney by the aidE, in the hammock. .1 .. estimated that Carney had been dead for several days. The body "Was neither recovered nor buried. I. I .. -. In.- - u. v.i?o 11.21 '0 an! f" I o. .. ?ugh! five patrols that were deploy 5' the Nueva Palestina base camp for the primary purpose of tracking down the guerrillas. The patrols set off from sandbars in the Patuca River in five roughly parallel columns in the general direction of the oer. The aide to ame was discovered by one of the .?ec?ggarwusus-HAW- ~11 Nicaragua - 13.1,- .. een . one ever asked him about Carney nor does he remember telling anyone about ?nding the priest. . . - participated in a patrol led 1983. This patrol re ortedl tra eled to the loca on of Carney'? body and rdered the body to be buried at the site. i The former . a .u Hr 3. commented that the patrol led by. follow?up patrol that had been sent co had been found. 1 a a .: wa.? 3 la \i?l Inzlli. sill-.93. .1- I. .. s. . Ian's..- . 1.11!? .0111. .31. ..1. .55! I2. Lv.3r..t!u #3 - . ap re a rrilla carrying a wooden de and adVised a claimed to be Carney's ai them that he had left Camey lying in a hammock that was protected by dense vegetation. Carney was described by the guerrilla as being too weak to continue with the march. ?"55 211. he aide reportedly had led the two patrols to Carney, 1 who had obviously been dead for a few days. The aide identi?ed the body as bein feutenant Communicated this to the I . 5 base camp - . . the body showed no Signs of trauma or viol nce was ?aparent that Carney had died of - . eded back to n?h' cp while - . 7.- atrol continued to search for an arms cache. i .Carney's body ws left in the hammock. *commented .- that the lieutenant probably killed Carney's aide as was not needed after finding the cache. 1: "l f-?I-uI-n-?N ough prisons had been taken. . ccop or ?ve captives who were returned to Nueva Paetina from -.Tegucigalpa. There other. officers marche L'guerrillasintothejunge 'tedthem. I also had executed another captured guerrilla sete similar, incident. . 213. - stimated that Honduran Special - -- Forces executed between 30 and 40 of the captured guerrillas who -.. the jungles. In addition to other executions that 3y he - served Nicaragua a Visor to the guerrillas. . . so was reported have participated executions 77 I lIand the related February 14, 1997 addend. The report and addendum were reissued on March 4, 1997 with the following Headquarters caveat: The following report is a reissue- . . . [S]ince issuing the report, we have learned that the source may not have been honest in his account of the events detailed in the intelligence report. . . . Consumers will wish to ensure that any finished intelligence publications that drew on this report are edited as appropriate. I nd aimed that he had been part of an insurgent group that included Carney and Reyes Mata. The citizen claimed that he had evaded the Honduran military and witnessed them' prepare 'a mass graye for between 70 and 90 eceased comrades - in the Nueva Seovia region. 1 "5 nu?g SMET - 6. @_l[gs mformaonggas 7' ?7 at "dis?emin . - . . - . . . . - -.. .o-I?terview 7.. that the SFC eortd 4" L- an was ase at LaVe . .1 79 0' ?you .- EITCE 218. 497 During training-malls that SFC officers were ordered to participate in an operation to ca ture the .orders were to search and stop the group? - "capture" as Opposed to "search and destroy." All SFC officers and 7., approximately 120 soldiers attached to the Air Mobile Unit quickly deployed to Nueva Palestina. 219.6 After finding a guerrilla during a routine supply mission, more guerrillas were located, captured and sent to Teuia I questioning and prOpaganda purposes. According to - 'i most of the guerrillas were in oor sical sfeiing from starvation. I I, .l .I I tates that these individuals; numbering were - tortured. He notes that torturing them would not have served the Hondurans well as the guerrillas were to be presented to the press. 22 a ro-I . the field, . I I _w dthreeor . n. - . 4. . . gue oegucrg pa. I Alvarez riately. After the meetin ?73 Pales?i?a in .5 a helico ter. a I "7 old have to ake them disappear." I. I in aid that the guerrillas were to 1e or exed er we get information from them II and in a place they can't be found." Only officers were to be involved in carrying out the executions and each officer had to tici ate so if that they would not discloe their I I 'l I n'individua was givenloverall - I I responsibility ensufing that the executions were performed - Vlfficr. MET I an SFC Lieutenant eyes Mata. a he ha ca?ui?d and tha eyes Ma?a?? m?t?i-?itea she ilncludm was not present for the intbgation or ekecutiongjgi .1. 1 222. two original deserter?s had indicated'thatCarney, - . referred to?as "Father Guadalupe," was traveling with states that Honduran military intelligence?hxad a large. file on Carney and that CTN Alvarez was eager to use him for propaganda purposes. This desire stemmed from pressure the" a Catholic Church had applied on CINC Alvarez for his perceived 'tnisUeatment of the Church and its representatives? iindicates that there was never?an? orderto .kill Came to capture .r him alive and brine" him back to the camp*F i emphasized the importance of capturing ather Guadalupe alive and offered a week of leave to the patrol that found and returned the prieSt to ueva Palestina. oint the operation .rdere assemble I atrol andasist another patr that was in field. . i -ollecte'd approximately 15 men, located the ?rst -: patrol, and they then?came into contact with an individual _who -- 1 identified himself as the ai to Carney. The individual had in his possession . a carved wooden chalice and a stole and indicat by a lack of food, was "t unable to continue the march, and was left hanging in a hammOck in the uncle. The individual led the patrols-"to the hammocl?? -- {qwhere a badly decoi'npOsed bOdy was foun and I '5 i presume the bod Carney due to the story told by the 'i In eiieves that the leader of the primary .3: camp and reported the find. ..1 individual. patrol radioed 8 5 224% After observing the bod n; patrols departed the area and the first group CO seeking out arm caches while traveling towards Nicaragua. This patrol may have taken along and executed the individual claiming to be Carney's aide. Cae' patrolling227. specifically requesting informati Operation or the fate of Carney until 1997not return Carney's .- - The first patrol did not re was ordered to contintre dvise'd- oes not recall any CIA personnel on from him regardin the Olancho ?awed that, after approximately a two-month pen'o in 1983, interest in the Olartcho Operation diminished quickly?there were other issues to address and the operation was considered a military success. 28. (8) May 30,199? tinue its mission SE CONCLUSION 7' '229. froduced timely and substantial I intelligence on 0 Operation, including relevant guinformation regarding?eyes Mata and Carney: 6 An October 15, 198 - A Ii. dicated that aid i soner captured during the Olan peration had been executed by Honduran Army officers and that Reyes Mata was among those executed. The executions reportedly were iniu'ated after I commander" in Olanchon?not otherWise identifiedf received an order from the Honduran Armed Forces General taff to "search October 17, 1983 . I :onfirmed the rid added es's held for a couple of days before being executed. Neither of these reports contained the identi?es of the alleged executioners . or any information regarding the fate of Carneyi l?n-?nn- cuSsions relaai to the hus, no further u. f" I. u- .. confin'? "1 ?Jab ?4 230information regarding Carney on three occa 1983 and July 1995: -u?n . Despite these efforts, however, the precise fate of Carney remains . unknown to CIA. 87 .c .c I 240. In August 1983,? ought?- assistance and advised him that they would be traveling to uev-a Palestina as two PRTC guerrillas had turned themselves in to Honduran authorities.? recalls that advised him before their departure that it was pos?si e" a guerrilla . - been charged with ?nding and nutraiizing the guerrillas. says he interviewed six to eight captured insurgents, but is uncertain whether these guerrillas had deserted. They were interviewed in a coercion-free environment. Two guerrillas claimed to- that they were the last to have seen Carney, whom they referred to as "Padre Guadalupe," alive. 242.1933 Two insurgents indicated that Carney had made it, in the company of the PRTC insurgent group, to a base camp on tOp of a hill between the Coco and Patuca Rivers after eight days of marching. Traveling down the hill in a northwesterly direction, Carney was described by the two guerrillas as being so weak that he could only cover approximately '100 meters in the triple canopy jungle before requiring rest. Before reaching the Patuca River, Carney reportedly - had to be assisted, sometimes carried, by the two insurgents. The 4 insurgents reportedly expressed a fear of capture and Carney urged ?them to continue without him. They then placed the priest in a {hammock and left. The guerrillas believed, says? - that Carney had died of exposure and starvation. 