No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

STEVAN E. BUNNELL
General Counsel
U.S. Department of
Homeland Security
Washington, D.C. 20528

DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR.
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
BENJAMIN C. MIZER
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Deputy Solicitor General
BETH S. BRINKMANN
Deputy Assistant Attorney
General
ZACHARY D. TRIPP
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
DOUGLAS N. LETTER
SCOTT R. MCINTOSH
JEFFREY CLAIR
WILLIAM E. HAVEMANN
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217

 QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Department of Homeland Security has long
engaged in “a regular practice * * * known as ‘deferred action,’ ” in which the Secretary “exercis[es]
[his] discretion” to forbear, “for humanitarian reasons
or simply for [his] own convenience,” from removing
particular aliens from the United States. Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525
U.S. 471, 483-484 (1999). On November 20, 2014, the
Secretary issued a memorandum (Guidance) directing
his subordinates to establish a process for considering
deferred action for certain aliens who have lived in the
United States for five years and either came here as
children or already have children who are U.S. citizens
or permanent residents.
The questions presented are:
1. Whether a State that voluntarily provides a subsidy to all aliens with deferred action has Article III
standing and a justiciable cause of action under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et
seq., to challenge the Guidance because it will lead to
more aliens having deferred action.
2. Whether the Guidance is arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law.
3. Whether the Guidance was subject to the APA’s
notice-and-comment procedures.

(I)

 PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners were appellants in the court of appeals.
They are: the United States of America; Jeh Charles
Johnson, in his official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; R. Gil Kerlikowske, in his official capacity as Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection; Ronald D. Vitiello, in his official capacity
as Deputy Chief of U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection; Sarah R. Saldaña, in her official capacity as Director of U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; and León Rodríguez, in his
official capacity as Director of U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services.
Respondents were appellees in the court of appeals.
They are: The State of Texas; State of Alabama; State
of Georgia; State of Idaho; State of Indiana; State of
Kansas; State of Louisiana; State of Montana; State of
Nebraska; State of South Carolina; State of South
Dakota; State of Utah; State of West Virginia; State of
Wisconsin; Paul R. LePage, Governor, State of Maine;
Patrick L. McCrory, Governor, State of North Carolina; C.L. “Butch” Otter, Governor, State of Idaho; Phil
Bryant, Governor, State of Mississippi; State of North
Dakota; State of Ohio; State of Oklahoma; State of
Florida; State of Arizona; State of Arkansas; Bill
Schuette, Attorney General, State of Michigan; State
of Nevada; and the State of Tennessee. *

*

Several putative beneficiaries of the Guidance moved to intervene as defendants in the district court. The court denied the
motion, but the court of appeals reversed that order. See 2015 WL
6876054.

(II)

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Opinions below .............................................................................. 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
Statutory and regulatory provisions involved ........................... 2
Statement:
A. Legal framework.................................................... 2
B. Factual and procedural background .................... 8
Reasons for granting the petition ............................................. 11
I.
Respondents do not have Article III standing or a
cognizable claim under the APA ............................... 14
A. A State’s voluntary decision to extend a
subsidy to aliens accorded deferred action
does not give it standing to challenge federal
deferred-action policies ....................................... 14
B. Respondents lack a cognizable APA claim ........ 18
II. The Secretary had ample statutory authority
to issue the Guidance ................................................. 24
III. The Guidance is exempt from notice-andcomment requirements .............................................. 29
IV. This case warrants immediate review ...................... 32
Conclusion ................................................................................... 35
Appendix A .................................................................................. 1a
Appendix B .............................................................................. 156a
Appendix C .............................................................................. 244a
Appendix D .............................................................................. 407a
Appendix E .............................................................................. 411a
Appendix F .............................................................................. 420a
Appendix G .............................................................................. 430a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Page

Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) ...... passim
Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn,
131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011) ......................................................... 15
(III)

 IV
Cases—Continued:

Page

Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2015),
petition for cert. pending, No. 15-643
(filed Nov. 12, 2015) ...................................................... 34, 35
Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340
(1984) .................................................................................... 23
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138
(2013) .................................................................................... 17
Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388
(1987) .............................................................................. 18, 19
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) ........ 15
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) ..................... 3, 12, 20
Johns v. Department of Justice, 653 F.2d 884
(5th Cir. 1981) ...................................................................... 20
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) ................... 4, 20, 29, 30
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) ................... 14
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992) .................................................................................... 14
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) ................. 15, 16
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) ................................... 19
Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976) ....... 16, 17
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) ...................................... passim
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) .................... 14
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) .................................. 2, 23
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) ..................... 32
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) ...................... 30
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc.,
531 U.S. 457 (2001).............................................................. 24
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992) ...................... 17

 V

Constitution, statutes and regulations:

Page

U.S. Const.:
Art. II, § 3, Cl. 5 .............................................................. 10
Art. III .................................................................. 11, 12, 14
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500
et seq. .................................................................................... 10
5 U.S.C. 553 ............................................................ 10, 430a
5 U.S.C. 553(a)(2)................................................... 31, 430a
5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A) ................................................. 29, 431a
5 U.S.C. 701(a)(1)................................................... 23, 432a
5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2)................................................... 20, 432a
5 U.S.C. 702 ............................................................ 18, 432a
5 U.S.C. 706 ............................................................ 10, 433a
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L.
No. 113-76, Div. F, Tit. II, 128 Stat. 250............................. 4
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-4, 129 Stat. 39:
Tit. II:
129 Stat. 42 ......................................................... 4, 450a
129 Stat. 42-43 .................................................. 25, 450a
129 Stat. 43 ......................................................... 4, 451a
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101
et seq. ...................................................................................... 2
8 U.S.C. 1103(a) ..................................................... 26, 436a
8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1)............................................. 2, 20, 436a
8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1)-(3) ..................................... 25, 30, 436a
8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(2)................................................... 3, 436a
8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3)............................................. 3, 20, 436a
8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(II) ............................................. 8
8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(IV) ............................................ 8

