// DRAFT //

U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

Body-Worn Camera
Feasibility Study
Report

Presented by: CBP Body-Worn Camera Working Group
August 2015

i

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................... i
Section I: Comprehensive Summary............................................................................................1
1.1 Background ...........................................................................................................................1
1.2 Establishing a Body-Worn Camera Working Group ............................................................1
1.3 Body-Worn Camera Feasibility Study ..................................................................................3
Phase I – Controlled Environment Evaluation .........................................................................3
Phase II – Field Evaluation.......................................................................................................3
Phase III – Data Analysis and Report Creation ........................................................................5
Section II: Operational Utility Evaluation .................................................................................6
Section III: Deployment Strategies...............................................................................................7
3.1 Pre-Deployment Actions ........................................................................................................7
3.2 Component Deployment Strategies ........................................................................................7
Air and Marine Operations ......................................................................................................8
Office of Field Operations .......................................................................................................8
United States Border Patrol .....................................................................................................9
Section IV: Implementation Considerations .............................................................................10
4.1 Costs .....................................................................................................................................10
4.2 General .................................................................................................................................12
4.3 Records Management and Retention....................................................................................15
4.4 Expectation Management .....................................................................................................16
4.5 Technology Considerations ..................................................................................................16
4.6 Privacy Concerns ..................................................................................................................18
4.7 Policy Considerations ...........................................................................................................19
4.8 Training ................................................................................................................................21
4.9 Risk Management .................................................................................................................22
4.10 Evidentiary Value ...............................................................................................................22
Section V: Conclusion ..................................................................................................................23

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Body-Worn Camera (BWC) Working Group is
pleased to present findings and recommendations regarding the feasibility of using BWC
technology within CBP’s operational environments. The information presented in this report, and
the recommendations made herein, are subject to change as the technology continues to develop
and gain momentum within the law enforcement community and the nation’s neighborhoods.
The BWC Working Group was established in July 2014 at the request of Commissioner R. Gil
Kerlikowske. The Working Group’s objective was to evaluate the feasibility of incorporating
BWC technology into CBP law enforcement operations. Members were comprised of
representatives from 13 CBP offices, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office for
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and DHS Privacy Office.
For twelve months, the BWC Working Group conducted a Feasibility Study. Members studied
available data, reviewed published reports, analyzed expert recommendations, and consulted
scholarly papers to assist in the development of this report. Members also participated in a
government sponsored expert panel hosted by the U.S. Department of Justice-Bureau of Justice
Assistance, and took part in several interagency meetings with the U.S. Department of Justice,
U.S. Department of Interior, and U.S. General Services Administration. Consultation with state
and local law enforcement entities, to include the Los Angeles Police Department and the New
Orleans Police Department, afforded members a greater understanding of the subject matter and
provided valuable insight.
Meetings were held with BWC manufacturer representatives to provide Working Group members
with an understanding of the abilities and limitations of the existing technology. Based on the
information received, a representative sample of available technology was purchased for use
during the feasibility study.
The Working Group employed a methodical approach that incorporated three phases. The first
phase consisted of a controlled environment evaluation at the CBP academies and training facilities
in Glynco, GA, Artesia, NM, Oklahoma City, OK, and St. Augustine, FL. Evaluations at these
sites were conducted by Academy personnel who observed the technology on officer and agent
trainees during scenario-based training.
The second phase, the field evaluation phase, applied practical evaluations at CBP environments
on the Northern Border, Southern Border and Coastal Border. This phase utilized officers and
agents from: the United States Border Patrol, El Paso and Blaine Sectors; the Office of Field
Operations, Seattle Field Office; and the Air and Marine Operations, West Palm Beach Marine
Unit and Great Lakes Air and Marine Branch.

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Additionally, the field evaluation phase utilized the services of the CBP Office of Technology
Innovation and Acquisition in conducting an Operational Utility Evaluation. The evaluation
produced critical quantitative analysis of the data collected during the field evaluations, and the
information contained in their evaluation has been incorporated into the Working Group’s final
recommendation.
The Operational Utility Evaluation concluded that “While there are many BWCs in the
marketplace today, it is vital to recognize that most were not designed to meet the rigors required
by CBP officers and agents. As such, these BWCs tend to provide limited effectiveness, and for
the most part are not suited for CBP operational use. While the concept of BWCs has potential
benefits for CBP, there are operational requirements that need to be met, policies that need to be
developed, and issues that need to be resolved before a BWC solution is deployed.”
The third phase consisted of analyzing the data from the previous phases, as well as associated
policy, legal, privacy, labor relations, operations, deployment, cost, record retention, and
information technology considerations.
After analyzing available data, understanding the capabilities afforded by the technology, and
evaluating the technology within the CBP operational environments, our findings conclude that
BWC technology may offer benefits in support of the CBP mission by:
•

Reducing allegations and complaints, deterring frivolous complaints and lowering the
likelihood of use of force incidents. 1

•

Affording insights into law enforcement encounters that have traditionally been
unavailable.

•

Supplementing evidence in criminal cases increasing the likelihood of obtaining successful
prosecution for those who have violated the law. 2

•

Enhancing training capabilities through utilization of footage as a learning tool.

•

Contributing to a “civilizing effect” on law enforcement/civilian interactions by reducing
hostilities between officers/agents and citizens. 3

•

Strengthening officer/agent performance and accountability.

•

Increasing officer/agent awareness and safety by influencing public behavior. 4

•

Simplifying incident review by enabling the quick and immediate review of footage.

1

Ariel, Barak, William A. Farrar and Alex Sutherland. November 2014. The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras
on Use of Force and Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial; Miller, Lindsay,
Jessica Toliver, and Police Executive Research Forum. 2014. Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program:
Recommendations and Lessons Learned; White, Michael D. 2014. Police Officer Body-Worn Cameras: Assessing
the Evidence.
2
International Association of Chiefs of Police. 2005. The Impact of Video Evidence on Modern Policing: Research
and Best Practices from the IACP Study on in-Car Cameras; Miller, Toliver and PERF, 2014.
3
White, 2014; Mateescu, Alexandra, Alex Rosenblat and Danah Boyd. 2015. Police Body-Worn Cameras.
4
Farrar, Tony, and Barak Ariel. 2013. Self-Awareness to Being Watched and Socially-Desirable Behavior: A Field
Experiment on the Effect of Body-Worn Cameras on Police Use-of-Force.

iv

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The Working Group also identified several factors that may adversely affect CBP officers/agents,
operations, and mission. These factors represent significant concerns that require additional
research and study prior to an implementation decision being made, such as:
•

Impacts to officer/agent safety. The BWCs increase the cognitive load experienced by
officer/agents, causing them to redirect their attention towards the operation of the camera
versus allowing them to focus on the encounter. 5 BWCs may also cause an officer/agent to
second-guess a course of action. 6

•

Implementation of a BWC program may be interpreted as a lack of trust in officers/agents,
which could negatively impact morale and create mistrust and suspicion between
officers/agents and management. Officers/agents involved in the study were concerned
about the BWC video being used for disciplinary actions and uncertain about the BWC
technology capabilities and limitations.7

•

BWCs cannot capture the physiological and psychological phenomena that an officer/agent
experiences during a high stress situation. 8 Consequently, the footage may not accurately
convey the same sense of threat that is experienced by an officer/agent.

•

The diverse operational environments and enforcement assignments within CBP make the
application of BWC technology less conducive than its application within the traditional
law enforcement environment.

