Leaked EU "Sustainable Development" Proposal Fails
to Protect Environment from Threats of TTIP

Academics, policy makers, environmental organizations, and voters have voiced increasing
concern that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) pact under negotiation
between the United States and European Union (EU) would undermine environmental
protection. Leaked documents and official position papers reveal that TTIP would give some of
the world’s largest fossil fuel corporations the power to challenge environmental policies in
private tribunals while imposing restrictions on green jobs policies and expanding trade in
climate-disrupting fossil fuels. U.S. and EU officials have sought to defend the deal as
environmentally beneficial. In particular, the European Commission has asserted that a TTIP
chapter on “Trade and Sustainable Development” would “safeguard basic rules that protect…the
environment” and even “reinforc[e]…environmental governance.”
A leaked September 2015 version of the EU proposal for the Sustainable Development chapter
reveals that it falls far short of these goals. The chapter’s weak and unenforceable environmental
provisions stand in sharp contrast to the strong and highly-enforceable privileges for foreign
investors that are proposed for TTIP. Nothing in the leaked chapter would prevent foreign
companies from using those special privileges to attack environmental policies in unaccountable
trade tribunals.
And while the chapter expresses concern about climate change, TTIP would actually facilitate
increased trade in fossil fuels – an explicit goal set by the Council of the EU. Moreover, the
chapter is too weak to “reinforce” environmental policy making, as the EU claims.
The text’s failure to adequately safeguard or meaningfully advance environmental protection
stems from three core flaws:
1. The text does not provide adequate protection for an array of environmental policies that
TTIP would undermine.
2. The text’s environmental provisions are vaguely-worded, creating obvious loopholes.
3. The text fails to include any meaningful enforcement mechanism.
It is important to note that even if a dispute settlement mechanism were included (and even if the
environmental commitments were strengthened), environmental obligations have historically not
been enforced under U.S. trade agreements. In addition, even if the standard enforcement
mechanism in U.S. trade pacts were included, it would still be weaker than the one foreign
corporations could use to challenge environmental policies under TTIP.