243. In addition to suffering from lack of food and the I elements, Carney was described by the guerrillas who were 1 interviewed by - as being spiritually broken. recalls learning from the captives that Carney had Hurtistered to the insurgents but came to odds with Reyes Mata who prohibited .Carney from performing religious services. According to Carney was - also emotionally affected by Reyes Mata's execution of a member of the group. 3 I- q? .: 244. Initially, it was h0ped that Carney was alive and 5 would be captured. After In! interviewed the 'deserters, however, i he recalls that the conclusion within the Embassy was that Carney had died of starvation. There was never any indication, says i that the Hondurans had captured or killed the priest: By the end of 1 1983, no information had been identified that contradicted this .conclusion and the .I began to focus on other matters. 1 . . 245. -says he prepared several intelligence reports i. based on and the subsequent discovery by the that apparetl bel to S. recalls that; -. ade inquiries of the Honduran . concerning the fate 'of Carney. After .3 initial involvement, i reportedly assumed full reSponsibilitv for reporting on matters relating to the Olancho Operadon_su3pected, but never had Honduran Army confirmation, that Reyes Mata may have been captured and subsequently killed by the Hondurans. These 89 . s1: :51" suSpicions arose after a picture of the dead Reyes Mata appeared in the media wearing a uniform that appeared to have been surprisingly fresh and clean for someone who had been on the run in the jungle for weeks. -advised that these pictures appeared after he was 7 assigned other duties and, thus, I would have . followedaup on the suspicions. subsequently was killed in an automobile accident 247. ?Ways that the Embassy was cautious in not .-. reporting street rumors or unverified information on issues that might be politically volatile- has no reason to believe that the Embassy or its components, including the. suppressed any intelligence reporting. . . as consumed with the Contra . program, and 7 I interested in the insurgency and intense q. in reporting related details. The insurgenCy was viewe 3 i5 a broad sense?an ill conceived, badly implem tion, wherein the insurgents paid the price for self-destructive behavior. Many of the insurgents and Carney were thought to have succumbed to exposure and starvation. 3? Embassy's Consular Section would have been responsible for pursuin Carney? fate, ven his resumed status as a US. citize ,7 the Embassy did no on the fate of Carney 7' it was thought that Carney starvation and disease. - 90 SECP 1a account of the Ola A in: Quesoninem and not necessarily resulted truth. . - :13- ?d not do more in this . H2.- 9- In 252. In i" indicated that. al? ameijyas'left tovdie in a because he was suffering from was too Weak'to contihue. I Carney was reported by far the oldest member'otztheginsurent and I assumed__that he was dead, - 5-4.. - 1' HodLiHran thi'?u?ddetothe credib - ,Ah.- mug-u"- un of the account . terestinC?rney' 'r to its interest in ee 1 ata? but there-W21 no information left to pursue?jin the Carney matter. 3; - It 3? eported every peration. 91 sec I s?er 3. ?ewed the Olancho was largely responsible for reporting on the event. . . the information concerning Carney dying of natural causes ws credible then and now.- As a result, there was no firither i the priest's fate after it was detennined that he had likelyhdied. of__ starvation254- as purposely exclu referred to in .. prisoner executiOns. . . . exetins ere ama ?ves. - . did not-hayej'a eicant inter-estin the Oanch Opera?Eon as; there . 13?. was not a eat-?a?ioiint?ofpoligi :11: ecame aware of the 1983 ed the Honduran media. . sue the insurgents. During the short?lived ecalls that insurgents surrendered and gave details of the groups history and make?up. This included a descri tin of a gupriest identified as Father Guadalupe. g, . ?d not realize that this priest was Carney fily contacted .- the US. Embassy for assistance and media articles described his participation in the guerrilla penetration. at information rela to - y. . nd that - personnel'p?r?ovided informatio regarding the operation. ?personnel were describe a" 3 being very enthusiastic about collecting information concerning this military action and were considered to be the reporting focal point for it within the Embassy. locor; of Tegucigalpa and talked with captured guerrillas. The guerrillas appeared to be in good health and told of being trained in Cuba and sent through the jungle of Olancho. Once in the jungle, they ran out of food and the leader of the group sent two or three individuals to a village to obtain supplies. These guerrillas were detected and the Hondurans mounted a milit operation. The I captured guerrillas 3 i also mentipned that apriest accompe I tarvation '.ays he can no longer recall the name the prisoners use to re er to the priest. ?Mm, 7 arid sg through bags 0 seized documents and photographs taken by the guerrillas. He says the photographs were worn, dirty and greasy. Among the photographs were pictures of guerrillas who were obyiously starving and in bad physical shape. i - ?75 ays that some of these individuals appeared to be dead an he attributed their - death to starvation. . . . 261: ecalls one Photograph, possibly black an white, that pictured the body of a male lying in a hammock. The individual was ap rt 5?5 ears of age, - . with grayish hair and a long face. . concluded at the time that the indi 'o n. The photograph also showed a "purple stole," almougfm?s not i recall whether this item was emckground ff: '73 ebelievedthis individual to a ure of how he came to this conclusion. .- ecalls that the?Hondurans - . were not showing an interest in the 's'eizb?dlit'eins and he pointed out the photograph of the individual in the hammock to'a Combined Military Intelligence officer. He recalls doing so because he was aware that the Carney family had expressed its suspicions to the Embassy concerning the priest's fate and its belief that it was not receiving adequate cooperation from US. representatives. .He believes that the photograph indicated that the priest had died of starvation and emphasizes that it would have forced the family to acce that Carney had died of natural causes in the jungle- -meheves that this photograph was provided to Carney re'Ka ves DOS personnel at the Embassy. 263. (35 I as no Specific recollection of reporting or rding the ation relating to the. photograph . he thinks may have been of Carney? However, he says he reg?triagy??s - I I I . passed such information to Embassy officials, given the high profile of the case He 11 ?mason was used Cameyfam?y- nor Embassy management ever sought to 511 - ress the dissem g. ~of ani information on this or other event h. ondan media as bearing a resemblance to the individual he rea as photographed lying in the hammock- Nor can I of a deceased Carney could have been taken and deveIOped by the Honduran guerrillas in the Olancho jungle. He believes that itis possible that he is mstake in his identification of the individual as . Carney. . A ,1 misinformation concerning the Olancho Operation. sneer?:1? . r. . He was assistedin this 2 assignment by locally?hired Hondurans who referred to him as "Wes" . and "Commandante Wes." . - a 1 267. -When the Olancho Operation beg 803115 that the Honduran Armed Forces set up a staging area Base where supplies were stored and then trucked to the Tinto River. The staging area cOnsisted of a few tents and was staffed by logistical personnel from the Honduran Armed Forces. He says he -- -- discouraged his personnel from interacting with the individuals, assigned to the staging area and indicates that there was no reason to have contact with them: - 1 - 268. After the staging area was established, one Honduran ssistants advised him that a truckload of guerrillas been brought to the area and then tranSported to Comayagua. says he never saw these prisoners and advises that the staging area did not have any detention facilities. He alsosays he is unaware of what happened to the prisonersJUpon Completion of the counterinsurgent operation; the staging area was disassembled. to . dvjses that a i group of to Lepat?'fie looking for an known as West." 15 elieves that the related to him and opin?es that the rs had apparently Edd the name of "Wes" wi 'est." 'In reaction 'tion' references to an individual called 'West." He also says he has'nd ?lglowledge of a "West Blank" or. f- . -. "Mark Kelvi" serving Hondurasff75 . 'ay that they were not aware of prisoners held at El ?Aguacate Air Base during the_Olanch0 . or interrogate 96 sw? i - . . ary 1n the Olancho Operation was when 3 two US. heliCthers delivered C?rations to Nueva Palestina frorn Palmerola, an Air Base in Comayagua. He says the US. helicopters, ?sent by the stayed on the ground for . appi?Oxirhately one While delivering the fooidaridideparted thewareawlthout prov1ding further assmtance'w'fn- wad-Ta a" a - . ?r 0.4- i - .1 August 1994 an August?1995 regarding Carne - that he had previously learned from local news a allegedly had been murdered. g-According to indicated that he .d .. as: (I thatdead ?lmed: death at -- the" time.? 11f the'latter'; the Honduran patrol ad left him todie,- '15 not C?f?amwhemer - at Carney was dead or left to die, provided any information that would indicate that Carney was 1 {murdered . pau- I. litvo?x?.? . 