COMMUNICATIONS 6

THE BATTLE OF IDEAS, MEDIA TRANSFORMATION & DIVERSITY, AND ACCELERATING DIGITAL FUTURE

INTRODUCTION

1. This document seeks to provide a mid-term report on the implementation of the 53rd Conference Resolutions. It will evaluate gaps, provide analysis of the challenges faced in the implementation of Conference Resolutions, outline interventions needed between now and the Policy Conference, as well as provide new policy considerations in preparations for the 2015 National General Council (NGC). It builds on the decisions of the 53rd conferences and also takes into account ongoing endeavours by the ANC and the Government with respect to delivering services to the citizens.

2. The structure of the document follows the outline of the Battle of Ideas, ICT and Media Diversity Resolutions adopted during the 53rd ANC National Conference. These resolutions are grouped into the following sections:

   2.1 Battle of Ideas

   2.2 ANC Internal Communications

   2.3 Government and Legislature Communications

   2.4 Information and Communication Technologies

   2.5 Broadcasting Infrastructure and Services

   2.6 Print Media Transformation, Accountability and Diversity

   2.7 Postal Infrastructure and Post Bank

   2.8 Research, Development and Innovation

3. The hegemony of the ANC and the democratic forces in the battle of ideas remains central to the advancement of the National Democratic Revolution. The ANC must operate in a coordinated and disciplined manner to set the agenda in the battle of ideas. Our interventions must be informed by the ANC Strategic and Tactics, and Organizational Renewal.

THE BATTLE OF IDEAS

4. The 53rd National Conference noted the raging battle of ideas and the need for the ANC to engage in the ideological work in order to lead society during the current phase of the NDR and the second phase of the transition towards the complete economic emancipation of our people. The resolution noted the battle of ideas between the theoretical and practical underpinnings of the democratic developmental state and the neo-liberal paradigm. The use of market forces to try to dislodge the democratic forces as the drivers of change and the substitution of the NDR objectives with a neo-liberal market driven paradigm was noted.

5. The ANC 53rd Conference further noted the serious advances made by the ANC, the Alliance and democratic formations in transforming South Africa into a non-racial and non-sexist democratic society.

6. Conference resolved on increased participation of ANC cadres in public debates and that cadres

should be trained to respond effectively to the growing onslaught against the movement in all media. The Conference also resolved that ANC Political education syllabus should be inclusive of media training, research and ICT literacy. A National Dialogue was observed as critical to re-ignite and deepen the battle of ideas with the aim to reassert the position of the ANC as a progressive leader of society and to forge unity for accelerated transformation. The 53rd Conference also resolved that editions of **ANC Today**, **Umrabulo** and other ANC publications should always include articles from ANC government executives (Ministers, MECs and Mayors).

7. Globalisation has also sharpened inequalities between regions and nations, and within nations, producing winners and losers and a core and a periphery. The ANC policy is aimed at fighting this segregation and inequality, and working nationally, regionally and internationally to ensure a more just social order.

8. In the context of radical transformation in this second phase of the transition, robust discussions are needed to help the ANC and society to emerge with new policies and decisions that will increase the pace of transformation, development, innovation, creativity, service delivery and integration of our society.

9. The ideological and political battles have intensified since the adoption of these resolutions. The news media has been filled with raging attacks on the nature and character of the movement. Opposition parties who lost the elections have been provided with ample space to question the outlook of the mass democratic movement and substitute with their own visions. There is a ganging up on the ANC and the movement's representatives by the media analysts, media commentators, the ultra-left and ultra-right forces. All the media outlets including unfortunately the public broadcasting outlets are dominated by the persistent attack on the NDR.

10. The ANC has not been able to systematically respond to this escalating ideological and political attack. The spokespersons of the ANC remain largely lone voices as there is no coordinated machinery that draws on the collective political and ideological base of the movement. As a result the ANC has failed so far to set the agenda in the national discourse through the limited dialogues

on all media platforms. In the meantime, the ANC cadres deployed in Government have not actively con-tributed to the degree required into ANC publications.

11. Some progress has been achieved in the re-organisation of the ANC Communications Team to provide capacity to engage the media and counter the onslaught. The ANC War Room demonstrated the potential impact such a coordinated and well-oiled effort would have on the battle of ideas. The winning of the May 2014 National Elections and the several Local Government By-Elections is an indication that despite the propaganda against the ANC, the movement still commands hegemony and is entrenched with the masses of our people.

12. The operations of the War Room at all levels should be scaled up and be operational through-out the year and not just in times of elections if the ANC would be able to effectively deal with the propaganda onslaught.

13. War rooms must be strengthened, repopulated with requisite skills, cost the war room, meet daily and a Clearing House comprising of ANC H/O, ANC Parliamentary Caucus, Government spokesperson and Legislature) should be established in terms of the ANC Internal Communication Policy.

14. The ANC need to develop a *"battle plan"* that mobilizes the collective strength of the cadres and organizational capacity. The battle plan should be coordinated at Headquarters but executed at Provincial and Regional levels. The battle plan should include engagements with strategic allies and other progressive forces that can influence media and help drive the thrust of the national democratic revolution in the media platform spaces. The battle plan should help reignite the national dialogue and focus it on the radical transformation trajectory. The battle plan must encompass all platforms and provide creative and innovative ways of bringing about the mass participation of ANC cadres beyond the official spokespersons of the movement in order to set the agenda.

15. The ANC has not effectively demanded its rightful share of the media space. In many instances the *"right to reply"* to baseless attacks have not been followed upon. It is now usual to hear one sided discussions, attacking the ANC, in print, radio and

television platforms without ANC cadres and spokespersons participating. There is a need for co-ordination of the participation by ANC Cadres on the different platforms where the ANC voice is in deficit.

16. Facilities to manage multiple digital media platforms must be utilized to actively monitor news and debates on all media platforms and develop daily message in collaboration with the ANC communications team and disseminate the messages.

17. ANC should measure its successes where it governs, package the success stories and disseminate them through all media platforms.

18. An ANC Business Plan for communications must be developed.

19. ANC network must be strengthened, optimally use Community Television (CTV), mobile CTV vans for each province, employ LED screen, identify Schools of Journalism of choice, revive ANC News Service and incorporate these onto the ANC Communications Business Plan.

ANC INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS

20. The war of ideas must be fought like a real war therefore, there must be strict coordination of content and messages between all structures of the organisation. The advent of community and public media offers an additional potentially progressive opportunity for the ANC, depending on the ability to influence this media and provide it with adequate support.

21. The 53rd National Conference resolved that the National Executive Committee (NEC) should develop an ANC Internal ICT Policy and strategy to drive the ANC's administrative and political systems, ANC structures must be connected with high speed ICT services, ANC build a unified ICT capacity enabling it to engage with all its members using latest technologies including social media platforms, avail ANC content on several platforms, improve membership systems using new technologies, develop social media policy and establish a political champion to drive ANC ICT Policy and Strategy.

17. The resolutions correctly identify the need

for the ANC to adopt the modern means of communications in its own organisational and political work so as to augment the different mass mobilisation and engagement tools it has utilised over the decades. The resolutions spoke of how the administration of the ANC, the involvement and management of its cadreship and the dynamic link with various communities can benefit greatly from adopting the modern communications tools. Importantly these tools were identified as important to mobilise the mass of the people into action advancing the democratic revolution and to deepen their interaction and involvement with the programmes and daily activities transforming South Africa.

18. The ANC Communication machinery has since been revamped and reorganized. A draft ANC Internal Communications Policy has been developed for consideration by the NEC. Access to affordable high speed technologies remain a challenge throughout the country and thereby affecting the implementation of the 53rd Conference resolutions. In the meantime, innovative use of bulk SMS, group email accounts, ANC apps, etc. has been explored by some provinces and branches. These innovative systems have not been maximally used throughout the country and explored to potentially enhance internal ANC communication. New technologies have also not been maximally used to improve membership systems. An online interactive ANC cadre database to assist track ANC professionals and skilled cadres has not been developed. The Social Media policy has been included in the drafted ANC Internal Communication Policy.

19. The draft ANC Internal Communications Policy provides for political discipline, framework, protocol and coordination of ANC approach to communications and the battle of ideas.

20. A draft ANC Communications Strategy (Comstrat) has been developed for consideration by the NEC. The strategy is intended to guide and focus ANC communication, informed by the ANC Internal Communication Policy.

21. Implementation of the 53rd National Conference resolutions is hampered by amongst others lack of resources and lack of access to affordable high speed broadband infrastructure. In order for the ANC to maintain its hegemony and sustain its societal leadership, it must improve its capacity to

innovatively and creatively explore the use of new technologies and social media to communicate its principles, policies and programmes. Accordingly, the 53rd National Conference resolutions remain relevant and must be implemented.

22. The ANC Media Charter (1992) must be reviewed guided by the new technological developments, SA Constitutional dispensation, the current media landscape and the need to respond to the radical transformation agenda. The revised ANC Media Charter should outline the role of media in the development of a non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society. It should also outline the role of public media (including the Public Broadcasting Services and the Parliamentary Services) in the provision of platforms for the effective participation of all the people in the democratic dispensation. The Charter must outline the role of independent media regulation and accountability within the framework of the new SA Constitutional dispensation. The evolution of community media and the participation of small and medium sized commercial media entities should form part of the policy principles. The funding mechanisms that will support public, community and small/ alternative commercial media in order to realize media plurality and diversity. The Charter should also provide an ANC policy perspective on the reflection of African voices in the global arena including SADC platforms for regional reflection and continental platforms.

23. There is a need to train ANC communicators at all levels of the organization and continuously train all deployed cadres in media handling. ANC cadres deployed in Government must be obligated to attend media coaching and training. Strengthening the ANC's own network of sympathetic circle of analysts and journalists is important.

24. The ANC needs to strengthen and develop its capacity to stimulate demand to increase broadband usage and uptake by generating relevant content, across different communication medi-ums and for different target audiences. This includes its online presence, improving its research and monitoring capacity, strengthening forums for ideological and policy reflection such as ANC Today and Umrabulo, and developing writing skills, communications skills, skills relating to website and social media development amongst its cadres and leaders.

25. The ANC reaffirms that communication is an ongoing exercise that requires continuous interaction and forward and backward engagement. The ANC Today should further be a publication of choice for engaging, responding and debating current issues related to and or affecting the ANC. As part of organisational discipline leaders of the ANC should desist from discussing ANC internal issues outside of the ANC structures and forums. ANC Today is one such a forum and original articles generated from it do migrate to mainstream media after serving to educate and inform primarily our membership and support base.

GOVERNMENT AND LEGISLATURE COMMUNICATIONS

26. Effective and coherent government communication aimed at rendering effective structure and services informing people of government programmes has not yet been fully addressed despite all efforts. The problem of coordination and integration between municipalities, provinces and national government has not been achieved.

27. ANC should support Legislature's communication where it governs and ensure effective and coherent communication.

28. The ICTs were identified as means for political, economic and social transformation whose importance is growing. The 53rd National Conference Resolution noted the critical importance of government ability to use the ICTs to communicate with citizens in the delivery of services, the deepening of democracy and the ability of citizens to interact with government. The need to enhance government communication in order for government to be accountable and be in a position to influence and set the agenda for public discourse was seen as important.

29. The 53rd National Conference resolved that there was a need for an institutional arrangement and framework that enhances collaboration, effective planning and oversight between the ANC and Government communication. The use of community and public broadcasting services to reach all South Africans in their languages should be prioritized. Coordination of the flow of information from the different Government

departments and amongst all spheres of Government (local, provincial and national) was seen as important. Conference resolved that the GCIS should strengthen local Government communication and offer support to parastatals and other State agencies. The enforcement of compliance with the Codes of Good Practice in procuring services from the media was identified as critical to drive efficiencies and the transformation of the media industry. Government was required to diversify its ad spent to empower community, emerging commercial and public media. The review of effectiveness of Government communications including vision, structure, coordination and increased resources was identified as crucial.

30. The link between the capacity of ANC to lead the NDR and the capacity of government to communicate and involve the masses of the people in political and economic activities was also identified as requiring focused attention. The lack of co-ordination and capacity to communicate at the three spheres of government was also noted as deserving resolution. Conference directed the creation of effective information communication platforms to enable the three tiers of government to communicate effectively.

31. A number of developments took place post the 53rd National Conference and the May 2014 National Elections. A new Department of Communications was created to focus on communications and branding of South Africa. This new Department is intended to coordinate and provide an institutional platform for the coordination of communication at various spheres of Government. There has been an increase in the Government ad-spend through community and small commercial media by GCIS. 10 year review of GCIS was conducted and new plans for Government communication were developed. Media bulk buying was introduced with the aim of ensuring maximal benefit for Government in terms of economies of scale and to diversify Government ad-spend. Communication has been prioritized and mainstreamed, including increased usage of the community and small commercial media platforms. For example, the President, after tabling the State of The Nation address, communicates it through a platform of community and small commercial media. The challenge is cascading this approach through all

spheres of Government.

32. The Government communication continuously needs improvement, as poor government communication leads to denial of service to people who depend on Government for the same. The improvement of the Government ability to communicate with its citizens enhances service delivery, accountability and involvement of ordinary people in the affairs of the State.

33. There is a huge number of government communicators in all three spheres. Government communication stills lacks coherency in the different spheres. This needs intervention in order to transform the way government communicates to its citizenry.

34. In this regard, there is a need for the development of a National Government Communications Policy to provide a framework for communications at different spheres of Government. This framework should provide for a coherent structure to communicate Government programmes and activities, and enable the interaction of the people with Government in all spheres.

35. The National Government Communication Policy should provide for the use of all official languages and all platforms to reach all citizens.

36. The ANC and its government need to strengthen other effective communication methods to reach targeted communities like using community broadcasting and public broadcasting services (radio and print) to highlight government service delivery in the battle of ideas.

37. Government communication and messaging need to be coordinated and reflect a one united country and one united Government.

38. The Policy should ensure communication coherence and alignment at all levels, Government, Legislature and the ANC.

39. Government media buying patterns should not reinforce media concentration and media monopoly, instead its bulk-buying strategy should ensure that communication reaches targeted audiences and support media diversity agenda. All spheres of government should advertise in the community and small commercial media that produce media in the languages spoken by communities, to assist with media transformation

and diversity, and the sustenance and growth of these media.

40. Government communication should reach all citizens and in all languages and DoC (GCIS) should be strengthened in order to coordinate information flow among different departments and among all three spheres of government (national, provincial and local).

41. COMTASK must be reviewed again taking into account, 20 years of democracy; the need to curb fragmentation of messaging and disconnect; centralization of Government communications; structure, roles and responsibilities; the need for a clearing house (comprising of Government, Legislature and ANC) to ensure coherent messaging; the mandates of entities reporting the communications Ministry (GCIS, DoC, SABC, Brand SA, Film and Publication Board and MDDA); and the need to clarify Government spokesperson vs Cabinet.

42. The local government communication should be strengthened through enhanced training programmes and the DoC (GCIS) should further offer communication support to parastatals and funding development institutions in order to properly profile work of these institutions.

43. DoC (GCIS) should support the communication of work done by other public and state owned entities that does not get media coverage. We must use arts and culture to enhance communication and convey the values of our democratic society, e.g. sculptures, murals and other forms of public art.

44. There is a need to review Government policy that mandates placements of advertising on national newspapers, as this reinforces media monopoly, as this is not relevant to local and provincial Government needs. These so called national newspapers are not available in all local municipalities and rural areas. This policy therefore is not reflective of the real media landscape in our country, in terms of national coverage platforms.

45. A short to medium term Communications Action Plan must be developed whilst reviewing Comtask and developing national Communication Policy.

INFORMATION COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES

46. The 53rd National Conference noted that over the last three decades, the world has been undergoing, and continues to undergo, an information and communication technologies (ICT) revolution and unprecedented social and economic transformation driven by the advent of the ICT, High Speed Internet that has fundamentally transformed the way people live and relate to one another. This has made the world a much smaller place, in which individuals can access information and services from wherever they are in the world.

47. The 53rd National Conference resolved that the National Development Plan (NDP) should be underpinned by a National ICT Policy that is focused on ensuring universal access to affordable and quality high speed infrastructure and services throughout the country. The National Cyber Security Policy was identified as a top priority together with the policies of Green ICTs. Conference resolved on the realignment of Government shareholding in the various telecommunications entities. Conference also resolved on the establishment of a national ICT forum that will serve as a platform for engagement of all the segments of society in matters of the deployment and use of ICTs. Further, conference resolved that skills were important in order to complete the ICT transformation process by 2030. Conference supported the convergence of technologies and services and resolved that the regulation of the ICT sector in the converged environment should not lead to the consolidation of vertical and horizontal monopolies or the abuse of dominance by the existing operators. Conference directed that competition rules and regulations dealing with the opening of the market to competition must be prioritized. Conference directed that ICASA should be resourced to the required degree in order for effective regulation of the sector to be achieved.

48. While noting the advances made since 1994 to introduce new technologies, the 53rd Conference Resolution noted that South Africa has not lived up to her potential as a result of a lack of a comprehensive National ICT Policy, institutional fragmentation and ineffectiveness, limited e-skills, inadequate funding amongst other challenges.

49. The Conference therefore directed the creation of a policy environment that will see the widest uptake and usage of the ICTs through:

49.1 The roll-out of universal broadband services to connect all government offices and enable the delivery of e-government services targeting all frontline services delivery departments.

49.2 The expansion of the Postal infrastructure to reach all South Africans the establishment of a single integrated National Address System, the corporatisation and repositioning of the Post Bank to offer fi-nancial services to the unbanked.

49.3 The digitisation of the broadcasting infrastructure and support measures to connect all South Africans to the digital networks especially the indigent, the licensing of more subscription services, an increase in South African Content and the introduction of new converged serv-ices.

49.4 The transformation of the ICT sector to be reflective of South African demographics by 2030, a focus on e-skills at all levels of education and an increase in investments in ICT research and development.

50. These resolutions underline the cross-cutting nature of the ICT and the role played by the sector as an enabler of improvements and efficiencies in all other economic and social spheres. At the same time, the ICT market is on its own right a significant contributor to the GDP, employment creation and wealth generation.

51. The ICTs are ideally suited to help government and society change the material conditions of all South Africans and help integrate into economic activity the segments of our society that are disproportionately affected by the triple challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequality.

52. The NDP calls for a cohesive strategy to ensure the diffusion of ICTs in all areas of society and the economy. It further identifies ICTs as an enabler, such that it contributes to service delivery, support analysis, build intelligence and create new ways to share, learn and build social capital.

53. The medium term target support the vision 2020 initiative of expanded broadband penetration to 100 percent by 2020, where all schools, health facilities and similar social institutions should be connected and individual citizens should have affordable access to information services and voice communication at appropriate locations.

54. By 2030, the NDP expect that the aggressive implementation of the e-strategy, South Africa will be globally competitive amongst its peers. Furthermore, all South Africans will be able to use core ICT services and enjoy access to a wide range of entertainment, information and educational serv-ices. The National eStrategy collaborations between the state, industry and academia will stimulate research and innovation, and promote local content production and multimedia hub establishment.

55. Government has undertaken a number of activities to put in place coherent policy and regulatory frameworks to deal with the policy inconsistencies, weaknesses and challenges identified during the discussions leading to the 53rd National Conference.

56. The Broadband Policy and Strategy was finalised in 2013 to provide for the roll-out of the infrastructure for high speed internet envisaged in the 53rd ANC resolution. This strategy addresses four elements.

56.1 Digital Readiness that deals with policy and regulatory challenges that must be addressed to facilitate broadband roll-out and uptake of services.

56.2 Digital Development that deals with aggregating public sector demand to improve supply of broadband service.

56.3 Digital Opportunity that deals with improvement of broadband user skills and the promotion of local content.

56.4 Digital Future that deals with infrastructure provisioning at wholesale layer of fixed and wireless broadband networks and the market structure to deal with broadband.

57. An Integrated ICT Policy Review process was initiated with the aim of producing an Integrated ICT Policy, as resolved in the 53rd Conference, in order to deal with policy and regulatory issues and to allow for the converged policy and regulatory frameworks. The Framing Paper was issued in April 2013. The Green Paper on Integrated ICT Policy was published in January 2014. The Integrated ICT Policy Options Paper was published in November

2014. This review process is to be finalised with the issuing of a New Integrated White Paper on ICTs by the end of March 2015.

58. The ICT Policy Review process supports the realisation of universal access to affordable and quality services for broadband and other services. The review supports the extension of the definition of universal service beyond access to traditional infrastructure to encompass the training and provi-sioning of equipment to enable the targeted communities to participate effectively in the generation and use of services. To this end the universal service institutional arrangements are to be reviewed to expand the scope of the obligations and to fine tune the institutional arrangements to deliver on these universal targets.

59. The definition of broadband should be reviewed from time to time and include:

    59.1 High speed internet networks and services.

    59.2 Always available and multiple services.

    59.3 Speed to be determined from time to time through Government policy or prescribed regulation.

60. The provision of universal access to ICT infrastructure and services is conceptualised as part of a bigger basket of interventions aimed at social inclusion targeting the rural areas and other vul-nerable segments of society. Universal access should include accessibility, quality and affordability.

61. The provisioning of e-government for all frontline services, the support for the delivery of e-education and e-health using the broadband network and the training of the beneficiaries in e-skills constitute part of the strategy. A pilot programme for the roll-out of the broadband plan coincides and is interwoven with the National Health Insurance (NHI) pilot programme to establish the methodologies and assess the impact of this integration.

62. The ICT Review Process has demonstrated the need for the enhancement of the regulatory environment in order to allow for further convergence of the IT, Telecommunications, Postal and Broadcasting markets. The development of all IP (Internet Protocol) networks now means that different services that were traditionally transmitted through different networks can now be transmitted using one network to be received and consumed using one end-user device.

63. This convergence has practical effect in the realisation of the sector goals as it lowers the cost of infrastructure deployment while allowing for the entry of new players in the market. There are policy and regulatory considerations that must be in place including a licensing regime that fosters innovation through the entry of new services, a regulated competition environment that discourages the abuse of market dominance in general and the abuse of current market dominance in particular to stifle the entry of new services in particular, an open access model that allows the new entrants to access critical infrastructure and the effective enforcement of the regulatory provisions to ensure a level playing field.

