Anti-Deportation Ireland (ADI) is a national, multi-ethnic grassroots network/alliance of activists, asylum seekers,
refugees, community workers, trade unionists, and academics who have come together to campaign against forced
deportation in Ireland, and for the abolition of the direct provision system.
We firmly believe that deportation is inhuman, unnecessary and a violation of an individual's fundamental human
rights, especially the right to seek and receive protection.
One of our demands is the immediate end to all deportations from Ireland. We believe that the deportations that do
occur involve unnecessary violence, intimidation (including the use of racist language) and unnecessary force from
the Gardaf carrying them out.
That being said, we feel that whether or not deportations are being carried out, there are several ways a new
Policing Authority could ensure greater restraint, fairness and accountability when Gardaf are in contact with asylum
seekers, refugees and other immigrants.
Obviously there is a lot of work to be done to change the Garda itself but, for the purposes of this submission, we
will be focusing specifically on the proposed Policing Authority.

For clarity, we have used as headings the four areas mentioned in the advertisement for written submissions.

1. Membership of the board
We feel that the Policing Authority Board, whatever its final arrangement, should include a number of non-Garda,
non-political and non-professional, or "lay" members.
Assuming that the introduction of the board will lead to a three way balance of power over the Garda (between the
Dept. of Justice, the Authority and the Garda itself) we would argue that the board should be made up entirely, or in
the majority, of these lay members (ie. the people who are being policed).
Specifically we would like to see an asylum seeker and/or other immigrant as a permanent member of this Board.
The other lay members we have in mind are eg. A member or members of the travelling community, etc. In short,
representatives of any (and all) groups of people who have had a less than equitable relationship with the Garda.
We want to make clear that we are talking about actual members of the communities. That is, for example, an actual
asylum seeker or member of the travelling community rather than a professional "representative" of these groups
eg. A member of an NGO or a politician.

2. Functions
We believe that the Authority should, to borrow a phrase from the Northern Ireland Policing Board, "monitor
everything the police do". Unlike the NIPB, however, we believe that the new Irish Authority should have the power
to fully investigate specific Gardaf or groups of Gardaf;
1.
2.

On the basis of complaints made to the Authority
As issues arise as the Authority "monitors" the Garda,

We would also say that whatever the final functions of the Authority, we strongly argue that the Authority should
have the specific functions of overseeing and investigating:
1. Garda actions as they carry out deportations
2. The actions of Gardaf and other state agents when they interact with newly arrived immigrants at various
"ports of entry".

 Regarding number 2, above: Specifically, the Authority should ensure, through regular monitoring and investigation,
that the rights of immigrants are fully upheld at "ports of entry", especially those of asylum seekers or potential
asylum seekers.
Newly arrived immigrants might not have excellent English (or any at all), but this in no way affects their right to seek
asylum, as you know. This is why we feel that it is extremely important that the new Authority has specific powers to
ensure that any Garda interactions with newly arrived immigrants are with the view to ensuring that the rights of the
immigrant are fully upheld.

3. Relationship to Government/Oireachtas
Whatever the new Authority's relationship to Government and the Oireachtas, the Garda must be much more
accountable, individually and collectively, to the people they serve.

4. GSOC/Garda Inspectorate
We feel that it is irrelevant whether these organisations remain intact. Our main concern is increased transparency
and accountability within the Garda. This could be achieved by giving these organisations increased powers, or by
giving the Authority the investigatory powers of these organisations, or in a variety of other ways. Whatever the final
arrangement, the important thing is that:
•

The Authority has full powers to investigate the conduct of individual Gardaf and units within the Garda, and

•

the Ability to act on these investigations. For example: to publish the findings of the investigations, to
discipline Gardaf or to initiate prosecutions against individual Gardaf if necessary.

 AG SI

Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors
Cumann Sairsinti agus Cigiri de’n Gharda Siochana

Modernising our force. Strengthening our service.

Police Authorities
Structures and Functions
June 2014

 Table of Contents
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................... 2
Number of Members of the A uthority..............................................................................................3
How Selected/Elected......................................................................................................................... 4
Make-up of the Garda Authority....................................................................................................... 5
Role and Function of the A uthority.................................................................................................. 6
Accountability...................................................................................................................................... 7

 Introduction
AGSI welcome the opportunity to make a submission on the establishment of a policing
Authority for An Garda Siochana.
We were the first Representative body or group to call for a police Authority and look
forward to working with the Joint Committee on Justice, Equality and Defence to define the
structure, selection, make up and roles and responsibilities
We have set out hereunder our observations in respect of each of the areas mentioned in the
previous paragraph.
The Association would welcome an opportunity to make an oral presentation in order to fully
discuss our submission.

 Number of Members of the Authority
The Authority must have sufficient numbers to perform its role effectively while at the same
time allowing engagement from a wide range groups/individuals interested in becoming
involved.

AGSI believe that:
Number should not be excessive to ensure that business of the Authority is conducted
effectively.
The Authority should be no fewer than seven and no greater than 13 members. This figure is
a guide only. However, there should be sufficient numbers to allow a diverse involvement
outside of any political participation. Under the category ‘make up’ below AGSI will outline
our views on diversity and political involvement.

 How Selected/Elected
The selection process must be fair, transparent and free from undue political influence.

AGSI propose the ‘Authority’ would be selected by a cross party body to avoid excessive
influence from Government. In this regard we recommend that the Joint Committee on
Justice, Equality and Defence is the most suitable political institution to perform this role.

 Make-up of the Garda Authority
The Authority should be open to the widest possible audience to ensure the greatest diversity
and involvement.

AGSI believe any oversight Authority should be independent of undue political influence.
No more than two members of the Authority should be members of the Oireachtas, Seanad
Eireann or any local council.
The Authority should comprise of:
• A representative from the business community
• An academic from the criminal justice area/social science area
• Representatives from community groups
• A representatives from Victim advocate groups
• An economist/accountant
• A representative from the ICCL or Human Rights groups
• A representative from social justice groups
Optional areas for where representation might be considered:
• Self-nomination, i.e. where an individual presents themselves for consideration for a
seat on the Authority
• The general education area
AGSI believe that individuals should be invited to express an interest in filling a place on
the Authority. An independent panel1 may be considered a suitable way to short list
candidates for consideration by the Joint Committee on Justice, Equality and Defence,
providing no more than two candidates for each area being considered.
AGSI believe that the majority of the Authority should be from statutory/voluntary sector
with a proven record in service to the public and/or an interest in criminal justice issues.
The Joint Committee should select the Authority from the short list provided.
AGSI believe that if there is a political involvement in the Authority, serving public
representatives should not hold the position of Chairperson
The length of service on the Authority needs to be determined. Rotating the entire
authority at the end of each agreed term would have a negative impact on business
continuity. However, having people on the Authority for protracted periods could prove
equally negative. Consideration should be given to a rolling rotation of 50% of the
Authority every 2/3 years.

1 (In Scotland the Public Appointments Commission appoints the members o f the Scottish
Police Authority)

 Role and Function of the Authority
The roes and functions must be clearly defined to ensure the Authority works effectively and
its performance can be assessed against strict criteria.

The roles and responsibilities should extend to:
•

The appointment and dismissal of senior officers within An Garda Siochana. By
senior officers AGSI mean Superintendent rank and above

•

Holding officers appointed by them accountable. In this regard clear guidelines
should be set down to ensure appraisals are carried out effectively

•

Setting police crime objectives and approving the Commissioner’s Policing Strategy
and the implementation of the Commissioner’s Annual Policing Plans

•

Reviewing actions and decisions of Garda management

•

Advising the Government on the budget required to deliver the strategy and plans.

•

Having a consultative/oversight role in relation to Garda
staffing/resources/IT/training and other key areas.

•

Consulting regularly with staff associations to ensure views of Garda members are
properly communicated and represented

•

Consulting with the Garda Inspectorate to see the recommendations in their reports
are implemented

•

Establishing a mechanism to allow the views, concerns and matters of interest for
Joint Policing Committees to be received and considered by the Authority

•

Consulting with the public on a regular basis and publish findings

•

Publishing an annual report.

While the Authority is established to provide oversight for An Garda Siochana AGSI
believe it should consider and where appropriate comment on:
•
•

The impact that decisions made in other areas of the criminal justice system2 could
have on the delivery of a policing service
The impact that decisions of An Garda Siochana could have on the other areas of
the criminal justice system

# The Courts and Court Services, the Prison Service and the Probation Services.

 Accountability
The Authority must be accountable for its performance and effectiveness.

AGSI believe that the Garda Authority should be accountable to the Joint Committee on
Justice, Defence and Equality - the appointing authority.
In this regard the Joint Committee should review the functioning of the authority on an
annual basis. If they believe, following examination and inquiry that it is not performing its
role effectively it should appoint an ‘interim board’ to fulfil the role until a new Authority
is selected.
The Garda Authority should be subject to a full evaluation after 3 years and to biennial
reviews thereafter.

 www.agsi.ie
Address: Sixth Floor, Phibsboro Tower, Phibsboro, Dublin 7
Emai: agsi@agsi.ie I info@agsi.ie
Phone: 01 830 3166
Fax: 01 830 6396

 Government Consultation on Justice Reform
Proposal to establish an Independent Policing Authority
Submission by M ick W allace TD
I would like to put forward my Garda Siochana (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2014 as a
submission to the G overnm ent’s consultation on the proposal to establish an Independent
Policing Authority. Part 2 o f the Bill deals w ith the establishment and functions o f a
Garda Siochana Independent Board. All o f the proposals contained in the Bill derive from
extensive consultation with, and review o f the research and reports of, many relevant
stakeholders which I conducted w hen preparing and drafting the legislation last year. The
stakeholders included many legal academics, Combat Poverty, Social Justice Ireland, the
Irish Council for Civil Liberties, the Irish Human Rights Commission, Transparency
International, the M orris Tribunal and the G arda Siochana Ombudsman Commission
themselves. Further support exists in reports emanating from the U nited N ations Special
Rapporteur in February 2013, and the Council o f Europe, including reports from the
European Committee for the Prevention o f Torture and the European Code o f Police
Ethics.

Overview
The Bill provides for the establishment o f the Garda Siochana Independent Board with
monitoring, supervisory and oversight functions over the Garda Siochana. It is hoped that
both the composition o f the Board, the strong functions relating to community
engagement and Joint Policing Committees, and the reporting obligations o f the Board to
the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Public Service Oversight and Petitions will help
strengthen the democratic accountability o f the Garda Siochana. The Board also aims to
promote public confidence

and trust in the Garda Siochana and to reinvigorate the

legitimacy o f “policing by consent” in Ireland. The Board's objectives include the
promotion o f respect for human rights w ithin the Garda Siochana and the B oard’s
functions include the human rights-proofing o f all Garda policies, procedures and
practices and the provision o f detailed Codes o f Practice for all key operational policies

 and procedures to include effective compliance measures. The value o f transparency is
promoted by the requirem ent to now publish all relevant Codes and operational policies
and procedures and by the identification o f the Garda Siochana as a public body for the
purposes o f Freedom o f Information legislation. One o f the Board's functions is to
conduct a five yearly independent

root and branch review o f the Garda Siochana's

w orking practices, accountability, operational m anagem ent and governance.

M any o f the Sections o f the Garda Siochana Act 2005 are amended consequentially, with
the aim o f increasing the autonomy and independence o f the Garda Siochana from central
government, and from direct ministerial control, and from political influence by
realigning the structures and accountability o f the Garda Siochana and by creating a
system o f checks and balances to replace the current hierarchical structure.

The overall aim is to establish a pow er-sharing arrangem ent between the Board, the
M inister and also the Garda Commissioner and to achieve a balanced diffusion o f the
relevant powers and responsibilities. It is hoped that this measured approach is evident
from the particular arrangem ents set out in regard to the policing plan, the strategy
statement, setting o f priorities etc.

However, the direct accountability o f the Commissioner to the M inister under Section
26(3) o f the Principal Act is rem oved and the Section 40(2) requirem ent to provide any
Garda document to the Government upon request is also removed. The broad powers o f
direct communication between M inister and Com missioner under Section 41 (a) o f the
Principal Act are limited by this Bill and the appointment and removal o f the Garda
Commissioner has been made a function o f the Board, following consultation with the
Minister. Section 25 o f the Principal Act has also been amended to remove the capacity
o f the M inister to issue specific directives to the Garda Commissioner.

This rebalancing is particularly necessary in light o f the extensive functions and powers
o f the Garda Siochana in providing both policing and security to the State, a state o f
affairs which was compounded by the vesting o f both the M inistry for Justice and the
M inistry for Defence in one Minister.

 Dem ocratic Accountability
I would like to take this opportunity to respond to Government comments about the
establishment o f an Independent G arda Authority. I note with concern that the
G overnment press statement o f M arch 25th 2014 summarising the C abinet’s response to
the various Garda crises sets out only a com mitment to an Independent Garda Authority
that would “m ain tain appropriate democratic accountability to th e O ire a c h ta s.”
Dem ocratic accountability, in its purest form , is the accountability o f the Gardai to the
citizens it polices. This reinforces and legitimises the policing by consent m odel, which
requires that a mutuality m ust exist between the Gardai and the people. Democratic
accountability currently takes place only through the medium o f the M inister answering
parliamentary questions from the legislature. This arrangem ent is inadequate and
unsatisfactory for several reasons;

(1) The legislature is by far the weakest arm in the tri-partite separation o f powers
arrangem ent in Ireland. This G overnm ent has no plans for reform in this area.
Political parties have too much to lose to seriously consider strengthening the
legislature through, for example, opposition-chaired Com m ittees or any relaxing
o f the whip system.

(2) A M inister for Justice’s reputation is too closely linked to that o f the Garda
Com m issioner’s under the current legislative structure.

Section 26(3) provides

that the Garda Com m issioner is solely accountable to the M inister in the
perform ance o f his functions. Criticising a Garda C om m issioner’s perform ance in
a public forum would thus be akin to the M inister criticising him self and his own
performance. Any ‘holding to account’ is impossible in these circumstances

(3) Dem ocratic accountability o f the police to the people does not necessarily mean

parliamentary accountability, and can be more directly provided for through the
medium o f a strong and effective Independent Police Board.

 (4) U sing the medium o f parliam ent to provide democratic accountability allows the
M inister and the Garda Commissioner to escape any parliamentary requests to
explain policy with the excuse that “This is an operational matter for the Garda
Commissioner.” As the Garda Com m issioner’s conduct and perform ance is also
exempt from G SO C ’s remit and due again to the exclusivity o f accountability
provided for under Section 26(3), there is no further avenue or no other method o f
holding the Garda Commissioner and by extension the Garda Siochana to account,
once this “operational m atter” excuse is provided to a parliamentary question.

The improvement o f our democratic accountability model would go some way to restore
public confidence and trust in the Gardai.

Introductory N otes re my Garda Siochana (Amendment) Bill

In order to provide context and background for the contents o f my Garda Siochana

(Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2014, it is necessary to look back to October 2008 when the
M orris Tribunal completed its extensive w ork cataloguing corruption, systemic failures in
senior Garda m anagem ent and w orking practices, the failure o f accountability systems,
and the impenetrable “blue wall o f silence” w ithin the Garda Siochana.

The Garda Siochana Act 2005 was then posited as the panacea to the many deep-rooted
issues uncovered by Mr. Justice M orris, how ever it is this Act which this Garda Siochana

(Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2014 amends. I strongly believe that the recom m endations o f
the M orris Tribunal have never been addressed fully by the State and that the 2005 Act
does not provide the tools and structures needed to overcome the embedded cultural
problems underpinning discipline and the “blue wall o f silence” so bleakly exposed by
Mr. Justice Morris.

This Bill creates and establishes a Garda Siochana Independent Board, similar to the
N orthern Ireland Policing Board which was considered a central plank o f reform in the
Patten report. The Board has supervisory, monitoring and oversight roles and strong

 functions relating to community engagement and the promotion o f human rights. A
policing board is not a novel concept and exists in one form or other in most common law
jurisdictions, and has been accepted in the U K since the 60s.

The Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL) and the State’s statutory human rights advice
body, the Irish Human Rights Commission, along with the Garda Ionann Human Rights
A udit in 2004 have long called for consideration o f a policing board along w ith many
commentators such as Professor Derm ot W alsh, Dr. Vicky Conway and Father Peter
McVerry.

In addition, the State has made commitm ents to policing standards under international
law such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which it has
repeatedly been found in breach of, breaches which this Bill sought to address. The
European Code o f Police Ethics reflects the Council o f Europe’s established interest in
the promotion o f the rule o f law through human rights based policing and provides for
strong accountability measures on multiple levels to both the State and its citizens.

The Board & Functions

Broadly in line with ICCL recommendations, the composition o f the Board is envisaged
as follows; 16 m embers to include 2 o f the newly appointed Irish Human Rights &
Equality Commissioners, 4 members o f the Oireachtas (2 from government, 2 from
opposition), the Ombudsman for Children, the D ata Protection Commissioner, C hief
Inspector o f the Garda Inspectorate and m ost importantly, 6 members to represent civil
society drawn from the following; NGOS, community representatives from socially
m arginalised

groups/areas,

local

authorities,

trade

union/business

representatives,

representatives from the youth and education sector and a possible representative from the
AGSI/AGSS. These 15 would then appoint their own Chairperson from a list provided.

The goal is that the composition o f the Board along with the strong functions relating to
the co-ordination and facilitation o f community engagement through an improved Joint
Policing Committees system, and the reporting obligations o f the Board to the Joint

 Oireachtas Committee on Public Service Oversight and Petitions will provide for a
functioning dem o cratic acco u n tab ility o f th e G a rd a S iochana to address what
Professor D erm ot W alsh has referred to as a “ serious accountability deficit.” W alsh’s
study o f the current operation o f democratic accountability to the Dail through the
M inister w as highly critical o f its ability to provide meaningful accountability.

The

M inister’s information can be very limited due to his reliance on answers from the
Commissioner - or simply due to the fact that he refuses to answer parliamentary
questions on matters o f Garda policies, acts or omissions.

This combined w ith the

determination o f most politicians to prove their support and dedication to the Garda
Siochana limits the D ail’s potential to hold the Garda to account.

Indeed M inister

Noonan explicitly stated in the House in 1987, that the governm ent o f the day should
never criticise the G arda Siochana. The ministerial practice o f refusing to answer for
such matters in parliam ent allows for both the M inister and the governm ent to enjoy the
exercise o f political control w ithout responsibility in policing matters. It is this overlydeferential treatm ent o f the organisation and m anagem ent o f the Garda Siochana both by
politicians and the m edia that Dr. Vicky Conway has identified as having prevented the
absorption o f Justice M orris’ more overarching findings and has allowed the acceptance
o f the fact that wrongs had occurred but also the denial o f a need for ongoing concerns for
the Garda Siochana.

The Board also aims to promote public confidence and trust in the Garda Siochana and to
reinvigorate in Ireland the legitimacy o f “policing by consent” and in partnership with
local communities. This is a central characteristic to the legitimate use o f power.

The Board's objectives include the prom otion and integration o f respect for human rights
w ithin the Garda Siochana and the B oard’s functions include the human rights-proofing
and monitoring o f all Garda policies, procedures and practices and the provision o f
detailed Codes o f Practice for all key operational policies and procedures to include
effective compliance measures, as recom m ended by the Irish Human Rights Commission
and the ICCL and by the U N in order for us to comply with Article 7 o f the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Although there is provision in the Garda A ct 2005

 for the adoption o f a code o f ethics to set out the standards o f conduct expected from each
Garda, the M inister has not seen fit to produce or adopt one.

One o f the Board's most significant functions is the conducting o f a five yearly
independent root and branch review o f the Garda Siochana's w orking practices,
accountability, operational m anagem ent and governance.

N o independent root and

branch national review o f the Garda Siochana has ever taken place in the history o f the
State and I would submit that it is badly needed. The Board will also appoint and dismiss
the Garda Commissioner and the members o f the Ombudsman Commission, and will hold
monthly meetings w ith the Garda Com m issioner regarding the perform ance o f the Garda
Siochana.

The value o f transparency is promoted throughout the Bill by the requirem ent on the
Board to now publish all relevant codes, operational policies and procedures and on the
Ombudsman Commission to receive and publish follow-up details o f investigations.
Publication and accessibility o f these documents has long been recom m ended by the
ICCL and the IHRC and transparency was strongly emphasised throughout the Patten
Report.

Transparency is also increased in this Bill by the identification o f the Garda Siochana as a
public body for the purposes o f the Freedom o f Inform ation legislation, something that
was recom m ended by the U N in their m ost recent report on compliance w ith the
International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights. This was also promised in the
Programme for G overnment but rem ains undelivered three years into government.
Indeed the Information Commissioner pointed out in 2008 that Ireland is almost unique in
Europe in excluding its police force from the scope o f freedom o f information law and
that even the police forces in form er Eastern-bloc countries such as Albania, G eorgia and
M oldova are subject to this legislation.

In a w orldw ide study o f 70 countries with

Freedom o f Inform ation legislation, David Banisar found that only Ireland excluded its
police service. Current governm ent proposals regarding freedom o f information extend
only to the administrative records o f the G arda Siochana relating to human resources,
finances and procurement matters.

 M any o f the sections o f Garda Act 2005 are amended consequentially, w ith the aim o f
increasing the autonomy and independence o f the Garda Siochana from central
government, and from direct ministerial control and political influence. This is done by
realigning the structures and accountability o f the Garda Siochana and by creating a
system o f checks and balances, particularly regarding the drafting o f the policing plan, the
strategy statement and the setting o f policing priorities which replaces the current
hierarchical structure.

It is this direct and centralised governm ent control o f a single, hierarchical national
organisation which has been identified by Professor Dermot W alsh as “rendering the
police vulnerable to being used by dominant interests as a vehicle for protecting their
privilege through the suppression o f minority views and lifestyles.”

The Bill's tri-partite arrangem ent would ensure the dilution o f partisan political control
over the Gardai, ensuring that too much police power is not left over-concentrated and
under-accounted for in the hands o f a party politician.

Some examples include the removal o f Section 40(2) referred to by Professor Dermot
W alsh as an “ alarming provision” which provided that the M inister or the government
could demand any record or documents from An Garda Siochana.

Secondly, the

m inisterial power to issue directives under section 25 power to the Garda Commissioner
is now transferred to the Board, a non-political and independent body.

The direct

accountability o f the Commissioner to the M inister is also removed. Any references that
the Commissioner shall have regard to “governm ent policy” have been replaced by “the
recom m endations o f the Board.” This rebalancing is particularly necessary in light o f the
extensive functions and powers o f the Garda Siochana in providing both civil policing
and security to the State, something that merits discussion and possible review at another
time.

Unfortunately, it appears that the response at a m anagem ent and organisational level
remains unchanged and that the culture o f “denial and defensiveness” identified by the
ICCL remains.

 It is clear that the Garda Siochana cannot and will not reform themselves. A cultural
change is needed and it is my belief that only a partnership o f the Garda Siochana, a
strengthened Ombudsman Commission and the establishment o f an independent Police
Board can achieve this.

Excerpt from Garda Siochana (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2014 which establishes a Garda
Siochana Independent Board

PART 2
T H E G A R D A S IO C H A N A IN D E P E N D E N T B O A R D
Chapter 1

Establishment, Appointment, and Accountability o f Garda Siochana
Independent Board 5
5.— The M inister shall by Order appoint a day to be the establishment
day for the purposes o f this Part.
6.— (1) On the establishment day, a body corporate to be known
as Bord Neamhspleach an Gharda Siochana or, in the En glish language,
the Garda Siochana Independent Board stands established to 10
perform the functions assigned to it by this A ct.
(2) The Board has, under its corporate name, perpetual succession
and an o fficial seal and may—
(a ) sue and be sued in its corporate name,
(b) acquire, hold and dispose o f land or an interest in land, 15
and
(c) acquire, hold and dispose o f any other property.
7.— (1) The Board is to consist o f sixteen members, all o f whom
are to be appointed by the President on:
(a) the nomination o f a Special Committee, such Committee 20
to be established solely for this purpose by the Top Level
Appointments Com m ission, and
(b) follow ing fair and independent selection o f the Members
by the Special Committee through public advertisement
and open competition, and on a transparent and m erit- 25
based means, and
(c) the passage o f resolutions by D a il Eireann and Seanad
Eireann recommending their appointment.
(2) The com position o f the Board shall be as follow s:
(a) four Members o f the Oireachtas, with an equal represen- 30
tation from both Government and opposition Members,
( b) two Com m issioners from the Irish Human Rights and
Equality Com m ission,
( c) the Ombudsman for Children,
(d ) the Data Protection Com m issioner, 35
(e) the C h ie f Inspector o f the Garda Inspectorate,
(f ) six members to be selected by from the relevant bodies

 and according to the relevant guidelines as prescribed,
(g) a Chairperson o f the Board to be selected and appointed
by these 15 members from a list of nominees provided by
the Special Committee.
(3) In considering the nomination o f a person to be a member o f
the Board, the Special Committee shall satisfy themselves that the
person has the appropriate experience, qualifications, training or
expertise for appointment to a body having the functions o f the
Board.
(4) A person who holds ju d icial office in a superior court may,
without relinquishing that office, be appointed as the chairperson o f
the Board but, unless otherwise provided by the terms o f the
appointment, he or she shall not, w hile a member, be required to
carry out duties under statute as the holder o f that ju d icia l office.
(5) The first appointments to the Board become effective on the
establishment day.
(6) I f the chairperson is tem porarily unable to carry out the duties
o f office, the other members shall determine w hich o f them is to act,
for all or part o f the period o f inability, in the chairperson’s place.
(7) For as long as a member is acting in place o f the chairperson
under subsection (6) references in this A ct to the chairperson o f the
Board are to be read as references to that member.

8.— (1) Subject to section 9, a member o f the Board holds office
for the period, exceeding 3 years but not exceeding 6 years, that the
Special Committee may determine at the time o f appointment.
25 (2) A member is eligible for reappointment for a second term.
(3) A member holds office on the terms and conditions relating
to remuneration (including allowances for expenses, benefits in kind
and superannuation) or other matters that may be determined by the
Government at the time o f appointment or reappointment.
30 (4) The Board may act notwithstanding one or more than one
vacancy among its members.
(5) W henever a vacancy occurs in the membership o f the Board
caused by the resignation, removal from office or the death o f a
member, the vacancy is to be filled by appointment in the manner
35 specified in section 7.
(6) A member who is appointed to fill a vacancy caused by the
resignation, removal from office or the death o f a member, holds
office for the remainder o f the term o f office o f the replaced
member.
9.— (1) A member o f the Board may resign from office at any
time by letter addressed to the President and copied to the M inister,
and the resignation takes effect on the date the President receives
the letter.
(2) The President may remove a member o f the Board from
45 office, but only for stated m isbehaviour or for incapacity and then
only on resolutions passed by D a il Eireann and Seanad Eireann calling
for the member’s removal.
10.— (1) The quorum for a meeting o f the Board is 10 members.
(2) Each question at a meeting o f the Board shall be determined
10

 by a m ajority o f the votes o f the members present and voting on
the question.
(3) In the case o f an equal division o f votes, the chairperson or 5
other member presiding at the meeting has a second or casting vote.
(4) Subject to this A ct, the Board may regulate its own procedures
to include the formation o f sub-committees.
11.— (1) The Board may appoint such numbers o f persons as its
officers, with the consent o f the M inister for Finance. 10
(2) The Board shall determine the grades o f its officers and the
numbers o f officers in each grade, with the consent o f the M inister
for Finance.
(3) O fficers o f the Board are c iv il servants in the C iv il Service o f
the State. 15
(4) The Board is the appropriate authority (w ithin the meaning
o f the C iv il Service Com m issioners A ct 1956 and the C iv il Service
Regulation A cts 1956 to 1996) in relation to its officers.
12.— The M inister may, in each financial year, pay to the Board,
out o f money provided by the Oireachtas, a grant o f such amount as 20
he or she, with the consent o f the M inister for Finance, determines
towards the expenses o f the Com m ission in perform ing its functions.
13.— (1) The Board shall keep, in such form and in respect o f such
accounting periods as may be approved by the M inister with the
consent o f the M inister for Finance, all proper and usual accounts o f 25
money received or expended by it, including an income and expenditure
account and a balance sheet.
(2) Not later than 3 months after the end o f the accounting period
to which the accounts relate, the Board shall submit accounts kept
under this section to the Com ptroller and Auditor General for audit. 30
(3) Im m ediately after the audit, the Board shall present to the
M inister copies of—
( a ) the audited accounts, including the income and expenditure
account, the balance sheet and such other ( if any)
accounts kept under this section as the M inister, after 35
consulting w ith the M inister for Finance, may direct, and
(b) the Com ptroller and Auditor General’s report on the
accounts.
(4) A s soon as practicable after presentation o f the audited
accounts and the Com ptroller and Auditor General’s report, the 40
M inister shall cause copies o f them to be laid before each House o f
the Oireachtas.
14.— (1) The Chairperson o f the Board shall, whenever required
to do so by the Committee o f Public Accounts, give evidence to that
Committee on—
(a) the regularity and propriety o f the transactions recorded,
5 or required to be recorded, in any book or other record
o f account subject to audit by the Com ptroller and Auditor
General that the Board is required by this A ct to
prepare,
(b) the economy and efficiency o f the Board in the use o f its
resources,

 (c) the systems, procedures and practices employed by the
Board for the purpose o f evaluating the effectiveness o f
its operations, and
(d) any matter affecting the Board referred to in—
(1) a special report o f the Com ptroller and Auditor
General under section 11(2) o f the Com ptroller and
Auditor General (Amendment) A ct 1993, or
(ii) any other report o f the Com ptroller and Auditor
General that is laid before D a il Eireann in so far
as the report relates to a matter specified in any o f
paragraphs (a) to (c).
(2) The Chairperson shall not—
(a) question or express an opinion on the merits o f any po licy
o f the Government or a M inister o f the Government or
25 on the merits o f the objectives o f such policy, or
(b) provide inform ation that m ight facilitate the com m ission
o f an offence, prejudice a crim inal investigation or prosecution
or jeopardise the safety o f a person.
15.— (1) In this section and in section 16 “committee” means—
(a) the committee appointed jo in tly by both Houses o f the
Oireachtas known as the Joint Committee on Public
Service O versight and Petitions,
(b) a sub-committee o f a committee as defined in paragraph
(а).
(2) Subject to subsection (3), the Chairperson shall, at the written
request o f the committee, and on at least four occasions per annum,
attend before it to give account for the fulfilm ent o f the Board’s
functions and duties under this A ct.
(3) The Chairperson o f the Board shall not be required to give
40 account before a committee for any matter that is or is lik e ly to be,
the subject o f proceedings before a court or tribunal in the State.
(4) The Chairperson o f the Board shall, i f o f the opinion that subsection
(3) applies to a matter about w hich he or she is requested to
give an account before a committee, inform the committee o f that
opinion and the reasons for the opinion.
(5) The inform ation required under subsection (4) must be given
to the committee in w riting unless it is given when the Chairperson
is before the committee.
(б) If, on being informed o f the Chairperson’s opinion about the
matter, the committee decides not to withdraw its request relating to 5
the matter, the H igh Court may, on application under subsection (7),
determine whether subsection (3) applies to the matter.
(7) Either the Board or the committee may apply in a summary
manner to the H igh Court for a determination under subsection (6),
but only i f the application is made w ithin 21 days after the date on 10
w hich the member o f the Board is informed o f the committee’s
decision not to withdraw its request.
(8) Pending the determination o f an application under subsection
(7), the Chairperson shall not attend before the committee to give
account for the matter that is the subject o f the application. 15
(9) I f the H igh Court determines that subsection (3) applies to the
matter, the committee shall withdraw its request in so far as it relates
to the matter, but if the Court determines that subsection (3) does
12

 not apply, the Chairperson shall attend before the committee to give
account for the matter. 20
(10) In carrying out duties under this section, a Chairperson
shall not—
(a) question or express an opinion on the merits o f any po licy
o f the Government or a M inister o f the Government or
on the merits o f the objectives o f such po licy, or 25
( b) provide inform ation that m ight facilitate the com m ission
o f an offence, prejudice a crim inal investigation or prosecution
or jeopardise the safety o f a person.
16.— (1) Not later than M arch 31 in each year, the Board shall
submit to the M inister and the Committee a report on its activities 30
to include a review o f the performance o f the Garda Siochana in the
im m ediately preceding year.
(2) The Board shall, w ithin 2 years from the date o f its establishment,
submit to the M inister and the Committee a report on—
(a) the effectiveness o f the Board, and 35
(b) the adequacy o f the functions assigned to it by this A ct.
(3) The report submitted under subsection (2) may contain recommendations
for im proving the effectiveness o f the Board.
(4) A t the end o f each 5 year period commencing with the date
o f its establishment, the Board shall submit to the M inister and the 40
Committee a report review ing the general performance o f its functions
in the preceding 5 years.
(5) The Board may make any other reports that it considers
appropriate for drawing to the Committee and the M inister’s attention
matters that have come to its notice and that, in its opinion, 45
should, because o f their gravity or other exceptional circum stances,
be the subject o f a special report to the Committee and the M inister.
(6) A s soon as practicable after receiving a report under this
section, the M inister shall cause a copy o f the report to be laid before
each House o f the Oireachtas.
17.— (1) A person who is or was a member or officer o f the Board
5 or who is or was engaged under contract or other arrangement by
the Board shall not disclose, in or outside the State, inform ation
obtained in carrying out the duties o f that person’s office or o f his
or her contract or other arrangement with the Board i f the disclosure
is lik e ly to have a harm ful effect.
10 (2) For the purpose o f this section, the disclosure o f inform ation
referred to in subsection (1) does not have a harm ful effect unless
it—
(a) prejudices the effective performance o f the Board’s
functions,
(b) results in the publication o f personal inform ation (as
defined in the Freedom o f Inform ation A ct 1997)
obtained in the course o f the performance o f the Board’s
functions and constitutes an unwarranted and serious
infringem ent o f a person’s right to privacy.
(3) For the purpose o f this section, a person is presumed, unless
the contrary is proved, to know that disclosure o f inform ation
referred to in subsection (1) is lik e ly to have a harm ful effect i f a
13

 reasonable person would, in all the circum stances, be aware that its
disclosure could have that effect.
(4) Subsection (1) does not prohibit a person referred to in that
subsection from disclosing inform ation if the disclosure—
(a ) is made to—
(i) the Garda Com m issioner,
(ii) the M inister,
(iii) the Attorney General,
(iv ) the Director o f Public Prosecutions,
(v) the C h ie f State Solicitor,
(v i) the Crim inal Assets Bureau,
(v ii) the Com ptroller and Auditor General,
(v iii) the Garda Siochana Inspectorate or an officer o f the
Inspectorate,
(ix ) the Revenue Com m issioners, or
(x) a member o f either o f the Houses o f the Oireachtas
where relevant to the proper discharge o f that
member’s functions,
( b) is made to a court,
( c) is made to a tribunal appointed under the Tribunals o f
Inquiry (Evidence) A cts 1921 to 2002 or a com m ission o f
investigation established under the Com m issions o f
Investigation A ct 2004,
(d ) is made in the course of, and in accordance with, the duties
o f that person’s office or employment or o f his or her
duties under a contract or other arrangement to work 5
with or for the Board,
( e) is authorised by the Board, or
(f ) is otherwise authorised by law.
(5) A person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty o f an
offence and is liable— 10
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding €3,000 or
im prisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or
both, or
( b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding
€10,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years 15
or both.
(6) A person who contravenes subsection (1) and who receives
any gift, consideration or advantage as an inducement to disclose the
inform ation to which the contravention relates or as a reward for, or
otherwise on account of, the disclosure o f that inform ation is gu ilty 20
o f an offence and is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding €3,000 or
im prisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or
both, or
( b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding 25
€40,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years
or both.
(7) The provisions o f this section are in addition to, and not in
substitution for, the provisions o f the O fficia l Secrets A ct 1963.
(8) The Chairperson o f the Board may, follow ing request from 30
the M inister and follow ing consultation with the Data Protection
Com m issioner, withhold inform ation from the Members o f the
Board, for reasons o f State security.

 Chapter 2
18.— The objectives o f the Board are:
(a ) to ensure that its functions are performed in an efficient
and effective manner,
( b ) to promote public trust and confidence in the Garda
Siochana, 40
( c ) to promote respect for human rights and the value o f
transparency w ithin the Garda Siochana,
(d) to provide an independent means o f oversight, m onitoring
and supervision o f the Garda Siochana,
14
(e) to increase the democratic accountability o f the Garda
Siochana,
( f to encourage and facilitate community engagement with
the Garda Siochana.
19.— The functions o f the Board include—
(a) to human rights proof all Garda policies, procedures and
practices to include but not lim ited to:
(i) public order
(ii) inform er management and intelligence gathering,
(iii) intelligence and inform ation sharing,
(iv ) Garda statutory powers and any proposed expansion
thereof,
(v) exercise o f Garda discretion,
(v i) the drafting and updating o f all Garda Codes.
(b) to monitor Garda Siochana implementation o f such policies,
procedures, and practices,
( c ) to develop detailed and publicly accessible human rightsbased
Codes o f Practice for all key Garda operational
policies and procedures to incude effective compliance
20 measures,
(d) to prepare draft Code o f Service, follow ing consultation
with the Com m issioner and the Ombudsman
Com m ission,
(e) to include the development o f education and training
25 modules on relevant human rights standards,
( f to ensure the Garda Siochana operates with high standards
o f transparency in discharge o f its functions and to
require publication o f all Garda Codes and Garda operational
policies and procedures, subject to Section 17B o f
30 the Principal A ct,
(g ) to promote community engagement and to encourage and
facilitate m eaningful and inclusive consultation and cooperation
between local communities, the Garda Siochana
and the Board to include the holding o f quarterly
35 public meetings,
(h ) To issue guidelines for the establishment and maintenance
o f Joint Po licing Committees as set out in Chapter 4 o f
Part 2 o f the Principal A ct as amended by this A ct,
(i) fu lfillin g its role in relation to the setting o f priorities, the
40 approval o f strategy statement and the drafting o f the
15

 annual policing plan,
(j) to review the performance o f the Garda Siochana in
respect o f the policing plans and strategy statements and
priorities by requiring the Garda Com m issioner to
provide m onthly reports and attend monthly meetings
with the Board,
(k ) fu lfill its consultative role as provided for in the Principal
A ct as amended by this A ct,
(/) fu lfill its reporting duties as provided for in this A ct. 5
(m ) appoint and dism iss the Garda Com m issioner and Deputy
and Assistant Com m issioners,
(n ) receive and consider reports from the Ombudsman Com m ission
including regarding com pliance or otherwise o f
the Garda Siochana with any protocols under section 108 10
o f Principal A ct,
(o) nominate members o f the Ombudsman Com m ission,
(p) w ithin two years o f the commencement o f this A ct, and at
five year intervals thereafter, to conduct an independent
review o f the Garda Siochana governance, accountability 15
and w orking practices, operational management and
governance.

 B IL L E A N G H A R D A S IO C H A N A (L E A S U ) (U IM H . 2), 2014
G A R D A S IO C H A N A (A M E N D M E N T ) (N O . 2) B IL L 2014

E X P L A N A T O R Y M EM O R A N D U M

1. This B ill provides for the amendment of the Garda Siochana A ct
2005 to strengthen theindependence and im partiality of the Garda
Siochana Ombudsman Commission in the performance of its
functions, recognising that its remit was always intended to be
investigatory rather than one of review and oversight. The
adm issibility criteria of complaints are widened; firstly in regard
to time lim its, and secondly in regard to subject matter by the
introduction of a third ground of adm issibility; breach of the
newly created Code of Service. Members of the Com m ission are
appointed by the Garda Siochana Independent Board rather than
the Government. Section 106 is amended to allow the Commission
to initiate its own investigations of polices and procedures of the
Garda Siochana where it sees fit to do so. Serving members of
the Garda Siochana may no longer form part of the staff of the
Ombudsman Commission. A requirement of mandatory
supervision by the Ombudsman Commission of all investigations
arising from complaints made to it is included in the B ill in order
to ameliorate the current situation where approximately 40% of
complaints made to the Ombudsman Commission are referred
back to the Garda Siochana for internal, unsupervised
investigation. A new section is inserted to ensure that the
Ombudsman Commission has full and independent access to the
Garda Siochana electronic databases and systems. Amendments
are also made to strengthen the requirements on the Garda
Commissioner in relation to timely provision of evidence, and in
relation to information sharing in accordance with protocols
under Section 108. The definition of ‘‘serious harm’’ under
Section 102 is expanded to include incidences where injuries arise
from torture, inhumane or degrading treatment and also rape or
sexual assault. Investigations by the Ombudsman under Section
102 into incidences of ‘‘serious harm’’ or death are mandatory and
do not require submission of a complaint by any complainant.
2. The B ill also provides for the establishment of the Garda
Siochana Independent Board with monitoring, supervisory and
oversight functions over the Garda Siochana. It is hoped that both
the composition of the Board, the strong functions relating to
community engagement and Joint Policing Committees, and the

 reporting obligations of the Board to the Joint Oireachtas
Committee on Public Service Oversight and Petitions w ill help
strengthen the democratic accountability of the Garda Sfochana.
The Board also aims to promote public confidence and trust in the
Garda Sfochana and to reinvigorate the legitim acy of ‘‘policing by
consent’’ in Ireland. The Board’s objectives include the promotion
of respect for human rights within the Garda Sfochana and the
Board’s functions include the human rights-proofing of all Garda
policies, procedures and practices and the provision of detailed
Codes of Practice for all key operational polices and procedures
to include effective compliance measures. The value of
transparency is promoted by the requirement to now publish all
relevant Codes and operational policies and procedures and by
the identification of the Garda Sfochana as a public body for the
purposes of Freedom of Inform ation legislation. One of the
Board’s functions is to conduct a five yearly independent root and
branch review of the Garda Sfochana’s working practices,
accountability, operational management and governance.
3. Many of the Sections of the Garda Sfochana A ct 2005 are
amended consequentially, with the aim of increasing the
autonomy and independence of the Garda Sfochana from central
government, and from direct m inisterial control, and from
political influence by realigning the structures and accountability
of the Garda Sfochana and by creating a system of checks and
balances to replace the current hierarchical structure.
The overall aim is to establish a power-sharing arrangement
between the Board, the M inister and also the Garda
Commissioner and to achieve a balanced diffusion of the relevant
powers and responsibilities. It is hoped that this measured
approach is evident from the particular arrangements set out in
regard to the policing plan, the strategy statement, setting of
priorities etc.
However the direct accountability of the Commissioner to the
M inister under Section 26(3) of the Principal A ct is removed and
the Section 40(2) requirement to provide any Garda document to
the Government upon request is also removed. The broad powers
of direct communication between M inister and Commissioner
under Section 41(a) of the Principal A ct are lim ited by this B ill
and the appointment and removal of the Garda Commissioner
has been made a function of the Board following consultation
with the Minister. Section 25 of the Principal A ct has also been
amended to remove the capacity of the M inister to issue specific
directives to the Garda Commissioner.
This rebalancing is particularly necessary in light of the
extensive functions and powers of the Garda Sfochana in
providing both policing and security to the State, a state of affairs
which is compounded by the current vesting of both the M inistry
for Justice and the M inistry for Defence in one Minister.
4. Many of the amendments in this B ill, and particularly the
establishment of the Board, have been recommended in reports
and works published by the United Nations, the Council of
Europe including reports from the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and the European Code of Police Ethics,
The Irish Human Rights Commission, The Irish Council for C ivil
Liberties, Combat Poverty, Social Justice Ireland and the M orris
Tribunal.