1- .. 3.. A . - '1 we; v. 'd xp and thatm same fate'prior to the Hondurans ?nding them. says he was not privyth 17, 1.9.8 _eo . regardingprisoner exegutionsanddoes not recall cuho to the priest's fate. - taken place during th?'irisurg'en?cy'p?r what specific actions werertaker'i'f'f incl. . .iaforthcoming and to assist him with whatever avenues-he.- decided 'to pursue: There were no restrictions placed 0 - - pursuit of information. Irutially?was provided wi seized I documents for his review. The 111 st substantive document was a copy of the diary belonging to Reyes Mata: The other materials were consideredlr?t?o be mostly propaganda and of little us aveledrs to the Olancho Deparhnent for one da and waccomamed .v prisoners were clean, lacking visible signs of physical mistreatment, well fed, without chains, and dressed in military fatigues. There was SEW an armed guard present during this general questioning session and .2 only a few of the prisoners talked. They spoke of being starved while in the field and of wanting to surrender. They surrendered when the (Hondurans encouraged such action with leaflets and messages Droadcast from an airplane. I talk with any of prisoners as he desire and this reiilted in his interviewing three or four insurgents individually. During 5 discussions about the group's leadershi he learned that the group had included a "Guatemalan priest" The priest was not identified by any name, nor Was he described as a US. citizen. The priest was said to be accompanying the group's leader, Reyes Mata, and suffering from malnutrition. He was further described asvbeing in the worst physical state of all members of the group. Reyes Mata {reportedly ordered that the priest be carried and one insurgent 5 indicated priest would die because of his failing state of a health dicates that he did not have prior information :oncerning'the priest, nor did he develop enough information during the interview to cause him to focus on this individual. 293- .. informed that . Embassy. It was at this time ade the association between i?the priest described by the insurgents Carney. alyzed the diary of Reyes Mata, but says he did not find any noticeable "references to Carney. ound the diary to be consistent with the i prisoners' stories in regar to the hardships that the group endured. ays' he was provided with information to in his review?lso' obtained additional seized documents some 0 which were signed by ?Father Guadalupe,? but i these, say'sqwere not helpful in his review as they were i considered to prOpaganda. ecalls questioning 3. - out the bodies of am .- I .9 3- and eat. 10 dvised that the bodies were not recovere a ue to the inability of the patrols to carry the bodies through the rough and inaccessible terrain while also carrying their own equipment. Additionall elieves the patrols probably were not inclined to recover "5 posing bos of indiv?idug who had threatened the security of their coun also advise that Reyes Mata ha ed in a fif'?fi was believed that Carne? had starved. made sense, says . i-?ij- oes not recall seeg an pictures of :u - .2 -9. .--. . .. .- an . the bodies of Caeyor eyes Mata. - .- 295. as asked to meet with Congressman Broomfield several months after compltin the October 1983 analysis of the Olancho Operation. ~51, emembers it, Broomfield had been contacted by which was seeking an appointment with the President. The family claimed that . it had a signed affidavit, ad ossibly a tape indicating that CIA had ordered the priest's death i; :3 prisoner executions at the that he advised Broomfield of what he had learned about Carney. M29616m3 shown the October 15 and October 17, 1983 .?ports regarding prisoner executions. Hesays that he had the documents before and behaves that had this information [regarding prisoner executions] before I went to Congress and no one told me. I should have been told as the designated expert [on that this information- may not have been W1 from him, as CATF was an exti?egi'efyfb?. . tates that, even if all the information osel gee? . had been shared with m, 1 would not have changed his conclusion 1 that Carney starved to death, but would have created "a little doubt in my mind" concerning the fate and Reyes Mat says that he did notsense tha - withheld information on this. sec in _-P?mphasizes that every piece of information that he had coll or reviewed indicated that Carney had died of starvation. 104 srger . I I Y5 he had no knowledge 0f any - I i. . . a In") . - test-arm' err-Bu-?F?M? I circumstances uh.- . . were questions from the oversight comitte 5. information was provided only . reporting by CIA, he recalls that sponsible for follow-up 'eporting on matters relating to Carney since he was a US. citizen. there was significant interest during his tenure in alleged human ??ights abuses. This resulted in an exerienfyrepresentative being assigned a: if; responsibility for nonitoring hum-an allowedCATF to review . uiries from numan rights allegations prior to the receipt of official in i senior CLA management and Congress. - :ecolleo of <7 I prarmg ongreional testimony and correspondence that originated She recalls tremendous scrutiny of the Contra Linitiative and a olitically charged atmosphere. As a result? took great care in drafting congressional responses 3 as did not want to take any action that could negatively affect Covert action funding. Thus, she says congressional inquiries were [interpreted and answered narrowly. I 300. During the winter of 1983, she recalls that HPSCI 5 Chairman Edward Boland requested infoan from CIA concerning the fate of Carney. . . Headquarters traces and queri recalls, that Carney had died frowhile marching through the jungles. According '5 all information available within CIA at . recalls receiving several additional ngral inquirie . concerning Carney's fate that were substantially identical to previous requests. She says that the Agency responses to these requests were based on previous Agency responses. If the substance of the questions differed from previous requests, research was performed before providing an answer. i says she was never limited in the amount of- research that she could do to answer congressional inquiries. 302. The Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analyst who was nsible for Honduran issues recalls reviewing a report i October 1983 concerning executions that oce Olancho Operation. She recalls that the Operation had ended prior to her assignment. Based on at least this CIA report and DOS re orts, she says she prepared the October 19, 1983 ?article concerning prisoner executions in Honduras. From an analyst's perspective, she says the identities of the executioners were not necessary in order to ensure that policy 7 makers understood the event. The DI analyst does not recall there being any issues regarding Carney's fate during her assignment. 0 I85 106 513M . RELEVANT my cApxm?l-t 1 ON NON-CIA ATAAND WHATDO CIA :momER LLS. GOVERNMENTPERSONNEL RECALL REGARDING THIS .. . CIA 1U) ReleRant Re R'Egafdi?? Reyes?Mata and . Carney 303. . - . Operational Group (AOG), Fort Meade, Ma land, maintained a - IdatiOI'lShi I ?tially came to attentioninluly 1980 the 19805. -. 3 while attending the i" 304.16) After? six-month pe?od of - I develo - 51;! v_ A. r: greed to function a- Additiall, dtion ad subJe a sensitive the eyes 'of [Ambassador Negroponte] j. ed from d??is?e?hg?f?ht that -- ortediy advised the -officer of . . and aSked that if _'picked up anything regarding - anti?8a sta activities, corruption and terrorism, could they please 3 . mew -- . 5 . I . q, Operation indicating tha I 4.1 ad shot insurgent leader Reyes Mata with a servicersto capture and Alvarez had probably been consulted. This information was sent for informational purposes to numerous organizations, However, it was never disseminated as ti rela gence rep 109 sy?r provided - with additional -. 4- cutions during the Olancho Operation". Accordin to -this information provided _a i I. reports tha r'V - Y, . .., dicated that I only a young guerrilla Who had aCCOmPpn'est saw Carney dead, purportedly covered his body with leaves and left it in the f; jungle. A the gueaas subsequently -- investigation was reportedly split betwee his troops each time they killed or captured a guerrilla. . 313. 314. Between October 1983 and June 184, rovided infoation to response 1 . .. . . . nth, - prepared, fully coordinated and published 2 '1 . first intelligence report at the Embassy. During this i same month, the? handling expressed his elithat . . detected a reluctance on the part of the Embassy '3 ersonnel to publish information regarding I .H. content/turmoil within the [Honduran] armed forces forfeargvofni??j (??political repercussion [affecting funding votes in Congress316. Subsequently, three repors oained from. . August 1984 were determine._ I, .. ction .. - .. inaccurate and-wereprecluded from pub 317. .66) In November praised? reporting. _continued _to be met by the .pfficer 3 .- during 1985 and aft telliece re orts based upon his information i Embassy. Accor i . . 