..-- Tmrulatiun 00817121 -1 MAIN STAFF OF THE ARMY . - - OF REPUBLIKA - STR. CONF. NO. 03/4-434 17 March 1995 VERY URGENT Directive for Up-Coming Operations . TO THE COMMAND OF THE IST KK /Krajina Corps! Enclosed with this document, we are sending you the Directive for Furhter Operations 1 op. no. 7. Confinn receipt of the above-mentioned Directive by returning a copy of this document. CHIEF OF STAFF Lieutenant General Manojlo MHDVANOVIC lsigned and stamped! /stamp:I . 21 Matz 1995 I as written! Istampzl COMMAND OF THE IST KRAJINA CORPS . DT str. conf. no. 1-1 21 March 1995 - - xo. 00823159.rm-ar. bs. sv . I- Translation - .. SUPREME COMMAND OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE - - ARMED FORCES OF REPUBLIKA STATE SECRET Ref. no: 2/2-1 1 8 March 1995 . VERY URGENT Corpsl, DK IDrlna Corpsl, Force and Air Defence! and CV ICentre of Military Schools of the Army of Republika I I FOR FURTHER OPERATIONS OP. NO. 7 fm 1. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AND SITUATION The Contact Group has not really abandoned its plan for the former BH [Bosnia and Herzegovina/. However, it has reached an impasse and is now trying through contacts with representatives of the RS to find a cosmetic formula which would enable them to continue the process of negotiation. America's latest initiatives are aimed at formally maintaining Contact Group unity and its own domination. By using pressure and a compromise solution regarding the signing of the agreement on a temporary cessation of hostilities they have created conditions for the military strengthening and arming of Muslims and Croats, the survival of Muslim enclaves (the Cazin Krajina, Goraide, Zepa, Srebrenica, Sarajevo), additional pressures and the depletion of the Serbian defence potential. They reckon that the conflict between Serbian leaders will be exacerbated and that Serbs will split. They are therefore endeavouring to impose this Plan as a "starting point for the continuation of negotiations", which is a de facto acceptance of the Plan under even more unfavourable conditions than when it was first moored, while allegedly providing an By exerting pressure on the FRY /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and the RSK /Republic of Serb Krajina/, the West has achieved the signing of an agreement between the RSK and the NDH llndependent State of Croatia/, the implementation of which creates favourable conditions for the RSK's economic reintegration into the NDH, supported by a UN Security Council resolution envisaging that Franjo TUDMAN and Alija IZETBEGOVIC must approve any flow of goods fr?the RS. This effort is aimed at ensuring the RSK's full economic reintegration into the NDH while making it dependent on it, and the RS dependent on the Muslim Government. 'l`his is the basic precondition for the political reintegration and recognition of Croatia and BH within their administrative borders. They plan to attain this objective by increasing pressure on the Serbian people in all spheres, counting on widening the split among their political leaders. They think that the FRY will not interfere militarily in the case of NDH aggression against the RSK, or more particularly, the RS. Meanwhile, they tr?y to ensure this by adopting new resolutions - and imposing new agreements-- in- order- to eliminate-the Vance plan which does not - ?23I59.d0c6r. bi'. rv 2 mumsprejudice political solutions and does not exclude the VJ's (Yugoslav .Army's) . legitimate participation in preventing aggression against the RSK. the work of the Contact Group and an immediate military presence in the NDH, Albania, Macedonia, former BH, Bulgaria and Romania. In this regard, they have - probably come to a secret agreement with Russia. Rus ia is forced to do so because of its intemal economic and political problems. At this stage one should not expect any significant opposition by Russia to the Americans. Westem European countries, especially France and Britain, are aware of the danger of Islam spreading across Europe, but in these countries the prevalent stand is that they can successfully neutralise fundamentalism by virtue of the so-called civil option. For the moment, they have no real hope or intention of preventing the establishment of an Islamic state in the Balkans because of the interests and dominance of America and Germany and the belief shared by West European countries that they are capable of controlling the Islamic factor in Europe; in this context, the Orthodox church has an important role to play. Western diplomacy, in particular that of Great Britain, sees the integration process as - a solution to the political crisis in the Balkans involving the establishment of a so- called Balkan federation or confederation which would incorporate the former Yugoslav republics, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania. This would call for the former Yugoslav republics to recognise one another within AVNOJ IWW Il Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugo lavial borders. Serbia proper and Montenegr?o are here seen as being the parent countries of the Serbian people. 