Office of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
O
ffice of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice

Bonuses and Other Favorable
Personnel Actions for Drug
Enforcement Administration
Employees Involved in Alleged Sexual
Misconduct Incidents Referenced in
the OIG’s March 2015 Report

Evaluation and Inspections Division 16-01

October 2015

 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In March 2015, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) released the Review of the Handling of Sexual Harassment and Misconduct
Allegations by the Department’s Law Enforcement Components.1 In that report, we
described several incidents involving alleged sexual misconduct of Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) employees. Following the OIG review, the
Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform asked the OIG to determine whether any promotions, bonuses,
awards, or new job assignments were given to the DEA personnel involved in the
incidents described in our report.
DEA policy generally prohibits employees from receiving promotions, awards,
or other favorable personnel actions for a period of 3 years after being subject to
discipline for significant misconduct or while a misconduct investigation is pending,
absent a specifically approved exception reflecting the basis for going forward.
Fourteen DEA employees were involved in the incidents we described in our
report. 2 Although none of those 14 employees were promoted between the
initiation of their respective misconduct investigations and the date we requested
this information from the DEA, we found 10 instances where, contrary to DEA
policy, DEA officials approved bonuses and a time-off award for these individuals
even though they had been subject to discipline for significant misconduct within
3 years or while a misconduct investigation was still in progress. We also found
three instances in which there was no documentation reflecting the basis for going
forward with a favorable personnel action under these circumstances. In addition,
we found seven instances in which the DEA followed policy and appropriately issued
awards and bonuses to these employees.
We make two recommendations to ensure the DEA consistently follows policy
and its integrity check process for approving favorable personnel actions for
employees who committed significant misconduct in the past or are subjects in
ongoing misconduct investigations.

1

U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Handling of Sexual
Harassment and Misconduct Allegations by the Department’s Law Enforcement Components,
Evaluation and Inspections Report 15-04 (March 2015).
2

One of the 14 employees is now retired from the DEA.

i

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1

Background.......................................................................................... 1

Scope and Methodology of the OIG Review .............................................. 4

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW ............................................................................... 5

None of the 14 DEA Employees Involved in the 3 Misconduct Incidents

Described in Our Report Received Promotions; But in 10 Instances, 8 of 

the 14 Employees Received Bonuses or Awards Contrary to DEA Policy ....... 5

First Incident: Special Agents Involved in Patronizing Prostitutes and

Frequenting a Brothel while Assigned Overseas ........................................ 5

Second Incident: Assistant Regional Director’s Harassment of a Foreign 

Service National.................................................................................. 10

Third Incident: Special Agents Soliciting Prostitutes and Attending Sex

Parties............................................................................................... 12

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS......................................................... 22

Conclusion ......................................................................................... 22

Recommendations............................................................................... 22

APPENDIX 1: DEA’S POLICY FOR PROMOTION OF EMPLOYEES WITH

ADVERSE ACTIONS .................................................................. 23

APPENDIX 2: DEA’S INTEGRITY CHECK PROCESS............................................ 26

APPENDIX 3: OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPONENT VETTING POLICIES FOR

FAVORABLE PERSONNEL ACTIONS ............................................. 28

APPENDIX 4: DEA’S RESPONSE TO THE FINAL DRAFT REPORT.......................... 29

APPENDIX 5: OIG ANALYSIS OF DEA’S RESPONSE .......................................... 32


 INTRODUCTION

Background
The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG) March
2015 Review of the Handling of Sexual Harassment and Misconduct Allegations in
the Law Enforcement Components described the security, reporting, investigation,
and adjudication of sexual harassment and misconduct allegations in the
Department’s four law enforcement components. 3 As part of our review, we
examined the circumstances of 14 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
employees involved in 3 incidents of sexual misconduct investigated between 2005
and 2012.
Following our review, the Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform asked the OIG to determine
whether any promotions, bonuses, awards, or new job assignments were given to
the DEA personnel involved in the three incidents described in our report. The DEA
provided the OIG with information and documents regarding promotions, bonuses,
awards, and transfers received for the 14 subjects of these investigations. The OIG
reviewed the material to determine whether the personnel actions were consistent
with DEA policy and procedures.
DEA Disciplinary Process
The DEA internal disciplinary process is carried out at three levels: (1) the
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), (2) the Board of Professional Conduct
(HRB), and (3) the DEA Deciding Officials. DEA OPR investigates misconduct, while
the HRB and the Deciding Officials, respectively, propose and render discipline
decisions.
When a misconduct allegation is made against a DEA employee, the
Associate Deputy Chief Inspector within OPR assigns the case to an Inspector for
investigation. 4 The Inspector gathers evidence and conducts interviews. If the
3

U.S. Department of Justice OIG, Review of the Handling of Sexual Harassment and
Misconduct Allegations by the Department’s Law Enforcement Components, Evaluation and
Inspections Report 15-04 (March 2015).
4

Although the DEA has an internal disciplinary process, all non-frivolous allegations of
criminal wrongdoing or serious administrative misconduct by Department employees, including DEA
employees, must be reported to the OIG. The OIG generally will investigate all allegations of criminal
or serious administrative misconduct or misconduct by high-ranking employees or others in which the
impartiality of a component’s internal investigation might be open to question. For the cases the OIG
investigates, it issues a final report of investigation that is provided to the component to be used as
the basis for the component’s disciplinary decision.
See generally 28 C.F.R. Parts 0 and 45, which require the law enforcement components to
refer all non-frivolous allegations of employee misconduct to the OIG. See also the Inspector General
Act of 1978, as amended, 5 U.S.C. App § 8(E) (b) (2), providing the Inspector General the authority
to investigate any Department employee misconduct.

1


 assigned Inspector determines there is no indication of misconduct, or that the DEA
employee was not involved, the matter is administratively closed and sent back to
the referring DEA field office for any additional action that may be warranted. If a
full investigation is warranted, the assigned Inspector will gather additional
evidence, conduct interviews, and complete a final report of investigation. The
Associate Deputy Chief Inspector and the Deputy Chief Inspector review the report
and make any necessary changes.
Once the report is reviewed and approved, it is sent to the HRB. The HRB
reviews the report of investigation, drafts a proposal letter, and issues it to the
employee. The proposal letter describes the alleged conduct, the proposed penalty,
and the right of the employee to provide an oral or written statement prior to
discipline being imposed. Once the proposal letter is issued, a DEA Deciding Official
reviews the proposal letter, the report of investigation, oral or written statements
from the employee, and the Douglas Factors to determine the appropriate penalty
to be imposed. 5 At the close of the review, the Deciding Official issues a decision
letter to the employee. DEA employees have a right to grieve a suspension of
14 days or less with the official designated in the decision letter or to appeal a
suspension of 15 days or more to the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). 6
DEA Policy on Significant Misconduct and Its Effect on Personnel Actions
On May 28, 2002, the DEA formalized its policy regarding when an employee
may be promoted, receive an award, or receive a favorable personnel action after
having been disciplined for misconduct. 7 According to the DEA policy
memorandum, the DEA generally would continue its prior practice of requiring a 3­
year waiting period from the time an employee is disciplined for “significant
misconduct” before that employee can be promoted, transferred, or given an award
or other favorable personnel action. In the memorandum, the DEA abandoned the
prior definition of “significant misconduct” that required a suspension of 14 days or
more in favor of a more “pragmatic” definition requiring a 3-year waiting period
following discipline for “misconduct that is of such a nature that would create
questions as to whether or not the person could function properly in the new
position, and/or is of such significant issue to the agency that to take the action
would be inconsistent with the best interest of the agency and/or its mission.”

5

Under civil service laws, 12 factors, known as the Douglas Factors, should be considered in
determining the appropriateness of a disciplinary penalty. See Douglas v. Veterans Administration,
5 MSPB 313 (1981).
6

The MSPB is an independent, quasi-judicial agency of the Executive Branch established by
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1978, which was codified by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA),
Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (CSRA) (1978). The CSRA authorized the MSPB to hear appeals of
various agency decisions, most of which are appeals from agencies’ adverse employment actions.
7

See John B. Brown III, Deputy Administrator, memorandum to All SACs [Special Agents in
Charge] and Office Heads, Policy for Promotion of Employees with Adverse Actions (FFS 570-10),
May 28, 2002 (Appendix 1).

