SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
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In the Matter of the Application of
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DRAFTKINGS, INC., A Delaware Corporation,
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— against —
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ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN,
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in his official capacity as Attorney General of the
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State of New York; and
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STATE OF NEW YORK,
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Respondents/Defendants.
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Petitioner/Plaintiff,

Index No.
IAS Part
Justice
VERIFIED PETITION

Petitioner/Plaintiff DraftKings, Inc. (“DraftKings”), by and through its attorneys, Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher LLP, as and for its Verified Petition and Complaint, alleges as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1.

This action seeks to stop New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman from

carrying out his threat to banish from this State a lawful industry beloved by hundreds of
thousands of New Yorkers. The Attorney General, misreading New York’s gambling laws, is
attempting to bully DraftKings—a celebrated company offering Daily Fantasy Sports (“DFS”) to
millions of Americans—and its vendors into immediately shutting down DraftKings’ New York
operations before it even has a chance to defend itself. Using strong-arm tactics and defying the
rule of law, the Attorney General earlier this week sent a self-styled “cease-and-desist” letter to
DraftKings, accusing it of engaging in prohibited “gambling” activities and supposedly giving
DraftKings five business days to “cease and desist” before any enforcement proceeding would be

 filed. But the Attorney General’s staff then turned around and contacted DraftKings’ business
partners, threatening to take action against them unless they immediately ceased performing
services for DraftKings in New York. Emergency declaratory and injunctive relief is therefore
necessary to bar the Attorney General from continuing to abuse his power and to prevent the
irreparable harm that will result from it.
2.

Fantasy sports have become a national pastime. DFS—a natural and more

sophisticated outgrowth of traditional season-long fantasy sports—is enjoyed by millions of
Americans. Although DraftKings only entered the DFS market in April 2012, today it is one of
the nation’s two largest and most successful DFS operators. It serves more than two million
customers across 44 states, including New York. Indeed, DFS companies have operated openly
and permissibly in New York for nearly a decade.
3.

This past Tuesday evening, November 10, without any prior notice, consultation,

deliberation or opportunity to be heard, the New York Attorney General publicly announced that
he considered DraftKings and another DFS operator, FanDuel, to be promoting “illegal
gambling” and demanded they “cease and desist” offering DFS contests in New York. The
Attorney General’s decree was communicated in a four-page letter devoid of judicial authority or
coherent analysis. Indeed, the Attorney General’s letter contains damning admissions that
undermine his newfound position. Within hours of his announcement, the Attorney General took
to the airwaves to publicly slander DraftKings and FanDuel, alleging that the companies are “the
leaders of a massive, multi-billion-dollar scheme intended to evade the law and fleece sports fans
across the country”—a malicious falsehood unwarranted by the facts and unbecoming of a public
official. DraftKings and FanDuel promptly announced that they intended to exercise their First
Amendment rights to petition the courts and seek judicial review from an impartial arbiter.

2

 4.

In the face of DraftKings’ resolve to protect itself in the courts, the Attorney

General resorted to acts of retaliation and intimidation. He claimed that his banishment was
effective “immediately”—despite the explicit five-day notice period mandated by the very
statutes he cites in his letter. When DraftKings would not back down, the Attorney General
resolved to act as judge, jury, and executioner. His aides targeted DraftKings’ most important
business partners and vendors, including the payment processors on which it depends,
threatening them with adverse action if they did not immediately stop performing their
contractual obligations to DraftKings in New York.
5.

The Attorney General’s actions constitute a shocking overreach. He has

unleashed an irresponsible, irrational, and illegal campaign to destroy a legitimate industry,
intending to deprive hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers of the use and enjoyment of these
services. Adding insult to injury, he has done so in defiance of New York law, which plainly
permits games of skill such as DFS. Indeed, academic scholarship, skills studies, and
commentary conclusively establish that DFS is a classic game of skill and entirely legal under
New York law. That evidence was fully available to the Attorney General, but he ignored
it. Since the Attorney General first contacted DraftKings five weeks ago to inquire about
employee gameplay and data security issues, DraftKings has provided its full cooperation, twice
meeting with his office, communicating regularly by phone, responding to information requests,
and producing reams of documents. Never—not once—during any of those communications
did the Attorney General even suggest that he was considering, for the first time ever, declaring
DFS illegal in New York. Instead, the Attorney General chose to proceed in secret, reaching an
illogical and incorrect interpretation of law, and then trying to strong-arm industry participants
into submission before having their day in court. To ban an entire industry from the State,

3

 without even once informing these companies that such a thing was possible or affording them
any opportunity to be heard, violates the most basic tenets of fairness and due process.
6.