 VI
Statutes and regulations—Continued:

Page

8 U.S.C. 1182 .......................................................... 22, 437a
8 U.S.C. 1182(a) ....................................................... 2, 437a
8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B) ............................................. 6, 437a
8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i) ......................................... 6, 437a
8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) .............................6, 22, 32, 438a
8 U.S.C. 1226(a)(3)........................................................... 22
8 U.S.C. 1226(c) ............................................................... 25
8 U.S.C. 1227(a) ............................................................. 2, 5
8 U.S.C. 1229b.................................................................. 28
8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(7)........................................................... 22
8 U.S.C. 1252 .................................................................... 23
8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B) ..................................................... 27
8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) ................................................ 22
8 U.S.C. 1252(g) ............................................... 8, 23, 26, 27
8 U.S.C. 1324a ........................................................ 22, 439a
8 U.S.C. 1324a(a) ................................................... 27, 439a
8 U.S.C. 1324a(a)(1) ................................................. 5, 439a
8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(3) ......................... 5, 13, 22, 23, 27, 440a
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 ...................................... 5
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 1703(c)-(d),
117 Stat. 1694-1695 ............................................................... 8
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-3010 ......................... 27
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193,
§ 411, 110 Stat. 2268 (8 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) ..................... 19
8 U.S.C. 1611 .......................................................... 20, 441a
8 U.S.C. 1611(a) ....................................................... 6, 441a
8 U.S.C. 1611(b) ..................................................... 20, 441a

 VII
Statutes and regulations—Continued:

Page

8 U.S.C. 1611(b)(2) ................................................ 22, 443a
8 U.S.C. 1611(b)(2)-(b)(4) ........................................ 6, 443a
8 U.S.C. 1611(b)(3) ................................................ 22, 443a
8 U.S.C. 1611(c) ..................................................... 20, 444a
8 U.S.C. 1621 .......................................................... 19, 445a
8 U.S.C. 1621(a) ................................................. 7, 19, 445a
8 U.S.C. 1621(b) ................................................. 7, 19, 446a
8 U.S.C. 1621(c) ..................................................... 19, 447a
8 U.S.C. 1621(c)(1)(B) ........................................... 20, 447a
8 U.S.C. 1621(d) ............................................7, 19, 20, 448a
8 U.S.C. 1641(b) ....................................................... 6, 449a
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B,
119 Stat. 302 .......................................................................... 8
49 U.S.C. 30301 note ......................................................... 8
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 423(b),
115 Stat. 361 .......................................................................... 8
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, Tit. V, 108 Stat. 1092. ..................................... 8
6 U.S.C. 202(3) ............................................................... 2, 435a
6 U.S.C. 202(5) ..............................................2, 20, 25, 30, 435a
6 U.S.C. 271(b) ......................................................................... 2
6 U.S.C. 557 .............................................................................. 2
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-1001(2) (2013) ............................ 18
Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.421(a-3) (West 2013) .......... 15
8 C.F.R.:
Section 1.3(a) .......................................................... 20, 473a
Section 1.3(a)(4)(vi) ........................................... 7, 32, 474a
Section 274a.12(a) .................................................... 5, 452a
Section 274a.12(b) .................................................... 5, 456a
Section 274a.12(c) .................................................... 5, 465a
Section 274a.12(c)(14) ....................................... 5, 32, 469a

 VIII
Miscellaneous:

Page

Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez,
The President and Immigration Law,
119 Yale L.J. 458 (2009) ..................................................... 25
Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act (1947) .............................. 29
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Yearbook of Immigration
Statistics: 2013 Enforcement Actions, Tbl. 39,
Aliens Removed or Returned: Fiscal Years 1892
to 2013 (2014), http://www.dhs.gov/publication/
yearbook-immigration-statistics-2013-enforcementactions .................................................................................... 4
44 Fed. Reg. 43,480 (July 25, 1979) ................................ 23, 27
46 Fed. Reg. 25,080 (May 5, 1981) ............................. 6, 27, 32
61 Fed. Reg. 47,041 (Sept. 6, 1996) .................................. 7, 32
6 Charles Gordon et al., Immigration Law and
Procedure (1998) ................................................................... 5
Memorandum from Gene McNary, Comm’r, to Reg’l
Comm’rs, Family Fairness, reprinted as 67 No. 6
Interpreter Releases 153, App. I (Feb. 2, 1990) .............. 30
Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Immigration
& Naturalization Serv. Comm’r, to Reg’l Dirs.
et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, reprinted as 77 No. 46 Interpreter Releases 1661,
App. I (Nov. 17, 2000) .......................................................... 3
Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc.
Dir., to Field Leadership, Consolidation of Guidance Concerning Unlawful Presence for Purposes
of Sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of
the Act 42 (May 6, 2009), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/
default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_
Files_Memoranda/2009/revision_redesign_
AFM.PDF ............................................................................. 6

 IX
Miscellaneous—Continued:

Page

Manuel Pastor et al., The Kids Aren’t Alright – But
They Could Be: The Impact of Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) on Children (Mar. 2015),
https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/731/docs/DAP
A_Impact_on_Children_CSII_Brief_Final_01.pdf ........ 33
Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Verifying Lawful Presence (July 2013), http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/
DriverLiense/documents/verifyingLawful
Presence.pdf ........................................................................ 17
The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority
to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. __
(Nov. 19, 2014) ............................................................. 7, 8, 33