2


 The memorandum describes several factors for DEA managers to consider in
determining whether misconduct is significant. These include when the offense and
discipline occurred, whether the offense involved integrity or sexual harassment
issues, whether the misconduct affected the employee’s position, whether the
misconduct occurred during on-duty or off-duty hours, and whether the employee
was a supervisor or manager.
The DEA policy also states that if an employee is found to be under an
ongoing OPR investigation, the proposed personnel action will be held “in abeyance”
until the disciplinary process is completed. According to the policy, an ongoing OPR
investigation includes an ongoing investigation, an investigation being drafted, and
an investigation still under consideration by the HRB or the Deciding Officials. The
policy permits an exception if the OPR investigation has progressed sufficiently to
allow DEA officials to make a determination as to the likely outcome of the specific
case. DEA officials told us that an investigation is considered closed upon the
issuance of the final decision letter.
For the purposes of this review, the OIG did not independently evaluate the
3-year waiting period or how it compared with the policies and procedures of the
other law enforcement components. 8 (For informational purposes, we describe our
understanding of the latter in Appendix 3.)
DEA Integrity Check Process
DEA officials proposing favorable personnel actions are also responsible for
ensuring that an “integrity check” is conducted for, among other things, all
promotions, bonuses, awards, foreign assignments, tour extensions, and
exemptions to mandatory retirement. The DEA office proposing a favorable
personnel action must submit an integrity check request to OPR, the HRB, and the
Human Resources Employee Relations Unit (HRER), which are each responsible for
receiving the requests and querying their databases to determine whether the
employee was subject to disciplinary action or pending disciplinary action within the
previous 3 years.
We learned from the DEA Office of Chief Counsel that if an employee is found
to be under an ongoing OPR investigation during the integrity check process, the
proposed favorable personnel action will be held in abeyance until the completion of
the disciplinary process. If the Deputy Chief Inspector or the HRB Chairman
8

We asked a DEA official when the 3-year waiting period for a favorable personnel action
begins when an employee has been previously disciplined for “significant misconduct.” We were told
that the period begins from the date of the decision letter but that the final decision maker, the Chief
Inspector, has “latitude” in determining when the period begins based on the policy memorandum. By
contrast, the former Associate Deputy Chief Inspector for DEA OPR told us that in his view, the 3-year
waiting period begins from the date of the offense. Based on this information, there seems to be a
lack of consistency in the understanding among DEA personnel responsible for making these
determinations as to when the waiting period begins. For the purposes of our review, we calculated
the inception of the 3-year waiting period from the date of the decision letter.

3


 determines there is no indication of misconduct on the part of the employee, that
information is referred to the HRER and the favorable personnel action is approved,
provided the HRER has approved the action as well. 9
If the integrity check reveals that the employee was disciplined within
3 years, the request is forwarded to the appropriate Assistant Administrator for a
recommendation. The recommendation is then referred to the Chief Inspector, who
makes the final decision on whether to approve or disapprove the proposed
personnel action. Appendix 2 contains a more detailed discussion of this process
and the vetting process the other law enforcement components use when a
favorable personnel action is proposed. 10
Scope and Methodology of the OIG Review
We did not undertake a formal evaluation of the DEA’s integrity check
process in this review. Instead, in response to the congressional request, we
focused on the results of the integrity checks for proposed bonuses, awards, and
other favorable personnel actions for the DEA employees who were involved in the
incidents described in our prior report to determine the extent of such actions and
whether they were consistent with DEA policy.
In order to conduct this review, we obtained and considered information from
the DEA about each respective action for the period between initiation of the
misconduct investigation and April 21, 2015. For each proposed action, we
examined the results of the database queries conducted by DEA personnel in OPR,
HRB, and HRER during the integrity check process; the recommendations of various
DEA officials on whether to approve or disapprove the proposed action; and the
final decision of the Chief Inspector when an employee had been disciplined within
3 years of the award proposal. 11 We also reviewed the DEA’s policy regarding the
approval of certain personnel actions when an employee is the subject of an OPR
investigation or has received a disciplinary action. Finally, we interviewed DEA
officials to obtain an understanding of the integrity check process and their
recollection of specific award decisions discussed in our report.

9

While holding a personnel action "in abeyance" may be a HRER policy, as a practical matter,
the Deputy Chief Inspector recommends either approval or disapproval.
10

In December 2013, the DEA instituted an electronic Integrity Check Application system.
This system is capable of indefinitely retaining integrity checks with related and supporting
documentation.
11

In most cases, the integrity check information the DEA provided to the OIG was
incomplete. In addition, there were several instances in which the DEA told us it could not provide the
information we requested because the information did not exist. Therefore, the OIG was unable to
fully review all of the integrity check results and the basis for the recommendations and decisions DEA
officials made to approve or disapprove a request. The results we report represent the best
conclusions we were able to draw based on the existing and available information.

4


 RESULTS OF THE REVIEW

None of the 14 DEA Employees Involved in the 3 Misconduct Incidents
Described in Our Report Received Promotions; But in 10 Instances, 8 of the
14 Employees Received Bonuses or Awards Contrary to DEA Policy
In the 2015 report on the handling of sexual harassment and misconduct
allegations by the Department’s law enforcement components, the OIG reviewed
three misconduct cases involving 14 subjects. For this review, we requested
promotion, bonus, and award information and documents for each of the
14 employees.
Our review found there were 20 award requests made in connection with the
14 individuals described in our report. Although none of the 14 individuals received
promotions, we found that in 10 instances, 8 employees received bonuses, awards,
or other favorable personnel actions, contrary to DEA policy. We also found
three instances in which there was no documentation reflecting the basis for going
forward with a favorable personnel action under these circumstances and
seven instances in which the DEA followed policy for these employees.
The eight employees who received awards were subjects in an ongoing OPR
investigation in which the offenses involved integrity and/or sexual harassment
issues, with some of the employees serving as supervisors and managers. In many
instances, we could not determine the reason why exceptions were made and we
were unable to determine when, or if, an integrity check was performed, the results
of the integrity check, or the reason for the approval of the proposed personnel
action, because the DEA was unable to provide the OIG with complete
documentation.
Finally, we found that one of the 14 individuals is now retired from the DEA,
two individuals remain in the same overseas positions they were in at the time of
the incidents, and the 11 remaining employees are currently agents or supervisory
agents assigned to various DEA offices. We discuss each DEA case in more detail
below.
First Incident: Special Agents Involved in Patronizing Prostitutes and
Frequenting a Brothel while Assigned Overseas
As we described in our previous report, a Regional Director, an Acting
Assistant Regional Director, and a Group Supervisor failed to report through their
chain of command or to OPR repeated allegations (between 2005 and 2009) that
DEA Special Agents serving as Criminal Investigators patronized prostitutes and
frequented a brothel while posted overseas. In addition, one of the subjects
allegedly assaulted a prostitute following a payment dispute. In August 2009, the
State Department Regional Security Officer notified the Regional Director about this
incident. At the time, the supervisors treated these allegations as local
management issues.
5


 In June 2010, the allegations were ultimately reported to OPR through an
anonymous letter. OPR initiated an investigation on June 7, 2010, identifying two
subjects (the two agents); an additional subject, the Regional Director, was named
in October 2010. OPR completed the investigation on April 7, 2011, and forwarded
the investigative case file through the DEA disciplinary system. Ultimately, one
agent received a 14-day suspension, the Regional Director was counseled by the
DEA Administrator and Deputy Administrator, and the other agent was cleared.
Although none of these individuals received promotions during the period
between initiation of the misconduct investigation in 2010 and the time we
requested this information from DEA, we determined that all three individuals
received performance awards. The amount of the awards ranged from $1,500 to
almost $32,000.
We discuss below the performance awards each individual received, the
dates related to the investigation process, the integrity check process, and the
results of the integrity checks the DEA conducted.
Regional Director (Subject 1)
As described in our prior report, the Regional Director failed to report to OPR
allegations concerning his subordinates’ (Agent 1 and Agent 2, discussed below)
involvement with prostitutes at government-leased quarters, as DEA policy
required. Instead of reporting the allegations to OPR, the Regional Director treated
the allegations as a local management issue. OPR officials told us that the Regional
Director was orally counseled by both the DEA Administrator and Deputy
Administrator for failing to report these serious allegations.
DEA officials informed us that counseling does not constitute formal
discipline. According to the DEA’s Personnel Manual, counseling or “oral
admonishment” consists of a face-to-face meeting where the supervisor puts the
employee on notice about his misconduct, describes management expectations, and
warns the employee about the consequences of failing to correct the behavior. An
oral admonishment is non-grievable, and any records relating to the admonishment
are not filed in the employee’s official personnel folder (OPF). Since a record of an
oral admonishment or counseling is not maintained in an employee’s OPF, it would
not be considered in determining whether the employee is eligible for a favorable
personnel action. 12
The DEA also told us that it was unable to provide us with any documents
that reflect when the counseling session occurred with the Regional Director, the
DEA Administrator, and the Deputy Administrator, or what matters they discussed.
Given the gravity of the allegations, and the importance of keeping records related
to misconduct reviews, we are concerned that the DEA was unable to provide any

12

According to the DEA Personnel Manual, section 2752.4.B.1.

6


 written documentation confirming that the counseling occurred and the substance
of the counseling. 13
According to the limited information the DEA provided, OPR concluded its
investigation in April 2011. Other than a counseling session, the Regional Director
was not disciplined for failing to report these allegations to OPR. Thus, because the
DEA does not consider “counseling” to constitute formal discipline, it appears that
the DEA’s policy generally requiring a 3-year waiting period before an award or
promotion can be given to an employee disciplined for “significant misconduct” did
not apply to the Regional Director.
During the time period between October 2010, when the Regional Director
was named a subject in the OPR investigation, and April 2014, approximately when
the 3-year waiting period would have expired had the DEA considered the Regional
Director’s actions “significant misconduct,” the Regional Director received four
performance awards: three Senior Executive Service (SES) bonus awards and one
SES Meritorious Executive Rank award. 14 In total, these four awards totaled
approximately $68,600. 15
The DEA was unable to provide complete information related to any integrity
checks conducted for these awards. However, the Acting Chief Inspector
responsible for reviewing this award request told us that he “never received
information on the adjudication [for failure to report allegations], nor approved or
disapproved an integrity check for the Regional Director’s SES bonus award in
December 2011.” Moreover, since the Regional Director was not subject to formal
discipline, it is doubtful that anything adverse would have been reflected in such
checks based on the counseling he received following the underlying incident.
Table 1 illustrates the timeline of the misconduct investigation and the personnel
actions that the DEA considered for the Regional Director.

