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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION (at Covington)
Hon. JOHN SCHICKEL,
in his Personal and Official Capacities,
2147 Natchez Trace
Union, KY 41091

: Case No. ________________________
:
:

AND
:
DAVID WATSON
4475 Oak Level Road
Benton, Kentucky 42025

:
:

AND
:
KEN MOELLMAN, JR.
475 Hickory Grove Road
Foster, KY 41043

:
:

PLAINTIFFS
v.

:

Hon. CRAIG C. DILGER,
in his official capacity
as Chair and Member, Kentucky
Registry of Election Finance,
140 Walnut Street
Frankfort, Kentucky

:
:
:
:

and
:
Hon. TERRY NAYDAN,
in her official capacity
as Vice-Chair and Member,
Kentucky Registry of Election Finance,
140 Walnut Street
Frankfort, Kentucky

:
:
:

and

:

Hon. ROSEMARY CENTER,
in her official capacity
as Member,
Kentucky Registry of Election Finance,

:
:

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140 Walnut Street
Frankfort, Kentucky

:
:

and
:
Hon. REID HAIRE
in his official capacity
as Member,
Kentucky Registry of Election Finance,
140 Walnut Street
Frankfort, Kentucky
and

:
:
:
:

Hon. ROBERT MATTINGLY
in his official capacity
as Member,
Kentucky Registry of Election Finance,
140 Walnut Street
Frankfort, Kentucky

:
:
:

and

:

Hon. CHASTITY ROSS
in her official capacity
as Member,
Kentucky Registry of Election Finance,
140 Walnut Street
Frankfort, Kentucky

:
:
:
:

and
:
Hon. THOMAS STEVENS
in his official capacity
as Member,
Kentucky Registry of Election Finance,
140 Walnut Street
Frankfort, Kentucky

:
:
:

and

:

Hon. JOHN STEFFEN,
in his official capacity
as Executive Director
Kentucky Registry of Election Finance,
140 Walnut Street
Frankfort, Kentucky

:

2

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:
and
:
Hon. GEORGE C. TROUTMAN,
in his official capacity
as Chairman and Member
Kentucky Legislative Ethics Comm’n.
22 Mill Creek Park
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

:
:
:

and

:

Hon. ELMER GEORGE
in his official capacity as Member
Kentucky Legislative Ethics Comm’n.
22 Mill Creek Park
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

:

and

:

Hon. DEBORAH JO DURR
in her official capacity as Member
Kentucky Legislative Ethics Comm’n.
22 Mill Creek Park
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

:

and

:

Hon. NORMA SCOTT
in her official capacity as Member
Kentucky Legislative Ethics Comm’n.
22 Mill Creek Park
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

:

And

:

Hon. CHARLES R. BORDERS
in his official capacity as Member
Kentucky Legislative Ethics Comm’n.
22 Mill Creek Park
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

:

And

:

Hon. BOB FULKERSON
in his official capacity as Member

:

:
:

:
:

:
:

:
:

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Kentucky Legislative Ethics Comm’n.
22 Mill Creek Park
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

:
:

And

:

Hon. PAT FREIBART
in her official capacity as Member
Kentucky Legislative Ethics Comm’n.
22 Mill Creek Park
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

:

And

:

Hon. HENRY STEPHENS
in his official capacity as Member
Kentucky Legislative Ethics Comm’n.
22 Mill Creek Park
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

:

And

:

Hon. PAUL D. GUDGEL
in her official capacity as Member
Kentucky Legislative Ethics Comm’n.
22 Mill Creek Park
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

:

And

:

Hon. ANTHONY M. WILHOIT
in his official capacity as
Executive Director
Kentucky Legislative Ethics Comm’n.
22 Mill Creek Park
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

:

:
:

:
:

:
:

:
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DEFENDANTS
:
And
:
Jack Conway, KY Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
700 Capitol Avenue, Suite 118
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-3449
For Notice Purposes Only

:
:

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VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF,
COSTS, AND ATTORNEY FEES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
Plaintiffs Kentucky State Senator John Schickel, (“Senator Schickel”), Mr. David Watson
(“Mr. Watson”), and Mr. Ken Moellman, Jr. (“Mr. Moellman”), by and through counsel, for their
Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Costs, and Attorney Fees for
Constitutional Violations (the “Complaint”), state and allege as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1.