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 Environmental policies are not adequately protected from TTIP threats
The proposed text would not stop companies or governments from using TTIP rules to
undermine environmental policies in either the EU or the U.S. While the EU “intends to present
further proposals” concerning climate change and “the importance of promoting green growth,”
there is nothing in the current text to protect climate and environmental policies from the myriad
threats of other parts of the deal.
For example, nothing in the text would prevent foreign corporations, on either side of the
Atlantic, from challenging climate or other environmental policies via an “investor-state dispute
settlement” (ISDS) mechanism or via the European Commission’s proposed “Investment Court
System.” Both enable foreign investors to challenge environmental policies before a tribunal that
would sit outside any domestic legal system and be able to order governments to compensate
companies for the alleged costs of an environmental policy. While the Commission claims that
its new investment “reforms” would protect the right to regulate, States could still be “sued” if
foreign investors considered that a policy change violated the broad, special rights that the
Commission’s “reformed” investment proposal would give them.
If an EU member state or U.S. state introduced a moratorium on fracking, for example, fossil
fuel corporations would be able to challenge the moratorium as “arbitrary” on the basis that it
frustrated the companies’ “legitimate expectation” to be able to continue fracking. A U.S.
company is already using the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to demand
compensation for a moratorium on fracking in Quebec, Canada on that very basis. The European
Commission’s proposed “sustainable development” chapter includes no safeguards that would
alleviate such threats. In fact, TTIP would newly empower firms such as ExxonMobil, Chevron,
Royal Dutch Shell, and BP to challenge common sense policies to protect the environment.
The leaked text also would do nothing to prevent increased trade in fossil fuels under TTIP.
While the chapter suggests that the Parties should cooperate to “facilitate trade” in
environmentally friendly goods, the Council of the EU has also proposed an energy chapter in
TTIP that would facilitate trade in environmentally destructive goods, including oil and gas.
According to a previously-leaked EU proposal for a TTIP energy chapter, “The EU proposes to
include a legally binding commitment in TTIP guaranteeing the free export of crude oil and gas
resources…” This would require the United States to undermine its current policy for liquefied
natural gas (LNG) export licensing and its ban on the export of crude oil by requiring the U.S. to
automatically approve licenses to export crude oil and LNG to the EU, increasing global
greenhouse gas emissions and encouraging further extraction of fossil fuels. If the U.S.
government chose to reinstate restrictions on crude oil or LNG exports to the EU in order to
combat climate change, it would risk TTIP-authorized trade sanctions or orders for government
compensation.
The EU also has proposed TTIP procurement provisions that would prohibit policies intended to
incentivize domestic production of green goods such as wind turbines or solar panels, despite the
leaked text’s stated support for “green growth.” The leaked “sustainable development” text does
not exempt widely-used “domestic content” policies in renewable energy programs from such
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 TTIP rules, offering little consolation to policymakers wondering if they could defend popular
green jobs policies from costly TTIP challenges.
To adequately protect environmental policies, the proposed chapter would need to include a
“carve-out” stating that none of TTIP’s rules apply to measures related to environmental
protection.1 Instead, the European Commission has included provisions that may be intended as
“safeguards,” but that would not provide effective protection against challenges to climate and
environmental policies.
For example, the leaked text states: “The Parties recognise the right of each Party to determine
its sustainable development policies and priorities, to set and regulate its levels of
domestic…environmental protection, and to adopt or modify relevant policies and laws
accordingly…” This provision would not offer an adequate defense for TTIP-enabled challenges
to environmental policies. First, the operative language is weak – rather than state that “Nothing
in this Agreement shall prevent a Party from” determining, setting, regulating adopting, or
modifying its environmental protections, the provision includes the far less enforceable provision
that the Parties merely “recognise the right” to do such policymaking. Second, an ISDS tribunal
could easily interpret this provision as having no effect on ISDS rulings against environmental
policies. Technically, such rulings require governments to compensate a foreign investor for the
challenged policy, not to alter the policy. Of course, such costly rulings can have (and have had)
the effect of chilling public interest policymaking, but an ISDS tribunal could ignore this effect
and decide that ruling against an environmental policy does not in any legal sense block the
government’s “right to regulate.”
And, while the leaked text states: “A Party shall not waive or derogate from” or “fail to
effectively enforce” its environmental laws “in a manner affecting, trade or investment,” similar
provisions in recent U.S. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have failed to prevent governments
from weakening environmental protection to attract foreign investment. Similar provisions in the
U.S. – Peru FTA did not stop Peru from rolling back an array of environmental protections last
year, including stripping enforcement powers from the environmental ministry, in the name of
boosting investment. To date, Peru has faced no consequences for contradicting the terms largely
replicated in the leaked TTIP text.

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Such a “carve-out” should make clear that it is the government, not a trade tribunal, that determines whether a
measure relates to environmental protection. A “carve-out” would provide greater protection than an “exception.”
An “exception” would mean that TTIP’s polluter-friendly rules still apply to environmental measures, while a
“carve-out” would remove such measures from the entire scope of TTIP’s rules. In the event of a challenge over
environmental measures, a tribunal would first decide whether the measures fell within the scope of the agreement.
An “exception” would not stop the challenge at this point, while a “carve-out” could. For an “exception,” the
tribunal would go on to consider whether the measures violated the rules, and only after deciding that they did
indeed constitute a violation would the tribunal assess whether the government could avoid being penalized as a
result of the “exception.”

