REPORT AND OPINIONS OF W. KEN KATSARIS
POLICE CONSULTANT AND TRAINER
USE OF DEADLY FORCE BY CLEVELAND AND POLICE
OFFICER TIMOTHY LOEHMANN RESULTING IN DEATH OF
TAMIR E. RICE ON NOVEMBER 22, 2014

Submitted to Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office November 12,2015

The basis for the below listed opinions comes from an intensive review of all the
materials submitted to me by the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office which are listed as
Attachment "A" of this report, as well as the extensive education, training and experience I have
gained from over fifty years of involvement in the law enforcement field.

INTRODUCTION OF W. KEN KATSARIS
I am currently a certified Florida Law Enforcement Officer/Instructor, and consultant in
law enforcement and corrections. I regularly instruct in a wide area of law enforcement and
corrections subjects at the Regional Police/Corrections Academy, where I have been teaching for
over 30 years. For over 25 years, I was also an instructor at the Florida Highway Patrol
Academy. I also participate in law enforcement seminars throughout the USA where I have
instructed Officers, Commanders, Agency Administrators and the Attorneys representing these
Agencies on a number of liability and investigation related subjects, including the Internal
Review/Investigation Procedures following a complaint or incident. In the past I have instructed
over 25,000 Officers from all 50 states including the Federal agencies and the Canadian Royal
Mounted Police in a variety of street survival police procedures that are detailed in my C.V.

 My law enforcement experience includes service as a Police Officer for the St. Petersburg
Florida Police Department, the Tallahassee Florida Police Department, Deputy Sheriff with the
Leon County Sheriffs Office, Trooper with the Florida Highway Patrol and the elected
Constitutional sheriff who performs as the ChiefLaw Enforcement Officer of the County of
Leon, City of Tallahassee, Florida area.
My academic instructional background includes 10 years as the Department Chairman of
the Criminal Justice Program at Tallahassee Community College (Tallahassee, Florida). In this
capacity I directed and taught both the advanced in-service Police training programs and the
degree granting programs, as well as directing the crime lab used to support local law
enforcement. Extensive teaching and training including hands on skill development was taught
in both criminal investigation and criminalistics courses. Academic subjects included courses in
management, procedures, and criminology.
My experience includes extensive instruction to officers throughout the United States on
all of the concepts, issues, and procedures for threat assessment, approaching, controlling, and
restraining resisting subjects. For over twenty-five (25) years I instructed at the Florida Highway
Patrol Academy on use of force policy and procedure, as well as serving as the force and deadly
force advisor for thirteen (13) years to the Director of the Highway Patrol. For over thirty (30)
years I have instructed at the Pat Thomas Regional Law Enforcement Academy. Some of my
assigned subjects are use of force, deadly force, crisis intervention, and dealing with the mentally

ill and emotionally disturbed individual. For over twenty (20) years I have been senior instructor
for AELE, the nationally recognized organization providing instruction to commanders of law
enforcement agencies and the attorneys representing city, county, and state agencies on civil

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 liability claims. I also held the position of instructor for the nationally acclaimed Calibre Press
Street Survival seminar where I presented specific instruction on the skills and tactics of control,
including handcuffing, neck restraint systems, total appendage restraint, active counter-measures,
and tactics for pressure point control. I hold certifications as a firearms instructor, use of force
instructor, electronic control device (ECD) instructor, handcuffing instructor, total appendage
restraint instructor, and lateral vascular neck restraint instructor.

In addition to all of the above experience, training, and education, it is important to also
assess one specific consulting practice that I engage in- assessing police involved use of force,
including physical force, and force utilizing various police tools such as the police baton,
handcuffs, chemical restraint sprays, electronic control weapons, and more specific to this case,
firearms. I am either a certified user or instructor of each tool, and have been a state certified
firearms, and decision shooting instructor, for over thirty (30) years.
Of equal importance to over 30 years of actual police experience in the field and the
forty-five (45) plus years of teaching tens of thousands of police officers from al fifty (50) states,
in both practical, hands-on use of force, and deadly force issues, I have extensive experience
doing case evaluations for the purpose of presenting reports and opinions to the Court. I have
also participated in testifying, under oath, in both depositions and trials in both state and federal
courts, where my testimony reflected I found police misconduct, that conduct was considered
criminal and/or civilly responsible for negligence, gross negligence, deliberate indifference, as
well as objectively unreasonable. In the alternate, where the facts and circumstances were
present to render favorable opinions as to police officer conduct, such as in the use of force or
deadly force, my report, deposition testimony or trial testimony reflected those opinions as well.