 Provisions of the A ct
Part 2 — Establishm ent and Functions of Garda Siochana
Independent Board
Chapter 1
Establishm ent, Appointm ent and Accountability
Establishm ent day

Section 5 provides for the establishment day for this part of the
B ill.
Establishm ent of Board

Section 6 provides for the establishment of the Garda Siochana
Independent Board.
Membership and Appointm ent of Board

Section 7 provides for the membership and the manner of
appointment of the members of the Garda Siochana Independent
Board. The Board w ill comprise 16 members (2 Irish Human Rights
and Equality Commissioners, 4 members of the Oireachtas (2 from
Opposition, 2 from Governm ent), Children’s Ombudsman, the Data
Protection Commissioner, Chief Inspector of Garda Inspectorate and
6 members from bodies as prescribed by M inisterial Order. It is
envisaged that, along with a requirement for gender balance, the
relevant statutory instrument would provide that the following are
generally represented in such bodies; Community Representatives,
particularly from socially m arginalised groups (such as the 9 groups
identified under the Equal Status A cts 2000-2004) and socially
marginalised areas, the N G O sector, Lo cal Authority groups such as
Lo cal Authorities Member Association/Association of County and
C ity Councils, Trade Unions, representatives from the Business
sector, Representatives from the Youth and Education sector, and
possibly one representative from the Association of Garda Sergeants
and Inspectors or the Association of Garda Superintendents. A ll
members of the Board shall be appointed by the President, on the
nomination of a Special Committee, following the approval of
resolutions recommending their appointment passed by both Houses
of the Oireachtas. These 15 members would then select a full-tim e
Chairm an from a list of nominees selected by the Special Committee.
Term s and Conditions of O ffice

Section 8 provides for the terms and conditions under which
members of the Board w ill hold office and the arrangements for
filling vacancies among the membership. Members of the Board w ill
be appointed for a minimum of 3 years, but not exceeding 6 years
and they may be reappointed for a second term.
Resignation or Rem oval of members in Certain Cases

Section 9 provides for the resignation and removal of members
under certain circumstances.
Meetings and Business of Board

Section 10 provides for meetings, quorum and business of the
Board.

 Officers of the Board

Section 11 provides for the officers of the Board.
Grants to the Board

Section 12 is a standard provision concerning the m aking of grants
in accordance with Government Accounting Rules to the Board to
meet its operational costs.
Accounts and Audit

Section 13 is a standard provision relating to the maintenance by
the Board of accounts, their submission to the Com ptroller and
Auditor General and scrutiny by the Oireachtas.
Accountability of Board to Committee of Public Accounts

Section 14 is a standard provision relating to the accountability of
the Board to the Committee of Public Accounts.
Accountability of Board to Joint Committee on Public Service
Oversight and Petitions

Section 15 provides for accountability to the Committee by
quarterly appearances before it to account for the fulfilm ent of the
Board’s functions and duties under the Act.
Various Reports by the Board

Section 16 provides for the submission by the Board of various
reports to the Committee and the M inister who shall lay them before
the Houses of the Oireachtas.
Confidentiality of Inform ation Obtained

Section 17 provides for an offence of harmful disclosure of
information by a member or an officer of the Board. Penalties are
provided for in respect of contraventions by persons of these
provisions.
Chapter 2 — Functions, Powers and Duties
Objectives of the Board

Section 18 provides for the objectives of the Board to include; the
promotion of public trust and confidence in the Garda Siochana, the
promotion of respect for human rights and the value of transparency
within the Garda Siochana, the provision of an independent means
of oversight, monitoring and supervision of the Garda Siochana, the
improvement of the democratic accountability of the Garda
Siochana, the encouragement, co-ordination and facilitation of
community engagement with the Garda Siochana.
Functions of the Board

Section 19 provides for the functions of the Board to include; the
human rights-proofing of all Garda policies, procedures, and
practices; the monitoring of the implementation of such policies; the
development and publication of publicly accessible human rights
based Codes of practice for all key Garda Operational policies and
procedures to include effective compliance measures; the
preparation of a draft Code of Service following co-operation with

 the Garda Commissioner and the Ombudsman Commission; the
development of training and education modules on relevant human
rights standards; the promotion of the value of transparency through
the publication of all Garda Codes, operational policies and
procedures; the promotion of community engagement, meaningful
consultation and co-operation with local communities; the issuing of
guidelines to establish and maintain Joint Policing Committees; the
fulfilm ent of its role regarding the setting of policing priorities; the
approval of the strategy statement, and the drafting of policing plan;
the reviewing of the performance of the Garda Sfochana in respect
of the aforementioned priorities, strategy and plan by requiring the
Garda Commissioner to provide monthly reports and attend monthly
meetings with the Board; the fulfilm ent of its consultative and
reporting roles as provided for elsewhere in this A ct, the
appointment and dism issal of the Garda Commissioners and the
Deputy and Assistant Commissioners; communication with the
Ombudsman Com m ission including relating to the compliance or
otherwise of the Garda Sfochana with any protocols under Section
108 of the Principal A ct; the nomination of the Ombudsman
Commission, the conducting of a five yearly independent review of
the Garda Sfochana governance; accountability and working
practices; operational management and governance.
PART 3
Amendment of the Garda Siochana A ct 2005 (Part 2 and 5)
Amendment of Section 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Principal A ct

Section 20 provides that the ‘‘Board following consultation with
the M inister’’ shall appoint the Garda Commissioner (currently
section 9 provides that it is ‘‘the Governm ent’’ alone that appoints
the Garda Com m issioner).
Section 21 provides sim ilarly for the appointment of Deputy and
Assistant Garda Commissioners.
Section 22 provides that the ‘‘Board following consultation with
the M inister’’ rather than ‘‘the Governm ent’’ can remove these office
holders for — in the opinion of ‘‘the Board’’ (and not ‘‘the
Government’s’’) — any of 3 reasons as currently set out in Section
11.
Section 23 provides that ‘‘the Board’’ and not ‘‘the Government’’
shall be responsible for taking the necessary steps to remove the
office holder. These amendments reduce political influence from
these appointments in an effort to promote the independent
functioning of the Garda Commissioner and by extension, the
Garda Sfochana.
Amendment of Section 13,14 and 15 of the Principal A ct

Section 24 provides that ‘‘the Board’’ and not ‘‘the Government’’
shall be responsible for the appointment of whatever numbers of
Superintendents and Chief Superintendents it sees fit, and Section
25 provides that ‘‘the Board’’ (rather than ‘‘the Government’’) must
consent to the Garda Com m issioner’s decision to dismiss a Garda.
Section 26 provides that the Commissioner shall submit proposals to
the Board (rather than the M inister) for training of Reserve Gardai
and that the Garda Commissioner may only determine the range of
powers to be exercised and the duties to be carried out by Reserve
Garda^ with the approval of the Board.

 Amendment of Section 17 of the Principal A ct

Section 27 provides that the M inister shall establish the Code of
Ethics by regulations ‘‘with the approval of the Board’’ in
consultation with the Commissioner ‘‘and the Board’’.
Insertion of New Sections 17A and 17B in the Principal A ct

Section 28 provides for a new Code of Service to be drawn up to
include standards of efficiency and service that members of the
public may expect from the Garda Siochana and the Board shall
submit such a draft code to the M inister following consultation with
the Garda Commissioner and the Ombudsman Commission. Breach
of this code shall be a new third ground of adm issibility for
complaints to the Ombudsman Commission. Section 17B provides
that all codes of the Garda Siochana, and all operational policies and
procedures shall be published, subject to matters of state security.
Amendment of Section 20 of the Principal A ct

Section 29 provides that the policing Priorities shall remain to be
set by the M inister but now in consultation with both the Garda
Commissioner ‘‘and the Board’’. The Garda Commissioner shall now
inform both the M inister ‘‘and the Board of the measures taken to
achieve these priorities.
Amendment of Section 21 of the Principal A ct

Section 30 provides that the Strategy Statement submitted every 3
years by the Commissioner to the M inister shall now be submitted
to both the M inister ‘‘and the Board’’ in whatever form and manner
they require it. In preparing the Strategy Statement, the Garda
Commissioner shall have regard to (amongst other things) ‘‘the
recommendations of the Board’’ rather than ‘‘relevant government
policy’’ as Section 21 currently provides. The Board is a
representative body rather than a political one and so its
recommendations are a more appropriate consideration for the
Garda Commissioner than ‘‘relevant government policy’’.
Amendment of Section 22 of the Principal A ct

Section 31 creates a requirement (rather than the current
discretion) on the part of the Garda Commissioner to have regard
to the most recent report of each Joint Policing Committee. In
preparing the Strategy Statement, the Garda Commissioner shall
have regard to (amongst other things) ‘‘the recommendations of the
Board’’ rather than ‘‘relevant government policy’’ as Section 22
currently provides. The Board is a representative body rather than a
political one and so its recommendations are a more appropriate
consideration for the Garda Commissioner than ‘‘relevant
government policy’’. The Commissioner shall submit the policing
plan to the Board rather than the M inister, in order to remove direct
M inisterial control and supervision of the Garda Commissioner.
Amendment of Section 23 and Section 24 of the Principal A ct

Section 32 provides that the three year review report shall be
submitted to both ‘‘the Board’’ and the M inister. Section 33 provides
that the Garda Professional Standards U nit shall, upon the direction
of either the Commissioner ‘‘or the Board’’ review the performance
of the Garda Siochana at all levels and that the U nit may propose
measures to either the Commissioner ‘‘or the Board’’.

 Amendment of Section 25 and Section 26 of the Principal A ct

Section 34 removes the capacity of the Government as currently
stands to issue directives to the Garda Commissioner ‘‘concerning
any matter relating to the Garda Siochana’’ to which he is obliged
to comply and gives this capacity to the Board with the lim its set out
in subsection 4 remaining. Section 35 is amended by redirecting one
of the Garda Com m issioner’s four functions to advising ‘‘the Board
and the M inister’’ on policing and security matters rather than simply
‘‘the M inister’’ as currently stands. Section 36 is also amended to
remove the requirement on the Commissioner to have regard to
(amongst other considerations, e.g. policing plan, strategy statement,
priorities, directives) relevant policies of the government and replace
this with relevant policies of ‘‘the Board’’ (amongst the same other
considerations). Subsection 3 — which starkly sets out that the Garda
Com m issioner’s direct accountability to the M inister for the
performance of his functions and those of the Garda Siochana — is
removed. This accountability provision has been criticised as
‘‘reinforcing m inisterial control powers’’ by rendering the
Commissioner statutorily accountable to the M inister for the first
time in the history of the State.1
Amendment of Section 27 and 28 of the Principal A ct

Section 36 now provides that the Garda Commissioner must
consult with ‘‘the Board’’ instead of ‘‘the M inister’’ regarding
arrangements for obtaining views of the public. Section 37 provides
that the Commissioner may only enter into agreements with law
enforcement agencies outside the state with the prior consultation of
the Government now ‘‘following consultation with the M inister’’ and
if that agreement provides for the exchange of information
‘‘following consultation with the Data Protection Com m issioner’’.
Amendment of Section 33 of the Principal Act

Section 38 provides that the Garda Commissioner shall make
decisions on the redistribution and stationing of Garda Siochana
throughout the State ‘‘following consultation with the Board’’.
Amendment of Section 35 and Section 36 of the Principal A ct

Section 34 of the Principal A ct is amended in Section 40 by giving
responsibility to the Board instead of the M inister for the issuing of
guidelines concerning Joint Policing Committees, and allowing that
any member of the JP C may now be elected as Chairperson by its
members (removal of requirement that Chairperson be a member of
local authority). Section 35 is amended by inserting a ‘‘quarterly’’
requirement on all JP C s for public meetings. ‘‘The Board’’ rather
than the M inister shall resolve any dispute submitted to it by a JP C .
Section 40 imposes a requirement to submit a report to the Board
and the M inister which shall now include recommendations and
details of the quarterly public meetings.
Amendment of Section 40 of the Principal Act

Section 41 is amended by the deletion of subsection 2 of Section
40 of the Principal A ct which imposes a duty of the Garda
Commissioner to provide to the M inister and the Government ‘‘any
document in the power or control of the Garda Siochana including
1W alsh, H um an Rights and Policing in Ireland — Law, Policy and Practice, (Clarus
Press, 2009), p. 370.

 Garda records, statements....’’ Subsection 2 had been referred to as
‘‘an alarming provision’’.2
Amendment of Section 41, 42 and 46 of the Principal A ct

Section 42 amends Section 40 of the Principal A ct by lim iting the
circumstances where the Garda Commissioner is under a duty to
provide information to the M inister, to three circumstances only;
security of state, protection of peace and public order, and protection
of life and property of the State. The broader subsections (b), (c)
and (d) are deleted. The Garda Commissioner is now required to
report to the Board rather than the M inister in relation to matters
in ( b) and (d ). Th is is more appropriate as the entitlement to be
kept fully informed by the Commissioner is diffused and the broader
subsections regarding ‘‘any other matter that the Commissioner
believes’ and ‘significant developments that m igh t.... be expected to
a ffe ct.....public confidence in the Garda Siochana....’’ now refer to
a duty to inform to an independent body rather than a political one.
A lso reporting obligations w ill now apply to both the M inister ‘‘and
the Board’’. Section 43 provides that either the M inister or the Board
can order a Special Inquiry. Section 44 provides that the Garda
Commissioner shall submit the annual report to ‘‘the Board’’ as well
as to the M inister. Section 61 of the Principal A ct is amended by
Section 45 and provides for the extension of the exceptions to
confidentiality requirements to now include disclosures made to the
Board.
Amendment of Section 117 of the Principal A ct

Section 46 amends Section 117 of the Principal A ct by extending
the functions of the Garda Siochana Inspectorate to include an
obligation to carry out inspections or inquiries at the request of the
Board.
PART 4
Amendment of the Garda Siochana A ct 2005 (Part 3 and 4)
Amendment of Section 65, 66, 71 and 76 of the Principal A ct

Section 47 provides that ‘‘the Board’’ shall nominate the members
of the Ombudsman Commission rather than ‘‘the Government’’ as
the legislation currently provides and Section 48 provides that ‘‘the
Board’’ w ill also set the terms and conditions of office of the
members of the Ombudsman Commission. Section 49 provides that
Section 71 be amended so that ‘‘the Board’’ shall approve the
numbers of officers appointed by the Ombudsman Commission,
rather than the M inister as Section 70 currently provides. Section 51
amends Section 76 so that ‘‘the Board’’ rather than the M inister is
responsible for grants to the Ombudsman Commission.
Amendment of Section 74, Section 87, Section 93 and Section 100 of
the Principal A ct

Section 50 removes the subsections that provide that members of
the Garda Siochana may provide special assistance or temporary
service to the Ombudsman Commission. This removes the
perception of bias which attaches to the Ombudsman Commission
currently as serving members of the Gardai form part of the staff of
the Ombudsman Commission. These Gardai do however currently
provide valuable access to the P U L S E system to the Ombudsman
2Ibid, p. 371.

 Commission. However Section 93A as inserted by Section 60 w ill fill
this gap by now providing that the Ombudsman Commission shall
be entitled to full and independent access to electronic databases,
incident record management systems and computerised intelligence
systems of the Garda Sfochana. The effect of Section 93A may be
tempered by the state security requirements of the M inister which
are now included as matters reviewable under Section 100, as
amended by Section 64, by a specially appointed H igh Court Judge
who has existing powers to deal with sim ilar matters. Section 87 is
amended by Section 54 to ensure that the conduct of all members of
the Garda Sfochana, regardless of whether and when they resign or
retire, may now be deemed admissible by the Ombudsman
Commission.
Amendment of Section 80 of the Principal Act

Section 52 provides for the various reports of the Ombudsman
Commission to be provided now to both the M inister ‘‘and to the
Board’’.
Amendment of Section 82 and Section 102 of the Principal A ct

Section 53 amends certain definitions set out in Section 81 in order
to widen the adm issibility criteria currently applied by the
Ombudsman Commission; ‘‘member of the Garda Sfochana’’ w ill
now include former members of the Garda Sfochana. The definition
of ‘‘m isbehaviour’’ w ill now be extended to include a breach of the
new ‘‘Code of Service’’, which w ill form a third ground of
adm issibility in addition to the current grounds which are firstly
breach of discipline and secondly conduct which if substantiated,
would amount to an offence. Section 28 provides for the new Code
of Service to be drawn up to include standards of efficiency and
service that members of the public may expect from the Garda
Sfochana and the Board shall submit such a draft code to the
M inister following consultation with the Garda Commissioner and
the Ombudsman Commission. The definition of ‘‘serious harm’’ is
expanded to include injuries that would correspond with the
European Convention on Human Rights A rticle 3 definition of
‘‘torture, inhuman or degrading treatment’’ and also injury that
would amount to ‘‘rape or sexual assault’’, an absence that has been
noted by the Omudsman Com m ission several times in its Reports.
The new definition extends the obligation of the Garda
Commissioner in Section 102 of the Principal A ct. This obliges the
Garda Commissioner to refer to the Ombudsman Commission for
investigation any matter that indicates that the conduct of a Garda
may have caused death/paralysis. Section 66 now extends that
definition to include injury amounting to torture, inhuman or
degrading treatment and rape or sexual assault.
Amendment of Sections 84 and Section 93 of the Principal A ct

Section 54 extends the 6 months time lim it to one year in the case
of conduct amounting to breach of discipline or Code of Service
(sim ilarly to the time lim its applicable in Northern Ireland) and to
two years from the date of conduct which, if substantiated, would
amount to an offence. Section 92 is amended by Section 59 which
provides that the Ombudsman Com m ission shall review its decision
to discontinue any investigation on the provision by the Com plainant
of relevant inform ation not previously considered by the
Commission.

 Amendment of Sections 90, 92 and 94 of the Principal A ct

Section 57 removes the possibility of a member of the Garda
Sfochana vetoing any attempt to resolve a complaint by mediation
or other inform al means. The consent of the complainant to
mediation/informal means is still however required. Section 58
provides that a complaint may only be referred back to the Garda
Sfochana for internal investigation with the consent of the
complainant and that supervision by the Ombudsman Commission is
mandatory in any such investigation and mandatory reporting
requirements are imposed. This has been recommended by the Irish
Human Rights Commission and the most recent 2011 figures
provided by the Ombudsman Com m ission’s 5 year report indicate
that currently approximately 40% of admissible complaints are
returned to the Garda Sfochana for internal and unsupervised
investigation by members of the Garda Sfochana themselves.
Amendment of Section 89, Section 107 and 108

Section 56 imposes a requirement (rather than the current
discretion) on the Garda Commissioner with regard to timely
provision of evidence to the Ombudsman Commission once a
complaint is declared admissible, and the postponing of notification
to the relevant Garda until such evidence is preserved. Section 69
amends section 107 also relating to the tim ely provision of evidence.
Section 108A is inserted by Section 70 and provides that any
incidence of non-compliance of the Garda Sfochana with any
protocols made under Section 108 (currently regarding informationsharing and co-operation between Garda Commissioner and the
Ombudsman Com m ission) may be reported to the Board for its
consideration and the Ombudsman Com m ission’s annual report shall
include a summary of the general compliance by the Garda Sfochana
with these protocols. These amendments are aimed at addressing the
delays due to information exchange and the issues arising from
categorisation of information requests highlighted by the
Ombudsman Commission in its 2012 report and the issues raised by
the case studies listed by the Ombudsman Com m ission in the
appendix ‘‘Issues in the Provision of Inform ation” released on 23rd
May 2013 with the Annual Report 2012.
Amendment of Section 97 and Section 101, Section 103

Section 62 amends Section 97 by providing that the Ombudsman
Commission shall, following referral of the results of its investigation
back to the Garda Commissioner in a finding of breach of discipline,
recommend an appropriate sanction, and shall be notified by the
Garda Commissioner of the outcome of any disciplinary proceedings
and of any disciplinary sanction imposed on the member concerned
to include the grounds and statement of reasons of any decision.
Section 101 of the Principal A ct is amended by Section 65 which
provides for sim ilar requirements relating to provision of follow up
data by the Director of Public Prosecutions where the results of the
Ombudsman Commission are referred to the D P P in a finding that
the relevant conduct may have amounted to an offence. Section 103
is amended by Section 67 which requires the publication by the
Ombudsman Commission of the results of its investigations to
include details of any disciplinary proceedings and sanctions imposed
by the Garda Commissioner and details of penalties imposed by the
D PP in any related prosecutions. This requirement to publish is
restricted in certain circumstances by Section 103(2).

 Amendment of Section 106

Section 68 amends Section 106 to permit the Ombudsman
Commission to investigate on its own initiative and without a request
or authorisation from the M inister or the Board the practices,
policies or procedures of the Garda Siochana if the Commission
decides that it is necessary to do so for the purpose of preventing
complaints arising in relation to the relevant practices, policy or
procedure. This amendment was recommended by the U N Special
Rapporteur to Ireland, M Seggayaka in her report presented to the
U N in March 2013 and has been recommended by human rights
groups on many occasions.
PART 5
Regulations and Miscellaneous Provisions

Section 74 provides that the Garda Siochana w ill now be a public
body for the purposes of Freedom of Information legislation.
Deputy Mick Wallace,
Bealtaine, 2014.

Wt. 66787. 616. 5/14. Clondalkin. (44634). Gr. 30-15.

 Bille an Gharda Siochana (Leasu) (Uimh. 2), 2014
Garda Siochana (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2014

Mar a tionscnawdh
As initiated

[No. 45 of 2014]

 B I L L E A N G H A R D A S fo C H A N A (L E A S U ) (U IM H . 2), 2014
G A R D A S fo C H A N A (A M E N D M E N T ) (N O . 2) B I L L 2014

M ar a tionscnaiodh
As initiated

CO N TEN TS

PART 1
P relim inary M atters
Section
1. Short title and collective citation
2. Commencement
3. Interpretation
4. Expenses
PART 2
T he G arda S m ch Ana I ndependent B oard
C hapter 1

Establishment, Appointment, and Accountability o f Garda Siochana Independent Board
5. Establishm ent day
6. Establishm ent o f Board
7. Membership and appointment o f Board
8. Terms and conditions o f office
9. Resignation or removal o f members in certain cases
10. M eeting and business o f Board
11. O fficers o f the Board
12. Grants to the Board
13. Accounts and audit
14. A ccountability o f Board to Committee o f Public Accounts
15. A ccountability o f Board to Committee
16. Various reports by the Board
17. Confidentiality o f inform ation obtained

[No. 45 of 2014]

 Chapter 2

Objectives and Functions
18. O bjectives o f the Board
19. Functions o f the Board
PART 3
A mendment of the G arda SfocHANA A ct 2005 (P art 2 and 5)
20. Amendment o f section 9 o f the Principal A ct
21. Amendment o f section 10 o f the Principal A ct
22. Amendment o f section 11 o f the Principal A ct
23. Amendment o f section 12 o f the Principal A ct
24. Amendment o f section 13 o f the Principal A ct
25. Amendment o f section 14 o f the Principal A ct
26. Amendment o f section 15 o f the Principal A ct
27. Amendment o f section 17 o f the Principal A ct
28. Insertion o f new sections 17A and 17B in the Principal A ct
29. Amendment o f section 20 o f the Principal A ct
30. Amendment o f section 21 o f the Principal A ct
31. Amendment o f section 22 o f the Principal A ct
32. Amendment o f section 23 o f the Principal A ct
33. Amendment o f section 24 o f the Principal A ct
34. Amendment o f section 25 o f the Principal A ct
35. Amendment o f section 26 o f the Principal A ct
36. Amendment o f section 27 o f the Principal A ct
37. Amendment o f section 28 o f the Principal A ct
38. Amendment o f section 33 o f the Principal A ct
39. Amendment o f section 35 o f the Principal A ct
40. Amendment o f section 36 o f the Principal A ct
41. Amendment o f section 40 o f the Principal A ct
42. Amendment o f section 41 o f the Principal A ct
43. Amendment o f section 42 o f the Principal A ct
44. Amendment o f section 46 o f the Principal A ct
45. Amendment o f section 62 o f the Principal A ct
46. Amendment o f section 117 o f the Principal A ct
PART 4
A mendment of the G arda SfocHANA A ct 2005 (P art 3 and 4)
47. Amendment o f section 65 o f the Principal A ct
48. Amendment o f section 66 o f the Principal A ct

 49. Amendment o f section 71 o f the Principal A ct
50. Amendment o f section 74 o f the Principal A ct
51. Amendment o f section 76 o f the Principal A ct
52. Amendment o f section 80 o f the Principal A ct
53. Amendment o f section 82 o f the Principal A ct
54. Amendment o f section 84 o f the Principal A ct
55. Amendment o f section 87 o f the Principal A ct
56. Amendment o f section 89 o f the Principal A ct
57. Amendment o f section 90 o f the Principal A ct
58. Amendment o f section 92 o f the Principal A ct
59. Amendment o f section 93 o f the Principal A ct
60. Insertion o f new section 93A in the Principal A ct
61. Amendment o f section 94 o f the Principal A ct
62. Amendment o f section 97 o f the Principal A ct
63. Amendment o f section 98 o f the Principal A ct
64. Amendment o f section 100 o f the Principal A ct
65. Amendment o f section 101 o f the Principal A ct
66. Amendment o f section 102 o f the Principal A ct
67. Amendment o f section 103 o f the Principal A ct
68. Amendment o f section 106 o f the Principal A ct
69. Amendment o f section 107 o f the Principal A ct
70. Insertion o f new section 108A in the Principal A ct
PART 5
R egulations and M iscellaneous M atters
71. General power to make regulations
72. Amendment o f section 121 o f the Principal A ct
73. Amendment o f section 126 o f the Principal A ct
74. Amendment o f the First Schedule to the Freedom o f Inform ation A ct 1997

 C iv il Service Commissioners A ct 1956 (No. 45)
C iv il Service Regulation Acts 1956 to 1996
Commissions of Investigation A ct 2004 (No. 23)
Comptroller and Auditor General (Amendment) A ct 1993 (No. 8)
Crim inal Justice A ct 2007 (No. 29)
Equal Status Acts 2000-2008
Freedom of Information A ct 1997 (No. 13)
Garda Siochana A ct 2005 (No. 20)
O fficial Secrets A ct 1963 (No. 1)
Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Acts 1921 to 2002

 B I L L E A N G H A R D A S fo C H A N A (L E A S U ) (U IM H . 2), 2014
G A R D A S fo C H A N A (A M E N D M E N T ) (N O . 2) B I L L 2014

Bill
entitled
A n A c t to am end the G arda Sio ch an a A c t 2005 to strengthen the independence and

5

fu n ctio n s o f the O ffic e o f the G arda Sio ch an a O m budsm an C o m m issio n and to provide
fo r the establishm ent o f a body to be know n as the G arda Sio ch an a Independent B o ard
w ith m onito ring, o versigh t and su p erviso ry fu n ctio n s over the G arda Sio ch an a to
im prove the dem ocratic a cco u n tab ility o f the G arda Sio ch an a and to encourage
com m unity engagem ent and to ensure adherence to relevant hum an righ ts standards, to

10

provide fo r the am endm ent and repeal o f certain sections o f the G arda Sio ch an a A c t
2005 and to pro vid e fo r related m atters.
W H E R E A S the State has com m itted to hum an righ ts standards across a ll aspects o f
p o lic in g and p o lice organisation, draw n from international o b ligatio n s under the U N
International C ovenant on C iv il and P o litic a l R ig h ts, the European C o n ven tio n on

15

H um an R ig h ts and the C harter o f Fundam ental R ig h ts o f the European U n io n and ta kin g
cognisance o f recom m endations o f the C o u n c il o f Euro pe in c lu d in g reports from the
European Com m ittee fo r the Preventio n o f Torture and the European C ode o f P o lice
E th ic s and as recom m ended b y the M o rris T rib u n a l;
A N D W H E R E A S the service s provided b y the G arda Sio ch an a are la rg e ly exem pt from

20

the scope and protection o f the E q u a l Status A c ts 2000-2008 re su ltin g in a gap in the
protection o f hum an righ ts;
A N D W H E R E A S the M o rris Trib u n a l, the Irish H um an R ig h ts C o m m issio n and the
G arda Sio ch an a H um an R ig h ts A u d it 2004 id en tifie d p rio ritie s and recom m endations in
relation to hum an righ ts and com m unity engagem ent w h ich can be furthered by the

25

establishm ent o f a G arda Sio ch an a Independent B o ard , b y a reform o f the structures
w ith in the Garda! and the strengthening o f the o ffice o f G arda Sio ch an a O m budsm an
C o m m issio n ;
A N D W H E R E A S the State has com m itted in the B e lfa st A greem ent in 1998 [“ the G ood
F rid a y A greem ent” ] to take com parable steps to those bein g taken in N orthern Ire lan d to
im prove hum an righ ts; and w hereas in reco gn itio n o f the extensive fu n ctio n s and

30

 pow ers o f the G arda Sfochana in p ro v id in g both p o lic in g and security o f the State, there
is a need to increase the independence o f the G arda Sfochana from central governm ent
and from direct m in iste ria l control and to im pro ve dem ocratic acco u n tab ility o f the
G arda Sio ch an a by the creation o f a p u b lic and independent body w ith m onito ring,
oversigh t and su p erviso ry fu n ctio n s w ith reporting o b liga tio n s to the Com m ittee on

5

P u b lic S e rvice O ve rsigh t and P e titio n s and b y the re su ltin g realignm ent o f the structures
o f the G arda Siochana;
A N D W H E R E A S there is a need to em phasise engagem ent and create a forum fo r
d ialogue and consultation w ith com m unity, to reinfo rce the le g itim a cy o f the Irish
consensual m odel o f p o lic in g and to restore p u b lic trust and confidence in the garda and

10

the strengthening o f the role o f the jo in t p o lic in g com m ittees.
Be it enacted by the O ireachtas as follow s:

PART 1
P relim inary M atters

Short title and collective citation
1.

15

(1) Th is A ct may be cited as the Garda Siochana (Amendment) A ct 2014.
(2) The Garda Siochana A ct 2005 and Part 7 o f the Crim inal Justice A ct 2007 and the
Garda Siochana (Amendment) A ct 2014 m ay be cited together as the Garda Siochana
A cts 2005 to 2014.

Com m encem ent
2.

20

Th is A ct comes into operation on such day or days as the M inister may appoint by order
either generally or with reference to any particular purpose or provision, and different
days m ay be so appointed for different purposes and different provisions o f the A ct.

Interpretation
3.

(1) In this A ct, unless the context otherwise requires:

25

“Board” means the Garda Siochana Independent Board established under Part 2;
“Chairperson” means the Chairperson appointed under section 7;
“Code O f Service” means the Code established under section 17A o f the Principal A ct
as amended by this A ct;
“establishment day” means the day appointed under section 6;
“functions” includes powers and duties and references to the performances o f
functions include, with respect to powers and duties, references to the exercise o f the
powers and the carrying out o f the duties;

30

 “Member” in relation to the Board means a member appointed under section 7;
“prescribed” means prescribed by regulation;
“Principal A ct” means the Garda Siochana A ct 2005;
“Special Committee” means the Committee established under section 7(1)(a) to
nominate members for the Board.

5

(2) In this A ct—
(a) a reference to a section, Chapter, Part or Schedule is to a section, Chapter or Part
of, or a Schedule to, this A ct unless it is indicated that reference to some other
enactment is intended,
(b) a reference to a subsection, paragraph or subparagraph is to the subsection,
paragraph or subparagraph in w hich the reference occurs, unless it is indicated
that reference to some other provision is intended,
(c) a reference to any other enactment is to that enactment as amended by or under
any other enactment, including this A ct, unless the context otherwise requires,
and

10

15

(d) all o f the terms shall have the meaning ascribed to them in section 3 o f the
Principal A ct unless the context otherwise requires.

Expenses
4.

The expenses incurred in respect o f the Garda Siochana Independent Board and the
Garda Siochana Ombudsman Com m ission in the adm inistration o f this A ct shall, to such
extent as may be sanctioned by the M inister for Finance, be paid out o f moneys provided
by the Oireachtas.

20

PART 2
T he G arda S m ch Ana I ndependent B oard
C hapter 1

25

Establishment, Appointment, and Accountability o f Garda Siochana Independent Board

Establishm ent day
5.

The M inister shall by Order appoint a day to be the establishment day for the purposes o f
this Part.

Establishm ent o f B o ard
6.

30

(1) On the establishment day, a body corporate to be known as Bord Neamhspleach an
Gharda Siochana or, in the E n glish language, the Garda Siochana Independent Board
stands established to perform the functions assigned to it by this A ct.
(2) The Board has, under its corporate name, perpetual succession and an o fficia l seal and
may—

35

 (a) sue and be sued in its corporate name,
(b) acquire, hold and dispose o f land or an interest in land, and
(c) acquire, hold and dispose o f any other property.

M em bership and appointm ent of B o ard
7.

(1) The Board is to consist o f sixteen members, all o f whom are to be appointed by the
President on:

5

(a) the nomination o f a Special Committee, such Committee to be established solely
for this purpose by the Top Le vel Appointments Com m ission; and
(b) follow ing fair and independent selection o f the Members by the Special
Committee through public advertisement and open competition, and on a
transparent and merit-based means; and

10

(c) the passage o f resolutions by D a il Eireann and Seanad Eireann recommending
their appointment.
(2) The com position o f the Board shall be as follow s:
(a) four Members o f the Oireachtas, with an equal representation from both
Government and opposition Members;

15

(b) two Com m issioners from the Irish Human Rights and Equality Com m ission;
(c) the Ombudsman for Children;
(d) the Data Protection Com m issioner;
(e) the C h ie f Inspector o f the Garda Inspectorate;

20

(f) six members to be selected from the relevant bodies and according to the relevant
guidelines as prescribed;
(g) a Chairperson o f the Board to be selected and appointed by these 15 members
from a list o f nominees provided by the Special Committee.
(3) In considering the nomination o f a person to be a member o f the Board, the Special
Committee shall satisfy themselves that the person has the appropriate experience,
qualifications, training or expertise for appointment to a body having the functions o f
the Board.
(4) A person who holds ju d icia l office in a superior court may, without relinquishing that
office, be appointed as the chairperson o f the Board but, unless otherwise provided by
the terms o f the appointment, he or she shall not, w hile a member, be required to carry
out duties under statute as the holder o f that ju d icia l office.

25

30

(5) The first appointments to the Board become effective on the establishment day.
(6) I f the chairperson is tem porarily unable to carry out the duties o f office, the other
members shall determine w hich o f them is to act, for all or part o f the period o f
inability, in the chairperson’s place.
(7) For as long as a member is acting in place o f the chairperson under subsection (6)
references in this A ct to the chairperson o f the Board are to be read as references to

35

 that member.

Term s and conditions of office
8.

(1) Subject to section 9, a member o f the Board holds office for the period, exceeding 3
years but not exceeding 6 years, that the Special Committee may determine at the time
o f appointment.

5

(2) A member is eligible for reappointment for a second term.
(3) A member holds office on the terms and conditions relating to remuneration
(including allowances for expenses, benefits in kind and superannuation) or other
matters that may be determined by the Government at the time o f appointment or
reappointment.

10

(4) The Board may act notwithstanding one or more than one vacancy among its
members.
(5) W henever a vacancy occurs in the membership o f the Board caused by the
resignation, removal from office or the death o f a member, the vacancy is to be fille d
by appointment in the manner specified in section 7.

15

(6) A member who is appointed to fill a vacancy caused by the resignation, removal from
office or the death o f a member, holds office for the remainder o f the term o f office o f
the replaced member.

R esignatio n or rem oval o f m em bers in certain cases
9.

(1) A member o f the Board may resign from office at any time by letter addressed to the
President and copied to the M inister, and the resignation takes effect on the date the
President receives the letter.
(2) The President may remove a member o f the Board from office, but only for stated
m isbehaviour or for incapacity and then only on resolutions passed by D a il Eireann
and Seanad Eireann calling for the member’s removal.

20

25

M eeting and business of B o ard
10.

(1) The quorum for a meeting o f the Board is 10 members.
(2) Each question at a meeting o f the Board shall be determined by a m ajority o f the votes
o f the members present and voting on the question.
(3) In the case o f an equal division o f votes, the chairperson or other member presiding at
the meeting has a second or casting vote.

30

(4) Subject to this A ct, the Board may regulate its own procedures to include the
formation o f sub-committees.

O ffice rs of the B o ard
11.

(1) The Board m ay appoint such numbers o f persons as its officers, w ith the consent o f
the M inister for Finance.
(2) The Board shall determine the grades o f its officers and the numbers o f officers in

35

 each grade, with the consent o f the M inister for Finance.
(3) O fficers o f the Board are c iv il servants in the C iv il Service o f the State.
(4) The Board is the appropriate authority (w ithin the meaning o f the C iv il Service
Com m issioners A ct 1956 and the C iv il Service Regulation A cts 1956 to 1996) in
relation to its officers.

5

G ra n ts to the B o ard
12.

The M inister may, in each financial year, pay to the Board, out o f money provided by the
Oireachtas, a grant o f such amount as he or she, with the consent o f the M inister for
Finance, determines towards the expenses o f the Com m ission in perform ing its functions.

A ccounts and audit
13.

10

(1) The Board shall keep, in such form and in respect o f such accounting periods as may
be approved by the M inister with the consent o f the M inister for Finance, all proper
and usual accounts o f money received or expended by it, including an income and
expenditure account and a balance sheet.
(2) N ot later than 3 months after the end o f the accounting period to w hich the accounts
relate, the Board shall submit accounts kept under this section to the Com ptroller and
Auditor General for audit.

15

(3) Im m ediately after the audit, the Board shall present to the M inister copies o f—
(a) the audited accounts, including the income and expenditure account, the balance
sheet and such other ( if any) accounts kept under this section as the M inister,
after consulting with the M inister for Finance, may direct, and

20

(b) the Com ptroller and Auditor General’s report on the accounts.
(4) A s soon as practicable after presentation o f the audited accounts and the Com ptroller
and Auditor General’s report, the M inister shall cause copies o f them to be laid before
each House o f the Oireachtas.

25

A cco u n ta b ility of B o a rd to Com m ittee o f P u b lic A ccounts
14.

(1) The Chairperson o f the Board shall, whenever required to do so by the Committee o f
Public Accounts, give evidence to that Committee on—
(a) the regularity and propriety o f the transactions recorded, or required to be
recorded, in any book or other record o f account subject to audit by the
Com ptroller and Auditor General that the Board is required by this A ct to
prepare,

30

(b) the economy and efficiency o f the Board in the use o f its resources,
(c) the systems, procedures and practices employed by the Board for the purpose o f
evaluating the effectiveness o f its operations, and
(d) any matter affecting the Board referred to in—
(i) a special report o f the Com ptroller and Auditor General under section 11(2)
o f the Com ptroller and Auditor General (Amendment) A ct 1993, or

35

 (ii) any other report o f the Com ptroller and Auditor General that is laid before
D a il Eireann in so far as the report relates to a matter specified in any o f
paragraphs (a) to (c).
(2) The Chairperson shall not—
(a) question or express an opinion on the merits o f any p o licy o f the Government or a
M inister o f the Government or on the merits o f the objectives o f such policy, or

5

(b) provide inform ation that m ight facilitate the com m ission o f an offence, prejudice
a crim inal investigation or prosecution or jeopardise the safety o f a person.

A cco u n ta b ility of B o a rd to Com m ittee
15.

(1) In this section and in section 16 “committee” means—

10

(a) the committee appointed jo in tly by both Houses o f the Oireachtas known as the
Joint Committee on Public Service Oversight and Petitions,
(b) a sub-committee o f a committee as defined in paragraph (a).
(2) Subject to subsection (3), the Chairperson shall, at the written request o f the
committee, and on at least four occasions per annum, attend before it to give account
for the fulfilm ent o f the Board’s functions and duties under this A ct.

15

(3) The Chairperson o f the Board shall not be required to give account before a
committee for any matter that is or is lik e ly to be, the subject o f proceedings before a
court or tribunal in the State.
(4) The Chairperson o f the Board shall, if o f the opinion that subsection (3) applies to a
matter about w hich he or she is requested to give an account before a committee,
inform the committee o f that opinion and the reasons for the opinion.

20

(5) The inform ation required under subsection (4) must be given to the committee in
w riting unless it is given when the Chairperson is before the committee.
(6) If, on being inform ed o f the Chairperson’s opinion about the matter, the committee
decides not to withdraw its request relating to the matter, the H igh Court may, on
application under subsection (7), determine whether subsection (3) applies to the
matter.
(7) Either the Board or the committee may apply in a summary manner to the H igh Court
for a determination under subsection (6), but only i f the application is made w ithin 21
days after the date on w hich the member o f the Board is informed o f the committee’s
decision not to withdraw its request.
(8) Pending the determination o f an application under subsection (7), the Chairperson
shall not attend before the committee to give account for the matter that is the subject
o f the application.

25

30

35

(9) I f the H igh Court determines that subsection (3) applies to the matter, the committee
shall withdraw its request in so far as it relates to the matter, but i f the Court
determines that subsection (3) does not apply, the Chairperson shall attend before the
committee to give account for the matter.
(10) In carrying out duties under this section, a Chairperson shall not—

40

 (a) question or express an opinion on the merits o f any p o licy o f the Government or a
M inister o f the Government or on the merits o f the objectives o f such policy, or
(b) provide inform ation that m ight facilitate the com m ission o f an offence, prejudice
a crim inal investigation or prosecution or jeopardise the safety o f a person.

V ario u s reports by the B o a rd
16.

5

(1) N ot later than M arch 31 in each year, the Board shall submit to the M inister and the
Committee a report on its activities to include a review o f the performance o f the
Garda Siochana in the im m ediately preceding year.
(2) The Board shall, w ithin 2 years from the date o f its establishment, submit to the
M inister and the Committee a report on—

10

(a) the effectiveness o f the Board, and
(b) the adequacy o f the functions assigned to it by this A ct.
(3) The report submitted under subsection (2) m ay contain recommendations for
im proving the effectiveness o f the Board.
(4) A t the end o f each 5 year period commencing with the date o f its establishment, the
Board shall submit to the M inister and the Committee a report review ing the general
performance o f its functions in the preceding 5 years.
(5) The Board may make any other reports that it considers appropriate for drawing to the
Committee and the M inister’s attention matters that have come to its notice and that,
in its opinion, should, because o f their gravity or other exceptional circum stances, be
the subject o f a special report to the Committee and the M inister.

15

20

(6) A s soon as practicable after receiving a report under this section, the M inister shall
cause a copy o f the report to be laid before each House o f the Oireachtas.

C o n fid e n tia lity of inform ation obtained
17.

(1) A person who is or was a member or officer o f the Board or who is or was engaged
under contract or other arrangement by the Board shall not disclose, in or outside the
State, inform ation obtained in carrying out the duties o f that person’s office or o f his
or her contract or other arrangement with the Board if the disclosure is lik e ly to have
a harm ful effect.

25

(2) For the purpose o f this section, the disclosure o f inform ation referred to in subsection
(1) does not have a harm ful effect unless it—

30

(a) prejudices the effective performance o f the Board’s functions,
(b) results in the publication o f personal inform ation (as defined in the Freedom o f
Inform ation A ct 1997) obtained in the course o f the performance o f the Board’s
functions and constitutes an unwarranted and serious infringem ent o f a person’s
right to privacy.
(3) For the purpose o f this section, a person is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to
know that disclosure o f inform ation referred to in subsection (1) is lik e ly to have a
harm ful effect if a reasonable person would, in all the circum stances, be aware that its

35

 disclosure could have that effect.
(4) Subsection (1) does not prohibit a person referred to in that subsection from
disclosing inform ation if the disclosure—
(a) is made to—
(i) the Garda Com m issioner,

5

(ii) the M inister,
(iii) the Attorney General,
(iv ) the D irector o f Public Prosecutions,
(v) the C h ie f State Solicitor,
(v i) the Crim inal Assets Bureau,

10

(v ii) the Com ptroller and Auditor General,
(v iii) the Garda Siochana Inspectorate or an officer o f the Inspectorate,
(ix ) the Revenue Com m issioners, or
(x) a member o f either o f the Houses o f the Oireachtas where relevant to the
proper discharge o f that member’s functions,

15

(b) is made to a court,
(c) is made to a tribunal appointed under the Tribunals o f Inquiry (Evidence) A cts
1921 to 2002 or a com m ission o f investigation established under the
Com m issions o f Investigation A ct 2004,
(d) is made in the course of, and in accordance with, the duties o f that person’s office
or employment or o f his or her duties under a contract or other arrangement to
work with or for the Board,

20

(e) is authorised by the Board, or
(f) is otherwise authorised by law.
(5) A person who contravenes subsection (1) is gu ilty o f an offence and is liable—

25

(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding €3,000 or im prisonment for a
term not exceeding 12 months or both, or
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding €10,000 or im prisonment for
a term not exceeding 2 years or both.
(6) A person who contravenes subsection (1) and who receives any gift, consideration or
advantage as an inducement to disclose the inform ation to w hich the contravention
relates or as a reward for, or otherwise on account of, the disclosure o f that
inform ation is gu ilty o f an offence and is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding €3,000 or im prisonment for a
term not exceeding 12 months or both, or
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding €40,000 or im prisonment for
a term not exceeding 5 years or both.