64. The entry of the SMME's in the sector will be dependent to a great degree on the ability of the regulatory scheme to support such market reform. Other measures that will facilitate the entry of the SMMEs will include spectrum licensing and allocation. The need to empower the regulator and to provide enough skills and resources to do the necessary regulatory interventions has been identified as critical.

65. Effective regulation of competition, including the role of SMMEs should also promote universal access. There is a link between effective competition and the attachment of universal access to quality and affordable services.

66. Research continues to indicate the extent of market concentration that frustrates the expansion of the ICT sector in a manner that can accommodate the SMMEs and lead to some size-able innovation and employment creation. The ICT sector is still overly focused on large capital intensive approaches in which the big established players dominate and limit the role of the SMMEs.

67. The fixed line segment continues to be dominated by Telkom whereas the wireless segment is dominated by two operators namely Vodacom and MTN. Even though new licenses have been issued in all market segments the reality of the market is that the established players have consoli-dated their market share to such an extent that issuing new licenses no longer leads to any significant changes in market behavior. The

same situation is playing out in the broadcasting subscription market. In this market even though others have been licensed Multi-Choice continues to dominate and this dominance cannot be challenged any time soon.

68. Measures to allow for market access for the small operators and new services must therefore be part and parcel of the regulatory interventions that are aimed at making the sector much more competitive in order to drive down the cost to communicate, as well as allow for the real and meaningful transformation of the sector.

69. There must be complementary utilization of different technological options to accelerate broadband rollout including:

    69.1 Wireless

    69.2 Satellite

    69.3 Fibre optics

    69.4 Emphasis on fixed, wireless convergence, amongst other innovations.

70. Choice of technology due to socio-economic and other realities should not deepen inequalities within and between communities.

71. Infrastructure and services should be aligned within social and economic development plans of communities and Government.

72. The management of the spectrum and other scarce natural resources is emerging again as crucial to the success or failure of interventions to broaden the sector beyond the number of players that currently dominate.

73. There is not enough spectrum to enable all licensed entities to be able to build their infrastructure and use the spectrum to deliver services directly to the market. While the wireless broadband roll-out will be easier to finance the cost of constructing national networks is still prohibitive for many small players.

74. The permit system for the construction of towers and the rights of ways is burdensome and still contributes significantly to infrastructure roll-out delays and therefore costs. These constraints point to the need for policy to foster infrastructure sharing and the opening of the infrastructure for access by those who want to offer down-stream services.

75. Policy must be fine-tuned to strike a balance between the entry of the new operators and SMMES and the maintenance of the investments to drive infrastructure roll-out predicated on adequate returns.

76. There are low hanging fruits that need minor adjustments to policy for them to be realized. The broadcasting infrastructure has been digitised allowing for an expansion of services and an increase in South African content for all platforms.

77. Content will drive the uptake of digital traditional services in as must as it drives the new audio-visual services that are entering the scene to compete with broadcasters. A regulatory regime that supports South African content on all platforms is a prerequisite for the country to reap benefits from the technological changes. An increase in the amount of South African productions will enable us to exploit the expanded transmission and storage capacity associated with digital systems.

78. The training of youth in digital production for all platforms will stimulate SMME participation and create jobs on a sustainable basis. Support for the manufacturing of electronic components has already been approved in the case of the set-top-boxes to support digital migration of broadcasting services. This programme should be incentivized to support the roll-out of tablets and end-user devices in schools, clinics, libraries, Thusong Service Centres and other centres that are to be part of the national broadband roll-out.

79. Aggregating government demand is one of the key pillars of the Broadband Policy and Strategy. Activities to execute on this strategic element have focused on the role of the different state entities that are involved in the delivery of broadband services. A process to rationalise the State Owned Companies (SOCs) that play a direct role and are licenced as major players in the industry is underway.

80. The SOCs have been exploring ways and means of coordinating their activities so as to reduce duplication and enhance the use of the limited resources to deliver on government services. The final structure and standing of the various SOCs will be determined by the time of the finalisation of broadband implementation plans.

81. Research has indicated that there are many other government players that are active in the infrastructure provisioning space whose activities must be taken into account for a coherent role of government to emerge. Municipalities are rolling-out their infrastructure linking government offices and facilities in a manner that contributes to the duplication of infrastructure. The ICT Policy Review process indicate that these services are not used to full capacity and are at times perceived to be crowding out private investment as they compete by offering wholesale services to third parties. Organisation like PRASA, Eskom and SANRAL are also active in some capacity running parallel strategies to provide wholesale fixed infrastructure services to the market.

82. The definition of the role of the government entities and the setting of policies as to how they will behave in the market is emerging as critical in the fulfillment of a comprehensive strategy to roll-out broadband and other infrastructure. Rules of behavior need to be considered in areas where the state owned entities are in direct competition with licensed operators more so when they are in a position to distort the market through preferential deals with some competitors to the exclusion of others.

83. The Information Society commitments of South Africa has the vision of establishing South Africa as an advanced society in which Information and Information Communication Tools are the key drivers of economic and societal development.

84. The strategic goals include the use of technology to broaden participation in the economy, the reinvention of how government deliver services and interacts with citizens, the celebration of South Africa's cultural heritage and creativity and the entrenchment of democratic participation by citizens and the respect of their fundamental rights.

85. The following are key policy areas that need attention in order that the information society development initiatives can meet the stated strategic objectives:

    85.1. Infrastructure roll-out to reach all South Africans (discussed in earlier sections)

    85.2 E-government and other e-services

    85.3 Digital Inclusion and e-awareness

    85.4 Human capital development

    85.5 Development of local content

    85.6 Research and development

    85.7 Industrialisation.

86. The roll-out of e-government services has not progressed as fast as it should have possibly done, due to the fragmented approaches to the deployment of ICT infrastructure and systems within government. There is a need for a national e-government strategy that involves all spheres of government. This strategy must inform all the spheres of government in planning e-government services.

87. There is a need for an evolution of an e-government service approach that takes into consideration the different levels of maturity of the various departments and municipalities. Such an approach must enable the different legacy systems to be integrated and retired at different stages so as to ensure minimum service level disruptions.

88. A government wide strategy involving the three spheres of government must devolve sufficient ownership of the system to the various levels for effective planning and implementation.

89. The procurement of infrastructure, hardware and services have proven to the main distraction in terms of rolling out e-government services. There is a need to define the role of the State Information Technology Agency (SITA) in the new reconfigured environment, taking into account the level of diffusion of the system of procurement and service integration the new strategy will encourage. In the medium term government departments need to migrate an increasing percentage of their work online. The addition of e-services should lead to realizable budget shifts towards the implementation of the cost effective online services and therefore savings.

90. The roll-out of e-government services will rely heavily on the availability within the state and public service of a cadre of administrators who can work in the online automated environments as well as the public that can use the modern communications tools to access services. This calls for concerted measures to skill South Africans at various levels to manage the electronic environment and use it for their daily activities.

91. The shift to online services for the delivery of e-government services, electronic commerce and mobile commerce will entail heightened risks that are associated with cybercrime and therefore warrant urgent consideration of policy measures to deal with cybersecurity.

92. Some tentative steps have been taken by government in this regard including the establishment of the Cybersecurity Hub that joins the public and private sectors in the monitoring and reaction to cybercrimes. Cyber Response Teams will be established to respond to actual and potential cyber-security related issues.

93. The organised measures taken by government and the private sector are just one part of the measures that will enhance security. The public awareness of cyber threats, the protection of personal information and a vigilant attitude to online environments is the other part that is supposed to be played by the citizens. There is therefore a need for a wide ranging cyber awareness strategy to educate the public on matters relating to cybercrime and cybersecurity and to instill a measure of confidence in the e-environment.

94. Policy will also have to resolve new emerging policy issues such as the Internet of Things, cloud computing, privacy, cybersecurity and IP interconnection between content, application provid-ers and terminating ISPs. The quality control necessary for the content and application of providers will also feature significantly in future policy and regulatory discussions. The net neutrality discussions have already started and policy and regulations need to provide certainty over the access to the last mile (fixed or mobile) over which end-users access the internet. Policy will have to ensure that there is no degradation or interconnection failures due to failed negotiations between parties that could make it impossible for users to access, distribute or use the applications and services of their choice.

95. New policy should also seek to create an enabling environment for e-commerce, m-commerce, Internet of Things and Big Data.

96. Policy should also deal with SA's position on net neutrality, in favour of universal access to new services.

97. The merger of national entities responsible/ involved in broadband should be expedited.

98. SA should expedite the development of a comprehensive cybersecurity policy, which should be in place by the time of the 54th ANC Conference. In its nature, cybersecurity is a shared responsibility and thus policy development should be a coordinated effort. National policy should also encourage/support citizens to take active interest in the security of their own information in the cyber-space.

99. Interconnection could also be used to engage in anticompetitive behaviour towards the source, the destination or the content of the information being conveyed. Principles of non-discrimination and transparency should infuse policy and regulatory considerations.

100. The rights of South Africans to use the ICTs for their freedom of expression, cultural and artistic expression will be protected and regulations will ensure adequate space for South African content. Policy will promote the production of South African content and impose measures for the display of predominant South African content.

101. The protection of the minors and the vulnerable will receive uttermost consideration in the regulations dealing with obscene violence, pornography and gratuitous sexual display during times when these vulnerable groups are able to watch.

102. The Digital Opportunity and Digital Future elements of the strategy will require collaboration of the three spheres of government, public entities, the private sector and communities. The ability of government to mobilise and direct a critical mass to ensure the buy-in and participation in the transformative programme to use ICTs to change South Africa will be critical.

103. Extending the infrastructure to reach, especially rural areas that are sparsely populated will require considerable investments and planning. Public and private sector resources must be mobi-lized and harnessed towards the realization of a common broadband project. The development and promotion of digital services will contribute to needed economic activity but require a sustained commitment on the part of both public and private sectors to deeper co-operation that will turn challenges and escalating competition

into new opportunities. The role of the private sector and co-operation and partnerships with the public and private sectors need to be defined in order to direct investments. Appropriate structure and forums must be established for engagement.

104. Government still controls significant SOCs that are operational in the ICT sector as tools to realize policy ends. As discussed and resolved in the 53rd ANC Conference there are areas of duplication and mandate overlaps that results in wastage of resources and misalignment. In addition, the South African government also holds equity stakes in listed telecom companies such as Telkom, Vodacom. The role of the state in the digital future need to be defined.

105. The broadband strategy must move beyond the traditional sectoral ways of thinking and foster new ways of networking throughout society. This calls for the mobilization of the different economic and social sectors to collaborate on this programme. The work of the yet to be established National ICT Forum as a machinery for social and economic mobilization cannot be overemphasized.

106. Importantly funding mechanisms need to be determined and rural areas that will not be a top priority of the private sector investments provided for, in order to ensure universal access to broadband connectivity and services. In addition to the use of Government Budget, additional sources of funding also need to be determined. These could include the use of Governmental guarantees, infrastructure bonds, vendor finance, and country and development bank loans. Furthermore, other mechanisms of support should also be explored. These could include the use of corporate income tax benefits, CAPEX tax benefits, low interest loans, indirect subsidy and regulatory forbearance.

107. The advent of broadband and digital transmission networks increases many folds the capacity of the ICTs to deliver content. This potential cannot be realized without significant changes to the supply side dynamics in order to increase the production and supply of the content to fill the expanded networks and the storage facilities. The content that has to be generated for the broadband and digital networks far exceeds in scope and scale the content generated for

the analogue environment. This requires a coordinated approach of traditionally different industries involving the creative and performing arts, the ICTs, broadcasting, the audio visual and film industries.

108. The training of local production talent will need to be scaled up to the required degree so as to avoid a situation in which the expansion of the South African market only benefits foreign producers and the creation of a situation in which South Africa turn into a net importer of content again. The development of policy will support the availability of innovative South African content over all platforms and screens. Regulatory parity and fair competition is critical in building a viable and vibrant audiovisual content sector that meets defined social, economic and cultural public interest goals.

109. As broadcasting-like content will be increasingly available across a number of platforms and on a range of devices (over the air, on the internet, on television and radio sets, and on tablets and mobile phones). Policy will need to develop new ways to facilitate and promote the availability of public interest programming, including South African programming and music in all languages. At the same time, such a policy will need to focus on ensuring that traditional broadcasting services are viable so that they can fulfill South African content and news and information obligations, as they compete for audiences, advertising and content with new media services from inside and outside the country.

110. The rapid deployment regime that enables the providers of the electronic communications to construct towers and dig up trenches in private and public areas is so complicated and takes so much time that the targets can never be realized without any fundamental changes. The current arrangements mean that any construction of infrastructure requires individual applications to all affected municipalities who have different procedures and time frames to take decisions. This process takes currently a minimum of 18 months for a single application on average. The roll-out of fixed broadband will be most affected in rural areas as the digging of trenches will require more permits and rights of ways. The mobile services will be greatly impacted in the urban areas as they have to deploy significant infrastructure to densify and augment their networks.

111. National policy will be developed to outline the activities of various national, provincial and local authorities in dealing with the various permissions that are required to roll-out infrastructure. The rapid deployment policy will facilitate access to rights of ways and way leaves in order to allow for rapid deployment of Infrastructure.

112. There is a need for an interdepartmental/ intergovernmental forum to expedite the development of guidelines for rapid deployment of facilities, including DTPS, COGTA, SALGA, DEA, DSE. The guidelines should be in place within a year after the NGC, taking into account the delays since 2005.

113. Considerations will be made on the creation of a *"clearing house"* to facilitate the streamlining of local planning permissions and to standardize the application processes. A central data base will be constructed so as to enable for the tracking and tracing of the application processes. The recom-mendation is that government should serve as a clearing house for these permissions. Cooperation with SIP15 will be enhanced to ensure that all significant public and private sector infrastructure roll-out is expedited and supported.

114. The spectrum is emerging as the most important resource at the early stages of population access to broadband services. The assumption is that at the initial phases of broadband roll-out individuals will rely on wireless broadband to be connected. The spectrum available is not enough to ensure that all service providers will have enough spectrum to deliver the broadband converged services including, voice, data and video. The digital migration of broadcasting services is important in ensuring that the much needed spectrum is freed but even this migration of broadcasting services to free the spectrum will not yield enough spectrum to satisfy all needs.

115. A comprehensive National Spectrum Policy to support the speedy implementation of SA Connect must be developed and it must be guided by the principles outlined in the 53rd ANC Conference resolutions.

116. Government and public service will be exempted from paying fees for the use of the frequency spectrum to discharge their mandated services. The importance of the spectrum going forward and the need for ongoing research into spectrum bands that can be re-farmed and re-issued for use to meet the increasing demands warrants a discussion about the necessary institutional arrangement that can provide for this capacity.

117. Policy advocates for consideration of new approaches to spectrum management, including the Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) technology which entails opening up underused spectrum exclusively licensed for a single purpose to shared use with other purposes. These approaches will be considered while taking into account the needs of different services. In particular, trials should be considered within the 2.3GHz band in line with global developments.

118. Additional mechanisms for managing high demand spectrum should be considered. These should include the use of spectrum sharing, pooling and trading. An open access model will be considered in the assignment of high demand spectrum to facilitate competition to ensure universal services and universal access is achieved. High demand spectrum should be set aside for an open network that will sell wholesale access to new and established operators.

119. In terms of spectrum pricing, it is important for the price charged to reflect the true value of spectrum being a scarce resource. For this to take place, the regulator, guided by the transformation objectives, needs to consider accommodating a competitive bidding process in the model it will follow in the assignment of spectrum. Auction as alternative method for licensing spectrum will be considered to raise the money for investments in the broadband and digital roll-out of services.

120. Research will be conducted into the use of the TV White Spaces, as this presents an opportunity to utilize vacant frequencies for the provision of broadband and other digital services.

121. The need for Open Access regime that enables access to critical infrastructure services by all licensed entities is underpinned by the stated approach to avoid duplication and to minimize the cost of rolling out the ICT infrastructure. The current regulatory regime does not provide for an all-encompassing Open Access regime, is focused on public utilities when it does and treats different providers differently depending on their technologies.

122. The scarcity of the spectrum, the number of operators needing access to infrastructure dictate that the open access regime be extended to all infrastructure service providers with significant market power. Open Access arrangements will foster the sharing of infrastructure at all levels and access to network infrastructure or services that is provided effectively on a fair and reasonable terms, for which there is some degree of transparency and non-discrimination.

123. Government should develop a comprehensive open access regime with the State playing a significant role.

124. The existence of two new national Departments in the ICT sector should not stifle national interest, the implementation of ANC resolutions, Government commitments and plans.

125. SA should develop a national e-strategy that seeks to encourage further uptake and usage of ICTs. This should be in place by the time of the next ANC conference. The e-strategy should give effect to the NDP, new ICT Policy and SA Connect.

126. All policies should seek to create a model e-society by 2030 when all South Africans will have access to critical ICT infrastructure and services.

127. A new market structure should be defined in the ongoing policy work of the country, taking into account technological changes and innovations. This should place emphasis on retail competition and infrastructure sharing.

128. ANC re-emphasize that National Government should also engage with provinces and municipalities to harmonize the implementation and rollout of broadband infrastructure and services.

BROADCASTING INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES

129. The ANC should continue to struggle for the sharing and participation of the poor and the marginalised sector of our communities to be active participants and beneficiaries of the opportunities created by the digital economy consistent with the goal of pursuing economic growth, development and redistribution so as to achieve a better life for all which is one of the key tasks of our NDR.

130. The 53rd National Conference resolved that the current model of public broadcasting should be reviewed in order to prioritise public service obligations including education, health, rural development, the reflection and development of all South African languages and cultures. This review was viewed as critical to the development of the broadcasting services in the digital era and the resolution of the challenges facing the SABC. It was resolved that the SABC must prioritise public service in the digital age. Conference resolved that Government funding must be ringfenced to be targeted towards public programming such as indigenous languages, developmental and educational programming. The stable cooperate governance mechanism was identified as important in terms of the provision of long term stability to the SABC. To this extent, conference called for strengthened accountability to Parliament, Shareholder (Government) and the public. Conference resolved that any future strategy of the SABC must position the broadcaster as a leader in the uptake and usage of new technologies including mobile television and Internet Protocol Television in an environment that does not allow the public broadcasting system to lag behind commercial broadcasting. Conference further resolved to relook to the behavior of the dominant players, access to premium content including sports rights, access to critical infrastructure to enable the entry of new pay and other services during and after the migration process. The review of local content quotas for all tiers of broadcasting was identified as important. The fair representation of women, people with disability, and the aged in the community broadcasting sector was also identified as important. Migration from analogue to digital terrestrial television was identified as an opportunity for South Africa to enter into the manufacturing of electronic goods for the SA and other markets. The safeguarding of children was perceived to be important. The need for a youth station was again highlighted as necessary and urgent.

131. Various ANC Conference Resolutions and Policy documents capture the vision of a diverse South African broadcasting system – owned by the public, private and community sectors and reflective of the cultural, multi-lingual and demographic diversity and unity inherent in our society.

132. The ANC has consistently upheld the notion that broadcasting operates at two levels. Firstly, it acts as a means to reflect the rich South African cultural heritage, provides voice to South Africans to participate in democratic dispensation as well as acting as an important platform for community involvement, education and entertainment. Secondly, as part of the ICT industry, broadcasting is an important economic sector that sustains the South African creative industries.

133. Despite these achievements much still needs to be done to develop a broadcasting system that caters for all the needs of the South African population because of the inherent challenges facing the broadcasting system and the advent of digital terrestrial broadcasting. Some of the challenges requiring resolution include:

    133.1 The public broadcasting system, beset by many structural, managerial and funding problems, needs to be restructured and repositioned to prioritise public service as opposed to the commercial focus that it has displayed.

    133.2 The 51st, 52nd and 53rd ANC Conference resolutions on funding have not been implemented due in part to the failure to develop a public broadcasting model that is not reliant on commercial programming, failure to cost the mandate as well as different interpretations on the role of public broadcasting in government.

    133.3 The series of crises at the public broadcaster reflect a lack of leadership, lack of accountability and poor management. In confronting the crisis more emphasis has been placed on reporting processes without a corresponding attention to holding those responsible to account for the financial and organisational maladministration that has brought the public broadcasting institution to the crisis.

134. Such a situation has prevailed because institutional structures responsible for oversight have not been effective. There has also been an overlap in oversight roles enabling the public broadcaster to forum shop.

135. The review of the public broadcasting services and local content quotas has been undertaken as part of the comprehensive ICT Policy review. Both a Green Paper and a Discussion Document include sections on broadcasting and the emergence of broadcasting like audio visual services. The new Department of Communications (DoC) has also indicated an intention to review the broadcasting landscape. The Department has established a National Communications Task Team (NCTT) which is reviewing the entire landscape. The Digital Migration process has been stalled by the lack of consensus by industry players on technological standards and conflicting interests.

136. Cabinet intervened and took a decision in December 2013 that accommodates all scenarios. There is no reason for the delays in the implementation of ANC policy and Cabinet decision of December 2013 regarding the Broadcasting Digital Migration Policy (BDM).

137. The Digital Migration Policy must be finalized through the determination of the performance period/dual illumination and implemented for the digital services to start. Cabinet must implement the December 2013 decision and avoid further delays that may arise from a deviation from that decision. The performance period must commence on 1st April 2015.

138. SA must invest more on public education and awareness, support content development and grow the industry to sustain digital broadcasting future.

139. ANC policy (as per the ANC Media Charter, 1992) promotes media diversity and is against dominant players consolidating monopolies. ANC deployees must implement ANC policies and by extension Cabinet decisions. ANC decisions must be informed by national and public interest not commercial imperatives.

140. Disagreements amongst the broadcasters must not be allowed to frustrate the realisation of an important migration process that will improve broadcasting services and contribute to the development of broadband services. The ANC should be vigilant not to find itself in the middle of conflicting interest. Public interest must always be the guiding principle.

141. SA must build capacity and capabilities to manufacture Set-top-boxes (STBs) and in particular the core components of the STBs and not just assemble components.

142. One of the first issues that must be addressed in reviewing current broadcasting related policies in line with the principle of regulatory parity is the definition of broadcasting/content services. Given convergence, many countries have expanded such definitions to include non-linear television- and/or radio-like services.