•

The presence of a BWC may negatively impact intelligence gathering, such that the public
may be less likely to divulge information if they know they are being recorded. 9

•

BWC technology, and its corresponding software, may pose a significant vulnerability and
security risk to CBP through the availability of Bluetooth capabilities, interactive apps and
a lack of adequate security features. Streaming and interfacing with non-CBP approved
devices and signals from BWCs could be susceptible to hacking. 10

•

The significant costs associated with implementation, including those that must be born
long after the initial purchase costs have been defrayed, such as: technology enhancements,
infrastructure improvements, associated costs of storage, and additional staffing
requirements to support the management of footage.

•

The associated man-hours needed to manage and support the program, such as:
enforcement hours lost due to new administrative duties for end of shift uploading of
footage, processing of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, records management
and retention, training, and technology infrastructure support.

5

See Section II. Operational Utility Evaluation, page 6.
Force Science Institute, Ltd. 2015. 10 Limitations of Body Cams You Need To Know For Your Protection.
7
See Section II. Operational Utility Evaluation, page 6.
8
Force Science Institute Ltd., 2015.
9
See Section II. Operational Utility Evaluation, page 6.
10
Ibid.
6

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After compiling available information, reviewing the feedback received from participating
officers/agents, and considering the evaluation results provided by the Office of Technology
Innovation and Acquisition, the Working Group offers the following three paths forward and
recommends their completion prior to deploying BWC technology.
1. Develop a final policy document that advances solutions for key issues and establishes
parameters for the handling, cataloging, use, access, and activation of BWCs and the
resulting footage.
2. Perform technology evaluations that identify specific technology requirements for each
operational component.
3. Examine existing fixed camera technology to identify areas where BWC technology may
overlap with existing technology, causing redundancy and duplication. Reserve the use of
BWC technology for those areas where technology gaps are identified.
In conclusion, the complexity of the issues surrounding the use of BWCs requires a deliberative
approach to deployment, as well as consideration to the long-term consequences that may continue
to impact the CBP law enforcement mission into the future. The Working Group considered and
rejected several different deployment options, including a pilot program and broad-based
deployment, before deciding on the recommended paths forward.
Our research and findings leads the Working Group to recommend a risk-based deployment
option. A risk-based deployment option consists of measured deployment based on individual
component risk analysis and operational need. This approach will allow for a fluid deployment
strategy that is fact based and responsive to individual component operational requirements. Each
component may, based on their operational need, be able to utilize the technology as an operational
tool, which could ultimately have a significant positive impact on CBP’s overall mission, as long
as a cautious and deliberate implementation strategy is applied.

Body-Worn Camera Working Group
August 2015

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I. Comprehensive
Summary
•
•
•

1.1 Background
In 2013, a comprehensive review of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) use
of force policy by internal and external
entities
generated
more
than
90
recommendations calling for enhancements
to policy, training and tactics, analysis tools,
equipment options for officers/agents, and a
defined operational and tactical posture. CBP
agreed with the spirit of the review, as well as
the underlying concerns, and began taking
steps to implement the recommendations.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

One of the recommendations stated that CBP
should study the feasibility of using video
cameras. As part of CBP’s emphasis on
increasing officer/agent safety, as well as
being accountable to the public, CBP sought
to determine the feasibility of including
body-worn camera (BWC) technology into
its law enforcement operations and each of its
operational environments.

The Working Group established a threephased approach to allow for the thorough
consideration of issues surrounding the
application of BWCs in the operational
environments of Air and Marine Operations,
Office of Field Operations and United States
Border Patrol. The Air and Marine
Operations, Office of Field Operations and
United States Border Patrol designated
headquarters level BWC Program Managers
to oversee the implementation, logistics and
evaluation during the study.

1.2 Establishing a Body-Worn
Camera Working Group
On July 30, 2014, at the request of
Commissioner R. Gil Kerlikowske, CBP
established a Working Group to evaluate the
feasibility of incorporating BWC technology
into its law enforcement operations. The CBP
BWC Working Group was comprised of
representatives from the following offices:
•
•
•
•

Liaison, Office of Policy and Planning,
Privacy and Diversity Office, and
Office of State, Local and Tribal
Liaison,
Office of Congressional Affairs,
Office of Field Operations (OFO),
Office of Human Resources
Management,
Office of Information and Technology,
Office of Internal Affairs,
Office of Public Affairs,
Office of Technology Innovation and
Acquisition,
Office of Training and Development,
United States Border Patrol (USBP),
and
Department of Homeland Security:
Office for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties and Privacy Office.

During the first phase, trainees evaluated
BWCs during scenario-based training at the
CBP academies and training facilities. In the
second phase, officers/agents wore BWCs in
various operational environments. During the
third phase of the study, the Working Group
thoroughly analyzed data generated in the
study and formulated recommendations
regarding the feasibility of using BWC
technology within the CBP operational
environments.

Air and Marine Operations (AMO),
Office of Administration,
Office of the Chief Counsel,
Office of the Commissioner:
Non-Governmental Organization
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U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Body-Worn Camera Feasibility Study
Phase I

Phase II

Conducted a controlled
Conducted a limited field
environment evaluation at the evaluation at the Northern Border,
CBP academies and training
Southern Border and Coastal
facilities
Border

October 2014 to
December 2014

January 2015 to
May 2015

Phase III

Prepared findings,
recommendations and
report for the
Commissioner

June 2015 to
August 2015

Table 1. Feasibility Study - Phases and Dates

agencies, as well as a variety of other
stakeholders, to discuss a wide range of
topics from policy, procedure and legal
liability, to technology requirements and
training. Representatives from police
departments across the country such as Fort
Worth, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New
York City, Oakland, Phoenix, Washington
DC, and Seattle shared valuable information
with Working Group members.

Throughout the yearlong process, Working
Group members studied available data,
analyzed
expert
law
enforcement
recommendations, and consulted scholarly
papers to understand the fundamental
aspects, benefits, and limitations of BWC
programs.
Members reviewed model policies created by
the Police Executive Research Forum, the
International Association of Chiefs of Police
(IACP), the American Civil Liberties Union,
and consulted existing policy documents
from state and local law enforcement
agencies that have or are in the process of
implementing a BWC program. On several
occasions, members took part in interagency
discussions with attorneys and researchers
from the U.S. Department of Justice-Bureau
of Justice Assistance. Topics included policy
issues associated with BWC usage, current
technology capabilities and limitations, and
lessons learned from state and local law
enforcement deployment.

Meetings were held with BWC manufacturer
representatives to provide Working Group
members with an understanding of the
abilities and limitations of the existing
technology. Based on the information
received, a representative sample of available
technology was purchased for use.
Finally, the Working Group assessed the
legal and operational issues associated with
establishing a BWC program in a large
federal law enforcement agency.

Working Group members also participated in
a BWC expert panel hosted by the U.S.
Department of Justice-Bureau of Justice
Assistance. Members collaborated with
leaders from small and large law enforcement
2

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1.3 Body-Worn Camera Feasibility
Study
Phase I – Controlled Environment
Evaluation
Phase I of the BWC feasibility study, which
lasted from October 1, 2014 through
December 31, 2014, evaluated the
functionality of BWCs in the non-operational
environments of the CBP academies and
training facilities. Locations used were:
•
•
•
•
•

BWC Demonstration to USBP Leadership

Border Patrol Academy, Artesia, NM;
Field Operations Academy, Glynco,
GA;
National Marine Training Center, St.
Augustine, FL;
National Air Training Center,
Oklahoma City, OK; and
Air and Marine Basic Training
Academy, Glynco, GA.