This is an action involving the continued and threatened deprivation of the First Amendment
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson, Mr. Moellman, and
millions of other Kentuckians by the official capacity Defendants named herein. Senator
Schickel, a retired law enforcement officer, who has a long and distinguished history of
protecting Kentuckians, seeks to continue fulfilling his oath of office, upholding and
protecting the U.S. Constitution, and vindicating the First Amendment rights of himself and
millions of other Kentuckians. Mr. Watson, an Army veteran, and candidate for the
Kentucky House or Representatives, likewise seeks to vindicate the constitutional rights of
millions of Kentuckians. Specifically this action challenges certain campaign finance
legislation contained in K.R.S. § 121.150, and specifically certain campaign contribution
limitations as well as campaign contribution prohibitions contained within those sections.
This suit likewise challenges certain provisions in K.R.S. § 6.767 through K.R.S. § 6.811, as
being incompatible with the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This suit seeks injunctive
and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
PARTIES

2. At all relevant times herein, Senator Schickel was a resident of Boone County, Kentucky,
was and is the incumbent State Senator for the 11th Senatorial District in Kentucky, was a
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candidate for the office of State Senator for the 11th Senatorial District in 2012, and is a
candidate for the office of State Senator for the 11th Senatorial District in 2016. In
connection with his candidacy for office, for which he will stand for election in the 2016
primary and general election, Senator Schickel has and continues to engage in fundraising
and other campaign activities, and desires to engage in campaign activities that are currently
prohibited by the statutes challenged herein.
3. At all relevant times herein, Mr. Watson was a resident of Marshall County, Kentucky, and is
currently and will be a candidate for the 6th House District in Kentucky in 2016. In
connection with his candidacy for office, for which he will stand for election in the 2016
primary and general election, Mr. Watson has and continues to engage in fundraising and
other campaign activities, and desires to engage in campaign activities that are currently
prohibited by the statutes challenged herein.
4. At all relevant times herein, Mr. Moellman was a resident of Pendleton County, Kentucky,
and, in 2011, was a statewide candidate for the office of Kentucky State Treasurer. Mr.
Moellman will be a candidate for the office of Pendleton County Judge/Executive in the 2018
elections, and in connection with that office, will begin fundraising activities in the near
future. Mr. Moellman desires to engage in campaign and other activities that are currently
prohibited by the statutes challenged herein.
5. Defendants Hon. Craig Dilger, Hon. Terry Naydan, Hon. Rosemary Center, Hon. Reid Haire,
Hon. Robert Mattingly, Hon. Chastity Ross, and Hon. Thomas Stevens are the duly installed
and serving members of the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance (collectively “KREF”),
who are all sued in their official capacities as such. Defendant John Steffen is the Executive
Director of the KREF and is sued in his official capacity as such. The members of KREF,

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KREF itself, and Mr. Steffen are responsible, pursuant to K.R.S. 121.110, 121.120, and
121.140, for the enforcement of K.R.S. Chapter 121, including, without limitation, the ability
to bring administrative or civil enforcement actions, as well as the ability to refer
enforcement matters for criminal prosecution. KREF also, pursuant to K.R.S. 121.140,
receives sworn complaints from the public relating to potential violations of K.R.S. Chapter
121.
6. Defendants Hon. George Troutman, Hon. Elmer George, Hon. Deborah Jo Durr, Hon. Norma
Scott, Hon. Charles R. Borders, Hon. Bob Fulkerson, Hon. Pat Freibart, Hon. Henry
Stephens, and Hon. Paul Gudgel are the duly installed and serving members of the Kentucky
Legislative Ethics Commission (collectively “KLEC”), who are all sued in their official
capacities as such. Defendant Anthony Wilhoit is the Executive Director of the KLEC and is
sued in his official capacity as such. The KLEC and Mr. Wilhoit are responsible, pursuant to
K.R.S. 6.651 and 6.666, for the enforcement of K.R.S. 6.601 through 6.849, known as the
Kentucky Code of Legislative Ethics (“Ethics Code”), including, without limitation, the
ability to bring administrative or civil enforcement actions, as well as the ability to refer
enforcement matters for criminal prosecution. KLEC also, pursuant to K.R.S. 6.686,
receives sworn complaints from the public relating to potential violations of the Ethics Code.
7. The Kentucky Attorney General is not served as a Defendant, but is provided notice under
the provisions of K.R.S. 418.075.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
8. Subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and causes of action asserted by Senator Schickel
in this action is conferred on this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 28
U.S.C. §1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, and other applicable law.

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9. This Court has personal jurisdiction over each defendant because each of them is domiciled
within the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
10. Venue in this District and division is proper, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391 and other
applicable law, because all of the deprivations of Senator Schickel’s and Mr. Moellman’s
Constitutional Rights occurred in Boone County, Kentucky and Pendleton County,
Kentucky, respectively, and future deprivations of their Constitutional Rights are threatened
and likely to occur in this District. The named Defendants live in separate divisions within
the Eastern District of Kentucky, and some live in the Western District of Kentucky. A
substantial portion of the events and deprivations at issue occurred in the Northern Division
of the Eastern District of Kentucky. While deprivations of Mr. Watson’s constitutional rights
occurred in Marshall County, Kentucky, which is outside this district, the questions of fact
and law are identical to the claims brought by Senator Schickel and Mr. Moellman.
FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS
11. Senator Schickel was a candidate for the office of State Senator for the 11th Senatorial
District in 2012, and is a candidate for the office of State Senator for the 11th Senatorial
District in 2016. In connection with his candidacy for office, for which he will stand for
election in the 2016 primary and general election, Senator Schickel has and continues to
engage in fundraising and other campaign activities, and desires to engage in campaign
activities that are currently prohibited by the statutes challenged herein.
12. Mr. Watson is and will be a candidate for the office of State Representative for the 6th House
District in 2016. In connection with his candidacy for office, for which he will stand for
election in the 2016 general election, Mr. Watson has and continues to engage in fundraising