'I'he idea is being propagated that such a model would be the best solution to the problem of etlmic minorities. This whole association would then supposedly be incorporated into the European Union. They expect the associated left-wing parties in the former Yugoslavia to be the vehicle to implement this project. Members of the association would have the status of autonomies with national characteristics, police and a joint assembly. NATO would "guarantee" its security. . The West, headed by the U.S.A. and Germany, will keep up pressure in order to preservethe Croat-Muslim Federation and its confederation with the NDH. 'I`hey have estimated that the establishment of a Muslim-Croat coalition creates a balance of forces with the Serbs and that the military option, involving no-direct gagement of NATO ground troops, will allow them to impose a solution on the former Yugoslavia, should the Serbs refuse to accept the political solution under pressure (the Contact - Group Plan). 2. MUSLIM-CROAT COALITION FORCES 2.1. FEDERATION FORCES - Relations within the Federation are burdened by distrust and a lack of tolerance as both sides endeavour to gain the upper hand, the Muslims to secure a unitary state and the Croats to "fill their stomachs" by dominating the Muslims while drawing closer to . the borders of a Greater Croatia. However, both sidesare well. aware of the fact that at .- . 00823I59.doc.6r this stage neither ofthem needs a new war and will, therefore, try to avoid open armed . conflict. Regardless of the fact that they have failed to either organise federal bodies or set them in motion, including the Joint Staff of the Federation, the coordination of Muslim-Crom activities is provided by American-led sponsors, who sent their high- ranking officers to the former BH in order to form and start the Joint Staff of the - Federation. They are also directing activities again the RS through political and . diplomatic channels along selected lines of advance which are of interest to both sides (the attack on Kupres - Cincar 94 /Tzintzar 94/, the attack along the Glamoc and Grahovo axis - Zima 94/95 /Winrer 94/95/ aimed at suppordng the Muslim Corps). Similar joint action may be expected in the direction of Tesli? (given the Croatian interest in the village of Komusina and Banja Vru?ica) and the Serbian Posavina /Sava river basin/, subject to prior agreement on future territorial demarcation in the area, as well as a coordinated action by Muslim forces along the Mostar-Nevesinje line of advance and the Croatian forces on the Capljina-Stolac line. 2.1.1. MUSLIM ARMED FORCES .2.1.1.1. Probable Objective and Plans of Muslim Forces After signing the agreement on a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, not a segment of which is being respected, the Muslims have embarked on the reorganisation of their armed forces, forming operational and tactical manoeuvre units and divisions (in the lst, 2nd and 7th training intensively, bringing manpower, materiel and equipment up to strenSth (UY massive production of military equipment and illegal - imports) and engaging in other preparations for attack operations in the spring of 1995 before the expiry of the agreement to cease hostilities. Their military and most of their political leaders are in favour of continuing the war and make no secret of it. 'I`hey expect the intemational community not to pressure them to accept a political solution to the crisis in the former BH, accepting the changes to the Contact Group Plan, hoping that the results of their offensive action will receive the stamp of intemational approval. 'l`he beginning of the attack may be expected in March 1995 with the tacit approval of the international community, should the Muslim--Croat armed forces . succeed; Should they fail, the RS would be exposed to strong pressure from the international community through NATO to halt our counteroffensive; They will constantly threaten us and possibly use NATO airforce. UNPROFOR ground troops will probably not be directly engaged, except in the case of immediate danger. 'l`he engagement of NATO ground troops is very unlikely. 'I'he so-called Army of BH consists of six corps (112 brigades and 45 independent battalions and artillery battalions), numbering approximately 270,000 men. They have about 120 tanks, 80 APCs, 340 artillery pieces, 90 VBRs lmultiple rocket launchers/, 230 LRLs Ilight launchers/, 1800 mortars, 450 PATs /anti-aircraft guns/, 700 PAMs /anti-aircraft machine guns/, 200 PARs land-aircraft missiles! (Stinger or Strela 2M), 370 POR /anti-armour rocketsl, 16 transport helicopters and 17 sport and agricultural The Muslims are planning a 'Tspring offensive" along selected lines of-attack (in the- - direction of Sipovo, Srbobran, Vlasi?, Tesli?, Doboj, Brcko, Majevica, Kozluk, 008231 59.dnwrI Translation -. Sekovi?i, Vlasenica, Han Pijesak, the Semizovac-Olovo road, Tmovo, Borci, Krupa . -- n/u na Uni/and Ripa?. Contact Group Plan envisions as being conceded to the Muslims, focusing on the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo from the north-west and south-west, linking up the central and eastem parts of the former BH, seizing Vozu?a and Ozren, cutting off the corridor, taking Brcko and Derventa and gaining control over the wider area of Vlasi?, . Srbobran, Jajce and Tesli?. In the second sl?8?. they will probably keep up these activities in order to seize the rest of the RS territory and link up the Muslim--held territories in order to create a unitary state. They will focu on linking the enclaves and reaching the Drina river, continuing the attack along the Jajce-Mrkonji? Grad-Klju?