143. With a change in definition, and the changing environment, it is necessary to consider if the two categories of broadcasting licenses are still the best approach to licensing or whether new categories should be introduced, taking into account the new content value chain which introduces not only non-linear services, but also new operations and processes and players in relation to television immediately, including consideration about:

    143.1 Channel packaging of individual channels;

    143.2 Channel aggregation into bouquets;

    143.3 Aligned services such as electronic programme guide (EPG) development and back-door services such as subscriber management, complaints etc.;

    143.4 Mux operation and multiplexing;

    143.5 Platform operation (an end-to-end service, managing a platform and the content); and

    143.6 Platform service operator – same as above, but on the basis of lease of platform as video-on-demand (VOD) and over-the-top (OTT) television).

144. The multi-channel environment envisaged in terms of digital broadcasting should be used to strengthen Free-to-Air television services, strengthen public and community broadcasting, improve public service programming, promoting local content industry, development of channels to enhance South Africa's international policy, etc.

145. There are a range of issues relating to the SABC/public broadcasting which need to be covered in a new White Paper, taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of the current system and the impact of digitization and convergence. There is a need for a discussion on the nature of the converged services, the structure, funding, governance and management.

146. The introduction of DTT, broadband and the increased number of television and other content delivery channels requires policy to consider the role of the SABC in the converged environment. Convergence, moreover, requires policy makers to consider whether or not the SABC will be a major developer and distributor of online content and content for multiple plat-forms, screens and devices, and if this would require a change in the structure of the broadcaster.

147. The SABC must be restructured to prioritise public services in the digital age. There is a need for the reconsideration of the mandate, structure and services of the SABC in view of the convergence of the transmission medium, services and devices. Policy must determine the scope of SABC's responsibilities in terms of publishing in all the digital platforms. In line with the principle of regulatory parity, under convergence, the definition of broadcasting must be reviewed to take into account the emergence of non-linear television or radio like services such as video-on-demand, Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) and over-the-top services.

148. As part of this process, the government must, in line with the resolutions of the 53rd conference, increase its funding of the SABC. This must be implemented progressively over a reasonable period. Government funding must be ring fenced to be targeted towards public programming such as indigenous languages, developmental and educational programming. In addition to government funding, the SABC requires a long-term sustainability strategy based on a people centered approach to public broadcasting.

149. Programming that is supporting education, health, poverty eradication, rural development, crime prevention and other societal priorities are miniscule compared to programming that is entertainment based. Budgets devoted to developmental programming are reflective of the miniscule programming output targeting the developmental agenda. This needs to be revised as a matter of urgency.

150. SABC reach to the African continent must be enhanced in order to support African rise, NEPAD and BRICS. Partnership with the BRICS countries in respect of relevant programming must be explored.

151. There are a range of issues to be noted regarding the SABC which take into account the strengths

and weaknesses of the current system, in the context of policy review. These include; the nature of the services, the mandate, the structure and funding of the future SABC. The ANC must ensure there is political will and skilled capacity to implement these resolutions.

152. The ANC reaffirms that a stable corporate governance mechanism is required to provide long-term stability. These include strengthening the SABC's accountability to parliament, shareholder (government) and the public. The public ownership of the SABC is central to its existence and sustainability.

153. Significant entry barriers remain in place in the pay commercial broadcasting sector. Regulation of this sector to enforce effective competition has not produced the desired competition. There is a need to relook at the behaviour of dominant players, access to premium content including sports rights and access to critical infrastructure by the competitors in this sector to enable the entry of new Pay TV services during the migration process and new Free-to-Air players after switch-over in 2015. It is important deal with these barriers to entry, regula-tory and policy certainty, in order for South Africa to continue in the growth path of the broad-casting industry and the 20 years good story as confirmed in the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) report (2014), *"State of the Broadcasting Industry Report"* and other research conducted by the ICT Review Panel.

154. The need for prioritizing South African content is greater today than any other time since democratization. The advent of broadband and digital multi-channel system requires new and additional content. The advent of non-linear television, video-on-demand services and over-the-top services will increase the available platforms and require concerted efforts to boost the capacity to produce South African content. The creation and production of additional South African content will enable South African productions to be mainstreamed internationally.

155. More than 200 community radio stations and community television stations have been licensed through the fast track processes at ICASA. The fast tracked approach to licensing community broadcasters need to be reviewed in order to assess to what extent are these new licenses achieving the intended objectives of the country. Many of these community services do not as yet reflect communities they serve in terms of directorship, management and programming. There is a need for concerted action to ensure a fair representation of women, the workers, and people with disabilities, children and the aged. Programming offered by the community sector still need to be diversified to cater for the special needs of these strata while also contributing to community development and upliftment.

156. The capacity of ICASA to effectively regulate in the public interest still shows limitation occasioned by funding constraints, skills shortage and confusion on the means and ways of achieving effective regulation. There is an overriding need to boost the capacity of the regulator to effective monitor the broadcasters in order to enforce licence conditions and regulations.

157. The terrestrial digital way of distributing and accessing the television broadcasting services presents a fresh opportunity for South Africa to realise the policy ends that are defined in the broadcasting environment.

158. There is a need to align the review of the broadcasting system with the review of the integrated ICT policy framework in its entirety before 2015 in order to encourage the emergence of converged services under a coherent national integrated policy framework.

PRINT MEDIA TRANSFORMATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND DIVERSITY

159. The patterns of ownership, control and distribution of the media and ICTs in South Africa were seen as reinforcing this battle of ideas. The resolutions called for a focus on redressing and correcting past discriminatory practices and providing a firm foundation in policy for a information communications technology sector that embraces all South Africans and treat them equitably. The need for the democratic forces to assert the hegemony, popularise the democratic ideas of transforming South Africa, was asserted.

160. As we celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Freedom Charter, 25th anniversary of the unbanning of the ANC and the good story of our democracy since 1994, it is worth noting the Constitutional protected freedoms in the Bill of

Rights including right to human dignity, freedom of expression, freedom of the media and access to information. This context provides a perspective in terms of, to what extent is South African citizens (rural and urban, poor and rich, etc) enjoying these rights and to what extent is the battles of ideas led by ANC and information accessible to all South Africans in languages of their choices.

161. Information and content gap is widening between the haves and have nots. Agenda is set by (amongst others) a white monopoly media, established media and driven towards neoliberal paradigm. The media space is filled by attacks on the positions of the movement and the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) by both the ultra-left and neo-liberals. In this context, the long dormant ultra-left forces have been resuscitated and provided ample space used to at-tack the democratic forces.

162. The 53rd National Conference resolved that the ANC review its own Media Charter. Conference reaffirmed the need for Parliament to conduct an inquiry on the desirability and feasibility of a Media Appeals Tribunal within the framework of the Constitution Act of 1996. Further, Conference stated that the Parliamentary process should review the existing media accountability mechanisms, balance the individual's rights to dignity and freedom of expression and freedom of the media, and review the privacy laws as well as those dealing with libel and defamations. It was resolved that the Press Freedom Commission (PFC) recommendations should be included in the wide ranging Parliamentary processes for consideration. Conference resolved that to encourage media diversity, an Empowerment Charter to promote Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment in the print media sector, be introduced. Also, the Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA) must be strengthened to support community and commercial entities towards a diverse media landscape, and Competition Commission should investigate possible anti-competitive practices within the print media sector. It was also resolved that the transformation of the advertising industry to ensure its contribution to media diversity must be prioritized.

163. In 1994, South Africa made significant strides to facilitate the transformation of the media and communication landscape and these include:

163.1 The introduction of new laws which facilitate the provision of communication services to the people, including in rural areas. This includes the licensing of community radio, licensing of community television, support for community and small commercial media (radio, print and TV), creation of an enabling environment for media diversity.

163.2 Support for media freedom and diversity.

163.3 The transformation of the SABC from being an apartheid mouthpiece to being a credible public broadcasting institution. In recent years, the SABC has played a very important role in the national and local elections thereby strengthening our democratic discourse.

163.4 New subscription television and commercial radio stations have also been licensed to contribute to diversity of voices and the participation of people from historical disadvantaged communities.

163.5 Creation of an independent regulatory environment to ensure that the licensing of services takes place in a transparent and fair manner.

163.6 Creation of an enabling environment in the broadcasting landscape that supports all tiers of the broadcasting system (public, community and commercial/private).

163.7 Promotion of local content through legislation and regulations.

163.8 Reviewing and development of a government communication and information system that serves our citizens.

163.9 Government communication and ad-spend used towards targeted audiences using community and small commercial media, with a minimum of 30% as a target for each state department or entity/SoEs.

164. South Africa has lagged behind in terms of the transformation of print media in respect of the entire value chain, viz. publication, printing, advertising, circulation, newsrooms, content, languages, class, gender, conditions of employment, etc.

165. Whereas the enactment of legislation regarding media development and diversity had good intentions, the final law product limited the extent the intentions of legislature could be achieved. The established MDDA was limited to supporting community and small commercial media, thereby unable to intervene in mergers and acquisition in the mainstream media, unable to finance new mainstream entrants and was provided with limited resources.

166. Further, irrespective of the enhanced government communications, there remain challenges in respect of access to information by the poor and rural.

167. Quality of journalism continues to deteriorate with increasing signs of gutter journalism.

168. On the skills front, young graduates in media studies have been exposed to a media studies curriculum and journalism in the respective School of Journalism that supports the status quo of media landscape, promote sensational reporting and lacks a great deal regarding development communication and with little training in terms of government communication.

169. Many young people from historically disadvantaged backgrounds come out of the Basic Education system that does not promote the media literacy and the culture of reading. This prevailing information and content divide, have constrained the ability of many citizens to participate in the mainstream economy thus entrenching the spectre of poverty and underdevelopment afflicting many people in the world as a whole and in our country, in particular.

170. A number of developments took shape post the 53rd National Conference including the establishment of the Print and Digital Media Transformation Task Team (PDMTTT) and its recommendations published in 2013, the research conducted by the MDDA on print media transformation published in 2014 and the GCIS production of a media landscape booklet and reflection on the 20 years of democracy and the media.

171. Changes in respect of patterns of ownership and control of the media (broadcast and print) is slow, in some cases in respect of broadcasting gains achieved post-1994 are reversed away from a diverse media back towards a monopoly. The

dominant *"big 4"* namely Naspers, Times Media Ltd, Caxton and the Independent Media Group (which has changed ownership to Sekunjalo) continue to dominate the print media space, despite the buyout by Sekunjalo Group of the Independent Newspapers Group and the establishment of The New Media (TNA). The print sector is still dominated by four big players. These companies also dominate the entire value chain of the market especially printing, distribution, advertising and research. This integration and the very market structure is perhaps the biggest barrier to market entry and potentially show possible anti-competitive behaviour. Other main-stream media players include the M&G Media and TNA Media.

172. The subscription broadcasting market continues to be dominated by a single player despite the efforts to introduce competition in this segment of the market. The anticipated broadening of the radio sector has failed to introduce the much needed diverse ownership.

173. The ownership of the broadcasting media by the public and community heralded an opportunity for the provision of news and content in the public interest. Despite the resolutions of the 53rd Conference regarding the public broadcaster and the need for action to restore its credibility, the SABC continues to be subject to negative stories and internal conflicts.

174. Digital migration project has stalled despite the resolutions of the 53rd Conference to ensure that South Africa benefits from the migration in terms of more public broadcasting channels, employment creation through the manufacturing of set-top boxes, content production and en-try of new players. The digital dividend arising out of the migration of broadcasting services and the release of the spectrum for broadband purposes has not been realized. The delays in Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT) are such that there is a likely possibility that SA may not meet the switch-off date. It is very necessary for SA to coordinate with other SADC countries at least and possibly negotiate a deadline extension.

175. Over the years, the ANC has remained resolute that the media including print media patterns of ownership, management and content must reflect the democratic dispensation ensuring the freedom of expression, which includes freedom

of the press and other media; freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; freedom of artistic creativity; and academic freedom and freedom of scientific research. We have also insisted that freedom of expression which includes the freedom of press and other media does not supersede human rights and other rights enshrined in the South African Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

176. The ANC notes that the MDDA Report: ***Transformation of Print Media*** (April 2014) further confirms the ANC position and necessitates the radical intervention to fast track transformation.

177. There exist a number of community and small commercial print media, who all face the challenge of sustainability. The acquisition of small established titles/small commercial media by the big players work against the policy of media diversity as espoused by the ANC and warrant further consideration.

178. The ANC participated in the process leading to the PDMTTT report which was handed over to Print and Digital Media SA (PDMSA) and published on Friday, 27th September 2013. The gist of the report confirmed the ANC correct reading of the media landscape in our country. The PDMSA subsequently launched the PDMTTT to explore the issues raised in their own report. Some critical issues identified in the report like lack of transformation remain unresolved. This warrants further policy interventions.

179. The ANC is still convinced of the necessity of further pursuance of the inquiry initiated by the 5th Parliament. The possible existence of anti-competitive behaviour is still a cause of con-cern and is not in line with the Constitutional intentions of a free media for all and freedom of expression imperatives.

180. Issues of media transformation should continue to focus on ownership and control, manage-ment, editorial, reporting on children, gender, rural, class, language and content diversity, as well as other demographic considerations across the entire value chain from publishing, printing, distribution, research, advertising, audit of bureau of circulation (ABC certification), editor's forum, etc. These issues still warrant further consideration beyond the PDMTTT, PFC and MDDA reports.

181. ANC still believes that the existing self-regulatory mechanism (Press Ombudsman and Press Council) remains ineffective and needs to be strengthened. The ANC appreciate the initiative by the print media to establish the Press Freedom Commission (PFC) in response to its call for enhanced accountability mechanisms. The PFC report largely confirmed the correctness of the ANC position. Therefore there is still a need for a rigorous debate and resolution on the establishment of accountability mechanisms that are independent and provide for an independent appeal mechanism. This discussion must be pursued and led through the Parliamentary inquiry.

182. South Africa will always protect, defend and promote media freedom. The media industry must be encouraged to implement the recommendations of the PFC and the PDMTTT Report. The print media industry must proactively cooperate & support the mooted parliamentary process as a way to help find a lasting solution that meets and takes into account the diverse needs of people in our country.

183. The ANC remains committed to a media climate that is free from vested political and commercial interests. This has been our guiding principle in all the engagements and ongoing discussions on the media transformation and accountability.

184. There has also been other changes in the sectors post the 53rd Conference, including changes of ownership in print, the introduction of the New Age, numerous licenses awarded (subscription, commercial radio in the Free State and Eastern Cape as well as in cities, community radio and TV – with all the challenges regarding regulatory certainty regarding digital broadcasting).

185. To maximise the value of the development of the media, to strengthen interventions in respect of media development and diversity. The ANC needs to prioritise ensuring that freedom of expression is enjoyed by all, transformation in the media, media diversity and ensure fair and accurate reporting.

186. A new Media Development and Diversity Policy should:

    186.1 Provide media diversity index;

    186.2 Provide for a community media (radio, TV, print and any other electronic) support strategy;

186.3   Provide specific support strategy for small commercial print media in line with Small Micro Medium Entreprises programme of the Department of Small Business Development;

186.4   Promote fair competition;

186.5   Promote media literacy and culture of reading;

186.6   Fast track transformation of the media;

186.7   Support local content and revive the local content industry;

186.8   Promote media platforms in indigenous languages and indigenous k n o w l e d g e systems;

186.9   Promote and protect our culture;

186.10 Support alternative and diverse mainstream media; and

186.11 Provide for an institutional framework that enhances collaboration, effective planning and oversight.

187. The policy must review whether the licensing and regulatory regime overseen by ICASA enhances the media diversity agenda and what more measures could be taken to advance media diversity.

188. Media diversity should be central to ensure citizens enjoy the media freedom principles enshrined in the Constitution.

189. The institutional framework within government is perhaps the greatest barrier to the emergence of a coherent government strategic thinking, effective planning and deployment infrastructure and services to the people. There is a need for a rethink on how government is organized to discharge its services timeously within the available resources.

190. As a point of departure government should develop and retain policy making capacity. A National Communications Task Team (NCTT) comprising government, civil society and industry to engage on critical issues of mutual interest should be supported. This NCTT amongst others looks at effective government communication and development communication.

191. The ANC reaffirms the 53rd Conference resolution that state institutions that are duplicating mandates and efforts must be rationalized to address existing overlaps, duplication and undue competition within the state.

POSTAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE POST BANK

192. Post Office is one of the oldest institutions of Government, established since 1910. It has the largest footprint with three business components, physical, courier/logistics and financial (Post Bank).

193. The 53rd National Conference resolved that the National Address System should prioritise the rollout of addresses to informal settlements and rural areas to ensure addressability for all households to achieve economic inclusion. Conference resolved that Government should introduce policy guidelines to direct opportunities to the Post Bank as a bank of first choice of Government and citizens transactions. Conference also resolved that national policy should clarify the approach to the regulation of cherry picking behavior of international courier companies. Conference resolved to encourage all spheres of Government to use the South African Post Office. Further, conference resolved that postal services should be inclusive and address the needs of the people with disability.

194. While the last century saw a consistent increase in the mail volumes in the postal services sector, the 21st century is marked by a general decline in postal volumes and revenue. Letter mail is the most drastically reduced type of mail, partly due to electronic substitution such as e-mail, text messages and social networks, but also customer preference for expedited or secure services offered by courier companies. However, parcel mail is increasing, driven by largely e-commerce and the requirement for deliveries. These changes, driven largely by the technological developments, have affected the traditional provision and delivery of postal services.

195. The Post Bank corporatization process was initiated after the 53rd Conference Resolution. Policy discussion still needs to be held to deal with the market positioning of the Post Bank as well as the differentiation of the Post Bank from all other commercial entities. The role of the Post Office and Post Bank in the delivery of government ICT and other services needs resolution in policy.

196. During the 2012/2013 financial year SAPO had Retail Post Office infrastructure of about 2497 service points of which 1753 are Post Office outlets and 874 are Retail Postal agencies (RPAs) country-wide.

197. Electronic substitution of traditional mail is accelerating as both consumers and businesses adopt electronic processes across multiple domains. Mail users are shifting from traditional hard copy distribution models to a variety of new ways to digitally communicate, advertise, or transact. They are attracted to greater convenience, faster service, and lower cost.

198. The digital revolution has become the disruptive innovation to the traditional business of postal service. With several different communications channels competing for consumers, the postal service needs to modernize its role to accommodate for the digital age. This therefore necessitates for the future of postal services to be defined within the context of these technological developments. The postal service should consider new products and services that reflect the evolving mandate to bind the nation together in a new world where people are increasingly communicating digitally.

199. It is important for policy to provide for the use of postal networks (collection, transportation and delivery of mail, retail outlets) for a wide range of value-added services. A postal system can help to provide logistical solutions to integrate data flows, physical flows and financial flows. The Post Office should continue to be the Universal Postal Services Obligation provider and continue establishing points of presence in all communities.

200. Transformation of the Post Office should include:

    200.1 Modernization of services (e-government services, issuing of IDs, Government to citizens Door-to-Door delivery, distribution of books and medication, etc.);

    200.2 Expansion into freight and logistics, and consider expansion beyond SA borders;

    200.3 National Address System (NAS) to contribute to census, trading and tax regulation;

    200.4 Address structural inefficiencies and negative perceptions.

201. A universal services fund (USF) should be established which all sector players should contribute to. Any player providing universal services should be allowed to claim compensation from the USF for the universal services provided.

202. The Post Office should consider incorporating express, courier services, ICT, logistics operators and other providers into the delivery chain of the postal sector. The postal service should consider expanding hybrid mail applications as an early step on the bridge across the digital divide. Postal service should leverage its networks in order to be used as an agency contact points for private partners in the provision of a range of financial services.

203. The scope of competition in postal markets has to be defined in order to pre serve the universal postal service objectives, and also 'reserved services' for the exclusive right of the public postal operator should be defined to prevent market creaming.

204. Policy should introduce regulated competition in the postal market to ensure that postal operators compete with each other in providing services efficiently and at acceptable levels of quality and price. This is aimed at transforming postal providers into dynamic market led and customer oriented enterprises that satisfy the needs and expectations of users of postal services.

205. Post offices are seen as potential ICT access points that could offer a broad range of services (including e-services), as well as extension of broadband network to rural areas that do not have broadband coverage. Post offices are therefore considered as potential points of presence for broadband infrastructure provision.

206. This country-wide network of post offices positions SAPO as a key player in rural connectivity and overall ICT service delivery. The Post Office provisioning of infrastructure and services has been affected by the instability at the South African Post Office. Weak governance and management, the unstable labour environment and poor oversights are some of the contributory factors.

207. There are other deep seated issues that are policy and regulatory in nature. These include the

financing of the roll-out of infrastructure to areas that are uneconomical. The funding support by government has been terminated despite the measures by the Post Office to rebalance their network to reach the majority of rural areas.

208. The Post Office was allowed a protected market up to 1kg of mail. The substitution of mail by electronic communication has meant a decline in mail volumes that has impacted on the revenues of the Post Office. The funding structure of the Post Office Universal Service Obligation needs to be considered in tandem with measures that are taken at the regulatory level to protect the Post Office from uncompetitive behavior from local and international courier services.

209. Post Bank should be considered as a State Bank/ Banker of Government. All civil servants should be paid through the Post Bank.

210. Post Bank should accommodate as secure landing for consumers and financial access.

211. Postal Regulation should define the postal market and segmentation in line with UPU strategy.

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, INNOVATION AND INDUSTRIALISATION

212. The 53rd National Conference resolved to promote and support development of new ICT Research and Development (R&D) plans and strengthen existing strategies and policies to foster robust, well-coordinated institutional arrangements that lead to development of indigenous world class, technology innovations in ICT through directed national ICT research, de-velopment and innovation programmes. Conference also resolved that investments in ICT Research and Development and Innovation (RDI) should be increased and an ICT RDI roadmap be adopted by 2014.

213. The ICT RDI Roadmap has been drafted and is in the process of being adopted.

214. Government launched an e-Skills Institute in 2014 to spear-heard the planning of cross-sectoral e-skills initiatives. The e-Skill Institute has fostered relationship with universities and the technical and vocational training colleges for distance learning initiatives. The e-Skills Institute will have

to develop programmes with the various tiers of government and government departments while offering training to out of school youth, women and others that need empowerment.