13

SES employees are not subject to the disciplinary system. The Board of Professional
Conduct (HRB) would not be responsible for SES discipline and would not have access to disciplinary
information in regard to an integrity check for an SES employee.
14

The DEA could not provide the OIG with an exact date of when the Regional Director was
named the subject of the OPR investigation. Based on the DEA’s review of its documents on this case,
the DEA hypothesized that the date was on or about October 2010.
15
Although the DEA indicated that the investigation involving the Regional Director concluded
in April 2011, the DEA was unable to provide information regarding when he received oral counseling
from the DEA Administrator and Deputy Administrator. Therefore, we included in Table 1 the
December 2011 bonus he received. In addition, the Regional Director received a May 2013 bonus
($31,938.80) and a February 2014 bonus ($12,163) outside the period of ineligibility. These awards
were not in violation of DEA policy because the DEA did not consider the Regional Director’s conduct
“significant misconduct.” Had the DEA considered the Regional Director’s conduct “significant
misconduct,” he would not have been eligible for an award until April 2014.

7


 Table 1

Regional Director Awards Timeline

Date
October 2010

April 4, 2011
Unknown Dates

December 3, 2011
Source: DEA

Event
The Regional Director is named a subject of an ongoing OPR
investigation.
The period of ineligibility for a favorable personnel action begins.
OPR completes its investigation and prepares a summary
memorandum from the Acting Chief Inspector to the DEA
Administrator for review.
The Deputy DEA Administrator and DEA Administrator counsel the
Regional Director.
The period of ineligibility ends.
The Regional Director receives an SES bonus award of $12,000.

The Regional Director presently serves the DEA at the same overseas office.
Agent 1 (Subject 2)
This Special Agent, who served in an office overseen by the Regional
Director, was one of the Special Agents alleged to have patronized prostitutes and
frequented brothels while in an overseas posting. He ultimately received a letter of
clearance on this matter. During the period between when Agent 1 was named the
subject of an OPR investigation on June 7, 2010, and January 19, 2012, he received
one performance award of $2,000 and was nominated for two other awards.
Table 2 illustrates the timeline of the misconduct investigation and the personnel
actions that the DEA considered for Agent 1.
Table 2

Agent 1 Awards Timeline

Date
June 7, 2010
July 4, 2010
January 2011

March 30, 2011
April 7, 2011
November 14, 2011
January 19, 2012
Source: DEA

Event
Agent 1 is named a subject of an OPR investigation.
The period of ineligibility for a favorable personnel action begins.
Agent 1 receives a performance award of $2,000.
An integrity check is conducted prior to the OPR investigation.
Agent 1’s name is submitted for an Administrator’s Group Award.
The request appears to have been disapproved by at least one of
the three offices that conducted the integrity checks. We found no
evidence indicating that Agent 1 received this award.
Agent 1 is nominated for a group award from an outside agency.
The DEA provided no information showing that Agent 1 received this
award.
OPR completes its investigation and forwards its report to the HRB.
The HRB issues a proposal letter for a letter of clearance.
A final decision letter is issued. Agent 1 receives a letter of
clearance.
The period of ineligibility ends.

8

 For the July 4, 2010, performance award, DEA policy required that the
proposed personnel action be held in abeyance until the completion of the OPR
investigation, absent a finding that the OPR investigation had progressed
sufficiently to allow DEA officials to make a determination as to the likely outcome
of the case. However, we found that the DEA conducted the integrity check on
Agent 1 in January 2010, which well pre-dated the initiation of the misconduct
investigation. Consequently, Agent 1’s status as a subject of the misconduct
investigation was not identified during the integrity check process.
When we asked for more information regarding the July 2010 award request,
the DEA was unable to provide any further explanation. We believe that the DEA
should consider conducting integrity checks in closer proximity to the date the
favorable personnel action is issued to ensure that employees are not given awards
while they are subjects of an investigation that has not progressed sufficiently for
DEA officials to determine the likely outcome.
For the January 2011 award request, OPR recommended disapproval and
noted the ongoing investigation in the case file. The Deputy Chief Inspector who
reviewed this award request told us he disapproved this award because of the
ongoing investigation. We found no evidence indicating that Agent 1 received this
award. OPR recommended approval of the March 2011 award request, while noting
in the case file the ongoing investigation on Agent 1, which was completed 1 week
later. However, the DEA stated that it had no information that Agent 1 actually
received this award. 16 Agent 1 is currently assigned to a DEA office in the United
States.
Agent 2 (Subject 3)
Agent 2 is the other Special Agent who served in an office overseen by the
Regional Director and was alleged to have patronized prostitutes and frequented
brothels while in an overseas posting. In addition, Agent 2 allegedly entertained
prostitutes at his government-leased quarters on a frequent basis and on one
occasion reportedly assaulted a prostitute. Agent 2 served a 14-day suspension for
his actions. During the period beginning June 7, 2010, when Agent 2 was named
the subject of an OPR investigation, to January 19, 2015, when the 3-year waiting
period expired following the imposition of discipline, he received one performance
award of $1,500. Table 3 illustrates the timeline of the misconduct investigation
and the personnel action that the DEA considered for Agent 2.

16

In addition, Agent 1 received an Attorney General’s Distinguished Service Award (April
2013), a $2000 performance award (June 2013), and a quality step increase (May 2014).

9


 Table 3

Agent 2 Awards Timeline

Date
June 7, 2010

Event
Agent 2 is named a subject of an OPR investigation.

July 4, 2010

The period of ineligibility for a favorable personnel action begins.
Agent 2 receives a performance award of $1,500.

April 7, 2011
November 14, 2011
January 19, 2012

Source: DEA

An integrity check is conducted prior to the OPR investigation.
OPR completes its investigation and forwards its report to the HRB
for review.
The HRB issues a proposal letter for a 14-day suspension.
A final decision letter is issued. Agent 2 served a 14-day
suspension.
Ineligibility expired on January 19, 2015.

Agent 2 received a performance award while he was the subject of an
ongoing misconduct investigation, which should not have occurred pursuant to DEA
policy. We found that this occurred because the integrity check for the
performance award was completed in January 2010, predating Agent 2’s status as a
subject of the unrelated OPR investigation. The Deputy Chief Inspector at the time
confirmed that the integrity check for this award request was conducted 5 months
prior to issuance of the award. As noted above, we believe the DEA should
consider conducting integrity checks in closer proximity to the issuance of a
favorable personnel action. Agent 2 is currently assigned to another DEA office in
the United States.
Second Incident: Assistant Regional Director’s Harassment of a Foreign
Service National
In this case, the DEA received a complaint through the Department of State,
Diplomatic Security Service, regarding an Assistant Regional Director (ARD) in an
overseas Country Office. According to the report of investigation, a Foreign Service
National who served as the ARD’s Assistant alleged that between January 2009 and
May 2010, the ARD made numerous inappropriate sexual comments; asked the
Assistant to watch pornographic movies; and, among other allegations, routinely
threw items, yelled at employees, and used other vulgarities in the office and at
official functions. As a result of the misconduct investigation, the ARD received a
letter of reprimand. 17
During the period beginning May 10, 2010, when the ARD was named the
subject of the OPR investigation, to October 26, 2014, when the 3-year period
following the issuance of the letter of reprimand expired, he received one

17

According to the DEA Personnel Manual, section 2752.4.C.2., a letter of reprimand must be
filed in the employee’s OPF and remain there for a period not to exceed 2 years.

10


 performance award of $5,000. Table 4 illustrates the timeline of the misconduct
investigation and the personnel action that the DEA considered for the ARD.
Table 4

ARD Awards Timeline

Date
May 10, 2010
September 29, 2010
May 8, 2011

June 20, 2011
October 26, 2011

Source: DEA

Event
The ARD is named the subject of an OPR investigation.
The period of ineligibility for a favorable personnel action begins.
OPR completes its investigation and forwards its report to the HRB
for review.
The ARD receives a performance award of $5,000.
The ARD receives a performance award while the subject of an
ongoing investigation.
The HRB issues a proposal letter for a letter of reprimand.
A final decision letter is issued. The ARD receives a letter of
reprimand.
Ineligibility expired on October 26, 2014.