Because the Attorney General rushed to judgment without engaging in any

deliberation or discussion, he got it wrong, proffering an incoherent and self-defeating
interpretation of New York law that cannot stand. The Attorney General’s own reasoning
undermines the position he has strained to reach. The Attorney General’s cease-and-desist letter
claims that DFS is a game of chance, not skill. Yet in the very next breath, the Attorney General
admits that a minority of experienced, skilled players reaps the vast majority of winnings—a fact
that confirms DFS is, in fact, necessarily skill-based. The Attorney General also acknowledges
that “the legality of traditional fantasy sports has never been seriously questioned in New
York.” Yet daily fantasy sports is, in fact, grounded in the same game of skill as traditional
fantasy sports played over an entire season and, indeed, is even more heavily skill-based—a fact
that the Attorney General would have understood had he bothered to review expert opinions and
skills studies readily available to him.
7.

Advancing a patently incorrect interpretation of New York law belied by its plain

language, the Attorney General is now an outlier who stands alone. No New York official—
including the Attorney General’s immediate predecessor and now-Governor Andrew Cuomo—
ever found DFS to be illegal. And in New Jersey—where the gambling law is essentially
identical to New York’s—a federal court recently ruled that fantasy sports leagues did not violate
the state’s gambling statutes, finding that “[t]he success of a fantasy sports team depends on the
participants’ skill in selecting players for his or her team . . . .” Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc., 2007
WL 1797648, at *2 (D.N.J. June 20, 2007) (emphasis added). As Massachusetts Governor
Charlie Baker proclaimed yesterday after participating in a fantasy sports contest for fun: “It’s a

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 game of skill.” That’s exactly what DraftKings offers and New York law expressly permits—
games of skill. That should end the inquiry.
8.

The irreparable harm that would result from the Attorney General’s threatened

shutdown is self-evident, and this Court’s immediate intervention is necessary to prevent it. New
York is home to more than approximately 7% of DraftKings’ customers nationwide.
Furthermore, the Attorney General’s cease-and-desist letter—and the adverse publicity attendant
to it—are having a chilling effect on DraftKings’ business nationwide, as well as its ability to
attract new investors and partners. Moreover, the Attorney General’s letter is impeding
DraftKings’ ability to continue its relationships with its current investors and partners. Absent
emergency relief, the Attorney General will succeed in forcing DraftKings to shutter its New
York operations, harming not just the company, but hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers who
enjoy its games—all prior to any judicial determination settling the question of the legality of
DraftKings’ operations. That outcome would make a mockery of due process by effectively
denying DraftKings its day in court, forcing it to shut down before it has even had the
opportunity to defend itself.
9.

Meanwhile, the equities here militate strongly in favor of urgent relief. After

conducting an abbreviated, five-week look into DFS, supposedly focused on consumer-related
issues, the Attorney General then rushed to ban an industry that has been operating openly and
honestly and permissibly in New York for nearly a decade. Not once during that time did any
Attorney General so much as suggest that those companies might be violating the law. Nothing
changed this week that required such a precipitous about-face on the Attorney General’s part.
The only thing that changed was this Attorney General’s mind. In short, there is no justification
for the Attorney General’s draconian rush to judgment, but his misguided conduct could have

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 devastating consequences for DraftKings. This Court should therefore bring an immediate halt
to the Attorney General’s irresponsible, irrational, and illegal actions here.
PARTIES
10.

Petitioner DRAFTKINGS, INC., is a Delaware corporation with its principal

place of business in Boston, Massachusetts.
11.

Respondent ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN is the Attorney General of the State of

New York. DraftKings brings this Article 78 proceeding against Mr. Schneiderman in his
official capacity.
12.

Respondent STATE OF NEW YORK (the “State”) is a sovereign State and is a

necessary party to this action.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
13.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and

Rules (“CPLR”).
14.

Venue is proper because Respondent Schneiderman’s Division of Economic

Justice, Internet Bureau, is located in New York County, New York. Numerous meetings
between DraftKings and Respondents took place within New York County, including meetings
at which the parties discussed the services of DraftKings. Respondents’ violations of due
process also took place in New York County. See C.P.L.R. §§ 506(b), 7804(b).
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS RELATED TO ALL COUNTS
A.

DraftKings And Fantasy Sports Contests
15.

DraftKings provides an online platform for individuals to enter DFS contests with

friends, family, or other fantasy-sports enthusiasts.
16.

While DraftKings has offered DFS since approximately April 2012, DFS games

have been around at least since the launch of Fantasy Sports Live in June 2007. Since then, other
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 companies have entered the DFS marketplace, including FanDuel, which was founded in or
about 2009.
17.

Traditional fantasy sports—which the Attorney General explicitly endorses as

legal—have existed since as early as the 1960s and provide fans with an opportunity to assemble
a fantasy team of real-life players to compete against other fantasy players. Traditional fantasy
contests generally span the entire season of a particular sport—typically four to six months.
18.

DFS was a natural and more sophisticated outgrowth of traditional season-long

fantasy sports. Like season-long games, DFS gave sports fans the opportunity to use knowledge,
skill, and evidence-based analytics to strategically assemble a team of players within firm salary
constraints. However, unlike season-long contests, DFS games last one day or one week
(depending on the sport), rather than for many months.
19.