215. An e-Skills strategy that is adequately funded and supported will be critical in the success of the transformation of the public sector from a paper based administrative system into an always available easy to use interactive system of service delivery.

216. Industrialization should unlock the opportunities for the majority of South Africans. The Industrialization Strategy should include:

    216.1 DTT programme to revive the local electronic manufacturing;

    216.2 Broadband to stimulate demand for local products;

    216.3 DTT and Broadband to stimulate local content, applications and software.

217. The Regulator (ICASA) must be strengthened so that its capacity match the task, streamlined and focused activity on concrete deliverables, adequately funded, accountable for policy and legislative ends, and harmonized with other regulators.

218. There is a need to understand the ICT value chain, identify areas that can be developed locally, promote local manufacturing of components/ segments and be aligned to the broader industrial policy. There is a need to understand the gaps in the current policy implementation.

219. Industrialisation strategy must be lined to Government priorities, focus on services and the cost of communication.

220. Manufacturing of devices can be approached progressively through first assembly and then manufacture.

221. Strategy should promote SMMEs, unlock their potential, and enforce cooperation by the proprietary software owners to help the development of SMMEs and/or open source solutions through the creation of platforms.

222. PPPFA need to be reviewed to support the objective of unlocking opportunities for the majority of citizens. Ensure 70% set aside for SMME linked entrepreneurship.

223. Broadband rollout should involve SMMEs and be specific about the nature and character of such involvement.

Conclusion

224. Evaluation of progress since several ANC previous conference resolutions show that implementation has been constrained by the capacity of the ANC to sustain the effectiveness, continuity and capacitating its communication structure. Further, the ANC has not been able to effectively monitor the implementation of its resolutions by ANC cadres deployed in Government. Another challenge relate to our government's capacity to implement the ANC resolutions. Government seems to have also been constrained by policy incoherence, high staff turnover in critical departments and business areas, and overlapping and often competing institutions.

225. South Africa has the potential to leapfrog its development through the adoption of radical policies and programmes that will ensure a fast tracked transformation and better life for all its citizens.

226. Guided by the radical transformation agenda, enabling policies are a must, in order to unlock the opportunities for the majority of South Africans.

227. A diverse media is essential for South Africans to have choice and enjoy the freedoms of expressions protected by our Constitution. A diverse media, in the battle of ideas, will also assist democratic forces to assert the hegemony, popularise the democratic ideas of transforming South Africa.

228. The ICT sector holds significant and strategic potential to enhance economic activity and development, stimulate a viable SMME sector, create sustainable jobs, improve the delivery of government services and attract new investments. Appropriate policy frameworks must be developed to enable the country to realise this potential.

229. While much progress has been made to transform and grow the communications landscape, a lot more still needs to be done to meet the objectives of our Vision 2030. Our approach to this vision, should seek to consolidate the link between the communications policy environ-ment and the broader developmental and democratization context.

"An inclusive, knowledgeable and informed society enabling development".

ANNEXURE TO DISCUSSION PAPER ON COMMUNICATIONS

DRAFT ANC INTERNAL COMMUNICATION POLICY AND IMPROVING ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS & EFFICIENCY

1. The purpose of this policy is to generate inputs and provoke discussions within the structures of the ANC around the content of an over-arching policy frame work. It is imperative to have policy parameters and guidelines within which communication in the ANC will be managed. The policy seeks to strengthen the culture of internal democracy, open communication and robust debate within ANC structures and to ensure that these co-exist with a culture of discipline, unity and the principles of democratic centralism.

2. The ANC has often been in the forefront of strategies to engage with the reality of the information and communication revolution. It regularly uses research and opinion surveys to aid its elections strategy development, while at the same time emphasising internal communications and discussions through organs such as **ANC Today**, **NEC Bulletin**, **Umrabulo**, various provincial ANC publications, social media and direct communications (door-to-door visits, mini rallies, sectoral meetings) with its mass base.

3. The innovative use of *'new media'* was particularly evident during the 2009 and 2014 elections campaign and is one of the explanations for the concerted outreach to young and first-time voters.

5. The engagement on the issues of communications remains an important part of ANC organisational strategy, as recognised by the extensive resolution from the 51st, 52nd and the 53rd National Conferences. The issue of ICT in the ANC has also arisen in the context of discussions about organisational design and modernising the operations of the movement.

6. Problems with the ANC membership system since the re-establishment of the ANC as a legal movement post 1990, have demonstrated the need for a system overhaul. Not only is our membership system inefficient (long waiting periods for membership cards, problems of renewals, etc.), but it also poses a serious risk to the ANC, since the system can easily be manipulated.

7. Assessments of the membership system indicate that there are a number of challenges in the 'membership system value chain' that can be classified as information systems and technology problems. In addition to organisational processes and systems, there are a host of other areas, where we have only scratched the surface in terms of using information and communication technology to improve organisational effectiveness.

8. The ANC needs to develop its own ICT policy and strategy to drive its administrative and political systems. The said ICT policy and strategy must encompass the overall training of ANC staff and leaders starting with the branches. The ANC further needs to strengthen and develop its capacity to manage its own internal IT systems. The IT must have a political champion to drive the ANC ICT policy and strategy including overseeing the implementation. The proper authority regarding the IT should be located within the Communications Unit to champion roll-out and connectivity of ANC regions and branches, to develop and strengthen ICT platforms, manage membership system, including managing all conference registrations, and the like.

9. The 53rd Conference reaffirmed the 51st National Conference Resolution, which called for all ANC regional offices and branches to be connected to the internet, so as to aid internal communications and improve efficiency. To this end, this task has not been fulfilled.

OBJECTIVES OF THE POLICY

10. To promote co-ordination, coherence and consistency in the ANC's approach to communication.

11. To promote uniformity and discipline in messaging.

12. To promote synergy between the work of the ANC and the ANC government.

13. To clarify the roles and responsibilities of various structures with regard to their communication responsibilities and obligations.

CONTEXT, CHALLENGES AND UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMUNICATION POLICY

Freedom of speech

14. The ANC acknowledges and recognises the right of all its members and structures to freedom of speech and expression, as guaranteed in the South African Constitution.

15. Consistent with its culture of internal democracy and robust engagement, members have the right and freedom to raise various issues within the internal structures of the movement. The ANC encourages its members to exercise their freedom of speech internally.

16. However, the ANC, like any other organisation or institution, also recognises the need to manage and co-ordinate its communication with stakeholders in the interest of consistency in messaging and organizational discipline. The ANC has a responsibility to ensure that its messages are presented in a coherent and consistent manner.

17. Any revolutionary movement has a responsibility to ensure message discipline in the interest of unity, cohesion and coherence.

18. Individual members of the ANC are accountable for statements or comments they make in the media and other public platforms. Members of the ANC should be discouraged from using social media to undermine the policies, programmes and leadership of the ANC or engaging in public spats. No organisation can find this behavior acceptable. Those who use social media or any platform to rub-bish and insult the ANC and its leadership or make statements that bring the ANC into disrepute must be subjected to disciplinary processes.

Coordination, consistency and coherence of communication

19. The ANC is a mass movement with millions of members and supporters as well as various structures and leaders at different levels of the organisation. The challenge is to ensure that the ANC speaks in one voice across all its structures and levels.

20. Despite the fact that the ANC is a massive organisation with many structures cutting across national, provincial, regions, branches as well as ANC in government, Parliament and provincial legislatures, the over-riding principle must be – there is only one ANC. This policy proceeds from the premise that all ANC structures must operate within the discipline and policies of the ANC.

21. For a variety of reasons, and partly as a result of ill-discipline, it has not always been easy to project an image of an organisation that speaks in one voice. Conflicting and contradictory messages have continued to play themselves out in the public domain, thus giving the public an impression of an organisation *"at war with itself"*.

22. Message discipline and co-ordination of messages is key. Lack of co-ordination can lead to paralysis of the communication machinery and inability to cascade information effectively across the organisation and to ensure message coherence.

23. The other key challenge that undermines the ANC's capacity to communicate effectively and coherently is uneven adherence to organizational decisions, where some structures, leaders or individual members tend to contradict or publicly defy positions adopted by the higher structures, or where members of the leadership collective publicly distance themselves from positions that were officially adopted by a constitutional structure of the ANC. A situation where positions and policies of the ANC are contested by its own membership or parts of its leadership in the public domain, and not within the structures of the organisation, poses both a discipline and communication challenge for the ANC. It further compromises efforts to articulate a clear and common position of the movement on a given issue.

24. The broad church character of the ANC has always accommodated different tendencies, perspectives and ideologies within its ranks and the alliance, but bound together by a common commitment to the strategic objectives of the NDR. What is critical for communication is to ensure that the broad church character of the ANC and the alliance, which has historically given the movement its resilience, strength and tenacity, does not translate into conflicting

and contradictory voices. It is important that the capacity of the ANC to articulate its policies and positions in a uniform and coherent way is not undermined.

Allegiance to official ANC positions and message discipline

25. The principle of democratic centralism shall guide the communication approach of the ANC and its membership. Members of the ANC, or its structures, at various levels, should not publicly speak out against formally adopted policies of the ANC. Any dissenting view must be expressed within the internal structures of the ANC and at an appropriate forum. This will reduce the risk of having a multiplicity of conflicting and contradictory voices all purporting to be speaking on behalf of the movement.

26. Once a decision has been taken or a position adopted by the highest decision-making structure of the organisation, all cadres of the movement operating at whatever structure or level, must rally behind the decision or position, and refrain from contesting it in public. Dissenting voices must only be aired internally. This will promote the goal of an ANC that *"speaks in one voice".* Similarly, structures of the ANC must ensure that they do not send contradictory messages on the same issue.

27. The communication policy should discourage members of the ANC from publicly attacking each other or contradicting positions, policies or decisions adopted by the NEC, NGC, Policy Confer-ences and National Conferences. The same applies to different structures or leaders of government criticising each other in public. Public criticism of other structures or members on public platforms should be discouraged, if not prohibited. Criticisms should be aired through internal structures and must have the objective of contributing to the overall strengthening of the ANC. All disagreements should play themselves out within constitutional structures of the ANC.

28. Those speaking officially on behalf of the ANC should ensure that they stick to formally adopted policies and policy positions of the ANC. Spokespersons of the ANC have a responsibility to articulate policies of the organisation or decisions taken by the constitutional structures of the ANC and not their personal views.

29. Once a competent ANC decision-making structure has adopted a position on a particular matter, leaders and members of the ANC are discouraged from continuing to defend and propagate a view that was defeated in a formally-constituted structure of the ANC. Spokespersons whose per-sonal views conflict with the official policy or position of the ANC have a responsibility to ensure that they do not place themselves in a position where they would bring the movement into disrepute

Every cadre a communicator

30. Every cadre of the ANC has a revolutionary duty to contribute to strengthening the hegemony of the ANC and to defend and articulate its policies and programmes in the public domain. The principle of *"every cadre a communicator"* recognizes that ordinary members of the ANC are ambassadors for its policies, views and programmes.

31. To achieve this, all ANC cadres must be sufficiently grounded in the politics of the ANC, to enable them to articulate and defend its positions and policies in the public spaces that they find themselves in. The ANC recognizes that political discussions take place all the time and in different informal settings, such as in trains, taxis, funerals, pubs, radio talk shows, etc. These informal programmes do not lend themselves to planning, co-ordination and formal deployment. In this regard, each member of the ANC has a responsibility to ensure that they arm themselves with a broad understanding of ANC policies and positions on key issues to enable them to defend the movement whenever debates arise in such informal forums. The need for cadre development and political education remain critical if every member is to discharge their ambassadorial responsibilities more effectively.

32. However, this principle of *"every cadre an ANC communicator"* does not detract from the fact that the ANC, at various levels and structures, has officially designated individuals to speak on its behalf. No member of the ANC should purport to be speaking on behalf of the ANC, unless formally so assigned. Misrepresenting oneself as official spokesperson of the ANC on any matter shall be viewed as ill-discipline.

Promoting a culture of vibrant and robust debate

33. The communication policy is not intended to stifle internal debate, robust discussions and organizational communication. The need for coherence and consistency of communication must not replace the culture of robust debate. Internal debates remain the lifeblood of the movement which gives it its vibrancy. The policy merely seeks to develop a framework which promotes and strengthens the culture of internal democracy and a culture of vibrant and robust debate.

34. Members of the organisation have a right to engage in public debates. However, in the context of the communication policy, the expectation is that members of the ANC will not engage in public debates and disagreements on matters or policies that have already been resolved or adopted by the organisation.

Public engagements with alliance partners

35. Public spats among alliance partners are discouraged. Alliance partners are discouraged from raising issues of concern about each other in the media. Instead, these should be addressed through alli-ance structures. The ANC will not engage its alliance partners in the media. Each alleged attack on an alliance partner by another must be first verified for accuracy and context.

Coordination at the centre and execution at the point of delivery

35. ANC communication shall be coordinated from the centre (Luthuli House), and decentralised to lower structures. The principle should be: *"co-ordination from the centre, implementation at local level".* Our point of departure is that communication becomes more effective if information is imparted from the point that is closest to the target audience.

36. The Department of Information and Publicity at national level shall co-ordinate ANC communication. Headquarters shall take responsibility for developing an overarching policy, strategy and key messages for adaptation by other structures.

RELATIONSHIP WITH GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION

37. Cadres of ANC deployed in government have a responsibility to ensure that there is coherence in the communication strategies and programme of government and the ANC regarding the implementation of government programmes. The coherent messaging should extend to provincial and regional levels.

ROLES AND PROCESSES

Spokespersons

38. The President and Secretary-General of the ANC (and the rest of the Top Six Officials) are the chief spokespersons of the ANC and are thus entrusted with the responsibility and right to articulate ANC positions and policies on a wide range of platforms.

39. The NEC shall designate one member to assume the role of official ANC spokesperson.

40. All outcomes of the constitutional meetings of the ANC will be communicated by them (President, Secretary-General and ANC spokesperson), unless specifically delegated by them.

41. Responsibility for communication with the media may, from time to time, be assigned to heads of NEC Sub-Committees.

42. Members of the NEC are, collectively and individually, spokespersons of the ANC. They may, from time to time, be designated by the Secretary-General the responsibility to speak on behalf of the ANC on certain specific matters.

Structures and responsibilities

43. The ultimate responsibility for communication in the ANC shall lie with the Department of Information and Publicity at national level.

44. Following each National Conference, the Sub-Committee on Communication/Department of Information and Publicity shall ensure the development of an over-arching five-year communication strategy.

45. The Department of Information and Publicity shall monitor and evaluate the implementation of the ANC communication programme at

all levels, including in government and the legislature.

46. The Department of Information and Publicity shall convene regular engagements with Provinces, Alliance, the Leagues, government, etc. to deal with issues of co-ordination, messages, communication environment analysis, joint strategizing, etc.

47. Similar structures and processes shall be replicated at provincial or regional levels wherever possible.

Provincial level

48. The Chairperson of the ANC and Provincial Secretary shall be the chief spokespersons of the ANC in the province and shall have the responsibility to articulate ANC matters in the province.

49. The Provincial Executive Committees (PECs), shall designate a PEC member who will be responsible for communication and assume the role of official ANC spokesperson in the province.

50. Communication of all matters arising from meetings of the constitutional structures of the ANC shall be handled by the Chairperson, Provincial Secretary or official Spokesperson, unless specifically delegated by them.

51. Responsibility for communication with the media may, from time to time, be assigned to heads of PEC Sub-Committees.

DEALING WITH UNAUTHORISED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

52. Like many organisations, the ANC faces a challenge of leaks to the media from time to time. In particular, discussions and decisions of the NEC or other structures have been the subject of a number of media leaks. This unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information causes harm to the organisation, undermines its effectiveness and trust among members.

53. Experience in other contexts has demonstrated

that those likely to leak confidential and sensitive information are, in the main, disgruntled insiders as well as those with a vested interest on the matter in question. Cadres of the movement have a responsibility to be disciplined and to respect the confidentiality of organisational information.

54. In dealing with the challenge of leaks and unauthorized disclosure of information, the ANC must adopt the following approach:

54.1 Be proactive and prompt in communicating key decisions of the ANC to avoid speculation or pre-emptive leaks. If the ANC delays in announcing a formally-adopted decision, then some members with a vested interest on the matter may be tempted to leak that information to an anxious public or even distort its content and context. At times, unnecessarily delaying to release information which has a huge public interest may encourage leaks.

54.2 Any conduct involving leaking of confidential information shall constitute violation of the communication policy and the ANC has a responsibility to deal with this act of misconduct in the same way as it would deal with any act that brings the organisation into disrepute.

54.3 Any member who leaks or releases information to the media or public without due authorization or prior approval, shall be guilty of misconduct.

55. Members of the ANC need to appreciate that leaking information undermines the effectiveness, discipline and unity of the ANC, and is an embarrassment to the organisation.

56. The task is for the organisation to deal with all matters that may give rise to leaks and to ensure its cadres appreciate the harm that unauthorised disclosure of organisational information causes.

57. The problem of information leaks is largely a security matter and the relevant section of the ANC needs to develop guidelines in this regard. In the long-term, the ANC will have to evolve a much stricter culture that firmly and actively discourages leaks.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS   7

ANC INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A BETTER AFRICA IN A BETTER AND JUST WORLD

INTRODUCTION

1. The ANC celebrates the 60th Anniversary of the Freedom Charter in 2015. Encompassed within the Charter is the clause *"There shall be peace and friendship"* which is central to the implementation of the ANC International Relations policy.

2. The ANC, our Alliance partners and the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) are gearing themselves in preparation for the forthcoming National General Council to be held later this year.

3. The NGC is a constitutional gathering whose overall strategic mandate is to evaluate the organisational progress report, to review and consolidate new policy proposals, and more importantly to appraise the role of our National Liberation Movement into the future.

4. The ANC is revolutionary national liberation movement which is an integral part of the international revolutionary movement to liberate humanity from the bondage of imperialism and neo colonialism.

5. Over the years of our struggle for liberation, our political, economic and ideological ethos has been based on our revolutionary principles of internationalism and solidarity. Our historic mission is to build a better Africa and a better World that is humane, just, equitable, democratic, and free.

6. Our cadres have to appreciate that the international relations question is the most complex terrain of struggle. It is primarily about power and hegemony.

7. At the heart of this important question is how we locate our national interest within the unfolding world realities. Our foremost immediate task is to expand the influence of our nation state as part of the common effort to transform the world into a better place for humanity.

8. The NGC provides an important platform to expand our horizons in this complex terrain of our struggle. The premise is to build a special cadre of the ANC capable of taking forward the objectives of the second phase of our transition for socio economic transformation of our society in the context of our international relations.

9. We therefore present to our structures and membership this discussion document, which seeks to analyse the international balance of forces, and the extent to which they impact on our own specific concrete material conditions as a country and the continent.

2. CHARACTERISATION OF THE WORLD TODAY

1. The world has become an arena of protracted struggle characterized by legacies spanning thousands of years. The panorama of nationalities, languages, cultures and traditions characterizing the theatre of the world gives credence to the popular song *"Yinde Lendlela Esiyihambayo'* (It is a long journey that we traverse)

2. What remains important is our endless contribution to this historic task of human development. The guiding strategy is our political, economic and ideological basis for taking certain principled positions in the midst of these most complex world realities.

3. One of the important tasks of our National Democratic Revolution (NDR) is to grapple with the demands of the ever-changing complex world's material conditions. Our theoretical understanding of the world is derived from the traditions of our movement of the analysis of the balance of forces.

4. The balance of forces is about our understanding

of the concrete analysis of the dynamic world material conditions and how they impact on our own particular conditions. It is imperative to grasp the complexities of the world environment and the extent to which they influence the pace and the direction of the NDR.

5. The dialectic relationship between theory and practice in the struggle for the transformation of society is important for various reasons. Of importance to this dialectical relationship is the notion that theory without practice is sterile.

6. This theoretical formulation is affirmed by Vladimir Lenin when he maintains that, *"revolutionary scientific theory is the weapon to make us judge and define the methods of struggle correctly. It is a weapon that helps us analyse and understand correctly the cause of development of human society at every moment, to analyse and understand correctly every turning point of society and to carry out the revolutionary transformation of society".*

7. Our historic conjuncture of the 1994 democratic breakthrough took place against the backdrop of events of far reaching political significance. These historic events changed the theatre of the balance of forces in the world.

8. The democratic breakthrough took place against the backdrop of the demise of socialism in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states. A defining moment, which caught the imagination of the world, at the time, was the fall of the Berlin Wall, which separated the East from West Germany.

9. The sudden collapse of socialism in the world altered completely the balance of forces in favour of imperialism. It ushered in a new world hegemonic era of global socio economic agenda of capitalism and free market imperatives.

10. The world is navigating through a complex period of a transition from a bipolar into an increasingly contested unipolar world led by the US. There is still an increased contestation of ideas between the two previously opposing hegemonic systems of the world.

11. Our transition to democracy is taking place against the backdrop of a global economy buttressed by the worse global economic crisis at any time since the 1930s. The world economy is underpinned by growing features of poverty, disease and underdevelopment.

12. The world economic meltdown has led to increasing destabilization of regions outside the West and generated new conflicts. This is compounded by declining international solidarity, which is decreasing the ability of multilateral organisations to develop solutions to global and regional conflicts.

13. There is a fundamental need to appreciate the reality that we are taking forward the tasks of our revolution under the most complex and fragile conditions dominated by the world industrial military complex. The global economic trajectory is on a path to serve the interests of the international monopoly capital.

14. Imperialism has plunged humanity in a perpetual socio-economic crisis. The high levels of poverty, inequality, unemployment, disease and underdevelopment confirm our long held view that the capitalist market economy cannot resolve its own contradictions.

15. Western economies have become the epicenter of the world financial crisis. Most of the EU nation states were compelled by the worsening economic conditions to impose harsh austerity measures that saw huge cuts on social spending, privatization of key sectors of the economy, high levels of inflation, decreased standards of living and increasing inequalities and underdevelopment.

16. The increasing level of income inequalities amongst and within most of the world nation states remains a serious challenge. Statistics indicate that more than 870 million people in the world everyday sleep without food. At the same time 1% of the world population owns 50% of the wealth.