Coordinators (a new addition for Phase II)
and CBP Supervisory Officer/Agents. CBP
engaged both the National Border Patrol
Council and National Treasury Employees
Union during implementation of Phases I and
II.
Phase II – Field Evaluation
Phase II of the feasibility study, which lasted
from January 2015 through May 31, 2015,
evaluated the use of BWCs in select Air and
Marine Operations, Office of Field
Operations and United States Border Patrol
operational environments. Officers/Agents
volunteered to wear BWCs during daily
assignments to record enforcement-related
encounters at the time of the event, or as soon
as safely possible thereafter. Ninety
officers/agents participated in eight selected
locations. CBP deployed 32 devices to the
field for Phase II evaluation (USBP = 12
devices, AMO = 10 devices, OFO = 10
devices).

CBP trainees, under the guidance of
instructors and training personnel, evaluated
various BWC technology during scenariobased training (i.e., replicated situations of
real life events and encounters). Participants
completed user evaluation surveys which
were forwarded to the BWC Program
Managers.
The Working Group developed guidance
documentation and training materials prior to
the start of Phase II. Officer/Agent safety was
the primary consideration for CBP leadership
and Working Group members. The guidance
documentation,
which
details
when
officers/agents should activate and deactivate
the camera, encourages them to advise
individuals that they are being recorded, but
does not require them to obtain consent. It
also prohibits CBP from modifying
recordings and outlines procedures for the
review of BWC footage. The guidance details
the responsibilities of the CBP Headquarters
BWC
Program
Managers,
BWC

For Phase II, the Working Group asked the
CBP Office of Technology Innovation and
Acquisition-Operational Integration and
Analysis Directorate, Operational Evaluation
Branch to conduct an Operational Utility
Evaluation of BWC technology. The
Operational Utility Evaluation was not a test
of BWC technology, but rather an evaluation
of its potential effectiveness and suitability in
support of the CBP mission when employed
3

 // DRAFT //
by typical operators at various operational
sites. The Operational Evaluation Branch, a
DHS designated Operational Test Authority,
coordinated with the three CBP Headquarters
BWC Program Managers to develop the
following Operational Issues (OI).
•

•

Air and Marine Operations Locations
Two locations were selected for BWC
technology evaluation within the Air and
Marine Operations environment (Northern
Region and Southeast Region). Five cameras
were deployed at each selected location. Six
agents volunteered to participate, were
trained on the use of the cameras, and
participated in the study.

OI-1: Does the information provided by
body-worn
camera
technology
contribute to the overall CBP mission?
OI-2: Can body-worn cameras be
employed by typical CBP personnel in
the operational environment?

The Air and Marine Operations evaluation
was focused on the daily assignments of air
interdiction and marine interdiction agents.
Such assignments included: pilot certificate
inspections, marine intercepts and marine
boardings.

The Operational Utility Evaluation was
conducted by an Operational Evaluation
Branch-Evaluation Team at all evaluation
sites from January to May 2015. They
focused on BWC technology in regards to the
two OIs, not on any one particular product or
vendor solution.

Air and Marine Operations
Phase II Evaluation Locations
Locations

•
•

Finish

January 6

March 31

Second
January 26
Location:
Great Lakes Air
and Marine
Branch,
Selfridge, MI

April 30

First Location:
West Palm
Beach Marine
Unit, FL

The CBP Headquarters BWC Program
Managers and the CBP Field Office/Sector
designated BWC Coordinators who were
responsible
for
overseeing
the
implementation and evaluation of BWCs at
their specific field location, training
volunteers, on-site daily deployment, and
troubleshooting. The BWC Coordinators
ensured that officers/agents successfully
completed BWC training. Only volunteer
officers/agents who completed all necessary
training requirements participated in the
evaluation. Training included:
•

Start

Table 2. AMO Phase II Evaluation Locations and Dates

Office of Field Operations Locations
One Field Office was selected for evaluation
with three locations that incorporated an air,
land and sea venue. Ten cameras were
deployed and evaluations lasted for 30 days
at each selected site. Thirty-nine officers
volunteered to participate, were trained on
the use of the cameras, and participated in the
study.

The correct procedures for operating a
BWC;
Understanding and acknowledging the
protocols regarding the use of BWCs;
and
Procedures for the proper upload,
safekeeping, and labeling of BWC
recorded data.

4

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The Office of Field Operations evaluation
sites were limited to daily assignments that
encompassed a representative sample of CBP
Officer duties. Assignments included: preprimary inspection, outbound operations,
cargo inspection, vessel boarding, private
aircraft inspections, and use of force training
venues. Cameras were not deployed in areas
prohibited
by
the
draft
guidance
documentation nor in primary inspection
areas covered by existing cameras.

to sensor activations, all-terrain vehicle, and
roving patrol. Cameras were not deployed in
processing centers, hospitals, airports or
other specialty unit assignments.
United States Border Patrol
Phase II Evaluation Locations
Locations
Start
Finish

Office Of Field Operations
Phase II Evaluation Locations
Locations
Start
Finish
First Location:
Seattle Seaport,
Seattle Field
Office

February
26

March 28

Second Location:
Seattle-Tacoma
Airport, Seattle
Field Office

April 2

May 2

Third Location:
Blaine Land
Border Crossing,
Seattle Field
Office

May 3

First Location:
Santa Teresa
Station, El Paso
Sector

February
18

March 14

Second Location:
Ysleta Station,
El Paso Sector

March 22

April 18

May 3

May 30

Third Location:
Blaine Station,
Blaine Sector

Table 4. USBP Phase II Evaluation Locations and Dates

Phase III – Data Analysis and Report
Creation
Phase III of the feasibility study, which began
in June 2015, focused on the analysis of the
data generated during the previous two
phases. Working Group members analyzed
the data from Phase I and II, as well as
associated policy, legal, privacy, labor
relations, operations, deployment, cost,
record retention, and information technology.
The Working Group’s analysis and
recommendations are subsequently laid out
in the next few sections.

May 30

Table 3. OFO Phase II Evaluation Locations and Dates

United States Border Patrol Locations
Three locations were selected for evaluation
(One Northern Border Station, One
Southwest Border Station, and One
Checkpoint location). Twelve cameras were
deployed at each location and evaluations
lasted for 30 days at each selected site. Fortyfive agents volunteered, were trained on the
use of the technology, and participated in the
study.
The United States Border Patrol evaluation
sites focused on certain daily field
assignments. Such assignments included: line
watch, checkpoint, sign-cutting, responding

Excerpt Taken From BWC Footage
Taken During Phase II – USBP

5

 // DRAFT //
distance and defensive stances (e.g.,
blading off; field interview stance)
necessary to avoid standing in a
compromising position.

II. Operational
Utility Evaluation
At the request of the BWC Working Group,
CBP’s Office of Technology Innovation and
Acquisition-Operational Integration and
Analysis Directorate, Operational Evaluation
Branch conducted an Operational Utility
Evaluation of BWC technology. Ultimately,
the Operational Utility Evaluation concluded
that “While there are many BWCs in the
marketplace today, it is vital to recognize that
most were not designed to meet the rigors
required by CBP officers and agents. As
such, these BWCs tend to provide limited
effectiveness, and for the most part are not
suited for CBP operational use. While the
concept of BWCs has potential benefits for
CBP, there are operational requirements that
need to be met, policies that need to be
developed, and issues that need to be
resolved before a BWC solution is
deployed.”
Throughout the evaluation period, 1,895
video files were recorded for a total of 163
gigabytes of data stored, representing about
271 hours of video footage.
The Operational Utility Evaluation also
reported the following findings:
•

•

•

BWCs were generally easy to use, but
time to upload videos was excessive and
could reduce available enforcement
hours.