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 Over a thirty (30) year history of litigation and court expert consulting, my work would reflect a
near split between my findings and opinions of the police conduct and conformance/nonconformance to recognized policy and police accepted, recognized and trained practices. The
checks and balances of this consulting evaluation of police conduct comes from cross
examination, under oath, as to the police conduct being critiqued. Therefore, my record of
opinions, both supportive of police conduct or below a recognized standard of care findings of
police performance have been archived, public, and very transparent.
Because all of the material listed in attachment "A" was carefully and fully reviewed, and
is detailed and readily available, I will not attempt to summarize all the facts and circumstances
of this case file. To do so in a complete, and thorough fashion, would simply be reiterating the
salient information already archived, and in some fashion summarized by the investigative
process. Also, because I am evaluating the conduct of the Cleveland Police Department's
specific response to a specific 911 call, I will only utilize the information known to the Cleveland
911 call taker, dispatcher, and Officers Frank Garmback, Timothy Loehmann, as well as the
brief, and video archived actions, of Tamir Rice as the officers arrive on the scene. This
approach is the Court established review process of all officer involved shootings.
My opinions of the Cleveland Police Department (CPD) response will be directed at four
(4) areas ofCPD actions: The 911 call about "a guy with a gun;" the dispatch information
provided, via radio to Officers Garmback and Loehmann; the response and approach of the
officers to specific dispatch information as they arrived at the Cudell Rec Center; and the
shooting of Tamir Rice.

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 Again, these opinions will be rendered only on the information known by members of the
CPD, and not all of the information revealed as a result of an intensive evaluation of multiple
surveillance cameras, and witness interviews.

THE911 CALL
On November 22, 2014 at approximately 3:22p.m., the Cleveland Police Department
(CPD)Communication Center received a 911 call from a male who identified himself as
His immediate report was:
"I'm sitting here in the park by West Boulevard by the West Boulevard Transit Station.
There's a guy with a pistol. It's probably fake, but he's pointing it at everybody."
He further reported:
"Guy keeps pulling it in and out of his pants. It's probably fake, but you know
what? It's scaring the shit out of me."
continues by answering specific questions of the dispatcher, and ultimately gives a
description of the "guy" and his clothing. Then he said:
"He's sitting on a swing right now, but he keeps pulling it in and out of his pants,
and pointing it at people. He's probably a juvenile, you know?"
went on to say
"He's right here by the, you know, youth center or whatever, and he keeps
pulling it in and out of his pants. I don't know if it's real or not."

THE DISPATCH TO OFFICERS
When the call is dispatched to Officers Garmback and Loehmann (One Adam twenty-Five or
1A25), the Dispatcher gave the following information to the officers:
"He (

said in the park by the Youth Center, there's a Black Male

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 sitting on a swing. He's wearing a camouflage hat, a gray jacket with black
sleeves. He keeps pulling a gun out of his pants and pointing it at people."
Dispatch assigned it a code 1 (one), the highest priority emergency code for a police call
indicating arrive as quickly as possible using due regard for citizen safety.

OPINION OF 911 CALL AND
DISPATCH TO OFFICERS

My experience, education, and training in the areas of Communications Center
Operations and the generally recognized practices for both call taking and dispatching will
reveal that I have served in both roles as a Law Enforcement Officer Call Taker and Dispatcher.
Furthermore, I supervised a County 911 Call Center and Dispatch Operation as the elected
Sheriff and Chief Law Enforcement Officer, as well as serving for many years as a
Communication and Dispatch Instructor for both local and state police agencies in Florida,
through the regional and state Police Academy. With this as the basis of my review of this case
file facts about the CPD Call Taker, and Dispatcher, I render the opinion that the Call Taker did
gather sufficient information from "

and handled the call appropriately.