1 reports during 1984 and 1985 were identi?ed as "politically sensitive" by theEmbassy, which requested either their non?publication or restricted'disseminationi . - . . A November 21, - 1983November 18, 1983 Joint Chiefs of Staff message disseminating a ?draft? intelligence report concerning the capture and execution of a Honduran guerr?laion?ginally sent the draft report for -- comment to? and USCINCSO, and for information i to DIA, on ovem er 17, 1983. On November 18, 1983, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the draft, for informational purposes, to elements within CIA, State DeparUnent, Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and NSA. Within CIA, the draft was electronically distributed to various components within the DI. Additionally, c0pies of the draft 111 1 sew/?1 ssyg?r were distributed to elements within the Directorate of Administration, the Directorate of Science and Technology and the DO. 3? draft itintelligence report specifically aving killed Reyes Mata some days after his . - no. It also indicated that CINC Alvarez was consulted before and after the x, ution. _Re es Mata reportedly had $500,000 in his possession tha 7 - on?scated and split with the CINC. A . Ti. egrding piisner executions durin?the Olancho Operon on October 19, 1983ould neither name the executioner nor state uthority was aware of or had approved the executions. . elief . military office were not supportive Alvarez and that some . of the information contained in the draft?import might have. been designed to smear However, the basic information conveyed in the draft report?that prisoners had been executed? could not be refuted, according .. . 321. ??'mtd he had obtained the information that was included in the draft report from an unSpecified of?cer. 7 who witnessed the execution. The draf? report sai _f tit-?- ould not elaborate on the ecific rumor that he xcutheyes Mata, althoug I at - CINC Alvarez had commended o. i 'u ?in one in the Olancho Operation. Alvarez was reported to be fearful that Reyes Mata would seek revenge against him because of a mid~1970 incident during which Alvarez, then commanding the 4th Infantry Battalion, 112 SE 4T threw Reyes Mata from a cliff. Reyes Mata survived the fall and developed a strong hatred for Alvarez; 323 i Response. On November 25, 1983, a sent its comments to the with informational CoPies to DLA, IN SCQM and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. .It indicated that the had advised that Reyes Mata was killed in combat on September 18, 1983 while Operating in Northern Olancho. Two days prior to Reyes Mata's death, according, -to the- comment, the local press carried articles alleging?that he . had been captured. Although this was denied by Honduran . a authorities, the press stories led to unsubstantiated rumors that . Reyes Mata had been captured, interrogated and then shot by members of the Special Squadron. According to these rumors had not been confirmed response also indicated that it had learned .1. .I hat Reyes Mata had been in possession of ately $25, 00 in local currency that had been, at the 1 direction of CINC Alvarez, divided among all members of the Special Squadron. gusaid it was unable to locate in its files any I. I SE reference to CINC Alvarez having thrown Reyes Mata off a cliff. In - summary, --comment noted that the remoteness of the Olancho region and the secrecy of the Operation generated a number of rumors. In .opinion, did not have direct access to the information concerning Reyes Mata's death and probably was. repeating rumors. I .. Additional Reporting. On February 16, eceived a photocopy_and English translation of roduced transcribed on 3. dlcated in the message that he - .. . .Le dvised that ad Ret 1' no. signi?cant information. 327. (K In regard to Carneymstated only that a Hill young gu a who accompanied the priest had seen him dead. The I guerrilla covered the priest with leaves and left him in the jungle. a was subsequently killed 150 said that "~plit money confiscated from Reyes Mata with his Honduran InSpector General was reportedly conducting an {information was forwarded to 1' February 17, 1984. 328. additional details concerning Opinionof 'jreportin of risoer executions during the Olancho Operation. 'The . included comments reportedly made. 1 9- etween MarCh and April 1984: ,a . At the request of CLA, - - ?[the Intelligence Information. Report regarding capture and assassination of Reves Mata errilla Operation. saw? that as far a concerned: right On track ecept or the amount of money that they calculated of}? I. . . . matter that had been taken care'o?l? the Armed Forces Commandf ad been replaced and changes in policy had . een ma e. he principal interest was to avoid any recurrence of 5' the abuses that had taken place during Olancho. I 329 a If?? er indicated that. ?raised the quec prisonerexecutions again during a_ '3 subse uent meetin -At that time?advised". - ad ady?tted?t?o Reyes Mata and was upse - indicated tha 'i culation cornin the confiscated;w - - money was that it was split betwee ?the Honduran Forces. Chief of Staff and CINC Alvarez. (U) Recollections of Relevant Personnel 330/67/ . I- who was. v. responsible for handling . re ent time frame says that all matters concemingmwere coordinated with 115 g? . law't?'az. 'wb - may. repor a ecuted Reyes Mata and had stolen money captured guerrillas; CINC Alvarez was thought to . - gm: . briefed unrecalled individuals- "7 advised that this'information was not consiStent with 332. ys he recontacted 7 97:4; . reported information was not accurate. another meeting and brought with him a Honduran .x .7: -. Who Sid 8 witnessed the execution of Reyes . nd confirmed?the information that the? . seen provided previously by. On this basis, was tasked '5 later draft intellience rep interprete! Eese initiatives as 'u I . .says he belieVed that he had ful?lled his reporting obligation in this matter. Thus, he did not further address the dissemination 116 Ola-rich?) Operation were a pean'ng in the local media, the-'1 ebn'efed?on this event. ?eportedly r- 4 have received some of the money and to have ordered the? executions. 1' - "that the draft 1983;? report had not been disseminated. He believes that the Embassy Country Team in Honduras wanted {greports on subjects such as this to be benign "as to avoid Congress looking over its shoulders" and to keep Congress satis?ed With the ongoing implementation of US. policy. . I "suggsed" by elements Within the Embassy, includin I . -, political reasons. Re lorting murders, cplion, says -.- ould re?ect negatively on Honduras and not be beneficial in carrying out policy. ?e still believes that the information he obtained homiuwas accurate. .--.. ays he did not have the reporting on the Olancho Operation at the time. After receipt of the November 1983. . ?nd a possible follow-up meeting i to discuss the information it contained,_ was not tasked to collect further information relating insurgency. .. . . I 33'- urins 1983 recalls the gen??ral of the d? eportmexecutions and stolen money?and indicatest that sending it to the Embassy for comment was routine. 'mays he believes that the Embassy in Tegucigalpa Was sensitive i" to all reporting on matters internal to Honduras due to the political climate at the time. subject matter - i 117 I er 337-? 51;: that -reporting?did i not receive fair eaent . om comonentswithin the Embassy, to 5 . mud .. i3? ersonnel. He that -coments on -reporting, ost instances, were?merely a mirror of State's neative sentiment '3 ecalls a discussion wi ca 1983 wherein the latter indicated that uns dividu als at the Embassy did not want information concerning human rights abuses during the Olancho . Operation to be disseminated because it was viewed as an internal Honduran matter. . 5 he viewed the coordination process as a me .. I coping With political sensitivities at th assy. The coordination process allowed distributed, albeit in draft form. .normally would not disseminate a report if the coordination process resulted in negative comments, yet consumers already would . . have been made aware of the information in draft form. otes that .hreceived similar negative reactions to_ its reports from other Embassies during 1983. A contributin factor Ina hae . ,g - art of '1 340. recalls that the initial reporting provided was general innature and that CIA and expressed concerns in that regard? He says that reporting became more specific and substantial over time. The generality of the early reporting may have been caused by .J attempts to slici ormation regarding internal Honduran matters I befor 7:17;, became comfortable in, j? 341 .KDIA Personnel. DiA's Honduran Analyst from 1982 through 1 87 says there existed an informal arrangement wherein fofficers met with him to discuss future debriefings "of sources. 5. . also would provide draft copies of its intelligence reports to the DIA Analyst for his comments. The DIA Analyst recalls meeting with th . -, i termittently during 1983 and 1984 concernin 7777' reportedly was not sure of fides and periodically consulted with the DIA Analyst about information he had obtained. . - . also sought outissues to explore with - an attempt to assess his credibility and to obtain information of interest to intelligence consumers. The DLA that ,7 5 appeared to have the access he claimed and generally provided 7 substantive information..