30

35

 (7) The provisions o f this section are in addition to, and not in substitution for, the
provisions o f the O fficia l Secrets A ct 1963.
(8) The Chairperson o f the Board may, follow ing request from the M inister and follow ing
consultation with the Data Protection Com m issioner, w ithhold inform ation from the
Members o f the Board, for reasons o f State security.

5

Chapter 2

Objectives and Functions

O b jectives of the B o ard
18.

The objectives o f the Board are—
(a) to ensure that its functions are performed in an efficient and effective manner,

10

(b) to promote public trust and confidence in the Garda Siochana,
(c) to promote respect for human rights and the value o f transparency w ithin the
Garda Siochana,
(d) to provide an independent means o f oversight, m onitoring and supervision o f the
Garda Siochana,

15

(e) to increase the democratic accountability o f the Garda Siochana,
(f) to encourage and facilitate community engagement with the Garda Siochana.

Fu n ctio n s o f the B o ard
19.

The functions o f the Board include—
(a) to human rights proof a ll Garda policies, procedures and practices to include but
not lim ited to:

20

(i) public order;
(ii) inform er management and intelligence gathering;
(iii) intelligence and inform ation sharing;
(iv) Garda statutory powers and any proposed expansion thereof;

25

(v) exercise o f Garda discretion;
(v i) the drafting and updating o f a ll Garda Codes,
(b) to m onitor Garda Siochana implementation o f such policies, procedures and
practices,
(c) to develop detailed and p u b licly accessible human rights-based Codes o f Practice
for a ll key Garda operational policies and procedures to include effective
com pliance measures,

30

(d) to prepare draft Code o f Service, follow ing consultation with the Com m issioner
and the Ombudsman Com m ission,
(e) to include the development o f education and training modules on relevant human

35

 rights standards,
(f) to ensure the Garda Siochana operates with high standards o f transparency in
discharge o f its functions and to require publication o f all Garda Codes and
Garda operational policies and procedures, subject to section 17B o f the Principal
A ct,

5

(g) to promote community engagement and to encourage and facilitate m eaningful
and inclusive consultation and co-operation between local communities, the
Garda Siochana and the Board to include the holding o f quarterly public
meetings,
(h) to issue guidelines for the establishment and maintenance o f Joint P o licin g
Committees as set out in Chapter 4 o f Part 2 o f the Principal A ct as amended by
this A ct,

10

(i) fu lfillin g its role in relation to the setting o f priorities, the approval o f strategy
statement and the drafting o f the annual policing plan,
(j) to review the performance o f the Garda Siochana in respect o f the policing plans
and strategy statements and priorities by requiring the Garda Com m issioner to
provide m onthly reports and attend m onthly meetings with the Board,

15

(k) fu lfill its consultative role as provided for in the Principal A ct as amended by this
A ct,
(l) fu lfill its reporting duties as provided for in this A ct,

20

(m) appoint and dism iss the Garda Com m issioner and Deputy and Assistant
Com m issioners,
(n) receive and consider reports from the Ombudsman Com m ission including
regarding com pliance or otherwise o f the Garda Siochana with any protocols
under section 108 o f Principal A ct,

25

(o) nominate members o f the Ombudsman Com m ission,
(p) w ithin two years o f the commencement o f this A ct, and at five year intervals
thereafter, to conduct an independent review o f the Garda Siochana governance,
accountability and w orking practices, operational management and governance.

PART 3

30

A mendment of the G arda SfocHANA A ct 2005 (P art 2 and 5)

Am endm ent of section 9 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
20.

Section 9 o f the Principal A ct is amended in subsection (1) by substituting “Board,
follow ing consultation with the M inister” for “Government” .

Am endm ent of section 10 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
21.

Section 10 o f the Principal A ct is amended in subsection (1) by substituting “Board,
follow ing consultation with the M inister,” for “Government” wheresoever appears.

35

 Am endm ent of section 11 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
22.

Section 11 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) substituting in subsection (1) “Board, follow ing consultation with the M inister,”
for “Government”,
(b) substituting in paragraph (c) o f subsection (1) “Board’s” for “Governm ent’s”,

5

(c) substituting in subsection (2) “Board” for “Government” wheresoever appears,
(d) substituting in subsection (3) “Board” for “Government” .

Am endm ent of section 12 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
23.

Section 12 o f the Principal A ct is amended by substituting “Board” for “Government”
wheresoever appears.

10

Am endm ent of section 13 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
24.

Section 13 o f the Principal A ct is amended in subsection (1) by substituting “Board in
consultation w ith the M inister” for “Government” .

Am endm ent of section 14 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
25.

Section 14 o f the Principal A ct is amended in paragraph (d) o f subsection (2) by
substituting “Board” for “Government” .

15

Am endm ent of section 15 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
26.

Section 15 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) substituting in paragraph (a) o f subsection (4) “Board” for “M inister”, and
(b) inserting in subsection
“Com m issioner” .

(5) “, with the approval o f the Board,” after

20

Am endm ent of section 17 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
27.

Section 17 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) inserting in subsection (1) “, with the approval o f the Board,” after “shall”,
(b) inserting in subsection (2) “and the Board” after “the Garda Com m issioner”, and

25

(c) inserting in subsection (2) “in consultation with the Board” after “the
Com m issioner” .

In sertio n of new sections 17A and 17B in the P rin c ip a l A ct
28.

The Principal A ct is amended by inserting the follow ing sections after Section 17:
“ 17A. (1)The M inister, with the approval o f the Board, shall, by regulation,
establish a Code o f Service that includes standards o f service and
efficiency that members o f the public may expect from members o f the
Garda Siochana.

30

 (2) Before establishing or amending a Code o f Service, the M inister shall
request the Board to prepare and submit to the M inister a draft Code o f
Service.
(3) In preparing a draft Code o f Service, the Board shall consult with the
Garda Com m issioner and the Ombudsman Com m ission about the
content o f the draft.

5

17B. A ll codes o f the Garda Sfochana and a ll Garda operational policies and
procedures shall be published, subject to matters o f State security.” .

Am endm ent of section 20 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
29.

Section 20 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—

10

(a) inserting in subsection (2) “and the Board” after “Com m issioner” wheresoever
appears, and
(b) inserting in paragraph (a) o f subsection (4) “and the Board” after “M inister” .

Am endm ent of section 21 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
30.

Section 21 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—

15

(a) substituting in subsection (1) “to the M inister and the Board for their” for “to the
M inister for his or her”,
(b) substituting in paragraph (a) o f subsection (3) “the recommendations o f the
Board” for “relevant Government p o licy”, and
(c) deleting in paragraph (b) o f subsection (3) “by the M inister” .

20

Am endm ent of section 22 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
31.

Section 22 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) substituting in paragraph (e) o f subsection (2) “the recommendations o f the
Board” for “relevant Government p o licy”,
(b) substituting in subsection (3) “shall” for “m ay”,

25

(c) substituting in subsection (4) “Board” for “M inister”,
(d) substituting in subsection (5) “Board” for “M inister” wheresoever appears, and
(e) inserting in subsection (6) “The Board shall submit a copy to the M inister and”
after “po licing plan,” .

Am endm ent of section 23 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
32.

Section 23 o f the Principal A ct is amended by inserting in subsection (1) “and to the
Board” after “M inister” .

Am endm ent of section 24 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
33.

Section 24 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—

30

 (a) inserting in paragraph (a) o f subsection (1) “or the Board” after “Com m issioner,”,
and
(b) inserting in paragraph
“Com m issioner” .

(b)

o f subsection

(1)

“and

the

Board”

after

Am endm ent of section 25 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
34.

5

Section 25 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) substituting in subsection (1) “Board” for “Government”,
(b) inserting in subsection (5) “and the Board” after “inform the M inister”, and
(c) substituting in subsection (5) “specified by the Board” for “specified by the
M inister” .

10

Am endm ent of section 26 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
35.

Section 26 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) inserting in paragraph (c) o f subsection (1) “and the Board” after “M inister”,
(b) substituting in paragraph (c) o f subsection (2) “Board” for “Government”, and
(c) deleting subsection (3).

15

Am endm ent of section 27 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
36.

Section 27 o f the Principal A ct is amended by substituting “Board” for “M inister”
wheresoever appears.

Am endm ent of section 28 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
37.

Section 28 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—

20

(a) inserting in subsection (1) “and follow ing consultation with the Board,” after
“Governm ent,”, and
(b) inserting in subsection (2) “follow ing consultation with the Data Protection
Com m issioner” after “fit” .

Am endm ent of section 33 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
38.

25

Section 33 o f the Principal A ct is amended by inserting in subsection (1) “after
consultation w ith the Board” after “Com m issioner” .

Am endm ent of section 35 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
39.

Section 35 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) substituting in subsection (1) “Board shall” for “M inister shall”,
(b) substituting in subsection (2) “shall include” for “may include”,
(c) substituting the follow ing paragraph for paragraph (c) o f subsection (2):

30

 “(c) the selection and appointment o f a member o f the committee as
chairperson o f the committee by the members o f the committee,”,
(d) substituting in paragraph (l) o f subsection (2) “Board” for “M inister”,
(e) substituting in subsection (4) “Board may” for “M inister m ay”, and
(f) inserting in subsection (5) “the Board shall forward a copy o f guidelines issued
under this section to” before “the M inister” .

5

Am endm ent of section 36 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
40.

Section 36 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) inserting in paragraph (c) o f subsection (2) “quarterly” after “host”,
(b) substituting in subsection (3) “Board whose” for “M inister whose”,

10

(c) substituting in paragraph (b) o f subsection (5) “Board” for “M inister”, and
(d) inserting in paragraph (a) o f subsection (5) “, together with any recommendations
arising therefrom and including a summary o f the details o f the public meetings
referred to in paragraph (c) o f subsection (2 )” .

Am endm ent of section 40 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
41.

15

Section 40 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) inserting in subsection (1) “Board” after “fu lly to the” and by inserting “relevant”
before “functions”,
(b) deleting subsection (2), and
(c) substituting in subsection (3) “any Garda records, statements made by members
o f the Garda Siochana and by other persons and reports in the power or control o f
the Garda Siochana that are” for “m aterial specified in subsection (2) that is ” .

20

Am endm ent of section 41 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
42.

Section 41 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) deleting paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) in subsection (1),

25

(b) inserting the follow ing subsection after subsection (1):
“(1A ) The Garda Com m issioner shall keep the Board fu lly inform ed o f the
follow ing—
(a) significant developments that m ight reasonably be expected to
affect public confidence in the Garda Siochana,

30

(b) any other matters that in the Com m issioner’s opinion should be
brought to the Board’s attention,”,
and
(c) substituting in subsections (2), (3) and (4) “Board or the M inister” for “M inister”
wheresoever appears.

35

 Am endm ent of section 42 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
43.

Section 42 o f the Principal A ct is amended by the substituting o f “M inister or the Board”
for “M inister” wheresoever appears.

Am endm ent of section 46 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
44.

Section 46 o f the Principal A ct is amended by inserting in subsection (1) “and the Board”
after “to the M inister” .

5

Am endm ent of section 62 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
45.

Section 62 o f the Principal A ct is amended by inserting the follow ing subparagraph after
subparagraph (x) in paragraph (a) o f subsection (4):
“(x i) The Board” .

10

Am endm ent of section 117 o f the P rin c ip a l A ct
46.

Section 117 o f the Principal A ct is amended by substituting in subsection (2) “M inister or
the Board” for “M inister” wheresoever appears.

PART 4
A mendment of the G arda S m ch Ana A ct 2005 (P art 3 and 4)

15

Am endm ent of section 65 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
47.

Section 65 o f the Principal A ct is amended by substituting “Board” for “Government”
wheresoever appears.

Am endm ent of section 66 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
48.

Section 66 o f the Principal A ct is amended by substituting in subsection (1) “Board,” for
“Government” .

20

Am endm ent of section 71 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
49.

Section 71 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) substituting in subsection (1) o f “approved by the Board” for “approved by the
M inister”, and

25

(b) substituting in subsection (2) o f “approved by the Board” for “approved by the
M inister” .

Am endm ent of section 74 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
50.

Section 74 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) deleting subsections (1)(a) and (4), and
(b) deleting in subsection (3) the words “the Garda Siochana or” .

30

 Am endm ent of section 76 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
51.

Section 76 o f the Principal A ct is amended by inserting “with the approval o f the Board
and” after “he or she,” .

Am endm ent of section 80 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
52.

Section 80 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—

5

(a) inserting in subsection (1) “and to the Board” after “M inister”,
(b) inserting in subsection (4) “and to the Board” after “M inister”,
(c) substituting in subsection (5) “the attention o f the M inister and the Board” for
“the M inister’s attention”, and
(d) inserting in subsection (5) “and to the Board” after “report to the M inister” .

10

Am endm ent of section 82 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
53.

Section 82 o f the Principal A ct is amended in subsection (1)—
(a) by substituting the follow ing definition for the definition o f “member o f the
Garda Siochana” :
“ ‘member o f the Garda Siochana’ includes former members o f the Garda
Siochana but does not include the Garda Com m issioner;”,

15

(b) by substituting the follow ing definition for the definition o f “m isbehaviour” :
“ ‘m isbehaviour ’ means conduct that constitutes an offence or a breach o f
discipline or a breach o f the code o f service;”,
(c) by inserting the follow ing under the definition o f “serious harm” :

20

“(d) amounts to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, or
(e) amounts to rape or sexual assault” .

Am endm ent of section 84 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
54.

Section 84 o f the Principal A ct is amended by substituting the follow ing for subsection
(1)—

25

“(1) Subject to subsection (1 A ), a com plaint must be made w ithin the
period o f 1 year beginning on the date o f the conduct givin g rise to the
com plaint or w ithin any extension o f that period allowed under
subsection (2).
(1A ) Where the conduct givin g rise to the com plaint would, i f substantiated,
constitute an offence by the member o f the Garda Siochana, a
com plaint must be made w ithin the period o f 2 years beginning on the
date o f the said conduct or w ithin any extension o f that period allowed
under subsection (2 ).” .

30

 Am endm ent of section 87 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
55.

Section 87 o f the Principal A ct is amended in subsection (4) in paragraph (b) by
substituting “at any time before or after” for “at any time after” .

Am endm ent of section 89 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
56.

Section 89 o f the Principal A ct is amended in subsection (1)—

5

(a) in paragraph (b) by substituting “shall” for “m ay”, and
(b) by inserting the follow ing after paragraph (b):
“(c) on determination that a com plaint is adm issible under section 87
shall forward all evidence in subsection (1)(a) above to the
Ombudsman Com m ission without delay.”,

10

(c) in subsection (2) by substituting “subsection (1)(a) and (b)” for “subsection (1)” .

Am endm ent of section 90 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
57.

Section 90 o f the Principal A ct is amended—
(a) by deleting in subsection (3) “and the member o f the Garda Siochana”, and
(b) by deleting subsection (4).

15

Am endm ent of section 92 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
58.

Section 92 o f the Principal A ct is amended by inserting in paragraph (a) “with the
consent o f the com plainant,” before “refer” .

Am endm ent of section 93 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
59.

Section 93 o f the Principal A ct is amended by inserting the follow ing subsection after
subsection (2):
“(3) W here, subsequent to the m aking o f a direction under subsection (1),
the com plainant provides relevant inform ation not previously
considered by the Ombudsman Com m ission, the Com m ission shall
review the decision to discontinue.” .

20

25

In sertio n of new section 93A in the P rin c ip a l A ct
60.

The Principal A ct is amended by the insertion o f the follow ing section after section 93:
“93A. For the purpose o f an investigation o f any com plaint made under section
83, and subject to regulations made pursuant to section 126, the
Ombudsman Com m ission shall be entitled to fu ll and independent access
to and may inspect a ll electronic incident record management systems,
electronic inform ation databases, and computerised intelligence systems
o f the Garda Siochana.” .

30

 Am endm ent of section 94 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
61.

Section 94 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) substituting in subsection (2) “shall” for “m ay”,
(b) substituting the follow ing subsection for subsection (3):
“The Ombudsman Com m ission shall supervise the investigation o f
each com plaint referred under section 92(a).”,

5

(c) deleting subsection (4), and
(d) substituting the follow ing subsection for subsection (5):
“(5) In the course o f supervising the investigation, the Ombudsman
Com m ission—

10

(a) shall require the appointed member to keep it informed o f the
progress o f the investigation,
(b) shall require the appointed member to submit to it interim reports at
such times and in relation to such matters as the Com m ission may
direct,

15

(c) may arrange for a designated officer o f the Com m ission to be
present during any interview conducted by the appointed member
in the course o f the investigation,
(d) may direct the appointed member to investigate further any aspect
o f the com plaint.”,

20

(e) deleting in subsection (6) “if the investigation is supervised,”, and
(f) deleting subsections (9), (10) and (11).

Am endm ent of section 97 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
62.

Section 97 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) inserting in subsection (1)(b) “and a recommendation as to an appropriate
sanction” after “member”, and

25

(b) substituting the follow ing subsection for subsection (3):
“(3) The Ombudsman Com m ission shall be notified o f the outcome o f any
disciplinary proceedings or action taken and o f any disciplinary
sanction imposed on the member concerned, to include the grounds i f
any, on w hich the com plaint was upheld, and the grounds i f any on
w hich the com plaint was not upheld together with a statement o f the
reasons.” .

30

Am endm ent of section 98 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
63.

Section 98 o f the Principal A ct is amended by substituting “or 94(8)(a)” for “94(8)(a) or
94(11)(b)”

35

 Am endm ent of section 100 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
64.

Section 100 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) substituting in subsection (3)(a) “the operation o f section 93A, sections 96(4) to
(6) and 99(3) to (5 )” for “the operation o f sections 96(4) to (6) and 99(3) to (5 )”,
and

5

(b) substituting in subsection (4)(a) “under section 93A, section 96 or section 99” for
“under section 96 or 99” .

Am endm ent of section 101 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
65.

Section 101 o f the Principal A ct is amended by inserting in subsection 3(b) “, together
with details o f any penalties imposed” after “report” .

10

Am endm ent of section 102 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
66.

Section 102 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) inserting the follow ing paragraph after paragraph (b) in subsection (4):
“(c) behaved in a manner that would constitute a breach o f the Code o f
Service,”,

15

and
(b) substituting in subsection (5) “the M inister or the Board” for “the M inister” .

Am endm ent of section 103 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
67.

Section 103 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) inserting in subsection (1) the follow ing paragraph after paragraph (b):
“(c) The Ombudsman Com m ission shall publish the
investigations referred to in this subsection, to include:

20
results o f

(i) details o f any disciplinary proceedings and any related sanctions
imposed by the Garda Com m issioner, and
(ii) details o f any penalties imposed as a result o f any related
prosecution undertaken by the Director o f Public Prosecutions,”,

25

and
(b) inserting in subsection (2) “or publish” after “to provide” .

Am endm ent of section 106 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
68.

Section 106 o f the Principal A ct is amended by—
(a) inserting in subsection (1) “or the Board” after “the M inister”,
(b) inserting in paragraph (b) o f subsection (1) “or the Board” after “the M inister”,
(c) substituting the follow ing subsection for subsection (2):
“(2) The Ombudsman Com m ission may, on its own initiative and without a

30

 request or authorisation from the M inister or the Board, initiate an
exam ination o f a practice, p o licy or procedure o f the Garda Sfochana,
if the Ombudsman Com m ission decides that it is necessary to do so for
the purpose o f preventing com plaints arising in relation to the said
practice, p o licy or procedure or o f reducing the incidence o f such
com plaints.”,

5

(d) inserting the follow ing subsection after subsection (2):
“(2A ) The Ombudsman Com m ission shall report to the M inister and the
Board on the results o f an exam ination initiated under subsection (2)
and the said report shall include recommendations for achieving the
purpose referred to in subsection (2 ).”,

10

(e) substituting in subsection (3) “the M inister or the Board” for “the M inister”,
(f) substituting in subsection (4) “the request o f the M inister or the Board, or in
accordance with the terms o f the exam ination initiated pursuant to subsection (2),
as may be appropriate” for “the M inister’s request”, and

15

(g) substituting in subsection (5) “the M inister or the Board” for “the M inister” .

Am endm ent of section 107 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
69.

Section 107 o f the Principal A ct is amended by inserting in subsection (1) “without
delay” after “shall” .

In sertio n of new section 108A in the P rin c ip a l A ct
70.

20

The Principal A ct is amended by inserting the follow ing section after section 108:
“ 108A. (1) A n y individual incidence o f non-com pliance by the Garda Siochana
or its members with a Protocol made pursuant to section 108 may be
reported by the Ombudsman Com m ission to the Board and the
M inister for its consideration.

25

(2) In its annual report made pursuant to section 80(1), the Ombudsman
Com m ission shall include comments on the general com pliance by the
Garda Siochana with any protocols made pursuant to section 108.” .

PART 5
R egulations and M iscellaneous M atters

30

G eneral power to m ake regulations
71.

(1) The M inister may with the approval o f the Government make regulations prescribing
any matter or thing referred to in this A ct as prescribed or to be prescribed and in
addition to any other power conferred on him or her to make regulations, make
regulations generally for the purposes o f givin g fu ll effect to this A ct.
(2) Regulations under this A ct may contain such incidental, supplementary and
consequential provisions as appear to the M inister to be necessary or expedient for the

35

 purposes o f the regulations.

Am endm ent of section 121 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
72.

Section 121 o f the Principal A ct is amended by inserting the follow ing after subsection
(2)(c) “(d) the Board” .

Am endm ent of section 126 of the P rin c ip a l A ct
73.

5

Section 126 o f the Principal A ct is amended by inserting in paragraph (a) o f subsection
(1) “or Section 93A ” after “Section 96” .

Am endm ent of the F irs t Schedule to the Freedom o f In fo rm atio n A ct 1997
74.

Paragraph 1 o f the First Schedule to the Freedom o f Inform ation A ct 1997 is amended
by—
(a) deleting subparagraph (5)(a), and
(b) inserting in subparagraph (1) “the Garda Siochana” .

10

 27

B ille an G harda Siochana (L easu) (U im h. 2),
2014

G arda Siochana (A m endm ent) (No. 2) Bill
2014

BILLE

BILL

(mar a tionscnaiodh)

(as initiated)

da ngairtear

entitled

A cht do leasu A cht an Gharda Siochana, 2005 chun A n
neamhspleachas
agus
feidhmeanna O ifig
Choim isiun Ombudsman an Gharda Siochana a
neartu agus do dheanamh socru chun com hlacht
a bhunu ar a dtabharfar Bord Neam hspleach an
Gharda Siochana a mbeidh feidhmeanna
faireachain, feitheoireachta agus m aoirseachta i
leith an Gharda Siochana aige, chun cuntasacht
dhaonlathach an Gharda Siochana a fheabhsu
agus chun rannphairtiocht an phobail a
spreagadh agus chun a chinntiu go gcloitear le
caighdeain chearta daonna iom chui, do
dheanamh socru m aidir le hailt airithe d’A cht an
Gharda Siochana, 2005 a leasu agus a aisghairm
agus do dheanamh socru i dtaobh nithe
gaolmhara.

A ct to amend the Garda Siochana A ct 2005 to
strengthen the independence and functions o f
the O ffice o f the Garda Siochana Ombudsman
Com m ission
and
to
provide
for the
establishment o f a body to be known as the
Garda Siochana Independent Board with
m onitoring, oversight and supervisory functions
over the Garda Siochana to improve the
democratic accountability o f the Garda
Siochana and to encourage community
engagement and to ensure adherence to relevant
human rights standards, to provide for the
amendment and repeal o f certain sections o f the
Garda Siochana A ct 2005 and to provide for
related matters.

An Teachta Micheal de Bhailis a thug isteach,

Introduced by Deputy M ick Wallace,

15 Bealtaine, 2014

15thMay, 2014

BAILE ATHA CLIATH
ARNA FHOILSIU AG OIFIG AN tSOLATHAIR
Le ceannach direach o

f o i l s e a c h A i n r ia l t a is ,

52 FAICHE STIABHNA, BAILE ATHA CLIATH 2.
(Teil: 01 - 6476834 no 1890 213434; Fax: 01 - 6476843)
no tri aon dioltoir leabhar.

DUBLIN
PUBLISHED BY THE STATIONERY OFFICE
To be purchased from

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS,
52 ST. STEPHEN’S GREEN, DUBLIN 2.
(Tel: 01 - 6476834 or 1890 213434; Fax: 01 - 6476843)
or through any bookseller.

€3.81
Wt. 66787. 616. 5/14. Clondalkin. (44634). Gr.30-15.

 Preliminary Submission
by the
Garda Representative Association
on the
Establishment of an
Independent Garda Authority

May 2014

 Table of C ontents

1. In troduction.................................................................................................................................... 3
2. Independence, T ransparency, A ccountability and O versight............................................5
3. Necessity for a S eparate Police A u thority...............................................................................7
4. Social C o n tract - G a rd ai as Servants of the People........................................................... 10
5. Separation of Pow ers..................................................................................................................11
6. Need to be seen to be Independent and E nsuring Public Confidence........................... 12
7. Independent Police A uthorities in other Jurisdictions.......................................................13
8. N orthern Ire la n d ......................................................................................................................... 14
9. Scotland..........................................................................................................................................18
10. Los Angeles B oard of Police C om m issioners...................................................................... 20
11. Proposed G a rd a A uthority: its Role and S tru ctu re.......................................................... 21
12. Role............................................................................................................................................... 22
13. Dail Com m ittee on Policing.....................................................................................................23
14. Com position of the A uthority................................................................................................ 25
15. S upport Staff..............................................................................................................................26
16. R elationship between the Proposed A uthority and the G a rd a C om m issioner.......... 27
17. Finance M atters........................................................................................................................ 28
18. Conclusion.................................................................................................................................. 29
20. Executive Sum m ary.................................................................................................................30

 1

Introduction

1.1

As a nation, Ireland has undergone a “cultural revolution” in the last 20 years.
Systems of governance and methods of operation that were once acceptable are no
longer viewed as fit for purpose. Coupled with this evolution is a move towards
transparent and accountable governance. However, the progress towards this principle
has been slow in parts; one only has to look at the example of improper regulation in
the financial sector and the damage that has done to the economy in recent years. As
part of this evolution, the Garda Representative Association, which represents the
interest of 10,400 members of An Garda Siochana, wishes to propose the introduction
of an Independent Garda Authority that would be responsible for the effective running
of the Gardai and which should usher in a new era of transparency, accountability and
professional excellence for the force.

1.2

The need for independence in policing is not a new concept within common law
English speaking jurisdictions of Ireland, England, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
The desire of the Garda! to be free from “undue interference” in the discharge of their
duties has been noted as far back as 1983 by the then Minister for Justice Mr. Michael
Noonan at a GRA seminar on Police authority.1 Mr. Noonan noted that at that time:
“ ...there [had] been a growing number of allegations in recent years...of
outside influence in Garda affairs. W hether or not these allegations, or a
significant number of them, were true, there is no doubt that they did give rise
to considerable worry and questioning...[by both members of the Gardai and,
more importantly, members of the public]”

1 Garda Review, Volume 11, No. 6, June 1983, p. 8.
2 Garda Review, Volume 11, No. 6, June 1983, p. 8.

 1.3

The concern outlined above has not altered over the years, namely that interference
may erode public confidence in the Gardai and have a serious impact on the way the
force conducts its operations. This idea of independence, in particular from
governmental interference, was perhaps most succinctly put by the former Judge and
Master of the Rolls of England and Wales, Alfred Denning, in 1968:
“...I have no hesitation in holding that, like every constable in the land, [the
Police Commissioner] should be, and is, independent of the executive. He is
not subject to the orders of the Secretary of State...No Minister of the Crown
can tell him that he must, or must not, keep observation on this place or that;
or that he must, or must not, prosecute this man or that one.”

1.4

W hilst the operational methods of policing has developed in the intervening years
since the quote above and the remarks of Minister Noonan, questions of independence
have, at times, been harder to address. Recent events such as the Garda whistleblower
controversy and the subsequent resignation of then Minister for Justice Mr. Alan
Shatter indicate that the balance or authority between the state and the Gardai is still
fraught with difficulties. As such, it is the position of the GRA that a new and
independent method for ensuring effective policing is conducted within the
community and introduced in the form of an Independent Garda Authority.

1.5

Beyond the immediate issues raised above, in particular the need for independence
from outside influences, it is proposed that a Garda Authority, as a representative
body of the varied aspects of Irish civil society, would be in a better position to help
the force to adapt to changes in society. This consideration is relevant when viewing
the social transformation in Ireland in recent years and the move from a largely

3 R - v - Commissioner o f Police o f the Metropolis, Ex Parte Blackburn [1968] 2 Q.B. 118 at 135-136, Lord
Denning M.R.

 homogenous society to a more multi-cultural one, not to mention the need to tackle
modern issues such as tolerance towards and the integration of minorities4, as well as
addressing the policing needs of the LGBT community.

2

Independence, T ransparency, A ccountability, O versight

2.1

As the proposed Garda Authority will interpose itself between the Government (in
particular the Department for Justice) and the force itself, it is necessary to set out the
guiding principles upon which any such authority would operate. This is of vital
importance if the new Authority is to be seen as valid, effective and representative.
These proposed ideals would then, if accepted, form the core ethos of the authority
and would be applied in all of its functions.

2.2

Primary amongst these principles is that of independence. In the context of the
proposed authority this would be independence from Government. This is desirable
on a number of grounds, not least of which is the understanding that governments
change, as do their policies yet the requirement for effective and representative
policing is a constant in our society. It is not the aim of any proposed authority to
remove Government from the discussion on policing, merely that the proper operation
of the Gardai is better served by not being dependent on Government direction.

2.3

This principle is followed by that of transparency. Transparency is a paramount
consideration in any democratic society. Not only do the right decisions need to be
made in the interest of civil society as a whole, they need to be seen to be made. Put
simply, the proposed authority must act, insofar as is practicable, in full view of

4 Minority issues still plague modern policing in almost every jurisdiction. See generally Rethinking M inority
A ttitudes toward the Police, Weitzer, R., Tuch,.S., U.S. Dept o f Justice, October 2004
https ://www. ncj rs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/207145.pdf

 public scrutiny. The decision making process must be clear and accessible to the
public, the press and to Dail Eireann. It must also reject any desire for unnecessary
secrecy - no sweeping of issues under the rug.
2.4

Accountability is another vital element in the operation of the proposed authority.
This is the need to hold the Commissioner of An Garda Siochana in particular and the
Gardai in general accountable to the public and the legislature. In this role of public
accountability, the authority can play a part in the maintenance of the already high
public approval of the activities of the Gardai and can act swiftly to deal with
transgressions of these high standards of excellence wherever they occur. The
Authority would also be accountable to the Dail and the public for any failures on its
part in fulfilling its proposed role.

2.5

The final core principle of the proposed authority is that of oversight. It is proposed
that this would be a bidirectional obligation with the Authority having a general
oversight responsibility for the daily running of the force and a responsibility to be
amenable to the Dail to account for the activities of the Authority in respect of
disbursement of finances, reporting, etc.

2.6

It is proposed that the new Independent Garda Authority would hold these central
principles of independence, transparency, accountability and oversight as being the
fundamental starting point of all o f its operations. This ethos will help to promote
openness and community inclusivity in the work of the Authority and it is believed
that this will help to make the force more representative of the public as a whole.

 3

Necessity for a S eparate Police A uthority

3.1

Calls for the establishment of an Independent Garda Authority have gained greater
frequency in recent years. Indeed, shortly after her appointment as Minister for Justice
Frances Fitzgerald TD called for significant reform of the Gardai and stated that she
“believed the oversight and governance of the Garda Sfochana ‘will be transformed
with the establishment of an Independent Garda Authority’”5. The primary motivating
factor in the desire to establish an independent authority is to prevent excessive
political interference in the manner in which An Garda Siochana operates not only
within the community but also internally.6

3.2

The need for a separate and Independent Garda Authority is not only recognised by
the GRA but has also been the subject of the recent paper produced by Anne Ferris of
n

the Labour Party.
3.3

This report noted that public attitudes towards An Garda Siochana were consistently
high and that there was considerable satisfaction in the way the force performed their
role in the community. The report noted that in light of this understanding it was
necessary to protect the credibility of the Gardai and that this would be aided with the
o

introduction of “open and transparent oversight and accountability regimes.” The
report defined the role of the proposed Garda Authority as:
“ ...promoting standards of excellence in all services provided by An Garda
Siochana and to ensure that Garda services are delivered within a culture of
transparency and accountability to individuals and local communities”9

5 Irish Times (online edition), May 16th, 2014.
6 RTE News Online, 29th April, 2013 http://www.rte.ie/news/2013/0429/387093-gardai/
7 Framework fo r an Independent Garda Authority: A Labour Party Vision, Ferris, A. et al, March-April, 2014.
8 Framework fo r an Independent Garda Authority: A Labour Party Vision, p 2.
9 Framework fo r an Independent Garda Authority: A Labour Party Vision, p 4.

 The report also called for members of the Authority to be from all aspects of the
community and saw it as part of a link between the Gardai and a dedicated Oireachtas
committee on policing.10

3.4

This comes as relations between the Gardai and the Department of Justice have been
subjected to enormous strain as a consequence of recent political revelations, so much
so that one news report defined the Department of Justice as being “utterly isolated”
from Garda Headquarters.11 Indeed, as pointed out in the Guerin Report, recently
published in respect of Garda whistleblowers, the failure by the Department of Justice
(and the Minister) to perform an adequate review and investigation of complaints
made by Sergeant McCabe was “ ...a cause for concern” .

12

The failure to properly

investigate and, by extension to be held accountable, was noted in the report’s
conclusion and is worth quoting in full:
“No complex organisation can expect to succeed in its task if it cannot find the
means of heeding the voice of a member whose immediate supervisors hold
him in the high regard in which Sergeant McCabe was held. Ultimately, An
Garda Siochana does not seem to have been able to do that. Nor does the
Minister for Justice and Equality: despite his having an independent
supervisory and investigative function with specific statutory powers. The
same appears to be true o f GSOC, although this review is hampered in making
any assessment in that regard by the fact that GSOC has not made
documentation available”

13

10 Framework for an Independent Garda Authority: A Labour Party Vision, p 5.
11 Irish Times (online edition), 13th May, 2014.
12 “Guerin R eport”, Guerin SC, S., p327.
13 “Guerin R eport”, Guerin SC, S., p331, para 20.11

 3.5

The preceding statement exemplifies many of the reasons why an Independent Garda
Authority is necessary and relevant to the effective operation of policing in Ireland. It
is vital that accountability, independence, transparency and oversight are maintained
in respect of all public services, particularly policing. This principle was clearly
enunciated in the Canadian Ipperwash Inquiry Report published in 2007 which stated,

inter alia, that the police:
“ ...provide some of the most basic functions in any state. The police have law
enforcement powers that distinguish them from other public servants. They
also have special skills and knowledge that quite rightly give them
considerable discretion and autonomy in their work. As a result, Canadian
democracy depends upon the ability of the police to fulfil their responsibilities
to keep the peace and enforce the law equally, fairly, and without partisan or
inappropriate political influence.” 14

3.6

Where outside influences are capable of rendering the proper operation of the police
service in jeopardy, either through active interference or (as was the case cited in the
Guerin Report) a failure to act appropriately and hold accountable wrongdoers, the
morale, effectiveness and public confidence of the force will be eroded. This is not to
say that Government should be completely obviated from involvement in the role of
the Gardai; it is more a recognition of the delicate balance that needs to be maintained
in terms of the governmental/police relationship and the necessity for clear boundaries
and limitations.15

14 Ipperwash Inquiry Report, Attorney General’s Office o f Ontario, Canada, May 2007. Volume 2, Chapter 12,
p 303. http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/ipperwash/report/vol_2/pdf/E_Vol_2_CH12.pdf
15 Ipperwash Inquiry Report, Attorney General’s Office o f Ontario, Canada, May 2007. Volume 2, Chapter 12,
p 303.

 GRA Submission on the Establishment o f an Independent Garda Authority

4

Social C o n tract - G a rd ai as Servants of the People

4.1

The principle of the social contract is based on the agreed democratic ideal that all
state authority derives from the will of the people. That is to say that the general
public exercise their democratic franchise and elect people to govern on their behalf.
As a part of this process they empower the state to promulgate and enforce legislation
- in essence to run the state as befits the interest of the populace at large.

4.2

The concept of a social contract is not recent, indeed it finds it most basic postulation
in the memorable quote of the political philosopher and mathematician Thomas
Hobbes in his work Leviathan16 where he described the process of the people granting
the state power to govern on their behalf as a beneficial agreement as life before such
an arrangement was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” .

17

However, despite this

somewhat bleak beginning Hobbes and other proponents of the idea of the social
contract who followed (such as the French social philosopher Jean Jacques
18

Rousseau18) believed in a central guiding principle: that for any authority to be
legitimate it must be representative of the will of the people. This same principle can
be applied to the exercise of Garda powers; it must be representative of the citizens of
the state and not seen to be merely the state applying its authority over the populace.

4.3

If the principle that the power and authority of the state flows from the citizenry is
accepted, then it must also be accepted that all organs of the state must be
representative of the public in order to maintain legitimacy. In its simplest
formulation this means that the organs of state such as the police, fire service, health
care, city and county councils etc, are servants of the people, as is the legislature and

16 Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), “L eviathan” first published in 1651.
17 Leviathan, Hobbes, T., (Yale University Press, 2010) Ch. 13, p78.
18 Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), “The Social C ontract” first published in 1762.

 government of nation. Indeed, in respect of policing this position could be said to be
reflected in the mission of An Garda Siochana; Working with Communities to Protect

and Serve. As such, the legitimacy of the Gardai can only be enhanced from being
seen to be representative of the community and independent from Government which
can be changed by way of ballot box, whereas the necessity for policing remains a
constant requirement in a civil society.

5

Separation of Powers

5.1

Another fundamental principle of Irish democracy is that o f the separation of powers.
This provides for the non-interference by any one organ of state with any other organ
of state. The separate state entities are defined as the executive, the legislature and the
judiciary and each is bound by the Constitution from interfering in the role or
operation of the others. A simple example of this is that the Government cannot direct
a judge to deliver a particular ruling, or that the judiciary cannot dictate to the
legislature how legislation is to be formed - they must remain separate and
independent.

5.2

This Constitutional mechanism, provided for in Articles 6, 15.2.1°, 28.2, 29.4.1°, 34.1
and 37 of the Constitution serves as a system of “checks and balances” and ensures
that no one element o f state authority can wield power over the others. It is a
necessary concept for the proper functioning of a balanced democracy.19 As an
extension of this principle it can be inferred that as a function of the administration of
justice, the operation of the Gardai should remain if not separate from Government, at
the minimum it should be free from influence and interference.

19 See generally Constitutional Law in Ireland, Casey, J., Round Hall, (2000, 3rd Ed,) at p 221.

 GRA Submission on the Establishment o f an Independent Garda Authority

6

Need to be seen to be Independent and E nsuring Public Confidence

6.1

Independence is defined as that which is not dependent on or subject to the authority
of another.

20

The concept of independence in the exercise of police authority, a form

of autonomy from governmental control, is one that has been successfully applied in
many common law jurisdictions and, when coupled with the corresponding principles
of oversight and accountability can lead to an improved police force.

6.2

The principle of independence between important institutional organs of the State is a
long-held and clearly defined part of our democracy. The clearest example of this is to
be found in the tri-partite separation of powers that forms the essential structure of the
operation of the State. This is the distinct and separate operations of the Executive
(Government), the Legislature (Dail) and the Judiciary.

6.3

Another fundamental element of the operation of a democratic state is the trust that
exists between the people and those they delegate to exercise power on their behalf.
This is particularly important in respect of policing due to the extraordinary powers
granted to the Gardai, not least of which is the power to arrest and detain.
Independence in policing is vitally important to protect the positive image of the
police within the community and act as a safeguard against the inappropriate use of
police powers to achieve purely political ends.

21

20 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Onions, C.T., Oxford/Clarendon Press (1944, 3rdEd.) at p. 988.
21 Ipperwash Inquiry Report, Attorney General’s Office o f Ontario, Canada, May 2007. Volume 2, Chapter 12,
p 322.

 6.4

The ability of the Gardai to carry out their operations free from undue interference is
of central importance to maintaining public trust in the role that the force plays in
society. It is important that the proposed Authority is not only independent (in
actuality) but is also seen to be independent by the public as it is their interests it will
strive to represent. This ethos of independence, coupled with the Authority’s other
core values of transparency, accountability and oversight will help to maintain the
high levels of public satisfaction and professional excellence already enjoyed by the
force.

7

Independent Police A uthorities in other Jurisdictions

7.1

The concept of an independent police authority has been applied in various “common
law” jurisdictions with varying degrees of success. Perhaps the most relevant in terms
of comparison with the proposed Garda Authority are those of Northern Ireland and
Scotland.

7.2

Independent police authorities operated in England and Wales until recently but have
since been replaced by directly elected commissioners. As these commissioners are
appointed on a local basis in respect of the individual policing districts such a system
must be rejected as being applicable on a national level, as is the case for the proposed
Garda Authority. It is also difficult to know what the exact impact of these changes
will have on policing in England and Wales as there has not been enough time to
gather representative data in respect of this change and thus it is not capable of
comparing the new structure in those jurisdictions with that which is proposed here.

 7.3

It is also worth noting that the approach to police oversight taken in respect of London
has also seen recent change. In January of 2012 the role of police oversight was
transferred to the M ayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) under the direct
supervision of Mayor Boris Johnson (who has since delegated the role to Deputy
Mayor Stephen Greenhalgh).

22

W hilst the operational goals and responsibilities of

MOPAC are broadly similar to those of the proposed Garda Authority and of the
examples provided below, it is arguable that the system applied in London is
inappropriate in Ireland on a national scale. The primary concern remains the heavy
political influence that can still potentially be exerted over police operations where the
authority is run by a political appointee.
7.4

In the paragraphs to follow the role and operations of the Northern Ireland Policing
Board and the Scottish Police Authority will be discussed. Both were set up to meet
specific policing challenges and both have relevance to this jurisdiction. In the
interests of contrast there shall also be a discussion of the work of the Police
Commissioners of the city of Los Angeles.

8

N orthern Ireland

8.1

The difficult history of Northern Ireland and its troubled relationship with its police
service has been well documented. It serves as a classic example of the effects of a
loss of confidence in the police by a large section of the population. W hilst the
catalyst for this loss of confidence and trust in the case of Northern Ireland can be
attributed to sectarianism, a lack of effective political representation and uneven
distribution of power in the province, it is a chilling illustration of the difficulties
posed by any police force in restoring public confidence after it has been lost.

22 https://www.london.gov.uk/priorities/policing-crime/about-mopac

 8.2

It must also be noted that the unique situation in Northern Irish policing, that of
intense divisions between two societal elements, also brought criticism on the regime
that controlled the then RUC. It was noted that whilst replacing an old and one-sided
regime was a necessary condition for improving police relations (particularly in
Northern Ireland); the new regime that is being implemented must “signal a break
with the past sufficient to alter the symbolic status of the police.”

23

It can be seen

from the following that the Policing Board have attempted to implement this type of
regime change, and not without success.
8.3

Established in November of 2001 as a consequence of the Good Friday Agreement,
the Northern Ireland Policing Board derives its authority from statute, namely the
Police (Northern Ireland) Act, 2000 as amended by the Police (Northern Ireland) Act,
2003 and replaced the existing Police Authority for Northern Ireland. The board’s
primary objective is to ensure that the police and their support staff are “efficient and
24

effective” .24 As part of this objective the board is tasked with monitoring the general
performance of the police and holding the Chief Constable accountable for the
exercise of his duties.

8.4

25

The board lists its primary statutory obligations as follows:

•

to secure an effective and efficient local police service.

•

to appoint (and dismiss, if necessary) the Chief Constable and senior police officers
(Assistant Chief Constable and above).

•

to consult widely with local people about the policing of their area.

23 Policing Under Fire: Ethnic Conflict and Police-Community Relations in Northern Ireland Weitzer, R. (State
university o f New York Press, 1995) p 288.
24 S. 3 (2) Police (Northern Ireland) Act, 2000.
25 S. 3 (3) (a) & (b) Police (Northern Ireland) Act, 2000.