 In the Supreme Court of the United States
No.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the federal parties, respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to
review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App.
(App.) 1a-155a) is not yet published but is available at
2015 WL 6873190. The opinion of the court of appeals
denying a stay pending appeal (App. 156a-243a) is
reported at 787 F.3d 733. The opinion of the district
court (App. 244a-406a) is reported at 86 F. Supp. 3d
591.
JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on November 9, 2015. The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

 2
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent statutory and regulatory provisions are
reproduced in the appendix to this petition. App.
430a-475a.
STATEMENT
A. Legal Framework

1. The “authority to control immigration * * * is
vested solely in the Federal Government.” Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915). Pursuant to that authority, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. The INA
charges the Secretary of Homeland Security “with the
administration and enforcement of [the INA] and all
other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1). 1
Congress has expressly assigned the Secretary the
responsibility for “[e]stablishing national immigration
enforcement policies and priorities.” 6 U.S.C. 202(5).
One of the enforcement matters over which the Secretary has authority is the removal of aliens if, inter
alia, “they were inadmissible at the time of entry,
have been convicted of certain crimes, or meet other
criteria set by federal law.” Arizona v. United States,
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012); see 8 U.S.C. 1182(a),
1227(a). In this and other matters, the Secretary is
vested with the authority to “establish such regulations; * * * issue such instructions; and perform
1

Congress has transferred to the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) most of the functions of the former Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS). E.g., 6 U.S.C. 202(3), 271(b),
557. Unless otherwise indicated, references to the actions of DHS
and the Secretary include actions by their predecessors.

 3
such other acts as he deems necessary,” and to have
“control, direction, and supervision” of all DHS employees. 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(2) and (3).
2. “A principal feature of the removal system is the
broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.”
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. When they encounter a
removable alien, immigration officials, “as an initial
matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue
removal at all.” Ibid. They decide whether to
“[f]ocus[] investigative resources on particular offenses or conduct”; “to issue, serve, or file a Notice to
Appear”; to oppose a request for relief; to settle or
dismiss a proceeding; to appeal an adverse ruling; and
to execute a removal order. Memorandum from Doris
Meissner, INS Comm’r, Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion 2, reprinted as 77 No. 46 Interpreter Releases 1661, App. I (Nov. 17, 2000). “At each stage the
Executive has discretion to abandon the endeavor.”
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.,
525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (AADC).
Like other agencies exercising enforcement discretion, DHS balances “a number of factors which are
peculiarly within its expertise.” Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). Those factors include
“whether agency resources are best spent on this
violation or another” and “whether the agency has
enough resources to undertake the action at all,” ibid.,
as well as “immediate human concerns,” such as
“whether the alien has children born in the United
States [or] long ties to the community,” Arizona, 132
S. Ct. at 2499.
The Secretary faces resource constraints that require the exercise of enforcement discretion. More
than 11 million removable aliens are estimated to live

 4
in the United States. App. 5a. But Congress has
appropriated the funds to remove only a fraction of
that population in any given year. The number of
removals has varied depending on circumstances, but
DHS has not been able to remove more than four
percent of the estimated removable population in any
year. See DHS, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics:
2013 Enforcement Actions, Tbl. 39, Aliens Removed
or Returned: Fiscal Years 1892 to 2013 (2014). And
more aliens enter unlawfully or otherwise become
removable each year.
Recognizing that DHS cannot actually remove the
vast majority of removable aliens, Congress has directed U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), the relevant DHS component, to use at least
$1.6 billion to identify and remove aliens convicted of
crimes, and to prioritize removals of criminal aliens
“by the severity of th[e] crime.” DHS Appropriations
Act, 2015 (Appropriations Act), Pub. L. No. 114-4, Tit.
II, 129 Stat. 43. But as relevant here, Congress has
otherwise committed to DHS’s discretion the choice of
how to allocate its lump-sum appropriation for “necessary expenses for enforcement of immigration and
customs laws, detention and removals, and investigations.” Id. at 42; see Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, Div. F, Tit. II, 128 Stat. 250
(same); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191-194 (1993).
3. For decades, DHS has engaged in “a regular
practice * * * known as ‘deferred action,’ ” in which
the Secretary “exercis[es] [his] discretion” to forbear,
“for humanitarian reasons or simply for [his] own
convenience,” from removing particular aliens from
the United States for a designated period of time.
AADC, 525 U.S. at 483-484. Deferred action thus

 5
memorializes a decision “[t]o ameliorate a harsh and
unjust outcome” through forbearance. Id. at 484
(quoting 6 Charles Gordon et al. Immigration Law
and Procedure § 72.03[2][h] (1998)). Through “[t]his
commendable exercise in administrative discretion,
developed without express statutory authorization,”
ibid. (citation omitted), a removable alien is able to
remain in the country for the duration of the agency’s
forbearance. That person’s continued presence does
not violate any criminal law, because “[r]emoval is a
civil, not criminal, matter,” and “[a]s a general rule, it
is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present
in the United States.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499,
2505; see 8 U.S.C. 1227(a). But deferred action provides no defense to the civil consequence of continued
presence: The alien remains removable, and DHS has
discretion to revoke deferred action at any time. See
AADC, 525 U.S. at 484-485.
Under other longstanding federal law, according
aliens deferred action has several consequences.
First, aliens with deferred action—like many other
aliens whose presence is temporarily countenanced—
become eligible for work authorization. 8 C.F.R.
274a.12(a), (b), (c), and (14). As amended by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA),
Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, the INA makes it
unlawful to knowingly hire an “unauthorized alien.” 8
U.S.C. 1324a(a)(1). Aliens are “unauthorized” to be
hired if they are not permanent residents or not “authorized to be so employed by [the INA] or by the
[Secretary].” 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(3). Pursuant to a
regulation in place when Congress enacted IRCA,
aliens with deferred action and economic need may
apply for work authorization. 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14);