- ant. - . . .- ot have any 119 SECRET recollection of any comments by - and USCINCSO and says that he was unaware of any efforts to suppress reporting in this or any other matter. - 344. According to the BIA Analyst, the focus for during the Olancho Operation was on how well the Hondurans reacted to the first insurgent penetration from Nicaragua. were impressed that the Honduran military could mobilize and effectively address the threat. The Honduran response was viewed as sending a message to future groups that were plotting similar . actions. In addition; were interested in learning whether the population within Olan?cho supported the insurgents. Carney was - not of primary analytical concern to the BIA Analyst as?other I interests took priority: - 345. The DLA Analyst recalls the-1983 draft AOG report and believes that certain details in it were inaccurate. Specifically, he says CINC Alvarez was not believed to have ordered the executions because Alvarez was too smart to leave evidence of his involvement and never remain a secret. ad a'negative biasagains'ts.? Alvarez:- Iri?addition', the BIA Analyst believes that the Hondurans -. had observed human rights'fissues being addressed in-El Salvador . it made sensej?to use Reyes Mata for propaganda raer than ekecute the IDIA'fAii-alyst . 7 - in be corrupt and capable the . . {Alvarez .. "1 346. 18; The DIA Analyst re?c?a'l'll's? with in 1983 concerning Reyes Mata's fate. He says that: I?mderstanding was that Reyes Mata was wounded in combat, would not talk when interrogated and was then left to die. - I Analytical attention was focused on the .O'lanchoOperation for only two- to three-month period and, by April 119-84th'he issue was. forgotten at the Embassy. 120 sidier 347. The DIA Analyst says he was not privy to the two October 19, 1983 CLA Sensitive Memorandum reports concerning 3 prisoner executions. In regard to the identity of the "field aintains that this was not the Officer cm . a. commanding - recalls that, upon his arrival in Teci'd?al'a? the Olancho eration was co a a close. - es relating to the Hond military. concerned with issu 352._ecalls that there were "no requests tone down, suppress, sti?e, withhold, or manage information?-in regard to the 1983 draft report or any other instances during his tenure in Honduras. does not recall Negroponte having particular sensitivities to issues, nor -. does he recall Embassy personnel seeking to reporting. . He recalls rumors that prisoner executions had taken place during- the Olancho Operatioanut that 7 i did not have eyidence to substantiate them. ?m believes that the! comment on the 1983 draft ?report was prepared by - who subsequently died as no recollection of echange?of related messages -. - I He says that several US. I epre I on temporary duty and that their re orting sot balanced or lacd inthe roer context. H512, report wasredundantinth executions already had been reported'by CI In this respect; he Says, the ADC report woul importanceto the event and focused excessive attention on it. Second, there were Concerns regarding the objectivity and credibility 'of the draft AOG report and whether the dtails co cemin CIN Alvarez's involvement were accurate. - .- in a position to know readily whether . Alvarez was involved in a decision to execute the prisoners. The third area for concern related to the amount of mone that was cited no I '22anon-."nu" 1 was factually co ect, it failed to emphasize Negroponte's concern over reporting on an event that had previousl be reported by CIA in two disseminated intelligence clcnowledges that the Ambassador was sensitive to 123 331:} f- political ramifications that miht have resulted from?such reporting and its POSSible"effec ., However, he indicates that thi wa ot a factor the absence of further reporting regarding the executions and emphasizes that CIA had previously reported'on that issue. 6 he agrees that . egafding matsiismis'sio'nisg: "fir?a 35?; OG r??pbr?t' A essentially act, 55 note?twerrepot?ngb? weights. be'e? reported ofNeg'T??po?t? that t'e'anfjlinwarranted human: 1 problem for Honduras. . av-n-y-u? . -. ced and had been reporte - . 0 new toreport that would be of importance to consumers. Although the October 15 and October 17, 198 ports did not contain ecific names._._ or military units inVOlvin executions - 5 1 provided suf?cient informaEiOn to permit idethiI'ication of the perpetrators by cross-referencing of other reporting. The factithat executions took place was not an issue being addressed by the onduras. -E 359. elieves that his actions and Negroponte's 9' concern were parts of "a legitimate effort to manage the perception of Honduras." He notes that information concerning the Olancho . d! Operation and the executions was not suppressed? - - acknowledges that the amount of reporting that sho ave, been developed regarding the executions is debatable, but state? 124 at it does not emphasize??iegbas?is forging polical vacuum al ough it did not delay, withhold, or suppress intelligence reporting.? . J. . assy did i? or sop an IAI- report being 5. published, but only wanted the opportunity to commen not aware of any attempts by Negroponte of withhold human rights information from Washington. . . I 362. A DI Analyst with responsibilities for Honduras at the time rec the 1983 draft AOG report regarding prisoner executions and explains that one of her assigned duties was reviewing message traffic and forwarding it with comments to Dl branch and division I management. The analyst says the significance of the draft AOG 125 h- report was that it implicated CINC Alvarez in the executions. Although she?does not recall the disposition of the draft AOG reporta. she says that reporting was not considered reliable byClA CONCLUSION l2 :treported :i av ad killed Reyes Mata. . . revie'W?this AOG'report on N?yber 2 'c?ct. . 'f two October 1983 "repel - at; 2'l . dicat'edFthat .-. .ach?mb?rws . Ink :9.5. . 364. i . November 22,1983 that the Ambassador-.wa art: n" regarding the issue and was I concernedthat earlier CIA reporting on the same topic might create a human rights problem for Honduras. Based on the Ambassadbr?s reported conce ctively discouraged - - ?from to owmg up information reported by the: u} source. I -. -- 9.. 8 3:65" I listi?edthisactjon by noting that the Nomination the HenderaaAmy has." .. already bee'n?reporteM' the two October 1983 reports.? While these'reports'di con am? names of the executionersor .specific Honduran, military units that 'were myolyed believed that"receiying these?identi?ties'in the A06 ort we have . eto mte?ige?ncecohsumers" believe 8' . . rdyided'sufficient informa not -i 126 SW mm? u. guerrillas, inclu 1 :35 executed during the Olancho' Operation. The executions were reportedly initiated after the '-'field commander'f in the Olancho - Departnent received an order from the Honduran Armed Forces General Staff to "search and destroy." This order reportedly was construed as meaning that no prisoners were to be taken alive. The executions were carried out by "officers" in an isolated area away from the enlisted men. No further information relating to the identities of. the 'Yfield commander," the "officers," or the specific 129 SEC 4 SE armed forces elements that conducted the executions was contained -.-.. .- 3 I . - . 9:326 October 1,Department were executed byf'the Honduran Armed Forces." No information regarding who had performed the executionsiwas contained the ort or an accom an i Headquarters received the 1983 draft AOG report from indicating that Reyes Mata had been executed I 377. {883 Draft AOG Report. On November 18, 1983, CIA .DI's electronic records storage svstem. recelved the report in paper form only, .9 '?afte . quit ., . - -: . November . .. - a .. .- - pI?OYidEd is. a er c0py of the November 23, 1983 3.: eiterating that a. The- message also indieated . - cho and noted d" . November-21, 198 document was a November 21, 198 - -.- at the -1983_draft {eport fro. . . Maria days. 7 his ca? fur. - onfef'red b?fo?r?? . - 'ex?ai?b? With If. Octobr 15 . in the executions, but nOted?ha?th .7 . ould I - - . 1., - neither name the executioners nor authorities 5: were aware of or . no. . . 1-1-5.: 5 mm . a CONCLUSION at there was no ?regardin . - and did not make reference to indications tha . . as "the field commander"?may have in? 'l I 83 Olancho Operation and prisoner executions. Factors that appear to have contributed to Headuarters' failure to locate and provide this informatio included: 3' response indicate ailed to document the speci?cidenljties of the duran Army executioners, including "the field 5 commander," who were referred to in the two October 1983 5 CIA reports. 51?71513 ailed to requestad?ditional information @21ng the identitiesjof the Honduran y- a 0 were referredto in the two October 1983CIA i 5 reports as having been'inVOIVed in prisoner exze'Efu't'ions. . -wo (3 reports that eceved and Febriiary. 1984 and as loneof those unphcated 1n the executio r?tn'eVable b3} .. - Since none of this information was indexed or retrievable - I: - .- .- ome to the attention of Headu 3 136 SEYZET . olbrutv'l'll?l WEB Eg?m ill. ill! . t: in. . .A . Ill -0.