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and other campaign activities, and desires to engage in campaign activities that are currently
prohibited by the statutes challenged herein.
13. At all relevant times herein, Mr. Moellman was a resident of Pendleton County, Kentucky,
and, in 2011, was a statewide candidate for the office of Kentucky State Treasurer. Mr.
Moellman will be a candidate for the office of Pendleton County Judge/Executive in the 2018
elections, and in connection with that office, will begin fundraising activities in the near
future. Mr. Moellman desires to engage in campaign and other activities that are currently
prohibited by the statutes challenged herein.
14. The 11th Senatorial District covers Boone County, Kentucky which according to 2010 Census
data, had a population of 118,811, comprising 43,216 households.
15. The 6th House District covers Lyon and Marshall County, Kentucky, and part of McCracken
County, and, according to 2010 Census data, had a population of 41,978, comprising
approximately 20,000 households.
16. Pendleton County, Kentucky, has a population of 14,877, comprising 6,339 households
according to the 2010 Census.
17. Senator Schickel has engaged and continues to engage in significant fundraising activities in
connection with his campaigns for State Senate. For instance, in 2012, Senator Schickel
raised $92,968.88 for his Republican Primary Campaign, and Senator Schickel raised, and
spent $70,067.25 for his General Election Campaign. Thus far, for the 2016 election, by and
through his 2014 annual KREF report, Senator Schickel has raised $97,719.49 and spent
$8,763.38, from approximately 150 separate donors. Senator Schickel has raised as many
funds as he can, consistent with the limitations of the law.

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18. Senator Schickel expects to need to raise approximately $250,000 to $350,000 for his
primary and general election campaigns in 2016. He cannot do so lawfully under current
Kentucky law.
19. Mr. Watson will engage in significant fundraising activities in connection with his campaigns
for the Kentucky House of Representatives. He expects to need to raise at least $150,000 to
be competitive in the General Election in 2016. To win the election, Mr. Watson intends to
inform the voters of the 6th Kentucky House District of the incumbent, Will Coursey’s record
of sexually harassing female staffers in the Kentucky General Assembly, causing a lawsuit to
be filed against Coursey and the Kentucky Legislative Research Commission.1 He cannot
lawfully raise enough funds under current Kentucky law to so inform the voters.
20. Mr. Moellman needs to raise approximately $75,000 for his general election campaign in
2018. He cannot lawfully do so under current Kentucky law.
21. Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Moellman have many donors and potential donors
who are longstanding friends and acquaintances, and many of these donors contribute to
Kentucky’s campaign limit donation of $1,000 per election, per person. If permitted by
Kentucky law, these donors would donate more than the $1,000 limit.
22. A single mailer, for instance, in a primary cycle for the 11th Senatorial District costs
approximately $10,000 to run; while a single mailer in a general election cycle for the 11th
Senatorial District costs approximately $20,000 to run. Typically, Senator Schickel will run
at least two mailers in a primary cycle, and at least two mailers in a general election
campaign. More could be necessary on the competitiveness of the race. The costs for these

1

http://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/2015/06/23/taxpayers-hook-arnold-settlement/29185533/

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mailers, and other costs associated with running a campaign, goes up every year, exceeding
or at least matching the price of inflation.
23. A single mailer, for instance, in a general election cycle for the 6th House District costs
approximately $12,000 to run. Mr. Watson expects to need to run at least two mailers in the
general election campaign. More could be necessary based on the competitiveness of the
race. The costs for these mailers, and other costs associated with running a campaign, goes
up every year, exceeding or at least matching the price of inflation.
24. A single mailer, for instance, in a general election cycle for the Pendleton County
Judge/Executive Race costs approximately $10,000 to run. Mr. Moellman expects to need to
run at least two mailers in the general election campaign. More could be necessary on the
competitiveness of the race. The costs for these mailers, and other costs associated with
running a campaign, goes up every year, exceeding or at least matching the price of inflation.
25. Typically, Political Action Committees (“PACs”), including non-profit groups that advocate
for the election or defeat of particular candidates or send mail pieces about one candidate or
the other (or both), either registered with KREF, or, more often than not, so called federal
“dark money” Super PACs, which are not subject to disclosure and reporting requirements,
have been participating in primary and general elections for Kentucky State Senate or
Judge/Executive races, sending between one and three mailers per PAC per election. For the
11th Senatorial District or 6th House District, this results in spending of hundreds of
thousands of dollars in PAC (and Super PAC) money.
26. PACs also operate and are active in Judge/Executive races, and tens of thousands of dollars
are expected to be spent in the 2018 Pendleton County Judge/Executive race.