 6
see 46 Fed. Reg. 25,080 (May 5, 1981). Otherwise,
during the period the government has countenanced
an alien’s presence, that person would have no lawful
way to make ends meet and would be vulnerable to
exploitation by unscrupulous employers.
Second, like many other aliens, aliens accorded deferred action cease accruing time for purposes of the
admissibility bars in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B). That
provision makes an alien inadmissible for three or ten
years if she departs the United States after being
“unlawfully present” for six months or a year. 8
U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i). “For purposes of this paragraph,” an alien is “unlawfully present” if she is present “after the expiration of the period of stay authorized by the [Secretary].” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii).
The Secretary has long considered deferred action to
toll accrual of time for purposes of that calculation.
See Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting
Assoc. Dir., Consolidation of Guidance Concerning Unlawful Presence for Purposes of Sections
212(a)(9)(B)(i) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act 42
(May 6, 2009).
Third, aliens with deferred action become potentially eligible for certain federal public benefits. For
most such benefits, only “qualified alien[s]” are eligible, and aliens with deferred action are not “qualified.” 8 U.S.C. 1611(a); see 8 U.S.C. 1641(b) (defining
“qualified alien”). But that limitation does not apply
to some Social Security, Medicare, and railroadretirement benefits when a non-qualified alien is “lawfully present in the United States as determined by
the [Secretary].” 8 U.S.C. 1611(b)(2)-(4). Under longstanding regulations, deferred action makes an alien
eligible for some Social Security benefits under this

 7
provision. 8 C.F.R. 1.3(a)(4)(vi); 61 Fed. Reg. 47,041
(Sept. 6, 1996).
As a matter of federal law, deferred action has no
impact on whether an alien is eligible for any state
public benefit. States may provide certain minimal
benefits to all aliens. See 8 U.S.C. 1621(b). But non“qualified” aliens (who are also not parolees or
nonimmigrants) are prohibited from receiving any
additional state public benefits, unless the State has
affirmatively chosen after August 22, 1996 to provide
them. 8 U.S.C. 1621(a) and (d). Deferred action does
not make an alien “qualified” (or a parolee or nonimmigrant). See 8 U.S.C. 1641(b). Deferred action thus
does not trigger eligibility for any state public benefit,
unless a State voluntarily chooses to provide such a
benefit on that basis.
4. DHS has repeatedly accorded deferred action
and exercised similar forms of discretion on the basis
of the Secretary’s general authority to administer the
immigration laws. The Department of Homeland
Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain
Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and
to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. ___, *14*20 (Nov. 19, 2014) (OLC Op.) (collecting examples).
For example, in 1990, INS expanded a “Family Fairness” policy to provide extended voluntary departure
to spouses or children of aliens with legalized status,
and some estimates were that 1.5 million people—
about 40% of the total removable population at the
time—could be eligible. Id. at *31. In 2005, DHS
implemented a policy of according deferred action to
foreign students affected by Hurricane Katrina. Id.
at *16-*17. And in 2012, DHS implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy

 8
for certain aliens who were brought or came to this
country as children and have lived here for years. Id.
at *17-*18. More than 600,000 people have been accorded deferred action via that policy. App. 4a.
Congress has repeatedly recognized in legislation
that DHS has inherent authority to defer action. For
example, without defining or codifying the term, Congress has made aliens who petition for relief under the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, Tit. V, 108 Stat. 1092, eligible to request “deferred action.” 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(II) and (IV).
Similarly, certain family members of lawful permanent residents killed on September 11, 2001, or of
citizens killed in combat, are “eligible for deferred
action.” USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 423(b), 115 Stat. 361; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136,
§ 1703(c)-(d), 117 Stat. 1694-1695. Congress has also
provided that, if a State participates in the REAL ID
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 302,
it may issue compliant driver’s licenses to aliens with
“approved deferred action status.” 49 U.S.C. 30301
note. And 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) bars judicial review of “no
deferred action” decisions. AADC, 525 U.S. at 485.
B. Factual And Procedural Background

1. On November 20, 2014, the Secretary issued two
memoranda relevant here. The first directs DHS to
focus “to the greatest degree possible” on removing
serious criminals, terrorists, aliens who recently
crossed the border, and aliens who have abused the
immigration system. App. 426a; see App. 420a-429a.
The second announces “new policies for the use of
deferred action.” App. 412a (Guidance); see App.
411a-419a. The Guidance directs U.S. Citizenship and

 9
Immigration Services (USCIS) to expand eligibility
under the 2012 DACA policy to aliens with a wider
range of ages and arrival dates, and extends the period of deferred action from two years to three. App.
415a-416a. The Guidance also directs USCIS “to
establish a process, similar to DACA, for exercising
prosecutorial discretion through the use of deferred
action, on a case-by-case basis,” to certain aliens who
have “a son or daughter who is a U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident.” App. 416a-417a. This process is
known as Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA). App. 2a.
To request consideration for deferred action via
DAPA, an applicant must: (1) as of November 20,
2014, be the parent of a son or daughter who is a U.S.
citizen or permanent resident; (2) have continuously
resided here since before January 1, 2010; (3) have
been physically present here on November 20, 2014,
and when applying for relief; (4) have no lawful immigration status on that date; (5) not fall within the
Secretary’s enforcement priorities; and (6) “present
no other factors that, in the exercise of discretion,
make[] the grant of deferred action inappropriate.”
App. 417a.
The Secretary explained that the new policy would
reach “hard-working people who have become integrated members of American society,” have not committed serious crimes, and “are extremely unlikely to
be deported given * * * limited enforcement resources.” App. 415a. Deferring action for these individuals, the Secretary continued, supports “this Nation’s security and economic interests and make[s]
common sense, because [it] encourage[s] these people
to come out of the shadows, submit to background

