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No. 12-4659

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
AARON GRAHAM and ERIC JORDAN,
Defendants/Appellants.
____________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, Northern Division
(The Hon. Richard D. Bennett)
____________________
DEFENDANTS’/APPELLANTS’ OPPOSITION
TO THE GOVERNMENT’S PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
____________________
JAMES WYDA
Federal Public Defender
District of Maryland
MEGHAN S. SKELTON
Appellate Attorney
6411 Ivy Lane, Suite 710
Greenbelt, MD 20770
(301) 344-0600
Counsel for Aaron Graham

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Table of Authorities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Reasons for Denying the Petition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
I.

Rehearing would neither clarify nor resolve the fractured state of
the law regarding warrantless tracking using historical CSLI. . . . . . . 2

II.

The panel decision is consistent with Miller and Smith.. . . . . . . . . . . 5

III.

The decision is consistent with cases recognizing a privacy
interest in location information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

IV.

The government’s argument that the panel decision altered the
reasonableness requirement for subpoenas is really another
restatement of its argument about Miller and Smith. . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Certificate of Compliance
Certificate of Service

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846 (Mass. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 12
Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9
In re Application,
__ F. Supp. 3d __, 2015 WL 4594558 (N.D. Cal. 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data,
724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing Provider of Electronic
Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government,
620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3, 4, 12
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 228 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6, 14, 15
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 12
People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 8
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11, 12, 16
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

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Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4, 12
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc). . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3, 5
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 11, 12, 14
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 11, 12
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Statutes and Rules
Fourth Amendment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14

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Introduction
The panel correctly decided that tracking a person using historical cell site
location information (CSLI) for 221 days, without a warrant or probable cause, is
dragnet surveillance that the Fourth Amendment prohibits. See United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 n.6 (2012). The government is essentially asking this
Court to treat cell phones as personal homing beacons, providing it the wherewithal
to follow and recreate a person’s every movement. The government seeks to do so
without a warrant or probable cause, using the excuse that telecommunications
providers also happen to know when and where an individual has gone and is going.
The difference between what the government did here and what George Orwell
envisioned is that Big Brother’s constant surveillance through telescreens was
stationary. But the surveillance here moves with citizens using a common household
device carried in the pockets or purses of almost every American adult. Our Founders
crafted the Fourth Amendment to require a warrant based on probable cause before
the government could acquire such intimate information about a person. The panel’s
conclusion that the government must comply with the warrant requirement before
obtaining historical CSLI correctly applies the Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, rehearing this case could not resolve the circuit splits and splits
among the sovereigns, all of which existed before the panel decided this case.
Whether this Court finds a Fourth Amendment violation or not, the splits will remain.

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Reasons for Denying the Petition
I.

Rehearing would neither clarify nor resolve the fractured state of
the law regarding warrantless tracking using historical CSLI.
The government asks for rehearing en banc to resolve a split with opinions

from the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits.1 (Petition at 10-11, 14.) Rehearing,
however, could not achieve this goal because the splits would remain, whether the en
banc court decides that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred or not.
To begin, the government incorrectly claims that the majority’s decision
conflicts with a decision of the Third Circuit. (Petition at 14.) In fact, the majority
states, “We conclude, in agreement with the analysis of the Third Circuit in In re
Application (Third Circuit) and that of several state supreme courts, that the thirdparty doctrine of Smith and Miller does not apply to CSLI generated by cell phone
service providers.”2 (Slip Op. at 45 (emphasis added).) The government’s claim that
the panel opinion conflicts with the Third Circuit is misleading at best.
The government refers to United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir.
2015); In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir.
2013) (In re Application (Fifth Circuit)); and In re Application of U.S. for an Order
Directing Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the
Government, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (In re Application (Third Circuit)).
1

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979), establish in broad terms that individuals have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information that they have voluntarily disclosed to third
parties.
2

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While it is true that the majority opinion conflicts with decisions from the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits regarding the applicability of Smith and Miller and the third
party doctrine, these courts had already split with the Third Circuit. The Eleventh and
Fifth Circuits held that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
historical CSLI because, under Smith and Miller, individuals voluntarily disclose their
location data to cellular service providers. Davis, 785 F.3d at 511-12; In re
Application (Fifth Circuit), 724 F.3d at 612-13. Several years earlier, however, the
Third Circuit concluded that Smith and Miller do not apply to CSLI because
individuals do not voluntarily convey their location data in any meaningful sense. In
re Application (Third Circuit), 620 F.3d at 317-18. See also Tracey v. State, 152 So.
3d 504, 525-26 (Fla. 2014) (holding that CSLI does not fall within the third party
doctrine’s exception to a reasonable privacy interest). Indeed, the split existed before,
and continued after, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue en banc.
The Circuits, as well as several state supreme courts, are also already split on
a different, but related issue: whether individuals enjoy a privacy interest in location
data. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits decided that individuals have no privacy
interest in their location information over long term tracking. But the D.C. Circuit
concluded the opposite. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562-63 (D.C. Cir.
2010). Similarly, the Third Circuit explained that CSLI can locate a person inside
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private space, like a home, which implicates a privacy interest long recognized by the
Fourth Amendment.