-Sanski Most axis with the aim of joining up the forces of the and 7th Corps and seizing Borak and Nevesinje. This would enable them carry the offensive further, towards the_ sea. Action in the direction of the Serbian Posavina will depend on relations in the Federation and the intentions of the NDH regarding the RSK. These activities have already been planned and prepared. In combat operations, they will probably send in strong Isabotage groups! and order to launch sudden attacks on specific segments of our combat disposition on the front line and deep within our territory, especially on our tire support, command posts, supply and evacuation routes, and routes for bringing in intervention units. After creating panic and disorganising our defence they will engage stronger forces from the front to take advantage of the situation and strengthen the positions taken. On other lines of advance, they will probably engage in diversionary tactics in order to engage and stretch our forces. If they surprise us and secure initial gains, they can quickly regroup and continue operations in order to exploit the initial gains. 2.1.2. ARMED FORCES OF HR HB ICroatian Republic of Herceg?llosnal (HVO) ICroatian Defence Council! 2.1.2.1. Probable Objectives and Plans of the HVO Both the political and military strategies of the HR HB depend on the policy of the NDH. It is, therefore, subject to frequent change and adjustment to the immediate and long-terrn political and military interests of Croatian national policy. Its main objectives are to incorporate the HR BH into the NDH, preserve the Croat ethnic regions in Central Bosnia and join them to other Croatian territories, and to seize,the Serbian Posavina. "[`hey are incapable of attaining any military objective without the direct participation and support of the HV {Croatian Army/. '1`he HVO is organised into four military districts (four guards brigades, 32 home- guard regiments and four independent battalions -- artillery battalions), numbering some 60,000 soldiers. They- have around 70 tanks,-40 APCs, 140 artillery weapons; -30 Imultiple rocket launchers/, 750 mortars, 270 PATs lanti-aircraft gums Translation PARs /anti-aircraft missiles! (Stinger and Strela. 2M), 200 POR /anti-armour rockets! - -- and 12 transport helicopters. Offensive action by the HV0 is to be expected in the Tesli? region in order to take the . village of Komusina and Banja Vru?ica. along the Kupres-Sipovo axis with the aim of taking Jajce in coordination with the 7th Muslim Corps, in the Stolac region and in the direction of the Serbian Posavina. Actions alongthe Grahovo and Glamo? line will depend on NDH intentions regarding the RSK. 'I`he HV will be the- main agent to implement these actions. Offensive operations will involve the large-scale engagement of sabotage and guards units to ensure a deep into the territory. For consolidation of gains, they will engage units of the home guard with massive obsuuction and fortitication of lines taken. 2.2. ARMED FORCES OF THE RH IREPUBLIC OF (HV) ICROATIAN ARMYI 2.2.1. Probable objective and plans of the HV At this time, the Croatian military and political leadership will step up the military. political and economic pressure with the support of the intemational community and via the FRY /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], particularly on the RSK /Republic of Serb Krajina/, with a view to its integration into the NDH Croatian State/. At the same time, in their relationship with Muslims in the former BH they will formally embrace negotiations and agreements, while in reality they will only implement those provisions which are in the Croats' interest, including joint combat operations (Serbian Posavina, Kupres and Jajce). 'I`he Croatian policy-makers are prepared to enter into a permanent alliance with the Republika with a view to eliminating Muslims as a political factor, on condition that the RSK be reintegrated into the NDH as an autonomous entity. NDH policy towards the Republika will be adjusted depending on deteriorating relations between Croats and Muslims, and- is basically guided by Croatian interests which they intend to achieve through a two-faced political game of gentlemerfs agreements on the Serbs gaining access to the sea; the exchange of some territories in the RSK for territories in the Republika the creation of conditions, through intemal and secret -agreements between the NDH, the FRY and RSK of its status as an entity in the form of a republic or with a high degree of autonomy, and to strip it of as much territory as possible, thus precluding any eventual regionalisation, federalisation or confederalisation of the NDH (Istria,. Dalmatia, Dubrovnik, Slavonia and the RSK). - - 2.2.2. HV rules of engagement and capabilities The HV will deploy the brunt of its forces against the RSK. Mobilisation, regrouping of forces and a political and diplomatic campaign, encouraged by Germany, are under way in preparation for aggre sion against the RSK. 