 •

to set local policing priorities and targets for police performance.

•

to monitor everything the police do and how well they perform against the targets set
by the Policing Board.

•

to publish a three year and annual policing plan which tells local people what they can
expect from their police service and report on police performance every year.

8.5

•

to make sure local people get best value from their local police.

•

to oversee complaints against senior officers.

•

to discipline senior officers26.
The board performs the role of oversight in relation to the activities of the PSNI and
has no function in respect of day-to-day operations. It does, however in approving the
budget allocation to the PSNI.

8.6

The board comprises of 19 political and independent members. Political members of
the board, who are elected members of the Northern Ireland Assembly, are appointed
27

under d'Hondt principles , whilst independent members are appointed by the sitting
Justice Minister.28 The board is provided further support in the form of (as of 31st
March, 2013) 29 seconded civil servants and 19 directly appointed recruits.

29

26 “Statutory Obligations” http://www.nipolicingboard.org.uk/index/theboard/statutory-obligations.htm
27 d’Hondt principle are calculated based on a ‘highest averages method’ and are applied to appointments in a
proportional representation type political system.
28 http://www.nipolicingboard.org.uk/index/theboard.htm
29 Northern Ireland Policing Board Annual Report and Accounts 1 April 2012-31 March 2013, p24.

 8.7

In terms of public exposure and understanding of the role the Northern Ireland
Policing Board plays in the community, the board has published research in relation to
key considerations of the community.

30

In answer to the question “have you [member

of the public] heard of the Policing Board?” 82% replied in the affirmative. O f those
respondents who had heard of the board, 74% thought that the board had helped
improve the work o f the PSNI. In respect of the question “do you think the Policing
Board is part of the Police or is it independent of the Police?” 60% of respondents
answered that they believed that the board was independent of the police, a significant
figure when one considers the traditional lack of trust in the police force that is still, to
some degree, prevalent in Northern Ireland. Other notable statistics are that 76% of
respondents believed that the primary role of the board was to “oversee policing and
to hold the Chief Constable and the PSNI publically to account” and 77% of
respondents believed that the board was working adequately.

8.8

31

As can be seen, the Policing Board of Northern Ireland has instituted a clear and well
structured approach to the exercise of independent police authority in their
jurisdiction. When this is viewed in light of the unique difficulties the police face in
Northern Ireland, not least of which is building public confidence across all elements
of society, the adoption of a transparent and accountable police authority has proven
to be a positive change towards sustainable and representative policing for the
community as a whole.

30 Northern Ireland Policing Board Omnibus Survey 2013
http://www.nipolicingboard.org.uk/january_2013_omnibus_survey_publication.pdf
31 Northern Ireland Policing Board Omnibus Survey 2013 p 14,15.

 9

Scotland

9.1

Scotland faces different, and arguably less arduous, problems and considerations
when it comes to delivering representative policing within its jurisdiction. Whilst
general attitudes towards the role the police play in Scottish society are positive

32

there are numerous societal issues such as poverty, prevalence of drug use and social
33

inequality33 that are important factors in determining police operations within the
community.

9.2

The Scottish Police Authority was established as recently as 2012. Authorised under
the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act, 2012 it was established to “maintain
policing, promote policing principles and hold the Chief Constable to account” and
generally ensure that the people of Scotland receive the best policing possible.34 As of
April of 2013 forensic services have also come within the scope of the Authority, this
being within the purview of the Police Authority Chief Executive. With its
introduction, the Authority has sought to update and reform the concept of policing in
Scotland, changing it from adherence to its old principles of “guard, patrol and watch”
to a more modern understanding of policing by introducing new standards:

“ ...the main purpose of policing is to improve the safety and well-being of
persons, localities and communities in Scotland, and the Police Service,
working in collaboration with others where appropriate, should seek to
achieve that main purpose by policing in a way which is accessible to, and
engaged with, local communities, and promotes measures to prevent crime,
harm and disorder.”

35

32

http //www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/1999/03/614d26a7-2942-4ca6-90a7-2829af5764b7
33 http //www.jrf.org.uk/publications/monitoring-poverty-scotland-2013
34 http //www.spa.police.uk/about-us/
35 Scottish Police Authority Strategic Police Plan 2013, p 6. http://www.spa.police.uk/assets/128635/strategicpolice-plan-web

 9.3

The board of the Authority, which currently comprises of 13 members drawn from
various areas o f the private sector and includes former police officers, has no political
appointments.

9.4

9.5

The four main policing priorities set out by the Authority are:

•

Making communities safer.

•

Readiness to respond to natural hazards and major events.

•

Delivering an efficient and effective service.

•

Increasing public confidence and reducing fear of crime.
In addition to holding the police service to account and expecting high standards, it is
interesting to note that the Authority has pledged to assess its own performance and
has expressed a desire to reduce bureaucracy.36

9.6

The Authority also has responsibility for funding of the police service. This takes the
form of direct funding to the Authority which is then disbursed to the necessary areas
of the Scottish police service. It must also be noted that the Government also plays a
role in some aspects of funding the police service, in particular the payment of
37
pensions.37

9.7

The Scottish Police Authority broadly satisfies the principles of transparency by
making its operation and decision making publicly available. As stated in its Standing
Orders document “The SPA is a public authority with a statutory obligation to
38

conduct business in public”38 although some matters may be dealt with on a
confidential basis, such as information relating to police operations or issues of
national security.

36 http://www.spa.police.uk/performancepages/221302/
37 Scottish Police Authority Strategic Police Plan 2013, p 14
38 Scottish Police Authority Standing Orders, February 2014, version 1.4
http://www.spa.police.uk/assets/128635/standing-orders-mar-2014

 10

Los Angeles B oard of Police Com m issioners

10.1

The city of Los Angeles faces many difficulties in providing an effective and
representative police force. Issues of race and ethnicity, poverty contrasted with
unprecedented wealth and an inequality in public services all serve to place strain on
the operation of the city and its police force.

39

However, despite these pressures the

long serving Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners have endeavoured to hold
the force accountable to the public which they serve.

10.2

Policing in Los Angeles has been the subject of oversight by the Board of Police
Commissioners for since the 1920’s. The board consists of five commissioners who
are appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council and they are limited to
serving two five-year terms.

10.3

The Board o f Commissioners sets the overall policy of the police department whilst
the Chief of Police implements those policies and manages the day-to-day
operations.40 The Commissioners are representative of the Los Angeles community
and are tasked with reform, improving the police service, improving public relations,
reducing crime and supporting community policing. The current commissioners come
from varied backgrounds such as business, non-profit organisations, the legal
profession and academia.

10.4

As a result of the Rodney King assault, the entire structure of the LAPD, including the
Board of Commissioners, was reviewed in Report of the Independent Commission on
the Los Angeles Police Department (also known as the Christopher Commission). It
concluded that the LAPD should continue under the oversight and control of a

39 Los Angeles Times (online edition) December 27th 2006. http://www.latimes.com/la-oe-troubles27dec27htmlstory.html
40 http://www.lapdonline.org/police_commission/content_basic_view/900

 “Citizen Police Commission” and recommended increases in both staffing levels and
remuneration of commissioners due to the increasing importance of the role.41
10.5

Also notable in the structure of the Los Angeles Board of Commissioner’s operations
is the use of an Inspector General who reports directly to the Board. LAPD employees
are required to cooperate fully with any such investigation and furnish the Inspector
General with any document they request. The Inspector General also has a broad right
of access to any LAPD employee for the furtherance of their investigations and the
power to subpoena witnesses.42

11

Proposed G a rd a A uthority: its Role and S tru ctu re

11.1

The

core

principles

enunciated

earlier,

namely

independence,

transparency,

accountability and oversight would form the central ideal of any proposed Garda
Authority. Flowing from these ideals it would be necessary to set out a mission
statement or form of guiding document to assist the Authority in its decision-making
process. This could take the form of a constitutional document that would be publicly
available and can be used to check that the operation of the Authority is in compliance
with its guiding ideals.
11.2

It would be necessary for any new Authority to be set out in legislation. A similar
approach was applied in both Northern Ireland and Scotland with the establishment of
their independent policing authorities.43

41 Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991, p 208.
42 Los Angeles Board o f Police Commissioners Policies and Authority Relative to the Inspector General,
November 2000 http://www.oiglapd.org/documents/policies&authority.pdf
43 Police (Northern Ireland) Act, 2000 and Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act, 2012 respectively.

 12

Role

12.1

The proposed role of the Garda Authority would most likely be outlined in the
legislation that establishes the board. The role proposed in this document would
include:

•

A responsibility for improving the operational and societal impact An Garda Siochana.

•

To support and promote effective community policing.

•

To hold the Garda Commissioner accountable to the public and ensuring that the
highest levels of excellence are striven for in the management of the Gardai. Where
necessary the Authority may request the Commissioner or any other member of senior
management to step down where they have become compromised.

•

To manage the financial and budgetary issues o f the force.

•

To collaborate with communities and special interest groups throughout the country to
work towards maintaining the already high levels of public satisfaction with the
delivery of police services in the state and to implement strategies to enable the force
to remain inclusive and relevant in a rapidly evolving society.

•

To promulgate and support the introduction of modern policing policies.

•

To provide monitoring of Garda service delivery and to strive to remedy any
problems that may arise.

•

To be responsible for the transport fleet, ICT budgets, accommodation, equipment and
for all procurement and tendering processes. The current involvement of Office of
Public Works (OPW) and the Government Supplies Agency needs further evaluation,
as they are commonly perceived to hinder rather than assist the effective provision of
modern accommodation facilities and adequate fleet, uniform, equipment, and ICT
facilities.

 GRA Submission on the Establishment o f an Independent Garda Authority

12.2

G a rd a Siochana O m budsm an Commission
Recent controversies have pointed to the lack of adequate oversight of the Garda
Siochana Ombudsman Commission and of their resourcing - and ultimately to whom
they are answerable.

This should be a function of the new Independent Garda Authority; to whom the
Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission should report. The Garda Siochana
Ombudsman Commission should be adequately funded, independently of the Garda
Budget to allow all complaints against Gardai be investigated by the Garda Siochana
Ombudsman Commission and not referred back to An Garda Siochana.
The Garda Siochana Act 2005 does not adequately allow a member of An Garda
Siochana to make a complaint of treatment by a member of GSOC or the manner in
which an investigation is conducted. The Garda Representative Association believes
that the Independent Garda Authority should be empowered to deal with such
grievances or complaints, especially in light of the stated intention of Government to
increase the powers of the Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission.
The Garda Authority should have oversight and control of the Garda Siochana
Ombudsman Commission budget.

 12.3

Confidential informants should be able to make complaints to the Independent Garda
Authority and not to the Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission. Proposals that a
member of Garda rank should be able to make confidential complaints to the Garda
Siochana Ombudsman Commission is impracticable and defies logic. The suggestion
that the Body (quite rightly) tasked with investigating complaints from the public
should also be the forum for a Garda to make a complaint about others is both
unsuitable and unworkable.

The most appropriate forum for Gardai to report

operational wrongdoing is an Independent Garda Authority.
12.4

The Garda Siochana Inspectorate should be ultimately answerable to the Independent
Police Authority. Their reports should be forwarded to the Independent Garda
Authority whose role it should be to assess and progress the subsequent
implementation.

13

Dail Com m ittee on Policing

13.1

It is proposed that any new Garda Authority would report to a Dail Committee on
Policing. Such a committee would be composed of members of the legislature drawn
from all political parties so as to be fully representative of the populace as a whole.

13.2

The Dail committee would receive the Authority’s annual report and may request the
Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Authority to attend a special sitting of the
committee for the purposes of asking questions on specific issues that may arise.

 13.3

The proposed role of this committee is one of oversight. This would entail
examination of the Authority in respect of its disbursement of finances, its interaction
with the Commissioner and the content and nature of any reports published by the
Authority. It is proposed that the Dail Committee would operate in a similar manner
as Congressional oversight in the United States where the House of Representatives
have responsibility for maintaining standards in various governmental and state fields
such as agriculture, defence, finance etc. This process has varied from hearings on
particular specific issues to general administration of appropriations (i.e. disbursement
of state funds).44

13.4

Some of the advantages of oversight are:

Improvement of efficiency and effectiveness of the subject of oversight
The detection of poor administration and waste in respect of state finances
The protection of civil liberties and legal rights
Ensuring compliance with legislative intent
Preventing executive encroachment45

This last point is particularly valid in the context of the proposed Garda Authority as
independence from unnecessary governmental interference is one of the primary aims
sought to be achieved by the Authority.

44 CRS Report for Congress, Kaiser, F. M., January 2001
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/CRS.Oversight.pdf
45 CRS Report for Congress, Kaiser, F. M., January 2001

 13.5

It is unexceptional to state that any proposed Garda Authority would of course be
amenable to political oversight. It is the proposal of the GRA that, as outlined above,
this oversight would be exercised by a Dail committee as this would prove to be
representative of the national interest as opposed to that of the sitting government.
Where there is misfeasance on the part of the Garda Authority they can be called to
account for their actions by the Dail and it would also fall within the remit of the
committee to keep a check on excessive spending on policing by having a duty to
review the annual accounts and report prepared and presented to the legislature each
year by the members of the Authority.

14

Com position of the A uthority

14.1

It is proposed that the authority would be made up of a board o f up to 12 members.
These members would be selected based on an application process which would be
decided on by that Dail Committee on Policing. The members would be drawn from
all areas of society and ideally would include:

Members of the business community.
Legal professionals.
Financial/Accounting professionals.
Senior academics and criminologists.
Members of civil liberties and/or victim’s rights organisations.
Members of organisations that deal with immigrant’s rights.
Members of Garda Staff Associations.

 14.2

It may also be desirable to appoint a foreign police commissioner to the board to serve
in an advisory capacity and to provide a non-Irish perspective to the matters that may
arise at Authority meetings.

14.3

It is also desirable that the Garda staff associations would be a member of the
Independent Garda Authority. As a Garda Staff Association representing members of
Garda rank, our input is of exceptional importance to the development of policing in
the State.

14.4

At the head of this board it is envisaged that the Chairman and Vice Chairman would
be elected by the board members of the Independent Garda Authority. They would
serve for a predefined term and could then be re-elected by their peers or replaced. It
would be for the Chair and Vice Chair to manage the day to day running of the
Authority and they would also report to the Dail Committee on Policing either when
scheduled to do so or when requested. They would also be responsible for authorising
the preparation of reports, recruitment of support staff for the Authority and would
serve as the “public face” of the Authority.

14.5

It is paramount that the members of the Authority represent as broad a cross-section
of Irish society as possible in order to deliver real community based policing. As
noted previously, Irish society is constantly evolving and any representative
organisation must be able to keep pace with this evolution. Any failure to do so would
render the Authority unfit for purpose.

 15

S upport Staff

15.1

It will be necessary to employ support staff to ensure the proper running of the
Authority. Along with general administrative staff it would be necessary to engage
other skilled individuals in such areas as research, accounting and public relations.

15.2

As to the origin of such support staff, it is most likely that these people would be
employed directly by the Authority and not drawn from the civil service. This is for
the purposes of maintaining independence and employment flexibility.46

15.3

These individuals would be appointed to their roles either by the Chairman of the
Authority or a senior administrator to whom the Chairman has delegated this
responsibility.

15.4

It may be necessary for the Authority to appoint an Inspector or Inspectors General
who would fulfil a similar function to that outlined above in relation to the Inspectors
of the Los Angeles Board of Commissioners. It is proposed that any inspectorate
established under the Authority would have a fact finding and investigative role and
would operate under the direction of the Authority in respect of matters relating to the
day-today running of the Gardai. As such the inspectorate would be tasked with
investigating any matter upon which the Authority required further information, e.g.:
quality and standards o f garda stations and other facilities, the quality of equipment
issued to the force, etc.

46 The need for civilian staff and not police or civil servants was noted in the Report o f the Independent
Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991, p 208.

 16

R elationship between the proposed A uthority and the G ard a Com m issioner:

16.1

The Garda Authority would have an active role in the recruitment of new members to
the force. It is proposed that the Authority would also be involved in the appointments
and promotions to all ranks including the appointment of senior management
positions within the force, with the right to approve and reject such appointments.

16.2

As part of the Authority’s mission to hold the Commissioner accountable to the
public, it is proposed that the Authority would have the power to request the
resignation of the Commissioner for performance failures on their part or for any
incidences of stated misbehaviour in office. It is envisaged that the Commissioner
would have a right of appeal in respect of any such decision, most probably to the
High Court (in a process similar to that of appeals made by solicitors or medical
professionals who are struck off). This would be in accordance with the established
principles of natural and constitutional justice.

16.3

Such a power would be vital to the Authority as it must be able to effect real change
in garda leadership, if necessary, and that change must be timely. It would prevent
situations of uncertainty where disputes arise and subsequently fail to be resolved due
to intransigence on the part of the Commissioner.

 17

Finance m atters

17.1

It is proposed that the Garda Authority would be responsible for the disbursement of
funding to the Gardai. This would take the form of the issue of monies from the
central fund, as authorised by the Dail Committee on Policing, to the authority which
is then allocated to meet the needs of the force.

17.2

This financial autonomy, with Dail oversight, is an important element of the overall
aim of independence of the gardai from undue influence. If the resources of the
Gardai could be reduced based on political factors then not only does the An Garda
Siochana suffer but the public suffers as well.

17.3

As with all the other aspects of the Garda Authority proposed by the GRA,
independence from external influences remains a paramount concern, hence the
exceptional necessity for financial independence.

18

Conclusion

18.1

The necessity for police independence from governmental influence plays a central
role in the preservation of a representative and democratic civil society. As can be
seen in numerous other jurisdictions, the move away from rigid governmental control
or influence to a system that promotes stability and representation of all aspects of
society has a positive impact on the role the police force plays in the community.

 18.2

The Garda Representative Association believes that independence, in the form of an
Independent Garda Authority, is the appropriate method by which to ensure the
already high levels of public satisfaction, professionalism and quality of service are
enhanced.

18.3

As set out above, the GRA believe that the establishment of any such Independent
Garda Authority must be built on the four core principles of independence,
transparency, accountability and oversight. These principles must remain at the heart
of everything that the Authority does and should serve as the start point of any
decision-making process. It is by the implementation of these core principles that the
proposed Authority will secure public confidence and maintain its legitimacy into the
future.

18.4

As An Garda Siochana continues to evolve and modernise in terms of operations,
procedures and equipment there is also a necessity to evolve and modernise the
manner in which the force is managed. It is clear, not only from the examples set in
other jurisdictions but also for the growing desire nationally, that the introduction of
an Independent Garda Authority is essential.

The GRA fully supports the move

towards such independence and is willing to work with all interested parties in order
to achieve this aim.
18.5

It is the belief of the GRA that if such an independent Authority were to be
established, the beneficial impact this would have on policing within the State would
be considerable. As a nation evolves it is necessary that all elements of civil society
keeps step with this movement and the promotion of a modern, independent,
accountable and representative police force is just such a measure.

 19

Executive Sum m ary

19.1

Ireland is a changing nation and the role and organisation of its police force has had to
adapt to these changes. In recent years there has been an increase in calls for the
establishment of an Independent Garda Authority to enable the force to be run
separately from Government.

19.2

It is the position of the Garda Representative Association that such an independent
authority is a necessary step in ensuring that the force remains representative of all
aspects of Irish civil society and that it maintains its already high levels of public
satisfaction and legitimacy.

19.3

The move to independent authorities is not a new concept. Some have been in
operation with much success for a number of years in different jurisdictions. The
move to independent authority has been championed by the GRA since 1979 and in
light of recent political events the need for the establishment of such an authority has
never been greater.

19.4

The GRA believes that the proposed Authority should operate on the basis of four
core values:

•

Independence from external influence, in particular from Government interference in
respect of Garda operations.

•

T ransparency in action and operations. The legitimacy of the Authority as a
representative organisation of Irish civil society stems from the confidence the public
have in the organisation. The Authority should strive to operate as publically as
possible to ensure that it has the full confidence of the people.

 •

A ccountability is a crucial element of the operation of the Authority. This means
accountability on the part of the Gardai and the Authority to the public and the
legislature.

•

O versight of the operations of the Authority by the Dail is also inextricably linked
with the concept of accountability. It is also proposed that the Authority would play a
role in maintaining oversight of the senior management of the Gardai.

19.5

W hilst public recognition and approval of the role of the Gardai in Irish society has
remained high in recent years, there has been a growing consensus amongst political
parties and policing representative groups in respect of a move to an Independent
Garda Authority. This follows on from recent political scandals, including the Garda
whistleblower controversy and the subsequent findings of the Guerin Report.
Relations between the Department of Justice and the Gardai are currently strained as a
consequence of this and it is envisaged that the introduction of an independent
Authority would obviate the likelihood of such occurrences in the future.

19.6

As has been noted in respect of discussions on governmental and police relations in
other jurisdictions, in particular Canada and the Ipperwash Report, the police provide
an essential service to all aspects o f civil society and as such it is necessary that the
force represents the jurisdiction as a whole. This can only be achieved where there is
freedom on the part of the police from partisan or inappropriate political influences.

19.7

It is the position of the GRA that this principle of public representation is central to
any new Garda Authority. In a democratic society power flows from the people to the
state and its organisations. In essence the people agree to grant powers to the state on
the understanding that the organisations that are subsequently established to exercise
those powers do so in the interests of the people. This is the Social Contract.

 It is arguable that where the state, or any organ of the state, fails to uphold this
principle it will lead to an erosion of public trust. Where this occurs then a failure in
legitimacy will swiftly follow. It is clear from this principle that any proposed Garda
Authority should always have at the forefront of its operations the consideration that
An Garda Siochana is a representative of the people. As such the need for political
independence becomes a clear and legitimate necessity.
For the establishment o f a Garda Authority to be genuinely independent, the role of
the Joint Policing Committees must be reconsidered under such a new structure.

For

example, if a superintendent and all other ranks are ultimately responsible to an
Independent Garda Authority, is it then inappropriate for that the same superintendent
to be subject to local political control through Joint Policing Committees.

The

Association believes not.
19.8

In addition to the concept of the social contract above, it is also arguable that with the
principle of the Separation of Powers enshrined in the Constitution and legal process
it is a natural extension of that tenet that it was intended that all legal state authority
was intended to be separate. Just as the Government cannot dictate to the judiciary in
respect of the outcome of a trial, so too should the Gardai be independent of
governmental influence in how they discharge their duties.

19.9

Because of the extraordinary powers of arrest and detention that are granted to the
Gardai for the furtherance of their role it is of vital importance that they and the
proposed Authority are seen to be free from governmental influence or control, or
indeed any form of external pressure. Without such independence there is the
possibility that public confidence in the police would wane and as a consequence of

 this An Garda Siochana may simply be viewed as a governmental tool of
enforcement, operating purely to meet political desires.
19.10 Other jurisdictions have successfully introduced similar types of police authorities,
most notable in recent years are the Northern Ireland Policing Board and the Scottish
Police Authority. These organisations strive to preserve the police from external
influence whilst holding senior police management accountable to the public. These
bodies, comprised of non-political appointees, act as a form of oversight of police
activity while allowing the force to do what it does best - uphold the law and protect
the interests of the public.
19.11 Both the Northern Irish and Scottish police authorities have broadly similar aims;
holding the Chief Constable accountable to the public, making their respective
communities safer and ensuring the delivery o f effective policing. These goals,
coupled with proper administration, serve to boost public confidence in the role the
police play in the community.
19.12 The GRA proposes that the Independent Garda Authority would learn from these
examples and, in concert with an understanding of the changing needs of society in
respect of policing, it would work together with the community to deliver an effective
and relevant police service.
19.13 It is proposed that the new Independent Garda Authority would oversee the running of
An Garda Siochana and would hold the Commissioner accountable where necessary.
It would strive to improve the already high levels of public satisfaction and excellence
in the Gardai and it would be responsible for the disbursement of finances throughout
the force.

 19.14 In this capacity it is envisaged that the Garda Authority would remain separate from
Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission. The GRA believes strongly that the role of
GSOC should be preserved as independent from the Gardai and the proposed
Authority.

19.15 At the head of this board it is envisaged that the Chairman and Vice Chairman would
be elected by the board members of the Independent Garda Authority. They would
serve for a predefined term and could then be re-elected by their peers or replaced. It
would be for the Chair and Vice Chair to manage the day to day running of the
Authority and they would also report to the Dail Committee on Policing either when
scheduled to do so or when requested. They would also be responsible for authorising
the preparation of reports, recruitment of support staff for the Authority and would
serve as the “public face” of the Authority.
The Dail committee would also receive an annual report prepared by the Authority in
respect of its activities and would serve as an appropriations authority in the context
of garda finances. In extraordinary circumstances the Dail committee would be able to
seek the resignation of the Chairman or Vice Chairman due to specific failures in
management, but in general it is foreseen that the role of the committee would be one
of oversight rather than active involvement.

 19.16 The proposed Garda Authority would be composed of non-political appointees drawn
from the worlds of business, the legal profession, financial experts, academics and
criminologists, members of civil liberties, representatives from the Garda Staff
Associations and members of organisations that deal with immigrants’ rights.
19.17 It is also proposed that the Authority would employ a number of support staff. These
would take the form of administrative, research, accounting and public relations
personnel. It is believed that in the interests of independence that such support staff
should be hired directly by the Authority and should not be drawn from the ranks of
the civil service.
19.18 As can be seen from the foregoing, a clear and properly structured approach to the
formation of a Garda Authority, which learns from the mistakes and successes of
other jurisdictions, can potentially deliver a representative and effective service to the
public. Based on the core principles of Independence, Transparency, Accountability
and Oversight, it is the belief of the GRA that the proposed Garda Authority will
strengthen the role of the force within the community and improve and sustain the
already favourable public opinion of An Garda Siochana.
19.19 Most importantly, the introduction of an Independent Garda Authority will guarantee
that there can be no external influence exerted on the operations of the Gardai, be it
political, financial or any other measure of interference. It is vital for the credibility of
the force that is remains to be seen as being impartial and representative of the people.
This can be readily achieved with the introduction of an Independent Garda
Authority.

 Observations ef tne Ga;da inspectorate on the ^establishment of a
Garda Siochana Authority

Background
1. Arising from some oversight difficulties with An Garda Sfochana, the
Government has decided that an independent Garda Siochana
Authority will be established before the end of this year. Consideration
is now being given to the Authority’s structure, function ana linkages
required.
Existing police authorities
2. Police authorities have been established in the UK (Police and Grime
Commissioners), Scotland (Scottish Police Authority), Northern Ireland,
and there are police boards in the USA. Some members are appointed
and some are elected.
3. Police Services in Australia, New Zealand, France, Germany and
Denmark report directly to ihe relevant Minister
4

Police authorities or equivalent entities appear to possess similar
functions irrespective of jurisdiction. These range from the appointment
of the Commissioner to overseeing operations.

5. Crisis, whether in terms ot police agency functionality or misbehaviour,
rather than future-thinking, has been the basis for the introduction cf
police authonty-iype bodies in those jurisdictions reviewed which
possess such an entity.
6. More detailed information on existing police authorities is attached.
Functions and structure are dealt with further below.

7

Irish context
The policing “oversight” landscape in Ireland includes:
* An Garda Siochana corporately and internal units such as PSU
* Garda Sfoch&na Ombudsman Commission
* Garda Inspectorate
■ Department of Justice and Equality
* The Cabinet Committee on Justice Refonn
* Financial oversight mechanisms such as the Comptroller and
Auditor General and the Public Accounts Committee.
* The Joint Oireachtas Committee on Justice, Equality and
Defence. (The Committee has been asked by Dail tiiean n to
review the effectiveness of legislation related to oversight of
AGS. The Committee sought submissions and have met with a
number nf groups. It has also visited Belfast, Glasgow and
Edinburgh to consider potential models for police oversight. An

 •

interim report will be published next week and a more detailed
final report will be published in the Autumn.)
Joint Policing Committees which have varying levels o f
effectiveness in holding local garda divisions to account

8. The establishment of any new oversight body will have to take into
account the current landscape and changes which may be required 10
take account of the rote and function of the new body.
9. Issues which require to be considered are;
• Functions and responsibilities of GSA
• Appointment and membersnip of the Authority
• Its relationship with the Government and the Oireachtas, and
• kelationships with GSOC and the Inspectorate
Functions and responsibilities of tne Authority
10. The following table shows the functions carried out by police authorities
in other jurisdictions and the body currently holding that responsibility in
Ireland
Function
Appointment of the
Commissioner/Chief
Constanle/Deputy Chief Constables

Current body responsible
Government on foot of a
memo from D/J but future
appointments will be made by
open competition

Setting police priorities

Dept of Justice (D/J)

Setting police budgets

Depl of PER with D/J

Overseeing operations

Very limited judicial oversight

Setting recruitment and testing
standards

Public Appointments Service
(PAS) to limited extent

Overseeing recruitment

AGS with D/J tc limited extent

Assessing police oerformance

AGS to a limited extent

Dealing with public complaint and
disciplinary cases

Complaints :GSOC
Disciplinary: AGS

Engaging with the public ana
communities

AGS, D/Jr JPCs

Promoting confidence in the police
service

AGS. D/J, JPCs

Implementing reforms

Inspectorate identifying

 reforms
AGS, D/J implementing
11. New legislation will shortly be introduced to strengthen the powers and
remit of GSOC. Some of the measures being ccrisidersd include • Bringing the Garde* Commissioner within the remit of GSOC
• Enabling GSOC to undertake review? of Gards practice and
procedures on its own initiative
• Enhancing tne investigative pnwers available to GSOC. and
• Providing for the implementation of protocols entered into by th e
Garda Sfochana and GSOC.
12. The background to the current impetus towards the establishment o f
the new body clearly indicates that the primary function of the GSA
must be the governance and accountability of AGS.
13.it is the inspectorate’s view that it is appropriate for tne Authority to
have responsibility for the appointment of the Garda Commissioner
following an open and transparent process run by the PAS, setting
AGS priorities, holding to account AGS performance, engaging with the
public and communities and driving the implementation of reforms. The
inspectorate also considers that the Garda Commissioner shcula havs
s role in the appointment of Deputy and Assistant Commissioners.
14.The setting of AGS budgets is, and should remain,
government.

2

matter For

15. Operational matters are, and should remain, the responsibility of the
Garda Commissioner with appropriate judicial oversight as necessary.
One slight complication is that AGS has responsibility for State security
and national police operations. This could be addressed by delineating
clearly that oversight of State security is the responsibility of a
government Minister,
16. Garda public complaint matters should be the sole responsibility of
G 30C .
17. Discipline matters should be the sole responsibility of AGS with
appropriate policy oversight by the Authority.
18. Recruitment policy and standards should be devised by AGS in
conjunction with PAS and the Authority, while recruitment, promotions
etc should be run by PAS.
Appointment ana membership of the Authority
19. The Authority will have an important function and must be resourced
and structured to succeed. If the primary functions of the GSA are ic be
the determination of strategic priorities, performance oversight and
public engagement membership of the Authority should be drawn from
those with strong relevant competencies. The key ‘fault line of police

 authorities, according to Baroness Nuala O ’Loan, is the appointment o f
people w!th the relevant competencies,
20. The shared view of Baroness O’Loan and Dr. Vicky Conway is> that a
Board with approximately 19 members is desirable. The rationale
Dehind this number is that the board should reflect a range o f
representation, and have sufficient depth to have efficient sub ­
committees to look at specific matters. Baroness C'Loan specifically
advises that the Authority should have the capability to challenge A G S
ana t o identify the right questions to ask.
21. The appointment of the Authority members would ideally be dealt with
by PAS to ensure transparency and would draw from those with
experience in strategic thinking, criminal justice arid social policy
governance, finance and standards development and measurement.
There may be a need for some political appointment but the
chairmanship should be independent.
Relationship with the Gcvernmert and the Oireachtas
22. There will be a need for linkage between the Authority and the other
bodies set out in paragraph 7 above (i.e. GSOC, Garda inspectorate,
D/J Justice and Equality etc.). The linkage needs to ta*e account of t ie
functions and responsibilities of the various organisations. The
following flowchart demonstrates a suggested relationship path.

 Implications for the Inspectorate
23. The consensus at the Farmleigh seminar was that the Inspectorate
should retain its independent role and position. If the functions of the
Authority are to be in the region of governance, performance,
accountability, policy and process effectiveness, then the Inspectorate
could be of great assistance to the Authority if enabled to provide
aavice and observations from its position as independent poiice
experts. However, it is critical that the Inspectorate is separate to the
Authority to enable it to provide a clear, transparent and independent
voice, in line with its submission to the Oireachtas Committee on
Justice Equality and Defence currently considering amendments to the
Garda Siochana Act, 2005.
24. There was some suggestion at Farmleigh that the role of the
Inspectorate needs to be expanded. If it is to be enabled to provide
speedy and well considered advice and assistance, then indeed
appropriate expansion and restructuring needs to be considered.
Submission
25.This paper is submitted foi your consideration and the inspectorate is
available for further discussion as required with the Department.

fim ear Fisher
26 June 2014

 Police Authorities
Jurisdiction
Ireland

Other
Police
Authority
None but Reports to
the
one
proposed Government

Rationale
Parliamentaiy
and
indeoendent
report citing
concerns over
independence
of Minister,
Department,
police chief
and police
complaints
body
Police Reform
and Social
Responsibility
Act 2011inability to
address local
concerns

Met

Mayor's
Office for
Policing and
Crime
(2012)

Thames
Valley Police

Police and
Crime
Comrnrs
(2012)

tt

Greater
Manchester
Police

Police and
Crime
Commrs

u

EzF26/6/2014

Objective

Elected /
Appointed

Setting Crime
Plan
Assess how
the Met
spends its
budget
Assess how
Met performs
Hold Comrnr
to account
Set Crime
Plan
Hold Chief
Constable to
account
Set the
budget
Engage with
ine public
and
communities
Set Police
and Crime
Plan
Set the police
buJget
Appoint and
hold Chief
Constable to
account
Provide
grants
Maintain
custody
visiting
scheme
Translate

Elected

Eieeied

Elected

I

 Scotland

2009 HMICS
report found
problems in
local authority
pclice beards

Scottish
Police
Authority
2012

Northern
 i eland

Northern
Ireland
Policing
Board
(2001)

Political
situation
giving rise to
Gooa Friday
Agreement
and Patten
Commission

LAPD

Board of
Police
Commission
ers
(1S25)

Extensive and
sustained
corruption
across the
agency and
politics

NYPD
Chicago

-

Reports to
Mayor
Chicago
Police Board
(1861)

Kansas City

Board of
Police
Commrs

Milwaukee

Fire and
Police
Commission
(1885)

public
demands into
police action
Safer
Communities
Hazard
readiness
Efficient and
effective
service
delivery
Promoting
confidence,
reducing fear
of crime
Reduce
crime and
fear of crime
Set targets
Appoint Chief
Constable
Discipline
senior
officers
Set LAPD
priorities
Reduce
crime and
fear of crime
Implement
reforms

Appointed

Appointed

Appointed

Concern over
role of Mayor
in policing

Adopt rules
and
regulations
for the police
Hear
disciplinary
cases
Appoint
Superintende
nt of Police
Operates the
City Police
Department
in
accordance
w:th statute
Oversees
operations
Sets
recruitment

Appointed

Appointed
by the
Governor

Appointed
by the
Mayor and
approved

 Toronto

Montreal
Vancouver

New South
Wales
Queensland
Victoria
New Zealand

France

Germany

Sweden

Toronto
Police
Services
Board
(1957)

and testing
standards
Hears
discipline and
complaint
matters
Determines
First
conceived in
police
1859 following objectives
Catholic
and priorities
worker and
Recruits the
Orange Order Chief
aligned police Negotiates
and fire fighter collective
riots.
agreements
Approves the
budget
Establishes
complaint
mechanisms

Vancouver
Police Board
(1996)

-

Appointed

-

-

*

by the
Common
Council

Reports to
Minister
Reports to
Minister
Reports to
Minister
Reports to
Minister of
Police
Reports to
the Minister
for the
Interior
(1966)
Reports to
Minister of
the Interior
(1951)
National
Police Board
to be
replaced by
Police
Authority in

First board
introduced
attending
formal
incorporation
of the city
11)86

Sets direction
and policy
Overseer
recruitment
Sets budge1
Authority for
policy an j
service
complaints

Appointed

-

Leader v
Will hold the
Sweden 1987 police force
ECHR case
to account on
gave rise to a its activities
devolution of
powers to the  

Currently
appointed

 2015, and
Government

Denmark

R egret
Board
concern with
expansion of
police budget
by 40% and
its employee
volume by
25% over
years 20002010 and
Sweden riots
in May 2013

Minister of
Justice
identified as
‘chief police
authority’

Notes
1. A body specifically called a police ‘authority' is the exception rather than the
norm,
2.
Other authority-type bodies do appear to exist but with the emphasis heavily
upon selection by tne national government rather than through a plebiscite.
3. Crisis, whether in terms of police agency functionality or misbehaviour, /ether
than fuiu»-e-thinking has been the basis for thu introduction of police authoritytype bodies in tnose jurisdictions reviewed which possess such an entity.
4 Police authorities or equivalent entities appear to possess similar functions
irrespective of jurisdiction.
5. It is not clear that the broader range of activities coming within the remit of
some police authority-type entities (e.g. finance, complaints, Derformance
indicators ana policing plan) is necessarily a productive situation.

Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners- no information on its operations are
directly available from its website. Information is available from tne website
huu. /b.)3i cis mo,qov/userpaqes/Board.aspx?21 outlining that the board meets 12
times, is composed of four members, each appointed on varying durations up to four
years in length, and the mayor and demanding a total lime commitment of 50 hours
(whether per week, month or year is not clear).
Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission- consists of seven part-time
Commissioners backed up by a full-time staff of 10 persons. Commissioners are
appointed on overlapping five-year terms and hold what it describes as ‘regular
meetings" in City Hall that are open to the public.

The Los Angelos 3card of Police Commissioners- total five members, made up of
three ordinary members, one Vice President and one President, serving a maximum
of two five-year terms and demanding a commitment of up to 50 hours per week. The
Commission holds its weekly meetings in public. The Board is assisted by a full-time
administration team.
Scottish Police Authority- consists of 13 people and, as of 2013 when the relevant
information was last updated, intended to meet at least six times a year in public with
an allowance for closed sessions in some instances. A sub-committee structure also

 exists to deal with theme-specific work. The Authority is supported by a full-time staff
including a Chief Executive who oversees the management of forensic services in
Scotland.
Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (London)- delegated to tne Deouty Mayor
by the Mayor, the Office is supported by 76 n'embers of staff. The Office engages in
four panels/sub-board events, namely the Joint Investment Board, the Joint Asset
Management Panel and a bi-iateral meeting between the Deputy Mayor and Police
Commissioner and a stop and search community monitoring network. Decisions on
police work are taken in the first three of these initiatives.
Police and Crime Commissioners (Thames Valley and Srefeier Manchester
Police)- the Commissioners decide the direction of police operations, each being
supported by an Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner with (18 and 39 in the
respective areas). The Commissioner in turn is accountable to the Police and Crime
Panel, comprising local councillors (18 in Thames Valley and nine in Greater
Manchester) and independent co-opted memDers (two in Greater Manchester)
supported by a local county council. The Panels meet on a quarterly basis and can
veto the Commissioner in the case of raising a two-thirds majority on the level of the
preceDl and the choice of Police Constable,
Morthern Ireland Policing Soard- the nine independent members and ten political
members meet monthly with a statutory duty to meet at leasx eight times each year
All meetings are divided into private meetings involving just the Boa^d, private
meetings that extend to including the Chief Constable of the PSNI end, finally, public
meetings. A sub-committee structure also exists to deal with theme-specific work.
The Board is assisted by a full-time staff of some 55 members including a Chief
Executive.

 Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC)
and Policing and Crime Commissioners in England and Wales
Background
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 resulted in the abolition of the
Metropolitan Police Authority and the Police Authorities in England and Wales The
act established the Mayors Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) in London and
Police and Crime Commissioners across England and Wales
Police and Crime Commissioners
A police and crime commissioner is elected to a four year tern, charged with
securing efficient and effective policing of a police area in England and Wales, The
first incumbents were elected on 15 November 2012. Commissioners replaced the
now abolished police authorities
Scotland and Northern Ireland
Policing in Scotland and Northern Ireland has been devolved to the Scottish
Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly, respectively. In Scotland, the Cabinet
Secretary for Justice serves in a similar capacity for Police Scotland while in Northern
Ireland, the Minister of Justice fulfils a similar role for the Police Service of Northern
Ireland
Core functions of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCC)
The core functions of PCC are to secure the maintenance of an efficient and effective
police force within their area and to hold the Chief Constable to account for the
delivery of the police and crime plan. PCCs are charged with holding the police fund
(from which all policing of the area is financed) and raising the local policing precept
from council tax. PCCs are also responsible for the appointment, suspension and
dismissal of the Chief Constable and in London this extends to the Deputy
Commissioner.
Police and crime plans
Shortly after election to office, PCC must produce a "Dolice and crime plan". A plan
must include objectives for policing, what resources will be provided to the Chief
Constable/Commissioner and how performance will be measured. Both the PCC
and the Chief Constable must have regard to the police and crime plan in the
exercise of their duties. The PCC is required to produce an annual report to the
public cr. progress in policing.
Police funding
PCCs hold the 'police fund1, from which all policing is financed. The bulk of funding
comes from the Home Office in the form of an annual grant (calculated on a
proportionate basis by the Home Office to take into account the differences between
the 43 forces in England and Wales, which can vary significantly in terms of
population, geographical size, crime levels and trends) and PCCs can also se* a
precept on the Council Tax to raise additional funds. Plans under the Localism Bill
will trigger a referendum where a Commissioner intends to increase the precept by
an amount deemed to be excessive (as defined in the Localism Bill). It will be the
PCCs responsibility to set the budget for the force area, which includes allocating
enough money from the overall policing budget to ensure that they can discharge
their own functions effectively.
Police and crime panels
The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 established police and crime
panels within each force area in England and Wales (excluding Greater London).

fi-26/6/2014

 These panels consist ot =it least one representative from each local authority in that
area and at least two independent members co-optec by the panel.
Panels are responsible for scrutinising PCC decisions and ensuring this information
is available to the public. They must review the PCCs draft police and crime plan
and draft annual report before publication. A police and crime panel may require the
attendance of the PCC or a member of their staff at any time and may suspend a
PCC from office where they are charged with a serious criminal offence.

Heidfng the Bflayor to account in London
A London Assembly is in place is hold the Mayor to account for the effectiveness of
the Mayors decisions. The Assembly is descr'Derf as a ‘Watch dug' of 25 elected
members from the main political parties. The assembly can investigate and review
the work of MOPAC. The assembly has a wide remit, which includes Regeneration
of Stadia, London Underground, Diversity of the Met, Health Services in London,
Safeguarding Children and taxis ana private hire. Tne Assemb'y hold both private
and public meetings and exist to bring then mayor and the Met to account.
Greater London Authority
Established in 1999 it consists of two elected parts the Mayor (executive powers) and
the Assembly (to scrutinise decisions of the Mayor). The GLA has responsibility for
stidtegic planning, police and fire services, transport and economic development.
The GLA serve both the Mayor and the GLA arra lead on corporate roles such as
spending money wisely, maintaining high standards, governing the organisation and
overseeing the election of the Mayor and Assembly members
Relationship tietween the Mayor and the Met Commissioner
* Mayor can hire and fire a Commissioner
* Mayor ensures efficiency and effectiveness ot policing
* Mayor can award grants towards tackling crime and disorder
* Commissioner has responsibility for operational decisions
* Mayor and Commissioner agree the budget
* Mayor set? policing prioi itiec and publishes a policing plan
* MOPAC hes a challenge process to hold Mei to account for policing
* MOPAC hold live televised monthly meetings with tne Commissioner
* Mayor has a role to engage other partners.

 Garda Stochdna R etired M embers’ Association (GSRMA)
G S R M A H o u se

5

H a r r in g to n S tr e e t,

D u b lin

P hone

8
01- 4781525,

e - m a i l in f o @ g a r d a r e tir e d .c o m

W e b s ite w w w .g a r d a r e tir e d .c o m

30th. May 2014
Justice Reform Unit,
Departm ent of Justice and Equality,
51 St. Stephen's Green,
Dublin 2.

G overnm ent Consultation on Ju stic e Reform - Proposal to establish
an independent Policing Authority
Consultation - Proposal to establish an independent Policing A uthority.