•

Several
officers/agents
expressed
concern that BWCs caused others they
encountered to be more guarded in their
conversations thus limiting exchange of
information,
hindering
intelligence
gathering, and rapport building with
public and private land managers.

•

Lack of adequate security features could
allow videos to be deleted by personnel
either intentionally or unintentionally.

•

Lack of video stabilization and wind
noise made some videos less useful.

•

Officers/Agents indicated that the BWCs
did not have sufficient video quality
during night operations.

•

Cameras that lacked an auto rotation
feature produced hard to view upside
down videos.

•

Agents were concerned about the video
being used for disciplinary actions.

•

Lack of security allows some cameras to
be susceptible to hacking.
Body-Worn Camera Statistics by Component

In general, BWCs caused officers/agents
to have reduced situational awareness
during an encounter as they were more
concerned whether their camera was on
or off and pointed in the right direction
rather than having all their attention on
the situation and person they were
confronting. This is an unsafe scenario.
Officers/Agents felt that officer safety
could be compromised due to positioning
themselves in a way to capture an event
for the camera rather than taking proper

Component

Number
of BWC
Users

Average
Years of
Experience

Number of
Video Files
Created

AMO

6

18.5

18

OFO

39

11.1

840

USBP

45

11

1,037

TOTAL

90

13.5

1,895

Table 5. Operational Utility Evaluation

6

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3. Evaluate current capabilities to avoid
redundancies. Investigate the benefits of
enhancing existing fixed camera
technology to determine the most
effective technology options for each
location.

III. Deployment
Strategies
3.1 Pre-Deployment Actions

4. Involve officer/agents in the decision
making process to establish a bottom-up
approach that articulates the concerns and
opinions of the end users.

In order to maximize the benefits of BWC
technology
and
realize
successful
implementation there are several actions that
must be completed prior to the deployment of
any BWC device. These actions will serve as
the foundation on which a BWC program can
be implemented and their successful
completion is a key first step in the overall
process.

5. Avoid a one-size fits all approach to
implementation. The diversity of the CBP
operational
environments
requires
multiple product and deployment options.
6. Make
resource
allocations
and
deployment choices as close as possible
to the operational decision points. This
will ensure a thorough understanding of
individual component needs and make
sure that decisions are fact based.

1. Develop a final policy document to
ensure effective and efficient utilization
of the technology. The policy
development process should:
a. Advance solutions for issues that may
impede successful deployment, such
as: costs, records retention, privacy,
training, expectation management,
program messaging, BWC footage
handling, cataloging and access
protocols, and BWC use and
activation parameters.

3.2 Component Deployment
Strategies
Within the operational environments of the
Air and Marine Operations, Office of Field
Operations, and United States Border Patrol
there exists a large variance in the type of
terrain, weather conditions, and operational
duties performed by each component. These
differences necessitate the creation of
individual BWC deployment strategies for
each component. The Working Group, in
coordination with each component, makes
the following recommendations.

b. Engage the National Treasury
Employees Union and National
Border Patrol Council in the decision
making process.
2. Perform technology evaluations that
identify specific technology requirements
to support CBP operations. Current
technology limitations make full scale
implementation not possible as available
products may be effective, but not
suitable for all CBP operational
environments.

Each component strategy includes more than
one recommendation. Recommendations can
be implemented separately or in concert with
one another to provide each component the
most beneficial path forward.

7

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Air and Marine Operations
Risk-Based Deployment – Aircraft
Certificate Inspection and Vessel
Interdiction Operations.
The Air and Marine Operations deployment
strategy should encompass a risk-based
approach to deployment that can utilize BWC
technology in those areas or assignments
where internal assessments have indicated
the need for an enhanced level of technology.

Excerpt Taken From BWC Footage Captured During Phase I
Field-Based Scenarios – AMO

Office of Field Operations

Risk factors should be determined by Air and
Marine Operations leadership, and may
include: duties that result in a high level of
complaints, gaps in existing technology, or
other identified needs. Consideration should
be given to those areas where the benefits of
the technology can be maximized and
deficiencies minimized. The deployment of
BWC technology should remain fluid and
deployment adjustments should be made
based on evolving needs.

Enhance and Expand Current Fixed Camera
Capabilities.
The Office of Field
Operations
deployment
strategy should begin by
examining existing fixed
camera technology, with
the
expectation
of
Camera – CBP
expanding and enhancing
current infrastructure, technologies, and
recording abilities to optimize present-day
resources. The deployment of BWC
technology should be reserved for areas
where technology gaps are identified.

The Air and Marine Operations may realize
the greatest benefit from BWC technology in
its aircraft certificate inspection operations.
The recording of these encounters will aid in
resolving complaints from citizens and the
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association.

A significant portion of the Office of Field
Operations operational environment already
has varying degrees of existing camera
coverage.
Subsequently,
wholesale
deployment of BWCs in these environments
would have limited benefits. Enhancements
may include investment in higher grade video
resolution and improved audio capabilities to
allow for the accurate capture of real-time
data. Benefits of BWC technology may be
realized at outbound operations and vessel
boardings where camera technologies are less
prevalent. Vehicle mounted technology may
have applications at outbound operations.

The Air and Marine Operations may also see
value in placing BWC technology on Marine
agents while conducting enforcement
operations. Recording these encounters may
help the complaint resolution process and
capture assaults and uses of force.
Risk-Based Deployment – Vessel-Mounted
Cameras.
The Air and Marine Operations should
continue to pursue the implementation of
vessel-mounted cameras that capture a 360°
view of the area surrounding a vessel. This
would capture most of the Air and Marine
Operations’ significant maritime events.

The DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties has indicated that fixed camera
footage is successful in conclusively
8

 // DRAFT //
resolving complaints involving the use of
force when the fixed camera technology is
optimal and includes audio capabilities. In
ports of entry where optimally placed fixed
camera technology already exists the fixed
camera capabilities render BWC technology
unnecessary. In these cases the fixed camera
capabilities offer multiple angles, audio
recording, and the recording of multiple
officer interactions over the course of an
encounter, which are benefits not offered by
a single officer BWC.

decades. They enhance border security and
improve employee accountability.
Risk-Based Deployment.
A risk-based approach to deployment may be
utilized to dispatch BWC technology to those
areas or assignments where internal
assessments have indicated the need for
enhanced technology.
Risk factors would be articulated by United
States Border Patrol leadership and may
include: volume of illegal traffic, rate of
assaults against agents, frequency of
complaints against agents, gaps in existing
technology, training, or other identified need.

Risk-Based Deployment.
A risk-based approach to deployment may be
utilized to dispatch BWC technology to those
areas or assignments where internal
assessments have indicated the need for
enhanced technology.

Leadership
would
identify
duties,
assignments, locations, or areas that require
the use of BWC technology based on need.
Consideration would be given to those areas
where the benefits of the technology can be
maximized and deficiencies minimized. The
deployment of BWC technology should
remain fluid and deployment adjustments
should be made based on evolving needs.