- ill.? 136.131..? 1 . runs a. I. A .1 . .v Ill. 0 . rtl..auflVl. .IFD. .Ih )IIlet?In .. .. DES..- . .. i. I . g. .- .3 . . l1 ally-TIM 'lt'u .. {in l?l.l . . I cam5143? xmc?ailngn?a.3dm?r. u?nr II. . I [Pugrlf ?tuft-.1 fin-L. it 4.6- 7 . .. :u -lI-?DI-Iloiulu . - mmnma . I vll. I.. .u huh." - I: mm? A. Ivauyrft?ifi . d. P. . . {nu-5hr 3., ?fund .21 aka: . a I .Ln??rr-fsufr.1.- . Gm .I: a. .. .. H.9- o?f II. a f' 0.1. -- it! pl: 5.3 Lt pair-ll. I?l. .. L. #3333 E?uhuswna.ll.r .Ir glifa. Jun-Fifi us): an}: .mv 1. U4. - Ii. A Val-(I "1 "1n o? . . .. .. .ig . . I 51.15.. .. . 1a.. .5. 2.. 1. 1. . 3?1- A . 3. 1' Qul?analln . . a .l.tl< {gratify-L im?rvt'lt .I nun? --. .1 Inn-. .- a . a N2 mm nut. that the reports be converted to Sensitive Mernda dissemination format due to the sensitivity of the subject matter. One report addressed the structure and function of ELACH. The second report identi?ed the victims of ELACHated November 25, 1985, .- a. indicated that Mario Iza?g?mne had been the Director of ELACH since 7, 1980. Izaguirre reportedly maintained direct contact with DNI Director Colonel Guillermo Pinel Calix, who provided Izaguirre with i the identi?es of individuals who laced under - surveillance. It was reporte u} at ELACH members also maintained an informal liaison with members of the DN1 and the I 316th. Among the names of those in the 316th Battalion who were I contacted by ELACH members to discuss ELACH operations was Captain Siro Pablo Fernandez Cuevas, also known as "Captain Urquia." 495. ad reported on July 14, 1983 that Urquia was responsibe verall command of a FUSEP interrogation site and that he conducted kidnappings for ransom - I51 fr": 8 496: Wm November 26,1985,? second report on ELACH based upon? This report identi?ed Honduran ts who were allegedly executed by ELACH between 1980 and 1984: Pablo Moran, Tomas ativi, Fidel Martinez, Angel Manfredo Velazquez, Hermino Caceres Castellanos, Samuel Perez, Nelson Makay, Jose Ernesto Velazquez, and Eduardo Lanza Becerra. It was reported that Izaguirre participated with DNI operatives Carlos I Alfredo Martinez, Marcos Hernandez and Tranquilino Campos in the kidnapping of leftist student activist Omar Gustavo Vazquez Amaya, who died during interrogation. Consequently, Martinez was i separated from the DN land DNI Director Major Juan Blas Salazar ?Mesa was ?red. - Thereport also included a list of Honduran leftists . Ir" 7 .. all persons reported or missing in 1981 and 1.982 were identi?ed Rights?in Honduras" that had been published by the Honduran Documentation'Center in 1984. I i 1 the 1980 to 1984 5 p110; executions had been out, each execution had to President of Honduras omments indicated, however, that no requests for approval of executions had been made since Brigadier General Walter LOpez Reyes assumed command of the Armed Forces in April 1984. . l' 499- The information contained in the two - I a December 1985 Sensitive Memorandum to the Directo of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the Director of the Defense - I Intelligence Agency, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the US. Ambassadors at Tegucigalpa and Panama City, and the Commander-in?Chief of the US. Southern . i Command. 500and noted that it was important to 165 seytf Sig/inn? continue to collect information in order to obtain more details about the past and present Operations of ELACHdicated that it would use to determine the identities of the individuals who were aware of the existence of the ELACH eration and its victims. 501. Congressional Notification. On February 27,- 1986, a letterw rearedb' 'l I . or DCI William Casey's signature and transmittal I. of the 881. The letter described the -. Univ?v.6. nvs-g?i November 1985 reportin 't ELACH and. . .. the January 1986 reportinl ,h w, that the 316th Battalion had ordered ELACH to?mo on several Honduran leftists. The letter noted that, prior to making the ELACH ii information available to the Committees, every effort had been made to verify its authenticity and the reliability of the source. 502% The letter also stated that Casey was personally committed to investigating fully any'additjonal information the CIA received in this reard and that reporting reror ELACH. . I dasserted that, over lime, many of the individuals who were implicated in human rights abuses had been reassigned out of positions of responsibility in the Honduran intelligence services. The letter expressed Casey's concern that ELACH would continue to be a viable organization with . high level contacts in the Honduran Government. The HPSCI and SSCI Chairmen were assured by the Casey letter that CIA would examine. possible measures to resolve this problem and would bring 166 SE the matter to the attention of the appropriate senior Honduran - Government officials, including then-President Azcona. Casey signed and forwarded letters containing these statements to Representative Lee Hamilton and Senator David Durenberg'er'on' February 27, 1986. 503. '?i/On March 14, 1986,-prepared a response to a 3 White House request for information concerning an inquiry from -Congressman Gerry E. Studds regarding what CIA knew of the Honduran Government's involvement?in death squad activities. The response indicated tha had been allocated to 5 determine whether any information was available that confirmed the . allegations. The response also noted that the CIA had not tried to cover up or discourage the publication of information regarding death squad activities and that no CIA officer had tried to in?uence assignments, promotions, or continued military service of officers forwarded to the White House on March 21, 1986. .4 504. 999? An April 24, 1986 CIA reSponse to a question raised by 1 the SSCI recrartiincr Honduran human rights abuses was also prepared The question focused on what the CIA knew 5' about human rights violations in Honduras prior to 1986. The response indicated that CIA had been investigating allegations of Honduran Government-s ord human rights abuses. I 4 . ormatioCr that the - ?u ur Gt was directly-involved in human rights - . i. violations. The response noted that, prior to the late 1985 receipt of i the information regarding ELACH activities,-the CIA did not have 5' specific information that linked Honduran of?cials to death squad activity and had only unsubstantiated allegations of official involvement. . response was signed by" on May 8, 1986 and fo ar ed to Keith Hall of 167 .. see 505. SSCI Staff Members Visit Tegucigalpa. Aft SSCI Staff . delegation visited Honduras from March 14 to March 17, 1986. A Staff member prepared a Marc 18,1986 Memorandum for the I i 1" 1:5. told the visitors that he Was "absolutely certain that since 198 there had been nornurders, kidnappirrgs,? or toe of an Honduran et." i .J i aid that information between the 316th I Battalion and ELACH because of the high level contacts ELACH . maintained with members of the Honduran Armed Forces. . . According to the MFR aid that the 316th Battalion had . continued to conduCt sveillance Operations against Honduran leftists and that President Azcona had not yet been apprised of the high level contacts ELACH had in the Honduran Government. 506. ?ne MFR noted tha orrned the Staff members that the 316th Battalion had been scheduled to be disbanded in January 1986 and converted ?to the counterintelligence com onent of a new Honduran intellice srvicemr . . 2-. t- The MFR also indicated i - told the Staff members that there had been a delay, and it was now?anticip?ated that the 316th Battalion Would be .4 (U) Recollections of Relevant Personnel 507. Headquarters Personnel. - notes in an Aril 23, 1997 letter that, dor the ca re in'stru?cte?_ ?spec yto?repo ?any'an en'od under . .. . - - ulna-nu mu.? all f- - 168 recalls that was nt an 138 a aseo - have #concerned hmiself with, nor would he have raised it as an issue. gig-one of them. :fo-up Icti?o'n that the HPSCI and SSCI could easily have been forgotten because of more imortant issues. The focus at the time, accordin sumo-"P1atthat th never mentioned ELACH, nor had ever heard of i He also describes, -- being fully committed to keeping oversight committees well I says that Fiers asked him .{innit-v; h. ?0 I I I. resence a a an epe ent human rights issue in HondurasSEC {us #995va suggests that it was in part a response to co gressmnal ?r-XLr?F-r-? re ortin and ?commitment to fow a a 5 .45' interest in Human rights issues in Honduras as a result of the ELACH . 8; ?y .-. . A .I . . .35II, . . i ?surf vK. . s. 5. to report on han rig ts v10 that no information would be reporte 0:52:72"? 'ELexisH "-13 ad no information to repo ecalls at Ctra?related issues were but he does not recall ELACH in a? settin . ELACH and had promised to follow-up on the issue.? .a-I a I .. was-'sofsecretathat ould be oratf'. I information i 'eve that I?ll-1? on -. . . - 52-1, I . Esays tha tant and pervasive equirement._to collect information reardln han rihts abuse - . 'An' . . a-mug?rp- bt "coming up dry." This, . a a applied to other issues as well as ELACH. . and its imptance to the Oversight committees and CIA. He I that theEmbassy was re'u'jred tore ort on human rights abuse" .alzv, quit. 5 CONCLUSION . . -- (U) The basis and nature of this agreement is discussed in the next section of this Repert. 