'I'he purpose of the political arid . diplomatic. campaign is to provide legitimacy for the aggression, eliminate the Vance Plan for the RSK and what would be the legitimate involvement of the VJ in 00823l59.doc{ir. nr. sv . 6 I 00817127 preventing aggression against the RSK, and with Federation forces tying down the - -- VRS IArrny of Republika in the former BH, prevent them from forestalling Croatian aggression against the RSK. For the time being these measures serve as a show of force and pressure on the RSK to accept a "peaceful reintegration" into the NDH, as well as to save the 5th Muslim Corps f1?om defeat. 'They expect to achieve both goals by implementing this option, but the military option advocated by Germany is not excluded. America would support a military option, while the European Allies would accept the outcome - the factual situation. The I-IV has deployed about 25,000 troops (equivalent to 12 brigades), 120 tanks, 60 APCs, 130 artillery pieces, 30 multiple rocket launchers, 350 mortars, 120 anti-aircraft gums, 80 anti-aircraft missiles (Strela 2 or Stinger), 120 anti--arrnour rockets against the RS along the Dubrovnik-Trebinje line, the Glamo? and Grahovo frontline and on the north bank of the Sava from Slavonsld Brod to Zupanja. The forcesin the Slavonski Brod - Zupanja area are planning to carry out offensive operations in coordination with the 4th /Military District! of the HVO and Muslim forces in order to take the Serbian Posavina. The bulk of their forces will probably be engaged in establishing a bridge-head in the Svilaj area which would allow them to - extend their attack toward Modri?a and Derventa, while auxiliary forces would provide backup to the 4th ZP around the Orasje bridge-head and attack along the Duboeac - Derventa line. On the Dubrovnik -- Trebinje line, the HV has deployed 3 brigades (about 9,000 troops). which they can reinforce by bringing in troops from the rear. It is to be expected that they will mount small-scale offen 've operations with a view to improving their tactical position and capturing the western parts of Popovo Polje. Along the Grahovo and Glamo? lines the HV has deployed around 5,000 troops with the possibility of reinforcements. Further operations will follow if they assess that a peaceful reintegration of the RSK into the NDH is not feasible, with the ultimate goal of putting the Knin Krajina at an operative disadvantage by cutting it off. 3.THETASKS OFTHEREPUBLIKA 'I`he Republika Army has the following tasks: (1) to repel all attacks on RS territory by mounting a resolute defence in all sectors of the war front, and prevent at all costs, through a decisive defence on the and sectors of the Sarajevo war front, the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo from without and the cutting off of the Sarajevo -- Tmovo - Kalinovik communications line; (2) not to allow significant enemy incursions on any sector of the frontline or operative-tactical surprises of the Biha? or Kupres type, particularly to the north of Zvomik, on Mt. Majevica, Vozu?a, Vlasi?, around Br?ko, Tesli? or Srbobran; (3) to carry out, during the ceaseiire,,_the tasks and duties arising from the Order of the Commander of the VRS Main Staff, Strictly Confidential No. 03/4-182 of 5 February 1995; (4) by carrying out organised and coordinated combat operations, to inflict on the enemy as many losses as possible both in personnel and TMS Iequipment and materiel!. Make timely preparations and provisions for carrying out 1 - 2 strategic, and 3 - 4 tactical operations, in the event thatthe ceasefire-collapses?and- war resurnes,- with the - 7 following objectives: (1) through planned and organised material, propaganda and bl'. rv - . 7 I . other activities, regrouping of forces and resources, combat activities of tactical - -- significance or for diversionary purposes within and without the areas of planned operations, to deceive the enemy as to our true intentions and then by carrying out resolute operations with mechanised and armoured forces from several directions, advance deeply into enemy territory, crush and destroy his forces, inflict as much damage on its troops, equipment and materiel as possible, and thus, by force of arms, impose the final outcome of the war on the enemy, forcing the world into recognising the actual situation on the ground and ending-the war; (2) to improve the operational and strategic position of the (3) to reduce the frontline and create conditions for an economic revival in the RS by sending a number of military conscripts home; (4) to create optimum conditions for the state and political leadership to negotiate a peace agreement and accomplish the strategic objectives of the war. 4. I HEREBY DECIDE: Through a decisive defence by the 30th pd Iinfantry - divisionl, 22nd Iinfantry brigade!. TG !'I`actical Group!