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 Vague wording creates loopholes in environmental provisions
Despite the European Commission’s claim that TTIP’s “sustainable development” chapter would
“reinforc[e]…environmental governance,” the leaked text’s provisions are too ambiguous to
actually require robust environmental protection.
The chapter states that each Party “shall ensure that its domestic policies and laws provide for
and encourage high levels of protection” for the environment, but leaves open to each Party to
interpret what “high levels of protection” actually means. Similarly, the leaked text repeatedly
states that the Parties “shall implement effective domestic policies” to achieve environmental
goals, while failing to spell out what constitutes an “effective domestic policy.”
For example, the chapter states that “the Parties shall implement effective domestic policies and
measures to combat illegal logging and related trade...” and includes similar calls for “effective”
policies regarding biological diversity, illegal wildlife trade, and chemicals and waste. But the
text offers no definition of “effective” – a word on which the utility of these provisions hinges.
Nor are there any details as to what a Party must do to achieve such nebulous goals as “the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.” With the exception of the text’s
section on management of fisheries, which spells out some specific measures that Parties should
undertake to comply, the draft chapter is rife with vague aspirations instead of concrete and clear
measures that, if enforced, would help promote environmental protection.
In addition, the text fails to require both Parties to ratify additional international agreements that
would bolster environmental protection. For example, the text does not require the United States
or EU member states to ratify multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) to which they are
not already a Party. The United States has ratified just a fraction of the dozens of MEAs ratified
by EU member states. Despite this disparity and the additional environmental protection that
further ratifications would provide, the text only offers the non-binding suggestion that the
Parties “should continue to strive towards further ratification” of MEAs.
Similarly, while the text includes some stronger provisions regarding the “sustainable
management of fisheries,” Parties are only asked to “adhere to the principles” of international
agreements to deter illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, but not to ratify those
agreements.
Investors’ rights trump enforcement of environmental provisions
The European Commission’s draft text lacks any enforcement mechanism to hold countries
accountable to the chapter’s environmental provisions – a step backwards from recent U.S. trade
agreements that have subjected environmental and commercial terms to the same enforcement
mechanism. The Commission does note in the text that “dispute settlement aspects shall be
developed at a later stage.” An earlier EU position paper, released in January 2015, proposed a
state-state dispute settlement process (where one government can bring a case against another for
alleged non-compliance) for this chapter, but it did not include trade sanctions or other penalties
if a government failed to enforce the environmental provisions. This non-binding framework
would offer little incentive for States to comply.
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 Even if the leaked text were subject to state-state dispute settlement with penalties for nonenforcement, and even if the environmental provisions were precise and comprehensive
commitments rather than the current ill-defined objectives, there is still no indication that those
environmental provisions would be enforced, and therefore no indication that they would have
any meaningful impact on the ground. For example, the U.S. – Peru FTA included a Forest
Sector Annex with detailed obligations, subject to binding state-state dispute settlement, aimed at
stopping the illegal timber trade between Peru and the United States. Yet, more than six years
after the FTA took effect, illegal logging in Peru’s Amazon rainforest remains rampant. If the
stronger terms in the Peru FTA have failed to deter environmental degradation, why should the
weaker terms proposed for TTIP do any better?
In addition, even if the proposed chapter included a state-state dispute settlement mechanism, its
environmental terms would not be nearly as enforceable as the sweeping rights that foreign
investors could use under TTIP to challenge environmental policies.
Both the EU and the United States have proposed for TTIP to not only establish broad rights for
foreign investors, but to empower those investors to privately enforce those rights via ISDS – a
far stronger enforcement mechanism than state-state dispute settlement. For state-state dispute
settlement to be used for an environmental violation, a private actor (such as an environmental
organization) would have to first convince its government to initiate a case against the other
government, despite the diplomatic and financial costs that the government would incur. But a
foreign firm wanting to challenge an environmental policy would not need to convince anyone
before bringing an ISDS case against a government. The lower barriers to ISDS enforcement
help explain why foreign investors have used ISDS to launch more than 600 investment-related
cases against governments under international trade and investment agreements, while
governments have initiated a mere four such cases via state-state dispute settlement.
Conclusion
Despite its name, the proposed “sustainable development” chapter would not promote
environmental protection. To do so would require replacing the text’s litany of non-binding
vagaries with strong, specific, comprehensive, and enforceable obligations to safeguard the
environment.
Even more importantly, the leaked text fails to even mention, much less protect against, TTIP’s
many threats to our environment.
If the EU and U.S. negotiators want to ensure that environmental protection is not undermined
by TTIP, they need to start by amending the agreement’s polluter-friendly terms. They should,
for example, remove foreign investor rights (including ISDS or the Investment Court System)
that threaten environmental policies, eliminate rules designed to facilitate increased trade in
fossil fuels, and delete procurement terms that restrict green job creation. To guarantee
environmental protection, they also should carve out environmental policies from all of TTIP’s
rules. Barring such changes, TTIP would remain a toxic trade deal.

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