Dear Sir/Madam

The Garda Siochana Retired Members Association (GSRMA), wish to make the following proposals in
relation to the establishment of an Independent Policing Authority, as published in relation to the
raft of proposals all linked to Justice Reform.

I set out hereunder The Aims & Objectives of our Association as provided for within our own
Constitution.

The Association:
(a) The name of the Association shall be the Garda Siochana Retired Members’ Association and
its abbreviation GSRMA shall be construed accordingly
(b) The Central office of the Association shall be located at such a place as the Central
Committee from time to time determines.
(c) Subject to his/her consent the Garda Commissioner shall be the patron of the Association in
keeping with established tradition.

 Aims and Objectives:
The objects of the Garda Siochana Retired Members’ Association shall be: 1. To make representation to improve the social and economic status of members.
2. To voice the views of the members in all matters affecting their pensions and Garda
Superannuation Schemes.
3. To disseminate the views of members, to lobby on their behalf and to promote their aims.
4. To represent members on the boards of St. Paul’s Garda Medical Society, the Garda
Benevolent Trust Fund and any other body or group in which its members may have an interest.
5. To promote welfare of the members and to represent them on the committees established for
that purpose.
6. To negotiate group schemes to meet the requirements of the members.
7. To promote the members work prospects by way of vocational training and a jobs liaison
service.
8. To enhance the organisational strength and national image of the Association by means of a
magazine, hand-outs, recruitment drives, establishment of branches and the development of a
veteran’s society dimension
9. To affiliate with kindred retired associations and national federations for the purpose of
lobbying government and its agencies in order to advance the causes of the retired community in
general.
10. To disseminate information concerning the operation of the GSRMA amongst its members at
all times thereby providing an equitable and transparent means of consultation and representation.
11. To liaise with Garda Staff Associations and other Police Associations both serving and retired
in a spirit of fraternal co-operation.
12. To liaise with any other Associations and Societies as the GSRMA Central Committee deem
desirable in order to advance the interests of the membership.
13. To promote and develop good relations between the GSRMA and the media.
14. To develop a spirit of friendship and camaraderie at branch, regional and national level.
15. To pursue changes in legislation for the benefit of its members in or towards achieving any or
all of these objectives.
Garda Siochana Retired members Association represent approximately 9,000 retired
members of An Garda  Siochana, of all ranks.

 This Association has been in existence since 1961, with the mandate to represent the interests
of retired Gardai, in the areas of welfare and pension conditions.
The proposal to establish a Police Authority will have an impact on our position as
pensioners of An Garda Siochana, for the following reasons:
Support in relation to all welfare issues is provided by Welfare services of An Garda
Siochana, to all retired Garda!;
Members of Garda Siochana Retired Members Association are nominees to Divisional &
National Welfare Committees;
Pension payments to retired Garda! are indexed linked to the pay and conditions of serving
Garda!;
The Garda Siochana Retired Members Association are represented on the Garda
Commissioner’s Joint Consultative Council, which includes representatives of all staff
associations of Garda personnel - dealing with issues ranging from pensions to welfare.
While we are retired Garda! we have a lifelong experience of policing, at all levels. We take
an active part in social and community activities, associated with our former role as members
of An Garda Siochana. As a consequence we have an intrinsic relationship with An Garda
Siochana.
We request that you engage with the Garda Siochana Retired Members Association, when
developing the proposed Police Authority model for Ireland, because we are satisfied that can
make a positive and constructive contribution to the future policing, based on the wealth of
knowledge and experience we hold.
We also respectfully suggest that this Association have a representative on the Policing
Authority Board, and we accordingly apply for such representation.
Likewise in your analysis of the various submissions you will receive we feel that an oral
presentation from a small delegation from this association would pay dividends in the
creation of the proposed Authority.

Yours sincerely

Paschal Feeney
Acting General Secretary.

 Justice Reform Unit,
Department of Justice and Equality,
51 St. Stephen's Green,
Dublin 2.
To who it may concern

Submission to the Government Consultation on Justice Reform regarding its
proposal to establish an independent Policing Authority
I make this submission as a private citizen and I wish to submit the following
concerning this matter: 1. I support the proposal to establish an Independent Policing Authority.
2. I propose the in order to be responsive to local needs that this authority
be regionalized to correspond with Garda regions. That is there should
be a separate authority for the Dublin Metropolitan Region, a second
authority for the Eastern region as so on for the other regions namely
the Northern region, the Southern region, the South-Eastern region
and the Western region. This proposal would build on the current joint
policing committees.
3. The Regional Policing authorities should be structures so positions
could be reserved for members from each local authority, (see below)
4. Each Regional Policing authority should select a single member from
their authority to sit on an overarching National Policing Authority. A
clear division of functions should be drafted outlining the limits of the
power and responsibility of both the Regional and the National Policing
authority.
5. I further propose that instead of appointing member to these
authorities they should be directly elected by the citizens of the area
which they will represent. To achieve this they should be elected

 6.

7.

8.

9.
10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

members of the Local Authority. To achieve this, an additional position
on the local authority suitably recompensed could be created. T h a t is
this position would be filled by a person who would be a member o f the
local council. This councilor would have a reserved remit to sit on th e
Regional Policing Authority. Such an election could be legislated fo r to
coincide with the same time as Local elections.
Each regional authority should be responsibility for regional policing
plan which could be drafted annually or bi-annually in conjunction with
the regional Assistant Commissioner and or Divisional Chief
Superintendents.
Each regional authority should hold public either biannual or quarterly
meeting at which an citizen should be permitted to raise issues or to
make proposals which can subsequently be decide upon by the
regional police authority provided it is in accordance with priorities or
initiatives decided upon by the National Police Authority.
The training of Gardai should continue to occur at the Garda College
Templemore and once trained Garda should be assigned to a station
as is the current practice. Their wages should be met from central
funds. The Regional Police authority should be given a role in
supplying accommodation, training facilities, equipment and vehicles
which would be used within the functional area of the Regional Policing
Authority.
Such equipment should be centrally procured b1it should be ‘sold’ by
central stores to the Regional Policing Authority.
The local authority should be given a non Executative function to
maintain the regional section of An Garda Siochana similar to its role in
respect of the Fire service. The National Police Authority should hold a
veto power over any expenditure which is deemed to be excessive.
The Regional Police Authority should be responsible for setting a
budget which is proportionally split between local authorities in
accordance with demographic trends in population distribution.
The Regional Police Authority should play a role in setting the policing
priorities and the strategic direction of the region which they represent.
They should be empowered to scrutinize performance outcomes and
to make submission to the Garda commissioner regarding this scrutiny.
They should be required to prepare an annual reoort outlining the
priorities and the review of the priorities. The ultimate direction of the
service should continue to rest with the Garda Commissioner.
The maintenance of discipline should also continue to rest with the
Garda commissioner but each Regional Policing Authority should be
empowered to make submission in any disciplinary proceeding. The
results of any disciplinary proceedings should be published in the
Regional Policing Authorities annual report.
Goals and priorities regarding each region should set as the result of a
public consultation process and through submission from Community
engagement. Such Community engagement should be facilitated
through existing and future Garda Neighborhood watch schemes.
The Regional Policing authority should also be empowered in
establishing that funds expended locally are prudent and represent
value for the money being expended. Appropriate information should

 be included in the annual report of that authority.
16. The current interview system for promotion should be discontinued for
member up to the rank of inspector and it should be replaced with an
externally accredited system through national universities with
assessed courses that contain modules relevant to core com petencies
or skill. Once the member has passed the examinations they shou Id be
eligible on a merit basis for promotion
17. Each regional authority should also be tasked with a role in the
promotion of Gardai up to and including the rank of Inspector. A
member from each Local authority in conjunction with a local Divisional
Chief Superintendent, a member of either the local legal profession of
a member of the Judiciary should be tasked with the responsibility to
manage the promotion process. Personal interviews should not ta k e
place for positions at this level. Appointment should be on merit a n d an
appeals mechanism should be created through the Office of the
Commission for Public Service Appointments.
18. The National Police Authority could be tasked with a role in the
promotion of Gardai up to and including the rank of Deputy
Commissioner. Appropriate 3rd level accredited management
qualifications which should include aspect of Project management,
Human resource management, Communication, Criminology and
Conflict resolution should be an eligibility criteria for promotion at these
ranks. Additionally a personal interview should be used to select
people for these positions. Interviews for members to the positions of
Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commission should be opened to
both the press and members of the public.
19. The Garda Commissioner should be appointed following competitive
interview by the National Police Authority with the addition of the
Minister for Justice, the chairperson of the Garda Siochana
Inspectorate and the Chairperson of the Garda Siochana Ombudsman
commission. Each person should have one vote and the candidate
who gets the majority of votes should be appointed Garda
Commissioner.
20. The members of the regional authority should be responsible and
answerable to their respective Local Authority and should be capable
of being sanctioned following a Majority vote of the National Policing
Authority.
21. The National Policing authority should be individually and collectively
answerable to the Minister for Justice, the chairperson of the Garda
Siochana Inspectorate and the Chairperson of the Garda Siochana
Ombudsman commission.
Thank you for you time and I urge you to seriously consider my submission when
deciding on the future direction of the Garda service. Should you require clarification
of any of the points of my submission please do not hesitate in contacting me and I
will endeavor to provide clarification if necessary.

 W ith re f to the new policing board
I as a man on the street would be very interested in taking part.
I think our police force has to look forward.
W e need new ways for the police to police themselves
Thank you

Work Like You Don't Need The Money.
Love Like You've Never Been Hurt.
Dance Like Nobody's Watching.
Sing Like Nobody's Listening.
Live Like It's Heaven On Earth.
And Smile ... It get's to them..

 Government Consultation on an Independent Policing Authority.
Cllr. Tim O'Leary to: justicereformsubmissions

09/05/201419:02

I fu lly support the establishment o f a Police Authority. Is is vital to efficient policing and w ill create a buffer
between it and the government.
I served in The Garda Siochana for 36 years retiring as a Sergt at Listow el in 1997. I was Kerry Branch Se. of
The Association o f Garda Sergt & Insprs from 1982 to 1997. I am an elected member o f Listow el Town C l. for
for the past 15 years.
The Gda Force is badly in need o f an overhaul to up-date practices and procedures and make it fit for modem
day policing. The force I left was riddled with cronyisn and favouritism in relation to appointments, transfers and
promotions. Th is led to poor morale and cynicism . Staff associations were just about tolerated and not properly
engaged with by management for the betterment o f the force and the w ell being o f personnel.
The P/Aut should have control over promotions. Be accountable to the dail and government. The ombudsman
and inspectorate should be within its remit. Distinctions should be made between a police service, intelligence
gathering and state security. Good relationships with the public should be maintained and developed. No move
be made towards a police state. Common sense law enforcement practices to be fostered. Good relationship
with Defence Force
C llr Tim O'Leary, Ballygologue Road, Listow el

Government Consultation on an Independent Policing Authority.
Cllr. Tim O 'Leary to: justicereformsubmissions

09/05/2014 19:14

addendum
membership o f the p/auth. should be invited from the public with a particular emphasis on community service
and practical experience o f dealing with people. Made up o f probably 15 persons and not to be too unwieldy.
An annual report to issue.

 1.

Title to be "SERVICES" Not "FORCE". 2. The Commissioner to be elected by public.3.

Involve Psychiatric Nurses with the services on call or preferably a tta c h ed ...................... I have
been called to assist M etropolitan police in a psychiatric situation.lt can save lives and
money.lt is a confidence earner as well,and helps get a real handle on cases w here m entally
ill are involved.I have had over 40 years in nursing and management.Am now retired.

 To Whom It May Concern,

My subm ission is that an independent policing body should have
representation from com m unity groups.
In Ireland today, local com m unity m em bers do not know the Gardai in
th eir town like they once did, the G ardai are now strangers, which causes
distrust and raises questions.
This distrust has, in m any cases, lead to a lack of confidence in the
Gardai, who preform a vital and thankless job.
I believe as part of the role of An Gardai th e y must ensure they are
known to the locals, as much as on a first name basis and interact with An
Gardai on a regular basis to build trust.
Also, a better knowledge of the locality will be vital to An Gardai in dealing
with crim e and crim e trends, both officially reported and unreported.
My idea is that all m em bers of An Gardai Siochana should give 1-2 hours
per week, paid, working with local residential and com m unity groups. For
Exam ple, our specific area of Roscrea has formed a Com m unity Alert
Com m ittee for 4 housing estates com bined and were lucky to have a very
active m em ber of An Garda Siochana who is now known on a first name
basis and we will be introducing him to the residents, which will build trust
with m ore than 700 local residents who will, in the near future, have a
m em ber of our towns Gardai that they will have trust and confidence in
which w ill build trust to the entire force, in contrast, another local group
we are helping, on the other side of Roscrea, were initializing a
com m unity alert when the m ember o f An Gardai told their com m ittee it
was "going to cost a fortune" and in no way was he going to go to doors,
the im m ediate reaction was to tar the force as "all the same", this is a
sim ple m easure than can be avoided.
This com m unity initiative needs to be structured and have oversight to
ensure it is being done effectively and that the independent body can
ensure the confidence in An Gardai is being restored.
A Com m unity Com m ittee with no m ore than 10 representatives, serving 2
years, should be form ed as part of the Independent Policing Authority
where th e com m ittee can create codes of best practice, initiate
"com m unity projects" with An Gardai and review the progress with a
method o f enforcing the initiative. The Com m unity Com m ittee should be

 able to enforce this com m unity approach and be directly connected tea the
overall policing authority. (W ith the possibility of the Chair of the
com m ittee being a com m ittee m ember to the authority)
I believe as part of your review this initiative will be vital as confid ence
can only be restored with tru st and it is im possible to trust those you do
not know.
Please accept m y subm ission, my details are below if you wish to disc uss
th is further, th a n k you:

 I would like to m ake some points and recommendations on a new police force that is required
for Ireland.
Having traveled around the world I realize nobody has a perfect system. However our force is
quiet small and w e could if there was a will to fix this force and instill public confidence.
I would like a strong, fair and uncorruptible force that will attract the right candidate for the
W e have too m any Guards that ?re in the job for the wrong reason i.e cushy number and they
become resentful when they find that the job is no bed o f roses. Any person in the wrong job
is a liability.
It should be an offence to get a ticket or charge dropped.
There should be an independent body that oversees the guards and they should have the
powers o f investigation when things go wrong.
When a recruit goes to Templemore he should be told the following
1. Don't believe what your colleagues tell you .
2. If you are fair and honest and work hard you will do well.
3. Promotion is given on meritocracy ie if your good you will be promoted and not because its
your turn.
4. Every recruit is given a job description and is o f no doubt what are his/her expectations.
5. You work for the people o f ireland and you may be fired after two verbal and one written
warning.
6 You never cover up anythingif you do you will be fired.
7. You will be assessed every year on your performance as is the norm in all walks o f life.
1 am in m y forties and anytime i need the help o f the Gardai for things, the feeling i get is that
its too much trouble to do the little things but anyone will tell you that take care o f the small
stuff and the large things will be reduced. The fixing o f tickets by Guards has been rife all my
life and I never considered going to one with a problem because its wrong. I hope that this
will be stamped out and anyone caught doing this will be fired.
W e need a proper functioning police force that serves the needs o f the people and not their
own needs.
Thank You

 Public Consultation on Establishing an Independent Policing Authority
Dear Sir/Madam
When first seeing the Public Consultation on Establishing an Independent
Policing Authority I have to think that this Country needs a better organised
Police Service throughout the State as the Criminal seems to be have a free
hand to do what they like and please see attached ideas for the Policing of our
Country.
We have to be mindful of forming this Independent Police Authority that some
time in the future we may have an all Ireland Police Service and with that in
mind this Authority has to be imaginative and far reaching and the people on
this Board have to have knowledge of how the police work in this state.
In my opinion the Garda Commissioner had too many officers under his/her
control and therefore the job is toe big just for one person and to many areas of
operation and thats where my policing ideas com from.
This Anthority can't be political and we must have the proper people in this
organisation.
The Policing Authority functions responsibilities are:
• Independent of the Government.
• Responsible for promoting all Officers to the rank of Chief
Superintendent and Assistant/Deputy & Commissioner level.
• Responsible for Sacking all Officers to the rank of Chief Superintendent
and Assistant/Deputy & Commissioner level.
• Regrade the police Force to include the ranks of Chief Inspector &
Corporal rank so there is more supervision in smaller stations.
• Responsible for filling of all Officers to a second tier Police Service if
one is ever introduced.
• Responsible for all Police Service in the State i.e. Customs, Garda,
Military Police, Airport Police, Harbour Police, Luas Security, Health &
Safety Authority(for Investigating side .Air Crashes etc).
The Policing Authority Appointments & Membership:
• Deputy Commissioner of Gardai
• Chief of Airport Police
• Provost Marshall of the military police of the Defence Forces

 •
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Judge Advocate of the Defence Forces
Director General/Civil Defence Officer of the Civil Defence
Chief Justice
Head of the Garda SOC
Head of the GS Inspectorate
Ceann Comhairle of Dail
Ceann Comhairle of Seanad
Citizen of the State of good standing

The Policing Authority Relationship with Government:
• Ceann Comhairle of Dail
• Ceann Comhairle of Seanad
In mv opinion this is as much input as the Government of the day needs.
The Policing Authority Relationship with GSOC & Garda Inspectorate:
The head of both organisation have a seat on the Police Authority.
This is my submission for the Policing Authority.
Regards

 Submission
I have some ideas for Policing in Ireland for the 21 st
Century in the EU.
• Reduce the Gardai to 10,000 members.
• Introduce a new Local Police Force dealing with Local
Issues and leave the serious Policing to An Garda
Siochana.
• This would be in line with most other Eu countries.
THE BASIS IS AS FOLLOWS:
1.The 3,000 less Gardai could pay for approx 5,000 Local
Police/Peace Officer and only the cream of this
Police Force can apply for An Garda Siochana so
the country is getting the best Police Officers.
2 Where do these Local Police/Peace Officer Force come
from Park Rangers ,Fishery Inspectors,Former
FCA/RDF Military Police,PDF Military Police
(retired),Traffic Wardens,Civil Defence
Members,Environment Wardens,Reserve Gardai or
Retired Gardai,Airport Police,Harbour Police etc
who wish to have a Local Police Career at less pay
than An Garda Siochana.
.

What does this achieve:
• An Gardai Siochana can concentrate on Major Crime
• Local Issue can be dealt with by this new Force
Unarmed (but can get advice from An Garda
Siochana)
What work can they preform:
• Litter
• Airport Policing & Harbours
• Policing of Waterways
• Parking Violations

 • Street Patrols
• Hospital Patrols
• Park Patrols
• Directing Traffic for spoiling events
• Speed Camera work
• Transport Police Trains,Luas,Buses,Lakes & the
Islands off the coast.

Where can they train:
Columb Barracks Mullingar still in State Hands and still
used by the Garda Armed Response Unit would be ideal
as members up to 300 can be housed in this Barracks for
emergency or crowd control work in Dublin.

Police Forces of the EU:
Ireland - Garda + (Military Police Defence Forces only)
UK- 43 Forces + Transport Police + Border Control
France - Gendarmerie + National Police etc
Belgium - Federal police + Local police of Belgium etc
Spain - Local Police + Guardia Civil etc
Italy - Carabinieri + Polizia Locale etc
Maybe Ireland N eeds a second Police Force for
Local P olicing/m inor police work.
The Garda should be for Serious Crime and
in vestigation s.
Canada have Fedral Police Serious Crime, Sherrifs Dept
for prisoner transfer etc, Peace Officers local policing
unarmed, Border Agency & Railway police. Maybe they
should be looked at.
IRELAND NEEDS CHANGE AND IN CANADA RETIRED
FEDRAL POLICE & MILITARY ARE SELECTED FOR
PEACE OFFICER ROLES.

 My submissions under the headings are as follows:

F u n c tio n s and re s p o n s ib ilitie s o f a P o licin g A u th o rity.
»
•

To secure an effective and efficient national police service for this country.
To have the statutory power to appoint and dismiss the Commissioner,D/commissioner and
assistant Commissioners
• To consult widely annually with local people about the policing service needs.
• To set local policing priorities and targets for police performance
• To monitor overall police performance, development, and to make recommendations
» To publisn a three year and annua! policing plans and report on its effectiveness
» To make sure local people get best value from their local police service.
• To oversee complaints against senior officers.
• To oversee discipline/sanctions of senior officers.

 •

To make recommendations on promotions on all ranks.

A p p o in tm e n t and m e m b e rsh ip of the A uthority.
•

Membership no longer than 5 years on the authority.

•

It should represent all matters ot policing such as governance, finance, resources and
training.

•
•

All aspects of Irish society should have a representation.
Should be more independent than political.

•

Appointed by the Taoiseach of the day.

I t s re la tio n sh ip w ith th e G o v e rn m e n t and th e O ire a ch ta s.
•
•
•

Should be answerable to the Public Accounts Committee.
Should have overall control of the Garda Budget.
The D irector of Finance in An Garda Siochana must be answerable to the
A utho rity.

Should be governed by a set of Standing Orders and incorporating the Code of Conduct for Board
Members and Role of Committees similar to that of the Northern Ireland Policing Authority.

Im p lic a tio n s fo r th e G arda S fo ch a n a O m b ud sm an C o m m issio n
(G S O C ) and th e G arda S fo ch a n a In sp e c to ra te .
•
•

Both bodies should report directly to the Police Authority and should continue
w ith th e ir respective work.
Both bodies should report separately annually to the A uthority.

Again thank you for the opportunity and I am available for an oral submission if required
in the future.

 http://www.ifsecglobal.com/body-worn-cameras-herald-new-era-surveillance-policeaccountability/
note its reported effects..
Hello,
My friends tell me that I am wasting my time trying to make any suggestion to
Government 'They don't listen and don't seem to care , they get their pay at th e
end of the day, arid no one wants to ruffle any feathers, so far they appear to m e
as being right, but in this time I have a feeling that maybe it might be forwarded
through to the right person and that I might receive a call to clarify or explain
further anything not understood below;
This is an attempt to tackle the seed to much of our problems including the reasons
why are building bigger jails and fancyER court houses.
In IRELAND, in reality, The bartenders and anyone serving alcohol are freely able to
serve already intoxicated customers without fear of reprisal / sanction.
One country I've lived in Defore, fines the server PERSONALLY, fines the
establishment AND enforces shutdown for a 14 day period.
After seeing the effectiveness of this enforcement back in 2000, I've made the
suggestion on many occasions to different departments here but without success.
The people in these departments seem to me that this would be too much trouble
to even consider.
But I beg you to consider the out-weighing benefits to Ireland if such policy was
ENFORCED, I believe there maybe something in place already?
What would happen to the supermarkets and petrol stations (unnecessary vendors)
if there was one or two shutdowns? The appetite for this product line would be
less. Hence bringing the supply back to the original vendors. Pubs could reopen
their off-licence areas and help their trade, they would have better CONTROL on its
sales. There are several other benefits ...
Pair this policy with the alcohol minimum unit pricing (or better 'SET pricing' as
suggested to minister White) and there is an opportunity tc upset the source
problem to many other problems in Ireland.
on a second suggestion:
the Garda could do with being allowed to use stun gun/batten weapons. As the
current policies let unfortunate situations flourish on our streets and more.

 - 1 have a an idea, rapid response , reporting and transparency concept for its m ore
simplified application. That I'm willing to share with the right person.

Thank you for reading,
Please send me some feedback
Regards

 All cases available to all people in Ireland
on internet.
All cases must be on television.
No case against the public sector can be refused
an investigation.
Will pay all costs and losses suffered by victim.
Do criminal court cases against public sector workers.
To dismiss public sector management who do not
train and discipline their staff.

 Attention of
Justice Reform Unit.
My submission is somewhat diverse from the four categories outlined, but, I fee!
that under category A, I can contribute some ideas to assist with the
development of the Gardst service.
One on the main and most controversial issues that impedes every organisation
and administration is the cancer of overtime. The use of overtime payments for
additional and unforeseen requirements is unacceptable in the new era. Other
areas such as change within the system are affected, in house industrial unrest,
increased sick leave are all the result of overtime.
The Garda service must be completely reviewed, all aspects of the service be
examined, the rostering of all grades requires in depth analysis, a multi-rostering
system be designed to meet local requirements and provide cover for leave.
One roster for all is impractical, it generates overlapping, unsocial aspects and
generally discontent.
Along with roster examination of the system:All staff must be required to clock in and out for duty.
All tasks / posts are aligned to the time recording.
All time recordings are directly electronically transferred to payroll
Killarney.
Only exceptions on the day require attention, serious reduction of
administration.
A full HR policy is devised with staff availing of sick leave.
A standard built in agreement on staff late attendance for duty.
These are some issues that must be standardised, administrators must be taken
out of decision making process in these areas. Time saved and the staffs are
dealing with policy rather than local managers.
All sections are independently operating and the experience from introduction of
an annualised hour’s system changes the ethos of the workforce, allows for
change within the organisation, reduces sick leave, better control of annual
budgets.
The change and implementation of a new programme will not be a simple
process, the benefits for the staff and the service would be in time very positive.
From experience, organisations that have completed a full examination and

 transformation of the systems would not return to the use of overtime as a
payment for working extra hours or extended shifts.

 The problem in the Garda Sfochana is a breakdown in discipline linked to a flawed promotion
system. Basically, if a Sergeant wants to get promoted to Inspector s/he does not rock the boat
by reporting breaches o f discipline to members up the line.
W hen a breach is reported the Superintendent will (likely as not) stop it in its tracks because
s/he won't want it reaching the Chief Superintendent
So it will be handled locally - a euphemism for not handled at all, or brushed under the
carpet. This lends itself to unhealthy disrespect for supervisory ranks.
This leads to situations where problems are brushed under the carpet at every level w ithin the
organisation. Sergeants who can't handle discipline breaches won't pass them upwards;
likewise for Inspectors and Superintendents. Y es people' are promoted leaving the whole
strength simmering at rank and file level. Interview Boards sit but the reality is if candidates
are disliked by their Superintendents and Chiefs they will be marked down and passed over.
I heard a story recently where a high ranking member o f the force visited a rural Garda
station. The Garda on station orderly duty upon seeing the officer enter the public office
jumped out o f her chair, went to the officer, threw her arms around her kissing and hugging
her. That kind o f familiarity between the ranks should be discouraged because lends itself, not
only to indiscipline, but also to perceptions o f cronyism.
The whole promotion selection process badly needs overhaul - the personal dislikes o f one
person should not be sufficient to scupper another member's chances o f promotion.
TV sets in Garda Stations are a disaster. These are usually hidden in presses under counters
in the public offices or in recreation rooms o ff public offices.
All kinds o f programmes from sports to films distract not only the Station orderly from
his/her duties but mobile patrols, public order patrols, and beat personnel. Gardai don't live
in stations any longer and TV sets, pool tables etc should be banned from the buildings. They
lend themselves to personnel disgruntled at being disturbed becoming impatient and even
rude to callers to the desk.
You cannot run an organisation without discipline and clear lines need to be drawn to ensure
that it cannot be (deliberately or otherwise) confused with bullying.

 Department of Justice and Equality,
5?. St. Stephen's Green,
Dublin 2.

Dear Minister,
I welcome the opportunity to make submissions with regard to the establishment of a P o licin g
Authority.! would be gra teful if you could consider my view as detailed below.

functions & Responsibilities

To conduct a full review of the Garda Siochana with a view to implementing the following charges,
♦

Reduce the amount of inspectors, Superintendents, Chief Superintendents & Assistant
Commissioners, there are too many Senior Officers and middle management as it «s and
soma of the functions of management will he taken away by this authority.

»

Remove Human Resource Management from An Garda Siochana with a view to the policing
authority along with HR Civilians taking charge of appointments, promotions and transfers.
Likewise promotion to Superintendent and above should be taken over by the body. As
things stand all appointments, promotions and transfers in the Gardai is down to how well
connected the member is. Gardai are trained from a young age to police tne streets and are
not capable of the HR management of 13,000 people.

•

From a HR and policing ooint of view the Garda Commissioner should be directed that all
Gardai working in plain clothes but not appointed as Detective, jlo or other appointed
position should be redeployed to Uniform duties on the front line where they are most
needed as a resource

 •

Act as an intermediate body between gsor and Gardai. All complaints of a potential c*i m i "a!
nature should be referred to gsnc and all other complaints particulary internal affairs should
be ciealt with by the authority

•

Act as the ;onfident;al recipient for whistle blowers.

•

Provide a system of receiving confidential complaints/grievances from Gardai of all ran ks.

•

Deal with internal allegations of bullying.

•

Provide a modem version of Garda Code.

•

Design a new respectable looking uniform.

•

Fight for retention and in jome cases re opening of Rural 6ard? Stations.

Apoirrtment and Membership

•

No serving or former members of An Garda Siochana should be appointed.

•

Officials from the Departments of Justice and Education should be considered.

•

Senior HR Personnel from Private or Public sectors should be considered.

•

No member o f gsoc or inspectorate should be considered.

•

Chief of staff of Defence forces should be considered.

•

Members of Judiciary; judges, former judges, solicitors or barristers
considered but not any person practising in Criminal law.

shot;id be

Relationship with Goverm ient/gsi*c/inspectarate

•

Regular reports to be provided to Dail and Oireahtas meetings.

•

In relation to GSOC both bodies can refer cases to each other with all internal matters going
to Policing Authority and all criminal matters to gsoc,

•

Inspectorate should carry out extensive research into cpd, internal affairs and all areas of
improving Gardai and report findings to policing authority.

•

Garda Siochana, gsoc, dent of justice and inspectorate should all answer to Authority.

In addition to ail of the above points 1 recommend that the Policing Authority identify problem
stations and set abcut rejuvenating morale in these stations. For examples some stations, one in
particular have consistently featured in the public domain for the wrong reasons such as members

 appearing in court on criminal charges and receiving criminal convictions. Such stations need *
freshened up by way of new management and movement of members who wish to transfer.

q

be

Finally ! live in a rural community and have noticed a strong decline in Garda presence in my loca lity.  
hope that the Policing Authority can examine the decline in Rural Policing and address the issues
concerning people in Rural Ireland.

 Policing Reform Independent Authority Suggestions to Advertisement in S la r
Paper Titled “Government Consultation on an Independent Policing”

To Whom It May Concern,

I,
,
have seen the work of our policing force first hand.
I will not go into the details as issues involving individual cases are not to be
considered. This is the first flaw as it is precisely those individual cases which m ust
be examined in order to get to the root of the laissez-faire attitude of the Gardai
which results in the unnecessary deaths of people due to their negligence or / a n d
lack of training in the areas of mental health and the addictovoidance of our
Governments to find the political will to finance and educate our police in order to
avoid tragic deaths. The whole method of seeing and understanding why crime
exists in the first place is well scripted by both sociologists and criminologists. T h e
health system is buckling under the barrage of people who are in need of help in
order to adequately transpire from adolescence to being a healthy adult capable of
existing in an open minded society rather than being criminalised and labelled fo r
life. The prison industry in warehousing people to be locked up for seventeen hours
a day are creating a criminal university where people are forced to play a negative
ego game in a society of the fallout of the Celtic tiger and are caught in a dysfunction
akin to a bipolar tryptch with the Gardai on the interface of this shadow narcissism.
In this fallout of the good and evil created by the split psyche of the narcissistic tree
of Good and Evil, we must first learn to be gentle in our growing collective rainbow
culture. Growing pains of a young European nation who lock up more of our
unwanted children as adult children or Brat child gangsters. W e are ultimately
capable of resoliving this and healing the deep psychic wounds of oppression and be
careful that we do not become the oppressors of our own errant people who risk the
thin line of crime shadows and their legal alter egos.
Finally, we must train specialist Gardai in psychology to a level of discernment to
intervene in domestic situations, especially when they are asked to use their legal
right to incarcerate in a mental facility when they become a danger to themselves or
others. W hen the Gardai do not have these skills of discernment and timely
intervention, people die due to their inability to get help from the agencies of the
State which are provided at inadequate levels. W e must have hope that we can
generate the intelligence and will to help our lost and disempowered people. Alcohol
and drugs are here to stay and we must remember that this State empowered
unmarried mothers to birth fatherless sons who, in their inability to bond in the vital
father / son relationship fall foul of law and addiction. W e must rear our own self­
created demons and begin to understand the growing pains of a yet young State.
So, to finish, I suggest more of a Garda liaison with rehabilitative services and the
political will to create centres to help rather than criminalise our mentally unwell as
the dark shadow of a cruel system. There must be humanistic services provided to
help the social welfare ghettos that our previous Governments have created and now
neglect. It is not houses we need, my God, we as a nation have ihe creative wealth
of a splendid Celtic past, we musi grow an honest and transparent national soul and
love the state of our human condition. There is hope and love now we must let

 charity and forgiveness become a cornerstone in our new alive, fun society, w h o can
handle the sections of recreation drug use and misuse as their misfortune if t h e y can
find no spiritual path in our new secular society. W e were not called the island o~f
saints and scholars for nothing and we must have compassion for our Gardai w h o
most of the time do a wonderful job of not interfering in the free creativity of its
citizens.
Oh, come away o human child
To the waters and the wild,
Least we forget who we are.
W.B. Yeats
Yours sincerely
Looking forward to your reply before you spend millions on agencies that create
further disharmony, we as a people in dialogue can fix our own problems.
Mise le meas

 Submission on the Concept of a Garda Authority
Professor Dermot P.J. Walsh MRIA

Introduction
Policing is a unique and vital public service that is not suited to the normal constraints
and requirements o f political governance. Its pivotal role in the judicial law
enforcement process, coupled with the immense powers o f each police officer over
the life, liberty, property and privacy o f every individual, are such that it cannot safely
be left to the direct control o f centra1 government. Exposing the police to the
conventional processes and procedures o f central government invites the risk o f
political interference in decision-making in the criminal process. Equally it facilitates
the deployment o f the full force of police power and resources by powerful political
and economic interests against those individuals and minorities they perceive as a
threat. On the other hand, insulating the police against the scrutiny o f the
democratically elected government runs the risk o f fuelling a police state in which th e
police are free to use their immense powers and resources to pursue their own
political and sectional agendas. This provides the opportunity for even more sinister
and secretive forces to use the police as a tool to further their own interests at the
expense o f society as a whole.
There is no perfect, or even ideal, solution to these tensions in police governance. T h e
aim m ust be to strike a practical and principled compromise in which the police can
deliver their vital public service functions in an environment w here they are protected
against being used as a tool o f powerful elites, while remaining effectively
accountable to all o f the publics the)' serve. In m any democracies based on the rule o f
law, this practical and principled compromise has entailed the sharing o f police
governance among several bodies, two o f which are the police and central
government. The others (or other, depending on jurisdiction) are: a police authority,
the central prosecutor, local authorities etc.
In m y view, Ireland is probably best suited to a tri-partite arrangement in which the
third body is a Police Authority which sits above the police and parallel to central
government. In this arrangement, I envisage the Police Authority playing the
instrumental role in protecting the police against sectional political direction, wnile at
the same time ensuring that the police are transparently accountable to the public for
the quality o f service they deliver. In effect, it will subsume m ost of the policing
functions currently vested in central government generally, and the Minister for
Justice in particular. It will also have further powers and functions: it must establisn
and m aintain a professional, human rights compliant, transparent, efficient, effective
and accountable police service; it must oversee compliance with best international
practice in the standards o f recruitment, education and training, appointments,
promotion and accountability; it must provide human rights compliant equipment and
exercise close scrutiny over the use o f weapons; it m ust closely supervise the exercise
of police powers and the quality o f police performance; and it must give advice,

 leadership and direction to the police on operational policies, priorities, strategies a n d
practices. The capacity c f the Police Authority to deliver on these matters will d e p e n d
very heavily on it being established with the necessary independence, powers and
personnel to take a robust, hands-on approach to the discharge o f its role. I have
outlined below what I consider to be essential in this context. If I had to emphasise
one concept that should inform these components and the contribution o f a Police
Authority as a whole it would be transparency. A Police Authority must deliver
maximum transparency in policing otherwise it is not worth the effort.
Before outlining the essential components, it must be acknowledged that the current
Garda State security role is problematic. In m y view the Garda should be a purely
civil police service, and this State security function should be transferred to another
body (the status, remit, composition, accountability etc of whicn is another day’s
work). The proposals outlined below are framed on the basis that the State security
role will be transferred from the Garda. Even if it is not so transferred, the essence o f
my recommendations remains the same. However, I do accept that the retention o f a.
Garda State security function will entail some limitation on the powers and functions
c f the Authority (and a correlative increase in the Minister’s input) in situations w here
State security issues are in play.

Overall objectives
•
•
•
•

To ensure the delivery o f an efficient, effective, human rights compliant,
ethical and transparent police service;
to render the Garda accountable for their policies, practices, strategies and
performance;
to act as a buffei against direct political involvement in policing policies,
practices, strategies, operations and performance
to render the Garda responsive to community needs and circumstances and
human rights principles

Powers and functions
•

•

Appointment o f all officers o f Commissioner rank by open competition, after
consultation with the Minister for Justice (ultimate decision to be that o f the
Authority).
o This shall extend to the power o f removal for just cause and subject to
compliance with fair procedures
o The power o f appointment and removal over all other members should
vest in the Commissioner, subject to standards and procedures set and
overseen by the Authority
To discharge the regulatory functions with respect to the Garda that are
currently vested in the M inister - including: recruitment, appointments,
education and training, pay, pensions, conditions o f service, discipline,
complaints, ethics, promotion, uniform etc.
o In addition to regulations on education and training, it is vital that the
Authority should exercise close direction and oversight over the
structure, contents, standards and delivery o f education and training for
both recruits and professional development

 •

•
•
•

•

•

•

To provide and maintain buildings and equipment in consultation with the
Commissioner
o This must include control over the type and range o f vehicles,
weapons, surveillance devices, IT technologies etc to be available for
use by gardai
To determine Garda estimates and budget in consultation with the Minister
To determine annual and strategic Garda plans in consultation with the
Commissioner
To approve (at least annually and as the need arises) Garda policies, priorities
and strategies in consultation with the Commissioner
o This must include operational policies
o Day to day operational decisions, and the management o f an individual
law enforcement etc operation, must remain the preserve o f the
Commissioner; but she will be accountable to the Authority for
decisions made, and for performance and outcomes with respect to
them
To require a report from the Commissioner at any time on any maixer
concerning the Garda, the policing o f the State or EU/intemational police
cooperation. This is a critical power as it will play a vital role not just in
delivering accountability, but also in replacing the current role o f the M inister
for Justice as a conduit for information on the Garda and policing via Dail
questions.
o This must include reports on individual operations that have given rise
to concern among the public or a section o f the public
o Restrictions (eg. to protect the integrity o f an ongoing critical
investigation, etc) to be strictly limited and defined
To require annual reports from the Commissioner on the discharge o f Garda
^unctions, Garda performance , the management o f the Garda organisation, the
policing o f the State and cross-border police cooperation in Ireland, the EU
and internationally
o This must include the power to call for general reports for time to time
as the need arises
To require periodic information on crime and the exercise o f Garda powers.
Again, this will be a vitally important power to replace the current role o f the
M inister for Justice in acting as a conduit for such information via the Dail
question. It must ensure the provision o f extensive and detailed information on
crime and the exercise o f Garda powers - areas that are grossly undeveloped
in terms o f data coverage and transparency in this country. The material must
be published regularly by the Authority
o It is vital that this power extends to the exercise o f Garda powers from
stop, through arrest, detention, entry, search, surveillance etc. It is
essential in any democracy based on the rule o f law that this data
should be publicly available alongside published information on Garda
policies on the exercise o f these powers.
o The publication o f crime data (currently published through the CSO)
needs to be radically revamped to make it much m ore comprehensive,
detailed and meaningful. It needs to range from data on crime
reported/unreported and detected right to final disposal in the courts,
including detailed data on steps in the criminal process en route, all
broken down on the basso o f age, gender, location etc

 ® To keep under review trends in complaints against the Garda and how they a r e
resolved (see below under relationship with GSOC)
o The Authority should pay particular attention to underlying trends a n d
issues that are giving rise to public concern or which may reveal
weaknesses in Garda policies, practices, priorities, strategies,
management etc. with a view to exploring the need for remedial a c tio n
and taking such action where necessary
• To establish an independent inquiry into any aspect o f policing or the Garda
which is giving rise to public concern.
o The Authority shall appoint a suitably qualified independent
chairperson who shall have the power to summon witnesses and to
compel the production o f documents, subject to limited and strictly
defined exceptions
o Witnesses shall be generally obliged to answer questions on oath and
must submit documents
o The sittings snail be in public or private as determined by the
chairperson
o The inquiry shall report to the Authority which shall normally publish
the report
• To hold monthly meetings with the Commissioner etc to discuss matters
concerning the Garda and policing from an accountability perspective. The
Commissioner and her colleagues will be expected to respond to questions an d
matters raised both orally and, where requested, through the provision o f
documentation. Restrictions (eg. need to protect ongoing criminal
investigations, legal privilege etc) should be strictly limited and defined. The
Authority will be expected to convey their concerns (and satisfaction) over
Garda policies, practices, performance etc. The Authority will also be
expected to respond to Garda concerns over Authority decisions and
performance on matters within its remit (budget, appointments, policies,
standards, training and education etc)
• To hold quarterly meetings o f the type outlined in the immediately preceding
bullet which are open to the public. These quarterly meetings should be held at
different locations around the country from time to time.
• To hold an annual public meeting (attended by the Authority members and the
Commissioner etc) to listen to and to respond to issues raised concerning the
Garda, policing and its own performance as an Authority.

Composition
•

Composition is absolutely vital to the success of the Police Authority. It must
have some link to democratically elected representatives, without being a
reflection o f the Dail. It must have a broad degree o f representativeness
without being to large or elected. It must have academic (policing/criminal
justice) and regulatory expertise on it without being a body o f academic and/or
administrative experts. Most critical o f all is the calibre o f members appointed
10 it. They m ust be able, willing and committed to contribute their own brand
o f knowledge and experience to the common enterprise o f a professional,
human rights compliant, transparent, efficient, effective and accountable
police service. I would suggest that it should be broadly representative o f a
range o f interest groups and experts: eg - one member from each o f the mam

 •

•

political parties (including Sinn Fein) and independents; one from each o f a
range o f interest groups such as employers/business, workers/unemployed,
farmers, voluntary sector, youth, elderly, immigrants/ethnic minorities,
religious, social workers, medical profession, lawyers and academia. The
appointees should reflect gender balance.
The choice o f chairperson is critical. It needs to be someone who can
combine expertise in policy/public sector management with a strong
reputation for independence, vision and balance. It needs to be a leader who
can bring disparate factions/interests together in a common goal; someone
who can articulate vision and communicate effectively with disparate political,
socio-economic and vested interest groups. A public profile would be helpful
but not essential. Expertise in policing/criminal justice would be helpful but
not essential.
The chairperson should be a salaried full-time appointment. Members should
be salaried part-time appointments.

Appointment
•

Members should be appointed by the Oireachtas following a public invitation
o f expressions o f interest. The process to be handled by an appropriate
Oireachtas Committee (preferably not Justice). The term o f appointment
should be four years renewable once on a staggered basis (i.e. first h alf o f the
appointees should be for two years in the initial round o f appointments). A
member can be removed by a majority vote in each House o f the Oireachtas,
but only for gross misconduct.