DraftKings now offers DFS games in 44 states of the United States.

20.

DraftKings offers a variety of contest types (for example, large-field tournaments,

head-to-head contests, private leagues) in eleven different sports and e-sports.
21.

DraftKings users pay an entry fee to enter cash contests, while there is no entry

fee whatsoever to play in free contests. Winners of contests receive prizes. The prize structure
is always known ahead of time when users decide to pay an entry fee and enter a contest, and
does not change.
22.

DraftKings users’ lineups are comprised of between five and eleven real-world

athletes, and the success of those lineups depends on the combined performance in numerous
statistical categories of those real-world athletes across many real-world sporting events.
23.

DraftKings assigns a fictional “salary” to each real-world athlete who could be

selected to any fantasy team, as well as a “salary cap” that limits the sum of the salaries of

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 athletes that can comprise a user’s lineup. The same salary cap and fictional “salaries” of realworld athletes applies consistently to all players in a particular contest, which significantly
augments the skill required to participate and succeed in those contests. This mechanism
prevents DFS players from merely selecting the real-world athlete that they believe will score the
most points at every position in their lineup—such a strategy would cause them to exceed the
salary cap. Rather, DFS players must consider the expected value of each real-world athlete, set
against the constraint to the salary cap, the overall composition of the roster, and the opportunity
cost of other real-world athletes who are not selected.
24.

While DraftKings sets the salaries and salary caps, it in no way has any control,

let alone full control, of the contests, entry fees, or fantasy lineups selected by its customers.
B.

DraftKings’ Contests Are Complex Games Of Skill, Not Gambling
25.

There is overwhelming evidence that DraftKings’ contests are complex games of

26.

To begin, the skill set required to play DFS successfully has nothing to do with

skill.

correctly predicting the ultimate win-loss outcome or margin of victory of a real-world sporting
event, such as a football or basketball game. The results of DraftKings’ fantasy contests are not
tethered to the outcomes of real-world sporting events. DraftKings customers do not place bets
on events outside of their control; rather, they pay entry fees to participate in a fantasy contest
against other contestants in which they compete by selecting the lineup that determines the
winners and losers.
27.

Furthermore, the restraints of the salary cap, coupled with the large number of

real-world players and statistical categories for which fantasy points are earned provide a nearly
infinite number of possible lineups and results, making DFS completely unlike the binary
outcomes in sports proposition bets. Instead, the relevant skill-set involves accurately projecting
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 the performance of individual athletes and strategically assembling individual athletes into
optimal lineups given the constraints of the salary cap.
28.

Sophisticated DFS players know that “optimal” lineup construction varies

dramatically by contest type. In a two-person contest or small league, for example, the optimal
lineup strategy primarily involves avoiding risk and maximizing the minimum expected fantasy
output of each lineup slot within the salary cap. In a large-field Guaranteed Prize Pool (“GPP”)
tournament, however, prizes are awarded only to the top-20% of entries, so outperforming a
single opponent or 50% of a tournament field is not sufficient. As a result, success in GPP
contests over time requires employing an extremely high level of skill and strategy that
emphasizes high-upside (but also high beta) lineups.
29.

The skill-based nature of DFS games has been repeatedly confirmed by leading

experts. For example, Ed Miller—an MIT-trained engineer and noted author of gaming strategy
books—and Daniel Singer—the leader of McKinsey & Company’s Global Sports and Gaming
Practice—penned an article published by Sports Business Daily entitled: “For daily fantasy
sports operators, the curse of too much skill.” Among Miller and Singer’s conclusions was the
assertion that in the first half of the 2015 MLB season, 91% of DFS player profits were won by
just 1.3% of players.
30.

Miller and Singer also identified two primary ways in which skilled users succeed

over unskilled users: (1) skilled users employ lineups that create covariance by choosing multiple
athletes from the same real-life team in order to produce the extreme DFS outcomes—good and
bad—that are necessary to win a large field tournament; and (2) skilled users exploit salary cap
pricing inefficiencies by using sophisticated models to optimize their lineups by projecting which
athletes are most likely to under- or over-perform relative to their salary on a given day.

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 31.

To help measure the degree of control DFS users exercise over their outcomes,

DraftKings engaged Gaming Laboratories International (“GLI”) to conduct sophisticated
computer simulations involving DraftKings contests in MLB, NBA, NHL, and NFL.
32.

GLI tested the performance of DraftKings lineups generated at random—subject

only to the constraint that 90% of the salary cap must be used—compared to the results achieved
by top-earning DraftKings users. In each case, skilled users dramatically outperformed the
computer simulation in head-to-head contests: 83% of the time in MLB, 96% of the time in
NBA, 82% of the time in NHL, and 84% of the time in NFL.
33.