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27. Each dollar that Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson, or Mr. Moellman raises, however, is subject
to both disclosure requirements, and limitations under K.R.S. Chapter 121.
28. Each PAC mailer that is adverse to Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson or Mr. Moellman requires
each of them to spend corresponding dollars to address issues raised. Where the issues are
misleading, and require clarification, more than one mailer or other form of voter messaging
may be necessary. Thus, each dollar spent by a PAC requires between one to three dollars of
money to be spent by a candidate to effectively communicate with voters.

The Challenged Provisions
29. K.R.S. 121.150(6) limits, in any election, campaign contributions to $1,000, from any
person, permanent committee, or contributing organization; K.R.S. 121.150(13) limits loans
to a person’s own campaign to $10,000; K.R.S. 121.150(23)(a) limits a candidate’s ability to
accept more than 50% of fundraising from a permanent committee or $10,000, whichever is
greater. If permitted, Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Moellman would accept
donations of more than $1,000 in an election; would loan themselves more than $10,000 to
conduct their elections; and would generate more than 50% of his fundraising, and more than
$10,000 from permanent committees. They do not do so out of a legitimate fear and threat of
criminal and civil enforcement of K.R.S. 121.150, and the other sections contained herein, by
the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, the official capacity Defendants herein. Under
K.R.S. 121.990 violations constitute Class D felonies.
30. In addition to the foregoing, Mr. Watson intends to run as a Libertarian Candidate. K.R.S.
121.150(11) provides for four special “Super PACs” – called “caucus campaign
committees,” these committees are established in K.R.S. 121.015(3)(b), which states:

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(b) "Caucus campaign committee," which means members of one (1) of the following
caucus groups who receive contributions and make expenditures to support or oppose one
(1) or more specific candidates or slates of candidates for nomination or election, or a
committee: 1. House Democratic caucus campaign committee; 2. House Republican
caucus campaign committee; 3. Senate Democratic caucus campaign committee; and 4.
Senate Republican caucus campaign committee;
31. K.R.S. 121.150(11) provides for a $2,500 per year donation limit to the caucus campaign
committee for the House Democrats, House Republicans, Senate Democrats, and Senate
Republicans, and Kentucky law, and specifically K.R.S. 121.180(2)(b) envisions a donor
giving to the committee and “earmarking” the donation to assist particular candidates.
Unlike donations to political parties, which K.R.S. 121.150(11) caps at $2,500 per year, but
provides that donations in excess of $1,000 be “deposited in a separate account which the
state executive committee maintains for the exclusive purpose of paying administrative
costs incurred by the political party,” there is no such limitation on such donations to
“caucus campaign committees.” This allows the caucus campaign committees to funnel
funds, at two and a half times the “normal” candidate donation limit, to particular races and
candidates, engaging in viewpoint discrimination to protect Republican and Democratic party
candidates.
32. In the case of Mr. Watson, the special, viewpoint based, limitations for caucus campaign
committees significantly and negatively affect his ability to campaign, since he is limited to
$1,000 per donor limitations.
33. The contribution limits, in 1990, were set at $4,000 per candidate, per election. In 1992,
these contribution limits were lowered to $500 per candidate, per election. Finally, in 1994,
and since that point in time, the limit has remained $1,000 per candidate, per election.
34. The same $1,000 per candidate, per election, limit applies to a Mayor of a small city of 100
people, as to a State Senator covering a district of 118,811 people.
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35. The $1,000 limit does not rise based on inflation or consumer price index. Applying the
Consumer Price Index to the $1,000 from 1994, that would equate to $1,583.82 today. Put
another way, the $1,000 limit today would equate to $631.39 in 1994 dollars. More
fundamentally, using 1976 dollars, the $1,000 limit today, adjusted for inflation would be
$242.41 in 1976 dollars. Similarly, $1,000 in 1976 would equate to $4,125.17 today.
Similarly, the $1,000 limit today, equates to $683.79 in 1997 dollars.2
36. At the federal level, campaign contributions are adjusted for inflation, and are currently
$2,700 per candidate, per election. 52 USC 30016(a) and (c).
37. Elections are and continue to be more and more costly, largely because of so called Super
PACs; See, also, McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (describing Super PACs).
These Super PACs have and continue to participate in Kentucky legislative races. Over
$3,000,000 in Super PAC monies were spent in the 2014 general election cycle in Kentucky
state races and these Super PACs further participate in primary elections, spending
significant sums. See, also “Super PACs will spend millions in fight for Ky House,”
Louisville Court Journal, Tom Loftus, 10/31/2014 (attached as Exhibit A).
38. In a contested state house or state senate race, a Super PAC can be expected to fund at least
$100,000; and in particularly contested races, $200,000, or more could be spent.
39. As opposed to campaign disclosures in 1976, today, Kentucky’s Registry of Election Finance
accepts campaign finance reports from candidates in the weeks and months preceding an
election, and makes these figures available to the public on its website and searchable
database at http://www.kref.state.ky.us/krefsearch/ (last visited 4/10/15), making meaningful
campaign donor information, including date, amount, and identity of the door, available to