Status and structure
•

•

The Authority should be established as a single body with legal personality
just like the Policing Board in NI. It should be statutorily independent in the
discharge o f its functions - comparable to the Irish Human Rights
Commission.
It should have the power to establish sub-committees and delegate specified
functions to sub-committees

Relationship with Ombudsman Commission
•

As noted above, the Authority should keep under review trends in complaints
against the Garda and how they are resolved. To this end they should receive
regular reports from the GSOC on complaints (broken down into relevant
categories), how those complaints are dealt with and outcomes. The Authority
should meet regularly with GSOC to keep itself informed on trends in the
incidence and contents o f complaints and in their investigation and disposal. A
primary purpose o f these reports and meetings will be to identify (in
conjunction with GSOC) factors that are generating complaints and/or
impeding their efficient, satisfactory and fair disposal, and to take necessary
measures (within its competence) to address them (eg. a change in some
aspect o f Garda policy or practice, a change n some aspect o f Garda education
and training etc). Where the need for remedial action beyond the competence

 o f the Authority is identified, it will have a duty to bring the matter to the
attention o f the competent body with appropriate recommendations for actio n ,
o There is a broader issue o f whether the M inister’s current powers a n d
functions with respect to GSOC should vest in the Authority. As a
general principle, the M inister’s powers and functions should transfer-,
but there may be a separate need to reconsider the appropriateness o f
some o f those powers/functions

Relationship With Inspectorate
•

The Authority must have the power to request the Garda Inspectorate to
conduct an inquiry into any aspect o f the efficiency and/or effectiveness o f thie
Garda and its performance. The Inspectorate should be obliged to comply w ith
such a request in the absence o f reasonable grounds to decline. The
Inspectorate’s report consequent on such an inquiry should be submitted to th e
Authority and should normally be published.
o The Authority should meet regularly with the Inspectorate to keep
itself informed on the progress, contents and results o f Inspectorate
inquiries (not just those requested by the Authority)
o The M inister’s current powers and functions with respect to the
Inspectorate should vest in the Authority

Relationship with Local Joint Policing Committees
•

The Police Authority should maintain a dialogue with the local Committees,
inviting and considering their view on local policing issues.
o The Authority should subsume the powers and functions o f the
Minister with respect to the local Committees
o The Authority should host an annual meeting with the local
committees to discuss issues o f common interest and how they might
be addressed

Accountability of the Police Authority
•

The Authority should submit an annual report to the Oireachtas on the state o f
the Garda and the policing o f the State. This report must also address its own
performance in the exercise o f its powers and discharge o f its functions.
o The annual report should be debated in the Dail and in the Seanad
o The Authority chairperson etc should appear before the Joint
Committee on Justice etc every year to be questioned on the report and
related matters. This is without prejudice to an appearance before any
other committee, such as PAC.

The Broader Context
I w ould like to take this opportunity to make a separate, albeit related, point. The
problems currently associated with policing in this country cannot be addressed

 satisfactorily by ad hoc, piecemeal measures such as the establishment o f a Police
Authority, tinkering with the complaints procedure, a succession o f judicial inquiries
etc. W hat is needed is a comprehensive, considered, evidence-based and forwardlooking inquiry into all aspects o f policing in this country, ranging from what the
public (and sections o f the public) need and want from policing, through police
powers and procedures to all aspects o f poiice structure, organisation, methods
governance and accountability. The object must be to define a vision for Irish p o licin g
for the next fifty years, and to identify the joined up reforms that will be necessary t o
deliver on that vision; all bench-marked against international best practice relevant t o
a common law democracy based on the rule o f law situated firmly within the EU and.
in an increasingly diverse and globalised society.
The Patten Commission on the reform o f policing in Northern Ireland provides a
useful blueprint. The inquiry should be carried out by a Commission o f experts
embracing: senior police officers from other jurisdictions with a reputation for vision
and commitment to community based policing; academics in policing/criminal
justice; representatives from the legal, medical and social work professions; and
representatives from the business and economically and socially deprived
communities. The Commission should commission independent research on relevant
subjects, conduct hearings in all parts o f the community (eg. in community centres in
social housing areas), conduct focus group meetings across a wide range o f expert and
non-expert groups; and examine policing in other comparable jurisdictions abroad. Its
object should be to produce a report setting out a reasoned road map for
comprehensive police reform, written and presented in an accessible style for the
average layperson. The task for government should be to debate that road map
thoroughly in the Oireachtas and to implement it in its entirety subject only to
reasoned changes to reflect the Oireachtas debate.
The choice o f chairperson o f the Commission will be vital. I would suggest Maurice
Hayes or Maurice Manning.

I am happy to clarify and build on any aspect o f this orally or in writing.
Professor Dermot P.J. Walsh MRIA

 Justice Reform Unil
Dept o f Justice & Equality
51 St. Stephen’s Green
Dublin 2

27th May, 2014

Dear Sirs,
Re: Independent Policing Authority
I should like to make the following submissions:
• The Authority should be set up a.s.a.p.
• The Authority should have the overall control of the Garda Siochana
• No member of the Auth. should be a serving or recently serving member o f the Garda
Siochana [This includes the new Commissioner when elected].
• “Chair” and clear independence o f same, is paramount. W hilst there are many
worthwhile civil servants [especially retired], in view o f the Guerin Feport, such an
appointment would be a huge mistake and would lead to public distrust ab initio.
• Wh ilst most worthwhile people have political affiliations o f some sort, the “Chair”
should not be someone with party connections.
• As far as possible, the same restrictions should apply to other Auth. members.
• The Government should appoint the Auth. in the first instance b at it then should
answer to the Oireachtais, giving a report twice a year - more if required by either the
Oireachtais, or the Auth.
• Following the Guerin Report, nobody from the Dept, o f Justice & Equality should be
a member o f the Auth.
• The Minister o f Justice and Eq. should not be a member o f the Auth.
• Neither the said Minister, the Dept, o f J & E nor the Garda Commissioner should
have any form o f veto on the role/activities o f the Auth. [the Legislation unfortunately
gave a right o f veto to the Banks in relation to the insolvency arrangements - hence
the ongoing mess. Let us not repeat that mistake],
• The role and powers o f the GSOC should be strengthened, widened and reasonably
transparent, so that public confidence can reside in it.
• It should not use current members o f the Garda to investigate themselves.
• The culture o f loyalty as opposed to justice and truth as referred to in the Smithwick
Report must be tackled as a priority by the Auth. [very difficult].

 Submission on Independent Police Authority
Functions and responsibilities of a Policing Authority

The function of the Policing Authority should be to oversee the workings of the Police force both a-t local
and national level. They must ensure the needs and requirements of the community are served. Policing
Authority boards should exist at both at national and local level. The local/regional Policing Authority
should be responsible for policing in its area. If you reduce problems at local level, then you
automatically reduce the problems at national level. For this to work Police (An Garda Sfochana) m ust be
divided into regional forces. This will best serve the community and reduce the level of incompetence
and corruption.
It should be the responsibility of the Policing Authority to monitor the actions and behaviour of th e
Police. They should be in regular contact with the police at local level. The police in turn should report
and consult with the Policing Authority on an ongoing bases. The Policing Authority should be
responsible for promotions within the police.
Appointment and membership of the Authority

Political appointments should be outlawed.
The Policing Authority should be made ud of regional authorities. The national authority should be
maae up with a member of each of the regional authorities. The regional authority should be made up
of a group of seven to nine persons. Positions on the regional authority should be offered to groups
within the community, for instance, if a group is given authority to appoint one of their members. Then
it is the choice of that group whom their member shall be. The term of service on a Policing Authority
should be three years. No member can serve longer than two terms, at which time they must step down
and would not be eligible for re-election for a further three years. The authority would elect their own
officers. The chairperson position would rotate yearly. The financing of the authority would be done by
the group that has the privilege bf appointing a member. For instance, if the Farmers organisation had a
member on the regional authority it is up to the farmers to take care of their own member. This would
apply to all groups. Other groups whom could be considered to appoint a member could be: - The legal
profession, Farmers, Chamber of Commerce, Transport & Motoring groups, Charitv organisations,
Neighbourhood Watch, Vintners including Restaurant and night Club establishments.
Relationship with the Government and the Oireachtas

Relationship between the Government and the Policing Authority should be through the Minister
responsible for the reverent police force. If and when the Minister is unavailable contact should be
direct with the Taoiseach. Contact should not be controlled by the civil servants.
Any short comings by the police should be reported to the national Policing Authority, if a matter is
grave enough the local Policing Authority should go straight to the Minister. They should also work close
with the Garda Sfochana Ombudsman Commission.

 Inspectorate.

The Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) should have powers similar to their counterparts
in Northern Ireland. They should have the power to bring cases before the Courts without consulting
with senior Police members or civil servants.
The Garda Siochana Inspectorate should be disbanded.

Notes
Forming a Policing Authority in itself will not be enough to sort the problems of An Garda Siochana, to
achieve this objective you must first identify their problems.
An Garda Siochana are crumbling, yet, they have not been attacked by any outside force such as,
terrorism, gangland attack, negative media campaign, political interference or protests from the
taxpaying public. They are crumbling under the weight of their own corruption. Their problems have to
be fixed from within and time is running out. There are still good people within the force and they are
the ones that is keeping the organisation going.
There are five main problems with An Garda Siochana, they are badly trained, badly managed, badly
deployed, overall attitude and the method of commutation between the Garda and the Department of
Justice is seriously compromised.
Training

This is where most of them get off on the wrong foot. Young people enter the full of enthusiasm.
However, the training personal sometimes leave a lo tto be desired. There have been rumours over the
years of Garda members that misbehaved within the force where sent to Templemore as a punishment
and these are some of the personal involved in training. There are no rumours circulating that any Garda
member was such a good Garda that they were sent to become instructors. The training of young police
personal is something that will have to be overhauled. The introduction of outside expertise in the
training program will have to be seriously considered.
Management

The selection process for promotion within An Garda Siochana is not in keeping with best practice in
selecting managers. Middle or senior management are not selected on merit, it depends who you are
and whom you know. The Policing Authority should also be involved with the promotion and
appointment of senior Gardai.
Deployment

Police should be based in the area they know best. If you were to travel to any other place in Europe or
the USA and stop and speak to a policeman you will find he is from the area he services. The same
should apply here.

 Attitude

An Garda Siochana are too secretive, they fail to give accountability, nobody is responsible for anything,
their image is all important regardless of the consequence. Their attitude at the barracks counter I eaves
a lot to be desired. Just imagine, take any town in Ireland and go to the local Hotel and take the s ta ff
from behind reception and place them behind the counter in the Garda station. Now take the Gardai
from the Garda station and place them in the reception of the Hotel. The popularity and efficiency of the
Gardai would rise and the local Hotel would end up with little or no guests.
Garda and the Department of Justice

This is the area where most of the problems occur. Originally the DOJ were to monitor the Gardai ?and
keep them in line and oversee their performance. The DOJ were the only body that the Gardai had to
answer too. Over the years their situations changed. It transpired that the Gardai end up in the position
of dominance. This change took place over the past twenty years. When civil servants are moved v\#ilhin
the DOJ there is no training or standard to be achieved before they take up their new positions. This
created a situation whereby the civil servants were in a vulnerable position and open to manipulation.
Had the civil servants been stronger and better trained, then Donegal may never have happened. Today
you will find DOJ civil servants will turn automatically to the An Garda Siochana for direction in the«r
work because they have known no other way. This has to change.
Conclusion

There are many more examples of wrong doing and inefficiency I can tell you about and there are many
other suggestions I can make, but I do not know how serious you are about chance. If you wish to speak
to me I will make myself available. As a Farmer and a Businessman I have been dealing with the Ga rdai
over fifty years and I first called to the DOJ in the late seventies and dealing with you ever since.
You are welcome to the benefit of my experience if you want it.

 Justice Reform Unit,
Department of Justice and Equality,
51 St. Stephens Green
Dublin 2.

CONSULTATION PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT POLICING AUTHORITY.

When An Garda Siochana was established in

1922 it adopted the Royal Irish

Constabulary (R.I.C.) model of policing both operationally and administratively. T h e
Department o f Justice took over the oversight role and political responsibility which had
previously rested with the Chief Secretary in Dublin Castle and the Government in
London.
While this model of policing worked successfully in the early decades o f the State th e
dynamics o f policing and society have changed fundamentally in the intervening years.
A new model is required for the 21st century and we feel the Government decision to
establish an Independent Policing Authority and the appointment of the Commissioner b y
open competition is a step in the right direction. We believe it will enhance the delivery
of a 21st century policing service to the public and it will also restore confidence in A n
Garda Siochana and the morale of its membership.
During the last 10 years of recruitment (2000 - 2009) over two thirds of entrants had a
third level qualification.

There have been significant advances in training and

development at point o f entry and ongoing personal development at all levels. An Garda
Siochana have a well educated workforce with great potential. Yet the organization has
failed to capitalise on this valuable resource.
Significant problems also exist in tne organisation at management level and particularly
at senior management level. Many of the failures have arisen in part because of the value
system / culture o f the organisation. This value system manifests itself both overtly and

 covertly. Crucially the subliminal message will sunercede the official resulting i j i a
particular policy or initiative not getting traction on the ground thus fading.
Internally there has been a long-term concern regarding the political influences exerted
on the Garda organisation. O f late this perception and concern has increased and is n o w
also an external stakeholder concern. Specifically there is a concern over the political
influences in the areas of promotion, recruitment, transfers and allocations. There is a lso
a concern about the general political influence on how the organisation does its busines s.
This politicisation is perceived to take two forms; a direct external influence by
politicians and internally by senior Garda Officers. A key result o f this is the internal
belief that loyalty is valued and favoured over ability.
affected.

Morale is thus negatively

Highly qualified personnel are either passed over or are not presenting fo r

promotion or lateral movement. Both influences are detrimental to the effective and
efficient operation of the Garda Siochana.
In order to succeed the proposed Authority must be, and be seen to be independent o f all
inappropriate influences. Through robust oversight, the new Authority must ensure that
such politicisation which existed in the past has no place in An Garda Siochana in
the future. All appointments must be made on merit following open and transparent
competitions. The new Authority must be a buffer between An Garda Siochana and the
Government of the day.
Another contributory factor is that historically careerwise most of the senior management
team progressed through the Detective Branch or Administrative positions in Garda
Headquarters. This despite the fact that approximately 80% o f the service is employed in
uniform operational policing. Detective work tends to be rated more highly and the same
value is not placed on other competencies, which are required to manage and leaa a large
evolving organisation like An Garda Siochana. Crime fighters are lauded internally and
in the media. While this is understandable given the valuable work that they do and the
risks they take, it is critical that the organisation is aware that this is happening so that
others do not feel that their work is less valuable. The undervaluing of the operational
uniform Garda has to be reversed if reform is to succeed.

 It goes without saying that crime prevention and detection is the core business o f t h e
organisation. However a quality policing service cannot be delivered in the absence o f
good governance and if it is not led and managed ethically and in accordance with b e s t
practice.

It is imperative Human Resource management is advanced in line with b e s t

international practice in order to support operational policing. An Garda Sfochana h a v e
fallen behind most Government Departments / agencies in this area. New innovations in
the private sector must also be considered and where suitable adopted. It will be seen in
the section ‘Function and Responsibilities’ that many of the issues are HR related

We

see this as one o f the areas critical to the refonn o f An Garda Sfochana, the improvement
of morale internally and the promotion of public confidence.
Initially following the

enactment of the

Garda

Sfochana Act, 2005, there w as

significant development and review o f policies. However there has been little progress
in recent years. Reviews o f Policy and Procedures on Harassment, Sexual Harassment &
Bullying and the Employee Assistance Service, both o f which were commenced five
years ago have not yet been finalised. The resource of the Garda Reserve has not been
properly utilised due to the failure to roll out the new powers agreed following a
review, finalised three years ago.
performance management

system.

Limited progress has been made on delivering a
The Professional

Standards Unit which

w as

established following the Morris Tribunal has yet to reach its potential in ersuring that
good governance prevails. The recommendations o f the Patton Commission on Policing
insofar as they relate to An Garda Sfochana must be proactively addressed. Lateral entry
has not happened; only one secondment of a year’s duration to the P.S.N.I. has taken
place while exchanges have been reduced to a trickle.
If the organisation is to realise its full potential, it must focus on governance, manage the
critical issues for success in a modem organisation and allow for regeneration.
In conclusion the role o f the Authority must be to ensure the attainment of the Mission o f
An Garda Sfochana in accordance with the Legal, Ethical, Financial and Political
parameters o f the State.

 FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The Authority will have responsibility for circa 13,000 full time Garda members, 1,4-00
Garda Reserves and approximately 2,500 civilian staff. In particular we believe t h e
Authority must have responsibility for:1. Oversight of the strategic objectives and governance o f An Garda Siochana.
2. The

development

of

a

three

(3)

to

five (5) year

organisational

strategy in conjunction with the Garda Commissioner.
3. The development o f an annual Policing Plan and the establishment o f key policing
targets in consultation with the Garda Commissioner
4. Monitor Police performance against the Annual Plan and 3/5 year strategy.
5. The publishing of an Annual Report on Police Performance.
6. Holding to account the Commissioner on the operation and management o f tiie
Service.
7

Require the Commissioner to report on issues o f National importance and also
any matter critical to the good governance o f An Garda Siochana.

8. Report to the Oireachtas including presenting an Annual Report on Policing.
9. The establishment and allocation o f budgets.
10. The payment of salaries and other financial payments.
11. Oversight o f the provision of all infrastructure to support the delivery o f

a

policing service, e.g. I.T., Telecommunications, Transport, etc.
12. Following consultation with all stakeholders approve the opening or closing of
Stations.
13. Appointment (and dismiss if necessary) through open competition o f the Garda
Commissioner,

Deputy

Commissioner,

Assistant

Commissioners

and

all

comparable civilian positions in conjunction with T.L.A.C.

14. Oversight o f all promotion competitions from Sergeant to Chief Superintendent
inclusive, with the competitions being administered by the Public Appointments
Service. The role of the Promotion Advisory Council as established under the
Garda Siochana (Promotion) Regulations 2006 being subsumed by the new
Authority.

 15. The approval of promotions o f Superintendent rank and above.
16. Oversight of the discipline o f Assistant Commissions, Deputy Commissioners,
Commissioner and comparable civilian posts.
17. Oversight of the reform and regeneration of the Human Resources Department in
conjunction with the appointment of a civilian Executive Director o f Hum.an
Resources (Advertised May 2014).
18. Oversight of recruitment o f Garda trainees and civilian personnel together w ith
regular review o f entry criteria and selection methods.
19. Oversight of all training with particular emphasis on training at point o f entry.
2G. Oversight o f the delivery o f a training program on the principles

of

Human Rights, diversity and culture change.
21. Oversight of the development and delivery of a robust Performance Appraisal
system linked to the promotion process and lateral movement.
22. Oversight of the development and delivery of a Tenure Policy to obviate th e
possibility of staff remaining extensively long periods in specialist areas.
23. Oversight of a review of abstraction including sickness absence and th e
predominant causes o f long-term absences.
24. Review the Garda rank structure together with the operational structure.
25. Liaise with the Garda Staff Associations on the development and implementation
of Industrial Relations policies.
26. Carry out research on optimum Garda numbers and deployment together with
similar research in respect of each of the promoted posts.
27. The holding of a biennial convention on Policing (similar to the Convention on
the review o f the Constitution).
28. Liaise with the Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission.
29. Require the Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) to provide
quarterly reports on complaints received and outcomes.

 APPOINTMENT AND MEMBERSHIP.
The ordinary members o f the Authority should be selected from as wide a spectrum o r
society as possible and must include representatives o f community groups, voluntary
organisations, business, trade unions, legal profession and experts in policing. They m u st
also have the expertise to set policy priorities and audit the management of resources,
delivery of service including community engagement, human rights and diversity. T h e
Chairperson to be appointed by the Government and must be an eminent person o f h ig h
standing.

RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT AND THE OIREACHTAS,
The Authority should continue to report to the Minister for Justice and Equality who w ill
report to the Government and the Oireachtas.

It will also report to the Oireacntas

Committee on Justice and other Oireachtas Committees as requested. They must also la y
an Annual Report before both houses of the Oireachtas.

IMPLICATIONS FOR GARDA SIOCHANA OMBUDSMAN COMMISSION AND
GARDA INSPECTORATE
The functions o f the. Garda

Siochana Ombudsman Commission

(GSOC)

should

remain as enacted under the Garda Siochana Act, 2005, subject to the outcome o f the
current review. They will continue to report to the Minister for Justice and Equality.
Under the new dispensation it is suggested that in order to achieve maximum value from
the work of the Inspectorate and a streamlined administration they should report directly
to the Authority. The powers that are currently vested in the Minister for Justice and
Equality under the Garda Siochana Act, 2005, to order an enquiry to be conducted by the
Inspectorate in the public interest or to examine or enquire on matters which contribute to
the Efficiency and Effectiveness of An Garda Siochana in fulfilling it mission should in
the interest of depoliticisation be transferred to the new Authority. Also arising from
their oversight and governance role, we believe the Authority will be best placed to order
such an enquiry. The Chief Inspector or a representative should be a member of the new
Authority.

 Government Consultation on Justice Reform - Proposal to establish an
independent Policing Authority
Submission of Dr Vicky Conway (BCL, LLM, MSSc), Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Kent, Author
of The Blue Wall o f Silence: The M oiris Tribunal and Police Accountability in the Republic o f Ire la n d
(2010) and Policing Twentieth Century Ireland (2013).

"We are at a defining moment in the history of the policing service, a moment at which th e
principles of accountability, transparency and professionalism must be at the core of a
strong, confident and connected policing service and at which such principles must be seen
to be at the core of everything we do in order that we are trusted and valued by the public
we serve." Acting Commissioner O'Sullivan, Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and
Equality, 29 May 2014
Any effort to establish "an independent Policing Authority, which is appropriate to Ireland's needs
and which will maintain appropriate democratic accountability to the Oireachtas" needs to be
embedded in an understanding of the weaknesses in policing structures in Ireland, both internal and
external to the organisation. If we do not engage in such an assessment then any mechanism
created cannot be expected to solve any problems, as it is not created with those in mind. The role
which such a body can play in remedying those weaknesses must then be accurately gauged, based
on existing evidence and research which can aid sucn decisions.
In this submission I will argue that to achieve an understanding of the weaknesses a Patten style
commission should be undertaken. Only then can a full sense of the issues be accumulated. Without
it we are simply reacting to individual incidents and as we have seen from the Morris Tribunal, for
instance, we cannot then fully address the problems.
If government is not inclined to proceed with such a Commission it is essential that existing evidence
and research both from Ireland and abroad is considered in detail. What my research has led me to
conclude is that there are three core aspects of Irish policing which need to be addressed:
1. Governance
2. Accountability
3. Police Culture
An independent Policing Authority, in line with the recommendations I will make below, can directly
contribute to 1 and 2 and can be one element in beginning reform of 3. To this end it is imperative
that it is understood that events over the last number of decades have indicated serious deficiencies
caused by the nature of police culture in Ireland and unless this is appreciated and addressed on an
on-going basis any improvements created by a policing authority will be short-lived.
In what follows I will begin by using existing research to define what I mean by the above terms. I
will then consider the known failings in regards to these in Ireland. Next I will move to the specifics

 of the type of policing authority I would propose in terms of function, appointment, membership,
relationship to government and the Oireachtas as well as to existing bodies such as the Garda
Siochana Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) and the Garda Siochana Inspectorate (the Inspectorate). I
will also suggest that the relationship to an Garda Siochana also needs adequate considaration.
Definitions

The police have exceptional and unique powers in society: powers to invade our privacy through
searches, powers to deprive us of our liberty through detention, powers to demand answers to
questions that no one else can and powers to achieve some of these things by force if necessary.
Weber wrote that the defining feature of the police is that they have the monopoly on che legitimate
use of force in society.
Not only this, but the police have discretion in how they use those powers. A garda on the street
makes a decision to stop and question one individual or another, to stop one car or another, to
arrest and individual or not, to use force in arresting that person or not. We can issue regulations
and guidance on how those powers should be used but often those decisions are made in
circumstances where the only person who sees what decision is made is the member of the public
affected by it. In some respects this is desirable: we would not want a society where police apply the
law strictly tn every circumstance, but this inherent discretion means that accountability is also
necessary. Members of the police, politicians and the public generally needs to accept that
accountability is not a negative feature but is part of and parcel of ensuring that we have a police
service that does its job well and which the public can trust.
It is imperative in these discussions to distinguish between governance and accountability of the
police. Walsh and Conway have written that governance
"can be defined broadly as encompassing the procedures and methods aimed at ensuring
the efficient discharge of the policing function... includes key management issues such as:
policy formation & implementation, the determination of priorities S strategies; deployment
choices; the allocation of resources; the maintenance of standards; & internal discipline...
associated with the promotion of values such as transparency, responsiveness & the
maintenance of professional, ethical & human rights standards in policing... the instruments
and processes of governance can be used to deploy the police as a tool of repression, and
ultimately as the facilitator of a police state."
Accountabilitv, we wrote, comprises
"all procedures and methods which can be deployed to render an individual police officer,
and the police authority as whole, answerable to another person or body whether that
person or body is located inside or outside the oolice force in question." (Walsh & Conway,
2011)
Bowling and Foster contend that accountability:
"...involves a duty to account for actions taken, to explain them, and for the police to be
cooperative with an external, independent authority and ultimately with the wider
community" (2002:1015).
One might say that governance determines what the police do, when and why (a control element),
while accountability responds when questions arise as to what the police, either individually or
collectively, did (an explanation element). Some scholars see aspects of governance as bound up in
accountability. These twin elements are represented in Chan's (1999) outline of two 'competing

 meanings' of accountability when discussing the police; (i) controlling the police and (ii) demanding
explanations for behaviour and actions. Wnen discussions of accountability were most prominent in
the UK, in the 1980s, commentators took extreme views on which was appropriate. Lusigarten, in
his seminal work, The Governance o f Police (1986), linked accountability directly with control. For
him, it centres on how political institutions manage to govern the police and so accountability (or
control) is achieved through the tripartite system, in the work of the police authorities and the Home
Secretary with the Chief Constable (1986,113). What we can take from this review of the literatu re
is that any system put in place needs to combine but controlling and explanatory elements.1
The Patten Commission (1999) outlined five forms which accountability should take (democratic
accountability, transparency, legal accountability, financial accountability and internal
accountability) which between them, it is hoped, would incorporate the twin elements of control
and explanation, and deliver a robust framework of accountability.
There is one other factor to be borne in mind in any discussion such as this: police culture. In all
democratic countries it is well documented that, like other occupations, police services develop
occupational subcultures. Manning defines the police sub-culture as 'accepted practices, rules and
principles of conduct that are situationally applied, and generalized rationales and beliefs' (1989:
360) while Chan defines it as 'a layer of informal occupational norms and values operating under the
apparently rigid hierarchical structure of police organisations' (1999:43). Reiner discusses how it
applies: 'Cop culture has developed as a patterned set of understandings that help officers cope w ith
and adjust to the pressures and tensions confronting the police' (2000:87). Policing is a difficult jo b
and this culture and the values and norms associated with it can help people to deal with the stress
of the occupation. Reiner's work shows how certain values tend to be universal to this culture, such
as machismo, conservatism, stereotyping, a sense of mission, pragmatism and racial prejudice. While
the culture can help people deal with the job it has alsc been found to influence how police apply
their discretion, use their powers, and engage with accountability mechanisms. For this reason, any
effort aimed at improving democratic policing must engage with this culture and limit its negative
impact.
C o n te x t

It would not be an exaggeration to state that there is something of a crisis in Irish policing at present,
though it could be debated whether that crisis relates to governance, accountability or public
confidence. I have written, as others have also warned, that this has been building. It is not
necessary to rehash the numerous incidents which have generated concern, if not scandal but it
should be stated it is likely that there are many other incidents which have not come to light. There
are many dissatisfied people who have not managed to find a voice to argue their corner, people
who have their own stories of police misconduct in Ireland, What we know to have happened is in
no way all that has happened. Only an open, independent Commission on Policing could hope to
come close to appreciating the full scale of police misconduct and thereby understand all the ills of
policing in Ireland. The aftermath of the Morris Tribunal has hopefully taught us that piecemeal
reform triggered by one scandal will not cure all ills.
I maintain that there are a number of legacies in Irish policing which need to be faced and welcomed
into any discourse on policing: the legacy of colonialism and the legacy of the Troubles. For full
1 There is much more that could be discussed about the powers of the police, accountability and the nature of
society. How this all applies in the context of Ireland was the subject of my PhD thesis: Breaking Down the
Thick Blue Wall: A Socio-Historical Analysis of Police Accountability in the Republic of Ireland (2008) Queen's
University Belfast. I arrr happy to supply an electronic copy, if desired.

 details of this argument I encourage reading of Policing Twentieth Century Ireland but I contend t hat
both have shaped the nature of policing in Ireland in ways that we need to acknowledge if we a re to
move forward. Some of the consequences of these legacies are:
A reticence to welcome a critical attitude to policing and police use of powers. Politically, in
particular, there has been an attitude that it is disloyal to question the police. It should b e
accepted that it is disloyal to both the police and society not to question the police. As was
stated by the Patten Commission: "accountability places limitations on the power of the
police but it should also give that power legitimacy and ensu-e its effective use in the service
of the community" (1.13).
Relatedly, when problems are accepted, they are defined as the result of rotten apples.
There needs to be acceptance that apples don't rot without a problem in the barrel.
Political control of policing. The impact of this is complex, but at its most base it means th a t
political considerations may over-ride what is best for democratic policing.
Cultural problems with policing, most worryingly I content, the scale of violence and use o f
force, abuse of interrogation problems, the position of the Special Branch, internal attitudes
to accountability, and as evidence is emerging of late, racism (see Carr and Haynes, 2013).
Difficult and dangerous working conditions for gardai, contributing to low morale.
Governance in Irisn policing is achieved through a linear mechanism: the Garda Commissioner wo H<s
directly under the Minister for Justice. The Inspectorate may offer guidance but it's views are not
binding. Accountability is achieved in a number of ways: internal discipline, through the Dail, through
GSOC or through the courts either through the dismissal of evidence in criminal cases or through
civil actions taken against the police.
In the United Kingacm a different approach is taken. The Police Act 1964 instituted the tri-partite
system of governance, which in effect reflects a separation of powers approach to police
governance. For each force in England and Wales a triumvirate exists between the Home Secretary,
the Chief Constable and the Police and Crime Commissioner (or Police Authority until November
2012). In Northern Ireland the Policing Board sits instead of the PCC. Each of the three has certain
powers and dunes in respect of policing, ensuring that no one member has too much control at any
one time. By no means is this a perfect system and evidence abounds of police misconduct in
England and Wales in particular. What we do see however, is much less political control of policing.
Further, as was stated earlier these mechanisms cannot solve all problems: accountability
mechanisms and police culture also have to be addressed. As Loftus, among others, has shown,
police culture remains a substantial problem in England and shortcomings of the Independent Police
Complaints Commission have been well documented.
If taken as a model of good police governance, and thereby just one of three factors to be improved,
this separation of powers could have many substantial benefits for Ireland. I shall now consider the
specifics of how this might look.
Fu n c tio n :

The statement as regards the public consultation describes the proposed body as a Policing
Authority. This raises ab initio the question of remit. Will such an authority cover all bodies that
engage in policing functions e.g. members of the private security industry? It is submitted that for
the time being the Authority should he limited in remit to the Garda Siochana, as the scale of change
involved may be managed better if its remit is limited for now to the police service of the country.

 The functions of the Policing Authority should relate to both governance and accountability, in effe ct
I propose transferring much of what is currently the roie of the Minister for Justice as regards
policing to this body. Specifically:2
The Policing Authority should be required to:
(a) secure the maintenance of an Garda Siochana,
(b) secure that an Garda Siochana is efficient and effective.
These would complement the stated functions of the Inspectorate to ensure both bodies would t>e
working towards the same goal. The Policing Authority should be required to hold the Garda
Commissioner to account for the exercise of—
(a) the functions of the Garda Commissioner,3and
(b) the functions of persons under the direction and control of the Commissioner.
The primary function of the Commissioner should continue to be to direct and control the force and
s/he should continue to have ODerational independence in the performance ot that function.
To achieve these functions, the Authority should set 3-5 year policing plans for the nation, taking
into account any targets or priorities set by the Minister for Justice/Government of the day. In line
with that long term plan, the Commissioner should then develop an annual policing plan to be
approved and adopted by the Authority. It should then monitor performance of an Garda Siochana
against but the long term and annual plans.
The budget allocated to the Commissioner to achieve that plan should be determined by the
Authority in negotiation with the relevant government departments, ana funded by government.
The Authority should have responsibility for the appointment of the Commissioner, on the approval
of the Government. Serious consideration should also be given to giving the Authority the power to
appoint Assistant and Deputy Commissioners. The Authority should have the power to, in the
interests of the efficiency and effectiveness of the service (i.e. in line with it's functions) request the
Commissioner to retire. The Minister should be able to request the Authority to make this request.
On this vein, the Authority should have disciplinary capacity in relation to the most senior members
of the service.
One issue which will need to be separately addressed is that of national security. The two viable
options here seem to be to either transfer matters relating to national security to an alternative
agency (Mulqueen, 2012) or to reserve certain matters from the purview of the Authority. In the
interests of democratic accountability, however, what is considered a matter of national security
should be as limited as possible.
A p p o in t m e n t / m e m b e r s h ip

Broad, democratic membership is key to the success of an independent policing authority. As was
felt by the Patten Commission a majority of elected members (i.e. TDs) will gi»e the authority that
legitimate, democratic position. An Authority of 17 or 19 members would be appropriate with 8 or 9
being TDs. The Authority will also, through it's work, be supporting a large organisation, one with

2 Much o f this draws on the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 of Engiana and Wales as well as
the report of the Patten Commission.
3 As outlined primarily is s.26 of the Garda Siochana Act 2005.

 significant legislative and human rights obligations. To this end it should draw on expertise existing
in Irish society. Thus the balance of membership should come from different walks of Irish life
including, business, community, charity, NGO, academic, legal profession and so on. Appointmen ts
should be determined by the Minister for Justice and a diversity that represents the cultural mix o f
society should be achieved. All positions should be held for a period of 4 years and a chair should be
elected by the membership of the Authority. The English approach of a directly elected Police and
Crime Commissioner is not advised as this would, it is submitted, reinsert politics into the heart o f
police governance and accountability.
Full transparency of the Authority should be considered key with as much of its work made publicly
available as possible.
R e la tio n ship to G o v e r n m e n t and th e O ire a c h ta s

Under the proposals contained herein, a triumvirate would be created between the Minister for
Justice, the Police Authority and the Garda Commissioner. Each would have their individual function
in respective of policing, leading to the transfer of many of the current powers of the Minister to the
Authority. The relationship between the Authority and Government would then be one of
collaboration, working together to achieve an efficient and effective police service.
Re la tio n ship w ith G S O C and th e In sp e c to ra te

In this new scenario envisaged by the creation of the Authority both GSOC and the Inspectorate
would play invaluable roles. Amendments to the legislation for GSOC are necessary4 as are
relationship between GSOC and an Garda Siochana. The Authority would not have the capacity to
consider individual complaints and so some such body is essential. In addition an Inspectorate is
essential for the assessment of garda practices and procedures (promotions being one that may be
in need of immediate consideration). Indeed, if anything consideration should be given to the
expansion of its remit in order to conduct examination and inspections of individual police stations
with the aim of ensuring efficient and effective policing.
Fu rth e r Points fo r C o n sid e ra tio n

As Iceland is a national police force consideration should perhaps be given to some form of
consultative board to exist at the divisional level which could then feed into the work of the Policing
Authority. As the District Policing Partnerships in Northern Ireland these could hold monthly public
meetings (Brunger, 2011) to enhance the democratic nature of police governance and accountability
at the local level. This would, in my view, be in addition to the existing Joint Policing Committees.
The past decade has undoubtedly been a difficult one for the majority of members in an Garda
Siochana. In the wake of the Morris Tribunal swathes of reforms were introduced and swiftly
imposed on the service, in addition to the toll of the recession and its resource and financial
repercussions. As can be learned from the experience of substantial reform in Northern Ireland great
care needs to be taken to lead the members of the service positively through any further changes
(Murphy, 2013). Those with experience in change management, particularly in police organisations
should be consulted on how best this should be approached.
While it is beyond the remit of this consultation I wish to reiterate the need to consider how bestto
reform the culture of the members of an Garda Siochana. Research should be commissioned to fully

4 See further my published work on the Garda Ombudsman Commission and a forthcoming chapter in the
book Defining Events (Manchester University Press, 2014).

 understand that culture so that evidence led policies can be implemented in order to begin the
difficult process of altering that culture for the better.
C o n c lu s io n s

For those with the capacity to reform policing in Ireland, my primary call would be for the creatic n of
a Patten style commission which would conduct a thorough review of policing in Ireland, listening; to
all those with views to express. This would help us tc understand fully what works and what does
not work in Irish policing.
There can be no doubt that an empowered, independent Authority has the capacity to depoliticiscd
policing in Ireland and make a substantive contribution to the governance and accountability of
policing in Ireland. A unique opportunity presents itself, where there is broad agreement on the
need to reform policing. Ar, Authority which is not given specific powers such as the setting of
policing plans, the determining of budgets and the appointment of the Commissioner, could on th e
other hand be a retrograde step for Irish policing. In that scenario we create the semblance of
independence and accountability without the reality, just as was done with the creation of GSOC in
the last decade. That would be a disservice to Irish society and to the members of an Garda
Siochana.

 B iblio graphy

Bowling, B. & Foster, J (2002) "Policing and the Police" in Maguire, Morgan & Reiner, eds., The
Oxford Handbook o f Criminology, 4th ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brunger, M (2011) "Governance, accountability and neighbourhood policing in Northern Ireland:
analysing the role of public meetings" Crime, Law and Social Change, Volume 55 (2-3), pp 105-120
Carr, J and Haynes, A (2013) "A Clash of Racialisations: The Policing of'Race' and of Anti-Muslim
Racism in Ireland", Critical Sociology
Chan, J (1999) "Governing Police Practice: Limits of the New Accountability", British Journal o f
Sociology, 50(2) p. 251.

Conway V and Walsh, D (2011) "Recent Developments in Police Governance and Accountability in
Ireland" Crime, Law and Social Change, 55(2-3), pp 241-57
Conway, V (2009) "A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing? Evaluating the Impact of the Garda Siochana
Ombudsman Commission" Irish Jurist, 43 pp 109-30
Conway, V (20l0) The Blue Wall o f Silence: The Morris Tribunal and Police Accountability in the
Republic o f Ireland, Irish Academic Press
Conway, V (2013) Policing Twentieth Century Ireland: A History o f an Garda Siochana, Routledge
Press.
Conway, V (2014) "All that shimmers is not gold: An Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission and
garda accountability" in Dukelow and Meade, (eds) Defining Events: Power; Resistance and Identity
in Twenty-First Century Ireland, forthcoming Manchester University Press
Lustgarten, L. (1986) The Governance o f the Police, London: Sweet & Maxwell.
Manning, P. (1977) Police Work: The Social Organisation o f Policing, Boston: MIT Press.
Mulqueen, M (2010) Re-evaluating Irish National Security Policy: Affordable Threats? Manchester
University Press
Murphy, J.(2013) Policing fo r peace in Northern Ireland: Change, conflict and community confidence,
Palgrave Macmillan
Patten, C (1999) The Report o f the Independent Commission on Policing fo r Northern Ireland,
London:HMSO.
Reiner, R. (2000) The Politics o f the Police, 3rd Ed, Oxford: OUP.
Walsh, D and Ccnway. V (2011) "Police Governance and Accountability: An Overview of Current
Issues" Crime, L a w and Social Change, 55(2-3) pp 61-86

 Response of the Irish Council for Civil Liberties
(ICCL)
to the Public Consultation
on Establishing an Independent Policing Authority

30 May 2014

 About the Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL)
The Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL) is Ireland's leading in d ep en d en t
hum an rights w atchdog, which m onitors, educates and cam paigns in ord er to
secure full enjoym ent of hum an rights for everyone.
Founded in 1976 by Mary Robinson and others, th e ICCL has played a leading
role in som e of the m ost successful hum an rights cam paigns in Ireland. These
have included cam paigns resulting in the establishm ent of the Garda Siochana
O m budsm an Commission, the legalisation of the right to divorce, m ore effective
protection of children's rights, the decrim inalisation of hom osexuality and
introduction of enhanced equality legislation.
We believe in a society th a t p rotects and prom otes hum an rights, justice and
equality.
W hat w e do:
Advocate for positive changes in the area of hum an rights;
M onitor G overnm ent policy and legislation to m ake sure th a t it complies w ith
international standards;
Conduct original research and publish rep o rts on issues as diverse as equal
rights for all families, the right to privacy, police reform and judicial
accountability;
Run cam paigns to raise public and political aw areness of hum an rights, justice
and equality issues;
W ork closely w ith o th er key stakeholders in th e hum an rights, justice and
equality sectors.

For fu rth er inform ation contact:
Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL)
9-13 Blackhall Place
Dublin 7
Tel: +353 1 799 4504
Email: info@iccl.ie
W ebsite: www.iccl.ie

 1. Introduction
Since its foundation in 1976, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL) has
cam paigned consistently for a m ore accountable and hum an rights com pliant
police service.
In 2006, it produced the re p o rt "Implementing Morris, An Agenda for Change;
Placing Human Rights at the Core of Policing in Ireland" in which it called for the
creation of an in d ep en d en t policing au th o rity to provide civic oversight of
policing in Ireland.
For the p a st eight years, the ICCL has been re p re se n te d on the Garda
Com m issioner's Strategic Human Rights Advisory Com m ittee (SHRAC), on which
it serves as an in d ep en d en t m em ber alongside th e Equality Authority, the Irish
Human Rights Commission, A m nesty International (Irish Section) and senior
operational m em bers of An Garda Siochana. M atters on w hich the ICCL has
provided advice to SHRAC include: th e developm ent of a hum an rights
m onitoring fram ew ork and auditing tools; train in g and developm ent and hum an
rights proofing of policy and practice.
The ICCL w elcom es the opportun ity to contribute to this public consultation on
establishing an in d ep en d en t policing authority, a developm ent th a t it considers
is long overdue.