Risk factors would be articulated by Office of
Field Operations leadership, and may
include: volume of illegal traffic, rate of
assaults against officers, frequency of
complaints against officers, gaps in existing
technology, or other identified need.

Possible applications for BWC technology
utilizing a risk-based approach may include
checkpoint operations where technology
gaps may exist, and Special Operations
where the agents responding are exposed to
elevated safety concerns and where the use of
force is more likely to occur.

Leadership
would
identify
duties,
assignments, locations, or areas that require
the use of BWC technology based on need.
Consideration would be given to those areas
where the benefits of the technology can be
maximized and deficiencies minimized. The
deployment of BWC technology should
remain fluid and deployment adjustments
should be made based on evolving needs.

Additional applications for the technology
might be found within the Field Training
Units where they may enhance traditional
training tools. At the United States Border
Patrol Academy, agents could be provided
with a basic understanding of the technology,
making them better prepared to make
effective use of the technology in the
operational environment.

United States Border Patrol
Enhance and Expand Current Fixed Camera
Capabilities.
The United States Border Patrol should
consider upgrading and enhancing fixed
cameras at checkpoints and along the
international border. Fixed cameras are a
highly effective tool that have been used for
9

 // DRAFT //

4.1.1 Storage and Security
There are many factors that influence storage
cost, including record retention standards, the
size of the video file, and where and how the
video file will be stored.

IV. Implementation
Considerations

The final record retention schedule for BWC
footage will contribute to the amount of
storage capacity required. The majority of
BWC footage is expected to fall into the nonevidentiary category, thus rendering it
eligible for more timely destruction.

The Working Group identified several issues
that
represent
the
complexity
of
incorporating BWC technology into CBP
operations. The issues referenced are not allinclusive, but represent those that require
resolution prior to implementation. BWC is a
viable technology, but ultimately it is the
successful resolution of the areas of concern
that will determine if benefits of the
technology are realized.

As to be expected, audio and video files, such
as those produced from BWCs, require more
storage than their paper counterparts. The
duration of recording and the resolution
settings impact the size of BWC files. BWC
footage classified as evidence may be
restricted from the use of compression
software that would otherwise minimize the
size of the files. This will exacerbate the
storage concerns and directly impact cost
estimates.

4.1 Costs
Due to the number of variables affecting the
implementation of a BWC Program, the
Working Group was unable to produce a
definitive cost analysis for this document.
However, the Working Group recognized
that the implementation of a BWC program
represents a significant initial and long-term
investment of federal funds and resources.
This investment includes such things as the
procurement of technology, infrastructure
enhancements, officer/agent training, and the
management and storage of footage
generated by BWCs.

Where CBP decides to store the BWC
footage will also influence cost. Whether it is
stored locally or stored and shared over the
CBP network will impact the infrastructure
enhancements that need to be undertaken.
Sharing files over the network will consume
a considerable amount of network bandwidth
and will affect day to day operations and
network usage.

Variables such as the number of individual
camera units, technologies, and data storage
architecture selection largely influences cost
estimates. Operational deployment strategies
also significantly influence cost. CBP policy
decisions also have a large impact on
program costs such as video retention time,
camera activation times, and potential
impacts to overtime. The largest cost drivers
for any BWC program are storage, security,
and redaction of the footage.
10

 // DRAFT //
It has been reported that police departments
pay a minimum of $10 per month, per officer
to store their data in vendor-supplied third
party cloud storage. Many of these solutions
make the data storage a simple task, where
data is easy to recall when necessary and is
destroyed according to the police
department’s schedule.

Cyber security concerns and opportunities for
hackers to access footage make storage
decisions a critical aspect of a BWC program.
While cloud storage might reduce the amount
of time and resources CBP would need to
devote to managing footage, it also shifts
many of the privacy and security
responsibilities onto a third party. These third
party concerns have proven to be problematic
for CBP in the area of cyber security.

Camera vendors have differing formats for
their video as well. Some are not accessible
except through proprietary software. This
becomes problematic for video files that are
kept for long periods, as vendors may
discontinue software products or even cease
to operate. This would make vital video
evidence unusable.

The 2014 Police Executive Research Forum
report, Implementing a Body-Worn Camera
Program, advises police departments to
consult with prosecutors and legal experts on
whether a third party vendor’s policies are “in
compliance with all relevant laws and
adequately preserve evidentiary chain of
custody.”

Conversely, many CBP facilities will not be
able to support the storing of BWC footage
locally without enhancements being made to
their systems.

Additionally, technology staff will be needed
to support records management functions,
such as: filing, retrieval, and management of
the footage. Adequate support is essential to
ensure proper maintenance of files and
adherence to record retention schedules.

Excerpt Taken From BWC Footage Captured During Phase I
Field-Based Scenarios – OFO

Whatever storage mechanism is selected
must meet the standards put forward by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation-Criminal
Justice Information Services. While cloud
storage is offered by many manufacturers, the
associated privacy and security concerns
require this option to undergo additional
review.

11

 // DRAFT //
4.1.2 Redacting Footage
Significant staffing increases should be
anticipated in order to support the expected
increase in FOIA requests for BWC footage.
BWC footage requires special equipment and
certified personnel to successfully redact
footage. The process of redacting a data file
will result in a second copy of the file being
created and stored. Additional storage will be
required to keep the original footage and the
redacted version of the footage. Redaction
and review of footage is also more time
consuming than redacting paper documents.

4.2 General
4.2.1

Human Resource Constraints and
Costs
In addition to the funding required to
purchase BWC technology, the number of
man-hours needed to perform administrative
BWC functions and the increased levels of
staffing needed to support redaction and
storage efforts, contribute to the overall
expense of implementing a BWC program.
The most intensive human capital aspect of
implementing a BWC program comes in the
form of border enforcement hours lost due to
officers/agents needing to review, catalog
and upload BWC footage.

Making BWC footage available to the public
without proper protocols in place violates the
privacy of individuals who may or may not
be associated with the law enforcement
actions that are captured on video. Blurring
individuals’ faces or sensitive information
requires an inordinate amount of time and
expense for an agency, and still does not
sufficiently address privacy concerns. One
solution is to limit the storage of the data;
footage that is not of value for prosecution or
complaint resolution would be destroyed
after a relatively short time. Another solution
to the privacy problem is to exempt BWC
footage from FOIA.

During the Field Evaluation Phase, average
review, catalog and upload times were 30
minutes for every hour of footage recorded.
BWC administrative functions can account
for 1-2 hours
per
Calculations estimate that the
officer/agent
implementation of BWC technology
per
shift
at a USBP Checkpoint could result
depending
in a 8.3% loss in available duty
on
the
hours.
amount of
footage recorded, type of technology used,
the supporting network bandwidth and
infrastructure available. Actual upload time
is a mechanical issue that with different
levels of investment can be overcome.
However, officer/agent time for the review
and cataloging of BWC footage is not so
easily remedied. To view a representation of
potential enforcement hours lost, see Table 6.

12

 // DRAFT //
At the February 26, 2015 panel discussion
hosted by the Department of Justice-Bureau
of Justice Assistance, conversations with
state and local representatives revealed that
several had experienced an issue with
officers not turning on their cameras when
they had been unable to effectively establish
officer buy-in.
Phase II of CBP’s Feasibility Study relied
exclusively on volunteers for the field
evaluation portion. Utilizing volunteers
allowed for increased levels of officer/agent
buy-in since most volunteers had a predisposition
towards
embracing
the
technology. Volunteers were also more
willing to participate and turn-on their BWCs
once they understood the protections
afforded to them under the guidance
documentation.
A deployment strategy that does not rely on
volunteers, coupled with a final policy
document that will be more restrictive and
compliance oriented, will probably change
the opinions of the officers/agents and make
the application of the BWC technology
harder to implement.