17. The deteriorating world economic crisis has a tremendous adverse effect on the economy of our country and therefore our revolutionary programme for radical socio-economic transformation.

18. Despite our achievements since the democratic breakthrough in 1994, our people are still facing the structural consequences of the apartheid colonial realities oppression and exploitation. Our people bear the brunt of poverty, inequality, unemployment, disease, and underdevelopment which is still the principal characteristic of our society.

19. The question we need to ask ourselves is whether we have been able to consolidate the posture of our foreign policy in the continent and the world to advance our national interest? In other words

how do we distinguish our analysis of the world balance of forces and how they impact on our foreign policy perspective?

20. Our sphere of influence is underpinned by our understanding of the global economic power relations. Of importance are where to commence with our theoretical formulation of our national interest from the world perspective in general and our country in particular.

21. One of the crucial questions is whether we are able to use the opportunities we enjoy in the international relations platforms to advance the objectives of our national interest. Of importance do we relate to our understanding of the principles of internationalism and solidarity to achieve the fundamental objectives of our national democratic revolution?

22. Our answer to this question will help us expand our sphere of influence within the international arena. Therefore our main objective is to consolidate the leadership role of our country within the realms of the international world.

23. The main objective of our revolution is to create prospects for meaningful participation of the majority of our people into the mainstream economy. Therefore ours is the transformation of our economy in a manner that responds to the demands of the overwhelming majority of the people of our country.

24. Our perspective on human solidarity and internationalism has informed the role of South Africa on the international platform. Our approach is informed by our struggle to create a world, which is a better place for all humanity.

25. Our strategic approach is to strengthen multilateral institutions such as the SADC, AU and the UN to achieve the overall objectives of creating a just, equitable and humane world.

26. History is a testimony that the US effectively using its aggressive foreign policy to advance its national interests. In most instances it has been supporting undemocratic changes of government as an instrument to serve its global agenda.

27. But on the contrary, lack of democracy has been used as an excuse for US intervention in areas where its national interests are under threat. National interest has become an important factor in determining the world balance of forces.

28. While the economic situation described above

presents a gloomy picture, the rise of emerging economies led by China in the world economy has heralded a new dawn of hope for further possibilities of a new world order.

29. In the past twenty years of our democratic dispensation, we have witnessed an increased growth of trade relations between our country and the People Republic of China. China–South Africa trade and investment has been on a pedestal both quantitatively and qualitatively.

30. The trade volumes between China and South Africa have far surpassed the value of USD $400billion in this current year. But whilst we appreciate this phenomenal growth, more has to be done.

31. Our economic relations have grown in leaps and bounds into investment and beneficiation of both our industrial and manufacturing goods. We therefore have to use the opportunities of these great economic prospects between our two economies to build the friendship of our two people.

32. China economic development trajectory remains a leading example of the triumph of humanity over adversity. The exemplary role of the collective leadership of the Communist Party of China in this regard should be a guiding lodestar of our own struggle.

33. The rise of China as the second strongest economy, with the re-emergence of economies of Russia, and major countries of the South, is gradually redefining the world towards a multi-polar order. Therefore, the growing influence of China on the global economy is an important factor in the balance of global power relations.

34. Further giving credence to *"shifting balance of forces"*, as opposed to static observation, of the dominant US led unipolar world, is the emergence of BRICS constituted by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The formation of BRICS as a powerful political and socio economic bloc is necessarily not just about the size of the population of the member states but also the abundance of the requisite markets.

35. What has become clear is that the formation of BRICS was a conscious political decision to roll back the post-World War II Washington Consensus. The formation of the BRICS Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank will have a far-reaching impact on the development trajectory of the world institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

36. Our understanding of the fragile world environment is important for the success of BRICS as a regional power block. Of importance is to ensure that we guard this milestone achievement against centrality of the Washington Consensus. As progressive forces our immediate task is to constantly work towards building an alternative world that would create a fair, just, equitable and better environment for all the people of the world.

37. The US does not appreciate the resurgence of China and Russia as dominant factors in the arena of international power relations. It has instead declared a cold war against these two emerging world powers.

38. Its destabilisation strategy against China is on three fronts:

    ■ The US is bent on portraying China as the world's worst polluter and a threat to the environment with the intention being to suggest that China is but a paper tiger whose economic rise is not sustainable.

    ■ The US, backed by its ideological apparatus, has tried a repeat of the Tiananmen Square against the Chinese government by parading to the world counter revolution as a popular uprising and counter revolutionaries as human rights activists.

    ■ The US is exploiting China's dispute with some of its Asian neighbours over the North and South China Sea islands to rally these neighbours against China, including trying to build an anti-China alliance of Asian satellite states that will take its orders from Washington.

39. Russia has not been spared the wrath of US-led Western imperialism. As with China, the Russian leadership is constantly being portrayed in the Western media and official discourse as monsters abusing human rights. As with China, counter revolutionary demonstrations and marches are being staged and given huge publicity in the Western media in order to destabilise and/provoke the Russian government.

40. Whatever genuine concerns may exist within the Russian population and populations of former Soviet Union, there is a clear plot to exploit this in order to contain the rise of Russia globally. It is an encirclement strategy that seeks to isolate Russia in the manner that is being attempted on China as well.

41. This is the context within which the crisis in Ukraine should be understood by the world progressive forces. The war taking place in Ukraine is not about Ukraine. Its intended target is Russia. As with China, Russia's neighbours are being mobilised to adopt a hostile posture against Moscow, and enticed to join the European Union and NATO. Pro-West satellite states are being cultivated or as we saw with the coup in Ukraine, even invented, to encircle Russia and allow their territory to be used for the deployment of NATO's hostile military hardware faced in the direction of Russia. These Western manoeuvres, directed from Washington, are reminiscent of Cold War. They have vowed in Washington that there will be Russia or China to challenge the US hegemony.

42. Washington's sponsored destabilisation is not limited to Russia and China. We see it unfolding in the streets of Latin America including in Venezuela which the US has strangely declared a threat to its *"national security",* in the Middle East and in African countries with the sole intention of toppling a progressive democratically-elected governments. This has a bearing on the nature of conflict and the scourge of terrorism we see in the world today.

43. The South has been rising in a manner that promises to alter the international balance of power and offer opportunities for the emergence of a post-Western world order and Washington is in a fighting mood to ensure that this does not happen.

3. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION AND REINDUSTRIALISATION OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

1. This year the people of the African continent and the world marked the 51st anniversary celebrations of the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The OAU is the most important political instrument used over the years of our struggle to accelerate the process of the decolonialization of the continent.

2. The OAU, which is now the African Union (AU), has played a much significant political leadership role in the struggle of our people against imperialism and colonial domination. The AU continues to occupy the forefront trenches of our struggle to build a better Africa from the shambles of imperialism and neo-colonialism.

3. African leaders have identified industrialization as central to the development of the continent. Developmental integration as a radical approach to integration is imperative for our overall strategy to build the economic base of continental integration.

4. Promoting developmental integration across the existing Regional Economic Communities culminating in the eventual establishment of a continental Free Trade Area is a common endeavour agreed by the continent.

5. The integration of the African regional blocks and multilateral structures remain at the heart of ensuring that our continent occupies its rightful position in the arena of the global socio-economic power relations. Unity and cohesion of the people of our continent is a backbone of our international relations policy.

6. This will assist to unite the African continent against the superficial designs manifest in colonial boundaries and regional blocs. The fragmentation of the African continent was a result of the resolutions of the Berlin Conference of 1884-5.

7. Our focus is to accelerate the political, social and economic integration of our continent. There is a need to continue strengthening the capacity of the African Union (AU), its institutions and Regional Economic Communities.

8. Our movement has been consistent in its strategic approach of ensuring that African development remains at the center of the world development agenda. At the heart of this strategic approach is the development of its governance architecture at continental and regional level.

9. Centuries of colonial oppression and exploitation have left our continent at the periphery of the high levels of poverty, inequality, unemployment, diseases and underdevelopment. The question we need to pose to ourselves is whether we have the necessary capacity to use our political power to change the living conditions of our people.

10. Imperialism and neo-colonial forces are responsible for the wave of social instability in our continent. The principal aim is to exploit the human and the material resources of our continent.

11. However, we need to take cognizance that our continent is still confronted by mammoth challenges of lack of human capital and weak institutions to juxtapose this historic legacy. We

need to steer our continent into a more qualitative trajectory of economic growth and development.

12. The political economy of the continent is still characterized by the colonial economic logic of exporting raw materials while importing value-added products largely from the developed world. There is less initiative to beneficiate the economy in order to increase its productive capacity, and therefore create more requisite skills and the necessary job opportunities.

13. The socio-economic ownership patterns in our continent have still assumed the posture of the historical relationship between the former colonies and colonial master.

14. We have learned that the achievement of political independence does not necessarily translate into economic freedom. Therefore, our task is to accelerate the development agenda on the continent through fast-tracking the massive infrastructural backlog.

15. The 2012 UN Global Population Report predicts that the global population will grow by 9, 6billion people by the year 2050. Currently almost half of the global population is under the age of 25, with 1, 3billion people between the ages of 12 and 24 years, it should also be noted that Africa is the second fastest growing population.

16. The African Economic Outlook Report describes our continent as the world youngest continent with 600 million young people. The number of young people in the continent is growing faster than anywhere else in the world.

17. Our continent faces the biggest burden of youth unemployment crisis. Most of our countries are unable to create sustainable job opportunities to the exploding youth population.

18. The growing discontent amongst the youth in the continent could lead to explosive conditions that result in social upheavals, violence and therefore deepening political instability.

19. More emphasis is to build on the productive capacity of the economy of our continent so that it can respond to the needs of our people. We need to be proactive in channelling our resources to enhancing human capital especially the youth.

20. Our trade relations with the African continent have grown exponentially. Our trade volumes have grown larger than our combined trade with all the European countries.

21. According to statistics from the Department of Trade and Industry, in 1994 trade between South Africa and Africa was R11, 4billion and today is at R389billion. In the same year our trade volumes with Asia and the Middle East were at R42billion and now at R788billion as compared to R439billion from the European Union.

22. The vast North American market continues to offer opportunities for increased value-added exports and the attraction of FDI, technology transfer and skills development. The renewal of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) presents an opportunity to increase trade with the US not withstanding challenges.

23. Developments in the Pacific Alliance (Columbia, Peru, Chile and Mexico) need to be closely monitored with the view to identify opportunities for our country.

24. Brazil, Mexico and Argentina are G20 member states are destined to become privileged interlocutors in South Africa's efforts to improve regulation of the global political, economic, social and environmental sectors. Mexico is the 2nd largest manufacturing country by value in the world and may surpass China by 2018 as the number one manufacturing country.

25. Therefore as much as we must appreciate the increasing economic integration and trade with the other African states and the world, our democratic state must continue its work of ensuring that it becomes the anchor of the development of our continent.

26. The apartheid regime has over the years created a perception that our country is a typical colonial outpost on the African continent. We therefore, need to reposition the role of the South African capital in a manner that advances the objectives of the reconstruction and development of the continent.

27. At the same time we need to understand that the movement of the South African capital into the continent is an inevitable objective process of the development of our productive forces. Competition is in the nature and the character of the capitalist system.

28. Our continent is steadily becoming stable with most of our countries embracing democratic practices. However, the tendency by some in political leadership to remain in power for many years against the will of the people is a worrisome phenomenon.

29. The phenomenon has become a seedbed for counter revolutionary activities in the continent. It also cultivates an environment for social and political disharmony, creating fertile ground for manipulation and all sorts of conspiracies by imperialist and neo-colonial forces.

30. Whilst achieving some successes, the continent continue to face social upheavals that characterized regime change, internal conflicts, violence etc in countries such as Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, Lesotho, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Nigeria, Madagascar, Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia. These are the challenges the people of the continent have to confront.

31. One of the contributing factors hampering the political, social and economic integration and development of the African content is the high levels of illicit capital flow. Corruption has become a cancer to our developmental objectives.

32. The Report by the African Development Bank and the Global Financial Integrity Institute, reveal a high calibre analysis of the extent to which the illicit financial outflows hamper the social and economic development of the continent.

33. Each and every year, roughly one trillion dollars flow illegally out of the developing countries due to crime, corruption and tax evasion. The estimates are more than ten times the amount of the foreign aid flowing into the same economies.

34. The consequence of the illicit financial outflow is that it drains hard currency, reserves heightened inflation, reduce tax collection, cancel investment, undermine trade, worsen poverty and undermine income tax.

35. From the year 1970–2004, the estimated illicit financial flows from the African continent are at approximately $854 billion.

36. The report estimates that the illicit money stolen by corrupt government officials amount to 3%, whilst 65% moves across the border through international trade.

37. Further compounding the high levels of poverty as a result of income inequalities amongst the nation states are the continued challenges of diseases such as HIV/AIDS, TB, Malaria and recently Ebola.

38. Climate change continues to inflict catastrophic disasters to the poor of the world particularly those in the developing world.

39. Globally, terrorism remains one of the most serious concerns. The unfolding situation in the Middle East and some of the African countries such as Nigeria, Somalia, Libya, Mali, Kenya and the Sahel region need our close scrutiny.

40. The growth of international piracy of eastern and western coasts of Africa hampers trade, security and commerce in transport corridors that are crucial for the global economy.

41. Religious extremism and fundamentalism has become an anchor of terrorism in the continent. The terrorist groups with their anti-west radicalism have reined terror mainly in the East, Central and the northern parts of the continent.

42. Western Sahara remains one of the last bastions of colonialism on the African continent. We need to accelerate our campaign of demanding that the UN and AU end the occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco.

43. We therefore make a call that the Saharawi people be given the right to self-determination. Our movement is committing itself to host a solidarity conference with the people of Western Sahara.

44. The new agenda for reconstruction of Africa is about infrastructure development and industrialisation of the continent.

45. But this growth and development will be meaningless if its benefits only grow the pockets of the rich and the elites. To be meaningful, it must be truly transformative, eradicate poverty, reduce inequality, create jobs, and make our continent prosperous. This is what the rise of Africa must is about.

46. When we celebrated the 50th anniversary of the OAU/AU, we looked back with satisfaction on the road we have travelled. But also committed for doing better in the next fifty years. As part of the Golden Jubilee Celebrations, the African Union, during the Summit of May 2013, adopted a solemn declaration that rededicated the collective leadership for the development of the continent. The declaration also called for the development of a continental agenda that will guide our work towards a peaceful, integrated and prosperous Africa, driven by its citizens and taking its rightful place in the world by 2063.

47. The evolving Agenda 2063 is currently premised on seven inspirational pillars, which are:

   ■ A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development;

   ■ An Integrated Continent, politically united, based on the ideals of Pan Africanism;

   ■ An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for Human Rights, Justice and the Rule of Law;

   ■ A peaceful and secure Africa;

   ■ An Africa with strong cultural values and ethics;

   ■ An Africa where development is people-driven, relying particularly on the potential of women and youth; and

   ■ Africa as a strong and influential global player and partner.

48. In highlighting the above aspirations, the African people unequivocally expressed a collective desire to uplift the continent from the morass of underdevelopment and degradation. With Agenda 2063, the AU is rallying all African people to join the march for the rebirth of the African Continent in all aspects – to extend our political liberation to economic, cultural and social liberation.

> *"Agenda 2063 is about the Africa we want to build in the next 50 years. It connects the Africa of yesterday to the Africa of today and the Africa of tomorrow. The Africa of yesterday is the indispensable lessons we have learnt since the days of independence some 50 years ago. The Africa of today is our destiny that is firmly in our hands with every action we take. The Africa of tomorrow is the future we are creating through what we do today."*

4. OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SECOND PHASE OF TRANSITION FOR RADICAL SOCIO ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

1. The greatness of any revolution is measured in terms of its capacity to take forward the aspirations and the wishes of the people and to make possible the transformation of society.

2. The 53rd National Conference in Mangaung reaffirmed our 52nd Conference resolution that the ANC is a strategic centre of power. This resolution remains a cornerstone towards all our principal goals of reviewing organisational policies and programmes.

3. Our 53rd National conference dedicated this decade to the development of an ANC cadre capable of taking forward the tasks of the second

phase of our transition for radical socio economic transformation of our society.

4. The task is to build a diplomat of a special kind in the context of the present complex global political-socio-economic power relations and our national interests. This will assist to reposition us as a powerful force for change in the arena of international politics.

5. Since the advent of our democratic breakthrough in 1994, our people have bestowed our movement with the mandate to lead the process of transforming our society. In its capacity as a political movement and the leader of society, the ANC has engaged with fraternal parties and governments at various levels.

6. At the level of the international arena, our country was readmitted to the United Nations (UN) and all other multilateral agencies. In the continent we continue to dispatch our historic participatory leadership role in the AU and the SADC community.

7. Our movement continues to be instrumental in matters of strategic importance such as equality, development and peace in regional, continental and international bodies. Our principal task continues to be the consolidation of unity and cohesion of the progressive forces in the continent and the world.

8. Our foreign policy is at the heart of our domestic imperatives. The essence is to promote our national interest to build a humane world order.

9. Within this space the ANC should be firm in promoting peace and stability and at the same time articulating its domestic imperatives in the continent and the whole world.

10. We need to build a stronger continent based on African Union (AU) Agenda 2063 to ensure that the strategy of the reconstruction and industrialisation of our continent benefit our people. This will forge the competitive edge of the continent in its multilateral trade with the rest of the globe.

11. It is through the unity of the continent that we can ensure the eradication of poverty, inequality, unemployment, disease and underdevelopment as well as promote stability and prosperity. The question we must pose is what must be done to achieve this noble objective?

12. In this regard, we need a continuous transformation of our foreign policy to achieve the objectives of our national democratic revolution.

5. PROGRESS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANC INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS POLICY AREAS

1. Our 53rd National Conference reconfirmed the ANC as a strategic centre of power. It is from this premise that our foreign policy perspective is informed by the decisions of the ANC's National Conferences.

2. The report elucidates progress achieved by both the ANC international relations subcommittee and our democratic government over the period of review. The subcommittee's report will be covered under the Organisational Component while matters of governance will be presented under the section Governance Component. However, the two components must be examined as one because government implements the decisions and programmes of the ANC.

3. ORGANISATIONAL COMPONENT

Our organisational programme is anchored on the following six pillars adopted during our 53rd National Conference:

- ■ Building a better Africa and World
- ■ Continental and International solidarity
- ■ Party-to-Party, intra-party and multi-party relations
- ■ Transformation of global governance
- ■ Policy development issues
- ■ Campaigns

PILLAR I:
Better Africa and Better World

1. We begin with our programme for Building a Better Africa. Over the past two and a half-year period of review, we have made significant progress in ensuring that our structures and the general public understand the global political and socio economic situation. Of more importance was to promote the spirit of solidarity and internationalism.

2. We successfully advocated our foreign policy positions by organizing and participating in seminars, workshops and other platforms both in our country and throughout the world. Amongst others were platforms such as the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA), the African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD),

Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), South African Liaison Organisation (SALO), dialogues hosted by Universities and solidarity events like Palestinians Solidarity Week and the Colloquium to Free the Cuban Five.

3. We have also embarked on a vigorous programme of disseminating information through seminars and cultural exchanges between the different countries of focus and our Alliance partners. Amongst the programmes that were implemented include:

   ■ A seminar celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the OAU/AU;

   ■ A seminar on peace and conflict resolution with particular reference to the Central African Republics and South Sudan organised at the University of the Witwatersrand Business School;

   ■ International Relations seminar on Alba-TCP (Bolivarian Movement);

   ■ Political Education seminar on "Australian Labour Party Solidarity with South Africa and the Labour Accord";

   ■ Solidarity programmes on Palestine and Cuba.

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Post-2015 Development Agenda

■ In 2014 the plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly finalized the framework for the Post-2015 Development Agenda which will succeed the programme of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) when it expires in 2015. It is therefore important that the ANC familiarizes its structures and our people about the Post-2015 Development Agenda which will be a global programme for combating poverty, inequality, unemployment and underdevelopment.

■ Our structures must engage our people on the MDGs and their implementation. We must also make our structures and broader society understand the strategic differences between the MDGs and the Post-2015 Development Agenda. The ANC membership has to be in the forefront of our struggle for the achievement of the goals of the MDGs and the Post-2015 Development Agenda.

The African Union

■ The ANC and our democratic government has to focus more on strengthening regional economic integration by promoting NEPAD, utilising the African Peer Review Mechanism, and consolidating our participation in AU structures and programmes.

■ In this regard the ANC has been engaging progressive parties, some of them ruling parties, in the region and the continent on a party-to-party level on AU matters. We are confident that this will go a long way in making sure that the people of the continent work together for the realization of the goals of the AU.

The Pan African Parliament (PAP)

■ The year 2014 has been remarkable in the history of PAP. Much has been achieved to ensure that the revised protocols facilitate the upgrading of PAP into a full legislative body.

■ As PAP develops its legislative frameworks and develop model legislation for the continent, the ANC together with South Africa (as host) should take advantage of this positive development, to mobilise our people in support of this organ of the AU and its progressive agenda.

■ The construction of the permanent home for PAP in South Africa is work in progress.

The Pan-African Women's Organisation (PAWO)

■ The ANC and the ANC Women League are current faced with the challenges of the establishment of the Head Quarters as requested by the women of the continent to have South Africa as the host.

■ The Women's Wings of MPLA in Angola, ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, SWAPO in Namibia and CCM in Tanzania have registered their concerns in the Forum of the Former Liberation Movements in Southern Africa about the slow pace of progress as it relates to PAWO and have further raised fears that the institutions faces imminent collapse in the hands of South Africa.

■ The matter is receiving urgent attention as the National Working Committee has established a task team to ensure that all outstanding matters in this regard is solved and the institution receives a home.

Pan African Youth Union (PAYU)

■ The ANC faced some challenges of representation in the PAYU since the disbandment of the ANC Youth League (YL) NEC.

■ The ANC International Relations subcommittee is working together with relevant ANC structures to ensure that PAYU challenges are addressed once the ANC YL NEC is reconstituted.

All-Africa Student Union (AASU)

■ The regional structure of the Southern Africa Student Union (SASU) attempted to meet in 2013 but due to limited resources the meeting was unable to take place. On other areas such as the AU support to the All-Africa Student Union and the establishment of the Pan-African University, work is in progress.