In re Application (Third Circuit), 620 F.3d at 311-13

(explaining that CSLI allows the government to see inside a home, which is
government surveillance that requires a warrant) (relying on United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705 (1984)). Moreover, the supreme courts of Florida and Massachusetts
and the Court of Appeals of New York all recognize that individuals enjoy a privacy
interest in their location information. Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846,
864 (Mass. 2014); Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 525; People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195,
1201 (N.Y. 2009).
These splits existed before the panel’s decision. The panel thoroughly
addressed all the different positions in its 134-page opinion. If any further review of
this issue should occur, it should be in the Supreme Court, the only forum that can
clarify the fractured state of the law. A petition for certiorari is already pending in
Davis, which, if granted, would resolve these splits.
II.

The panel decision is consistent with Miller and Smith.
The government argues that the panel’s decision cannot be reconciled with

United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland because individuals disclose their
location information to third parties, who then maintain it as a business record. (Pet.
at 7.) The government is wrong; the panel’s decision is entirely consistent with
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Miller and Smith.
The government reads Miller and Smith in the broadest possible terms,
inferring a holding that establishes an absolute rule that any type of information, no
matter how private, that a third party maintains enjoys no Fourth Amendment
protection. Miller and Smith, however, held no such thing. And more important,
numerous cases in the ensuing forty years recognize a constitutionally protected
privacy interest in information disclosed to and held by third parties.
Miller reiterated what the Court stated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967): the Fourth Amendment does not protect “‘what a person knowingly exposes
to the public.’” 425 U.S. at 42 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351). This statement,
however, does not encompass the entire holding of Miller. The Court explained that
“We must examine the nature of the particular documents sought to be protected to
in order to determine whether there is a legitimate expectation of privacy concerning
their contents.” Id. In Miller, the documents were “not confidential communications
but negotiable instruments.” Id. The nature of the record thus demonstrated that the
individual did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.
Smith likewise reaffirmed Katz’s holding that individuals do not maintain “a
legitimate expectation of privacy in information [they] voluntarily turn[] over to third
parties.” 442 U.S. at 743-44. The Court decided that an individual voluntarily
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discloses to a telephone company the telephone numbers that he or she dials. Two
facts played a key role in the Court’s decision. First, the information that the
government obtained is “limited.” Id. at 742. Second, the telephone user “voluntarily
convey[s] numerical information to the telephone company” when dialing a telephone
number. Id. at 744. The limited information that the land-line telephone user
disclosed to the telephone company is the only information that the government
obtained. The telephone user knew precisely what that information was and could
control whether it was revealed or not. Indeed, the user saw a print out of the
numbers in each monthly bill.
The panel’s decision is consistent with both cases. These cases establish that
information that individuals disclose to third parties may be available to the
government if the disclosure is voluntary, the information is limited, and the nature
of the information or documents is not inherently private. The records at issue in
Miller and Smith conveyed limited information to the business, the individual knew
precisely what information he was conveying, and the individual could control the
flow of information. The information was tangible and visible to the individual.
But CSLI exposes vast amounts of private information even when individuals
take no affirmative steps to disclose their location data to the public. CSLI is
generated automatically and passively, without any choice or overt action by the cell
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phone user, including when the user is not even making or receiving calls. Unlike the
records in Miller and Smith, individuals do not know precisely when a phone is
passively conveying location data, or to which cell tower the phone is connecting.
FBI experts concede that CSLI can locate a citizen and her property, including
within the home, whenever a cell phone is turned on, without the user’s input or
control: “‘CSLI for a cellular telephone may still be generated in the absence of user
interaction with a cellular telephone. ... For example’ the CSLI may be generated by
‘applications that continually run in the background that send and receive data (e.g.
mail applications).’” In re Application, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2015 WL 4594558 *13
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting the declaration of FBI Special Agent Hector M. Luna); see
also id. at *9. Here, the record establishes that CSLI was generated when the
defendants were not actively using their cell phones. (JA 1974, 1980, 1992.)
The choices that the defendants in Smith and Miller made, to disclose limited,
specific information to businesses, evinced a lack of interest in maintaining privacy.
Since cell phone users, in contrast, make no active, deliberate choice to reveal the
nature and scope of information encompassed in CSLI, they retain their privacy
interest. The simple act of carrying a cell phone does not indicate a disinterest in
maintaining privacy. See Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1200 (“It would appear to us that the
great popularity of . . . technology for its many useful applications may not be taken
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simply as a massive, undifferentiated concession of personal privacy to agents of the
state.”). Thus, the panel’s decision does not conflict with Smith and Miller, but
applies the cases consistently with the cases’ own internal limitations.
Moreover, although the government does not mention any third party cases
decided after 1979, later Supreme Court cases hold that the Fourth Amendment
applies to information revealed to third parties. (See Pet. at 7-10.) For example, in
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), the Court rejected the
government’s argument that patients lose a privacy interest in sensitive information
once they share it with another. “The reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by
the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests . . . is that the results . . . will not be
shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent.” Id. at 78. Although the
documentation of the drug tests was created and maintained by a hospital, the
individual maintained a constitutionally protected privacy interest in the information.
Id. Likewise, in City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010), the Court
assumed that police officers retained a privacy interest in text messages sent on
government-owned and monitored pagers, but found that a different exception to the
warrant requirement authorized the search. Not only did the telecommunications
provider retain this information, but the police department itself monitored the text
messages. The Court had no qualms about the existence of the privacy interest
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despite this access by third parties. See also Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336
(2000) (rejecting the government’s third party argument and concluding that
passengers on common carriers retain a privacy interest in carry-on luggage, although
others might see and even touch it).
This Court’s more recent third party jurisprudence is consistent with Ferguson
and Quon. In Doe v. Broderick, this Court found a Fourth Amendment privacy
interests in information and documents containing private information held by third
parties – a patient’s file from a methadone clinic. 225 F.3d 440, 450-52 (4th Cir.
2000). When law enforcement examined that file without a warrant or probable cause,
it constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
In its request to rehear this case, the government ignores cases addressing
private information in a third party’s hands, if they were decided after 1979. But
these later cases demonstrate that when third parties maintain records of an
individual’s highly private information, that private information still enjoys
protection from the government’s prying eyes, unless the government produces a
warrant based on probable cause. The panel rightly continued reading cases that were
decided after Smith. As a result, the panel reached a conclusion that is both consistent
with Smith and Miller, and is in line with more recent third party cases. The
individuals in those cases did not forfeit a privacy interest in their sensitive
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information simply because a business or individual had access to that information.
The panel correctly concluded that the defendants here did not forfeit their privacy
interests in their CSLI.
III.