DFS is also fundamentally different than other games about which the issue of

skill versus chance has been previously debated, such as poker. Unlike poker, where players
start each hand on a non-level playing field based on the cards they are randomly dealt, in DFS,
each user starts in the exact same position and has complete and total control over the lineup the
user chooses, within the consistent constraint of the salary cap. The fact that a DFS user has no
control over player injuries is in no meaningful way different from the season-long fantasy sports
games the Attorney General has determined to be skill-based and lawful under New York law.
34.

In addition to reducing the impact of injured and underperforming players, DFS

also greatly enhances the degree to which users can learn from mistakes, develop their skills, and
refine their strategic thinking between contests over the course of one real-life season.
35.

DraftKings would have provided the Attorney General’s Office with this and

other conclusive evidence of the skill-based nature of DFS had the Office requested it, or
informed DraftKings at any time that it was evaluating the legality of DFS under New York State
law. It did not do so.

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 C.

Federal Statutory Recognition in 2006 That Fantasy Sports Activity Warrants
Distinct Recognition
36.

The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”), 31 U.S.C. §§

5361-5367 (2006), prohibits any person engaged in the business of betting or wagering from
accepting any credit or funds from another person in connection with the latter’s participation in
“unlawful Internet gambling.” 31 U.S.C. § 5363. Under UIGEA, “unlawful Internet gambling”
means “to place, receive, or otherwise knowingly transmit a bet or wager by any means which
involves the use, at least in part, of the Internet” in a jurisdiction where applicable federal or state
law makes such a bet illegal. 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(A).
37.

Critically, however, Congress recognized that fantasy sports activities are

different in nature from the conduct UIGEA prohibits, by defining a “bet or wager” as “the
staking or risking by any person of something of value upon the outcome of a contest of others, a
sporting event, or a game subject to chance, upon an agreement or understanding that the person
or another person will receive something of value in the event of a certain outcome,” and then
excepting from that definition, among other things, “participation in any fantasy or simulation
sports game . . . .” See 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(E)(ix)(I)-(III).
38.

In other words, federal law carves out fantasy sports games from the definition of

“unlawful Internet gambling” in this statute. DraftKings operates with careful attention to
UIGEA, to its exception for qualifying fantasy sports activities, and to the laws of the various
states.
D.

DraftKings’ Cooperation With The Attorney General’s Office
39.

DraftKings has operated in New York since 2012. It has advertised on broadcast-

television and radio stations, and entered sponsorship agreements with some of New York’s
major sports teams. Despite operating throughout New York for the past three years, openly and
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 transparently, no state prosecutor has ever brought gambling charges against DraftKings or
questioned the legality of DraftKings’ games. Nor has any state prosecutor brought charges
against CBS, Yahoo!, or other companies that offer online DFS contests, which New York
residents have been playing for almost a decade.
40.

On or about October 6, 2015, Respondents announced publicly that they were

reviewing DFS. That same day, Respondents sent a letter to DraftKings, requesting that
DraftKings respond to certain information requests. Respondents’ inquiry and letter followed
press reports alleging that a DraftKings employee, Ethan Haskell, may have used nonpublic
DraftKings data to gain an unfair financial advantage in a contest that he entered, and won, on
FanDuel. Neither the press reports nor the letter indicated that Respondents were investigating
the legality of DraftKings’ business under state gambling laws.
41.

After receiving the letter, counsel for DraftKings immediately contacted

Respondents and communicated DraftKings’ desire to cooperate fully. On or about October 9,
2015, counsel for DraftKings met with representatives of Respondents.
42.

On or about October 15, 2015, DraftKings produced documents and provided a

written response to Respondents’ October 6 requests.
43.

On or about October 22, 2015, Respondents sent a second letter to DraftKings

requesting a limited number of documents, none related to the legality of DraftKings’ business
under state gambling laws.
44.

Counsel for DraftKings met again with representatives of Respondents on

October 23, 2015.
45.

On or about October 29, 2015, DraftKings produced documents and provided a

written response to Respondents’ October 22 requests.

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 46.

At the end of October, counsel for DraftKings made repeated requests for a third

meeting with Respondents. Counsel for DraftKings understood that Respondents would allow
DraftKings to answer questions and discuss the documents produced. Respondents ignored
DraftKings’ repeated requests for additional communication.
47.

Throughout DraftKings’ cooperation and dialogue with the Attorney General,

Respondents never once indicated that they were investigating DraftKings’ compliance with
gambling laws. Respondents never invited or permitted DraftKings to engage in dialogue that
would allow DraftKings to explain its contests and how those contests are compliant with state
gambling laws. For example, DraftKings was never given the opportunity to produce
independent studies demonstrating that its DFS contests are games of skill.
48.

Respondents gave no indication to DraftKings that they believed that DraftKings’

contests may fall within the definition of gambling set forth in Section 225 of the New York
Penal Law or within any of the other gambling provisions in the New York Penal Law.
E.