2. Options for the establishm ent of an in d ep en d en t Policing A uthority
a. Functions and responsibilities
W hat is m issing from c u rre n t Garda oversight stru ctu res is civic oversight in the
form of an in d ep en d en t policing authority. The new au th o rity should have an
oversight role on issues including the allocation of Garda contracts, m anagem ent
perform ance, the setting of clear perform ance goals to which the Com m issioner
w ould be accountable on an annual basis, and the ap p o in tm en t of senior Garda
officers, up to and including the Commissioner.
Once established, the policing au th o rity should play a role in setting priorities
and m onitoring com pliance w ith hum an rights principles. The authority, w ith the
in p u t and consultation of the Comm issioner, should also draw up the strategic
and annual policing plans. Further, th e Com m issioner should be held
accountable by the authority for the perform ance of his or h er functions in
accordance w ith the strategic and annual policing plans.

 b. A ppointm ent and m em bership
If it is to b reak the historic cycle of unw holesom e M inisterial influence on
policing, Ireland's new policing au th o rity m u st be fully independent. This m eans
th a t particular attention should be paid to th e appointm ents process and to the
qualities th a t authority m em bers will bring to the role.
A tra n s p a re n t and fully in d ep en d en t recru itm en t process should be used to
app o in t the m em bers of the authority. This should go beyond m erely calling for
expressions of in te re st and preferably should be conducted by the Public
A ppointm ents Service (PAS). Following the m odel proposed in the Irish Human
Rights and Equality Commission Bill 2014,1 the relev an t M inister should be
obliged to recom m end candidates proposed by PAS to the G overnm ent for
ap p ointm ent and the m em bers should be form ally appointed by the P resid en t of
Ireland, after a resolution of both Houses of the Oireachtas.
In line w ith the approach adopted in Scotland, the ICCL considers it is essential
th a t only p ersons w ho genuinely have skills and expertise relev an t to the
functions of the authority be appointed to it.2 Subject to th a t caveat, m em bership
should be diverse and draw n from a cross-section of society, including the
public, private and not-for-profit sectors. A p articu lar effort should be m ade to
encourage applications from m em bers of vulnerable or disadvantaged groups
w ith a direct in te re st in the im provem ent of existing policing practices.
The Council considers th a t it w ould be preferable if the new au th o rity w ere to
consist exclusively of in d ep en d en t m em bers (as is the case in Scotland) ra th e r
than a m ixture of in d ep en d en t m em bers and politicians nom inated by th eir
parties / groupings (as is the case in N orthern Ireland). The Policing Board of
N orthern Ireland was established in a very p articu lar historical political context
th a t is n o t replicated in this jurisdiction and th e ICCL considers th a t political
engagem ent w ith policing is b e st retain ed w ithin existing O ireachtas stru ctu res
(see section c. below).
c. Relationship w ith th e D epartm ent of Justice, G overnm ent and the
O ireachtas
To ensure th a t the new policing au th o rity will play its p a rt in addressing som e of
the system ic dysfunctions identified by Sean Guerin SC in his recen t re p o rt,3 it
will be essential th a t its relationship w ith the D epartm ent of Justice be robust.
1 See section 13 of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Bill 2014.
2 See section 2(2) of P a rt 1 of Schedule 1 of th e Police and Fire Reform (Scotland)
Act 2012.
3 R eport by Mr Sean Guerin SC on a Review of th e Action Taken by An Garda
Siochana Pertaining to Certain A llegations Made by Sergeant M aurice McCabe.
Available at: h ttp ://w w w .m e rrio n stre e t.ie /w p -c o n te n t/u p lo a d s/2 0 1 4 /0 5 /F in a lR edacted-G uerin-R eport1.pdf

 The ICCL considers th a t the ongoing review of th e ex ten t to w hich the
D epartm ent of Justice is fit for purpose should consider explicitly w hich pow ers
and functions currently vested in the Garda Policy Division of the D epartm ent
should be tra n sfe rre d to the authority.
As regards the authority's relations w ith G overnm ent / the M inister for Justice,
the ICCL considers th a t the autho rity should take the place of the M inister in
exercising equivalent pow ers to those currently contained in Section 20(1) and
(2) of the Garda Act 2005 Act (setting ou t “p rio rities” for th e Gardai in
perform ing its functions; establishing “perform ance ta rg e ts” for the
Com m issioner) and in Section 21 of th a t Act (receiving “strateg y statem e n ts”
from the Com m issioner for approval). S tatutory references to the Garda
Com m issioner being obliged to take account of “relev an t governm ent policy”
should be excised from the 2005 Act.
The new authority's relationship w ith the O ireachtas should take place w ithin
existing parliam entary oversight stru ctu res. The au th o rity should p re se n t its
annual re p o rt to the O ireachtas Joint Committee on Justice, Defence & Equality,
to which it m ight be invited, from tim e-to-tim e, to outline its key priorities,
objectives and related strategies. The use of the resources of th e au th o rity
should be overseen by th e Oireachtas Committee of Public Accounts, w ith the
Chair of the au thority or its Chief Executive being appointed as accounting officer
for th a t purpose.
d. Im plications for the Garda Siochana O m budsm an Commission
(GSOC) and the Garda Siochana Inspectorate
Ireland is one of a small num ber of jurisdictions fortunate enough to enjoy a
system of in d ep en d en t investigation of com plaints against the police. However,
although the Garda Act 2005 (P arts 3 and 4) places GSOC on a solid legal footing,
aspects of GSOC's pow ers have proven problem atic to operate in practice.
The ICCL considers th a t the capacity of GSOC to contribute to the prevention of
future Garda m isconduct w ould be enhanced if section 106 of the Garda Act 2005
w ere to be am ended to p erm it the O m budsm an Commission to carry o u t review s
of practices, policies or procedures on its own initiative, ra th e r th an solely a t the
M inister's behest.
A nother significant gap in GSOC's pow ers is that, a t present, it is precluded by
section 87(3)(a) of the 2005 Act from carrying ou t investigations into “a
com plaint in so far as it relates to the general direction and control of th e Garda
Siochana by the Garda C om m issioner”. In view of the ICCL, re c en t events am ply
dem onstrate the need to end this exclusion of the Garda Com m issioner from the
investigative m andate of GSOC.
P a rt 5 of the Garda Act 2005 establishes th e Garda Siochana Inspectorate.
Although the Inspectorate has produced som e very useful rep o rts, it is n o t an
in d ep en d en t body w ith the requisite pow ers to com pel com pliance w ith its
recom m endations on b e st practice.

 As section 117(2) of the 2005 Act m akes clear, th e functions of the Inspectorate
are:
“(a) in furtherance of its objective to carry out, at the request or with the consent of the Minister,
inspections or inquiries in relation to any particular aspects of the operation and administration
of the Garda Si'ochana,
(b) to submit to the M inister—
(i) a report on those inspections or inquiries, and
(ii) if required by the Minister, a report on the operation and adm inistration of the Garda
Si'ochana during a specified period and on any significant developments in that regard during
that period,
and
(c) to provide advice to the Minister with regard to best policing practice.”

In o th er w ords, as currently constituted, th e Garda Inspectorate is a creatu re of
the M inister. The ICCL recognises the exceptionally high calibre of the
international policing experts w ho have w orked for the Garda Inspectorate b u t
considers that, in future, the Inspectorate's policing oversight functions w ould be
b e tte r allocated to GSOC and to an in d ep en d en t policing authority.
Once GSOC has been granted the pow er, on its own initiative, to conduct review s
of practices, policies and procedures, this asp ect of th e Inspectorate's w o rk could
be allocated to the O m budsm an Commission. Any residual aspects of th e cu rren t
ad v iso ry /o v ersig h t role of the Inspectorate could th en be assum ed by th e new
policing authority.

3.

Recom m endations

The ICCL recommends that:
-

an independent policing authority be established, with the following
functions:
o

o
o
o

-

an oversight role in the allocation of Garda contracts;
management performance and the setting of clear
performance goals to which the Commissioner would be held
accountable;
supervise the appointment of senior Garda officers, up to and
including the Garda Commissioner;
set priorities and monitor compliance of An Garda Siochana in
accordance with human rights principles;
in consultation with the Garda Commissioner, draw up
strategic and annual policing plans.

a transparent and fully independent recruitment process be used to
appoint the members of the authority;

 -

only persons who genuinely have skills and expertise relevant to the
authority be appointed to it; subject to this caveat, membership to
be diverse and drawn from a cross section of society, including
public, private and not-for-profit sectors. A particular effort be made
to encourage applications from members of vulnerable or
disadvantaged groups;

-

the ongoing review of the extent to which the Department of Justice
is fit for purpose consider explicitly which powers and functions
currently vested in the Garda Policy Division are to be transferred to
the independent policing authority;

-

the policing authority assume equivalent powers to those currently
vested in the Minister by virtue of sections 20 and 21of the Garda Act
2005;

-

the authority's relationship with the Oireachtas take place within
existing parliamentary oversight structures, with an information
link to the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Justice, Defence & Equality
and an accounting connection to the Oireachtas Committee of Public
Accounts;

-

GSOC be empowered, on its own initiative, to conduct reviews of
policing practices, policies and procedures and assume the
analogous review functions of the Garda Inspectorate;

-

the Garda Inspectorate, which is not an independent body, be
abolished and any residual aspects of its current advisory/oversight
role be allocated to the new policing authority.

 Submission of IHREC (Designate) to the
Cabinet SubCommittee on Justice on the
Establishment of an Independent Policing
Authority
May 2014

IHRCi
AN COIMISIUN UM CHEARTAAN DUINE

I

THE EQUALITY AUTHORITY
AN tUDARAS COMHlOMANNAI^

 1)

The Irish Human Rights Commission (“IHRC”) was established pursuant to the Human
Rights Commission 2000. Its functions include reviewing the adequacy and
effectiveness of law and practice in the State relating to the protection of human rights
and making recommendations to Government thereon. The Irish Human Rights and
Equality Commission Bill 2014 envisages the merger of the Equality Authority and the
IHRC into a single enhanced body whose functions will include the functions of
reviewing law and practice and making recommendations to Government thereon.

2)

The IHREC (Designate) welcomes the opportunity to make the present written
Submission to the Department of Justice and Equality and welcomes the commitment
by Government for the establishment of an independent Policing Authority.

3)

Accountability in the policing structure of the State has been a significant theme in the
work of the IHRC since its inception and a number of policy statements and legislative
observations have been published which underline the importance of a human rights
compliant police service in the State.1 This is unsurprising given the IHRC’s genesis in
the Good Friday Agreement and the influence of the Patten Report and attendant
policing reforms introduced in Northern Ireland. The principle of equivalence of rights
North and South is a key principle in the Good Friday Agreement.

4)

Significantly, the IHRC commissioned a substantial piece of research by Professor
Dermot Walsh in relation to human rights and An Garda Siochana, which was
published as a book in 2009 entitled Human Rights and Policing in Ireland: Law Policy
and Practice. Many of the issues examined in that book, and previous contributions on
policing matters by the IHRC, have relevance to the matters being considered in the
context of developing an independent Policing Authority.

5)

The IHRC and its sister body, the Equality Authority, are represented on the Strategic
Human Rights Advisory Committee of An Garda Siochana (“SHRAC”), which is
chaired by an Assistant Garda Commissioner. The establishment of SHRAC is part of
the efforts of An Garda Siochana to incorporate and mainstream human rights and
equality protections in the policies and procedures of the organisation. The IHRC and
the Equality Authority also engage in training o f Gardai, although this is not as yet
formalised in the Garda training curriculum.

1 See for instance, A proposal for a New Garda Complaints System, IH R C, December 2002;
Observations on the Scheme o f the Garda Siochana Bill 2003, IH R C , November 2003; Observations on
the Scheme o f the Garda Siochana Bill, 2003, IH R C , February 2004; Policy Statement: Human Rights
Compliance o f An Garda Siochana, IH R C, April 2009.
2 Human Rights and Policing in Ireland, Walsh, Dermot, Clarus Press, 2009.

 6)

II.

This submission makes proposals on the establishment of an independent Policing
Authority, in particular, it will consider the functions and responsibility of the
Authority, the appointment and membership of the Authority, its relationship with
Government and the Oireachtas; and the possible implications for An Garda Siochana
Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) and the Garda Siochana Inspectorate.

Functions and Responsibility of the Policing Authority

7)

The independence of the police service from executive control is central to the
credibility and the capacity of the police service to protect human rights. The IHRC has
previously stated that effective oversight bodies, coupled with transparency and
engagement with the community, are core mechanisms of human rights accountability.
As far back as 2004, in considering the Garda Siochana Bill preceding the 2005 Act,
the IHRC argued that the vesting of oversight and appointment functions with an
independent and representative agency, such as a Police Authority, as recommended by
the Patten Report, could make a valuable contribution to the promotion of human rights
within Irish policing.

8)

Issues of national security policing should be overseen by an independent body. The
IHRC has previously recommended that GSOC be permitted to examine complaints
against gardai even where issues relating to national security are involved. Apart from
complaints from members of the public, the Authority should be authorised to oversee
issues relating to national security policing, including stipulating policies and
procedures which should apply where national security policing impacts on the
fundamental rights of individuals. The Authority should also have a liaison role with
any Oireachtas committee which has competence in the area of national security
policing review. The presence o f independent bodies to provide oversight on this issue
is a requirement of the European Convention on Human Rights and lessens the risk that
the State may be found in violation of the Convention in particular cases.

9)

The IHREC (Designate) would draw attention to the fact that the issue of police
accountability is given detailed expression in the European Code of Police Ethics.4
Section VI of the European Code of Police Ethics is exclusively concerned with
accountability and control of the police.5 Article 59 of the European Code provides that
“ \t]he police shall be accountable to the state, the citizens and their representatives.
They shall be subject to sufficient external control.” Likewise, the Patten Report
emphasises the importance of the police being accountable to the citizens as well as the
State. 6 The Patten Report identifies five aspects to accountability: (1) democratic
accountability, by which the police are accountable to the elected representatives; (2)
3 See, Observations on the Garda Siochana Bill, 2004, at p. 1.
4 The European Code o f Police Ethics, Council of Europe Recommendation, Rec (2001) 10.
5 See also Articles 12, 16 and 17 of the European Code of Police Ethics.
6 Christopher Patten, A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland, the Report o f the Independent
Commission on Policingfor Northern Ireland, 1999.

 transparency, by which the community is kept informed; (3) legal accountability in the
event of abuse of police powers; (4) financial accountability; and (5) internal
n
accountability, by which officers are accountable within a police organisation. The
Patten Report states that “[a]ll these aspects must be addressed if full accountability is
o
to be achieved, and if policing is to be effective, efficient, fair and impartial" There is
an additional aspect of accountability which is increasingly evident in the years since
the publication of the Patten Report, namely the responsibility of the State Parties to the
European Convention on Human Rights to ensure that proper accountability structures
exist within their police forces to ensure: effective investigations following suspicious
deaths (Article 2); proper planning and oversight of police operations to address
foreseeable risks of human rights violations (Articles 2, 8, 13) and proper complaints
mechanisms following any human rights violations that can occur at the hands of police
(Article 13 when read in conjunction with Articles 2, 3, 8 and 14).
10)

In particular, the IHREC (Designate) recommends that the Policing Authority should
include within its statutory remit, the following functions and responsibilities:

(a) Supervise the functioning of the Garda Commissioner’s Office and supervise
the discharge of functions by the Commissioner including supervision of
national security policy and practice;
(b) Appoint, supervise and, where appropriate, discipline senior management
within An Garda Siochana, including the Garda Commissioner, the Deputy
Garda Commissioner and Assistant Garda Commissioners.9 Such office
holders should be fully accountable to the Authority for the performance of
their functions and be liable for removal from office by this body if warranted;
(c) Establish policies or procedures for An Garda Siochana, including the issuing
of policy Directives;
(d) Cause to be published and made accessible to the public all sections of the
Garda Code and Garda operational policies and procedures, with the exception
of certain clearly-defined tactical and/or security-related procedures;10
(e) Review the adequacy and appropriateness of the policies and procedures
which underpin the operation of an effective policing service;
(f) Monitor and address human rights and equality compliance by An Garda
Siochana at every level of its operations and align breaches of service/
discipline or criminal offences identified by GSOC and which would also

7Ibid, at p. 22.
8Ibid.
9 In addition, there should be express provision for the consideration of external applicants to such posts.
10 An Garda Siochana are currently outside the scope of the Freedom of Information Act, 2000. It is noted that
freedom of information legislation in Northern Ireland requires the police service to publish their written
policies. As a result, considerable progress has been made in Northern Ireland regarding the publication of
police policies and codes of practices.

 (g)

(h)

(i)
(j)
(k)

reveal a breach of human rights or a discriminatory act with disciplinary
procedures within the force.11
Review the adequacy of standards in relation to the training of An Garda
Siochana and the structures, policies and procedures for assessment and
development of those standards, with a very specific emphasis on training in
human rights and equality;
Set objectives and performance targets for An Garda Siochana and monitoring
and reporting on the achievement of those targets, including in relation to
human rights and equality compliance;
Ensure An Garda Siochana continuously improves performance;
Consult with the community to obtain their views on policing and make
arrangements to ensure their co-operation with the police in preventing crime.
Liaise with the National Preventative Mechanism established under the
Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) and ensure that its
recommendations relating to policing services are addressed.

In order to discharge these functions, the Authority should be ensured a stable and sufficient
budget over which it has autonomous control. The Authority should have control over the
selection and appointment of its own staff.

III.

Appointment and Membership of the Authority

11)

To ensure that the independence of the Policing Authority from the executive is real
and not illusory, the members of the Authority should be chosen and appointed through
an open and transparent process. To ensure a stable mandate the appointment of
members should be expressly set out in the legislation and members should serve for a
specific duration. Although, the mandate may be renewed, it is recommended that the
diversity of its members is ensured. The policies, procedures and criteria for the
selection and terms of appointment of the members should be documented and readily
available to aid transparency and attract appropriate candidates.

12)

In addition, the composition of the Policing Authority and the appointment of its
members should be in accordance with a procedure which allows for a pluralist and
independent Authority, which may be ensured by the appropriate oversight and input of
the Oireachtas. There should be representation from different sectors of society,
12
including minorities and representatives from the community more generally. The
Authority should also be gender balanced. There is also scope for political

11 It is noted that the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission B ill, 2014 includes a duty on public bodies
at section 42 to “have regard to” the elimination of discrimination, promotion of equality and to protect the
human rights of its members, staff and the persons to whom it provides services, which w ill also apply to An
Garda Siochana.
12 The nine grounds covered by the equality legislation may be a useful reference in this regard, as well as taking
into account the needs of certain geographical communities.

 representatives to be on the Authority, although such representatives should not form a
majority. There should also be a representative from the Department of Justice and
Equality.

IV. Its relationship with the Government and the Oireachtas
13)

The Authority should have an organic link, and be directly accountable to the
Oireachtas, rather than a Government Department. There is limited usefulness in
severing the Commissioner’s linkage with the Minister for Justice and Equality, if it is
intended to restore this linkage at the Authority’s level. Consideration should be given
for a separate vote for the Authority to ensure it can discharge its functions. The
Authority should be in a position to feed into the everyday detailed work of Parliament,
particularly the Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality and the mooted
subcommittee on Human Rights and Equality. The Authority can in this way be
accountable to Parliament in the discharge of its functions.

V.

Implications for GSOC, the Garda Siochana Inspectorate and the Confidential
Recipient

14)

The functions of the Police Authority must be calibrated in such a way as not to
encroach or undermine the work of GSOC, but rather should compliment and support
it. The Policing Authority should have a defined relationship with GSOC that reinforces
the independence of the latter, while allowing the Policing Authority to bring to the
attention of GSOC matters of concern that might warrant an investigation by GSOC. In
particular, there should be alignment of disciplinary procedures which flow from
GSOC investigations including, where serious allegations arise, the placing of officers
under suspensive sanction (such as placing the member concerned on administrative
leave pending judgment in criminal offences.)

15)

The IHREC (Designate)has recommended that GSOC be insulated from Ministerial
control and that it be independent in its functioning and budget. Rather than reporting to
the Minister, it is recommended that GSOC be structurally linked to the Authority to
allow for the implementation of its recommendations to be reviewed by the Authority.
However, GSOC should itself be accountable to the Parliament by appearing before
Parliamentary committees as required.

16)

The Garda Siochana Inspectorate, established under Part 5 of the Garda Siochana Act,
2005, would need to be realigned with any new Policing Authority, in order to ensure
that reporting procedures are through such an Authority and not the executive as is the
case at present. The functions of the Inspectorate should be set out in amending
legislation with issues of structural or systemic concern capable of being referred to the
Inspectorate by the Authority.

 17)

V.

Similarly the Authority should be functionally linked to the Office of the Confidential
Recipient, whether that office is merged with another body or remains stand-alone. In
particular, issues of systemic importance arising from confidential reporting by
members should be capable of being captured in the Authority’s ongoing review of
policing practice and its developent of policy and practice to strengthen human rights
and equality observance within the Service. Such confidential reporting should also be
capable of corroborating complaints made by members of the public to GSOC, subject
to procedural safeguards relating to the use of confidential information provided.

Conclusion

In conclusion the IHREC (Designate) would make the following recommendations:
1. That the State establish an independent oversight authority in respect of the
operation of An Garda Siochana that would ensure public confidence and trust
in An Garda Siochana and minimise political influence in the operational aspects
of the work by An Garda Siochana;
2. That the Authority’s statutory remit should include the functions and
responsibility as set out at paragraph 9 (a) to (k) of this submission;
3. That the appointment of members to the Authority is through an open and
transparent process, with the appropriate oversight of the Oireachtas
4. That the appointment of its members should be in accordance with a procedure
which allows for a pluralist and independent Authority;
5. That the Authority is independent from Government, and that it is
democratically accountable to the Oireachtas;
6. That the Authority should have a defined relationship with GSOC that ensures
GSOC maintains independence, but at the same time allowing for monitoring of
GSOC recommendations by the Authority on all matters of concern which may
warrant an investigation by GSOC.
7. That the Authority should have a defined relationship with the new National
Preventive Mechanism mooted under OPCAT.
8. That the Authority should be functionally linked to the Office of the Confidential
Recipient.

 Irish Hoad Victims Association

‘Change doesn ’t ju st happen, it is propelled by men and women whose spirits
are provoked and inspired to make a difference’ —NGO ‘Brussels Declaration’.
The Irish Road
Victims’ Association

IRVA Submission to the Dept o f Justice Reform Unit, Dept o f Justice &
Equality - on the establishment o f an Independent Policing Authority in Ireland

is a member of
the European

May 2014
Dear Sirs,

Federation of

Thank you for your invitation to members of the Victims Rights Alliance to make
Road Traffic
Victims (FEVR)
and o f the Global
Alliance o f NGOs
for Road Safety & Road

a submission to you.
Members of the Irish Road Victims’ Association have lost a loved one in a road
traffic collision or have been seriously injured in a collision themselves.
We very much welcome the establishment of an Independent Policing Authority
as the current system has failed to meet the needs of Road Traffic Victims.

Victims.

When a Victim of a road traffic collision becomes aware that the collision in
IRVA is also a
Signatory to the
European Road

which their loved one was killed has failed to meet a required standard they have
nowhere to turn. There is nobody in the system as it currently exists, looking out
for the interests of the Road Traffic Victim, or the Bereaved family. The Gardai
liaise with the DPP while also acting as Agents of the Coroner. The Victim is

Safety Charter

completely outside o f this process and the Coroner’s inquest is unduly restrictive.

and is a founding

As a Victim you are invited to make a complaint to the Garda Ombudsman
member o f the Victims’
Rights Alliance.

Commission ‘if you are directly affected by the conduct of a member of the Garda
Siochana that you believe is misbehaviour’. Does a failure to adequately
investigate a road traffic collision qualify as ‘misbehaviour’?

Website:- www.irishroadvictims.org Email: irva@eircom.net
Donna Price +353 86 8634194 or Noel O’Callaghan +353 86 3581634

 Irish Hoad Victims Association

We are advised that ‘The Garda Ombudsman Commission’s role and functions
are limited under the provisions of the Garda Siochana Act, 2005. Under this
legislation, the Garda Ombudsman does not have the remit to examine the
efficient or effective operation of the Garda Siochana nor can the Garda
Ombudsman adjudicate on the adequacy of a Garda investigation unless there are
clear allegations of misbehaviour involved.’
We are further advised that, ‘bearing this statutory position in mind, the Garda
Ombudsman’s determination not to admit our complaints is based on the
Commission’s view that the Garda conduct in our case(s) does not meet the
threshold for admissibility.’
In reaching its decision, the Garda Ombudsman Commission also takes into
account the fact that Garda files were submitted to the Office of the Director of
Public Prosecutions and whether that Office decided to bring prosecutions, or
not. The Coroner may do likewise when deciding whether to admit questions
relating to the Garda investigation at the Coroner’s inquest into the death.
IRVA therefore wishes to place our concerns on record in this submission
regarding the adequacy of the entire investigation process, in terms of the State’s
obligation under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (which
requires an effective investigation into all instances of suspicious deaths).
Where an investigation is inadequate, families have no recourse to an effective
remedy and all of this adds to their pain and suffering. The ‘system’ fails them.
GSOC is at present, in our view, restricted unduly under the Garda Siochana Act
2005 and therefore fails in their mission ‘to provide and promote an efficient, fair
and independent oversight of policing in Ireland’ and in their vision to ‘be an
active driver of ever-improving police accountability’.

Website:- www.irishroadvictims.org Email: irva@eircom.net
Donna Price +353 86 8634194 or Noel O’Callaghan +353 86 3581634

 Irish Hoad Victims Association

The United Nations Human Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights defenders, Margaret Sekaggya, following her
mission to Ireland November 2012, stated:
“While the Special Rapporteur welcomes the existence of the Ombudsman
Commission to ensure the accountability and independent oversight of the police,
she expresses concern at the serious constraints faced by the body, including
financial and resource limitations, and the reported limited public awareness of its
activities and responsibilities. While she takes note of the powers o f the
Commission to conduct public interest investigations into the behaviour of the
police in accordance with section 102(4) of the Garda Siochana Act (2005), she
remains concerned at the Commission’s excessive dependence on the Ministry of
Justice and Equality when it comes to opening investigations relating to the
practices, policies and procedures of the police, which requires permission from
the Minister, as laid out in section 106 of the mentioned Act. The Special
Rapporteur recommends that this provision be removed from the Garda Siochana
Act (2005) in order to grant the Commission independent investigative
powers.”(http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/ENACARegion/Pages/IEIndex.asp
X)
It is the experience of our Members that while GSOC felt that an examination of
the Garda investigation into the deaths of our loved ones in road traffic collisions
may have been required; the legislation was very restrictive and indeed
prohibitive. In some cases, they have requested that the M inister and the Garda
Commissioner agree to an examination of the files, without fear of their (GSOC)
being challenged in the courts, but no agreement to such reviews was forthcoming
The legislation needs to change to enhance GSOC and any new Policing
Authority, statutory power to carry out their work, without fear of court
challenges. The Garda Commissioner must also be brought within their remit.

Website:- www.irishroadvictims.org Email: irva@eircom.net
Donna Price +353 86 8634194 or Noel O’Callaghan +353 86 3581634

 Irish Hoad Victims Association

Restrictions in relation to the timeframe in which complaints must be made
should also be removed from the Act as these are unduly prohibitive. There is a 6
month limit in legislation at present. In most cases, a file has not been submitted
to the DPP within this timeframe and the Victims and Bereaved families have no
information. The normal statute of limitations should be considered in such cases,
with special consideration for complaints received outside of this timeframe.
We appreciate the opportunity to make a submission to you and we are
encouraged that there is now a willingness to improve the situation of crime
victims. We very much welcome the establishment of a new Independent Policing
Authority as it is very much needed and will help to fill a vacuum which exists for
our families at present. There must be a Body to whom Victims of crime have
some recourse when they are let down by enquiries into their loved one’s death.
We would welcome an opportunity to meet with you and with Minister Fitzgerald
to discuss our concerns in more detail.
Yours sincerely,
For Irish Road Victims’ Association

Donna Price, Chairperson
www.irishroadvictims.org
Pettitswood Close, Mullingar, Co. Westmeath
Phone 086 8634194

Website:- www.irishroadvictims.org Email: irva@eircom.net
Donna Price +353 86 8634194 or Noel O’Callaghan +353 86 3581634

 Law Society of Ireland
Submission of

The Law Society o f Ireland

Consultation on the establishment of an Independent Policing
Authority

Department of Justice and Equality
20 June 2014

 The Law Society of Ireland welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the
Government's public consultation on establishing an independent policing authority
in Ireland. Reform is undoubtedly now necessary.

In recent months, human rights

failures have been demonstrated as regards:
1.

serious and repeated breaches of privacy rights with the recording of
telephone conversations between clients and solicitors in garda stations,

2.

inadequate facilitation of access to legal advices with regard to the
Gormley and W hite decisions and the subsequent DPP direction to allow
solicitors attend interviews and

3.

inadequate whistleblower procedures and protections.

It appears that, in spite of policing reform through An Garda Siochana Act 2005,
systemic failures have resulted in constitutional and human rights breaches. A root
and branch review of policing and a review of policing oversight is now required.
The Law Society's Submission contains general principles which it is hoped will
significantly contribute to reform in this area irrespective of the final methodology
and shape of such reform.

The Law Society would welcome the opportunity to

further contribute to this important debate as the Government develops a new
policing and policing oversight policy for Ireland.

PART I of this submission defines the Law Society's priority recommendations for
policing reform.

PART II sets out the Law Society's recommendations as regards each of the
"options" as identified by the Government in its invitation for public consultation,
namely:
•

Functions and responsibilities of a policing authority

•

Appointment and membership of a policing authority

•

The relationship of a policing authority with the Government and the Oireachtas

•

The implications for Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) and the
Garda Siochana Inspectorate

 PART I

Law Society Priority Recommendations for Policing and Policing
Oversight Reform

Recommendation 1 - Redefine the role of An Garda Siochana: this is necessary to
define, shape and structure oversight objectives
An Garda Siochana plays an vital role in Irish society. The role was neatly
summarised by the first Garda Commissioner who believed that the success of the
newly formed police force would be achieved not by a force of arms but by showing
"moral

authority

as

servants

of

the

people"

International best practice in independent policing can provide useful templates in
the fields of human rights, independence, oversight and accountability; nonetheless,
the historic and cultural place of An Garda Siochana in Irish society should not be
overlooked in applying that best practice into Irish policing.

Recommendation 2 - Recognise and protect the important role of solicitors to
advise individuals in contact with An Garda Siochana
Solicitors play a central role in ensuring that the rule of law is respected and upheld
-

particularly for individuals requiring advice in criminal matters. Provision of

adequate legal aid to suspects in detention must be a key priority for the
Government if it wishes to safeguard a fair society and ensure its integrity.
Undoubtedly, disputes will arise as to the treatm ent of solicitors attending
interviews and the treatm ent of suspects in detention.

An independent policing

authority must put mechanisms in place for the oversight and resolution of any such
disputes, taking into account constitutional and human rights norms. Solicitors have
an important role to play within this fram ework and to advocate for its users.
The Law Society believes that protections should;
1.

ensure adequate legal assistance for suspects in detention through sufficient
legal aid provision,

2.

raise awareness among members of An Garda Siochana of the importance of
ensuring access to legal advice for suspects in detention and

3.

establish

robust mechanisms for the oversight of disputes as to the

treatm ent of solicitors attending interview and the treatm ent of those in
detention.

 Recommendation 3 - Implement OPCAT without delay, to facilitate independent
inspection of places of detention
The Government has yet to implement the Optional Protocol to the United Nations
Convention Against Torture ("OPCAT") through the introduction of a National
Preventive Mechanism which would allow for independent inspections of all places
of detention, including Garda Stations. The Law Society strongly recommends the
implementation by Ireland of OPCAT without delay.

Recommendation 4 - Make accountable the exercise of An Garda Sfochana
statutory powers which interfere or restrict fundamental human rights safeguards
and constitutional rights
An independent policing authority must have particular oversight over An Garda
Sfochana's statutory powers which

have the effect of removing,

limiting or

interfering with the constitutional and fundamental human rights of individuals.
Such statutory powers include the use of covert surveillance methods and further
powers under the new DNA Database framework.
Powers which limit and interfere with privacy rights must be exercised in an
accountable manner with appropriate oversight.

Recommendation 5 - Make Garda Vetting Procedures Compliant with the
European Convention on Human Rights (the "ECHR")
As the current Garda Vetting Unit does not operate pursuant to any specific
statutory power, it interferes with an individual's Article 8 ECHR privacy rights.
In light of UK case law on this issue the current policy for disclosure may be too
broad in particular as regards the release of information about unsuccessful and
pending prosecutions. While UK case law concerns Article 8 ECHR privacy rights, in
Ireland there may also be other Irish constitutional rights of relevance, for example,
due process and fair procedure rights such as the presumption of innocence.
The National Vetting Bureau (Children and Vulnerable Persons) Act 2012 may
resolve the potential privacy and other rights breaches posed by the current
procedure; however this legislation has yet to be commenced. The new statutory
procedure, if commenced, would facilitate the disclosure of information relating to
criminal offences and criminal records regarding non-successful prosecutions only
where such information is specified by statute. "Specified information" is defined by
section 2 of the Act and may be a more proportionate approach than the current ad
hoc procedure.

The Law Society recommends that Garda vetting procedures be reviewed as soon as
possible.

 Recommendation 6 - Implement Ireland's ECHR duties as regards police planning
and oversight
The Law Society recommends that the policy which will establish an independent
policing authority in Ireland must implement Ireland's ECHR duties as regards
appropriate planning and oversight of police operations to prevent, remedy and
repair police human rights violations. The IHRC Submission on the Garda Sfochana
Act echoes this sentiment by calling for signatories to the ECHR to
ensure th a t proper accountability structures exist within their police forces to
ensure...proper planning and oversight o f police operations

to address

foreseeable risks o f hum an rights violations (Articles 2, 8, 13) and proper
complaints mechanisms fo llow in g any hum an rights violations th a t can occur
a t the hands o f police (Article 13 when read in conjunction with Articles 2, 3, 8
and 14).

Recommendation 7 - Adopt a human rights based approach supported by human
rights proofing, contributed to by solicitors
Human rights must be at the centre of policing and oversight reform.
The 2006 ICCL Report [Im plem enting M orris - An Agenda f o r Changes: Placing
Hum an Rights a t the Core o f Policing in Ireland] recommends the following:

•

Human rights should be made central to the management of the Gardai.

•

Human rights monitoring fram ework should be devised for the Garda Siochana;

•

As a m atter of urgency, all current Garda policies and practices should be human
rights proofed.

Law Society members have professional expertise in the areas of human rights and
criminal justice. We should be delighted to bring this expertise to assist in the
incorporation of human rights standards into policing policy through membership of,
or engagement with, the Strategic Human Rights Advisory Committee of An Garda
Siochana (SHRAC).

 PART II
Law Society of Ireland proposals on the options presented in the
_____________ Consultation Paper._________________________________________

Functions and responsibilities of a policing authority (and An Garda Siochana
itself)
Recommendation 8 - Ability to initiate its own reviews of practice, policies or
procedures without need for political authorisation
An independent policing authority must be able to review policing practices, policies
and procedures on its own initiative without the need for Ministerial approval, as is
the existing situation pursuant to Section 106 of the Garda Siochana Act 2005.

Recommendation 9 - Oversight of Code of Ethics/Standards supported by a robust
complaints mechanism
All Garda Siochana Codes or Standards should be overseen by an independent
authority with responsibility for standard setting, individual complaint handling as
well as systemic lapses in Garda discipline.
Good

policing

practice,

accountability

and

independent

oversight

must

be

underpinned by international standards and codes.
Consideration must be given to ceasing the practice whereby complaints other than
those relating to death or serious harm are dealt with by An Garda Siochana.

Recommendation 10 - Adequate whistleblowing mechanisms and whistleblower
protection
The Law Society believes that mechanisms for whistleblowing and the protection of
whistleblowers must be envisaged in the development of an independent policing
authority.

The IHRC emphasises "whistleblowing is an important safeguard for

accountability".

Appointment and membership of a policing authority
Recommendation
membership

11

-

Independent

and

transparent

appointment

and

The appointment and membership of an independent policing authority must be
politically independent and transparent.

 The relationship of a policing authority with the Government and the
Oireachtas
Recommendation 12 - Independent and transparent appointment and
management of senior An Garda Siochana roles
Currently,

An

Commissioner,

Garda

Siochana

Deputy

and

management

Assistant

team

members,

Commissioner

positions,

such
are

as

the

political

appointees who can also be removed for a variety of reasons.
The Law Society believes that the appointment, management and removal of senior
staff members should be independent of the political infrastructure.

Independent

and transparent processes should be introduced with accountability vested in a
politically independent body.

Recommendation 13 - Enact oversight mechanisms to ensure an independent and
accountable A Garda Sfochana in line with internationally recognised best practice
standards
The Law Society believes that appropriate oversight measures must be put in place
as soon as possible to ensure an independent and an accountable police service in
Ireland.
In respect of independence of a proposed policing authority, the Law Society urges
that the benchmarks contained within the UN Paris Principles be applied.
The Law Society recommends, as does the Irish Human Rights Commission, that the
principles contained in the following international instruments guide the framework
for police accountability.

Article 59 of the European Code
"The police shall be accountable

to

the state,

the citizens and

their

representatives. They shall be subject to sufficient external control."

The Patten Report
The P atten Report identifies fiv e aspects to accountability as follows:
1.

dem ocratic accountability, by which the police are accountable to the
elected representatives

2.

transparency, by which the com m unity is kept inform ed

3.

legal accountability in the event o f abuse o f police powers

4. fin an c ia l accountability
5.

internal accountability, by which officers are accountable within a police
organisation

 Recommendation 14 - Adequate and ring fenced resourcing to ensure real political
independence
The Law Society recommends that the allocation of adequate resources must be
guaranteed to some extent so as to ensure independence cannot be tem pered by
threats of funding withdrawal.

The Law Society welcomes the opportunity to work with the Department in its on­
going consideration of this important issue and remains available meet with officials
to clarify any of the matters raised within this submission.

For further information please contact:
Cormac O Culain
Public Affairs Executive
Law Society of Ireland
Blackhall Place
Dublin 7
DX 79
Tel: 353 1 6724800
Email: c.oculain@lawsociety.ie

 Ferbane Business & Technology Park
Sallvcumber Road, Fsrbane, Co. Offaly
Tel: 090 6453623 hox: 090 6453697
Email: nargc@ nargc.ie i Web: www.nargc.ie

Independent Policing Authority
The National Association of Regional Game Councils (NARGC), which was founded in 1968, is the
largest organisation in Ireland involved in game hunting and conservation. It represents and defends
the interests of countrysports in general and the interests of game shooting enthusiasts in particular in
the Republic of Ireland It has 27,000 members in almost 1,000 clubs spiead throughout ihc country one club in almost every parish. The Association’s clubs are “Recognised Bodies” under the Wildlife
Act 1976, a unique statutory recognition which means they can initiate prosecutions for breaches of
the wildlife acts. The NARGC is also a Seanad “Nominating Body” on the Agricultural Panel which
means it is entitled to nominate two persons for election to the Upper House of Parliament: (the
Seanad). The Association has contributed to major legislative reforms in the areas of conservation,
hunting and firearms ownership over many years. NARGC subscribes to the principle of ''Wise mnd
sustainable use of renewable natural resources " and works with a wide variety of organisations to
achieve a balanced approach -c such use.
At an international level, through FACE Ireland, NARGC is closely aligned with the Federation of
4ssociatbns for Hunting and Conservation of the EU (FACE) which is based in Brussels and
represents the interests of 7 million hunters in 36 countries at the level of die European Union.
At the outset, the NARGC wholly welcomes the proposal to establish an Independent Policing
Authority for the Republic of Ireland. Dealing as it does in representing the interests of citizens who
are subject to a statutory licensing regime for participation in then- sport of cnoice. a licensing regime
which is administered by An Garda Siocnant ( vGS), the Association has had vast experience in
dealing with issues arising from such licensing. By way of background, picase see the attached
critique. While it is not intended to in any sense address the specific instances contained therein in
this suomission, the issues are nonetheless symptomatic of the consequences cf how An Ganda
Sioch&ia carries out its functions and will assist in placing this submission in context.
We believe there are three underlying principles wtiich strongly influence Gandm in how they
discharge then functions - financial accouroability administrative accountability and measurable
reward for professionalism. Unfortunate!}- the operations of AGS have all too often beer,
characterised by me absence of any real accountability in a whole range of areas resulting in a series
of malpractices, erosion of citizens’ rights and even criminality Many of these matters are now well
publicised and have given rise to the proposal to establish the Independent Policing Authority.
Accountability means there must be sanctions, not just for the institution, but for those individuals
who are charged with its management and with decision making authority.
hi the conduct of the functions of state in a democracy, but particularly the functions of policing, it is
imperative that the citizens have confidence that the police force act transparently, accountably, in
accordance with both the letter and the spirit of die law and fairly i.e. without prejudice.
Unfortunately, An Garda Sk-chana has not senrad well under these headings in recent years resulting

National &«*cutrve Commitfea, Sean Dons <Chc‘Vnan); fcm O'Donnell {Vice Ghajrtixm}, Bu«y Sullivan {Hon. Socrotary). Simon Deyanau? {fton Tn^trr-trJ; tU jy Define (Deputy Compensation
Pond Administrator}, Dav»d StaHah {Pubk Relations Officer); Tom Doh»rty (Safety Office^, Gerord Butns (Gamt.ot Officer), lom O'Connor fpwafator Control Officer)* Morga»e* Neile;
Owen MulhoISawi; John Butler; Ken Cunningham, Pc^ Oonten; Seaw -v Hwrtf * No*i©na Oirecter: frernond Ooteif * Comf>en»ertion Fund Administrator: (.hn» Gavtron

Compensation Fund Office: Broot^rda Mow*. Ahanagh, Drottod, Co teifrim

 in a rapid erosion of confidence in AGS. This erosion of confidence is widely apparent not just
among ordinary citizens, but also among large numbers of Oireachtas Members,
We submit:

_

1. Finance;
The force must be truly accountable for the finances allocated to it from the Exchequer i.e. the
taxpayer Ax present, it would appear there ic no accountability whatsoever. If there was, the
public would surely be aware of the sanctions which ought to have beeu imposed for the
myriad of activities which have come to light and which have cost the taxpayer literally
millions, not just recently but since as far back as the Frank Shortt case and further.
Furthermore, in the case of firearms licensing, the Gardai have continued to defend quite
indefensible court appeals pgamst unlawful licence refusals to the extent that over 600 court
challenges (both High and District courts) have taken place in the space of four years, 95% of
which have been upheld with consequent implications for the taxpayer. Yet at no point has
anyone within the Garda management or die Department of Justice sought take steps to hah
the actions which gave rise to die repeated cases and therefore mitigate the taxpayers'
exposure and neither has there b«en any attempt, either internally or externally, to ascertain
why licensing officers continued to make incorrect licensing decisions and/or lake remedial
action. No one has been held accountable. If the Garda Commissioner was truly responsible
and accountable for the Garda budget, action would have been taken cz the licensing issue
long ago which would have had the triple effect of saving the taxpayer from unnecessary
exposure, correcting what is clearly an issue of maladministration in the operation o f the
firearms licensing system and instead of eroding confidence in the Gardai amongst the
substantial numbers of firearms owners, strengthening confidence and respect True financial
accountability would in feet address many (riot all) of the ills which have oeen identified.
Strict accountability for the Garda budget must come within the remit of the new Independent
Policing Authority.
1. \dm inistrative Accountability:
An Garda Sioch&na is responsible for the implementation, monitoring and administration of
many of the state's laws. Its actions and how it discharge? its statutory functions are of the
utmost concern for the proper administration of justice, in th*t regard, it is imperative that
AGS interprets ana applies the law correctly and fairly. It is equally impeiative that it
monitors «uch interpretation and application in the context of ongoing evaluation of
performance. Failures should immediately cause an examination of where die fault/failure
lies and the implementation/imposition of corrective action where shortcomings are
identified. This may, at its most innocent, involve further training. However, where there are
repealed shortcomings following the corrective action, the principles of accountability should
be brought to bear. This means there must be sanctions for repetitive failure.

3. Reward for Professionalism:
For accountability to be effective and fair, a system of recognition for satisfactory/good
performance is appropriate. White sanctions for bad or poor performance are well justified,
these take oil a very focused significance if there is a corresponding reward system for good
performance. We would submit that consideration be given to establishing such a reward

 system as a positive counterbalance to the rigours of accountability The cost of a reward
system, iu whatever form it might take, can he measnrsd against the cost of the recent
conitoverpies but it mry nevei be qneauate'v measuren against the cost of the loss of
confidence in AGS as a result ol those controversies,
4. GSOC:
White the ide* of GSOC was a ^re»y good one when th?t body was «staoli«hed, it nas in reality
proved fat Ies- effective tnan tne impression hrrctotorc held by meat c'dzeus until recently.
The policing body tor the police force should ne^er refer any comokJnt back to the force for
investigation If there was ever any duubi on tbis matter, it was surely completely dispelled
by the penalty points controversy and tne sc called mvestigaticn "ito +iiai matter by a senior
Oarda officer appointed by the Coounissioner. The very notion that GSOC does non iiavc
ansupervise*! access to the PULSE system for it0 work is fotning mure tnan a torm staterrtenf
of nn confidence in GSOC by the Government. This matter is entirely contradictory the
discharge of functions for which GSOC was established and should be addressed without
delay The fac* of GSOC’S iwc^mmendatiofis of disciplinary sanction* under tha Oarda
Siochan? Act. following hs investigations, o^ing only oosoiole with iht approval of the
Commissions is farcical.
5. The Av,oounwl>ility of the Gnrda <",oininis»Moner:
The Garda Couimicsicnet should be arcounrable fur all matters over which he nas siatutor)
oversight. That accountobilitv mrist V« to the riew ludepondeiit Policing Authority ?nd not to
any politician or political institution Furthermore, in ths interests ot public confidence and
for the removal of any possible doubt that no reason is abo'"? the law, the position o' Garde
Commissioner must come within the amhil of G St)C .
6. Promotions:
The practice of promotions to senior positions within AGS boing at tne discretion of the
Government of the day must c^ase and be subject to a system of transparent merit based
assessment. fhe cturem system is open to the charge of political oatronage and id entirely
inappropriate

I^smW c^rofton
National rijfrector,

NARGC I
21/5/2014

  

/ RAPEc RISIS

I

NETW ORK

4W IR E L A N D

RCNI Subm ission to the Justice Reform Unit on the Proposal to
establish an independent Policing Authority
June 2014

 Introduction - Rape Crisis Network Ireland Overview:
1.0

Rape Crisis Network Ireland broadly welcomes the Proposal to establish an independent
Policing Authority. In our view, an independent police oversight body which draws on a

wide range of outside experience as it sets long term goals and supervises their
implementation, and which has the necessary powers to ensure that its goals are adhered
to, can benefit victims of sexual crimes significantly. This overarching role will become even
more important when the EU Directive establishing minimum standards on the rights,
support and protection of victims of crime, is transposed into Irish law in November 20151.
In addition, an independent Policing Authority could do much to ensure that complaint
mechanisms addressed victims' concerns about An Garda Siochana swiftly and effectively.
Our own research on attrition of rape victims in the criminal justice system, Rape and Justice
in Ireland,2 highlighted the difficulties they faced in their interactions with An Garda
Siochana when deciding whether to report, and once they had reported, maintaining a
formal complaint. It confirmed our daily experience that how victims are treated by An
Garda Siochana is a very significant factor in whether they can initiate and then sustain
formal complaints against their attackers. While there was much very good Garda practice

reported, the authors of the report made specific recommendations addressing key victim
concerns identified in the research. These were: maintaining ongoing contact between
Gardai and victims, providing information, behaving with sensitivity and compassion towards
victims, interviewing victims with due regard to the effects of trauma, and never dissuading
victims from maintaining a complaint. An Garda Siochana lost no time in incorporating
versions of these key recommendations in its Garda Siochana Policy on the Investigation of
Sexual Crime, Crimes and Children and Child Welfare, published in April 2010. 3

Rape Crisis Network Ireland: Aims, Activities, Goals, Members, Staff

2.0

RCNI is the national representative body for its 13 member Rape Crisis Centres. The RCNI
role includes the development and coordination of national projects including data
collection, supporting Rape Crisis Centres to reach best practice standards, legal advice and
policy development, and using our experience and knowledge to influence national policy
and social change. Our member Rape Crisis Centres provide free advice, specialised
counselling, advocacy and supports such as Court and Garda accompaniment, for survivors
of sexual abuse in Ireland, including a growing number between the ages of 14 and 18.