It is my opinion however, that the Dispatcher should have provided additional

information, gathered by the Call Taker from "

to the officers who were assigned this

high priority call. That information would have included the specific information that the "guy
with the gun" is "probably a juvenile," and that "

indicated that, while the firearm was

described as "probably a fake," he also clearly reported "I don't know if it's real or not." It is
also my opinion that this specific information would not be very helpful to the officers in terms
of decision making, it was information they should have been provided.

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It is not helpful

 information because the statement "probably a juvenile" is an approximate possible age range of
any age under eighteen ( 18), which certainly does not in any way diminish the threat potential,
and the statements about the firearm are far too ambiguous to be taken as relevant unless the
circumstances were clearly different than this situation unfolded. The comment that "it's
probably a fake," was followed by "I don't know if it's real or not." Again, the officers should
be given all known, and reported information to allow them to process as they are approaching,
and assessing the potential threat(s). Given the split second decision Officer Loehmann had to
make, observing the approach of a 5'7", 195 pound male, matching the description of the "guy
with a gun," who "keeps pulling it out of his pants, and pointing it at people," the officers focus,
threat assessment, movement of Rice towards Loehmann, possibly not reacting to Loehmann' s
commands, and though not perfectly clear, appears to be reaching for his waist under his
shirt/jacket (video), the only objectively reasonable decision to be made by Loehmann was to
utilize deadly force and deploy his firearm. The lack of dispatch information gained by the Call
Taker from "

became irrelevant to the deadly force decision. I include this error by the

Dispatcher as instructive only, as given some other of many potential scenarios, it might have
been relevant. It definitely was not in this situation.

THE POLICE VEHICLE APPROACH
BY OFFICER GARMBACK AND THE
DEADLY FORCE DECISION BY OFFICER LOEHMANN

From the Ohio State Highway Patrol reconstruction of the 1A25 vehicle's approach and
travel through the Culdell Rec Center area, it was determined that Officer Garmback was

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 driving at speeds between thirteen (13), and seventeen (17) miles per hour (MPH). It appears
that the officers were heading for the area of the swings, where the "guy with the gun" was last
reported being seen. However, the described subject they were looking for (Rice) was
apparently spotted, not at the swings, but instead at the Gazebo area, which is not far from the
swings. It also appears that this presence at the Gazebo was not expected, causing Officer
Garmback to apply the brakes suddenly, and hard, skidding for forty (40') feet, and ten (1 0")
inches. This fact is relevant to an assessment of the tactical deployment decision of the vehicle
stop being in close proximity to the identified subject of the "guy with a gun" dispatch call.
When overlayed against the movement, and actions of Tamir Rice, as can be seen in the video,
which would be the same view the officers had, it is obvious to me, from the totality of the
circumstances, that the vehicle stop position was not by choice, but by necessity.
Also, the lack of any further vehicle movement to create distance between the potential
threat, and the officers, would comport with the threat assessment of other reasonable officers
similarly situated. With the identified subject (Rice) approaching the police vehicle, and
appearing to lift his jacket and reach for the waist area of his pants, the potential threat from
possible gunfire at the officers, while making any attempt to move the vehicle, would place
them at significant risk of injury or death. Making an immediate exit from the police vehicle to
confront the threat, immediately moving to use the police vehicle as cover with guns drawn,
while beginning to give commands, even before exiting the vehicle, would be appropriate,
reasonable, and comport with policy and training. The recently provided "ambush training"
would certainly mandate this movement, and action by the officers.