-2Jlst KK !Krajina Corps! in the SRK !Sarajevo-Romanija Corps! area of responsibility, and towards the . Republic of Croatia forces, and by putting up a resolute defence in other sectors of the war front, coupled with intensive operations on the segment of the frontline within the areas of responsibility of the other corps, inflict on the enemy as much personnel, equipment and materiel damage as possible, prevent any rapid or deep incursions into the operative-tactical lines sector or any division of the territory, and by l-2 suategic- level with forces of up to corps strength (in the KK - IBK !Eastem Bosnia Corps! and SRK /Sarajevo-Romanija Corps! - HK !I?Ierzegovina Corps! zones of responsibility), and 3-4 tactical-level operations, advance as far as possible toward major enemy administrative and industrial centres, crush and destroy his forces and thus create conditions for a triumphant end to the civil war. The brunt of the defence shall be in the SRK, 30th pd, TG-2!lst KK areas of responsibility, in Semberija and Posavina, and the main thrust of offensive operations along the lines leading concentrically to Tuzla from the KK, IBK and DK !Drina Corps! areas of responsibility, as well as in the area of the rivers Neretva and Zujevina. Combat activities at strategic level shall be backed by all available forces and materiel of the and PVO IAir Force and Air Defence!. Defence readiness shall be implemented immediately, and operations operational and strategic level by 20 April 1995, by which time all operative--strategic and material preparations for the coming VRS operations must be completed. When carrying out- strategic-level operations, Operation Sadejstvo-95 !Coordination- 95/ shall be carried out iirst followed by Operation Prazar-95 !Window-95/. . Operation Sprefa-95 is to take place in . the run-up to Operation Sadejstva-95 !Coordinate Action-95/, and in the run-up to Operation Promr-95 planned operations within the responsibility of the SRK and DK will take place. . 5. UNIT ASSIGNMENTS: - 2ND KRAJINA CORPS: proceed to consolidate, as soon as possible, and no later than the end of March, with existing reinforcements, the bridge-heads in the Krupa na Uni area in the NIW sector of the warfront, thus reducing the front and creating conditions for sustained offensive operations, and open up the Skocaj-Baljevac-Li?ko . Petrovo Selo communicationsline SIE of Biha?. In further active combat operations, enable an advance to the right !?east! bank of the Una River in the Biha? area, and in 00823I59.dnc6r, bi'. sv . I Translation 00817129 coordination with the SVK /Arrny of the Serb Krajinal forces inflict as much damage - -- on the enemy as possible and crush the offensive power of the Muslim Corps. On the part of the front, regroup your forces and, when favourable conditions are created, in cooperation with forces of the 30?' pd and the SVK, break the Ustasha forces and reach the Caprazlije village - Celebi?i village line as soon as possible. At this point, take up defensive positions, remaining ready for a possible further attack towards Livno, Kupres and Duvno. - . . The corps KM shall bein the region of Osuelj, and the IKM lforward command post! shall be determined at the corps commander's discretion. 1" KRAJINA CORPS: Any breakthrough by enemy forces in the region of the operative-tactical axes should be prevented by a decisive defence of the border with the RH in the area of responsibility of the 30?' pd, 22"? and the Active operations should tie down as many enemy forces and cause as many losses in troops, materiel and equipment as possible. On the rest of the front, improve the operative- tactical position on Vlasi?, Komar and Vozu?a by very persistent defence and execution of planned and surprise battles and engagements. ?In preparation for operative-strategic level operations, carry out planned withdrawal, training and grouping of forces within the operative-tactical directions leading to Tuzla. By mid-March, under the leadership of the VRS Main Staff and together with the commands of the IBK and DK plan a strategic?level operation with the aim of cutting off the Muslim armed forces north of Tuzla, breaking up and destroying them, thus forcing the Muslim political leadership to recognise the factual situation on the - warfront and sign an agreement on ending the war. . Engage all available forces of the l" KK, IBK, DK, and PVO and the VRS Main Staff in the operation, with maximmn measures of operative and strategic camouflage and deception of the enemy, preparation of the population and all segments of society as well as securing strategic material supplies