The ARD received the performance award from the Acting Regional Director
of the overseas office at which he worked for performance unrelated to the
misconduct under investigation while the HRB was determining what discipline to
propose in that matter. According to the documents the DEA provided to the OIG,
OPR approved the request but noted that there was an open investigation on the
ARD. The Deputy Chief Inspector at the time, who approved this award request,
told us “the integrity check was probably approved because of the time taken to
adjudicate the case upon it being forwarded to HRB. I can only guess that a
conversation may have occurred between me and the former HRB Chairman as to
the ‘likely’ outcome of the investigation which was a letter of reprimand.”
Although the investigation of this case took approximately 1 year, there is
nothing in the policy memorandum to indicate that the amount of time for an
investigation to be completed is a relevant factor to be considered when
determining whether to approve an award request while an employee is a subject in
an ongoing investigation. The “likely” outcome of a letter of reprimand for conduct
amounting to sexual harassment, especially given the ARD’s supervisory position,
would not have made him eligible for an award in any event. 18 Therefore, it
appears that the ARD’s receipt of a performance award while he was the subject of
an ongoing OPR investigation involving “integrity and sexual harassment issues”
was inconsistent with DEA policy and the ARD’s performance award should have
been held in abeyance. The ARD is still serving in that position at the same
overseas Country Office.

18

The DEA confirmed to the OIG that a letter of reprimand constitutes formal discipline.

11


 Third Incident: Special Agents Soliciting Prostitutes and Attending Sex
Parties
In this case, former host-country police officers alleged that numerous DEA
employees formerly assigned to an overseas office solicited prostitutes and engaged
in other serious misconduct while abroad from 2001 to 2004. During this period,
the foreign police officer allegedly arranged “sex parties” with prostitutes at their
government-leased quarters. DEA OPR began its investigation in February 2010.
DEA OPR identified 10 of these employees as subjects of the investigation.
Seven of the subjects received suspensions ranging from 1 to 10 days; one subject
was cleared of all wrongdoing; another received a letter of caution; and the
remaining subject retired before the investigation was completed. 19
Based on our review, we determined that between the initiation of the OPR
investigation in 2010 through the 3-year period of ineligibility following the
imposition of the suspensions, none of the subjects received promotions but 5 of
the 10 individuals received performance awards and/or a time-off award. The
monetary awards ranged from $1,900 to $4,500. The time-off award of 40 hours
of paid leave was given to a General Schedule (GS)-13 level employee. By 2010,
all of the subjects of the investigation were no longer working at the overseas office
where the misconduct allegedly occurred and the favorable personnel actions that
were subsequently proposed were for performance unrelated to the misconduct.
The subjects who received formal discipline decisions on March 31, 2014, would be
ineligible for a favorable personnel action for 3 years following this date if the DEA
had considered their conduct to be “significant misconduct.”
We discuss below the performance awards and the time-off award that seven
of the DEA employees received, the dates related to the investigation process and
the integrity check process, and the results of the integrity checks the DEA
conducted.
Group Supervisor (GS) 2 (Subject 1)
This employee was a Supervisory Special Agent who ultimately served a
3-day suspension for the misconduct discussed above. He was named a subject of
the OPR investigation on June 8, 2010, and the 3-year period of ineligibility
following the issuance of his final suspension letter in March 2014 will expire on
March 31, 2017. During this period, he received one performance award of $2,500
for conduct unrelated to the subject of the misconduct investigation. The following
table illustrates the timeline of the misconduct investigation and the personnel
action that the DEA considered for GS 2.
19

One of the subjects of the allegations (Agent 3) who received a 1-day suspension did not
receive any awards, bonuses, or other favorable personnel actions during the period we examined and
thus is not discussed below. For the subject who retired under investigation (Group Supervisor
(GS) 1), the DEA stated, “There are no records to indicate GS 1 was submitted or received any awards
after being named a subject.” The subject who was cleared of all wrongdoing (Agent 4) received a
performance award for $3,000 on March 22, 2015, outside the period of ineligibility.

12


 Table 5

GS 2 Awards Timeline

Date
June 8, 2010

Event
GS 2 is named a subject of an OPR investigation.

June 3, 2012

The period of ineligibility for a favorable personnel action begins.
GS 2 receives a performance award of $2,500.

February 5, 2013
August 15, 2013
March 31, 2014

Source: DEA

GS 2 receives a performance award while the subject of an ongoing
OPR investigation.
OPR completes its investigation and forwards its report to the HRB
for review.
The HRB issues a proposal letter for a 5-day suspension.
A final decision letter is issued. The proposed 5-day suspension is
mitigated to a 3-day suspension. GS 2 served a 3-day suspension.
Ineligibility will expire on March 31, 2017.

On June 3, 2012, GS 2 received a performance award of $2,500. Although
OPR recommended disapproval, the HRER recommended approving the award.
According to DEA policy, the Chief Inspector makes the final decision regarding the
approval or disapproval of a performance award. 20 In this case, the Acting Chief
Inspector disapproved the award and the case file contained information supporting
that decision. The Acting Chief Inspector told us that the performance award was
disapproved because of GS 2’s admissions during an interview with OPR regarding
the ongoing investigation. Nevertheless, GS 2 received the award over the Acting
Chief Inspector’s objection; there was no documentation in the file to explain why
this occurred.
The Acting Chief Inspector also told us that he could “only guess that the
award was granted based on the approved integrity check by HR[ER].” We
concluded that issuing a performance award to GS 2 while he was the subject of an
ongoing OPR investigation was inconsistent with DEA policy. There is no evidence
that DEA officials believed that the outcome of the investigation would be favorable
to GS 2 at the time, which would have been inconsistent with their ultimate
decision to impose a 3-day suspension. GS 2 is currently a supervisor assigned to
a DEA office in the United States.
GS 3 (Subject 2)
GS 3 was a Supervisory Special Agent who received a letter of caution on
March 31, 2014. 21 During the period beginning June 8, 2010, when GS 3 was
20

See John B. Brown III, Deputy Administrator, memorandum to All SACs [Special Agents in
Charge] and Office Heads, Policy for Promotion of Employees with Adverse Actions (FFS 570-10),
May 28, 2002, 2 (Appendix 1).
21

According to the DEA Personnel Manual, section 2752.4.C.1., a letter of caution, signed by
the Deciding Official, is the most minor form of discipline. The letter of caution provides the reasons
for the reprimand in enough detail so that a reasonable person would understand the basis for the
(Cont’d.)

13


 named a subject of the misconduct investigation, until the matter was resolved
when he received a non-disciplinary letter of caution on March 31, 2014, he
received three performance awards, totaling $8,400, for conduct unrelated to the
subject matter of the misconduct investigation. Table 6 illustrates the timeline of
the misconduct investigation and the personnel actions that the DEA considered for
GS 3.
Table 6

GS 3 Awards Timeline

Date
June 8, 2010

Event
GS 3 is named a subject of an OPR investigation.

August 1, 2010

The period of ineligibility for a favorable personnel action begins.
GS 3 receives a performance award of $2,000.

February 16, 2011

GS 3 receives a performance award while the subject of an ongoing
OPR investigation.
GS 3 receives a performance award of $1,900.

August 11, 2013

GS 3 receives a performance award while the subject of an ongoing
OPR investigation.
OPR completes its investigation and forwards its report to the HRB
for review.
GS 3 receives a performance award of $4,500.

August 14, 2013
March 31, 2014

GS 3 receives a performance award while the subject of an ongoing
investigation.
The HRB issues a proposal letter for a letter of caution.
A final decision letter is issued. GS 3 receives a letter of caution.

February 5, 2013

Source: DEA

The period of ineligibility ends.

Both the August 1, 2010, performance award of $2,000 and the February 16,
2011, performance award of $1,900 were approved while the misconduct
investigation was still ongoing. The DEA told the OIG that it was unable to provide
the complete integrity check information related to these two matters. The limited
information the DEA provided showed that for the August 1, 2010, award, OPR
recommended approval even though it noted the ongoing investigation of GS 3.
The Acting Chief Inspector told us GS 3 may have received the award while under
investigation because his name might not have been entered as a subject in DEA
OPR’s misconduct database until sometime after the completion of the initial
integrity check.
The DEA was unable to provide any information on whether an integrity
check for the February 16, 2011, award request was conducted. However, the
Acting Chief Inspector speculated that based on witness statements, interviews,
and other information learned during the OPR investigation, he may have
anticipated that GS 3 would be cleared or would receive a letter of caution. Thus,
action. The letter is not filed in the employee’s OPF, and, the DEA stated, does not constitute formal
discipline.