 10
checks, pay fees, apply for work authorization (which
by separate authority I may grant), and be counted.”
Ibid. The Guidance emphasizes that it does not establish any right to deferred action, that deferred action
“does not confer any form of legal status in this country,” and that deferred action “may be terminated at
any time at the agency’s discretion.” App. 413a.
Under the Guidance, DHS was to begin accepting
requests under the expanded DACA criteria no later
than February 18, 2015, and for DAPA no later than
May 19, 2015. App. 416a, 418a.
2. On December 3, 2014, respondent States sued in
district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief against implementing the Guidance. Respondents alleged that the Guidance violates the Take Care
Clause, U.S. Const. Art. II, § 3, Cl. 5; is arbitrary and
capricious, 5 U.S.C. 706; and could only be adopted
through notice-and-comment procedures, 5 U.S.C.
553. App. 9a.
On February 16, 2015, the district court entered a
nationwide preliminary injunction against implementing the Guidance. App. 407a-410a. The court held
that respondents were likely to succeed in establishing that they had standing and a cause of action under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500
et seq., and that the Secretary was required to conduct
notice-and-comment rulemaking before issuing the
Guidance. App. 405a. The court did not reach respondents’ substantive APA and constitutional claims.
App. 403a-405a.
The government appealed, moved to expedite, and
moved for a stay pending appeal. App. 2a. The court
of appeals expedited the appeal. On May 26, 2015, a
divided panel declined to stay the injunction pending

 11
appeal. App. 156a-210a. Judge Higginson dissented.
App. 211a-243a.
On November 9, 2015, a divided panel affirmed the
preliminary injunction. App. 1a-90a. The majority,
consisting of the same two judges who were in the
stay-panel majority, held that “[a]t least one state”—
Texas—had Article III standing and a justiciable
cause of action under the APA, and that respondents
were substantially likely to establish that notice-andcomment rulemaking was required. App. 20a; see
App. 11a-69a. Although the district court had not
addressed the issue, the majority further held that the
Guidance is “manifestly contrary” to the INA. App.
76a; see App. 69a-86a.
The new panel member, Judge King, dissented.
App. 91a-155a. Like Judge Higginson, she concluded
that the Guidance involves non-reviewable matters
that are committed to agency discretion by law, and
that, if the Guidance “is implemented in the truly
discretionary, case-by-case manner it contemplates, it
is not subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements.” App. 92a-93a. She also found it inappropriate to rule on the substantive validity of the
Guidance but stated that, if she were to reach the
question, she would not have found the Guidance unlawful. App. 146a-155a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A divided court of appeals has upheld an unprecedented nationwide injunction against implementing a
federal immigration enforcement policy of great national importance, and has done so in violation of established limits on the judicial power. If left undisturbed, that ruling will allow States to frustrate the
federal government’s enforcement of the Nation’s

 12
immigration laws. It will force millions of people—
who are not removal priorities under criteria the court
conceded are valid, and who are parents of U.S. citizens and permanent residents—to continue to work
off the books, without the option of lawful employment
to provide for their families. And it will place a cloud
over the lives of hundreds of thousands of people who
came to the United States as children, have lived here
for years, and been accorded deferred action under
the 2012 DACA policy, which respondents have never
challenged. The decision warrants immediate review.
The court of appeals’ justiciability rulings threaten
a vast expansion of the judicial power that would entangle federal courts in policy disputes that are
properly resolved through the political process. The
court erroneously permitted any State to create Article III standing to challenge a federal policy, based on
the State’s voluntary decision to provide a state subsidy to the aliens that policy would benefit. But the
Guidance does not bar a State from eliminating that
subsidy if it believes that federal policy choices no
longer align with its interests. The court compounded
that error by rewriting the established limits on APA
review in disregard of this Court’s admonition that an
“agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal
with the many variables involved” in setting enforcement policies. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831832 (1985).
The court of appeals’ merits rulings warrant review
because they strip DHS of authority it has long exercised to provide deferred action to categories of aliens.
The majority acknowledged that DHS could lawfully
exercise enforcement discretion to forbear from removing the parents and children covered by the Guid-

 13
ance, who have lived here for years. App. 44a. It
nevertheless believed that the INA forbade the government from according those same parents and children deferred action. But “deferred action” itself is
simply the name in immigration parlance for when
DHS memorializes a decision to forbear from removing an alien, as a matter of enforcement discretion, for
a designated time.
To be sure, deferred action has several other consequences for the alien under longstanding federal
law, including eligibility to apply for work authorization. But the Secretary has discretion under the INA
to grant that work authorization, which is closely
bound up with his exercise of discretion over removals. Indeed, the INA for decades has made clear that
the determination of which aliens are authorized to be
hired lawfully may be made “by the [Secretary].” 8
U.S.C. 1324a(h)(3). The INA thus authorizes the
Secretary to accord deferred action to the parents
here—and to have them come forward, submit to a
background check, and support their U.S.-citizen and
permanent-resident children by working lawfully.
The court of appeals also fundamentally erred in
holding that the Guidance was subject to the APA’s
notice-and-comment requirements. The Guidance is a
classic example of a “general statement of policy” that
is expressly exempt from those requirements. The
court’s contrary ruling threatens to deprive agencies
throughout the government of the flexibility that is
essential in fashioning and revising policies for enforcement and other discretionary practices.
The court of appeals thus committed manifold and
significant errors in affirming the unprecedented
nationwide injunction barring implementation of an

 14
important federal policy affecting the parents and
children here. This Court should grant certiorari and
reverse.
I. RESPONDENTS DO NOT HAVE ARTICLE III STANDING OR A COGNIZABLE CLAIM UNDER THE APA
A. A State’s Voluntary Decision To Extend A Subsidy To
Aliens Accorded Deferred Action Does Not Give It
Standing To Challenge Federal Deferred-Action Policies