Table 6. Representation of potential enforcement hours lost

All BWC footage will require some level of
review in order to correctly identify and
separate evidentiary from non-evidentiary
footage. Correct classification and labeling is
essential to ensure prompt and efficient
retrieval of footage and to avoid the
accidental deletion of evidentiary footage.

“One of the most challenging
issues an agency may face is
officer acceptance. If officers
feel that the video cameras
are being used as a tool to
monitor behavior, as several
officers felt in the IACP study,
they may be resistant to
using the cameras.”

Additional secondary review will also be
required to provide oversight and substantiate
the content and labeling of footage to avoid
the deletion of evidentiary footage.
4.2.2 Change Management
Successful implementation of a BWC
program is dependent on the ability of CBP
to effectively initiate change management.

International Association of
Chiefs of Police, 2004

13

 // DRAFT //
For that reason, continued dialogue and
transparency between CBP decision makers
and the workforce is strongly encouraged.
Making officer/agent buy-in an integral part
of the discussions and solutions is critical to
ensuring a successful BWC program.

4.2.4 Data Metrics
In consideration of the national attention
surrounding CBP’s possible deployment and
use of BWCs, it is anticipated that analytical
data will be requested to substantiate results
and to report on the impact BWCs are having
on CBP’s national security efforts. In
anticipation of such requests, data metrics
should be established and reporting
requirements
developed
to
capture
information pertaining to camera usage and
costs, as well as any changes in the number
of complaints or in the number of use of force
incidents. CBP’s ability to publically provide
the requested data may impact its
transparency and accountability efforts.
Additionally, CBP should explore the
development of an auditing tool to assist in
supporting compliance verification.

4.2.3 Labor Union Considerations
Successful union negotiations are required
prior to implementation. BWC policy
negotiations will be extensive and time
consuming. The negotiations will have a
direct effect on an implementation timeline
and the ultimate success of a BWC program.
Keeping the CBP unions, and the workforce
involved in the development and
implementation of the program, combined
with having the appropriate policies and
procedures, will allay many concerns among
officers/agents. Union engagement regarding
the selection of technology and policy
creation will encourage cooperation and
promote officer/agent confidence in the
implementation process.

4.2.5 Other Federal Agency Integration
The Working Group supports coordination
with federal partners to develop a consistent
federal narrative. Economies of scale and
maximization of federal investments can be
achieved through coordination.

Officers and agents must be willing to wear
and operate their BWCs, without fear of
reprisal. Officers and agents must have the
confidence of knowing that the primary
purpose of BWCs is to corroborate their
sworn testimony, not create frivolous
punishments. They also must be assured their
privacy will be protected from unnecessary
review and release.

CBP should give consideration to including
partner agencies, federal prosecutors, and
investigating agencies in decisions regarding
BWC purchases, file storage formats,
information sharing, and availability and
access to footage.
4.2.6 Available Research and Data
While BWC technology is widely used
within state and local law enforcement
communities, there is a lack of systematic
empirical research on the long-term use and
implementation and the benefits believed to
result from the implementation of BWC
technology. CBP should consider all
available research and data, but be cognizant
of the limited scope and study of BWC
technology that makes the long-term benefits
and effects unknown.

Addressing union concerns about the use of
footage for disciplinary actions should be
discussed and addressed with the unions, in a
proactive and open forum. The discussion
and resolution of this topic will increase the
likelihood of successful implementation.

14

 // DRAFT //
GRS 21 allows for the disposition of
“Routine Surveillance Footage.” However, it
has yet to be determined if BWC recordings,
which are incident driven, will fall under the
definition of “Routine.” If they are not
classified as “Routine” then under GRS 21 all
BWC footage would be required to be
retained indefinitely. The amount of storage
that would be required to support such
retention requirements would significantly
impact costs.

“Data should be retained no
longer than necessary for the
purpose for which it was
collected…..”
American Civil Liberties Union, 2012

Realizing the impact that indefinite retention
would pose to the BWC program, the CBP
Office
of
Administration-Records
Management Office has applied for a
disposition schedule of 60 days for nonevidentiary BWC footage. Evidentiary BWC
footage will be cataloged and retained
according to established rules of evidence.
The application is currently pending within
the appraisal and approval process.

4.3 Records Management and
Retention
The retention requirements for video
recording and the destruction schedule will
play an integral role in policy development
and cost management. Understanding the
records retention process and the limitations
currently in existence are central factors to
consider.

When selecting a destruction schedule of 60
days, consideration was given to allowing
enough time for complaints or allegations to
come to light, while at the same time
balancing storage costs and the potential
downside associated with the retention of
non-evidentiary footage as it relates to
privacy.

The National Archives and Records
Administration provides oversight for the
management of Federal Government records.
Through the use of General Records
Schedules (GRS) they provide authorization
for the disposition of records produced by the
Federal Government. GRS 21 is the
governing schedule for audiovisual records
disposition.

In support of efficient records management, a
naming convention and cataloging system
that allows for the retrieval of files as well as
their timely destruction is essential.
Particular attention should be paid to the
retention and cataloging of footage identified
as having evidentiary value to ensure its
retrieval and retention are in keeping with
established laws of evidence.

GRS 21 states that disposition authority must
be obtained from the National Archives and
Records Administration for the disposition of
records that are not described in the schedule.
It further states that all such records should
be held indefinitely pending disposition
authority.

15

 // DRAFT //

Excerpt Taken From BWC Footage Captured During Phase I
Field-Based Scenarios – AMO

Excerpt Taken From BWC Footage Captured During
Phase II Field Evaluation – USBP

4.4 Expectation Management

4.5 Technology Considerations

BWCs are oftentimes perceived as being a
silver bullet and panacea for addressing
accountability and transparency. In order to
successfully manage public expectations, a
messaging campaign describing the BWC
program’s goals, benefits, limitations of the
technology, and CBP’s stance on the release
of footage will need to be effectively
communicated.

There are many technology requirements and
decisions that need to be contemplated prior
to the implementation of a BWC program.
4.5.1 Storage
While there is no typical file size for BWC
video footage, the quality of the video being
recorded by BWCs and possible limitations
on the use of compression software, may
result in considerable storage requirements.

BWC technology has the potential to enhance
transparency if the footage is proactively
shared with those who believe they have a
right to view it. If managed correctly, BWC
technology may be used to enhance
accountability with officers/agents, the
community, and other interested parties.

4.5.2 Proprietary Software
Most manufacturers require the use of
proprietary software to upload recorded
footage. This proprietary software may be
restrictive and hard to work with. It may also
require regular updates and maintenance that
will place an additional burden on CBP
technology personnel.

The potential for community distrust exists if
officer/agents fail to capture events the public
perceives they should have, or when an
encounter of significant public interest is
recorded but CBP requirements do not allow
for the disclosure of footage.

4.5.3 Technology Cycle
Innovation and new product development by
BWC manufactures is expected to increase as
the technology continues to be more widely
used within the state and local law
enforcement communities.

Coordination between the Offices of
Congressional
Affairs,
Privacy
and
Diversity, Public Affairs, and the DHS Office
for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties is
essential in proactively educating the public
on the disclosure requirements of BWC
footage.