14

 he believes he approved the integrity check based on the “likely” outcome of the
investigation.
We were unable to confirm whether all of the required DEA officials
conducted integrity checks for these two award requests and, if so, what they
recommended in light of the DEA’s policy, which proscribes performance awards
during pending misconduct investigations unless a favorable outcome is likely. In
light of the ongoing investigation, the OIG determined that the awards appear to be
inconsistent with DEA policy. OPR did not complete its portion of the investigation
and submit its report to the HRB for a final decision on disciplinary action until
February 5, 2013.
Based on the information the DEA provided for the August 2013 award, it
appeared that some of the integrity checks were completed in late June 2013. By
then, the HRB was reviewing OPR’s report of investigation on this matter.
According to the information the DEA provided to the OIG, OPR recommended
approval based on the HRB’s records that noted the HRB was proposing a clearance
letter for GS 3. However, the HRB eventually proposed that GS 3 be given a letter
of caution (which in any event was not considered discipline), rather than a letter of
clearance, for this matter. The file also shows that the HRER recommended
approval of the award request. The Acting Deputy Chief Inspector told us that he
spoke with the HRB Chairman on June 23, 2013, regarding this integrity check and
approved the request based on the likely outcome that GS 3 would be cleared.
On these facts, we concluded that the August 2013 performance award did
not appear to be inconsistent with the DEA’s policy because it appears that the HRB
did not anticipate formal discipline in GS 3’s case, as confirmed by the subsequently
issued letter of caution. However, this conclusion would be more certain had DEA
OPR and the HRB kept better documentation of the decision-making process. 22
GS 3 is currently a supervisor assigned to a DEA office in the United States.
Agent 5 (Subject 3)
Agent 5 was a Supervisory Special Agent involved in this matter. He served
an 8-day suspension as a result of the misconduct he was found to have
committed. Agent 5 was identified as a subject of an OPR investigation on June 8,
2010, and the 3-year period of ineligibility following imposition of his suspension
will expire on March 31, 2017. During this period, he received one performance
award of $2,000 in 2011 and the DEA disapproved two other proposed awards, in
2013 and 2014, all of which were for conduct unrelated to the subject of the
22
In addition, on May 18, 2014, and April 19, 2015, GS 3 received performance awards for
$4,500 and $5,000, respectively. He received these awards outside the period of ineligibility, which
we found ended on March 31, 2014. According to the file, although the integrity check request for the
May 2014 performance award was made on March 13, 2014, before the period of ineligibility ended,
by that time, DEA officials knew that GS 3 was not going to receive formal discipline. Consequently,
the HRER and the Assistant Administrator recommended approval and the Chief Inspector made the
final decision to approve the May 2014 award request. The 2015 award was well beyond the period of
ineligibility.

15


 misconduct investigation. Table 7 illustrates the timeline of the misconduct
investigation and the personnel actions that the DEA considered for Agent 5.
Table 7
Agent 5 Awards Timetable
Date
June 8, 2010

Event
Agent 5 is named a subject of an OPR investigation.

April 10, 2011

The period of ineligibility for a favorable personnel action begins.
Agent 5 receives a performance award of $2,000.

February 5, 2013
June 2013
August 14, 2013
March 13, 2014
March 31, 2014

Source: DEA

Agent 5 receives performance award while the subject of an ongoing
OPR investigation.
OPR completes its investigation and forwards its report to the HRB
for review.
Agent 5 is disapproved for an award. The DEA could not provide
any information regarding the office that disapproved the award.
The HRB issues a proposal letter for a 14-day suspension.
Agent 5 is disapproved for a proposed performance award. The DEA
could not provide any information regarding the office that
disapproved the award.
A final decision letter is issued. The proposed 14-day suspension is
mitigated to an 8-day suspension. Agent 5 served an 8-day
suspension.
Ineligibility will expire on March 31, 2017.

The DEA said it was unable to provide all of the information or documents
related to the integrity checks it conducted for the April 2011 performance award.
According to the documents the DEA was able to provide to the OIG, Agent 5 was
still a subject of the ongoing investigation when the integrity check was conducted
on this matter, though OPR recommended approval of the award request.
However, the DEA was unable to provide information regarding the integrity check
results, if any, conducted by the HRB and HRER. The Acting Chief Inspector told us
that it appears he approved the integrity check for this award on March 11, 2011,
when the Office Assistant placed the Acting Chief Inspector’s signature stamp on
the integrity check approval and initialed the form. However, the Acting Chief
Inspector never signed the final approval/disapproval form. Since Agent 5 was still
the subject of an ongoing investigation, the performance award should have been
held in abeyance or disapproved and issuance of the award violated the DEA’s
policy.
By contrast, it appears that the two disapproved matters were handled
consistently with the DEA’s policy. According to the information the DEA provided,
OPR recommended disapproval of the June 2013 request because of the ongoing
misconduct investigation unrelated to the performance award. For the March 2014
request that was disapproved, the integrity checks noted the misconduct
investigation and the proposed disciplinary action. The file further shows that the
appropriate Assistant Administrator and Acting Chief Inspector reviewed the matter.
The Assistant Administrator recommended that the award request be approved, but

16


 the Acting Deputy Chief Inspector made the final decision to disapprove it. When
we asked for more information regarding the rationale for this disapproval, the DEA
was unable to provide any further explanation.
In sum, we could not determine why DEA officials approved the 2011 award,
which was inconsistent with the DEA’s policy in light of the ongoing investigation,
and then disapproved the 2013 and 2014 awards, consistent with the DEA’s policy.
Agent 5 is currently a supervisor assigned to a DEA office in the United States.
Agent 6 (Subject 4)
Agent 6 was another Supervisory Special Agent involved in this matter. He
served a 9-day suspension as a result of the misconduct he was found to have
committed. He was named a subject on February 7, 2010, and the 3-year period of
ineligibility following imposition of his suspension will expire on March 31, 2017.
During this period, he received one performance award of $3,000 in January 2011
for conduct unrelated to the subject of the misconduct investigation. In July 2012,
the DEA disapproved another proposed award for Agent 6 for performance that was
also unrelated to the investigation. Table 8 illustrates the timeline of the
misconduct investigation and the personnel actions that the DEA considered for
Agent 6.
Table 8

Agent 6 Awards Timeline

Date
February 17, 2010

Event
Agent 6 is named a subject of an OPR investigation.

January 23, 2011

The period of ineligibility for a favorable personnel action begins.
Agent 6 receives a performance award of $3,000.

July 6, 2012
February 5, 2013
August 15, 2013
March 31, 2014

Source: DEA

Agent 6 receives a performance award while the subject of an
ongoing OPR investigation.
A proposed award is disapproved.
OPR completes its investigation and forwards its report to the HRB
for review.
The HRB issues a proposal letter for a 14-day suspension.
A final decision letter is issued. The proposed 14-day suspension is
mitigated to a 9-day suspension. Agent 6 served a 9-day
suspension.
Ineligibility will expire on March 31, 2017.

Because the DEA was not able to provide the OIG any information or
documents showing integrity checks performed for the January 2011 performance
award of $3,000, we were unable to determine why the DEA gave Agent 6 a
performance award while the misconduct investigation was still ongoing. In
addition, we were unable to determine whether DEA officials conducted integrity
checks and, if so, what they recommended. When we asked for more information
regarding the January 2011 award request, the DEA was unable to provide any
further explanation. Based on the information provided, the approval of the award
17


 appears to be inconsistent with DEA policy, especially considering that the
seriousness of his conduct resulted in a 9-day suspension.
According to the files we received regarding the proposed award the DEA
disapproved on July 6, 2012, OPR recommended disapproval in this case because
Agent 6 was a subject of the ongoing investigation. Therefore, the disapproval of
this award appears to be consistent with DEA policy. Agent 6 is a currently
assigned to a DEA office in the United States.
Agent 7 (Subject 5)
Agent 7 was a GS-13 level Special Agent involved in this matter who served
a 10-day suspension as a result of the misconduct he committed. He was named a
subject of an OPR investigation on June 8, 2010, and the 3-year period of
ineligibility following imposition of his suspension will expire on March 31, 2017.
Even though OPR did not complete the misconduct investigation until February 5,
2013, Agent 7 received a performance award in of $2,000 in February 2011 and a
time-off award of 40 hours in April 2011. Both awards were for performance
unrelated to the subject of the misconduct investigation. The DEA disapproved
another proposed award for Agent 7 in May 2013. Table 9 illustrates the timeline of
the misconduct investigation and the personnel actions that the DEA considered for
Agent 7.
Table 9

Agent 7 Awards Timeline

Date
June 8, 2010

Event
Agent 7 is named a subject of an OPR investigation.

February 27, 2011

The period of ineligibility for a favorable personnel action begins.
Agent 7 receives a performance award of $2,000.

April 10, 2011

Agent 7 receives a performance award while the subject of an
ongoing OPR investigation.
Agent 7 receives a time-off award of 40 hours.

February 5, 2013
May 2013
August 15, 2013
March 31, 2014

Source: DEA

Agent 7 receives a time-off award while the subject of an ongoing
OPR investigation.
OPR completes its investigation and forwards its report to the HRB
for review.
A proposed award is disapproved.
The HRB issues a proposal letter for a 14-day suspension.
A final decision letter is issued. The proposed 14-day suspension is
mitigated to a 10-day suspension. Agent 7 served a 10-day
suspension.
Ineligibility will expire on March 31, 2017.