1 This Directive may be accessed online through this weblink: http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:315:0057:0073:EN:PDF
2 "Rape and Justice in Ireland" (2009), Hanly & ors, Liffey Press, Dublin (RAJI). The recommendations may be
found in the Executive Summary, available for free download through this link: http://www.rcni.ie/wpcontent/uploads/Exec-Summary.pdf
3 Available online through this weblink:
http://www.garda.ie/Documents/User/WEB%20Investigation%20of%20Sexual%20Crime%20Crimes%20Agains
t%20Children%20Children%20Welfare.pdf

 RCNI Submission to the Justice Reform Unit on the Proposal to establish an
independent Policing Authority June 2014
3.0

This Submission - Structure:

This submission will follow the structure set out in the Justice Reform Unit information for
ease of reference, and will be directed mostly at the first part of that structure, the functions
and responsibilities of a Policing Authority.
4.0

Functions and Responsibilities of a Policing Authority

In general:
In our view, an independent Policing Authority should have the power to
-

-

-

set policy and long-term goals for An Garda Siochana,
appoint and supervise the most senior office holders (Garda Commissioner,
Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioners),
ensure that all operational policies and procedures are published, unless there
are compelling reasons for non-disclosure in particular cases (security related
etc),
set standards for performance across a range of areas, including the
compassionate and professional treatment of victims,
review those standards and monitor compliance with them,
ensure that high quality training appropriate to their role is given to all members
in the impacts of sexual violence (and other crimes of course) on its victims,
consult with the general public and with victim support groups to help improve
performance and also, awareness of the concerns of both victims and the
community at large, and
be answerable not to the Minister for Justice but to the Oireachtas as a whole.

We agree with the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (Designate)4 that in order to
fulfill its functions, any independent Policing Authority should have control over a stable and
sufficient budget, and further should have control over selection and appointment of its
own staff.
In particular:
Any independent Policing Authority should oversee implementation of the EU Directive on
Victims' Rights by An Garda Siochana, by ensuring that
(a) structures are in place to provide the information specified in their role as the
"competent authority" to victims of sexual (and other) crime under both Article 4 (right to
receive information from first contact with a competent authority) and Article 6 (right to

4 See IHREC (Designate) Submission to the Cabinet SubComittee on justice on the Establishment of an
Independent Policing Authority, May 2014, available online through this link:
http://www.ihrc.ie/download/pdf/ihrec_designate_submission_on_independent_policing_authority_may_20
14.pdf

 RCNI Submission to the Justice Reform Unit on the Proposal to establish an
independent Policing Authority June 2014
receive information about their case), across all Divisions of An Garda Siochana and Garda
HQ;
(b) systems exist to identify, pilot, and where appropriate generalize to all non-piloted
areas, new and original ways of working (including inter-agency working) which give priority
to victims' needs and to their rights to information and support from the Gardai as a
"competent authority" under the Directive;
(c) systems exist to ensure that in both general and specialist roles, An Garda Siochana,
including Garda HQ staff as necessary and appropriate, are given training to "increase their
awareness of the needs of victims and to enable them to deal with victims in an impartial,
respectful and professional manner" (Article 25). In our submission,
(d) systems are in place to ensure that all Divisions (and Garda HQ staff as necessary and
appropriate) are provided with enough training, information and other supports, to
implement fully in their professional roles An Garda Siochana's responsibilities to victims of
crime under the EU Directive, and under Articles 3 (right to understand and be understood),
4 (right to receive information about their rights, in effect), 5 (right to receive
acknowledgement of their formal complaint), 6 (right to information about their own case),
7 (right to interpretation and translation), 8 (facilitation of referrals to specialist support
agencies), 18 (victims' right to protection from secondary and repeat victimization, from
intimidation and retaliation, including right to physical protection), 20 (right to protection of
victims during investigative stage, including accompaniment), 22 (right to individual
assessment to identify specific protection needs), 23 (right to protection of victims with
specific protection needs in criminal proceedings) in particular;
(e) international best practice underpins timely and thorough ongoing evaluation of all
these systems, in collaboration with the Garda Inspectorate;
(f) international best practice underpins data collection systems, without which it would be
very difficult to implement (e) above. These systems should include qualitative and
quantitative anonymised data from victims of crime, which is collected in a robust and
reliable way.
(g) effective inter-agency structures are maintained, and new ones established and
maintained as necessary and appropriate to enable more efficient support and provision of
information to victims of crime.
2. Any independent Policing Authority should analyse and continue to monitor, the
effectiveness of the Garda Ombudsman Commission from the perspective of victims of
crime, and relay its findings to GSOC, making recommendations as appropriate. In
particular, it should look at:
(a) whether victims of crime have confidence, generally speaking, in GSOC's ability and
willingness to resolve complaints about An Garda Siochana's behaviour, from the most
serious to the most minor, to the satisfaction of the complainant?

 RCNI Submission to the Justice Reform Unit on the Proposal to establish an
independent Policing Authority June 2014
(b) if not, would the complainants have more confidence in a more independent
complaints structure, which did not ever involve informal resolution procedures or formal
investigations by An Garda Siochana members? Our daily work tells us that many victims of
sexual crime do not have confidence in the independence of the process, despite
reassurances, and also, that they fear that making a formal complaint to GSOC, or to a local
Superintendent, will have a negative effect on the investigation of their complaint of sexual
crime. This fear often results in no complaint being made about the conduct of the member
of An Garda Siochana, and therefore to the loss of the information about that conduct to
management structures.
(c) the GSOC complaints procedure itself: is it easily accessible and understandable, is it
constrained by rules which are not appropriate to the nature of many complaints, does it
take too long, for example? And so on;
(d) the available remedies for GSOC complainants: are they adequate and/or appropriate?
3. Independent Policing Authority should adopt a whole-system approach to maintaining
and where necessary, improving services provided to victims of crime by An Garda Siochana,
and should ensure that systems are put in place at all levels to place victims of crime at the
centre of An Garda Siochana activity. It should not be for IPA to devise and manage these
systems on a day to day basis, but it should be their role to ensure that effective systems are
in place and are maintained across An Garda Siochana.
5.0

Appointment and Membership of the Policing Authority

Our view is that membership of the Policing Authority should be varied, should be
temporary, and should be open and transparent in its method of appointment. It should not
include a preponderance of elected representatives, but should include people with
relevant expertise, including representatives of relevant State agencies and victim
representatives. There should be special provision for representation from minority groups,
and the Authority should make every effort to be gender-balanced.
6.0

Its relationship w ith the Government and the Oireachtas

As indicated above, our view is that the Authority should be answerable directly to the
Oireachtas, rather than to any specific Minister.
7.0

Implications for GSOC, the Garda Siochana Inspectorate and the Confidential
Recipient

In our view, GSOC should retain its independence, including from any Policing Authority, but
the Authority should be able to make recommendations and give advice to GSOC, and
should be able to bring anything which in its view warrants investigation, to the attention of
GSOC for further determination. If GSOC itself is not to be under the control of any Minister,
it should be answerable to the Oireachtas in the same way as the Policing Authority.

 RCNI Submission to the Justice Reform Unit on the Proposal to establish an
independent Policing Authority June 2014
We feel that the Garda Siochana Inspectorate should make its reports to the Policing
Authority rather than to any Minister, and the Authority should be able to refer issues of
concern to Inspectorate where appropriate. Finally, we think it is important that general
concerns raised with the Confidential Recipient should be received by the Authority, as this
is a route through which general victim concerns can be identified and measures taken to
address them effectively.
8.0

Conclusion

Finally, our view is that any Policing Authority should have as a headline statement not just
to all members of An Garda Siochana, but also to all victims and their supporters, as well as
the community at large, that victim concerns are fundamental to their philosophy, strategy
and objectives. Without victims' willingness to come forward and without the willingness of
Gardai to support them throughout the criminal justice process, attrition will not be reduced
and ultimately, serious crimes will not be detected, prosecuted and punished appropriately.

Rape Crisis Network Ireland
4, Prospect Hill, Galway

10 June 2014
LPD/1

 RCNI Submission to the Justice Reform Unit on the Proposal to establish an
independent Policing Authority June 2014
Appendix II:
LISC composition: The Legal Issues Sub-Committee is a sub-committee o f the National Steering
Committee on Violence against Women, on whose behalf it conducts research and discussions
and formulates agreed recommendations on domestic and sexual violence legal issues, wherever
possible and appropriate. It works to an NSC agreed annual Work Plan based on the National
Strategy to prevent Domestic, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence5, and in addition addresses
legal issues whenever requested to do so by NSC. Like the NSC itself, it is a multi-agency body,
whose volunteer membership meets quarterly and includes senior and junior representatives
from the Law Library, a Law Society representative, a Legal Aid Board representative, domestic
and sexual violence NGO representatives (in the case o f sexual violence, this means both RCNI
and Dublin Rape Crisis Centre), and representatives from An Garda Siochana, the Department o f
Justice, the Probation Service, and the Courts Service. All members are encouraged to contribute
their views, and all recommendations put forw ard are agreed by LISC members. The variety o f
experiences, roles and perspectives within LISC has allowed it to make informed and thoughtful
recommendations, well grounded in the daily reality o f our justice system.
Its rem it is purely advisory and non-executive, as is that o f the NSC itself.

5 available online in both summary and full form at www.cosc.ie/publications

 Tus nua do phdilfneacht
Moltaf d'athchoiriu
A New Beginning to Policing

Proposals for Reform
Sinn Fein Submission, May 2014.

 Introduction

Sinn Fein believes that a major step change is
now required in order to restore public
confidence and bring about the radical reform
citizens have a right to expect.

istration of justice.
ublic confidence in our policing and justice system con­
tinues to be severely undermined and must be restored.
There is a lack of regulation, transparency and accountability.
A catalogue of recent controversies that have emerged
through the courageous efforts of a number of whistleblowersUntil now Labour and Fine Gael have resisted proposals to
establish an independent Garda authority or increased powers
relating to An Garda Sfochgna are both shocking and pro­
for the Garda Ombudsman.
found for the state, society and not least the Gardaf them­
selves.
Sinn Fein welcomes the belated conversion of the government
to these reforms. We believe that a major step change is now
The chronic failure and inaction of An Taoiseach Enda Kenny
required in order to restore public confidence and bring about
and the Fine Gael/Labour government to properly respond to
the radical reform citizens have a right to expect. We believe
these matters with the urgency required has been alarming. It
that a new beginning to policing similar to that of the Patten
served to compound the crisis.
Report can deliver an open and transparent policing service,
which is accountable for its actions to both a new independ­
What has been uncovered amounts to very deep-rooted and
ent policing authority and also to the communities which it
systemic deficiencies within senior levels of An Garda
serves.
Sfochana and other institutions of the state, including the
Department of Justice and Equality. They failed to account for
These proposals set out by Sinn Fein relating to comprehen­
their actions. They failed to discharge their functions and
sive Policing Reform will be presented to An Taoiseach Enda
responsibilities in the public interest. They failed to safeguard
Kenny TO and the new Minister for Justice and Equality
the integrity of these fundamental institutions of the state.
Frances Fitzgerald TO for consideration.
There is widespread public support for rank and file Gardaf. It
has become increasingly clear that Garda senior management
do not have the confidence of the public. The vast majority of
Gardaf are good, public-minded, patriotic men and women
who do their job well. But they have been failed by senior
management and by government after government.

P

Citizens were promised real reform and a different way of
doing things by this Fine Gael/Labour government. Yet citizens
see before them an unchanged culture of cronyism from
banking, to the charity sector, health, policing and the admin-

-J

PadrSig MacLochlainn TD
Spokesperson on Justice,
Equality and Defence

Gerry Adams TD
President Sinn F6in

 Sinn Fein Reform Agenda

We believe that policing accountability should be
premised on the law, courts, constitution and the
proposed Charter o f Rights for the Island of
Ireland as expressly acknowledged in the Good
Friday Agreement 1998.

Policing and justice are central issues in any society. Over the
past decade there have been dramatic changes to the polic­
ing and justice landscape in the north as a consequence of
the Patten Commission on Policing and the Good Friday
Agreement and the transfer of powers to the Assembly in the
north.
In the south the enactment of the Garda Sfochana Act 2005
and 2007 saw the first substantial changes to how An Garda
Sfochana operated since the foundation of the state.
However, we believe that a major step change is now urgent­
ly required. The status quo is not an option. Sinn Fein wants
to see a new dispensation in order to achieve more strength­
ened and sustainable reform, which can deliver a modern
21st century policing service now and in the future.

Key Principles
The key principles which must inform this project of change
for An Garda Sfochana include:
• Freedom from partisan political control or influence.
• Operational independence.
• Policing with the community to develop maximum confi­
dence in the policing service and to maximise cooperation
between citizens and An Garda Sfochana.
Currently there exist five dimensions to policing delivery
including;
L
2.
3.
4.
5.

An Garda Sfochana and the Garda Reserve
Garda Sfochana Ombudsman Commission (GSOC)
The Garda Inspectorate
The Garda Professional Standards Unit (GPSU)
Joint Policing Committees

Each has different functions and responsibilities defined
within the Garda Sfochana Act.
The GSOC independently investigate complaints against
members of the Gardaf or where it is deemed that an offence
has occurred.
The Garda Sfochana Inspectorate benchmark performance
and promote best practice.
The Garda Professional Standards Unit examines and
reviews, as directed by the Garda
Commissioner, the operational, administrative and manage­
ment performance of An Garda Sfochana at all levels

what needs to change.
We believe that policing accountability should be premised on
the law. courts, constitution and the proposed Charter of
Rights for the Island of Ireland as expressly acknowledged in
the Good Friday Agreement 1998.
We consider that An Garda Sfochana in delivering its full func­
tions should be accountable not only to an independent polic­
ing board but also to the democratically elected Houses of the
Oireachtas through scrutiny committees and to local govern­
ment and the communities it serves through the Joint Policing
Committees.
Sinn Fein also propose that the Crime and Security Branch of
An Garda Sfochana and the Defence Forces Directorate (G2)
come under the scrutiny of the Oireachtas Committee on
Justice. Defence and Equality with the necessary safeguards
in place, based on international best standards.

The Joint Policing Committees act as a forum for local author­
ities. An Garda Sfochana. Oireachtas members and the com­
munity to work together locally in tackling crime and promot­
ing community safety.

We also believe that An Garda Sfochana must be accountable
to a professional Code of Practice established by the Minister
for Justice and Equality, applied by An Garda Sfochana and
benchmarked by a new Criminal Justice Inspectorate that will
incorporate the existing Garda Inspectorate.

What is clearly absent is an Independent Policing Authority,
which holds the Garda Commissioner, to account and acts as
a non-partisan body free from political control since the
Commissioner at this point in time is directly accountable to
the government through the Minister for Justice and Equality.

The Minister would be responsible for setting the overall long­
term objectives for policing after consultation with the new
policing authority. The Minister would be responsible for
securing and allocating the budget to the policing board also.

Sinn Fein would argue that the governance and accountabili­
ty model of policing and justice structures are the core of

The new Garda Authority would be responsible for the effec­
tive and efficient delivery of the police service and holds the
Garda Commissioner to account directly.

 A new Independent Garda Authority
The Garda Commissioner would have full operational inde­
pendence for the police service but must account for their
actions to the authority retrospectively if requested to do
so. They therefore must standover any operational deci­
sions taken and ensure that they are compliant within the
law and human right norms.
The existing GSOC does not have the required powers to
properly exercise their function and therefore their powers
must be expanded.
The new Criminal Justice Inspectorate would replace the
Garda Inspectorate and cover all state policing and justice
related agencies and would be responsible for ensuring
that standards, procedures, best international practice is
applied across all in compliance within the law.

Sinn F§in proposals include:
(1). A New Independent Garda Authority
There are aspects of both the Scottish Police Authority and
the Policing Board in the North, which could be incorporat­
ed into the design of the new Garda Authority.

Functions and Responsibilities
• The authority should have responsibility for determining
the priorities of An Garda Siochana and should work in
conjunction with the Garda Commissioner in the prepa­
ration of annual policing plans.
• Consult with local communities to obtain their views and
experience of policing and JPCs.
• The Garda Authority should be responsible for ensuring
the effective and efficient working of An Garda Siochana
to include the setting of performance targets.

me existing
aoes not nave tne required
powers to properly exercise their function and
therefore their powers must be expanded.

• The Authority should publish an annual report on the per­
formance of An Garda Siochana
• The Authority should have oversight responsibility and
budgetary control for an Garda Sfochanna.
• The Authority should hold the Garda Commissioner to
account and the Commissioner should keep the
Authority full briefed on relevant matters.
• Sinn Fein supports the recommendation from
Transparency International Ireland that the appoint­
ments of the Garda Commissioner, the Deputy
Commissioner and the Assistant Garda Commissioner
should be made by the new Garda Authority following an
open competition by the Public Appointments Service.
• The Authority should also have the power to remove these
senior officers, (Garda Commissioner, the Deputy
Commissioner and the Assistant Garda Commissioner).
• The Authority should deal with complaints against and the
discipline of senior officers, (Garda Commissioner, the
Deputy Commissioner and the Assistant Garda
Commissioner).
• The Authority should have a clear relationship with GSOC
which reinforces the independence of GSOC while allow­
ing the Authority to bring issues to the attention of GSOC
that might warrant investigation.
• The Authority should monitor and address human rights
and equality compliance by An Garda Siochana at every
level of its operations and ensure issues identified by the
Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission are dealt
with.

Appointment and Membership of the Authority
• The Authority should have twenty members and should
include members with a variety of backgrounds and
expertise including legal, human rights, academic, civil
society and law enforcement.
• The Authority should be diverse in its membership and
political representation should be decided through the
D’Hondt method. Independent members will also be
recruited through open and fair competition.
• The Authority should be appointed by the Minister for
Justice and Equality following an open competition man­
aged by the Public Appointments Service.
• There should be a statutory obligation to ensure as far as
is possible that the membership of the Authority is rep­
resentative of society.
• The Authority should be supported in its work by a num­
ber of advisory groups, e.g. on Equality, Human Rights,
and Youth Affairs etc.

 Independent Oversight

We need to have full accountability for the
Garda Siochana. The Garda Siochana
Ombudsman Commission needs to have full
powers and full independence.

(2). Independent Oversight
Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission
The Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission
was brought established by the Garda Siochana
Act 2005 and has been operational since 2007.
The statutory functions of the Ombudsman
Commission are
1. to receive complaints made by members of
the public concerning the conduct of
members of the Garda Sfochana,
2. to carry out the duties and exercise the
powers assigned to it in relation to those com­
plaints,
3. to issue guidelines for the informal resolution
of certain categories of complaints and to
make procedural rules for investigations
4. to report the results of its investigations to the
Garda Commissioner and, in appropriate
cases, to the Director of Public Prosecutions
and, if it reports to the Director, to send him
or her a copy of each investigation file,
5. to conduct other investigations of matters
concerning the conduct of members of the
Garda Siochana,
6. to examine practices, policies and procedures
of the Garda Siochcina
7. to draw up with the Garda Commissioner
protocols
There is an opportunity and a requirement for real reform of
the Commission. The concept of Gardaf investigating com­
plaints on behalf of GSOC has raised issues in respect of the
Commissions independence and effectiveness. Indeed in
2008, 2009 and 2010 45% of all complaints to GSOC were
investigated by An Garda Sfochana. Furthermore the fact that
the Garda Commissioner is not within the remit of GSOC is an
unreasonable limitation in its role.
The Garda Sfochana Ombudsman Commission has faced
serious blockages in its investigations. At times senior Gardaf
have questioned the relevance of the documents that it has
sought to attain. There is a real need for additional powers to
be given to it.
We need to have full accountability for the Garda Sfochana.
The Garda Sfochana Ombudsman Commission needs to have

full powers and full independence. That would be in the best
interests of the men and women who serve us in the Garda
Sfochana and all of our citizens.
Sinn Fein are broadly supportive of the recommendations for
change put forward by GSOC and by the former Police
Ombudsman in the North of Ireland. Nuala 0 Loan in their
submissions to the Oireachtas Justice committee.

 Proposals to improve the effectiveness of the Garda Siochana
Ombudsman Commission (GSOC):
' Serving officers of An Garda Sfochana should not be sec­
onded to GSOC, i.e. Gardaf should not be investigating
fellow Gardaf.
• A duty of impartiality and independence to be included in
GSOCs objectives.
• GSOC to have a statutory obligation to report at regular
intervals to the Oireachtas Committees on Justice and
Public Service Oversight and answer questions from
elected members.
• GSOC should have powers of investigation in respect of
the work of the Garda Commissioner.
• Where a Garda retires or resigns, any complaint against
the officer can still be investigated if GSOC believes it
would be in the public interest to do so.
• The time limit for the making of complaints to GSOC
should be extended from six months to one year with the
time period running from the date of knowledge, i.e. the
date upon which the complainant knew or ought reason­
ably to have known about the conduct the subject of the
complaint. There should be some level of discretion in
situations where a complainant would be unfairly preju­
diced as a result of the time limits.
• The Minister for Justice should not have the power to
withhold material from GSOC on national security
grounds. GSOC should be in turn under a statutory obli­
gation to make proper provision for protecting such
material.
“ Similarly the Garda Commissioner should be under a
duty to provide GSOC with material it requests.
• GSOC should be given an unqualified right to enter and
search police stations.
• The adherence to agreed Protocols between Gardaf and
GSOC should be made compulsory in legislation includ­
ing the granting of direct access to PULSE for GSOC.
• Allow the term of the Ombudsman to be reduced from 6
years to a 5 year term with the option of a second term.
• Give the Ombudsman remit over civilian staff of the
Gardaf.
• Extend the list of those who can refer complaints to the
Ombudsman to include the newly proposed Criminal
Justice Inspectorate and the Chief Justice Director of
Public Prosecutions.
Allow police officers to complain to the Ombudsman
about the conduct of fellow Officers.

■ Allow the Ombudsman to conduct mediation.
• Allow the Ombudsman to compel witnesses, including
Garda officers.
• Allow the Ombudsman to compel retired Gardaf to attend
interview and to provide any documentation in their pos­
session.
• Place a duty on all Gardaf to report any evidence of sus­
pected criminal offence by other Gardaf or civilian staff.
• Give the Ombudsman the power to arrest persons who
are not Gardaf but who are engaged in crime for which a
Garda is being investigated.
• Give the power to the Ombudsman to recommend the
suspension of a Garda.
• Give the Ombudsman the power to direct informal disci­
plinary proceedings against a Garda where it is inappro­
priate to recommend formal disciplinary proceedings.
• Give power to entitle the Ombudsman to attend all disci­
plinary hearings which follow a police ombudsman
investigation.

 Complaints Procedures for Gardaf
(3). Confidential Recipient/Complaints
Procedure for Garda\
• GSOC should have the power to take complaints directly
from Gardaf or civilian staff supporting An Garda
Siochana.
• The resolution of what has been termed service issues or
more minor problems should be dealt with by a disputes
resolution or mediation mechanism under the auspices of
GSOC to ensure the speedy and effective resolution of rel­
atively minor matters.
• The Confidential Recipient should be directly accountable
to the Independent Garda Authority.

(4). State security and accountability
Sinn Fein propose that the Crime and Security Branch of An
Garda Siochana and the Defence Forces Directorate (G2)
come under the scrutiny of the Oireachtas Committee on
Justice. Defence and Equality with the necessary safeguards
in place, based on international best practice.

(5). Garda Inspectorate - A New Criminal
Justice Inspectorate
Sinn Fein notes that as currently constituted there is the
potential for some overlap in the roles of the Garda
Inspectorate and GSOC. While some of the recent submis­
sions to the Oireachtas Committee on Justice. Equality and
Defence have recommended the abolition of the Inspectorate
and the effective merging of its roles into GSOC. Sinn Fein
believes a different approach would be more effective.
Sinn Fein advocates the broadening of the role of the
Inspectorate to that of a new Criminal Justice Inspectorate. In
a similar fashion to the way in which the Health Information
and Quality Authority (HIQA) conducts inspections of various
institutions within the health sector we believe the Criminal
Justice Inspectorate should have a similar role within the
Justice sector.
The Criminal Justice Inspectorate would be primarily respon­
sible for the effectiveness and efficiency of the workings of
organisations within the criminal justice sector. This would
include both the inspection and reporting of their examina­
tion of policies, operational practices and procedures across
the sector organisations specified in any new legislation and
work to ensure public confidence is maintained. They must
also have responsibility for laying their reports before the
Houses of the Oireachtas.

Bodies under the remit of the proposed
Criminal Justice Inspectorate
An Garda Siochana
Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission
The Director of Public Prosecutions
The Probation Service
The Courts Service
Irish Youth Justice Service

Sinn Fein propose that the Crime and
Security Branch o f An Garda Siochana and
the Defence Forces Directorate (G2) come
under the scrutiny o f the Oireachtas
Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality

 North/South Co-operation
inn F6in is seeking the development of an AIMreland
democratically accountable policing and justice service
operating to the highest standards of human rights and
justice.

S

At present the delivery of policing and justice is undermined
by partition. This requires immediate steps to promote greater
cooperation, joint working and the promotion of best practice
across the island.
Criminality and illegality does not recognise borders. In some
cases jurisdictional disjoints provides legal grey areas and
gaps in service and safeguards.
We have had occasions in which registered sex offenders can
cross the border without authorities being alerted and occa­
sions when vetting checks did not highlight concerns raised in
the other jurisdiction.
The lack of reciprocal arrangements on penalty points under­
mines road safety. The clear need to safeguard missing per­
sons. tackle fraud, money laundering and smuggling are clear
examples of issues that can be better tackled through formal,
structured and accountable co-operation.
There have are examples where the Gardaf are not cooperat­
ing with the Police Ombudman in the north in relation to his­
torical investigations including the Dublin/Monaghan bomb­
ings in which the 40th anniversary occurs this month and
also the Widow Scallons pub atrocity in Dublin in 1994 which
were both carried out by the loyalist UVF. An Gardaf Siochana
failed to cooperate with the Police Ombudsman in the North
in its investigation into the killing of Sinn Fein Councillor Eddie
Fullerton in 1991 in Buncrana. Co. Donegal by the loyalist
UFF. amongst other cases. In these cases, one justice system
is undermining the accountability of the other.

borders. In some cases jurisdictional disjoints
provides legal grey areas and gaps in service
and safeguards
Ireland, north and south, faces similar problems in tackling
criminality, and ensuring community safety. Both jurisdictions
face challenges and can learn from each other to build
accountable and representative policing and justice systems
operating to the highest international standards.
This includes the examination of the powers of the offices of
the policing ombudsman, policing and justice oversight bod­
ies and policing authorities to ensure equivalence of powers
and harmonisation of approaches to the highest internation­
al standards.
Both jurisdictions have an obligation to develop the optimum
human and civil rights framework within which policing and
justice must operate.
Cross border co-operation makes sense for border communi­
ties. where common working and protocols can tackle crimi­
nal behaviour and promote community safety.
The benefits to working in an All-Ireland context within the
policing and justice systems can deliver the optimal use of
resources, the increase in skills and professional expertise.
There already exists the protocol for lateral entry for Gardaf
into the PSNI and vice versa, but more can and should be
done to deliver greater co-operation for the mutual benefit of
all citizens on the island. Current barriers to lateral entry
should be removed.
Sinn Fein does not underestimate the challenges to creating
a Cross Border and All- Ireland approach to policing and jus­
tice. not only in terms of organisational change, but also in
resolving jurisdictional and legal issues. However it is work
that must be undertaken.

 All-Ireland Policing and Justice and the Good Friday Agreement
The Good Friday Agreement was supported by the political
parties and the two governments who are jo in t guarantors.
The Good Friday Agreement was endorsed by the majority of
citizens both north and south. It promised a new beginning to
policing and criminal justice. Significant progress has been
made on reshaping and building accountable policing and
changes to the criminal justice system over the past decade.
The Agreement provided for the establishment of a North
South Ministerial Council NSMC);
to bring together those with executive responsibilities in
Northern Ireland and the Irish Government, to develop con­
sultation, co-operation and action within the island o f Ireland
- including through im plem entation on an all-island and
cross-border basis - on m atters o f m utua l interest within the
com petence o f the Adm inistrations, North and South.

At the time of Good Friday Agreement, policing and justice
powers was not a devolved matter and so outside the compe­
tence of the Assembly/Executive in the north.
These powers have now been transferred and are therefore
now under the competence of the Assembly/Executive in the
north.
Following on from the transfer of these powers it is clear that
policing and justice should be an area of co-operation under
the NSMC as it is a clear issue of mutual benefit.
In addition, the Good Friday Agreement and ancillary agree­
ments provided for a Bill of Rights for the North and an AllIreland Charter of Rights, as well as equivalent Human Rights
Commissions and Equality Mechanisms north and south.
These commitments have yet to be implemented in full.
These rights frameworks are fundam ental to achieve
accountable policing and justice and should be expedited as
a matter of urgency.

Sinn Fein is calling for:
Policing and Justice to be an area of co-operation under
the NSMC.
Consideration be given to identifying and delivering
aspects of the policing and justice system through a ded­
icated All-Ireland body which may include an All-Ireland
sex offenders register and vetting system, All-Ireland
penalty points system and road safety promotion, AllIreland training and personnel exchanges across policing
and justice bodies, community safety, missing person and
fraud.
The implementation and enactment of a Bill for Rights
and All-Ireland Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The networking of policing Authorities North and South to
promote the exchange of best practice, identification of
areas of co-operation for mutual benefit and harmonisa­
tion of approaches.
Full co-operation between criminal justice and policing
oversight bodies across Ireland including between police
services and police oversight bodies including the offices
of the Police Ombudsman.
The development of equivalence of powers and approach­
es between the offices of the Policing Ombudsman and
oversight bodies, north and south and to the highest stan­
dards of oversight and investigation.
Holding joint meetings of Joint Policing Committees and
Policing and Community Safety Partnerships along the
border corridor (i.e. Donegal and Fermanagh or Louth and
Armagh) at least twice annually.

Please contact:
Padraig MacLochlainn TD
Sinn Fein Spokesperson on Justice, Equality and Defence
Leinster House
Kildare Street
Dublin 2
+353 01 618 4061
padraig.maclochlainn@oireachtas.ie

 Houses of the Oireachtas
Dail and Seanad
Oireachtas Committees

Minster for Justice and Equality

New Garda
Authority

Bodies under
the remit of
the p.roposed
Criminal
Justice
Inspectorate

An Garda
Sfochana

An Garda Sfochana

Tus nua do phoilineacht
Moltaf d'athchoiriu
A New Beginning to Policing
Proposals for Reform
Sinn Fein Submission, May 2014

Ti

J

V

Garda Siochana
Ombudsman
Commission
fi

 Sinn Fein
UU Parnell Square
Dublin 1
Ireland
Telephone+00 353 1 8726100
Email: admin@sinnfein.ie
Web: www.sinnfein.ie
About Sinn Fein
Sinn Fein is a 3?-< otinty political parly whose oDje-.iive is ;o end partition on Hie
island oi Ireland and establish a demociati* ana sorialisl republic that i-ellecls
(he core principles ol unity, equality and prosperity.

 Response of the
Victims* Rights Alliance (VRA)
to the Public Consultation on Establishing
an Independent Policing Authority1

1 These submissions are only made on behalf of the following members o f the VRA, namely: Advocates for
Victims o f Homicide [AdVIC], the Dublin Rape Crisis Centre [DRCC], the Irish Roaa Victims’ Association
[IRVA], the Irish Tourist Assistance Service [ITAS], One in Four, PARC Road Safety Grouo and Support after
Homicide [SAH .

 ABOUT THE VICTIMS RIGHTS ALLIANCE:

The Victims’ Rights Alliance (VRA) is an Alliance of victim support and human rights
organisations in Ireland namely, Advocates for Victims of Homicide [AdVIC], the Dublin
Rape Crisis Centre [DRCC], Inclusion Ireland, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties [ICCL],
the Irish Road Victims’ Association [IRVA], the Irish Tourist Assistance Service [ITAS],
One in Four, PARC Road Safety Group, the Rape Crisis Network Ireland [RCNI], Safe
Ireland and Support after Homicide [SAH].
The Alliance was formed with one key goal: to ensure the Victims’ Rights Directive is
implemented in Ireland witliin the proposed time frame, with all victims of crime in mind.
Given the short time frame some o f the VRA members have not been in a position to review
or approve these submissions. These submissions therefore are only made on behalf o f the
following members o f the VRA, namely:
Advocates for Victims of Homicide [AdVIC], the Dublin Rape Crisis Centre [DRCC], the
Irish Road Victims’ Association [IRVA], the Irish Tourist Assistance Service [ITAS], One in
Four, PARC Road Safety Group and Support after Homicide [SAH],

For further information on the VRA please see www.victimsrightsalliance.com

 " ... it is not merely o f some importance but is offundamental importance, that

justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen
to be done. ,,2+

I.

Introduction

The Victims’ Rights Directive must be transposed in Ireland by the 16th of November 2 0 153.
The Directive requires that minimum information, support and protection should be afforded
to all victims )f crime.
Article 4 (1) (h) of the Victims’ Rights Directive that information should be offered to
victims on ‘the available procedures for making complaints where their rights are not
respected by the competent authority operating within the context of criminal proceedings. ’
The competent authority in this context refers to the Gardai.
The implementation of a transparent, clear and easy complaints procedure would enable
victims to make a complaint about a breach o f their rights under the Directive. If such a
proceduie is not in place then victims will have to go to the courts to enforce their rignrs.
In the context o f implementing an independent policing authority it is imperative that the
‘victim’ is considered at the heart of any complaints process.

II.

Placing the voice of the victim at the heart of an Independent Policing
Authority?

The recent publication of the Guerin Report4 illustrates serious breaches o f trust and a
complete failure o f the complaints procedures which was in place to deal with complaints
made by victims of crime. It is important to note thai the Guerin Report 1righlights the
consequences which ineffective complaints procedures can have on the life, liberty and
protection o f the victim.
Surveys were conducted last year by AdVIC, SAH and DRCC on victims of homicide and
rape5. The results of the survey illustrate that some victims face difficulties in obtaining
information, support and protection from the Gardai. Furthermore, the comments o f victims

2R v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 at 259.
3 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council o f 25 October 2012 establishing
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection o f victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework
Decision 2001/220/JHA
< http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexllriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2Q12:315:FULL:EN:PDF [Hereafter Victims'
Rights Directivel
4 Report to An Taoiseach [Prime Ministerl Enda Kenny TD on a Review of the Action Taken By an Garda
Siochana [Police] Pertaining to Certain Allegations made by Sergeant Maurice McCabe, 6th May 2014
5 Survey by AdVIC, the DRCC and SAH of victims of crime; comment made by victim in response to the survey.
For further information on the survey please contact marianidhomhnaillQgmail.com

 highlight that they are often unwilling or too afraid to make a complaint to the Gardai in
relation to a breach o f their rights.
Victims were asked a number of questions during the course of the survey including whether
they felt intimidated or re-victimised by the accused and/or the criminal justice system.
Of those who answered the question, 49% of victims stated that they felt intimidated/re­
victimised by the accused, while 72% stated that they felt re-victimised by the criminal
justice system.
A number of victims complained thai they felt re-victimised by the Gardai:

'The Garda made me feel like a criminal and that our feelings weren't taken into account.
There was more respect given to the accusedfamily ’.
‘Found dealing with Gardai very traumatic and worse than the original experience of rape.
Felt re-traumatised. ’
*[Felt re-victimised by] the guards coming to my home informed me that they still had my
sons leg after he was buried the day previous. ‘
These comments are shocking and illustrate why victims often feel unwilling or unable to
make a complaint about the Gardai.
Victims who were surveyed by AdVIC, the DRCC and SAH were also asked why they did
not make a complaint about their case. They said that:
•
•

•
•
•

'I was afraid’
‘Didn't want to bother them'
‘1 didn’t make a complaint as I was afraid and conjused’
‘Didn't think there was any point ’
‘We were afraid that it would damage our case’.

The author has included the foregoing survey and quotes to illustrate that victims are often
afraid to make a complaint to the Gardai about their case. This fear can be unfounded in some
instances but not in others. The Gardai hold all of the power and the victim, who has already
been subject to a crime, is often forgotten or re-victimised, justice must not only be ione but
it must also appear to be done. This issue is ever more pressing given the outcome of the
Guerin Report and the forthcoming implementation of the Victim’s Rights Directive in
Ireland.

III.

What should an Independent Policing Authority look like?
a. Appointment and membership

 An Independent policing authority must be independent. It is imperative that membership
would exclude members of the Gardai'. Appointment should be via an open and transparent
competition. Membership should include people from diverse elements o f society including
the public and private sector. Non - Governmental organisations should also feature in. its
membership. Any board member should be familiar with the Gardai’s role under the V ictim ’s
Rights Directive and any subsequent legislation which is implemented to give effect to th is

b. Functions and responsibilities
The independence o f the policing authority should be established via legislation. Legislation
should also permit the policing authority to investigate the Gardaf and enable it to gain access
to any files relevant for the purpose of the investigation.
Some victims o f crime are afraid to approach the Gardaf with a complaint during the
investigation in fear o f an impact on their case. This new body therefore could be a liaison
mechanism between the victims o f crime and the Gardaf involved in their case
The conclusion arrived at by the policing body when dealing with victims o f crime
complaints needs to be respected and acted on by the Gardai.

c. Implications for the Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) and
the Garda Siochana Inspectorate - Lessons to be learned from GSOC
The Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) and the Garda Siochana Inspectorate
are currently not fit for purpose from the victim’s perspective. They would not be in a
position to deal with complaints o f victims as a result of any breaches under the Victims’
Rights Directive. These submissions are not advocating the abolition o f GSOC but are rather
highlighting issues with the current complaints system which is in place. This is important to
prevent similar issues arising in an Independent Policing Authority. Furthermore, such an
analysis highlights any necessary functions and responsibilities which an Independent
Policing Authority requires.
The majority o f complaints to the GSOC are from perpetrator of crime and very few from
victims o f crime. The new policing body therefore need to be “victimfriendly”.
The author is aware that some victims believe that GSOC is not independent. They see a
direct link between the Gardai and GSOC. This is exacerbated by the fact that a substantial
amount o f complaints which GSOC receive are from an accused person/perpetrator and not
the victim. This view has been fuelled by the manner by which victims complaints have been
handled in the past and the lack o f engagement with victims. This may have been due to the
fact that GSOC did not have the authority to deal with said complaints or lack of information.
However, perception is important for a victim to have faith or trust in a complaints process.
Victims are unlikely to engage with the system which they perceive to be biased. Once again
the author notes that justice must also appear to be done.

 The procedure to make a complaint to GSOC is too rigid. Victims o f crime are not in the
right frame of mine to get involved with the process and the system needs to be simplified.
The time period for the making o f a complaint to GSOC is unreasonable. Very often victims
are unaware that there is a time period by which they must make a complaint. A time period
of six months is inappropriate and it does not take account of the vulnerable nature in which
some o f the victims find themselves in6.It is submitted that a longer period should apply. In
this regard, the author has had regard to the Victim’s Rig]its Directive, which makes no
reference to a time limit on the making of complaints relating to a breach of a victims right’s
under the Directive. Failure to deal with a complaint outside of the six month time frame m ay
be in breach of States obligations under the Directive. At a minimum a complaint under the
Directive should be able to be made for the course of criminal proceedings and for a short
period thereafter'. When dealing with serious crime, there should be nc time constraint to
make a complaint
A member of the VRA is aware of a case where a victim, after complaimng almost three
years earlier to GSOC, was finally sent a letter stating that GSOC could not adjudicate on
their case. The author is also aware of a complaint that was made to GSOC in 20 078. It took
until 2011 for GSOC to make this complaint admissible. A report was published by GSOC in
early 2014 which found the Garda investigation, which was the subject of the original 2007
complaint, was ‘inadequate and poorly conducted'. The delay in the process was arguably
contributed to by the Gardaf s refusal to provide requested documentation to GSOC. A delay
of almost eight years is completely unacceptable and is arguably in breach of a person s right
to access to justice within a reasonable period o f time, as provided for by the ECHR.
Furthermore, any independent policing authority must be able tc gain access to Garda files in
a case. It is accepted that confidentially o f these files is also imperative.
Any independent policing authority will only be able to carry out their functions in an
effective manner if they can gain access to all relevant information. Moreover, the
independence and competency of an independent policing authority rests on its ability to
show that justice is being achieved and that the Gardaf are assisting in this process.
Legislation therefore must be implemented to ensure that the Gardal must provide the
independent policing authority with information which the policing authority believes is
relevant to iheir investigation. Whether information should be provided or not should not rest
on whether the Gardai believe it is relevant9. The legislation must also provide that the
6 Article 22 of the Directive provides for the individual assessment of all victims of crime in order to identify
those victims that may have specific protection requirements. In considering whether a victim needs extra
protection measures regard will be had under Article 22 (4) to the characteristics of the victim, the nature of
the crime and circumstances of the crime. It is assumed under Article 24 that child victims need extra
protection.
7 The Victim's Rights Directive
8 Michael Brennan; 'GSOC slams Garda investigation into death of Donegal taxi driver' (Sunday Business Post,
1st June 2014)
9 The author is aware that the Gardaf have refused to provide information to GSOC, which GSOC deemed
relevant. This refusal was on the basis that the Gardaf believed that the information was not relevant.

 information obtained must be held in a secure manner and it must be subject to
confidentiality.
These delays in dealing with complaints can cause additional distress to the victim and it can
often make them feel re-victimised. An Independent Policing Authority must be able to deal
with complaints in a quick and effective manner.
GSOC is not in a position in its current format to deal with complaints which would arise as a
result of a breach under the Victims’ Rights Directive.

IV.

Recommendations

•

An Independent Policing Authority must be independent and free from any influence
direct or indirect from the Gardai.

•

An Independent Policing Authority must provide a transparent, clear and easy
complaints procedure which would enable victims to make a complaint about a breach
of their rights, including a breach of their rights under the Victims’ Rights Directive.

a

A ‘victim’ and their needs must be considered when developing any complaints
process and procedures.

•

When dealing with serious crime, there should be no time constraint to make a
complaint.

•

A time period of six months for the making of a complaint is too short and this should
be extended for a period extended beyond the end of any criminal justice proceedings
in line with obligations to provide information, support and protection under the
Victim’s Rights Directive.

•

The manner by which a victim can make a complaint should be easy and straight
forward.

•

Complaints should be responded to in a timely and effective manner.

•

The Independent Policing Authority should have jurisdiction to deal with any
breaches of a victims rights under the Victim’s Rights Directive.

•

An Independent Policing Authority could be a liaison mechanism between the victims
o f crime and the Gardai involved in their case.

 •

Legislation must be implemented to ensile that an Independent Policing Authority
can gain access to documentation which they deem relevant to cany out an effective
investigation. This documentation must be kept secure and confidential.

•

The conclusion arrived at by an Independent Policing Authority when dealing w ith
complaints needs to be respected and acted on by the Gardai.