CBP should be cognizant of the typical
technology cycle—approximately every 2.5
years—that results in significant changes to
the technology.

16

 // DRAFT //
The Operational Utility Evaluation indicated
that most BWCs in the marketplace today
were not designed to meet the rigors required
by CBP officers/agents and opportunities
may exist for CBP to drive industry to build
BWCs that fit its mission.
4.5.4 Infrastructure
Certain facilities within CBP will need to be
upgraded to properly support BWC
technology. The additional storage and
network bandwidth requirements needed to
accomplish the uploading and storage of
footage is of great concern. Presently, many
facilities do not have the infrastructure to
handle the volume associated with this
technology.

Excerpt Taken From BWC Footage Captured During Phase I
Field-Based Scenarios – AMO

A thorough review of existing infrastructure
will need to be accomplished and a cost
estimate evaluation created to determine the
financial implications associated with
upgrading and enhancing infrastructure to
support BWC technology.

Excerpt Taken From BWC Footage Captured During Phase I
Field-Based Scenarios – OFO

4.5.5 Back-up System
A reliable back-up/back-end system to
manage BWC footage must be developed or
procured. The system will need to manage
the retention of the data, deleting it after the
retention period expires, and prevent
viewing, editing and deletion by nonauthorized individuals.
A comprehensive back-end system must
provide an impeccable audit trail while
protecting the chain of custody. Moreover, all
access to BWC footage should be
automatically recorded with audit logs.

Excerpt Taken From BWC Footage Captured During Phase I
Field-Based Scenarios – OFO

17

 // DRAFT //
A Privacy Threshold Analysis was completed
by the CBP Privacy and Diversity Office to
identify privacy issues associated with a
BWC program. Subsequently, a Privacy
Impact Assessment will be published to
evaluate the privacy impact of the
information captured by BWCs during the
Feasibility Study. The Privacy Impact
Assessment may be updated and additional
privacy documents may be updated or
developed, such as a System of Records
Notice as required.

4.6 Privacy Concerns
Technology advances coupled with the
proliferation of camera phones and social
media have changed the way people view
privacy. BWC technology allows law
enforcement to record sensitive situations
with a degree of closeness that has previously
been unavailable. The courts have been
unable to keep pace with technology
advancements, and legal decisions have yet
to decide the parameters by which law
enforcement can function in respect to BWCs
while upholding the public’s right to privacy.

The BWC Working Group suggests
additional guidance should be sought from
CBP’s Office of the Chief Counsel in
coordination with the CBP Privacy and
Diversity Office, particularly ones regarding
any Fourth Amendment implications that
may arise with the advent of a BWC program.
Guidelines should be considered for the
recording of vulnerable populations and
sensitive situations. CBP officer/agent
privacy concerns should also be considered
in the creation of a BWC program.

Jay Stanley, in his 2013 American Civil
Liberties Union report entitled, Police BodyMounted Cameras: With Right Policies in
Place, a Win for All, stated that the challenge
of BWCs “is the tension between their
potential to invade privacy and their strong
benefit in promoting police accountability.”
He went on to stress that BWCs must be
“deployed within a framework of strong
policies to ensure they protect the public
without becoming yet another system for
routine surveillance of the public, and
maintain public confidence in the integrity of
those privacy protections. Without such a
framework, their accountability benefits
would not exceed their privacy risks.”
On a whole, the public is aware of street
Closed Circuit Televisions and is accustomed
to being recorded as they go about their daily
lives. However, BWC technology allows
individuals to be singled out and by having
their actions and conversations recorded on a
more intimate level. They also allow for the
potential recording of sensitive situations that
may present a privacy concern. Furthermore,
BWCs may capture audio and video of
bystanders who are not the subject of any law
enforcement encounter.

18

 // DRAFT //
impractical to record an entire shift from
beginning to end due to technology
limitations of memory capacity and battery
life. Even if the technology did allow for the
recording of a whole shift, the amount of
resulting footage would present significant
storage issues at a considerable cost to CBP.
In his updated 2015 report titled, Police
Body-Mounted Cameras: With Right Policies
in Place, a Win For All, Jay Stanley,
recognized the complexities associated with
the topic and stated, “The problem is that
continuous recording raises many thorny
privacy issues, for the public as well as
officers.”

4.7 Policy Considerations
A well-executed policy is crucial to attaining
program success, and should be in place prior
to implementation. Multiple decision points
must be addressed within the policy to
provide officers/agents with clearly defined
parameters, while at the same time affording
them enough latitude to allow for discretion.
Sample policy documents are available from
the IACP, and additional policy guidance can
be located in the Department Of Justice Bureau of Justice Assistance-Community
Orientated
Policing
Service,
Police
Executive
Research
Forum
report,
Implementing a Body-Worn Camera
Program.

The Working Group supports using a broad
descriptor, such as “law enforcement
encounter”, to guide activation decisions.
This same language was utilized in the
4.7.1 When to Record
Phase
II
guidance
One of the most
documentation during the
important and widely
A
clearly
defined
policy
also
assists
field evaluation phase.
debated policy questions
officers
and
agents
in
articulating
their
Feedback received by
pertains to when BWCs
decision
to
record
or
not
record
an
instructors during Phase I
should be turned on and
encounter.
training indicated that
off. There is no definitive
some
officers/agents
answer that is universally
communicated
a
level
of
unease
with the
accepted, but consideration should be given
latitude afforded them, but most felt
to officer/agent discretion, privacy concerns,
comfortable with the level of discretion
camera storage capabilities, battery life, and
given. Success will be predicated on clearly
record retention issues.
articulated parameters detailing what
constitutes a “law enforcement encounter.”
When drafting a policy, consideration should
be given to the amount of discretion that will
be given to officers/agents. Discretion is
important because it recognizes that
officers/agents are professionals, and allows
them flexibility in evolving situations.
Established
industry
norms
suggest
officers/agents should record all “lawenforcement encounters.” Generally, law
enforcement agency policy defines what
constitutes a “law-enforcement encounter”
and what types of encounters should be
excluded from recording. Currently, it is

Excerpt Taken From BWC Footage Captured During Phase
II Field Evaluation – USBP

19

 // DRAFT //
impact, if any, on the accuracy and credibility
of a report if officers/agents are able to
review the footage beforehand.

Just as important will be the creation of
parameters for turning off a BWC at the
conclusion of a “law enforcement
encounter.” The Working Group advocates
for the BWC to remain on for the longest
possible duration in order to afford a more
complete representation of the events.
However, policy should clearly indicate what
is expected from an officer/agent.

There are a multitude of opinions on this
topic from experts in the field, with no
current or clear consensus. Peter Bibring and
Jay Stanley from the American Civil
Liberties Union wrote in their 2015 report,
Should Officers Be Permitted to View Body
Camera Footage Before Writing Their
Reports?, that “In our review of the available
research, we found ample evidence that
seeing additional information than what was
experienced (such as seeing the action from a
different angle) can alter the memory of an
event.” Similarly, many experts believe
officers/agents memories can become tainted
if they are allowed to view footage prior to
writing a report. The idea being that an
officers/agents initial recollections may be
spoiled by showing them what they believe is
other evidence. Therefore, these experts
advocate against officers/agents being able to
view footage prior to writing a report.