The files the DEA provided us for these two award requests were incomplete.
According to the files, OPR recommended approval of the February 2011
performance award despite noting the open investigation of Agent 7. The DEA was
unable to provide information showing the HRB’s and the HRER’s integrity check
18

 results. When we asked for more information regarding the February 2011 award
request, the Acting Chief Inspector told us that “the OPR integrity check on Agent 7
should not have been approved. No explanation.”
For the time-off award issued in April 2011, the DEA said it was unable to
provide the OIG the complete integrity check information. The only document the
DEA provided to the OIG contained the HRER’s integrity check results showing its
recommendation to approve the April award. The DEA provided no integrity check
results for OPR or the HRB. We asked the DEA for more information regarding the
April 2011 time-off award, but it was unable to provide any additional information.
Because the DEA was unable to provide to the OIG information for OPR and
the HRB related to whether integrity checks were conducted on the two
performance awards the DEA approved, we were unable to determine why the DEA
gave Agent 7 these two awards despite the ongoing misconduct investigation, the
seriousness of which was confirmed when he eventually received a 10-day
suspension for his actions. Therefore, it appears that the February and April 2011
awards were inconsistent with DEA policy.
For the May 2013 award request, OPR recommended disapproval. Although
the DEA provided limited information regarding this request, based on what was
provided, it appears that the decision to disapprove the May 2013 performance
award was based on the pending investigation, consistent with DEA policy. Agent 7
is currently assigned to a DEA office in the United States.
Although the remaining five DEA employees who were also subjects of this
investigation did not receive any bonuses, awards, or other favorable personnel
actions during this period, DEA officials proposed performance awards for two of the
five individuals. However, the awards were disapproved. We further discuss their
cases below.
Agent 8 (Subject 6)
Agent 8 was a Special Agent at the time of this matter. He received a final
decision letter imposing a 3-day suspension as a result of his actions. He was
identified as a subject of the investigation on June 8, 2010, and the 3-year period
of ineligibility following his suspension will expire on March 31, 2017. During this
period, he did not receive any awards, bonuses, or promotions. Agent 8 was
nominated for an Administrator’s Award for performance unrelated to the subject of
the misconduct investigation. According to the information the DEA provided to the
OIG, OPR recommended disapproval because Agent 8 was a subject of the
investigation. Table 10 illustrates the timeline of the misconduct investigation and
the personnel action that the DEA considered for Agent 8.

19


 Table 10

Agent 8 Awards Timeline

Date
June 8, 2010
January 12, 2011
February 5, 2013
August 14, 2013
March 31, 2014

Event
Agent 8 is named a subject of an OPR investigation.
The period of ineligibility for a favorable personnel action begins.
OPR disapproves a proposed Administrator’s Award for Group
Achievement for Agent 8.
OPR completes its investigation and forwards its report to the HRB
for review.
The issues a proposal letter for a 5-day suspension.
A final decision letter is issued. The proposed 5-day suspension is
mitigated to a 3-day suspension.
Ineligibility will expire on March 31, 2017.

Source: DEA

The DEA stated that it was unable to provide the complete integrity check
information for the award request disapproved in January 2011. According to the
information the DEA provided, OPR recommended disapproval because of the open
OPR investigation. In addition, the Acting Chief Inspector told us that he
disapproved this award request “based on the status of the investigation and
Agent 8’s participation in the misconduct.” Particularly given that Agent 8 received
a 3-day suspension for his actions, this decision appears to be consistent with DEA
policy. Agent 8 is currently assigned to a DEA office in the United States.
Agent 9 (Subject 7)
Agent 9 was a Special Agent involved in this matter who served a 2-day
suspension as result of his misconduct. He was named a subject of the
investigation on January 9, 2013, and the 3-year period of ineligibility following
imposition of his suspension will expire on March 31, 2017. During this period, he
did not receive any awards, bonuses, or promotions. However, he was nominated
for a performance award, for performance unrelated to the subject of the
misconduct investigation, which was ultimately disapproved by the Chief Inspector.
Table 11 illustrates the timeline of the misconduct investigation and the personnel
action that was considered for Agent 9.
Table 11

Agent 9 Award Timeline

Date
March 12, 2013
February 5, 2013
August 14, 2013

Event
Agent 9 is named a subject of an OPR investigation.
The period of ineligibility for a favorable personnel action begins.
OPR completes its investigation and forwards its report to the HRB
for review.
The HRB issues a proposal letter for a 3-day suspension.

20


 Date
March 31, 2014
February 13, 2015
Source: DEA

Event
A final decision letter is issued. The proposed 3-day suspension is
mitigated to a 2-day suspension. Agent 9 served a 2-day
suspension.
Agent 9 is disapproved for a proposed performance award.
Ineligibility will expire on March 31, 2017.

According to the information the DEA provided, on February 1, 2015, a DEA
official proposed a performance award for Agent 9 for performance unrelated to the
subject of the misconduct investigation. According to the file, the HRB integrity
check identified the discipline Agent 9 received in 2014. Despite this, the HRER
recommended approval, with OPR providing no documented recommendation. The
appropriate Assistant Administrator reviewed the proposed award and
recommended that the matter be disapproved. The Chief Inspector thereafter
disapproved the request. It appears that the decision to disapprove the award
request was consistent with DEA policy. 23 Agent 9 is currently assigned to a DEA
office in the United States.

23

In addition to the inconsistent treatment of multiple award requests for the DEA employees
identified above, the OIG also found instances of inconsistent treatment among the DEA employees
found to be involved in the third incident, soliciting prostitutes at their government-leased quarters.
In this particular case, the OIG found that DEA officials approved performance awards for five
employees (Agent 6, GS 3, Agent 7, Agent 5, and GS 2), yet the DEA disapproved an award for one
employee, Agent 8, even though all of the employees were subjects of the same OPR misconduct
investigation during the same period.

21


 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion
The DEA has an established policy and an integrity check process for
determining whether an employee who has committed significant misconduct or is a
subject of an ongoing investigation may receive favorable personnel actions such as
promotions, bonuses, and awards. However, based on our review of the
14 subjects named in 3 misconduct investigations discussed in our March 2015
report, the DEA did not consistently follow its policy or process and failed to
document the rationale for its decisions.
In addition, in many of the cases we reviewed, the DEA was unable to
provide the complete integrity check information. As a result, we could not
determine whether DEA officials conducted the appropriate integrity checks or the
basis for the recommendations and decisions various DEA officials involved in the
integrity check process made on those award requests. Further, DEA officials did
not always document the reasons for approving awards for individuals who were
the subjects of ongoing significant misconduct investigations. Therefore, we could
not determine the basis for the exceptions DEA officials made in approving such
awards.
The DEA’s policy states that employees who are subjects of a significant
ongoing misconduct investigation are not eligible for favorable personnel action
unless DEA officials are able to make a determination as to the likely outcome of
the particular case. However, we found that many employees who received awards
while misconduct investigations were pending were later suspended for their
misconduct, making such a favorable determination very unlikely.
Recommendations
To ensure that the DEA’s policy and integrity check process for approving
favorable personnel actions for employees are consistently followed and applied, we
recommend that:
1. 

DEA management should ensure that DEA officials are fully aware of and
consistently comply with its awards policy for employees who have been
subject to discipline for significant misconduct or who are under investigation
and, if there is a basis for an exception to the policy, that it is clearly
documented.

2. 

DEA officials should consider conducting integrity checks in close proximity to
the issuance of a favorable personnel action to ensure a proposed action is
not issued while an employee is the subject of a misconduct investigation. In
addition, the DEA should retain for 5 years all results of the integrity checks
it conducts, including documentation reflecting final determinations on all
award requests and the rationale therefor.
22


 APPENDIX 1

DEA’S POLICY FOR PROMOTION OF EMPLOYEES

WITH ADVERSE ACTIONS


Me mora nd um

I O.te
I

SubJUI

I

Po licy for Promoti on of Employees
with Adverse Actions
(FFS 570-10)

May 28, 2002

I
I

To

All SACs and Office
Heads
John B. Brown, III
Deputy Administrator
Recently. issues have been raised concerning the lime an employee must wait between a
significant adverse action and the time the employee may be promoted. given an award. or
recei ve other favorable personnel actions. A significant adverse aClion is defined as any
discipline resulting in a suspension of 14 days or more.
Generally speaking, either offi cially or uno ffi ciall y, the agency has been following a "3-year
rule." That policy requires that an employee wait 3 years from the time ofa significam adverse
action until the employee can be promoted, transferred, cIC. Some believe that the 3-year rule is
arbitrary and does not take into accountlhe totality of the circumstances. Others believe the 3yea r rule is necessary, but that the current definition ofa "sign ificam adverse action" is too rigid.
There are cases, especially with minimum mandatory penalties, where a 30-day suspension is
given for behavior that is less egregious than the behavior that may result in a I~-day suspension.
As an example, a person who receives a 30-day suspension based on an unauthorized use of an
OGV, such as going to a movie theater in the OGV. may not be promoted while a person who
gets 10 days for making inappropriate sexual comments to a fell ow employee can be promoted.
To alleviate the concerns raised by our current policy. I am instituting a morc pragmatic method
o f reviewing and approving various personnel actions. In general, the "3-year rule" will apply,
but the term "significant adverse action" will no longer be used and the term "significant
mi sconduct" will be utilized instead. Significant mi sconduct cannot be defined in the same
concrete terms as was significant adverse action, but. in general terms, it is misconduct that is or
such a nature that would create questions as to whether or not the person could function properly