174 SE I Ha 9 at 113' I I It .l.1ui.ax.l..a. {Arabia 113Ilrrl. ?r?drhunbf . 4 .f?il?il 1 . .. . . i .. If PM mm . .52- .110 . I: w. Imbaw?nhmk Mina. ?xgmufri .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. .. . s- I 31.3.1..1. VI.) - lWavFFt$K . l! i a 1 I -.. ul.ul. . .I. .. .IL \LWk?m% .. he II. ?r 33.5. (Ark. 1. . a . . ll?na. .nll . . ., . . . .?.udw/ .man .. I: 2, .. - - .7 -- -20530200 m? r: DID A CIA ?5 PROVIDE REGARDING i FATE or aer Camry ro me 0 use SELECT COMMIITEE NINTELLIGENCE AND THE ?pro on regarding the fate of an erican pnet and VReyes Mata that he said he had failed to report 533;? herr?heo?otamed the information 1tW that . . 4. SE ET -588.- Potential Con?icng 4 -.- sever - screpancies were identi?ed by'the od?fas Group btween th ormation provided by -. - . ..--.- I1996 and that which he provided to the HPSCI Staff members in July 1996- The specific discrepancies, annesponses to the IG regarding them, are as follows; 'l . ?3 "a push?rrfa? . A. . I1. . phi-?1? . . tatement; ecords do not indicate that attributed any statements regarding Father Carney's fate to HPS CI Statement. Th . ecord indicates tha statedtha . ad said that the priest was dead when found by the Hondurans. IG Statement a say that he persona had found et, ?out only that the priest had died of malnutrition. . taemnt. ycring to?ecords'aid >1 3 ,4 former membero the that: Honduran Special Forces Unit that participated in searching for the guerrilla band with which Father Carney - entered Honduras, claimed that he had been present when the priest was found dead and decomposed in a hammock in the jungle and that he placed the shin _of the priest into his backpack. - CI Statement. The-?ndicates that? said that .laimed that the Honduran troops carried the priest's head ina knapsack. IG Statement. ?tates that claimed to have placed the skull of the priest into his own backpack. . Statement. Accordingt 'ecords said that ad provided him W1 information in 1985 or 1986 regarding the fate of the insurgents during the Honduran military Operation to locate the group in 1983. 195 who reportedly said that?daimed that he was aware that captured prisoners had been pushed from helicopters as part of the interrogation/ intimidation campaign against the guerrillas. HPS c1 Statement. The~ecord indicates that-" said that he had heard rumors in 1985 from junior Honduran military of?cials that some guerrillas were thrown from helic0pters during the Olancho Operation. 1 .u g-u- . (fr-w . IG Statement. 'tates that rumors of people being thrown out of helicopters were-common 4 ?qlso states Fat it was in 1988 3 or 1989 that he had hear street rum0rs that the I i - Hondurans may have thrown individuals out of y. 5 helicopters to their deaths. He states that ever? mentioned anything about this to him. - . . CONCLUSION . The record op - tatements to the ousePermanent' Select Committee .on' "?telligen'ce and the rec0rd of-tatements to_ ontain slight discrepancies. However, none of . the discrepancies 'appear to be signi?cant. "52- . 196 . I'ln'. . . I Im9gieicql~g 9:2. .1. .u?mu . . . .. - Possible In'x'r'ol?ernent?oi Interrogations-t" . ?2594. HWG Findng received anallegation tha u: . present during a? hostile Hondan terrtion of ehalf?of the HWG, investiators fro . ay have been n?soner; On interrogation, hostile or otherwisever een present dunn conducted 595. IC Finding: tThe IQ investi ation fo no evience to substantrate the a?egatior'ftha A '1 . of a prisoner . .- I - r- .u this regard He deed ad. . wasp-resent at'a?host?e interrogationor participated in torture . . .- flown-lfdut .. . a. .. . (U) Failure to Notify Congress of Signifiveant Developments; . . 602. Honduras Working Group found .. that a February 1986 letter from DCI Casey informed Congress of his I commitment to investigate fully any additional information the received regarding ELACH, the right-wing paramilitary organization that was allegedly implicated along with Honduran officials in death The Honduras Working Group?noted thatailed to provide additional I . . . i oation on failed-to advise a SSCI Staff -- delegatio March 1996 . .n'dr A squad activities. 603. g?fo Finding: .: 4.55:? .3 5-: j; - sought additional information on ELACH'fromJ-but - .- none could provide addition Iii-4:433? they say - that none 9 OHM Con?rm .the alleged eaos of . ation regg the alleged existence of ELACH and the identities of its members was reported In Fary 6 Ceyinfed th a the HPSCI by - lett at would investigate fully andtional . .. -.-. didn'ot'le'arn of. until April 1986 . . '1 1t would have been impossible for . to report to the SSCI Staff members in March 1986 that? had been mistreated by a 606. ?87 HWG Finding: The Honduras Working Group concluded that Headquarters managers failed to devote.5uf?cien?t attention to routine support activities (U) Other HWG Issues; .. . . . . - . - - n. . I - .-.. (dl Potentialpoliticization by the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) in 1984 in that DI allegedly revised their I nae-IDI- ago?.? Potential politicization by the DI in 1988 when a DI I manager allegedly told subordinates that he was reluctant A - to dispara the Honduran Government in an injemgence 611.165 by the Honduras Working Group relating to alleged politicization of . -- - IDI analysis be investigated by the IG. In a September 11, I996 SIS/Safer response to the Executive Director, the IG recommended that the two ,7 potential politicization issues be? reviewed by the DPS Ombudsman . . ., . . ., 21CONCLUSIONS . .15612, - IAEMPLOYEE '7 -. PRESENT BURING SESSIONS OP HOS INIERROGAON OR TORTURE IN . :9 . - 'lnbeen found to substantlate the allegation? a an CIA wan? 'No eviden eent'dun'ng sessions of hostile-in ?errogation or tortureinI-Ionduras. . I . Mir}: Mimi: . . A5 FOR KILLING INCLUDING - . . .- -. . -- . - .. -- . - - -. - - - . - . . - - .- . i - . Pf?duced timely' and substantial intelligence on theOlan .peratro?n, ineluding relevant information regarding Reyes . . dam-I5 dist-d that a _ones captured during'th?. .ET;Olan QC eratfion had been executed by Honduran Officers and that-Reyes Mata was?arnon'g those?exeeuted. The executions reportedly were initiated afterthe "field "commander? Olaneho'i?nOt otherwise-identitiede Honduran'ArmedForces General Staff to "seareh'and'destroy." An October 17, 1983 I 204 . 5: . ?indicated that . *confirmed the ea rort and'added that'Reyes MataTx?fas held for a couple of days before being executed. Neither of these reports contained the identities of the alleged executioners or any information regarding the fate of Carney. ..-. . 1 0 .2.- ?vas told by? late 1994 oi- earlv 1995 that Carney was ei er ea or near death when the appened upon him while atrolling un'ng the 1983 Olancho eration. If from I 1992rs 2 subsequently shed some bt on soce's credib' 'ty in this regard. . eta-'7. - :7 . .. . aa'hf- -9 . I 614. . . . . DETERMINE . ?1 - . . FATE VIEW REPEATED (2111512 135 PM CONGRESS AND we . unknown to CIA. De5pite these efforts-however, the precise fate of Carney femains . 206 51:96 \hT 615. WHAT 0mm 71.5. GOVERNMENTASSETS INPORNIATION RE.S MATA AND 1 UP ON CIA REPONCERNING REYES NIAAND -- I '5 source reported on A l. - .- An Army Operational Grou ovember 5, 1983 thaz. - . 1 to document the specific identities of the. -- gmeludmg "the field commander," to in the-two ..- -- I. . CIA report's. - I .- 9 Thus, the October 1983?eports that implicated "the - ?eld commander?fin bye-f? t; notcontain -: a any reference - . "elmmane -- i . officer who were referred to in the two October 1983 CIA reports as having been involved in prisoner executions. - two A'reprts? ere reciVe . the Agency be $3 and February 1984 and . - - i__g identi?e - I, 5.- one of those implicated in the exequ we not retrievable by CIA. 0 Since none of 5 information waPemer/?able . . no cometothe the OLLOW-LIP ON THE ELACH REPORTING ESPECIALLY IN VIEW or CI W5 .- . -..-- ?a -c . the existence of .1. . 209 one could ermore, non 620. (60/ DID A CIA EMPLOYEE PROVIDE . STATEMENTS REGARDING THE FATE OF FATHER CARNEY To THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE --., - The reCOI'd 'i . statements to the Hoe k' eeon e?or?ncef'ff and the Tecofd taitements to the Office of PeTSOnnel 43:? Security contain g_ I crepancies.? Howevef, none of the-sf discrepancies appeafto Be significant. - - 2. (U) The findings of this Report of Investigation should be reviewed in any individual accountability determinations that are to be considered on the basis of the HOnduras Working Group (HWG) ?ndings. 3. (U) As recommended by the Inspector General on September 11, 1996; the Directorate of Intelligence Ombudsman for i? Politicization-should be instructed by the E-xecutiveDirector to reviewthe two potential politicization issues that were identi?ed by the HW G. - CONCUR: Q/L?vt/Ci?? rederick P. Hitz . Date Inspector General >225 U) i-l ANNEX 3 (U) Additional CIA Reporting Regarding the OlanchO'Operation .CI. TMJuly 11, 1983 Intelligence Report. 