The November 10, 2015 Cease-And-Desist Letter
49.

On the evening of November 10, 2015, Respondents issued and released to the

public a cease-and-desist letter (“Letter”) “demand[ing]” that DraftKings “cease and desist from
illegally accepting wagers in New York” and asserting that Respondents intend to file suit “to
enjoin repeated illegal and deceptive acts and practices,” while purporting to provide DraftKings
a five-day period to explain why Respondents “should not initiate any proceedings.” Letter at 1,
3-4.
50.

The Letter is replete with gross errors and misunderstandings concerning

DraftKings’ offerings and the laws that govern those offerings, and contains assertions
undermining the very statutory interpretation it advances.

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 51.

The Letter contends, “the legality of traditional fantasy sports has never been

seriously questioned in New York,” Letter at 2. That is true enough and makes good sense, but
the Letter at the same time incorrectly argues that DFS is illegal. In other words, the Attorney
General is taking the position that if individuals play fantasy sports focused on a particular day or
weekend, it is unlawful “gambling,” but if they continue to do that for a season, then it somehow
transforms into a legal game of skill. Unable to support its false premise that DFS is gambling,
the Letter focuses instead on what it asserts is a “critical distinction” between “traditional”
fantasy sports, whose operators profit primarily from “administrative fees and advertising,” and
DFS, whose operators “are in active and full control of the wagering” and “profit directly” from
it. Letter at 2. Of course, this supposed distinction is both incorrect and completely irrelevant to
the critical issue of whether DFS is a game of skill. The Letter also asserts that, unlike DFS,
“traditional” fantasy sports lack elements of “instant gratification” and “easy game play”; require
a “long-term strategy”; and are played only “for bragging rights or side wagers.” Id. Again, this
mischaracterization of DFS has nothing to do with whether DFS is a game of skill, which is the
core question to be determined under New York law.
52.

The Letter further alleges that DraftKings’ offerings violate the law under the

following theories:
53.

First, the Letter alleges that DraftKings’ operations constitute illegal gambling

under the definition set forth in New York Penal Law § 225.00 for two reasons: (1) because
DraftKings’ customers place “bets”—which Respondents contend are “styled” as fees—on an
“event not under [their] control or influence,” namely, the accomplishments of real-world
athletes; and (2) because “winning or losing depends on numerous elements of chance to a
‘material degree.’” Letter at 1-3. The Letter states, in conclusory fashion, that the “illegality of

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 DFS is clear from any reasonable interpretation of our laws,” in particular, the “New York State
Constitution”—which prohibits “pool-selling, book-making, or any other kind of gambling”—
and, the “statutory definition of gambling” set forth in Penal Law § 225.00. Letter at 2-3.
54.

Second, the Letter alleges that, because DraftKings’ offerings “easily” qualify as

gambling by its customers, DraftKings has violated several New York criminal laws, including
those prohibiting “knowingly . . . profiting from unlawful gambling activity” and knowingly
“possessing any writing, paper, instrument or article of a kind commonly used in . . . a
bookmaking scheme or enterprise.” Letter at 3-4.
55.

Third, the Letter alleges that DraftKings has accordingly misrepresented that it

“complies with applicable laws” and misrepresented that its games are not “considered
gambling.” Letter at 4.
56.

Fourth, although the Letter accuses DraftKings of operating games that are

dependent on chance “to a material degree,” and of misrepresenting “the degree of skill
implicated in the games,” it also accuses DraftKings of “misrepresenting the likelihood that an
ordinary player will win the jackpot” because “the top one percent of DraftKings’ winners
receive the vast majority of the winnings.” Letter at 1-2, 4.
57.

Fifth, the Letter alleges that DraftKings “transact[s] its business in a persistently

fraudulent and illegal manner.” Letter at 4.
58.

The Letter also asserts broadly that DraftKings’ offerings “are neither harmless

nor victimless.” Letter at 1. Respondents contend in that regard that they have learned from
unnamed “health and gambling experts” that DFS “appears” to create “the same public health
and economic problems associated with gambling.” Id. at 2. The Letter also alleges that
“[c]ertain structural aspects” of DFS “make it especially dangerous” to individuals “prone to

15

 gambling addiction.” Id. Those “dangerous” elements that the Letter views as distinguishing
DFS include a “quick rate of play,” “large jackpots,” and a “false perception that it is eminently
winnable.” Id. The Letter offers no support for these contentions.
59.

Shortly after releasing the Letter to DraftKings, Respondent Schneiderman widely

publicized the allegations in the Letter, and expanded upon them, in interviews with numerous
local and national news outlets (television, radio, and print). In those remarks, Respondent
Schneiderman further erred in equating DraftKings’ offerings with offerings by the “horse track
guys” and the “casino industry.”
F.

The Inconsistencies And Errors In Respondents’ Letter
60.