for logistics support during the operation. . - During preparation and planning of the operation, define precisely the time it begins and ends, its duration and each stage, the marmer of its execution, forces to be engaged, coordinated action, forces to execute the main and supporting thrust, etc. All preparations are to kept in suict secrecy and offensive combat operations carried out energetically and with lightning speed. Maximum responsibility for carrying out assigned tasks should be secured at all levels of command and contr?o1. Primary responsibility for planning and carrying out the operation lies with the VRS Main Staff while the commands of the KK, IBK, DK and and PVO cooperate. Plan to use forces of the 1* KK along the main direction of the thrust and forces of the IBK and DK along the auxiliary directions. 'l'he operation is to be planned and executed under the name Sadejsrv0?95. The corps KM shall be in Derventa, -while the IKM, which-is--at -the same time the -- of the VRS Main Staff shall be in Modri?a during the operation. 00823I59.dnc{ir, br. rv . I 00817130 EAST BOSNIAN CORPS: Any breakthrough and joining-up of the coalition forces - -- in the broader Br?ko region should be prevented by decisive defence in the Posavina and Semberija, in cooperation with forces of the l" KK, and through organised and planned execution of battles and gagements seize every opportunity to improve the operative?tactical position in the Posavina and Semberija and on Mt. Majevica. the l" KK, DK and and PVO, all necessary preparations and planning for the strategic operation Sadejstvo-95 should be carried out by mid-March. The aim of the operation is to cut off and destroy the Muslim armed forces north of 'Tuzla, widen the corridor and definitively eliminate any danger of a breakthrough and consolidation of coalition forces in the Br?ko region. In cooperation with the DK, planning should be carried out by mid-March for an operational level operation under the name Spre?a-95, with the following aim: - in the first phase of the operation, cut off Muslim armed forces in the wider regions secondphasebreakthemup and destroy an in the newly created Teo?ak enclave. Planning and command of combat operations during the operation shall be the responsibility of the IBK command. MainStaff,and following its completion, implementation of the strategic operation Sadejsrvo-95 should follow. On the other parts of the front, wherever possible, the operative-tactical position should be improved by diversionary and planned execution of battles and engagements and operative-tactical camouflage measures, keeping as many enemy . forces as possible tied down, thus preventing them from regrouping and pulling out for use in other directions. . atthe corps commander's discretion. DRINA CORPS: Enemy breakthroughs along selected operative-tactical lines should be prevented by extremely persistent and active defence in cooperation with part of the forces of the SRK on the part of the warfront and around the enclaves. As many enemy forces as possible should be tied down by diversionary and active combat operations on the NIW part of the front, using operational and tactical camouflage measures, while in the direction of the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves complete physical separation of Srebrenica from Zepa should be carried out as soop as - possible, preventing even communication between individuals in the two enclaves. By planned and well-thought-out combat operations create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of fruther s1u?vival or life for the inhabitants of srebmnics and Zepa. br, sv 10 I Translation case the UNPROFOR forces leave Zepa and Srebrenica, the DK command shall . - -- plan an operation named Jadar with the task of breaking up and destroying the Muslims forces in these claves and definitively liberating the Drina valley region. By mid-March 1995, in cooperation with the HK and SRK commands, the Zvijezda- 95 operation is to be planned, its task being to liberate Serbian areas in the Goraide enclave and reduce the enclave to the size of a protected area of 3 kilometres from the town centre, as well as toinflict a definitive military defeat on the -Muslim armed . forces and remove any possibility of their joining up with forces on Mt. Igman or Mt. Bjelasnica. Planning and execution of combat actions in both operations shall be the responsibility of the DK command. 'I`he Zvnezda-95 operation is to be executed after the end of the Spre?a-95 operation and before Prozcr-95. By the end of March, in agreement with the IBK command, take part in the planning of the Spre?a-95 operation, which has the task of cutting off the Muslim armed forces along the Kalesija-Simin Han line, and then breaking up and destroying them in the region of Teo?ak, Sapna and Vitinica, thus finally removing the danger of a Muslim breakthrough towards the Drina, north of Zvomik. Plamring and execution of combat operations in the Spre?a-95 operation shall be the responsibility of the IBK command. 