Southern African Development Community (SADC)

■ The ANC and the government play a prominent role in consolidating the region politically, socially and economically.

■ The ANC in the Former Liberation Movements (FLMs) meetings, its party-to-party meetings with sister parties of FLMs, as well as in meetings with other ruling parties in the region, continues to engage to find solutions and develop programmes to fast-track the regional economic integration, cultural exchange, people-to-people and country-to-country development and other integration programmes.

SADC Parliamentary Forum

■ The transformation of SADC Parliamentary Forum to a full legislative organ of SADC must serve to reinforce regional integration ensuring that it addresses the needs of the peoples of the region. Work on this is in progress.

Building a Better Africa goes hand in hand with Building a Better World which includes promoting South–South Cooperation

■ It is generally accepted that the international balance of forces are gradually shifting in the direction of the countries of the South. South-South Cooperation is important in the South Africa's Foreign Policy architecture.

■ In pursuit of the progressive agenda of a better world, the ANC has in the context of South-South party-to-party relations engaged with like-minded sister parties such as the Communist Party of Cuba, Australian Labour Party, Indian National Congress, Brazil Workers' Party, Former Liberation Movements, POLISARIO, Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), South Sudan People's Liberation Movement, National Congress Party of Sudan, NCD Ghana, Al-Fatah of Palestine, Baath Party of Syria, PUK of Iraq, and the Worker's Party of Brazil. We also met ruling parties of different ideological orientation to ours to discuss shared concerns and opportunities.

■ The ANC participates in various forums, seminars and conferences to strengthen South-South relations such as in the Sao Paulo Forum; and meets regularly with fraternal parties on the margins of such international gatherings.

■ The ANC's relations with political parties in Latin America and the Caribbean are weak. Consequently the ANC has identified strategic political parties in the region, while strengthening the already existing relations.

Brazil–India–China–South Africa (BRICS)

■ The ANC led awareness campaigns on BRICS and hosted a post-BRICS Summit seminar in partnership with Wits University Business School.

■ **On the establishment of the BRICS Bank:** The ANC campaigned strongly through its party-to-party and government-to-government relations for this Bank to be hosted in South Africa but the final decision at the BRICS Summit held in Brazil in 2014 concluded that it would be hosted by China with a regional structure based in South Africa.

■ **On the use of BRICS membership:** The ANC is in discussion with the ruling parties of f BRICS member states to sign a joint Memorandum of Understanding to promote stronger party-to-party relations in order to utilise the mechanism to promote party-to-party exchange. This mechanism will enable the parties to find common areas of cooperation that would be beneficial to all the members of BRICS, and present an alternative to the Washington Consensus.

■ **On consolidation of party–party relations:** The ANC has renewed its Memorandum of Understanding with the United Russia Party and the Communist Party of China with regular interaction and programmes. Bilateral engagements with the Workers' Party of Brazil and the Indian National Congress are underway.

North-South Dialogue

■ The ANC continues to strengthen its existing

relations of North-South interaction with sister parties of the North such as the Social Democratic Party of Sweden, Social Democratic Party of Germany, Norwegian Labour Party, Socialist Party of Spain, and the All United Russian Party, to promote respect for African Union Processes, respect for decisions made by African Countries and African solutions to African problems. Where differences may arise the ANC engages these political parties to establish common understanding on those matters.

Peace and Security, Reconstruction and Development

■ Since 2013, a new wave of conflicts has arisen in parts of Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Eastern Europe, while territorial disputes have surfaced elsewhere including the North and South China Sea area. The ANC has observed this closely.

■ The ANC has been active in peace-building missions both politically and governmentally and continues to assist in various ways to find resolution to conflicts in DRC, Madagascar, Somalia and Somaliland, Sudan and South Sudan, North Africa, Middle East and Sri Lanka.

■ The ANC has been engaging various role players on recent changes in the continent as a result of the uprisings in North Africa (the "Arab Springs"), the situations that ensued in CAR, South Sudan, Chad, Madagascar and Libya as well as analysing the impact of the recent economic recessions in Europe and the United States America (USA). The ANC has to continue analyzing the unfolding complex world reality the movement of NATO in our continent and the world.

Zimbabwe

■ South Africa through President Jacob Zuma continued to play a significant role as SADC facilitator in Zimbabwe until the country had democratic elections in 2013 that were declared by most observers as free, fair and credible. ZANUPF won with an overwhelming majority in the elections.

■ SADC, inclusive of South Africa, continue to advocate for the full lifting of sanctions against Zimbabwean leaders as a catalyst to promoting social and economic development in the country.

South Sudan and Sudan

■ The Horn of Africa Focus Group ceased to function at the beginning of 2014 but has now been resuscitated and reorganized as the Africa Focus Group which is a useful' resource for the IR Subcommittee, NWC, and NEC.

■ During the initial visits of the Special Envoy and his team to the region IGAD had agreed that South Africa's role would be on a political level to assist SPLM South Sudan. It was further agreed that a tripartite arrangement between ANC, SPLM (South Sudan) and EPRDF (Ethiopia) to find political solutions should be signed.

South Sudan:

■ Since the South African General Elections, the matters of South Sudan conflict in the office of the Deputy President of the Republic and together with his team they have been engaging various role players to find lasting solutions to the continual conflict in South Sudan.

■ Although the ANC International Relations is not directly involved in conflict resolution processes, however our movement is inundated with requests and enquiries from continental political parties, Europe and the USA about our role in both The Sudan and South Sudan.

■ The MOU between the ANC and SPLM South Sudan is up for revision and both parties have agreed to facilitate such revisions in the course of 2015.

■ During the initial visits of the Special Envoy and his team to the region IGAD had agreed that South Africa's role would be on a political level to assist SPLM South Sudan. It was further agreed that a tripartite arrangement between ANC, SPLM (South Sudan) and EPRDF (Ethiopia) to find political solutions should be signed.

■ Since the South African General Elections, the matters of South Sudan conflict rest with the office of the Deputy President of the Republic that has been engaging various role players to find lasting solutions to the continual conflict in South Sudan.

Sudan

■ The conflict situation between the Government of Sudan and the opposition forces of Sudan (of which SPLM North Sudan is a component) still persist. The AU High level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) mandated by the AUPSC continues the facilitation to develop peace agreement between the Government of Sudan and opposition forces in Sudan continues with minimal progress.

■ The ANC has met with SPLM North Sudan to revitalize relations, reignite communication lines

and is developing a strategy for relations and engagement on issues in Sudan and South Sudan.

■ The ANC participated in the NCP Congress in Sudan and the implementation of the MOU signed will begin soon.

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

■ The ANC had party-to- party meetings with PPRD (ruling party) in DRC as part of our further engagement stemming from a letter of intent signed by both parties in 2013, to work on the content of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on organisational building.

Swaziland

■ ANC International Relations has been engaging various role players such PUDEMO, SWADEPO, NLF, the Ngwane National Laboratory Party. We also participated in seminars on Swaziland organised by various NGOs and Solidarity movements on Swaziland.

■ In 2014, the world witnessed the arrest of the President of PUDEMO, Mario Masuku and other NGO role players who were advocating for democracy in Swaziland. The momentum on the campaign to release Mario Masuku is on the increase, with limited participation from the ANC.

■ The situation in Swaziland is becoming worrisome on a daily basis. It is without any contradictions that the regime has become a typical police state. The ANC must ensure that the necessary diplomatic interventions are initiated to bring democracy to our neighbouring state.

Ethiopia and Eritrea

■ The ANC in terms of lessoning the tensions between the two countries have done very minimal work. The deployment of cadres from the Alliance on a fact-finding mission to both countries is still outstanding. There has been significant improvement regarding engagement between ANC and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), but less so with PFDJ Eritrea.

Ethiopia:

■ The ANC continues to engage the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) at different levels to share experience and work together on common programmes. The

cooperation between the ANC and EPRDF around the hosting of a conference of Progressive Parties on the continent remains work in progress.

■ The ANC, SPLM South Sudan and EPRDF signed a trilateral agreement to deal with the internal party conflicts in SPLM South Sudan.

Eritrea:

■ Currently, Eritrea is not part of IGAAD whose current Chairperson is Ethiopia and this is a matter of concern because a regional body should include all countries. Therefore unresolved matters between the two countries must be resolved.

■ Notwithstanding this situation, Eritreans are present in many countries in the region, particularly, Sudan and South Sudan. Thus the Eritrean government is an important role player to consult pertaining to the current situation in South Sudan.

■ The PDFJ Eritrea has in the past requested to meet with the ANC and reiterated this request in 2014. The ANC is setting up a fact-finding mission to Eritrea as mandated by the national conference.

Somalia & Somaliland

■ The ANC-led government has continued to do extensive work in this area with a view to finding lasting peace. The understanding of Somalia/Somaliland within ANC Structures and in the broader South Africa public domain is very minimal. It is therefore imperative for the ANC to gather information to enhance our understanding and create awareness in our structures and the broader South Africa public domain, in order to empower our members.

Central African Republic (CAR)

■ The coup in CAR in 2013 resulted in deaths of SANDF soldiers providing training to the CAR army and police personnel and thus led to the withdrawal of the SANDF from CAR.

■ The situation in CAR deteriorated into conflict between religious groupings until agreements were reached in processes South Africa played a crucial supportive role in. CAR's instability threatens regional stability.

■ The SI Africa Committee that the ANC is a member will be sending a fact-finding mission to CAR to obverse and assess the situations, and engage forces and leadership on the ground.

Libya

■ The Western sponsored NATO military campaign in Libya in 2011 left a trail of destruction, disillusionment and widespread instability. The country continues to witness this four years on. Libyan situation continues to be unstable with a variety of political and armed actors vying for the control of the state and the country's resources.

■ The Libya crisis helped the spread of illegal weapons to the rest of the Sahel Region, thus contributing to increased destabilization of Africa by fuelling cross-borders crimes, human and drug trafficking, and violence affecting the ECOWAS Region and other parts of Africa.

■ By invading Libya under the pretext of protecting civilians, the West has thus helped the spread of violence, conflict and terrorism in Africa.

Middle East

■ The conflict in Syria, which now involves a few global powers, remains unresolved but there has been new developments unfolding with the rise of the extremist groups in Iraq putting further pressure Syria government.

■ We have witnessed the spectre of violence spread to other parts of the Middle East with the rise of extremist groups in Iraq with a spill-over effect on the region.

■ This has attracted the interest of western powers and others deploying militarily in the region, ostensibly to fight the rise of extremists, but in the process helping to further complicate the situation in the Middle East.

■ Furthermore, great understanding with regard to the Arab World is required in lieu of The Middle Eastern Alliance that was formed between Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Sudan with regard to the situation that has evolved in Yemen. Secondly, the changes unfolding between the Western Forces and Iran necessitate the ANC to political research and analyse the impact these changes would have on the Region as well as the impact it would have on the Palestinian situation.

Russia and Ukraine

■ The conflict in Ukraine escalated in the global power rivalry between US-Europe seeking to isolate and encircle Russia, on the one hand, and, Russia seeking to preserve itself. In the process, we have seen the conflict become entrenched with concern.

■ The ANC is in the processing of setting up consultations with experts and others as well as academics regarding the situation to enable it to remain informed on the developments.

China and Vietnam

■ China is involved in territorial disputes over islands in the North and South China Sea areas that have also drawn the ire of the US that has military bases in the region. Vietnam is one of the countries involved in the disputes and its ruling party has conveyed its concerns about this to the ANC. We should observe this situation closely.

PILLAR II:
Continental and International Solidarity

International solidarity will continue to inspire our approach to world affairs. As such, we support the struggle for the right to self-determination of the people of Palestine and the Western Sahara. We also continue to pledge support to Cuba for the lifting of the economic blockade.

Cuba

■ We will always be inspired by the role of Cuba in the struggle for internationalism and solidarity. Its role in the struggle for the liberation of the African continent against imperialism and colonialism will always be treasured.

■ Cuba continues to be an inspiration for us in pursuit of our agenda of international solidarity. Its role in the fight against Ebola in West Africa is exemplary.

■ We need to take forward the campaign for the end of the fifty years old US economic blocked against the republic of Cuba bearing in mind that 184 countries in the United Nations voted for the lifting of the blockade.

■ Our Movement, together with other progressive organisations across the world, has consistently campaigned for the release of the Cuban Five. The recent visit by the Five Cuban heroes to our country, during the significant celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the Freedom Charter, was a demonstration of friendly relations between our two countries.

■ We commend this positive step taken by both the governments of Cuba and the United States to improve relations. The ANC wishes both Cuba and the United States well in further moves to improve their diplomatic relations between these two countries.

■ The ANC re-affirms our ongoing solidarity with Cuba and the Cuban people and will continue to offer support for an end to the US economic blockade. The struggle of the people of Cuba is the struggle of the people of the world.

Palestine

■ The ANC continues to pledge solidarity with the people of Palestine, advocating for a two-state solution as a resolution to the continued ongoing conflict situation between Palestine and Israel.

■ The ANC has participated and will continue to participate in activities of the week-long programme on Israeli Apartheid Week in solidarity with the Palestinians.

■ Following the invasion of Gaza and the bombardment and the killings of innocent Palestinians by the Israeli military, the ANC issued a statement of condemnation and joined solidarity marches and programmes for a free Palestine. The ANC commends all provinces, the Leagues and the Alliance, for their participation on the campaign.

Western Sahara

■ ANC and ANC-led government in different platforms (solidarity meetings domestically, seminars on Western Sahara both domestically and internationally, Socialist International Africa Committee and Council meetings, United Nations, and so forth) continues to sponsor and support resolutions promoting the self-determination of the Saharawi people.

■ The ANC engaged with representatives from the POLISARIO Front on the sides of Socialist International (SI) meetings and put forward a proposal for SI Africa Committee to send a fact-finding mission to Morocco and Western Sahara, as well as the refugee camps in Algeria.

■ The domestic solidarity campaign has dropped to almost non-existence and therefore the ANC and the Alliance partners have to find a mechanism to reignite the solidarity campaign with the people of Saharawi.

■ For almost two years, the ANC has not participated in Solidarity activities in Spain and Algiers, but we have tried to rectify this by ensuring our participation in the Solidarity Conference held in Algiers in December 2014.

■ The ANC has also committed itself to host the next African Solidarity meeting for the people of Western Sahara in 2016 at the latter mentioned conference.

PILLAR III:

Party-to-Party, Intra and Multilateral Relations

■ The ANC receive frequent requests from other political parties and organisations, both continentally and internationally, to establish relations and share experience.

■ The ANC continues to participate in party-to-party and intra-party relations and has decided to take more politically informed approach to forging relations, but guided by our principles as outlined in national conference resolutions.

■ Many of the party-to-party relations arise as a result of the ANC's participation in Peace building, reconstruction and development and Continental and International Solidarity.

■ The ANC continues to participate in the Conferences and Congresses of our Fraternal parties such that of the Norwegian Labour Party, Swedish Social Democratic Party, Botswana Democratic Party, Botswana National Front, EPRDF, Cuba Communist Party, MPLA, FRELIMO, SWAPO, CCM, and ZANU-PF.

■ The ANC participates in seminars arranged by FES and the Olof Palme Foundation annually. The ANC further participated in a seminar hosted by FRELIMO and FES in Maputo, which was followed up with a party-to-party visit to the new Secretary General of the FRELIMO to share experience on elections.

■ The ANC met with the United Russian Party to elevate the relations and conclude a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which was signed between the two parties. The ANC has already embarked on some party-to-party exchange programmes in Russia.

■ The ANC is in the process of reviewing its MOU with the Communist Party of China. The first delegation

of NEC members has embarked on a two-week Study Tour to China in early this year. There are other exchanges envisioned for 2015.

■ The ANC has met a number of parties that have requested forging relations with the ANC. The ANC has also received request from parties it has relations with for strengthening these relations. Amongst these are CNDD-FDD Burundi, PNRF Libre Honduras, SDP Denmark, PAIGV Cape Verde, PAIGC Guinea Bissau, PDS Benin, PDS Niger, MLSTP Sao Tome and Principe and NDP Ghana, PPRD DRC, PCT Congo Brazzaville, LCD Lesotho, SPLM North Sudan, NCP Sudan, Workers Party of Korea, Netherlands Labour Party, FRELIMO, SWAPO, BDP Botswana, and Communist Party of Vietnam. Relations with progressive parties in West Africa and Latin America remain weak and the subcommittee is currently developing a strategy to establish relations with progressive forces in these areas.

■ With regard to party-to-party relations with parties from the developed North, the ANC has to really to be more pro-active, and this will require financial resources.

■ Apart from strengthening relations and reaching out to new friends, there are some serious questions we need to consider. Admittedly, the ANC is not and has never been a communist organisation. However, the ANC has always been anti-imperialist in nature and pro-working class. The need to define *"progressive policies"* is therefore imperative and urgent so that we know when we choose friends what criteria to look for. It does not help us that we are forced to embrace parties simply because we are affiliated to the same international organization.

Former Liberation Movements

■ The ANC continues to participate in the Former Liberation Movement meetings to strengthen and consolidate relations. The Secretaries-General meet twice a year and the Leaders meet once a year. The meetings take place on a rotational basis.

■ The Leaders of the Southern African Former Liberation Movements (FLMs) met in February 2013 at Freedom Park in Tshwane. Their meeting was preceded by meetings of the Secretaries-General and the Wings/Leagues (Veterans, Women's League and Youth League) of FLMs. The outcomes of the Leaders meeting were as follows:

❏ In strengthening and consolidating relations the Leaders of FLMs adopted further strategies

for the implementation of the project on the historical heritage of FLMs.

❏ Agreed on working together in realizing the objective of building the FLMs political school in Tanzania, as it is an important initiative in retaining the legacy and heritage of our liberation. Significant progress on the building of the political school has been made in that funding has been obtained and land for the construction of the school has been allocated in Tanzania.

❏ The Leagues/Wings in their meetings resolved on a number of issues that informs their common programme.

❏ A meeting took place in Tanzania where the Secretaries General went to view the land donated by the Tanzanian government for the establishment of the joint political school. The meeting also agreed on the establishment of the technical committee, which will be chaired by the former Secretary General of CCM to work out the design, curriculum and building time frames for the school.

■ The next meeting of Secretaries' General and Head of Organisations was scheduled in Maputo for 2014, to be hosted by FRELIMO, but due to the Mozambican and Namibian elections as well as the ZANUPF conference it has been postponed to 2015.

■ An urgent meeting of Secretaries' General was convened by CCM and hosted by the ANC in Johannesburg to process developments regarding the joint political school in 2014.

Building a Global Progressive Movement: Socialist International (SI) and the Emergence of the new "Progressive Alliance" (PA)

■ Since the hosting of the XXIV Socialist International (SI) Congress the SI has undergone substantial reforms in its composition and representation. However, post-congress, a new entity, *"The Progressive Alliance"* has emerged led by European members of the SI. The move increasingly seems like an attempt to create a new organisation to replace the SI.

■ In engaging the key proponents of the establishment of the PA on what defined it, we have been informed that it was a networking structure advocating for the transformation of SI.

■ The programmes and activities often reflect differently as being in direct opposition with SI. The PA has already established its headquarters in Leipzig. Thus far the PA has held meetings in Italy, Portugal, Norway, The Netherlands, United Kingdom and Germany as well as a meeting of the Africa Group coordinated by SDP Cameroon.

■ The ANC has agreed to meet with the key European Parties leading the PA as an attempt to convince them to do things differently and rather invest in ensuring that the full transformation of SI.

■ Secondly, these European parties have reduced their membership to observer status that implies a significant decrease in their membership fees contribution and this has put severe resource constraints on SI.

■ Our position as the ANC may put us in a precarious position as it may lead to our isolation – the Europeans are aggressively courting members on the Continent.

Socialist International (SI)

■ The ANC remains committed to the Socialist International despite the challenges faced by the organisation. The ANC has deployed representatives to the SI Presidium, SI Ethics Committee and SI Africa Committee namely: Comrade President Jacob Zuma as a Vice-President, Comrade Secretary-General Gwede Mantashe and Comrade NEC Member, Ebrahim Ebrahim as Deputy Chair, respectively. The deployees have been actively participating in the various meetings of the SI.

■ The last ANC representatives that attended the SI Council meeting in Mexico resolved that the format of SI meetings has to change if it is to be impactful and the ANC is in the process of working on a proposal in this regard.

■ There was significant progress in the SI Africa Committee and a call for reforms of the organization's operations. The SI Africa Committee has appointed a Working Group to look into the proposed reforms made at the meeting in Tanzania in 2014 and there is already work in progress.

PILLAR IV:
Transformation and Global Governance

■ The ANC, through party-to-party meetings continentally and internationally, as well as its engagements in regional forums (Former Liberation Movements, SI Africa Committee, the African Left Network) and other international forums, advocates for UN Reforms, with special emphasis on reforms of the UN Security Council.

IMF and World Bank

■ The ANC continues to advocate for reforms of these institutions as part of our policy positions. However, in the same breath, the ANC supports alternatives to these institutions such as BRICS Bank and Alba-TCP, amongst others.

The International Criminal Court

■ The 53rd Conference resolved that as much *"as the ANC does not condone impunity, authoritarian and violent regimes, it is concerned about the perception of selective prosecution of Africans and urges the ICC to also pursue cases of impunity elsewhere, while engaging in serious dialogue with the AU and African countries in order to review their relationship"*; and called *"on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which has referred some African cases to the ICC, to recognise the work done by the AU, its RECs and individual African countries to promote the peaceful end to and settlement of conflicts on the continent, the peace agreements signed and commitments made in regard to post-conflict justice."*

■ This has not happened. Instead the ICC has continued to attack African countries. In addition to this, the ICC arrogantly insists on African countries to execute ICC warrants of arrests which are not recognised by the African Union. South Africa was not spared by this arrogance when President Al-Bashir visited our country for the June 2015 Summit of the African Union to the point that the ANC decided on reviewing South Africa's membership of this organisation.

■ In taking this decision, we reaffirmed our unwavering commitment to the protection and promotion of human rights on the continent of Africa and beyond. We further noted that South Africa, correctly, had been a vocal proponent of the establishment of the International Criminal Court.

■ We believed, as we still do, that an independent and objective instrument was needed to bring to an end the heinous crimes against humanity and the violation of human rights which were then very prevalent on the Continent.