2

Source: http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited April 10, 2015)

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voters. This in turn makes it far easier to ferret out any quid-pro-quo donations, and has a
significant effect in preventing such quid-pro-quo corruption.
40. In fact, the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance admits, on its website, that its role is to
“assure the integrity of the Commonwealth's electoral process by making certain there is full
public access to campaign financial data and financial disclosure reports, and by
administering Kentucky's campaign finance laws.” See
http://kref.ky.gov/Pages/default.aspx#slide1 (last visited 4/10/2015). It further “ensures that
information reports pertinent to election campaign financing are filed on a timely basis and
reviews this information for completeness, accuracy, and compliance with campaign finance
laws.” Id.
41. K.R.S. 6.767(1)3 prohibits the receipt of a campaign contribution from a legislative agent (i.e.
a lobbyist), in any amount, at any time to any legislator or candidate for legislator – this
limitation applies not only to donations for legislative races, but also donations for any other
race the legislator desires to run (i.e. for Governor, Lt. Governor, or Attorney General).;
K.R.S. 6.767(2) prohibits the receipt of a campaign contribution from an employer of a
legislative agent (i.e. a lobbyist), at any time that the legislature is in session. K.R.S.
6.811(6) and (7) contains reciprocal prohibitions on the legislative agents and their
employers from making these same contributions. There are criminal, civil and other
penalties for violations.
42. K.R.S. 6.811(4) and K.R.S. 6.751(2) prohibits the gifting of “anything of value” to a
legislator, from a legislative agent or its employer, at any time, regardless of the
circumstances, for any reason. This includes a 2014 amendment that excluded a de minimis

3

To be clear, only Senator Schickel and not Mr. Moellman, are challenging the legislative ethics provisions in
K.R.S. Chapter 6.

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exception for entertainment, or a cup of coffee, from the definition of “anything of value”
under K.R.S. 6.611. Under the new definition, members of the public can invite legislators
to holiday parties, including events for political parties, and allow the legislators to receive
snacks and other de minimis items, but if the same event is organized by a lobbyist or
employer of a lobbyist, the legislator cannot attend. This infringes on the legislator’s,
lobbyist’s, and employer of lobbyist’s right to freedom of association, and freedom of
speech.
43. Senator Schickel, a retired law enforcement officer, is prohibited from taking donations from,
but otherwise would accept donations, from employers of lobbyists at all times but for the
aforementioned prohibitions set forth above, including, the Kentucky State Lodge Fraternal
Order of Police, Inc., the Bluegrass Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4, the Kentucky Fire
Fighters Association, and the National Rifle Association of America.
44. In terms of lobbyist donations, Senator Schickel would accept, if not prohibited, donations
from certain registered lobbyists, including those lobbying on behalf of the organizations set
forth in the preceding paragraph.
45. Furthermore, Senator Schickel would attend holiday parties, hosted by longstanding friends,
who are lobbyists or employ lobbyists, if he were not prevented from doing so under K.R.S.
6.811(4) and K.R.S. 6.751(2). In order to simply conform to social norms, he would also
accept a cup of coffee, or soda or other de minimis items, from such lobbyists, in the
Capitol’s cafeteria, in discussing issues with the lobbyists, just as he would do so from a
constituent.
46. Mr. Watson, an army veteran, father, and husband, who is an advocate for freedom and ethics
in government, is prohibited from taking donations from, but otherwise would accept