23


 APPENDIX 1


in the new position, andlor is of such significant issue to the agency th at to take the act ion would
be inconsistent with the best interest of the agency and/or its mi ssion.
In determining whether something is signifi cant mi sconduct, the foll ow ing factors should be
consid ered :
I. When did the offense occur?
2. When did the discipline occur?
3. Did the offense in volve integrity or sexual harassment issues?
4. Was the penalty issued based on minimum mandatory penallY?
5. Did the misconduct affect the employee's pos iti on?
6. Did the misconduct occur during duty or off duty hours?
7. Is the employee core or non+core? (Core employees are held to a hi gher standard than non ­
core.) Supervisors and managers are held to a hi gher standard.
These are some of the factors; there cou ld be several others. After careful considerati on of the
person's misconduct, the appropriate offic ial may determine that a person may receive the action.
even though the penalty rece ived was over 14 days.
Ln general, procedurally nothing will change. All actions proposed or considered that currentl y
go through an integrity check will still go through integrity checks. When an emp loyee is found
to be under an active Office of Profess ional Re ponsibility investigation (active in vesti gation
includes those investigations st ill being investi gated, being wrinen up, under considerati on by the
Board of Professional Conduct or Decidin g Official), action will be he ld in abeyance until the
completion of the process. Exceptio ns to tb is provision a re a llowable ir the. in vestigatio n bas
prog ressed sufficie ntly to a llow the Dep uty C hief inspector a ndlor the Chai rm a n of tbe
Board of Professionai Co nd uct a ndlor t he D«id ing O fficia l to ma ke a dete rmin a tion as to
tbe li kely outcome of th e pa r tic ular case. (50-70% of a ll cases e nd with no discip lin e
assessed.)
When an employee is found to have had any di scip line in the past 3 years (any suspension). the
details of that discipl ine wi ll be forwarded along with the proposed personnel action to the
appropriate Assistant Administrator who will render a preliminary decision. The appropriate
official will be the Assistant Administrator for Human Resources for Professional Administrative
Technical Clerical Occupations (PATCO), Assistant Admin istrator for Intelligence (Intelligence
Research Specialists), Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control (Diversion
Investigators), and Assistant Administrator for Operat ions (S pecial Agents), Assistant
Administrator for Operational Support (C hemi sts). The decisions rendered by the Assistant
Administrator will be submitted to the Chief Inspector for the final review. The Deputy
Administrator will make the final decision on all Career Board matters.

ACTIONS COVERE D

24

 APPENDIX 1


1. Domestic Transfers

2. Field Training Nominee

3. Foreign Transfers

4. Promotions (All Job Series)
5. Voluntary Transfers
6. Training Counselor Nominee

7. Awards

8. Exemptions to Mandatory Retirement

25

 APPENDIX 2

DEA’S INTEGRITY CHECK PROCESS
During the time period of this review, the DEA processed integrity checks
using two methods. Prior to December 1, 2013, the integrity check process was
manual. DEA offices transmitted their integrity check requests through e-mail or
fax. The Office of Personnel Responsibility (OPR), the Board of Professional
Conduct (HRB), and the Human Resources Employee Relations Unit (HRER)
searched the names of the proposed award recipients to determine whether they
had pending investigations, discipline within the previous 3 years, performancerelated matters, or performance improvement plans. Approval and disapproval
decisions were similarly transmitted back to the requesting offices.
The current electronic process, known as the Integrity Check Application,
became effective on December 1, 2013. Requesting offices access the Integrity
Check Application through a Concorde program. 24 The requesting office sends an
e-mail notification to OPR, HRB, and HRER personnel. Each office then queries its
respective databases and records to determine whether any relevant information is
identified on the DEA employee for whom the integrity check is being performed.
OPR personnel told the OIG that they go to the web-based OPR Case
Tracking System to identify any relevant information on the employee. OPR
personnel go back 3 years from the date of the integrity check request and identify
employees who received a letter of reprimand or more serious disciplinary action.
In addition, OPR personnel identify any ongoing OPR misconduct investigations. If
any prior discipline (within the previous 3 years) or an ongoing misconduct
investigation is identified, OPR personnel will generally recommend that the
proposed personnel action be placed in a disapproved or pending status. The
recommendation and any supporting documents are forwarded to the Deputy Chief
Inspector for his review and recommendation.
HRB personnel told the OIG that the HRB database is queried for three types
of information: (1) any pending HRB disciplinary matters on the employee, (2) any
adverse discipline (i.e., discipline more severe than a letter of caution) assessed by
the HRB, and (3) any disciplinary actions related to certain types of lost property
incidents. HRB personnel go back 3 years from the date of the integrity check
request to identify any relevant information. If any instances are identified, HRB
personnel recommend that the matter be put on pending status and attach any
relevant documents to the HRB narrative section of the integrity check screen.
HRER personnel told the OIG that three sources are queried during the
HRER’s review. HRER personnel check the HRER’s internal databases, the HRER’s
pending matters, and the Deciding Official’s databases to identify any information
24

DEA personnel stated that on occasion an integrity request might still be received outside
the electronic system because the requesting office might not have access to Concorde or there is a
time issue on the request.

26


 APPENDIX 2

related to the DEA employee. HRER personnel go back 3 years from the date of
occurrence of the most recent disciplinary action taken on the employee. In
addition to disciplinary actions associated with misconduct, HRER personnel also
identify disciplinary actions associated with performance-related issues, such as
performance improvement plans. If any disciplinary actions or performance-related
issues are identified, HRER personnel recommend that the personnel action be put
on pending status and attach any relevant documents to the HRER’s narrative on
the integrity check screen.
OPR, HRB, and HRER personnel told the OIG that if all three offices do not
identify any information on the employee, they will all recommend approval. In
these instances, the requesting office is notified electronically that all three offices
have recommended approval and that the requesting office can proceed with
processing the proposed personnel action. No further review is done by a Deputy
Assistant Administrator, an Assistant Administrator, the Deputy Chief Inspector, or
the Chief Inspector on these matters. However, if OPR disapproves at the outset,
the award is denied and the requesting office is notified.
If any of the three offices recommend a “pending” status on the action, all
three offices’ recommendations and any supporting documents that are attached
with the respective office’s recommendation are forwarded to the appropriate
Deputy Assistant Administrator for review and recommendation. The Deputy
Assistant Administrator’s recommendation and those of the three offices are then
forwarded to the appropriate Assistant Administrator for review and
recommendation. Once the Assistant Administrator has made a recommendation,
the integrity check information is forwarded to the Chief Inspector for the final
approval or disapproval on the matter. The requesting office is electronically
notified about the final decision. No reason is given for those instances in which the
final decision is disapproval.
Before the electronic process was activated in December 1, 2013, the
integrity check process was performed manually from the submission of the request
to the notification back to the requesting offices on the decision to approve or
disapprove the request. Results of the integrity checks conducted and the
recommendations and decisions made by OPR, HRB, HRER, Assistant
Administrators, and Chief Inspectors were all recorded on hardcopy documents.
Each respective office may or may not have retained the hardcopy documents.
Furthermore, each office did not provide the others with a copy of their respective
results. As a result, no one office would necessarily have the entire package
containing all of the documents received and generated by everyone involved in the
integrity check process. Because there was no central repository for all of these
documents, the integrity check results, the recommendations, and the decisions
made by various DEA personnel are not always readily available or are no longer
maintained at the respective DEA offices.

27


 APPENDIX 3
OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPONENT VETTING POLICIES

FOR FAVORABLE PERSONNEL ACTIONS

As mentioned above, for informational purposes, here we provide a more
detailed discussion of the vetting process the other law enforcement components
use when a favorable personnel action is proposed. The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
and the U.S. Marshals Service have varying policies for vetting employees who are
candidates for a promotion, award, or other favorable personnel action.
For example, ATF Order 2311.1A, Promotions, requires the ATF Office of
Professional Responsibility and Security Operations to review its files for previous or
currently open integrity investigations on any applicant for merit promotion.
However, the Assistant Director responsible for the employee’s division or
directorate may waive this requirement. ATF Order 2400.8, Performance
Management and Recognition, outlines specific requirements for the type of review
conducted when an employee is under consideration for an award, bonus, quality
step increase, or an external award. For example, honorary award recipients must
not have had any disciplinary action in the previous 3 years, unless the Deputy
Director makes an exception.
The FBI’s Merit Promotion and Placement Plan Policy Directive and Policy
Guide requires the Human Resources Division to perform name checks on all
internal FBI candidates for competitive or noncompetitive promotions or
reassignments to GS-14 and GS-15 professional staff positions. Name checks
consist of a complete check of FBI records for any pending or past disciplinary
actions and equal opportunity investigations within the previous 3 years. The FBI
Special Agent Mid-Level Management System Policy Directive and Policy Guide,
which governs promotions for employees at the GS-14 level or below, states that it
is the division head’s responsibility to determine whether there are any disciplinary
issues with respect to the candidate to justify overriding the local office’s selection
for a promotion. Generally, an FBI employee who is the subject of a pending
administrative inquiry which could result in disciplinary action should not be
recommended for an award. (See the FBI Manual of Administrative Operations and
Procedures, section 5-24.4, p. 1.)
U.S. Marshals Service Policy Directive 3.40(C), Discipline and Adverse
Actions, prohibits promotions, bonuses, or awards for employees currently under
investigation or with “recent” serious misconduct. The Policy Directive does not
specify a period in which an employee is ineligible to receive a favorable personnel
action following the imposition of discipline for serious misconduct.