4.7.2 Consequences for Failing to Record
If parameters exist for the recording of
encounters, then consequences must be
applied to those who fail to comply.
Consideration should be given to what
consequences, if any, may be applied for
officers/agents who stop recording during an
encounter, have gaps in a recording, or who
fail to record an encounter.
The consequences for officers/agents who do
not record an activity required by CBP policy
should be clearly delineated prior to
deployment. Officers/agents must have a
clear understanding of the requirements for
them to maximize compliance.

Conversely, the Police Executive Research
Forum is a proponent of showing
officers/agents videos prior to them writing
any reports. Their findings and research show
that in stressful situations, even trained
observers may have trouble recalling events
accurately. They argue that since BWC
footage is often the most accurate record of
what occurred, letting officers/agents review
the footage will help get to the truth of the
incident enabling them to remember an
occurrence more clearly.

Since BWCs represent a new technology,
time should be allowed for officers/agents to
become comfortable with the technology
before disciplinary action takes effect. How
much time should be allowed, and the type of
consequence imposed, will be contentious
issues requiring additional review and
consideration.
4.7.3 Review of Recorded Footage
Any policy document must address the
question of when officers/agents and
management may review the footage—
before they write a report, always, or never.

Yet still, other experts believe it is a
combination of both that will yield the most
accurate information. They advocate that
officers/agents be required to give an initial
statement before they are granted access to
footage. Officers/agents should then be
allowed to watch the footage and offer
additional information if it jogs their memory

This issue will have a direct impact on
officer/agent morale and the successful
prosecution of criminal cases. The final
decision should take into consideration the
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or if they left out, misremembered, or missed
something entirely. This approach may help
provide the fullest picture of what happened
without tainting their initial recollection.

exists for CBP training curriculums to be
improved through the use of BWC footage.
Recordings could be used as remedial
training tools to correct the behavior of
individual officers/agents, with or without
disciplinary action being taken. In addition,
processes will need to be in place to respond
to observed deficiencies in existing policies
or tactics that come to light as a result of the
review of footage.

The Working Group was unable to reach a
consensus on this issue. All sides felt equally
passionate about the merits of their opinion,
which is a strong indication of the complexity
of the topic. Regardless of which viewing
option is chosen, processes will need to be in
place to respond to observed deficiencies in
existing policies or tactics that come to light
as a result of reviewed footage.

The Working Group believes that BWCs
have the potential to be a useful training tool,
although the Department of Justice-Office of
Justice Programs has reported that this claim
is mostly untested. There is some evidence
that BWCs are being used for training in the
United Kingdom and the Miami Police
Department, but more research is needed to
fully evaluate the effectiveness of BWCs as a
training tool.
It must be noted that initial and continual
training will require additional resources for
materials, as well as time for training. An
issue that came up repeatedly during the
evaluation was an agent’s failure to activate
the devices in a timely manner. Many agents
simply failed to turn on the devices due to
their focus on the dynamic situation at hand.
This issue could be alleviated with training,
but could still be problematic.

Excerpt Taken From BWC Footage Captured During Phase I
Field-Based Scenarios – AMO

Effective workforce training and public
education play an integral role in the
successful implementation of a BWC
program. To that end, training should not be
limited to the officers/agents that will be
using the technology. Training should be
expanded to incorporate a public, media, and
court system awareness campaign.

Excerpt Taken From BWC Footage Captured During Phase I
Field-Based Scenarios – OFO

4.8 Training
Ensuring BWC footage is utilized as a
teaching tool instead of a discipline tool is
directly tied to change management. BWC
footage could be used as a mechanism to
provide constructive feedback and promote
officer/agent awareness. The opportunity
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Further evidence in the report stated that “In
April 2013, the Phoenix Police Department
began a yearlong study using BWCs.
Complaints against officers wearing body
cameras dropped by 23 percent during the
testing period, compared to a nearly 11percent increase in complaints for the officers
without them. Anecdotal evidence from the
study found that the use of BWCs had a
‘civilizing effect’ on civilians who
recognized that they were being recorded.”

4.9 Risk Management
BWCs may modify the behavior of both
citizens and law enforcement. As such,
BWCs could play a role in CBP’s risk
management by reducing the number of
incidents involving force, reducing civil
liability, and increasing officer/agent safety.
BWC footage may also:
•
•
•

•

•

Decrease the number of complaints
from the public.
Decrease the number of lawsuits filed
against CBP.
Resolve lawsuits more quickly through
settlements in cases where the video
evidence eliminates disputes about
facts of a case.
Deter the filing of frivolous claims and
help CBP evaluate the merits of a case
before engaging in any settlement
negotiations.
Establish a faster and more effective
complaint resolution process.

4.10 Evidentiary Value
In 2004, The IACP, in partnership with the
National District Attorneys Association and
the American Prosecutors Research Institute,
conducted a survey regarding the use of in car
police camera footage in criminal
prosecutions. The survey of prosecutors
examined the positive and negative aspects of
acquiring and using video evidence.
The survey reported “anecdotal evidence that
cases involving video evidence were more
rapidly resolved.” Prosecutors told IACP that
“the greatest value of video evidence is its
ability to refresh the officer’s memory” and
“to verify the accuracy of written reports and
statements surrounding [an] incident.”
Among the prosecutors surveyed, “96%
reported that video evidence has improved
their ability to prosecute cases.” It can be
speculated that if these types of benefits were
derived from the use of in-car video, then the
footage provided by BWCs may be just as, if
not more so, worthwhile.

However, in order to support the benefits
listed above, CBP’s video retention period
will have to be long enough to ensure that
relevant footage is preserved for review.
In 2014, Michael D. White, with the Office
of Community Oriented Policing Service,
offered the following information in his
report, Police Officer Body-Worn Cameras:
Assessing the Evidence. “In 2012, Mesa,
Arizona, police officers were equipped with
BWCs as part of a yearlong study. The study
indicated that BWC caused a significant
decrease in the number of complaints filed
against officers. Officers who wore cameras
were the subject of eight complaints during
the first eight months of the study, while the
officers who did not wear cameras were the
subject of 23 complaints during that same
period.”
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different. The BWC Working Group
recommends
against
sacrificing
a
deliberative and methodical process in order
to expedite a deployment decision.

V. Conclusion

Thoughtful consideration of the advantages
and disadvantages of BWC technology,
resolution of policy issues, as well as
recognition of the diverse individual
component operational environments, riskassessments and enforcement assignments,
should direct the implementation decision
and timeline.

Whether the decision to deploy BWCs is
based on identified risks, supplementing
existing fixed camera technologies, or
additional research and investigation, the
decision remains complex. Reconciling costs
and infrastructure limitations with the
perceived
benefits
of
increased
accountability and transparency will not be
easily accomplished. BWC technology is
already being incorporated into the law
enforcement environment, and regardless of
the decision made by CBP there is little doubt
that officer/agent encounters will continue to
be recorded by the public.

As the Operational Utility Evaluation
revealed, most of the BWCs available in the
marketplace
today
“provide
limited
effectiveness, and for the most part are not
suited for CBP operational use.” The limits of
the available technology make effective and
efficient deployment harder to achieve.

For the immediate future, BWC technology
will continue to outpace policy and law, and
BWC technology decisions will continue to
be made with a decided lack of supporting
data. Innovation is always ahead of
regulation, and this technology is no

The Working Group reiterates that BWC
technology may offer benefits in support of
the CBP mission, but advocates for caution as
the identified factors surrounding BWC
technology may adversely affect CBP
officers/agents, operations, and mission.

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