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donations, from employers of lobbyists at all times but for the aforementioned prohibitions
set forth above, including, the Kentucky Association of Sexual Assault Programs, Inc., which
advocates on behalf of rape crisis centers, and the National Rifle Association of America.
47. In terms of lobbyist donations, Mr. Watson would accept, if not prohibited, donations from
certain registered lobbyists, including those lobbying on behalf of the organizations set forth
in the preceding paragraph.
48. Furthermore, Mr. Watson would attend holiday parties, hosted by longstanding friends, who
are lobbyists or employ lobbyists, if he were not prevented from doing so under K.R.S.
6.811(4) and K.R.S. 6.751(2).
49. Unless enjoined, all Defendants will continue to enforce the challenged provisions herein, in
a manner that contravenes Senator Schickel’s, Mr. Watson’s, and Mr. Moellman’s First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
50. The actions set forth herein have and continue to deprive Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson, and
Mr. Moellman of their First Amendment rights.
Case Law, or a Good Faith Argument for Extension or Reversal of It,
Supports the Challenges Herein
51. Plaintiffs, Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Moellman, hereby reincorporates the
preceding paragraphs of their Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
KRS 121.150(6)’s $1,000 limit and K.R.S. 121.150(11)’s $2,500 limit for “caucus
campaign committees”4
52. K.R.S. 121.150(6) provides that “No candidate, slate of candidates, campaign committee,
political issues committee, nor anyone acting on their behalf, shall accept a contribution of
more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) from any person, permanent committee, or

To be clear, the challenge to K.R.S. 121.150(11) regarding “caucus campaign committees” is raised by Mr.
Watson, and not Senator Schickel.
4

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contributing organization in any one (1) election. No person, permanent committee, or
contributing organization shall contribute more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) to any one
(1) candidate, campaign committee, political issues committee, nor anyone acting on their
behalf, in any one (1) election.”
53. The $1,000 limitations contained within K.R.S. 121.150(6), which are not indexed for
inflation, violate Senator Schickel’s, Mr. Watson’s, and Mr. Moellman’s First Amendment
Rights under case law found in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) and Randall v. Sorrell,
548 U.S. 230 (2006). Specifically, the $1,000 limit today equate to $242.41 in 1976 dollars
(as is relevant to Buckey), and $683.79 in 1997 dollars (as is relevant to Randall).
Furthermore, the $1,000 limit, which is not and has not been increased for inflation, makes it
difficult if not impossible to amass the resources necessary for effective campaign advocacy,
particularly in light of: (1) the incremental effects of inflation; (2) the participation of PACs
and Super PACs in the race, which can and do raise more than the candidates themselves; (3)
increasing campaign costs, which, unlike the donation limits, are adjusted for inflation. For
non-incumbents, the $1,000 limit magnifies the advantages of incumbency to the point where
they can, absent PAC or Super PAC participation, places a non-incumbent at a significant
disadvantage.
54. K.R.S. 121.150(11) provides: “No person shall contribute more than two thousand five
hundred dollars ($2,500) to the state executive committee of a political party and its
subdivisions and affiliates in any one (1) year. No person shall contribute more than two
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) to a caucus campaign committee in any one (1) year.
Contributions a person makes to any executive committee other than the state executive
committee in excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000) in any one (1) year shall be deposited

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in a separate account which the state executive committee maintains for the exclusive
purpose of paying administrative costs incurred by the political party.”
55. The $1,000 limitation is particularly egregious in light of the $2,500 limitation for caucus
campaign committees for the Kentucky House and Kentucky Senate Democrat and Republic
caucuses. These viewpoint based, legislatively hard coded “super PACs,” permitted the
ability to fundraise and spend more on political races than political parties themselves, are
permitted to raise two and half times the amount that an individual candidate is, placing
persons such as Mr. Watson at a significant disadvantage.
56. Furthermore, notwithstanding the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kentucky Right to Life v. Terry,
108 F.3d 637 (1997), almost 20 years have passed (with corresponding inflation) without
revisions to the limits upheld in that case, as well as a significant sea change in election
finance with the advent of significant Super PAC participation, online transmission of
campaign contribution information, and other considerations outlined herein.
57. Under these facts and circumstances, the $1,000 limit is no longer “closely drawn” towards
preventing quid-pro-quo corruption, particularly where, as is the case here, there is full,
timely, and convent disclosure of donors to the public, and where the limits creates the issues
set forth in the preceding paragraphs.
58. Moreover, it is appropriate to overrule and revisit Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and
its application of anything other than strict scrutiny on contribution limits, given today’s
political atmosphere of Super PACs and the levels of their participation, and the fact that,
unlike Super PACs, contributions to candidates are subject to disclosure, where, “with
modern technology, disclosure now offers a particularly effective means of arming the voting
public with information” and limits “may in fact encourage the movement of money away

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from entities subject to disclosure.” McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460 (2014). The
$1,000 limit at issue is not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest, as
required by strict scrutiny.
59. Furthermore, the creation of the “caucus campaign committees,” under Kentucky law,
coupled with their privileged status under Kentucky law with heightened donation limits
under K.R.S. 121.150(11), is a facially based viewpoint discrimination, and therefore
unconstitutional.
K.R.S. 121.150(13) limit on campaign loans by the candidate
60. K.R.S. 121.150(13) provides “No candidates running as a slate for the offices of Governor
and Lieutenant Governor shall make combined total personal loans to their committee in
excess of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) in any one (1) election. No candidate for any other
statewide elected state office shall lend to his committee any amount in excess of twenty-five
thousand dollars ($25,000) in any one (1) election. In campaigning for all other offices, no
candidate shall lend to his committee more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) in any one (1)
election.”
61. This law was last enacted and updated in 2011.
62. If not prevented by law, Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Moellman would loan their
respective campaigns over $10,000.
63. The law is not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest. In the
alternative, the law is not “closely drawn” towards preventing quid-pro-quo corruption.
64. The $10,000 limit loan imposed on Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Moellman is
tantamount to an expenditure limitation, and it is not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
governmental interest. In Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 672-674 (6th Cir. 2004), the