28


 APPENDIX 4

DEA’S RESPONSE TO THE FINAL DRAFT REPORT


U. S. Depllrtment of Justice
Drug Enforcement Ad ministration

wllw,(lea.gol'

Washington, D.C. 20537

OCT 1 4 2015

MEMORANDUM
TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Ni na S. Pelletier
Assistant Inspector Geller;!1
Evaluations and Inspections
Office of the Inspector General

4'/";'---C-#?~

Michael A~ f)i<c%'
Acting Deputy Chief Inspector
Office of I nspcclion ~

DEA's Response to the OIG Draft Report: ., BOlluses (Illd Olher rm'orable Personllel
ANiOlu for I)ntg Etifnl"cemrll/ Admillislralioll Employees 1III'olved ill AI/ege(/ Sexllal
Miscom/licl IlIeidell/s Referellced ill Ihe OIC's Marth 2015 Hewnl"

The Drug Enforcement Administr:uion (DEA) has reviewed the Department of Justice (DOJ )
Office of the Inspector General"s (OIG) Draft Report entitled. "1101l1l$(>S (/luI Olher r(/I'orable
Per.fOllllel ANiol/sfor Drug EI/forcemem Admillislrmioll Employees "woh'ed ill Alleged Sexual
Misc{)/u/llc/ itJcidellls Heferel/enl il/ the OIC's March 2015 Relmn." DEA ack nowledges OIG's
efforts in providing additionally infOrmatiOn for a Congressional request following the Ole 's Mareh
20 I5 report of the '"Redell' of Ihe HmuJlil/g oj SexJlal Hamssmem and Misconduct Allegatiolls by
the Departmelll 's La\\' Elifol"cemellt COlllponents'"
The DEA nx:ogniled that awards shou ld not be granted to nominmed recipients who have an
open investigation for having alleged to commi t or determined 10 have eommilled serious
misconduct. In Deccmber 2013. DEA implemented an electronic integrity check system 10 track
favorable personnel action nominations to provide an efficient and effective method for deciding
officia ls to process favorable personnel action nominations. The electronic integrity c heck sys1em
also enables the electronic maintenance ;lnd slor;lge of favomble personnel action decisions in
accordance with requisite governmental standards.

29


 APPENDIX 4


Nina S. Pelletier. AssiSlam Inspector General

Page 2

Following a DEA award decision. there is an additional ])OJ process by which favorable
I)t!rsonncl actions are processed. This information was omiucd from OIG's repon. It should be
nOted thnt after OEA has made an award decision. DEA was nOt in full control of "when" bonuses
and awards were provided to nominated recipie nts. OOJ conducts a fiscal authorization process for
all monetary award paymems for OEA. '111e fiscal authorization usually occurs months after Ihe
initial integrity check. Regrettably between the time of an initial integrity check and when OOJ
issues the monetary awa rd payment. some type of misconduct may have occurred. OEA instituted
additional processes in 2013 to alleviate this :lction from occurring in future instances.
The OIG ma kes two recommendations in the report. DEA provides the following response 10
the recommendations.
Rel.-ommcnd1ltioll L DEA ma nllgcmcnl should ens ure Ihal DEA officials a rc fully awa re of
:md consistently compl y with its awards policy for ellll>loyees who ha\'e he en subjcctto
d isci pline for Sig nifica nt misconduct or who arc under in\'estigation and, if there is a basis
for an eXCel)tion to the policy, that it is cleMly d ocume nted.
nEA Response
DEA concurs with the recommendation. DEA management involved in the favorable personnel
action decisions have been provided with current pol icy. which instrucls deciding officials of
the protocols to approve or disapprove favorable personnel actions. to ensure consistent
compliance wit h its guidance.
The December 2013 implementation of OEA 's electronic integrity eheck system also enables an
efficient and effective method for deciding officials to process favorable personnel action
nominations. The system tracks favorable personnel action nominations. enables DEA
Headquaners (HQ) components to allach infonnativc and conelusionary documentation for
deciding officials. and permits decid ing officials the opportunity to provide explanatory
comments. to include any basis for exceplion to the guidance. for their decision.
Rased on this lnfonnalion. DEA requests closurc of this recommendation.

Recommendation 2. OEA of1icillls should cons ider conducling integrity checks in dose
I>roximity to t he issUllllce of a f:l\'orahle perso nnel action to ensure 11 proposed action is
not issued while a n e m]Jl oJ~ is the SUbjl"C t of 11 miscllnduel in,·estigation. In addition,
DEA s hould retai n for 5 }'ears:"lll res ults of the inteJ,:rity c h ~ks it condu cLs. including
documentatio n reflecting fin a l determina tions 011 allltward re<l uests and the r atio nale
thereror.

30

 APPENDIX 4

Nina S. Pellet ier. Assistant Inspector General

Page 3

DEA Rt-'i ponsc
DEA concurs with the reco mme ndation and h3S been ut ilizing an electronic integrity check
system si nce December 2013 to ensure employees nominated to receive favorable personnel
act ions are veiled by the proper HQ components ror approval or disapproval. Once the
nomination is approved by all stakeholders. the approved nomination is forwarded to the OOJ
for di spensation of <1 monetary <1ward or bonus. Once 0 01 has alLlhorized monetary
dispensation. OEA has a limited amount of time to conduct a secondary scree n of nominees to
ensure employees have not h3d an allegation of serious misconduct since the fi rst date of OEA' s
approval.
To ensure payments for favorable personnel action to employees under in vestigation for serious
misconduct do not again occur. DEA initi<1ted a process of conducting a second integrity check
immediately prior to dispens ing any award payments.
Based on this information. DEA requests c losure of thi s recommendation.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the recommendations made in the OIG report. If
you ha ve any questions regard ing [hi s response. please eontaclthe Audit Liai son Team, 0 11 202-307-

8200.

31

 APPENDIX 5

OIG ANALYSIS OF DEA’S RESPONSE
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for its comment. The DEA’s response
is included in Appendix 4 of this report. The OIG analysis of the DEA’s response
and actions necessary to close the recommendations are discussed below.
Recommendation 1: DEA management should ensure that DEA officials
are fully aware of and consistently comply with its awards policy for employees who
have been subject to discipline for significant misconduct or who are under
investigation and, if there is a basis for an exception to the policy, that it is clearly
documented.
Status: Resolved.
DEA Response: DEA concurs with the recommendation. DEA management
involved in the favorable personnel action decisions have been provided with
current policy, which instructs deciding officials of the protocols to approve or
disapprove favorable personnel actions, to ensure consistent compliance with its
guidance.
The December 2013 implementation of DEA's electronic integrity check
system also enables an efficient and effective method for deciding officials to
process favorable personnel action nominations. The system tracks favorable
personnel action nominations, enables DEA Headquarters (HQ) components to
attach informative and conclusionary documentation for deciding officials, and
permits deciding officials the opportunity to provide explanatory comments, to
include any basis for exception to the guidance, for their decision.
Based on this information, DEA requests closure of this recommendation
OIG Analysis: The dissemination of the DEA’s current policy regarding
favorable personnel actions to DEA management and the December 2013
implementation of the DEA’s electronic integrity check system are partially
responsive to our recommendation. By January 30, 2016, please provide specific
information detailing when the current DEA policy was provided to DEA
management. In addition, please provide examples (screenshots) of how the new
integrity check system allows deciding officials to attach documentation and
explanatory comments, particularly in cases where an exception to DEA policy was
made.
Recommendation 2: DEA officials should consider conducting integrity
checks in close proximity to the issuance of a favorable personnel action to ensure
a proposed action is not issued while an employee is the subject of a misconduct
investigation. In addition, the DEA should retain for 5 years all results of the
integrity checks it conducts, including documentation reflecting final determinations
on all award requests and the rationale therefor.
32


 APPENDIX 5

Status: Resolved.
DEA Response: DEA concurs with the recommendation and has been
utilizing an electronic integrity check system since December 2013 to ensure
employees nominated to receive favorable personnel actions are vetted by the
proper HQ components for approval or disapproval. Once the nomination is
approved by all stakeholders, the approved nomination is forwarded to the DOJ for
dispensation of a monetary award or bonus. Once DOJ has authorized monetary
dispensation, DEA has a limited amount of time to conduct a secondary screen of
nominees to ensure employees have not had an allegation of serious misconduct
since the first date of DEA's approval.
To ensure payments for favorable personnel action to employees under
investigation for serious misconduct do not again occur, DEA initiated a process of
conducting a second integrity check immediately prior to dispensing any award
payments.
Based on this information, DEA requests closure of this recommendation.
OIG Analysis: The implementation of the new integrity check system and
the initiation of a new process for conducting a second integrity check prior to
dispensing awards are partially responsive to our recommendation. By January 30,
2016, please provide information regarding when the DEA began to conduct
additional integrity checks prior to the issuance of awards. Please provide copies of
any policies, guidance, or other documentation reflecting how this change in
process was communicated to the appropriate officials. In addition, please provide
information on how long integrity check information is maintained in the new
system.

33


 The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General
(DOl DIG) is a statutorily created independent entity
whose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud,
abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and
to promote economy and efficiency in the Department's
operations. Information may be reported to the DOJ
DIG's hotline at www.justice.gov/oig/hotline or
(800) 869-4499.

Office of the Inspector General
U,S, Department of Justice
www.justice.gov/oig