Respondents’ letter is irrational, internally inconsistent, and based on a

fundamental misapprehension of fantasy sports and the governing law. By way of example:
61.

First, the Letter announces that “traditional” fantasy sports activities are legal, but

that Petitioner’s DFS offerings are not. In purporting to draw a distinction between those two
categories, Respondents betray their misunderstanding of the games. The notion that DFS
entails “no long-term strategy,” utterly ignores the reality that selecting a winning lineup is a
complex, skill-infused process involving picking (from within the salary cap) the players that
will outperform others on a host of particularized criteria not directly correlated to an existing
team’s winning, or even any single event. Cf. Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc., No. 06 2768 DMC,
2007 WL 1797648, at *2 (D.N.J. June 20, 2007) (“The success of a fantasy sports team depends
on the participants’ skill in selecting players for his or her team, trading players over the course
of the season, adding and dropping players during the course of the season and deciding who
among his or her players will start and which players will be placed on the bench.”). In that
regard, DFS calls on very much the same complex strategies employed in season-long fantasy
sports. And these are the skills that sharply distinguish DFS participation from the casino and
16

 horse track activities to which Respondents have drawn comparisons in their statements to the
press, explaining why Congress explicitly exempted fantasy sports games from the prohibitions
in UIGEA.
62.

Indeed, DFS is actually more skill-based than traditional season-long fantasy

sports, which the Attorney General acknowledged are skill-based and unquestionably legal.
First, every player in a traditional season-long fantasy sports contest starts off in a different and
unequal position, determined largely by chance according to their position in a “competitive
draft.” On the other hand, all DFS players start off in the same position, with the ability to draft
any player and facing identical salary and roster constraints. Second, because season-long
fantasy leagues go on for months, there is much more chance and unpredictability resulting from,
for example, the possibility that injury or other aberrant events months down the road can affect
player performance, making it difficult to predict performance over the course of the season.
Additionally, season-long players are limited to playing the same athletes they drafted or picked
up as free agents, even in games where adverse conditions exist. DFS players can select any
athletes they want and can thus factor in a variety of additional considerations into their skillbased lineup, such as quality of opposing defense, weather conditions, expected gameplay, and
many, many more variables.
63.

DFS contests also differ from some season-long games in that DFS operators like

DraftKings pre-announce for each contest the players’ salaries, salary cap, number of
contestants, and prize pool. As a result, DFS contests involve more skill than typical season-long
games, which do not require fantasy players to attempt to maximize fantasy points subject to the
assigned salaries and cap.

17

 64.

While DFS contests require more skill than season-long contests, they are in

many other relevant respects quite similar. Both can involve playing for bragging rights and/or a
significant range of entry fees and prizes. Both types of games are designed to be user-friendly,
encourage recruitment of new players, and involve game play that is easy to understand (though
difficult to master). Operators of both types of contests understand and supervise the types of
games that they offer. And some internet sites, like Yahoo! and CBS, host season-long contests
that, like DraftKings’ DFS contests, require entry fees and award prizes in amounts similar to
those provided through the DraftKings platform. Like the season-long fantasy sports business
that the Attorney General appears to endorse, DraftKings earns revenues from administrative
fees on pay-to-enter fantasy contests. Furthermore, these similarities are completely unrelated to
the skill or chance determination of the underlying fantasy contests.
65.

Second, the Letter states that the “the top one percent of DraftKings’ winners

receive the vast majority of the winnings.” But that fact—that, in certain contests, a minority of
experienced, skilled players may win with greater frequency—undermines the Attorney
General’s legal conclusion. Those players win with greater frequency precisely because DFS is
a game of skill that rewards experience, talent, and improvement over time.
66.

Third, in asserting that the relevant legal test in N.Y. Penal Law § 225.00(2)

hinges on whether “winning or losing depends on numerous elements of chance to a ‘material
degree,’” Respondents have ignored that courts and commentators have continued to use the
“dominating element” standard earlier New York judicial opinions applied after the legislature
enacted § 225.00 in 1965. See, e.g., People v. Li Ai Hua, 24 Misc. 3d 1142, 1145 (Crim. Ct.
2009) (“The test of the character of the game is not whether it contains an element of chance or
an element of skill, but which is the dominating element that determines the result of the

18

 game.”); Criminal Law in New York § 31:4 (4th ed. 2014) (“Some games involve both an
element of skill and chance. To determine if the game is one of chance, the court will look at the
dominating element that determines the result of the game.” (quotation marks omitted)); 62 N.Y.
Jur. 2d Gambling § 3 (2015) (“The test of the character of a game is not whether it contains an
element of chance or an element of skill, but which is the dominating element that determines the
results of the game.”). Thus, the critical question is whether the element of chance predominates
over the element of skill in DFS. It does not.
67.