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 However, it is obvious from the surveillance video that both the close proximity of
Officer Loehmann to Tamir Rice, the identified threat assessment reasonably made by the
officer, which shows Rice's movement toward the waist, the fact that the dispatch call was "a
guy with a gun," and that "he keeps pulling a gun out of his pants and pointing it at people,"
provided only one split second choice for Officer Loehmann under what is clearly a tense and
rapidly evolving situation that required the application of deadly force to protect both or either
of the officers. This decision, in my opinion, was clearly objectively reasonable, given the
totality of the circumstances.
The reported criminal activity - "pulling a gun out of his pants and pointing it at
people," and the actions ofTamir Rice lifting his jacket and reaching for his waist, was not only
consistent with the reported, and dispatched, criminal information, but also reflects an
immediate threat of death or serious injury to either or both of the responding officers. These
circumstances comport with deadly force decision making determined by Court guidance,
training, policy, and reasonable, and accepted police practices.
It is simply obvious that the officers had a reasonable belief that Rice was armed. The
trained threat assessment of the focused observations of the movements of the reported armed
person, especially the hand movements, and the movements toward the waist- an obvious "high
risk" area for being a known gun concealment area - combined with the reported, and
dispatched, information that the "guy with the gun," "(He) keeps pulling a gun out of his pants,
and pointing it at people," allows less than a split second decision to apply deadly force,
reasonably. Training and research on action-reaction timing reveal that even the trained police
officer can't wait to determine what the real intentions of the subject are. This would just be a

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 serious compromise of safety given the dynamics of the totality of the circumstances, and
actions ofthis specific encounter. Given the notice of the police presence to Rice, and the
specific threatening actions of Rice toward the reported gun location area on his body, Rice's
actions provided no other alternative to Officer Loehmann than to apply deadly force.
I realize there is some question yet to be answered, if it even could be conclusively
determined, that a warning, or more warning should be given of the potential before the use of
deadly force. However, the immediacy of the threat, the amount of definitive description of the
armed subject, and the hand movement toward the already identified location of "the gun,"
makes any, or further warning notice, against the backdrop of the obvious uniformed police
presence, and information known, totally irrelevant and surely not "feasible."
The issue of the "possible fake" gun, and whether the officers were given that
information or not, is also not relevant. Even ifthe officers were told the 911 caller said "it's
possibly fake," the officers would also have been told the 911 caller reported "I don't know if
it's real or not." The gun experience of the caller is an unknown, but we do know the caller still
reported "it's scaring the shit out of me," indicating he had a reasonable belief the gun was real.
We also now know that the replica gun - identifying "orange tip" had been removed, and
otherwise this specific replica model is an almost identical replica of a real production pistol. In
any event, I again reiterate, given the specific action ofTamir Rice, which can be generally seen
on the surveillance video, it would not have been reasonable to delay the application of deadly
force to confirm either Tamir Rice's intent or the identification of the gun being reached for by
Rice. And, we also know that Rice was warned by the owner of the replica gun that the "orange

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 tip" identifying the gun as a replica fireann had been removed and that the gun really "looks
real."
This unquestionably was a tragic loss of life, but to compound the tragedy by labeling
the officers conduct as anything but objectively reasonable would also be a tragedy, albeit not
carrying with it the consequences of the loss of life, only the possibility of loss of career. But
based on the circumstances outlined above, this outcome for the officers would be to judge them
by other than the Court decisions on the use of deadly force, the State law, training provided by
the State of Ohio, the CPD, and the recognized and accepted National Police Best Practices.
If additional information, evidence, or statements are provided that supplement the
materials listed in Attachment "A" of this report, I reserve the right to amend, add to, or change
myoptmons.

W. Ken Katsaris

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 ATTACHMENT "A"
MATERIALS PROVIDED BY THE
CUYAHOGA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE

EMS
EMS Audio transcript
EMS Run Sheet
EMT Bittel
Aaron Nicholson
Patrick Hough

CSD Report
911 DISPATCHER
CECSSR Subpoena
Grand Jury Subpoena
911 Call Request
911 Transcript
Constance Hollinger
Beth Mandl
Dispatcher Interview requests
CAD Unit History
Event Summary

WITNESSES

LOEHMANN
Akron Police Department
Cuyahoga County Sheriff
Euclid
Independence
Officer Urbania
TAMIRRICE
Cell phone search
Children and Family Services
CHP Investigation
Guidestone
School
INVESTIGATION
AVL
CPD Officers
CPD Witnesses
Crime Scene
Interview Requests
CDR Cameras
Duty Assignments
Frank Woyma Interview

CUDELLREC
Sign in Logs
Other CRC Documents
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 MEDICAL EXAMINER
toxicology Report
Autopsy
Trace Evidence
DNA
CD'S/DVD containing:
Evidence
Interviews
Photos
Video of Shooting
Other Surveillance Camera Video

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