1. Like a member of the public, a State generally
lacks standing to challenge the Executive’s policy
choices about how to enforce federal laws, including
the immigration laws. In the context of criminal proceedings, “a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of [a] prosecuting authority when he himself is
neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.”
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
Private parties similarly “have no judicially cognizable
interest in procuring enforcement of the immigration
laws” against someone else. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,
467 U.S. 883, 897 (1984). And because “the removal
process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal
Government” to the exclusion of the States, Arizona v.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012), it is not a
process in which a State inherently has a sovereign or
quasi-sovereign interest.
Nor does a State obtain standing to challenge a
federal immigration policy by virtue of the collateral
consequences for aliens who are the policy’s beneficiaries. See p. 7, supra. “[M]uch more is needed” to
establish standing than a mere assertion of “the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack
of regulation) of someone else.” Lujan v. Defenders

 15
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992); see, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 346 (2006).
Indeed, the Constitution’s assignment of immigration
responsibilities exclusively to the national government
renders States particularly unlikely candidates for
invoking the jurisdiction of federal courts to interfere
with the relationship between the national government and aliens.
2. If a State could ever have standing to challenge
a federal deferred-action policy despite these structural bars, at a minimum it would have to show a cognizable injury that affects it in an “individual way”
that is “fairly . . . traceable” to the policy. Arizona
Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436,
1442 (2011) (emphasis added; brackets and citations
omitted). Respondents cannot make that showing
because the Guidance does not regulate States or
require States to do (or not do) anything.
The court of appeals nonetheless held that Texas
had standing by extending Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497 (2007). App. 12a. According Texas “special
solicitude,” ibid., the majority found standing based
on an injury that results from Texas’s own decisions
(1) to subsidize the costs of its alien “temporary
visitor” driver’s licenses; and (2) to allow aliens
with deferred action to apply for those subsidized
licenses. See App. 11a-36a; App. 105a (King, J., dissenting) (dissent); see also Tex. Transp. Code Ann.
§ 521.421(a-3) (West 2013). By increasing the number
of aliens in Texas with deferred action, the majority
reasoned, the Guidance will increase the subsidy’s
overall cost. See App. 20a-21a. The majority recognized that “Texas could avoid financial loss by requiring applicants to pay the full costs of [those] licenses.”

 16
App. 24a. But in the majority’s view, Texas still suffered an actionable harm because the Guidance imposed “substantial pressure” on Texas to change its
state laws. App. 16a, 20a. Ultimately, therefore, it
was not the prospect of increased costs that provided
standing; it was the prospect that Texas might want to
change its laws to avoid those costs. Ibid.
Unlike in Massachusetts, however, the INA does
not grant Texas any special “procedural right” to
challenge federal immigration policy. 549 U.S. at 517.
And the interest Texas asserts is nothing like the
sovereign interest in Massachusetts. There, the State
was threatened with a loss of sovereign territory—a
literal loss of sovereignty—it could not unilaterally
avoid. See id. at 519-520. Here, the Guidance causes
no loss of sovereignty. Texas has chosen to link the
availability of state-subsidized licenses to a federal
immigration category that the State believed suited
its sovereign interests. Nothing in the Guidance affects Texas’s freedom to alter or eliminate its subsidy
at any time. Any “pressure” here is thus self-created
and fundamentally unlike preemption, where a federal
law overrides a duly-enacted state law.
The decision below is therefore at odds with Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976). That
decision holds that a State’s choice to extend a subsidy
on the basis of another sovereign’s actions is not a
proper basis for standing when the other sovereign’s
policies change and thus increase the cost of the subsidy. In Pennsylvania, the Court concluded that
Pennsylvania lacked standing to challenge a New
Jersey tax that triggered a tax credit under Pennsylvania law and thereby reduced Pennsylvania’s tax
revenue. Id. at 662-664. The Court explained that

 17
“[n]o State can be heard to complain about damage
inflicted by its own hand” and that “nothing prevents
Pennsylvania from withdrawing [the] credit.” Id.
at 664; cf. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct.
1138, 1152-1153 (2013). So too here.
The panel majority instead relied on Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992), but that case is inapposite. It held that Wyoming had standing to challenge a discriminatory Oklahoma law targeted at
reducing sales of Wyoming coal in Oklahoma, when
the effect was to reduce Wyoming’s revenues from its
neutral tax on coal extraction. Id. at 442-446, 454.
Wyoming, however, did not “tie[] its law to that of
another sovereign.” App. 106a n.16 (dissent). Wyoming’s tax depended solely on activity in Wyoming. It
was the defendant (Oklahoma) that reached out to
connect the two sovereigns’ policies by targeting Wyoming coal for particular burdens. Here, as in Pennsylvania but unlike in Wyoming, the link has been
created by the plaintiff State. But to the extent Pennsylvania and Wyoming can be read to point in different directions, that only underscores the need for this
Court’s review.
3. As the dissent recognized, “[t]he majority’s
breathtaking expansion of state standing would inject
the courts into far more federal-state disputes and
review of the political branches than is now the case.”
App. 103a. For example, Texas provides the same
subsidy to myriad other aliens, including those with
parole, asylum, temporary protected status, deferred
enforced departure, and extended voluntary departure. See Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Verifying Lawful
Presence 1-5 (July 2013). Under the majority’s reasoning, Texas could claim standing to sue the govern-

 18
ment for making an individual decision to grant asylum—and would clearly have standing to sue the
government any time it adopted immigration policies
providing relief to a substantial number of aliens in
Texas in any of these categories.
The harms of the majority’s theory also could extend well beyond immigration. For example, a State
that voluntarily incorporates the federal definition of
“adjusted gross income” in computing state income
taxes—as many States do, see, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 43-1001(2) (2013)—could have standing to
challenge an IRS revenue ruling that lowered adjusted gross income under federal law, and thereby incidentally decreased state revenues. But the consequences of the majority’s theory are particularly acute
in a case, like this one, where a State seeks to leverage
its own policy choices to insert itself—and the federal
courts—into discretionary immigration policy decisions that Congress and the Constitution have committed exclusively to the national government.
B. Respondents Lack A Cognizable APA Claim