Had the Attorney General provided DraftKings an opportunity to discuss the

legality of DFS under New York law, DraftKings would have offered these and other arguments
and evidence. The Attorney General chose not to do so, despite DraftKings’ ongoing
cooperation and repeated requests for continued communication.
G.

Immediate And Irreparable Harm To Petitioner, Its Customers, And Employees
68.

The harm threatened by Respondents to DraftKings’ customers, employees,

operations, finances, and reputation is extraordinary and self-evident.
69.

Those harms include the immediate ban of hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers

from the DFS marketplace, as well as a chilling effect on DraftKings’ business nationwide, its
relationship with existing investors and partners, and its ability to attract new investors and
partners.
70.

Moreover, even during the five-day notice period provided by the letter and by

statute, Respondents are coercing, through press statements and private conversations,
DraftKings’ vendors and business partners into ceasing business relations or providing services
to DraftKings in New York.

19

 STATEMENT OF THE CLAIMS
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
AGENCY ACTION INVALID AS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION: C.P.L.R. § 7803
71.

DraftKings re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of all

paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.
72.

By engaging in this conduct, Respondents have violated, and unless enjoined will

continue to violate, Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”).
Among other grave legal errors, the Letter is agency action unauthorized by New York law,
because, among other reasons, Respondent Schneiderman does not have statutory authority to
issue cease-and-desist orders. The Letter is further in conflict with New York law, including the
very provisions Respondents have purported to interpret and seek to enforce.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
73.

DraftKings re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of all

paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.
74.

Each and every one of the grave legal errors described herein independently

warrants declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of Petitioner, including, but not limited to, the
grounds that the Letter is agency action unauthorized by New York law, including because
Respondent Schneiderman does not have statutory authority to issue cease-and-desist orders, and
is further in conflict with New York law, including the very provisions Respondents have
purported to interpret and seek to enforce.

20

 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS: FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983
75.

DraftKings re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of all

paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.
76.

By engaging in this conduct, Respondents have violated, and unless enjoined will

continue to violate, DraftKings’ rights under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution, as made enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS: ARTICLE I, SECTION 6 OF NEW YORK
CONSTITUTION
77.

DraftKings re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of all

paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.
78.

By engaging in this conduct, Respondents have violated, and unless enjoined will

continue to violate, DraftKings’ rights under the Due Process Clause of Article I, Section 6 of the
New York Constitution.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
SEPARATION OF POWERS: ARTICLE III, SECTION 1; ARTICLE IV, SECTION 1;
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 1 OF NEW YORK CONSTITUTION
79.

DraftKings re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of all

paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.
80.

By engaging in this conduct, Respondents have violated, and unless enjoined will

continue to violate, DraftKings’ rights under the separation-of-powers provisions of the New
York Constitution, namely Section 1 of Articles III, IV, and VI.

21

 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION: FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983
81.

DraftKings re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of all

paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.
82.

By engaging in this conduct, Respondents have violated, and unless enjoined will

continue to violate, DraftKings’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution, as made enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION: ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 OF NEW YORK
CONSTITUTION
83.

DraftKings re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of all

paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.
84.

By engaging in this conduct, Respondents have violated, and unless enjoined will

continue to violate, DraftKings’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause of Article 1, Section 11
of the New York Constitution.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
UNCOMPENSATED TAKINGS: FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983
85.

DraftKings re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of all

paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.
86.

By engaging in this conduct, Respondents have violated, and unless enjoined will

continue to violate, DraftKings’ rights under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, as made enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

22

 NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
UNCOMPENSATED TAKINGS: ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF NEW YORK
CONSTITUTION
87.

DraftKings re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of all

paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.
88.

By engaging in this conduct, Respondents have violated, and unless enjoined will

continue to violate, DraftKings’ rights under the Takings Clause of Article I, Section 7 of the
New York Constitution.
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
89.

DraftKings re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of all

paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.
90.

At all relevant times, DraftKings was a party to separate payment processing

contracts with Vantiv, Inc. (“Vantiv”) and PayPal Holdings, Inc. (“PayPal”). At all relevant
times, DraftKings has fulfilled its contractual obligations to Vantiv and PayPal.
91.

Respondents knew about DraftKings’ contracts with Vantiv and PayPal. With

knowledge of these contracts, Respondents contacted Vantiv, PayPal, and other third parties
providing services to DraftKings, in an intentional effort to procure these third parties’ breach of
their contractual obligations to DraftKings. On information and belief, on November 11 and 12,
2015, Respondents contacted Vantiv and instructed the company to “immediately” stop
processing payments from DraftKings’ New York customers, threatening them with legal action.
On information or belief, on or about November 12, 2015, Respondents similarly contacted
PayPal and informed the company that it would be violating the law if it continued to process
DraftKings’ payments from New York customers.
23

 92.