■ We believed, as we still do, that those who committed such crimes must be prosecuted and punished by an impartial body empowered by international cooperation to defend the universal values of justice. The matter relating to the President al-Bashir therefore is of major concern to the African National Congress and we view the allegations levelled against him in a serious light.

■ It is our view however that the ICC has gradually diverted from its mandate and allowed itself to be influence by powerful non-member states. We perceive it as tending to act as a proxy instrument for these states, which see no need to subject them to its discipline, to persecute African leaders and effect regime change on the continent. It is being used as a court against Africa, deliberately oblivious to the fact that Africa countries themselves were vocal in their support for the necessity of such a mechanism, with for example, Senegal being the first country to ratify the Rome Statute.

■ South Africa was always a staunch supporter of the establishment of the International Criminal Court and one of the first signatories of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It remains committed to a system of international justice "to ensure that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation."

■ South Africa will continue to promote and encourage regional and international initiatives to deal with such crimes. We are a member of the Assembly of States Parties established by Article 112(1) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. We are also a member of the United Nations, the African Union and other international bodies. We take our international responsibilities and obligations very seriously.

■ South Africa is involved in peace keeping missions in many African countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. South Africa is also actively involved in ensuring that the fragile peace process underway in Sudan and South Sudan holds, in the interests of the people of those sovereign states and other sovereign countries and the African continent.

■ South Africa has invested a great deal of her financial, military, technical and human resources towards achieving peace, security and prosperity on the African continent. The benefits of these investments are slowly being realised in the countries in which South Africa is active. These countries include Sudan and South Sudan.

■ Despite being a member of the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, South Africa has to balance its obligations to the ICC with its obligations to the African Union and its obligations to individual states, including those in Africa, in terms of the international treaties which it has concluded.

■ South Africa notes that even Permanent Members of the Security Council which are not signatories to the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court may participate fully in discussions on the ICC and referrals by the Security Council of a situation in a country to the ICC. Those countries have taken steps to ensure that their officials and military personnel will not be subjected to the jurisdiction of the ICC.

■ There is no national interest value for South Africa to continue being a member if the ICC. The manner that we were treated around the al-Bashir incident is consistent with the cheeky arrogance that Africa has experienced in its interaction with the ICC. Continuing to be in the ICC especially when the big powers who are calling the shots are themselves nit members, gives it the legitimacy it does not deserve. The West dominates the ICC through the influence they command within its structures and the huge financial contributions they make to its budget. In return, they use the ICC as their tool for regime change in Africa.

■ Africa must build its own alternative to the ICC so that international crimes like genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, continue to occupy the attention of our continent. We must operationalise the African Court of Justice and Human Rights that will have a mandate to handle international crimes on our continent.

PILLAR V:
Policy Development

■ The ANC continues to lead and guide government in policy development and implementation through national conference resolutions, among others. The details of these policy issues are discussed in detail under the Governance Component below.

The Draft White Paper will soon be tabled for discussion by ANC structures including the Sub-Committee.

Parliamentary Diplomacy

■ The ANC continues to guide assisting parliamentarians deployed to international forums.

Business Code of Conduct

■ We have not done enough work in this area; however the matter will be referred to the Economic Transformation Committee to integrate it into their work.

Economic Diplomacy

■ The ANC should intensify its activism in this area. This must also include aspects of skills development in order to deal with the triple challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment in South Africa.

National Development Plan and Vision 2030

The ANC has identified the following areas of International Relations that need to be realigned with the ANC's International Relations policies as we promote a more radical approach to Internationalism on the continent and in the globe:

❏ Page 28 Paragraph 1 under *demographics;*

❏ Page 31 Paragraph 2 under a *changing Global Economy;*

❏ Page 32 Paragraph 3 under *Africa's development* with greater focus on infrastructure development and industrialisation on the continent to facilitate the promotion of inter-continental movement and trade

❏ Page 33 Paragraph 1& 3 under *Climate Change*

❏ Page 237 Paragraph 4 under *Integrate national institutions responsible*

❏ Page 241 Paragraph 1 under *Clarity on national interest*

❏ Page242 Paragraph 2 under *Move from regionalisation...*

❏ Page 244 Paragraph 1 under *SADC & SACU*

❏ Page 253 Paragraph 2 & 7 under *South Africa in the word*

■ The revision should concentrate on the ideas rather than paragraphs; and before finalisation, there should be broad consultations.

Xenophobia

■ The ANC and the ANC-led government continue to create opportunities for awareness programmes amongst South Africans regarding the international migration of people continentally and globally in order to create the necessary understanding and tolerance amongst South Africans towards particularly asylum seekers and refugees. These awareness programmes should be utilized to prevent any future xenophobic attack.

PILLAR VI:
Campaigns

AFRICOM

■ The campaign to engage all member state on the continent not to host these military bases continue; however, the question that should be posed is whether this is still preventable because in certain places on the continent AFRICOM has already established its footprint in the form of training soldiers and other newly devised mechanisms? The ANC has to deal with these realities and develop new strategies to take this campaign forward.

Africa Day

■ The ANC observes that there is growing awareness about the importance of this day and that the AU anthem and flags are beginning to appear in SA institutions.

■ ANC structures need to become more proactive in promoting this day, i.e. 25 May, every year, given its significance.

Mandela Day

■ As we celebrate nature and content of former President Nelson Mandela, the ANC should continue to educate society principles and norms and values that Tata Madiba represented. ANC structures and ANC-led government continue to play an increasing role on Mandela Day. The day is celebrated across all 9 provinces in the 54

regions. We have also witnessed an increase in the celebration of this day in the international and continental arena.

Capacity building and Coordination as an extension of the POA

■ *Capacity and work of the International Relations Department:*

❏ The ANC should continue to transform the International Relations Unit into a full-fledged department as per the decision of the 53rd National Conference. There has been some progress in the Unit as some vacant positions have been filled. However, there is a need to establish an International Relations Institute to allow International Relations to have a stable funding stream to run our programme, develop policy, conducting research and broaden the scope and foot print of ANC IR work especially in the continent and the Global South.

❏ Key capacity building tasks for the Department of International Relations and Cooperation are discussed under the Governance Component.

■ *Alliance Programme on International Relations*

COSATU and the SACP participate as full members in the ANC NEC Subcommittee on International Relations where they are able to share their programmes and raise areas requiring the ANC and ANC-led government's intervention. Certain programmes between the ANC and its Alliance partners are coordinated together, especially those on international solidarity matters.

■ *ANC Participation in International Organisations*

The policies for ANC participation in international organisations is currently being drafted would soon be processed for consideration by the NWC and NEC.

■ *Capacity and resources in the ANC, Government and South African Civil Society*

❏ Inadequate and insufficient human and financial resources to implement ANC International Relations part of the organisational part of the POA remains order of the day.

❏ The ANC NEC International Relations (IR) Subcommittee is in the process of relooking at the Unit's organogram with the view to making a proposal for improvement. However, we must adhere to the resolution from conference

to change the IR Unit into a fully-fledged department.

❏ The speedy building of International Relations structures in Provinces would further assist in enhancing ANC IR capacity. When Provinces have a better understanding of ANC International matters in all their structures, the IR Unit would have gone a long way towards integrating IR work in ANC structures at all levels, to the branch.

❏ Training of cadres in areas of language and understanding of International Relations issues is also imperative if the broader objective of the ANC is to be attained. COSATU has developed International Relations Practitioners Course with a course manual to train its representatives and affiliates deployed to this area. The ANC had participated in the first training course and should engage COSATU to allow more cadres to participate.

❏ A broader organisation to have an annual political school on International Relations should be established.

❏ Better Coordination between all structures of the ANC and the Alliance Partners, the Leagues and MDM structures would bring the ANC closer to attaining the goal of pro-activity in the global arena. Inclusive in this is also creating better coordination between the ANC and the ANC Parliamentary Caucus.

❏ The partnering with *"ANC-friendly"* civil society groupings in certain projects in terms of the implementation of the POA would further improve the implementation of the ANC's International Relations programme.

GOVERNANCE COMPONENT

The government's foreign policy implementation overview must be seen as a reflection of our overall foreign policy journey, with a sharp focus on both what we have done in the past 20 years, as well as what still needs to be done in the next five years of the current administration. South Africa's foreign policy finds expression from mutually reinforcing principles through the following pillars:

■ Strengthening and prioritizing the African continent as a centrepiece of our foreign policy;

■ Strengthening regional cooperation through a strong SADC;

■ Creating a strong South-South Cooperation with emerging countries of the south;

■ Enhance partnership with countries of the North in order to accelerate our socio-economic development; and

■ Participation in institutions of global governance to strengthen multilateralism, including the transformation of the global system and its institutions.

In the implementation of our foreign policy, these pillars remain critical in guiding our foreign policy actions for the benefit of our domestic priorities. Our domestic priorities are premised on the need to support South Africa's National Development Plan (NDP). But how do we make use of our foreign policy engagements to support the NDP's vision 2030 – that of creating a prosperous state where poverty, unemployment and inequality are a thing of the past? We do this by focusing on the following:

■ Defending and advancing our national Interest;

■ Enhancing our foreign policy development and implementation;

■ Cadreship development;

■ Agenda 2063;

■ Strengthening the South;

■ South Africa's leadership in international organisations for the African Agenda and the transformation of global institutions; and

■ International Solidarity.

National Interest

■ Over the past few years, we have been trying to assert our national interest. National interests are by definition selfish. They are about how we must survive and prosper as a nation. Some are "core" like sovereignty and territorial integrity; and other are "secondary". We have to constantly fine-tune the balance among our national interests, Pan-African obligations, and international commitments around a shared / collective vision of a better world.

■ Our missions abroad have come to understand the great importance our country attaches to national interest – which our national interests come first. In the past 20 years, since 1994, our government has ensured that Ambassadors understand fully their various roles, and what they need to do in foreign land in order to advance our country's national interests. We are convinced that today our Ambassadors understand our domestic priorities. This we also amplify through our annual heads of mission conference. This conference seeks to redefine our foreign mandate, and remind our Ambassadors of their role as representatives of the President. This becomes a great opportunity to reflect and take stock of diplomatic engagements with our partners, in the advancement of our national interest.

■ We must continue to sharpen our concept of national interest as recommended in the NDP.

■ Another important element in the enhancement of our national interest abroad is the creation of a strong economic diplomacy strategy. Some amongst the important elements underpinning economic diplomacy are as follows:

  ❏ Market and brand South Africa globally;

  ❏ Investment promotion;

  ❏ Skills and technology transfer;

  ❏ Promotion of joint ventures between South African and foreign companies; and

  ❏ Tourism promotion.

■ We believe in the importance of building national consensus on the core elements of our foreign policy. This consensus must be shared among all sections of our people and across political parties on non-partisan basis. In this regard, our government has made use of Public Diplomacy as a tool to enhance participatory democracy, communicating important messages to the public about matters of national interest. Our Public Participation Programmes (PPP) has proven to be effective in reaching out to the masses of our people, sharing what we do. Through our PPPs, we have since strengthened our relations with various key stakeholders such as NGOs, civil society organization, interest groups and the ordinary men and women of this country.

Enhancing our foreign policy development and implementation

In the conduct of our country's foreign policy, South Africa constantly reviews its foreign policy and strategy in order to ensure alignment with the current global challenges. Our country recognizes that, in order to respond adequately to such ever changing global challenges, there is a need for a constant review of our

approaches. In this regard, the following actions are being undertaken:

■ The White Paper on South African foreign policy - Building a better world: The diplomacy of Ubuntu is to be discussed within the ANC and will be served before parliament as well. The White Paper is intended to strengthen our foreign policy using the African philosophy of Ubuntu.

■ The SA Council on International Relations (SACOIR) is being established to serve as a sounding board on our foreign policy and non-state input into what we do. This body, whose role will be advisory, is comprised of civil society representatives, business, academics and labour; and will meet regularly to help government in the development and implementation of our foreign policy.

■ We are processing a Foreign Service Bill to address the peculiarities of the Foreign Service in our country. This is part of repositioning of our Foreign Service for its alignment with the future we envisage for our foreign policy through capacity development and constant renewal of personnel. The Foreign Service Bill will create a single foreign service for the country in order to end the current fragmented Foreign Service system, leading to improved efficiency, cost-effectiveness and enhanced service delivery.

■ The National Development Plan enjoins us to strengthen our policy research capacity. This will be done, building on our existing policy research unit at DIRCO.

■ We are establishing a Centre for Early Warning (CFEW) which will ensure proactive action and advisory, as we all as rapid response to conflict or disaster. This initiative is in keeping with the call by the African Union for the operationalisation of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) in order to redouble its efforts to detect potential conflict situations before they erupt. Given that the African Continent is our key foreign policy priority the Centre for Early Warning will give a sharp focus on Africa, ensuring that we receive information and advice well in advance about crises situations on the continent, and initiate interventions in order to prevent or limit the effects of these conflicts.

■ The establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) is in progress. The creation of SADPA will ensure more efficiency in the deployment and disbursement of South Africa's development and humanitarian assistance.

Cadreship development

A strong foreign policy relies on a strong cadreship. After 1994, we deployed cadres at the former Department of Foreign Affairs, with others sent abroad to represent our country. Some of these cadres will be retiring soon and others are already retired. We therefore have to renew our diplomatic cadreship on continuous basis. The following are our actions in this regard:

■ The Diplomatic Training, Research and Development (DTRD), that is responsible for training our diplomats, is being turned into a fully-fledged diplomatic academy.

■ Our existing internship and cadet programme has been consolidated into a Johnny Mkhathini Ubuntu Diplomatic Corps to improve its outcomes and impact.

■ Training and internship must be based on a progressive curriculum and training programme that is rooted in ANC politics and revolutionary teaching.

African Union (AU) Agenda 2063

■ Africa has undoubtedly transformed from where it was in 1963 when we formed the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to lay the foundations for the African Union we are proud members of today.

■ South Africa's foreign policy is driven by the vision to achieve an African continent that is prosperous, peaceful, democratic, united and assertive in defence of its interests in world affairs. This is in line with Agenda 2063.

■ Agenda 2063 will impact SADC, especially the pace and direction of the integration of our region. Our approach to the SADC region must therefore aim at consolidating bilateral relations with our neighbours, and strengthening SADC as an institution. In particular, we must:

❏ Strengthen regional integration in our SADC neighbourhood by discharging our responsibilities towards the full implementation of our Free Trade Area and concluding the current review of the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan. The SADC-EAC-COMESA tripartite trade negotiations must reach finality as they are an important step towards the realization of the African Free Trade Area by 2017.

❏ Peace and political stability in our region will remain a priority. We are encouraged by the

proactive and stabilizing effect that resulted from the deployment of the SADC Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo where the negative forces there are either on retreat or have been defeated. In this regard, we have operationalised the Tripartite Agreement between South Africa, Angola and the DRC in support of the Peace and Security Framework Agreement for the Great Lakes Region.

❏ We will galvanize political support for major infrastructure projects in our region, notably the Lesotho Highlands Water project Phase II, and the Grand INGA in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

■ For the rest of Africa, in the context of Agenda 2063, we must:
❏ Continue to strengthen bilateral relations with African countries through structured bilateral engagements to advance South Africa's interests throughout the continent;

❏ Intensify our work in supporting the African Union, including the AU institutions we host; namely, the NEPAD Secretariat, Pan-African Parliament and the African Peer Review Mechanism headquarters.

❏ Strengthen Economic Diplomacy to increase trade and investment opportunities for South Africa;

❏ Give dedicated attention to the North-South Corridor, and other NEPAD-driven Infrastructure Projects on the Continent championed by South Africa;

❏ Ensure speedy provision of Humanitarian assistance where needed to alleviate human suffering on the continent;

❏ Implement the African Diaspora programme adopted at the AU Summit we hosted in 2012;

❏ Continue peace-building and conflict prevention efforts in conflict situations in support of multilateral institutions; and

❏ Re-invigorate our Post-Conflict and Reconstruction and Development strategy in African countries emerging from conflict.

■ The African Union Peace and Security Council celebrated its tenth anniversary, and we look back with pride at what it has achieved. South Africa has assumed its two-year membership of this organ which will be used to focus on the restoration of constitutional order in the Central African Republic, and stability in the DRC, Libya, Somalia and South Sudan.

■ The operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture remains a critical element in providing the African Union with the necessary capacity to respond to our challenges of peace and security. The establishment of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), championed by South Africa, is an interim mechanism to enable the African Union to respond to emerging security situations while the African Stand-By Force is being operationalised.

■ Overall, peace and security challenges in Africa fall into the following categories:
❏ Political instability like in Lesotho;

❏ Full scale civil war like in South Sudan;

❏ Rebels and other negative forces like in the DRC;

❏ Unconstitutional change of government;

❏ Secessionist movements like in Mali; and

❏ The scourge of religiously motivated acts of terrorism.

■ Our role as South Africa is in preventive diplomacy to prevent a potential conflict from developing into a conflict; mediation like we are doing now in Lesotho; peace keeping; peace enforcement like we are doing in the DRC as part of FIB/MONUSCO. South Africa is fully seized and part of the continental campaign to silence the guns once and for all.

Strengthening the South
■ It is generally accepted that the international balance of forces are gradually shifting in the direction of the countries of the South. South-South Cooperation is important in South Africa's foreign policy architecture. Our approach to South-South Cooperation is anchored on South-South forums like the BRICS, IBSA and FOCAC and multilateral bodies such as the NAM and the G77 plus China, as well as the network of bilateral relations we have established with countries of Asia and Middle East, and Latin America and the Caribbean. The key elements of this cooperation are the promotion of political and diplomatic relations, enhancing trade, investment and other economic relations, and collaboration on global issues for a better world.

■ The 6th BRICS Summit hosted by Brazil reaffirmed our core vision to bring about a more democratic, multipolar world order. South Africa, as the previous Chair, successfully brought to fruition all the key

outcomes adopted at the 5th BRICS Summit. As such, in Brazil, the Agreement establishing the New Development Bank and the Treaty for the creation of the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement were signed.

■ SA leadership in international organizations for the African Agenda and the transformation of global institutions

■ How SA exercises leadership in international organizations must have four elements to it, namely:

❏ The election of South Africa to strategic structures and strategic positions in international organisations;

❏ Deployment of South Africans in strategic positions;

❏ South Africa championing and leading in a strategic issue of global significance in international organisations; and

❏ South Africa hosting strategic international meetings, including playing a leadership role in ensuring that such meetings produce a progressive outcome.

■ Reform of the structures of global governance, including the United Nations Security Council, must remain a key focus, including on how to ensure that the African Common Position, known as the Ezulwini Consensus, advances the reform of the UN. South Africa's multilateral activities are inextricably linked to South Africa's own domestic priorities and those of the African continent. In this regard, the following are the key priorities:

❏ Two critical negotiations will reach their conclusion in 2015; and these are the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on the basis of the Durban Plan for Enhanced Action agreed at COP17/CMP7; and the Post-2015 Development Agenda. We will continue to call for the acceleration of efforts and resources to ensure the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) up to 2015 and beyond.

❏ On sustainable development, a key process emanating from Rio+20 was to recommend to the United Nations General Assembly a set of possible Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The process to develop these goals has concluded with South Africa's robust participation.

❏ On the Post-2015 Development Agenda, which emanates from the MDGs, South Africa is active in the intergovernmental processes taking place within the United Nations where all nations participate on an equal basis to craft the successor goals to the MDGs, and informed by Rio Principles, in particular the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities. We are informed by the African common position whose essence is that the global post-2015 Development Agenda must give adequate attention to: *"the development of productive capacity underpinned by value addition, technology and innovation, and infrastructure development; people-cantered development with a particular emphasis on youth empowerment and gender equality; natural resources and disaster risk management in the context of sustainable development; peace and security; and a truly inclusive and transformative global partnership."*

❏ Continue to fight for the Durban Legacy that came out of the 2001 World Conference against Racism that we hosted in Durban. The implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action is far from satisfactory.

❏ In the G20, South Africa – also a Co-chair of the G20 Development Working Group (DWG) – continues to address development bottlenecks and help developing countries achieve growth.

❏ South Africa will continue to insist that as much as work is being done on non-proliferation, the issue of disarmament also requires progress and movement in the context of the alienable right of states to the peaceful uses of the atom.

International Solidarity

■ International solidarity will continue to inspire our approach to world affairs. As such, we support the struggle for the right to self-determination of the people of Palestine and the Western Sahara. The economic embargo on Cuba has to be lifted.

■ Cuba is an established strategic partner of South Africa in Latin America and the Caribbean and both countries continue, in a programmatic and systematic manner, to work towards the attainment of their respective foreign policy objectives. The year 2014, marks 20 years of fruitful relations with Cuba. Ties of culture, history, shared struggles and common aspirations, join Cuba to South Africa and the Continent of Africa. There are over 30 (thirty) signed bilateral agreements in place between the two countries covering vast

areas of cooperation for example arts and culture, defence, education, science and technology, health services, housing as well Home Affairs. The Joint Consultative Mechanism (JCM) and the Joint Bilateral Commission (JBC) are the two main instruments utilised by the two countries in the conduct of bilateral and political relations.

■ South Africa reaffirms its solidarity with the people of Western Sahara in search of their right to decolonisation and self-determination, through a UN supervised referendum with the option of independence.

■ Our history and support for the Palestinian struggle for freedom is one that is also linked in our historical and shared struggles. Our own history of Apartheid therefore demands that as South Africa we are required and morally obliged to support the Palestinian fight for freedom, equality and the right to self-determination. As part of South Africa's contribution to international diplomatic efforts towards the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, President Zuma appointed Comrades Zola Skweyiya and former Mr Aziz Pahad as Special Envoys to the Middle East to convey his grave concern over the then escalating violence, the civilian displacement and the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip. The Special Envoys have travelled to the region including Palestine, Israel, Egypt, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia to convey the President's message of concern. President Mahoumed Abbas paid a historic State Visit to South Africa. South Africa has pledged US$1million towards humanitarian assistance in Gaza.

■ South Africa supports the International Year of Solidarity with Palestine (2014) as declared by the UN. South Africa's commitment to the question of Palestine, together with this UN declaration, formed part of South Africa's consideration for hosting the Palestinian Heads of Mission Conference in Cape Town, as well as the Palestinian Solidarity Conference held on 2 May 2014.