The decision is consistent with cases recognizing a privacy interest
in location information.
The government offers a different iteration of its same third-party doctrine

argument, claiming that cases addressing long term location monitoring are irrelevant
because this case does not involve “direct tracking.” (Pet. at 4, 10.) The panel’s
decision, however, is correct.
Riley v. California establishes that individuals have a privacy interest in
historical CSLI. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014). Historical CSLI generated by cell
phones served as one of the Court’s chief examples of “the privacies of life” included
in cell phone metadata. The Court described just how intimate and detailed location
data is: “Data on a cell phone can also reveal where a person has been. Historic
location information . . . can reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to the
minute, not only around town, but within a particular building.” Id.

The Court

explained the intrusive nature of CSLI tracking by adopting Justice Sotomayor’s
concurrence in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012). The unanimous
Riley Court thus concluded that monitoring “a precise, comprehensive record of a

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person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations” infringes upon an individual’s
reasonable expectation of a privacy that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id.
The government’s position that people cannot have a privacy interest in historic
CSLI thus directly opposes what a unanimous Supreme Court decided a little more
than a year ago. The panel, on the other hand, followed Supreme Court guidance and
recognized a privacy interest in historic CSLI.
The conclusions in Riley (as well as the panel’s) flow logically from United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), and Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Those cases establish that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
details about the interior of private space, like a home, including who or what is
inside. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. The government may not track a person or his effects
inside a home without a warrant: “private residences are places in which the
individual normally expects privacy free of government intrusion not authorized by
a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as
justifiable.” Karo, 468 U.S. at 714; see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (holding that the
Fourth Amendment draws a “firm” and “bright line” at the entrance to a house).
Unless the police have a warrant, they may not use technology to observe details
about the interior of a person’s home that are otherwise invisible without a physical
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intrusion into the constitutionally protected area. Id. See also Karo, 468 U.S. at 71516; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953. And CSLI allows the government to observe a citizen,
together with his or her personal property, in private space. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at
2490; In re Application (Third Circuit), 620 F.3d at 311-13; Augustine, 4 N.E.3d at
864; Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 525.
The government is mistaken in its claim that the third party doctrine renders
these cases inapplicable. (Pet. at 10-11.) Miller and Smith simply provide a second
step in the analysis of whether the government is intruding upon an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. Location tracking cases are essential to the Fourth
Amendment analysis, providing the necessary first step. Courts cannot examine the
“nature of the record” under Miller and Smith, let alone whether a citizen has
voluntarily shared that information with a third party without first determining the
privacy interest at stake. Riley, Kyllo, Karo, and even Jones establish that CSLI is
private on a level far surpassing anything involved in Smith and Miller.
Just like the government stopped reading third party cases dating after 1979,
it asks the Court to skip the initial step in the Fourth Amendment analysis. This
logical leap is necessary to the government’s argument, because a head-on analysis
of these cases compels the conclusion that historical CSLI remains private and falls
into a category unlike bank records or dialed phone numbers. The panel, however,
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followed the proper analytical steps: it determined the nature of the information at
issue, considered the privacy implications of that record, and then decided whether
cell phone users knowingly and voluntarily convey that information to third parties.
The government posits that Smith and Miller are the only relevant cases, but the panel
correctly decided that courts cannot divorce the nature of the record from the Fourth
Amendment calculus.
IV.