13;" .. i {that a meeting was held in Mexico City in late June 1983that was attended by representatives of various Honduran leftist extremist groups. The was represented by Reyes Mata. The groups '5 agreed to form the Revolutionary Unity Movement (MUR) to begin implementation Of the initial phase of rural guerrilla warfare. The groups were-in the process of studying potential targets within Honduras. - - 3. MAuostlo, 1983 Intelligence Report. a. no I uals a? 1' . om the 1 guerrilla force located in the mountains of Olancho 1' Department. The two individuals described being infiltrated into i . sw? sscy?' Honduras from Nicaragua beginning in mid-July 1983 after being trained in Cuba. The leader of the group and a political officer were identified, respectively, as Reyes Mata and "Father FaustoM?la, known as Mario." The guerrillas had planned to consolidate with other guerrilla fronts and recruit new members until either September or October'1983. This group was one of four distinct fronts, all of which were to be unified under the conunand of Reyes f. Mata . . . . .1 . . August 10, 198 I a riefing, a close?up photograph of a-M-n-16u?fle, tame from a guerrilla, was presented. The markings on the rifle, among other identifiable information, indicated thate '_of_th'e Government_?Iu a - 7 August 10, 198" r_the Cordillera ntre Rios area was planned. The purposemhis leffort was to confirm that the guerrillas, who had in?ltrated from Nicaragua, were establishing base camps in Honduras. Wugust 11, 1983 National Intelligence Daily. CIA 'repo ed in an item published in the National Intelligence Daily that l- the Cuban-trained insurgents were present near the Patuca River in the_Olancho Department and planned to begin unspeci?ed guerrilla operations in September 1983. A commentary noted that the _Sandinistas were following through on their threat to increase subversive activities against Honduras. The difficult terrainvwas predicted to be a factor in the outcome of the counterinsurgent operation. -A- . Honduran Armed Forces intended aunch a sweepoperation against the guerrilla force af?liated with . U) I the The Operation was?planned to begin on August 11. Due a to the difficult terrain, it was predicted that the Operation could last i 10 days. .. urge-ch..? .- . - ?at! I loHonouran - August 16, 198'? television program tha documred the history of the guerrillas who deserted. During the show, the guerrillas talked about their recruitment,- trairung in Cuba and return to Honduras via Nicaragua for 93 tellieen-ce Rec. .. gaon guerrillas who deserted. The consisted of four majdr commands that were broken down into various sub-command centers that were further broken down into operational cells. The Central Command was located in Teg'ucigalpa and was divided into three sub?commands. as provided by I . -- . . orces were prepared to continue patrollng the area Where the guerrillas were believed to be Operating. - a . n- .- 17. :e?aovr guerrillas had having been recruited by the PR-TCH under false pretenses and the lack of food supplies. - - _k at 14 guerrillas had turn es in to Honduran arities and it was believed that others had deserted. Deserters advised that one of their officers had been executed by a I fellow insurgent officer for defeatist statements and at least two members of this group had died of starvation. 19. August 30, 1983 National Intelligence Daily. CIA . reported in an item in the National Intelligence Daily that the Hondurans had captured several guerrillas who all advised that they - had been trained in Nicaragua and Cuba. ln a commentary3' . noted that the apparent attempt by Cuba and Nicaragua to start an - insurgency in Honduras was doing poorly. The remaining guerrillas were believed to pose little threat. to the internal security of Honduras, although it was believed that the Sandinistas were likely to continue sending trained insurgents into the country to put pressure on the government. I on uran aut I 0th the guernlla debaters once they had been debriefed and he noted that some of the deserters 3 were sincere althouh some had te themselves in because of ecommended that the Honduran Government treat all me ers of the group as being sincere While giving them clothing, food and shelter in a military facility wherethe ,ft?he base but would be under? "commended that the deserters Governmen understbod the importance of treating the captured guerrillas well. However, the Honduran Government also realized that some members of the group presented a counterintelligence problem and could not be monitored if all members were released immediately. On the other hand, some of the deserters appeared to be genuinely hostile to the Nicaraguan and Cuban Govemments for 99-3 . the deception reportedly used to recruit them into the insurgency. September 2, 1983 Intelligence Report." . M, esults of the Olancho operatic v55; . 39-. . Without firing a weapon, the u. rep had taken 16 insurgentsiinto custody. The insurgents, suffering from malnutrition, disease and low morale, continued to desert and surrender to the Armythere were three reasons for the-Honduran 1- .- .pe?lieved that- Arm ess in the counterinsurgent operation. First, the Army responded before the guerrillas were able to consolidate. Second, the i Army won over the cigilian population that had originally been sympathetic toward the insurgents. Third, the Army treated the prisoners humanely?evacuating them to Nueva Palestjna where they were fed, provided medical treatment, debriefed, and then taken to . Te'gucigalpa- These factors had encouraged others to desert. n~ slsz?r guerrilla by Honduran authorities. The guerrilla was taken into custody-by a crew aboard a Honduran helicopter that was 'resupplying counterinsurgent forces in Olancho DeparUnent. He? reportedly stated that he joined the group because the reduiter promised him training in accounting and was subsequently told that the school was in Nicaragua. _When he arrived there, he was informed that he would receive political and military training in Cuba. ?He spent one year and six months in Cuba?being trained as a platoon leader before being infiltrated into Honduras. 26. The guerrilla also reportedly indicated that the group's leader was Reyes Mata and that its mission was to recruit and train sympathizers before conducting raids on Honduran military installations- He believed that the principal reason for the group's failure to accomplish its mission was its early discovery before it could consolidate its position in the -Additional guerrillas were reportedly waiting in Nicaragua to-be infiltrated. 8 segrt-T jig-{Se tember 6, 198? r- 'n aty near ElAacate Air?eld. On 5 September 4, 1983, a 26?member insurgent group reportedly had engaged Honduran tramps on the outskirts of the village of Rio Tinto. In this first actual military engagement of the counterinsurgent operation, one guerrilla reportedly was killed. Furgents were armed with ri?es that were'clean and maintamedgtfa?gu'es' and U-S- run??l? Gefmanyh?dih??USSRE "ofth?gg'renades thaEyVefgconjscateEI -were armed with fuses having a zero or one second delay as indicated on the detonators. The captured guerrillas stated they were iL not aware of the timing capabilityand would have in'ured . 1 I adused - . tember 14, 1383 Exclusive Intelligence Report 32: 'Se Sandinistas from the guerrillas in Olancho Department. One ?5 message re?ected that Reyes Mata had ordered the execution of a lieutenant for allowing-the defection of subordinates. In another i message, Reyes Mata asserted that the members of his group who were being held by the Honduran Army were not deserters, but a .5 reconnaissance platoon that had been captured. Several messages complained about the of loticl 'n?u ort to thoup.? ?adio communications had been received by the .?lug . - September Intelligence reported item in the'ation'?llntelligence Dailythatthejf?ij of the 5 and that'Re'jres -- against the insurgents were. continuing and the Hondurans planned to folloW?up with a civic action plan. A comment stated that the success of the counterinsurgent operation'was attributed to the effectiveness of the Honduran Army and the ineptitude of the "l guerrillas. The decimation of the group and death of Reyes Mata, considered a capable guerrilla leader, were envisioned as possibly prompting the Sandinistas to reevaluate their efforts to promote an . l. active insufgencyinHondurascan, 4- .- . . 4a.; 0 seven Hod temist cations had been relatively inactive. One exception was the that was quickly neutralized by the Honduran Armed Forces. As of late September 1983, only ?ve of the original force of 96 guerrillas - '5 .?nhf?n cit 1.. 1?1; .13; ?53m Wmmuon. . Mo . . wimm??m?mmwm?bmm 8 g?m?m ?1 .. . a- @me Smamgg .. I. - .- - . .- - vuM?N??un' 54". s- 4 4 3198 co?te that _ey treache?roilsr?n'ati??e? of the Olancho terrain and the . a. .. . . organizational'?llpp'oft that?WaS available. Reyes Mata 6on have: saved himself and his men by returning to Nicaragua but, in opinion of the official, opted to play a martyr role . (J3 'l 48. A PCl?l leader reportedly had counseled Reyes Mata against the operation during its planning stages. Reyes Mata replied 2 that he could not back out as he was under too much pressure from the Nicaraguan Sandiru'stas and that he believed the tithe was right, especially with the presence of the US. troops in Honduras. Berr? if}