'l`he operation shall begin after completion of planning and preparation, when material support is in place and at the decision of the VRS Main Staff. The corps command shall form brigade-strength ready forces for intervention along threatened axes and carrying, out offensive operations in their area of responsibility and those of others corps. - commander's discretion. SARAJEVO-ROMANIJA CORPS: External lifting of the siege of Sarajevo, the severing of t.he Sarajevo-Tmovo-Kalinovik road or occupation of the Vogos?a, Rajlovac and Hadii?i industrial areas should be prevented at any cost by decisive defence in the and SIE parts of the warfront and persistent and determined defence of its central part, in cooperation with forces of the HK and the l" /?Grbavica/ Motorised Brigade/.. Improve the operative-tactical position in the wider area of Tmovo by planned execution of diversionary and active lcombat operations! (battles and engagements) and various measures of operative-tactical camouflage, tying down as many enemy forces as possible and creating conditionafor a strategic-level operation in the Zujevina and Neretva river valleys with the aim of definitively cutting off Sarajevo and joining up forces of the HK and SRK in the wider area of Konjic. The strategic-level operation Proaor-95 is to be planned by the end of March under . the leadership of the VRS- Main??Staff and together with the command 00817152 aim is to cut Sarajevo off and physically separate the Muslim forces of the. l" and -- -- Corps. All available force of the SRK, HK, VRS Main Staff with reinforcements from the KK, IBK and DK, the equivalent of up to six brigades, are to engaged in this operation, which will be regulated by a special order. In agreement with the HK and l" an operation- named Lukavac-95 is to be planned by mid-March 1995, with the aim of recapturing lost positions on Mt. Igman, Bjelainica and Treskavica, thus creating conditions for extending the attack towards Ivan Sedlo. 'I'he command of the SRK shall be in charge of planning and executing the operation. In the and SIW parts of the front (Vogos?a and Tmovo regions) have a ready battalion in each place continually prepared for rapid intervention along endangered axes and for combat operations in the Corps areas of re ponsibility. The strategic operation is to be carried on completion of operations ZvU?zda-95 and Lukavac-95. The KM of the Corps shall be in Lukavica, and the IKM shall be determined at the comrnander's discretion. A CORPS: An enemy breakthrough from the Dubrovnik hinterland and the wider area of Konavle towards Trebinje and from the middle reaches of the Neretva river towards the Podveleije region should be prevented by a very persistent and determined defence. In the wider region of Rogoj and on the southem slopes of Mt. Treskavica battalion- strength ready forces should stand by for intervention and strikes at the flank and rear of the Muslim forces in case of attack on Tmovo and Kijevo and the threat of severing the Sarajevo-Tmovo-Kalinovik road. 1- By mid-March 1995, in agreement with the SRK command, take part in planning and producing the Lukavac-95 operation, aimed at recapturing lost positions on Mt. Igman, Treskavica and Bjelasnica- and creating conditions for a thrust towards Ivan Sedlo. The SRK command shall bein charge of planning and carrying out the operation. The Zvyezda-95 operadons is to be planned with the command break up the Muslim forces in the Goraide enclave and liberate the Ustipra?a- Goraide-Srbinje road. The DK command shall be in charge of planning and carrying out this operation. By the end of march 1995, the HK command shall plan operations for reaching the Neretva- river valley,- named-Krivaja-95, and for-coming-out- onto the coast-in the - - 00823I59.d0c6r. bl sv I . j? muumm Prevlaka--Cavtat sector, named More-95 /Sea-95/. 'I`he operations shall be planned and . -- -- the combat operations led by the HK command. The operations shall begin after preparations are complete, material support is in place and at the decision of the VRS Main Staff`. Besides HK forces, envisage and plan for the use of free forces from the DK. SRK and VRS Main Staff equivalent to two brigades, which will be regulated by a special order. corrunander's discretion. AIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENCE: Focus mainly on preparing and acquiring the required skills to successfully resist and destroy enemy aircraft in /?our/ airspace and Iprovidel air and fire support to the main VRS forces in case of foreign aggression, improving the resistance and resilience of the VOJ /Aerial Surveillance and Reporting! system in conditions of electronic air and ground interference. Special attention should be devoted to preparing individuals and units for air and fire support to forces during the execution of the strategic-level operations Sadejstva-95 and Pr0z0r-95. By the end of March 1995, form a mixed helicopter section (two transport helicopters, two anti-tank and one general-purpose helicopter) and train them