Because of Respondents’ actions, Vantiv informed DraftKings that it would

imminently stop processing payments for DraftKings’ New York players as a result of the
Attorney General’s cease-and-desist letter and outreach. In ceasing to process payments under
its contract with DraftKings, Vantiv would be breaching its contract with DraftKings. Absent
the outreach from Respondents on November 11 and 12, Vantiv would not breach its agreement
with DraftKings.
93.

As a direct result of Respondents’ misconduct, DraftKings has suffered and will

continue to suffer irreparable harm to its ability to operate its business in New York and
elsewhere. DraftKings thus has no adequate remedy at law.
ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE BUSINESS RELATIONS
94.

DraftKings re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of all

paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.
95.

DraftKings developed with both Vantiv and PayPal a lucrative, productive, and

mutually beneficial business relationship of processing payments from DraftKings’ customers.
DraftKings reasonably expected that its business relationships with Vantiv and PayPal, and the
work put in to foster these relationships, would ripen into continued contractual relations.
96.

Respondents unquestionably knew about DraftKings’ business relationships with

Vantiv and PayPal.
97.

Respondents intentionally interfered with DraftKings’ business relationships with

Vantiv and PayPal, and used dishonest, unfair, and improper means to do so. Among other
things, Respondents made explicit or implied threats of legal action, including potential criminal
prosecution, to Vantiv and PayPal. The purpose of these threats was to interfere with

24

 DraftKings’ prospective business relations with Vantiv and PayPal and to shut down DraftKings’
business in New York State.
98.

As a direct result of Respondents’ misconduct, DraftKings has suffered and will

continue to suffer irreparable harm to its ability to operate its business. DraftKings has no
adequate remedy at law.
JURY DEMAND
99.

DraftKings demands a trial by jury in this action on each of its claims.
DRAFTKINGS IS ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY

100.

DraftKings will seek expedited discovery, by order to show cause, into the record

on which Respondents’ cease-and-desist letter purports to be based. Such discovery is warranted
to provide DraftKings with information exposing that letter as the product of a predetermined
policy preference rather than law and available evidence.
NOTICE OF NEW YORK CLAIMS UNDER N.Y. GML § 50
101.

This action has been commenced within one year and ninety days of the date of

the occurrence of the events giving rise to this Complaint.
NO PRIOR APPLICATION
102.

No prior application for this or any similar relief has been made in this Court.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

103.

DraftKings respectfully requests that the Court issue a declaration, on an

expedited basis, pursuant to CPLR §§ 3001, 6301-13, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988:
a.

Declaring that DraftKings’ DFS contests do not constitute “gambling”

within the meaning of New York law, including Article I, § 9, of the Constitution and
Sections 225.00, 225.05, 225.10, 225.15, and 225.20 of the Penal Law, and do not

25

 constitute “bookmaking” within the meaning of New York law, including Article I, § 9,
of the Constitution and Section 225.00 of the Penal Law;
b.

Declaring that DraftKings’ statements and advertisements identified above

and in the Notice do not constitute a deceptive business practice in violation of GBL §
349 or false advertising in violation of GBL § 350; and
c.

Declaring that DraftKings’ operation of DFS contests therefore does not

constitute fraud or persistent illegality that may be the subject of an injunction or other
civil remedies under Executive Law § 63(12) or BCL § 1303.
104.

DraftKings further requests an injunction against the Attorney General’s taking

any enforcement actions inconsistent with the Court’s declaratory judgment requested above, and
an order mandating that the Attorney General cease and desist threatening adverse action against
DraftKings’ vendors, partners and financial institutions, and requiring the Attorney General to
inform those vendors, partners and financial institutions already contacted about this order.
105.

DraftKings further requests the award of its costs of this action, including

attorneys’ fees to the extent authorized by law.
106.

DraftKings also seeks such other, further and different relief as the Court

determines to be just and proper, including relief further or consequential to DraftKings’ request
for declaratory relief to the extent set forth above.

26

 Dated: New York, New York
November 12, 2015
Respectfully submitted,
GIBSON,DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

By:

/~• ~~-S
Randy M. astro
Alexander H. Southwell
Avi Weitzman
Matthew J. Benjamin

200 Park Avenue,47th Floor
New York, New York 10166-0193
Telephone: (212)351-4000
(212)351-4035
Facsimile:

Attorneysfor DraftKings, Inc.

27

 VERIFICATION

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

Jason Robins, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am the Chief Executive Officer of DraftKings, Inc., Petitioner and Plaintiff in

this consolidated Article 78 proceeding and plenary action.
2.

I have read the foregoing petition and foregoing complaint, and can state that the

factual contents thereof are true based upon my personal knowledge, except as to matters alleged
upon information and belief, which matters I believe to be true based on my review of pertinent
documents and conversations with persons with persor~"~~~-.,,~a~-~

Sworn to before me on this
12t~' day of November 2015

o~cir HaRR~s
Merry Public,State of New York
No.02HA6255842
Qualified In New York County
~Qrflrl~iSSMan Ettptres February 13,20~