The government’s argument that the panel decision altered the
reasonableness requirement for subpoenas is really another
restatement of its argument about Miller and Smith.
Finally, the government suggests that this Court should rehear this case

because subpoenas, supported by reasonable suspicion, and 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) act
as an exception to the warrant requirement. (Pet. at 12.) The government also asserts
that the panel imposed a probable cause standard onto subpoenas. The government
is wrong on both counts.
Subpoenas are not an exception to the warrant requirement, but simply fall
outside the warrant clause. Unlike a search, which requires a warrant and probable
cause, a subpoena begins an adversary process, where the parties are able to litigate
the reasonableness of the government’ request before complying. In re Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000). The intrusion into a recognized
privacy interest is far more limited than in a search. Id. A subpoena thus is not an
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exception to the warrant requirement; it simply is not a warrant.3
The issue the panel had to decide, and decided correctly, was whether
collecting and analyzing CSLI is a search. Courts decide whether a particular
governmental investigation technique is a search using the two-part test outlined in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949, 953
(holding that although a search certainly occurs when the government commits a
common law trespass, “[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic
signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”). First, a court
assesses whether the privacy interest upon which the government seeks to intrude is
one that society accepts as objectively reasonable. Second, the court determines
whether the individual’s expectation of privacy is subjectively reasonable. Katz, 389
U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Having conducted the Katz analysis, the panel concluded that collecting and
analyzing CSLI is indeed a search. Given the substantial privacy interests implicated
by the government’s analyzing of location data over a seven-month period, as
discussed above, this conclusion was both correct and consistent with decisions of the
Supreme Court and several states’ highest courts. Therefore, because what happened
Indeed, a court order under § 2703(d) operates like a warrant, not a subpoena.
It is issued under seal, with a gag order, providing no adversary process for the cell
phone user to challenge the search until after criminal proceedings begin.
3

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was a search, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applies. See In re
Subpoena Duces tecum, 228 F.3d at 348 (searches remain subject to the warrant
requirement).
The panel’s decision does not overrule Circuit precedent regarding
reasonableness requirements for subpoenas.

(Pet. at 12.)

Leaving subpoena

standards unchanged, the panel’s decision concludes that the government activity
here fell under the warrant requirement.
CSLI is not immune from search. The government just must seek a warrant,
something the Stored Communications Act itself contemplates. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c).
“Our cases have historically recognized that the warrant requirement is an important
part of the our machinery of government, not merely an inconvenience to be
somehow weighed against the claims of police efficiency.” Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493
(internal quotation omitted).
Conclusion
The panel’s decision correctly applied Supreme Court case law. It is consistent
with decisions from other circuits and several states’ supreme courts. Although the
panel’s decision conflicts with decisions from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,
rehearing would not resolve this split. This Court should therefore deny the
government’s petition for rehearing.
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Respectfully submitted,
JAMES WYDA
Federal Public Defender
________/s/___________________
MEGHAN S. SKELTON
Appellate Attorney
6411 Ivy Lane, Ste. 710
Greenbelt, Maryland 20770
(301) 344-0600

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
1.

This Opposition to the Government’s Petition for Rehearing has been prepared
using WordPerfect X4 software, Times New Roman font, 14 point proportional
type size.

2.

Exclusive of the table of contents, table of authorities, and certificate of
service, this brief contains 15 pages.

I understand that a material misrepresentation can result in this Court’s striking the
brief and imposing sanctions. If the Court so requests, I will provide an electronic
version of the brief and/or a copy of the word or line print-out.
10/06/15
Date

/s/ Meghan S. Skelton
Meghan S. Skelton
Appellate Attorney

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of October, 2015 a copy of the
foregoing Opposition to the Government’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc was
delivered via electronic filing to:
Sujit Raman, Esq.
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Office of the U.S. Attorney
6500 Cherrywood Lane, Suite 200
Greenbelt, Maryland 20770

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Meghan S. Skelton
Appellate Attorney