for combat operations in difficult weather conditions and at night, both in RS territory and behind enemy lines, as well as for air combat with enemy helicopters. Particular attention should be given to selection and training of crews. With help from the VRS Main Staff, possibilities should be found as soon as possible to ensrue continuity of tr?aining for LBA Iiighter and bomber! pilots, either and RSK. The command post shall be in Banja Luka, and the IKM shall be determined at the discretion of the and PVO commander. The VRS Irnilitary schools centrelr Focus the work on the complete execution of tasks and duties as set out in the 1995 Training Instructions, staff the Centre with sutiable instructors and improve the material basis for better quality tr?aining, living conditions and student work. Whenever possible, hold practical training as close. as possible to the front or on it, while live-fire exercises using artillery, mortar, anti-aircraft and tank weapons should be carried out against enemy targets. The command of the vias shall fomr a mixed battalion of soldiers, officers and students and use the available combat teaching equipment. This battalion will be on 12-hour starrd-by for dispatch to take part in combat tasks, at the decision of the VRS Main StaffTranslation 008171.34 The battalion is to be formed, supplied with ammunition and other MS and brought to - -- the ordered level of combat readiness by planned training and tests of its combat - readiness. 'I`he mixed battalion should be treated as a reserve of the VRS Main Staff. the Centre cornmander's discretion. 6. SUPPORT FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS 6.1. Moral and support The political leadership of the State and the military leadership are hereby obliged to show maximum readiness and initiative and to take all measures necessary to affirm pan-Serbian unity, define clear and unified national strategies, overcome existing differences and to encourage whatever brings us together, and not what separates us. 'I`he entire leadership of the Serbian people is to be brought together and a unified State-political and military concept under a common leadership established. Extemally, a more aggressive propaganda and information presence should be maintained, aimed at gaining allies, deepening discord in the coalition, unmasking the biased and hostile activities of certain individuals and parts of UNPROFOR and some humanitarian organisations and rmdermining the enemy's fighting morale. This is to be achieved through planned and organised information and propaganda activities coordinated from State level. Intemally, raise the awareness of people and soldiers of the necessity and possibility of waging an armed struggle and militarily defeating the enemy, make them also aware of the need to put all available human and material resources at the disposal of the liberation truggle in order to create a free and unified Serbian state in the former Yugoslavia. The relevant State and military organs responsible for work with UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations shall, through the planned and unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits, reduce and limit the logistics support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material resourcesto the Muslim population, making them dependent on our good will while at the same time avoiding condemnation by the international community and intemational public opinion. - In the implementation of other forms of support for combat operations, all measures are to be taken according to Direcdve Op no. 6. The focus of logistics support in 1995 shall be on units envisagaed for the execution of strategic-level operations; Special attention is to be given to training and full combat readiness of all PTO systems and units. These are to be trained for effective combat against all aerial targets, especially NATO combat formations. M., bl'. sv 14 - I . I 00817135 7. COMMAND AND CONTROL: -- 5 The command post of the Supreme Command shall be in the Pale area and the KM and PKM of the VRS Main Staff shall be in the Han Pijesak area. At VRS level, communications ane to be organised according to existing work schedules, while for operadons controlled by the VRS Main Staff, communications are to be organised according to special orders and schedules. with strict observance of protection instructions. Submit reports as follows: a) Regular reports - by 1900 hours, with situation as at 1700 hours. b) Interim reports - as the need arises and in the case of surprise action or incursions by the enemy. c) Reports on readiness for offensive operations. d) Summary reports -- every third day during active combat operations. 8. Send corps commanders' decisions for approval to the Commander of the VRS Main Staff seven days before carrying out the planned operation. Drafted by: Colonel Radivoje . Typed by: Staff Sergeant Spasoja ZEIJKOVIC Typed in two copies. I SUPREME COMMANDER Dr Radovan KARADZIC lsigned and stampedl 00823159.doc(ir, bl', sv 1 - I