The court of appeals’ decision also warrants review
because it vastly expands what qualifies as a cognizable cause of action under the APA and impermissibly
subjects the federal government’s exercise of enforcement discretion to judicial oversight.
1. The APA does not “allow suit by every person
suffering injury in fact.” Clarke v. Securities Indus.
Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 395 (1987). It limits the right of
judicial review to a plaintiff “adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute.” 5 U.S.C. 702. That provision requires that “the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant be arguably within the zone of interests

 19
to be protected or regulated by the statute * * * in
question.” Clarke, 479 U.S. at 396 (brackets and citation omitted). Here, Texas’s asserted interest in
avoiding costs flowing from a voluntary state-law
subsidy falls far outside the zone of interests of the
INA’s removal provisions. The INA “regulat[es] the
relationship between the United States and our alien
visitors,” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976), not
between aliens and third-party States.
Relying on 8 U.S.C. 1621, the court of appeals concluded that the INA protected Texas’s interest in
“participat[ing] in notice and comment before the
Secretary changes the immigration classification of
millions of illegal aliens in a way that forces the state
to the Hobson’s choice of spending millions of dollars
to subsidize driver’s licenses or changing its statutes.”
App. 37a-38a. Section 1621 is part of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 411,
110 Stat. 2268, not the INA, and it does not cover
Texas’s driver’s-license subsidy, which is not a state
“public benefit.”
See 8 U.S.C. 1621(c).
Under
PRWORA, deferred action does not trigger eligibility
for any state public benefit, unless a State voluntarily
chooses after PRWORA’s effective date to confer such
benefits on that basis. See 8 U.S.C. 1621(a), (b), and
(d); 8 U.S.C. 1641(b). It thus is up to each State—and
each State alone—to protect itself from the costs of
providing such benefits to aliens with deferred action. 2
2

The majority also erred in assuming (App. 8a-9a, 44a-45a) that
deferred action makes aliens eligible for Texas unemployment
compensation. That is a state public benefit, so aliens with deferred action cannot receive it unless Texas affirmatively opted to
extend that benefit after PRWORA became effective. See 8 U.S.C.

 20
The INA also contains no notice-and-comment provision or other procedure granting States a special
right to “participate” before the Secretary changes
immigration policies that may have incidental consequences for a State, including on any voluntary statelaw subsidies. App. 37a-38a. Rather, the INA gives
the Secretary authority to set immigration enforcement policies himself. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506;
see 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1) and (3); see also 6 U.S.C.
202(5).
2. The APA also bars respondents’ suit because, as
both dissents concluded, App. 93a; App. 213a-214a, it
challenges actions that are “committed to agency
discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2). That exception
“preclude[s] judicial review of certain categories of
administrative decisions that courts traditionally have
regarded as ‘committed to agency discretion,’ ” and
decisions under statutes that furnish “no meaningful
standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise
of discretion.” Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191
(1993) (citations omitted). In Heckler, this Court held
that “an agency’s decision not to take enforcement
action should be presumed immune from judicial review under § 701(a)(2).” 470 U.S. at 832; accord Vigil,
508 U.S. at 191. That principle applies to deferredaction policies because they involve nonbinding and
revocable determinations to forbear from removing
particular aliens for a period of time. See AADC, 525
U.S. at 484-485; cf. Johns v. Department of Justice,
1621(a), (c)(1)(B), and (d). Texas has not done so. Texas’s alleged
injury is also neither fairly traceable to nor within the zone of
interests of Section 1611, under which deferred-action recipients
may become eligible for some federal benefits. 8 U.S.C. 1611(b)
and (c); 8 C.F.R. 1.3(a).

 21
653 F.2d 884, 893 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Th[e] discretion [to
commence deportation proceedings] is, like prosecutorial discretion, immune from review.”).
The majority nonetheless concluded that deferredaction policies are reviewable under the APA because
“[d]eferred action” is “much more than nonenforcement: It would affirmatively confer ‘lawful presence’
and associated benefits on a class of unlawfully present aliens.” App. 44a. But insofar as deferred action
itself is concerned, “lawful presence” is simply the
label for the consequence of memorializing a decision
to forbear from enforcement action for a designated
time: A decision to forbear from removing a person
results in “lawful presence” in the sense that DHS has
decided to countenance that person’s continued presence in the United States so long as DHS continues to
forbear. See App. 113a-114a (dissent). Under Heckler, a deferred-action policy is presumptively unreviewable, whether a litigant chooses to focus on the
choice itself (to forbear from enforcement) or its effect
(to countenance the activity that could be the subject
of enforcement). Either way, the discretion is the
same.
Deferred action also has several consequences under different provisions of federal law, but they do not
make a deferred-action policy reviewable. Those
consequences “are not new”; they “are a function of
statutes and regulations that were enacted by Congresses and administrations long past.” App. 109a110a (dissent). “That a prior statute or regulation ties
a benefit to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
does not make that ordinarily unreviewable exercise
of prosecutorial discretion reviewable.” App. 115a.
Indeed, many exercises of discretion have collateral