6. CONCLUSION

■ A discussion of South Africa's international relations is incomplete without a reflection on the leadership role that is expected of us on the continent and globally. However, our sense and approach to such leadership must not be that of a bully or hegemony, but a member of a collective. We must lead in the following ways:

❏ By asserting the independence of our foreign policy; taking positions that are principled and correct.

❏ Speak out on African issues to defend our continent and collective interests.

❏ Champion progressive issues.

❏ Stand up for justice in the world.

❏ Our leadership must be political, not mechanical, driven by collective and shared interest, not by selfish interests.

QUESTIONS

SELECTED QUESTIONS THAT THE ANC CADRE SHOULD CONSIDER FOR DISCUSSION IN PREPARATION FOR THE 2015 NGC

1. *Our foreign policy and practice must reflect our understanding of national interests, balanced with our pan-African and south solidarity and broader international cooperation. What precisely does "national interests" mean in the pursuit of our international agenda?*

2. *The African Union has adopted the Agenda 2063 framework document – "The Africa We Want". What mechanisms can we use to domesticate Agenda 2063 for all South Africans; and how do we popularise it so that South Africans take ownership of Agenda 2063?*

3. *South Africa is one of the founding countries of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which the ANC played a critical role in formulating and championing, to the extent to which the NEPAD Agency is located in Midrand. Is it important for the ANC once again to lend its voice to the promotion of Africa's development programme, and if so how? Given that South Africa's intra-African trade is universally low in comparison to, to other regions of the world, what can be done to both strengthen and deepen intra-African trade in the coming years so as to ensure that regional integration becomes a reality?*

4. *We are in a period of moving from the (largely unachieved) MDGs to the Post-2015 development agenda and sustainable development goals (SDGs), of which there are currently an unwieldy 17 potential goals listed and being negotiated. What is important for Africa when we discuss sustainable development? How can we ensure that the Africa Common Position on the post-2015 development agenda has pride of place in the SDGs?*

5. *What is the significance of the BRICS to the international balance of forces? How important is the decision of the establishment of the New BRICS Development Bank and the establishment of the first regional office in South Africa?*

6. *The reform of the UN system and the global governance architecture more broadly is a matter of global fairness and justice. Is it time to think more broadly about South Africa's formal positions (for example the Ezulwini Consensus, amongst others), in order to ensure that the reform process comes to fruition?*

7. *In 2008 and most recently, we saw an explosion of "xenophobic" violence (attack on foreign nationals), in South Africa. What could be the causes and the how can the ANC address and respond to these challenges on the matter?*

8. *The rise of terror groups on the African continent and the Middle East present a dual challenge of local grievances combined with international strategies and allegiances. How do we understand the root causes of these terror groups with a view to combat these threats in the long term?*

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
ON OUR FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENT

1. The period between the fifteen and nineteenth centuries saw the rise of the phenomenon of imperialism and colonialism throughout the whole world. An epoch characterized by heightened forms of struggle by our people in the former colonies and semi colonies against colonial territorial conquest and dispossession.

2. Throughout this epoch the role of the conquered territories within the imperialist and colonial system has been to supply raw materials to the industries of the industrial metropolis and to provide a market for the manufactured goods from the metropolitan industries.

3. Therefore the scramble for territorial conquest and dispossession of our people in the former colonies and semi colonies has been part of the worldwide phenomenon of imperialism and colonial expansion. In the African continent and our own country, the wave of territorial conquest and dispossession gave impetus to the subjugation of many African Kingdoms and Chiefdoms

4. The 1884 Berlin conference was a historic event of a far-reaching political significance, which altered the course of the development of human race. It provided a platform for the world superpowers to partition many parts of the underdeveloped world, including our own continent, for the purposes of serving the political and economic interests of the colonial powers.

8.5. It was during this period of history that European voyages of exploration and expedition sailed throughout the world to expand their sphere of influence and socio economic hegemony. This was a moment in the development of imperialism and colonialism, when for the first time in history, the world-renowned explores Christopher Columbus and Vasco Da Gama reached the shores of the Americas and the East Indies respectively.

6. The tidal wave of the movement for the scramble of the world was accompanied by the cruellest forms of human rights violations, which forced millions of the indigenous people into commodities of the lucrative slave trade. The world was a witness to the massive disintegration of its population perpetuated by the colonial powers into the acrimonious world of slavery.

7. Millions of our people throughout the world endured atrocities as they faced the adversity of the scramble by the forces of imperialism and colonialism. Many of our people in the former colonies and semi colonies were conquered mainly because of lack of sophisticated weaponry.

8. Barbaric acts of genocide led to the extermination of millions of the indigenous people of the world. Millions of our people were forcefully imported from the African continent to work as slaves in most of the countries in the American hemisphere.

9. In our own country, millions of people from India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Madagascar, and many other islands in the East Indies, were forcefully imported to work as slaves in the Cape colony and Natal. Historical records prove that many of the enslaved people across the world died of hunger and disease in the slanderous hands of the colonial masters.

10. As a result of the strategic geo political location of the Cape colony, the Dutch East Indian Company instructed Jan van Riebieck to establish a refreshment station at the Cape in order to provide voyages of ships to the East Indies with fresh food and water.

11. The establishment of the refreshment station at the Cape was a turning point of fierce struggle by our people against the forces of imperialism and colonialism. Like many other people of the world, the indigenous people of our country found themselves having to wage struggle against intrusion, territorial conquest and expansion by the colonial masters.

12. At the same time the strategic location of the Cape colony and its prospective influence on the world map, exacerbated tensions between the Dutch and the British colonial powers. This

led to many of the Voortrekker community migrating into the hinterlands of our country, in protest against the laws imposed by the British administration.

13. The movement of the Voortrekkers into the hinterlands sparked a wave of frontier and tribal wars across the breath and length of our country. The scramble for the dispossession of land and livestock led to wars, which dominated the South African political scene for centuries to come.

14. The contradictions of the colonial interest between the Dutch and the British colonial administrations led to the establishment of the first Boer republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.

15. These contradictions steered the Afrikaner nationalism, which was against the domination of the British administration and the struggle for the control of the economy after the discovery of gold and diamond that led to the outbreak of the Anglo Boer war.

16. The catastrophic war between the Afrikaner and English-speaking people led to the total destruction of the entire socio economic base of the Afrikaner community. The war indeed became one of the major contributors to the poor white problem immediately after the establishment of the Union of South Africa.

17. After the most destructive battle between the English and the Afrikaner speaking people, protracted negotiations led to the peace treaty of the Vereeniging in the year 1902. The thrust of the negotiated settlement was fundamental towards the establishment of the Union of South Africa under the British dominion.

18. The formation of the Union was a catalyst towards the systematic segregation of the vast majority of the black people of our country from the political and socio economic decision-making processes. The black majority was marginalised from becoming meaningful participants and architects of the birth of the Union of South Africa.

19. The participants at the peace treaty of Vereeniging rejected the inclusion of the non-racial franchise clause in the draft constitution of the Union of South Africa. The unfolding events prompted the black people of our country to forge for a formation of a political

movement that would champion the wishes and aspirations of the majority.

20. The peace treaty of the Vereeniging was the main architect of the formation of the union of South Africa. The strategic desire was to find common grounds to unite both the British and the Dutch colonial interests against the black people who constituted the majority of the population in our country.

21. The painstaking event saw the forebears of our movement resonating with the defeated African Kingdoms and Chiefdoms, as well as other enlightened sections of our society from the western missionary education, to demand for the inclusion of the African people in the formation of their nation state. It was the culmination of these episodes of historical events, commencing with the conquest and dispossession of our African tribes by the colonial settlers, to the last horrendous subjugation of the Bambatha Rebellion, with the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 that led to the formation of the ANC in 1912.

22. Unity of purpose amongst the sections of Africans from various persuasions, including those from our neighbouring countries, saw the need for the formation of a political movement, which will take forward our struggle against imperialism and colonial domination.

23. The period before and after the formation of the Union of South Africa saw various deputations, presentations and petitions to the British Queen, urging her to persuade our white compatriots to include the black majority into the political decision making processes. This is indicative of how our movement understood the importance of diplomacy and peaceful means of resolving the political problems in our country, at its most embryonic stage of development.

24. In 1917 the victory of the Bolshevik party in Russia ushered in the triumph of the great October socialist revolution that was the momentous epoch making the event that saw the establishment of the first ever-socialist state in the history of mankind.

25. The great October Socialist Revolution was an outstanding historical event of our modern times. It marked a decisive turning point in the struggle of the people of the world against imperialism and colonialism.

26. The victory of the great October socialist revolution became an epicenter of struggle of the people of the world to fight against imperialism and the emancipation of the colonised people. It became a political instrument to formulate the principles, strategies and tactics of the working class struggle nationally and internationally.

27. One of the most important questions before the world communist movement was its dialectical relationship with the nationalists' movements of the oppressed people in the colonies and semi colonies. The role and contribution of the Communist movement towards the liberation of the people of the world from the bondage of imperialism and colonial domination.

28. In 1928 the Communist international instructed all Communist parties of the world to established relationships with nationalist movements in the colonies and semi colonies. Communist parties were instructed to work with proletarian parties in the colonies and semi colonies, providing moral and material support to the cause of their struggle against imperialism and colonialism.

29. As early as 1915, the leadership of the international socialist league in South Africa was already grappling with the most important question of internationalism and solidarity. The departure point was that internationalism should not only aim at unity with the Russian, Italian, and German Social Democrats, but also to embrace unity of all sections of the working class in South Africa, Black and White. They argued strongly that internationalism, which does not concede the fullest rights, which the native working class is capable of claiming, would be a sham.

30. The presidium of the sixth congress of the second international in 1928 characterised the South African situation as a British dominion of a special type. This was premised out of the most profound analysis that the character of the South African economy was such that the British imperialism occupied the principal positions of our economy with the participation of the South African white bourgeoisie.

31. In other words the British imperialism carried the economic exploitation of our country with the involvement of the white South African bourgeoisie. The oppressed people of our country did not only suffer from capitalist exploitation and colonial domination, but also from racial discrimination.

32. As a consequence, the sixth congress of the international made a clarion call for the establishment of an independent native South African Republic, as a stage towards workers and peasant republic with full and equal rights for all races. A correct theoretical preposition of our understanding of the national democratic revolution.

33. From the beginning, our struggle for national liberation has been shaped and influenced by the revolutionary principles and traditions of internationalism and solidarity. Our struggle for national liberation has always assumed an internationalist character.

34. Inspired by the traditions of internationalism and solidarity, the ANC has always mastered the theoretical grasp that the struggle of the people of our country is part of the struggle of the people of the world. That our struggle is essentially about the liberation of our people against imperialism and colonial oppression and exploitation.

35. The forebears of our national liberation movement recognised that the struggle against imperialism and colonialism in South Africa was tantamount to the defeat of colonialism in Africa and the rest of the colonised world. Hence, they were enthusiastic to join the international progressive forces in the fight against imperialism and colonialism.

36. The posture of the ANC on internationalism emanates from the period as early as the turn of the last century. Before the formation of the South African Native National Congress, Cde Pixley ka Seme took public platforms against imperialism and colonialism, calling for democracy and renewal of Africa in public speeches and publications.

37. It was in that context that in 1927 Cde President Josia Gumede attended the Anti- Imperialism conference in Brussels as the delegate of the ANC. The conference demanded the complete overthrow of imperialism and capitalist domination, the protection of freedoms of speech and assembly, and that the right to education to be extended to all peoples.

38. On his return from Moscow in 1928 Cde President Josia Gumede said *"I have seen the*

new world to come, where it has already begun, I have seen a New Jerusalem". In his Presidential address to the congress of the ANC in 1930, he said *"Soviet Russia was the only real friend of all subjected races and I urge congress to demand a South African native republic with equal rights for all and free from foreign and local domination".*

39. The birth of the South African Communist party and trade union movement also helped to infuse into our struggle body politics that was hitherto dominated by African nationalism, a new ideological perspective informed by the scientific revolutionary Marxist Leninist theory.

40. This again further engraved the South African liberation struggle into internationalism, highlighting the importance of solidarity to ensure furtherance of the local and international struggle for the common values of freedom, equality, democracy, peace and development.

41. The events that were to follow the various strikes in the South African mines after the end of the First World War and the reliance on South Africa's manufactures during the Second World War, helped us simultaneously to graduate from mere mining and agriculture into a manufacturing economy.

42. This had its own consequences, as the working class grew quantitatively and so did its high level of political consciousness. Our scientific Marxist Leninist revolutionary theory continued to play its pivotal role as a guiding tool of our struggle.

43. Throughout the years of our struggle, the leadership of the ANC has been committed to a revolutionary transformation of society. The ANC collaborated with other progressive forces galvanising them into mass campaigns, in defiance of oppressive colonial and Apartheid racist laws.

44. In 1941 the ANC galvanised the African people to join the Allied Forces into a war against Hitler, as a symbol of our struggle against the tide of racist supremacy and fascism in the world. It was done in earnest with the full hope that by the end of the war, the world powers would work towards the achievement of peace and common friendship amongst the nation states.

45. The ANC crafted the African Claims document whilst the Allied Forces prepared for a Summit in Malta scheduled for 1943 to detail the expectations of the colonised people of South Africa and elsewhere. It hoped that the Summit outcomes would reflect these aspirations, but it would not, thus causing the movement to pin its hope on the solidarity of the newly independent states in the struggle for a new world.

46. Indeed, in 1955 there was the first gathering of forces of the global south, the Non-Aligned Movement's (NAM) conference in Bandung, in which the ANC participated in shaping what, would be known as the World Progressive Movement. A movement committed to non-alignment in the cold war; non-proliferation of nuclear arms; non-interference in domestic affairs of countries; a peaceful resolution of conflicts; and the right of all nations to determine their own path, form and content of development.

47. Our movement facilitated the historic congress of the people that adopted the Freedom Charter in the year 1955. During this historic gathering, our people included in the charter, the idea of a *"free and a better world for all".*

48. It is the freedom charter that informed the idea of a free and a better world *"There shall be peace and friendship".*

49. Our moral standing on these basic tenants for freedom and equality, especially in the face of racism and bigotry, ensured that progressive people around the globe, even in colonial powers, supported the South African struggle for freedom and democracy.

50. It is important to note that the Freedom Charter was built on the 1943 African Claims Document, as well as in the spirit and letter of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights by the United Nations. This was the blue print of the social, economic and political values that were espoused by the whole of humanity post the Second war period.

51. Where the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was antithetical to the World War, the Freedom Charter was antithetical to apartheid's hegemony in South Africa.

52. On the international centre stage, the ANC made various representations to the United Nations, calling for its intervention against Apartheid South Africa. It was for this reason that in 1966 the UN General Assembly declared Apartheid as a crime against humanity.

53. This created the necessary momentum for the countries of the world to isolate South Africa on the basis of violation of fundamental human rights. The campaign was cantered on mobilization of the world for political, economic and diplomatic isolation of the Apartheid South Africa.

54. The ANC pushed for a strong international solidarity against apartheid, resulting in the establishment of anti-apartheid movements in all regions of the world. There was a great intensification of the mobilization of ordinary people, students, and the trade union movements, and middle class, faith-based organisations to support the struggle of the oppressed in South Africa. This helped to build a global and non-racial movement against apartheid racial chauvinism.

55. As evidenced by ANC President, Chief Albert Luthuli's Nobel Peace Prize in 1958, the struggle for South African independence became the centre-stage of the international struggle for the liberation of Africa. The ANC would also occupy the centre of the major political discourse on the liberation of Africa during the independence years.

56. The ANC also co-operated with the broader struggle against colonialism in Africa, recognizing that the struggle in South Africa was a part of the broader pan-African struggle for liberation. When the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established the ANC fully participated.

57. It recognised the OAU as a strategic platform to mobilize the continent against the apartheid state and former colonial powers which sought to divide the anti-colonial struggle. It suffices to elucidate that President OR was given a status of the head of state at all OAU meetings.

58. The political leadership role of the OAU was fundamental in contributing towards the liberation of most of the African states. The OAU went to an extent of establishing a liberation committee, which provided moral and material support to national liberation movements still waging struggle against colonial powers.

59. The OAU liberation committee was instrumental in assisting most of the liberation movements to defeat the unholy alliance between Portuguese and white South African colonialism in the Southern African region. In Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa.

60. Many countries in Africa, particularly Southern Africa, paid a heavy price in the destablisation campaigns by the apartheid state and its allies using brutal military and economic measures to subvert the struggle led by our national liberation movement. Frontline states, which provided refuge for ANC cadres were invaded and destabilised, and their economies blocked by the apartheid regime.

61. The Matola raid of 1981 in Mozambique, the Maseru raid of Lesotho in 1982, the Gaborone raid in Botswana in 1985, attacks on ANC Headquarters in Zambia and other attacks and assassinations in Zimbabwe and Swaziland, and many other parts of our continent and the world.

62. The battle at Cuito Cuanavale by the combined forces of the Russian, Cuban and the Angolan Military, and the units of the military wings of the SWAPO and ANC against UNITA and the South African Defence Force, cannot be forgotten for how it tilted the balance of forces in our country, the Southern African region, the continent and the world.

63. Even though the whole period spanning the Cold War era resulted in intransigency by western countries over apartheid, ordinary people and various important social figures took stances against apartheid in solidarity with the liberation struggle led by the ANC. A number of international platforms were in support of the ANC struggle for liberation, apart from the OAU.

64. Some of the European and Scandinavian countries that were led by social democrats aligned to the Socialist International also assisted us morally and materially. Artist such as the famed Bono also took a stance against apartheid, helping organize the Release Mandela concerts in places such as London.

65. We will forever remember the courage, the tenacity, selflessness, and heroic contribution by some of the outstanding world statesmen such as the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palma who sacrificed for the noble cause of the struggle for the liberation of our country.

66. The President of the ANC Cde OR Tambo had to say the following after his assassination: *"The murderer's gun that fired the fatal shot was aimed directly against the ANC and our people as well".*

67. Our campaign for the mobilization of the international community gathered so much attention that by the late eighties the ANC had 20 diplomatic representative offices in Africa, 14 in Europe, and 4 in the North America and the Asian countries respectively. Our movement essentially had more international diplomatic presence than the apartheid regime.

68. Today our democratic government led by the ANC has the presence of the diplomatic after the USA. We are the second biggest for obvious that the city of New York, is the host of the UN General Assembly.

69. More importantly our struggle was interwoven with the international cause for the promotion of the values enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As a result many African countries adopted the ANC struggle anthem "*Nkosi Sikelela I-Afrika"* as their national anthem post-colonial independence.

70. With this enormous international support, the ANC was able to protect our struggle from the enemies of our revolution. Thanks to the profound and tireless exemplary collective leadership of President OR Tambo.

71. We should also contextualise the period of our armed struggle from the perspective of internationalism and solidarity. Our armed struggle was to be unthinkable without the moral and material support of the international community.

72. Many countries of the world became second homes to the leadership of the movement banished into exile by the racist apartheid regime. This interconnection of solidarity made the people of the world the integral part of our struggle for freedom and equality.

73. The process of negotiations in the late 1980 was a culmination of intense pressure from our people and the international world. Thanks to the visionary leadership of our movement for making the world understand that the Apartheid regime was a crime against humanity.

74. The collapse of the Berlin wall and socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern European States influenced our transition towards the negotiated political settlement in our country. The cause of events in the world changed tremendously in favour of the US led imperialism.

75. At the same time the unbanning of our national liberation movement and the release of our political prisoners was the victory of the struggle of our people and the world. The 1994 democratic breakthrough was indeed a celebration of the struggle of the progressive world movement.

76. The adoption of our democratic constitution with the fundamental bill of rights symbolised the cause of our struggle for freedom and equality to the people of the world. Our constitution borrowed heavily from constitutional experiences of various countries, again highlighting our social, economic and political values as integral to the rest of the world.

77. The struggle led by the ANC is rooted in internationalism and solidarity. Our common vision is to build the world of peace and tranquillity. We want peace in the Middle East, in the Great lakes, Sudan, Palestine, Libya, Somalia, and many other parts of the world.

78. From the roots of its historical formation, the ANC firmly believed that our cause for national liberation would achieve its objectives, when all its formations, including the women and youth, continue to occupy the forefront tranches of our struggle. Our youth and women formations made tremendous contribution towards the isolation of the racist Apartheid regime both domestically and internationally.

79. The aftermath of the formation of the Women's International Democratic Federation after the Second World War, saw Cde Helen Joseph and Lilian Ngoyi, representing South African women in general and ANC women in particular, in all conferences organised by the federation. This added the voice of the ANC in its struggle against colonialism and imperialism internationally.

80. As a result, the ANC Women's Section – as it was known during the years in exile, represented the women of the continent in both the Bureau and Secretariat of the WIDF until the end of the cold war in Berlin where it was headquartered. Subsequently the headquarters were moved back to Paris in France.

81. It is important to mention that the ANC Women section was a founding member of the Pan African Women's Organisation (PAWO), the organisation that preceded the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

82. Through PAWO the ANC Women Section was able to highlight the challenges facing the South African people. It was able to highlight the problems of triple oppression confronting the women of our continent.

83. Throughout the history of our struggle, the ANC youth league participated in youth and student organizations across the world. As member of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY), All Africa Student Union (AASU), the ANCYL brought to the attention of the international community the plight of the struggle of the people of our country.

84. It is equally important to bring to the fore the most important question that the ANC was also inspired by Pan African movement which emerged at the turn of the 20th century. Alongside conferences of the communist international in the period between world wars, ANC leaders also attended some of the 7 Pan-African Conferences that knitted together a pan-African internationalist agenda around rights of the oppressed, mostly black people, solidarity, anti-imperialism, the land rights, unity of Africa and reform of international political economy.

85. This is why ANC's internationalism is anti-imperialist and pan-Africanist in its outlook. Without this acknowledgement, this commitment to African Renaissance that Prixley ka Seme well articulated in 1906, which Albert Luthuli and OR Tambo and also Thabo Mbeki constantly emphasized, becomes incidental rather than fundamental to the evolution of ANC's internationalism.

86. Internationalism and international solidarity has been an important political pillar in the history of our struggle for freedom and equality. The ANC always understood that our struggle is an integral part of the worldwide struggle against imperialism and colonialism.