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Sixth Circuit struck the $50,000 governor’s limitation on loans, yet Kentucky re-enacted the
statute with that ban in place. The $10,000 loan is contrary to Anderson, the First
Amendment, and unconstitutional.

KRS 121.150(23)(a) limitation on fundraising from permanent committees
65. K.R.S. 121.150(23)(a) limits a candidate’s ability to accept more than 50% of fundraising
from a permanent committee or $10,000, whichever is greater.
66. If not prevented by law, both Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Moellman would
accept, and permanent committees would donate, over 50% of their fundraising and over
$10,000.
67. These provisions are not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest.
These provisions are akin to the aggregate limits struck down in McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.
Ct. 1434 (2014).
68. In the alternative, these restrictions are not “closely drawn” towards preventing quid-pro-quo
corruption and are akin to the aggregate limits struck down in McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.
Ct. 1434 (2014).
K.R.S. 6.767(1),(2), K.R.S. 6.751(2), and K.R.S. 6.811 (4), (5), (6) and (7) – Lobbyists and
Employers of Lobbyists
69. K.R.S. 6.611(2) provides, in relevant part, that “anything of value” includes: “A gift, ... or an
interest in a gift...” but does not include: “[c]ompensation, food, beverages, entertainment,
transportation, lodging, or other goods or services extended to a legislator by the legislator's
private employer or by a person other than a legislative agent or employer.”

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70. K.R.S. 6.767 provides, in relevant part: “(1) A member of the General Assembly, candidate
for the General Assembly, or his or her campaign committee shall not accept a campaign
contribution from a legislative agent. Violation of this provision is ethical misconduct. (2) A
member of the General Assembly, candidate for the General Assembly, or his or her
campaign committee shall not, during a regular session of the General Assembly, accept a
campaign contribution from an employer of a legislative agent, or from a permanent
committee as defined in KRS 121.015. This subsection shall not apply to candidates for the
General Assembly in a special election held during a regular session of the General
Assembly. Violation of this provision is ethical misconduct.”
71. K.R.S. 6.751(2) provides, in relevant part: “A legislator or his spouse shall not solicit, accept,
or agree to accept anything of value from a legislative agent or an employer. Violation of this
subsection is a Class B misdemeanor.”
72. K.R.S. 6.811 provides, in relevant part: “(4) A legislative agent or employer shall not
knowingly offer, give, or agree to give anything of value to a legislator, a candidate, or the
spouse or child of a legislator or candidate; (5) A legislative agent shall not serve as a
campaign treasurer, and shall not directly solicit, control, or deliver a campaign contribution,
for a candidate or legislator. (6) A legislative agent shall not make a campaign contribution to
a legislator, a candidate, or his or her campaign committee. (7) During a regular session of
the General Assembly, an employer of a legislative agent shall not make a campaign
contribution to a legislator, candidate, campaign committee for a legislator or candidate, or
caucus campaign committee. This subsection shall not apply to candidates for the General
Assembly in a special election held during a regular session of the General Assembly.”

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73. There are, and were, no examples of legislative agent, i.e. lobbyist, donations to a legislator
or candidate’s campaign that created a scandal, or any unethical quid-pro-quo arrangements.
74. There are, and were, no examples of an employer of a legislative agent, i.e. lobbyist,
donations to a legislator or candidate’s campaign that created a scandal, or any unethical
quit-pro-quo arrangements.
75. There are, and were, no examples of a legislative agent, i.e. lobbyist, de minimis gifts to a
legislator or candidate that created a scandal, or any unethical quid-pro-quo arrangements;
nor are there, or were there, any examples of any de minimis gift from employer of a
legislative agent, i.e. lobbyist, donations to a legislator or candidate that created a scandal, or
any unethical quid-pro-quo arrangements.
76. Any such donations or gifts, individually or in the aggregate, would, if over $100, be
required to be reported to KREF.
77. Under the authority set forth in Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189 (2d Cir.
2010); Lavin v. Brunner, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114210 (S.D. Ohio 2010), and Barker v.
Wisconsin Ethics Bd., 841 F. Supp. 255 (1993), K.R.S. 6.767(1),(2), K.R.S. 6.751(2), and
K.R.S. 6.811 (4), (5), (6) and (7) are unconstitutional. Specifically, they are not “closely
drawn” towards preventing quid pro quo corruption. To the extent the U.S. Supreme Court is
willing to overrule Buckley, such provisions are not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
state interest.
COUNT I – VIOLATIONS OF FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
78. Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Moellman hereby reincorporate the preceding
paragraphs of their Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

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79. Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Moellman are citizens of the United States of
America.
80. Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Moellman have clearly established rights and
protections under the United States Constitution and its statutes to Freedom of Speech,
Association, and Expression and other First Amendment guarantees. The Fourteenth
Amendment likewise has guarantees of equal protection and liberty.
81. Defendants, using their respective offices and acting under color of state law, violated and
are violating Senator Schickel’s, Mr. Watson’s, and Mr. Moellman’s First Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment Rights, which have deprived, are depriving, and will deprive him of
his rights to Free Speech, Expression, and Association guaranteed to them under the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and their rights to Equal Protection, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, which rights are clearly established. Defendants thereby subjected
themselves under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to prospective injunctive relief and declaratory relief
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, et seq.
82. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech...” The First Amendment has been
incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states, including the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, under Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
83. Defendants abused the authority of their respective offices and, while acting under color of
law and with knowledge of Senator Schickel’s, Mr. Watson’s, and Mr. Moellman’s
established rights, used their offices to violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
84. Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Moellman seek declaratory relief, and prospective
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, declaring K.R.S.

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121.150(6), K.R.S. 121.150(11),5 K.R.S. 121.150(13), K.R.S. 6.611(2), K.R.S. 6.751(2),
K.R.S. 6.767(1) and (2), and K.R.S. 6.811(4) (5), (6) and (7) unconstitutional, facially, or asapplied to the activities set forth herein that Senator Schickel and Mr. Moellman seek to
engage in. Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Moellman likewise seeks a permanent
injunction enjoining the enforcement of these provisions, facially, or as applied to all of the
foregoing scenarios. Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Moellman further seeks their
costs and reasonable attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
85. In addition to the foregoing, the impermissible applications of the challenged provisions at
issue are substantial when compared against any legitimate sweep.
86. The challenged provisions are void for vagueness because they do not, for instance,
delineate the nature and scope of under what circumstances it applies, making compliance
with the sections impossible. The challenged provisions are also overbroad.
87. The challenged provisions fail to establish standards that are sufficient to guard against the
arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests.
88. A substantial number of instances exist in which the challenged provisions cannot be applied
constitutionally.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendants as prayed for, including:
A. That this Court issue a declaration that K.R.S. 121.150(6), K.R.S. 121.150(11), K.R.S.
121.150(13), 121.150(23)(a), K.R.S. 6.611(2), K.R.S. 6.757(2), K.R.S. 6.767(1) and (2),
and K.R.S. 6.811 (4), (5), (6) and (7), are unconstitutional, facially, or as-applied to the

5

The challenge to K.R.S. 121.150(11) is raised solely by Mr. Watson.

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activities set forth herein that Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Moellman seek to
engage in;
B. That this Court enter a temporary restraining order and/or an preliminary injunction to
enjoin enforcement of K.R.S. 121.150(6), K.R.S. 121.150(11), K.R.S. 121.150(13),
121.150(23)(a), K.R.S. 6.767(1) and (2), and K.R.S. 6.811(5), (6) and (7), on a facial or
as-applied basis, pending a trial on the merits;
C. That this Court award permanent injunctive relief, prohibiting the further enforcement of
K.R.S. 121.150(6), K.R.S. 121.150(11), K.R.S. 121.150(13), 121.150(23)(a), K.R.S.
6.767(1) and (2), and K.R.S. 6.811(5), (6) and (7), generally, or, in the alternative,
prohibiting enforcement of these sections as applied to the conduct Senator Schickel, Mr.
Watson, and Mr. Moellman seek to engage in;
D. That Senator Schickel, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Moellman be awarded his costs in this
action, including reasonable attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
E. Such other relief as this Court shall deem just and proper.

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Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Christopher Wiest___________
Christopher Wiest (KBA 90725)
Paul J. Darpel (KBA 84989)
Robert A. Winter, Jr. (KBA 78230)
Chris Wiest, Atty at Law, PLLC
25 Town Center Blvd, Suite 104
Crestview Hills, KY 41017
859/486-6850 (v)
513/257-1895 (c)
859/495-0803 (f)
chris@cwiestlaw.com
and
/s/ Jack Gatlin
Jack S. Gatlin (KBA 88899)
Thomas B. Bruns (KBA 84985)
FREUND, FREEZE & ARNOLD
Chamber Office Park
2400 Chamber Center Drive, Ste 200
Ft. Mitchell, KY 41017
Phone: (859) 292-2088
Fax: (859) 261-7602
jgatlin@ffalaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

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