 22
benefits, such as drug treatment following pretrial
diversion. App. 117a.
In any event, Congress also has committed to the
Secretary’s discretion each of the consequences that
result from deferred action under federal law. In
PRWORA, Congress gave the Secretary discretion to
decide which non-qualified aliens are eligible for Social Security and certain other federal benefits. 8
U.S.C. 1611(b)(2) and (3) (“as determined by the [Secretary]”). In the INA, Congress similarly specified
that the Secretary has discretion to decide whether
aliens with deferred action accrue time for purposes
of the three- and ten-year bars, see 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) (after “period of stay authorized by
the [Secretary]”), and whether to authorize aliens to
be lawfully hired, 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(3) (“authorized to
be so employed * * * by the [Secretary]”). No statute contains a relevant justiciable limit on the Secretary’s ability to do so for the parents and children
covered by the Guidance. 3 Moreover, the INA expressly prohibits review of any “decision or action of
the [Secretary]” “the authority for which is specified
under [INA subchapter II] to be in the discretion of
the [Secretary].” 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Sections
1182 and 1324a are both in that Subchapter. This
statutory shield from judicial interference underscores that the Secretary’s exercise of discretion re-

3

Congress has prohibited the Secretary from giving work authorization on the basis that an alien has been released on bond
during removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1226(a)(3), and has limited
work authorization for aliens released on orders of supervision
following entry of a final order of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(7).
The Guidance implicates neither limitation.

 23
lating to these benefits—including work authorization—is not reviewable in a suit by third-party States.
Authorizing aliens to be hired is also closely bound
up with the Secretary’s discretion over removals.
When DHS accords deferred action to an alien, that
alien will continue living here, and “in ordinary cases
[aliens] cannot live where they cannot work.” Truax
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915). Accordingly, authorizing aliens to be hired has long been considered a
“necessary incident of [the Secretary’s] authority to
administer the [INA].” 44 Fed. Reg. 43,480 (July 25,
1979). And IRCA reinforces that point by confirming
that “the [Secretary]” may decide whether an alien
may be lawfully hired. 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(3).
The INA’s text provides additional confirmation
that the Guidance is not subject to review. The INA
provides a cause of action solely to aliens to challenge
individual orders of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1252—but no
cause of action at all to third-parties, including States.
If Congress had intended to allow suits based on the
consequences of deferred action, one would expect
that the most impacted parties—aliens denied deferred action—could sue. Instead, 8 U.S.C. 1252(g)
squarely prohibits such suits. As this Court explained
in AADC, Section 1252(g) is “directed against a particular evil: attempts to impose judicial constraints
upon prosecutorial discretion.” 525 U.S. at 486 n.9.
That is just what respondents seek in this suit. 4
4

The INA’s provisions not only confirm that the Guidance involves actions that are committed to agency discretion by law, but
also they are part of a broader statutory framework establishing
that a challenge by third-party States to a deferred-action policy is
precluded by the INA under 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(1). See Block v.
Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984) (“[T]he

 24
II. THE SECRETARY HAD AMPLE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE GUIDANCE

The court of appeals’ ruling that the Secretary
lacked substantive authority to adopt the Guidance is
wrong, unduly restricts DHS’s enforcement discretion, precludes implementation of a national policy of
great importance, and places a cloud over a longstanding DHS practice that affects hundreds of thousands
of people.
“[D]eferred action—whether ad hoc or through
DAPA—is not an effort by DHS to ‘hide elephants in
mouseholes.’ ” App. 153a (dissent) (quoting Whitman
v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468
(2001)). To the contrary, it manifests the discretion
that is “[a] principal feature of the removal system.”
Ibid. (quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499). As this
Court recognized in Arizona, “[f]ederal officials, as an
initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to
pursue removal at all.” 132 S. Ct. at 2499. These
officials exercise discretion knowing that “[i]mmigration policy can affect trade, investment, tourism,
and diplomatic relations for the entire Nation, as well
as the perceptions and expectations of aliens in this
country who seek the full protection of its laws.” Id.
at 2498.
Deferred action—which the Court described in
AADC as a “regular practice” of forbearing, as a matter of discretion, from removing an alien, 525 U.S.
at 483-484—is a decades-old species of this removal
discretion. Like other forms of immigration discretion, it is grounded in expansive statutory authority,
presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action may
be overcome by inferences of intent drawn from the statutory
scheme as a whole.”).

 25
see 6 U.S.C. 202(5); 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1)-(3), and historical practice by both the Executive and Congress, see
pp. 7-8, supra. It also reflects the reality that Congress has enacted laws under which a huge population
of aliens is removable, but has appropriated the funds
to remove only a small fraction of that population. See
p. 3, supra. Congress has thus necessarily delegated
to the Secretary “tremendous authority” to decide
that large classes of aliens do not warrant immediate
removal efforts.
Adam B. Cox & Cristina M.
Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
Yale L.J. 458, 463 (2009); see id. at 510–511. In particular instances, Congress has channeled the exercise
of that discretion by directing the Secretary to prioritize the removal of serious criminals, see Appropriations Act, 129 Stat. 42-43, and by requiring DHS to
apprehend and detain certain criminal and terrorist
aliens pending their removal, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c). But
Congress has not disturbed the broad discretion the
Secretary otherwise exercises in this area—and in
particular his ability to establish policies for deferring
action for the parents and children here.
The court of appeals majority acknowledged that
the Secretary has discretion to decide to forbear from
removing every alien who could benefit under the
Guidance. App. 44a. But the majority nonetheless
concluded that the Guidance is unlawful, based on two
inferences: (1) that the Secretary cannot defer action
or confer work authorization, except to classes of
aliens the INA itself identifies; and (2) that the INA
implicitly precludes the Secretary from deferring
action for parents under more forgiving standards
than would apply if those parents were seeking to
become permanent residents or to obtain cancellation

 26
of removal. App. 85a-86a; see App. 71a-76a. The
result is that the Secretary can forbear from removing
each alien covered by the Guidance and thus enable
them to remain present for a period of time—but is
barred from enabling them to work lawfully to support themselves and their families while they are here.
Congress did not constrain the Secretary’s broad
discretion to such half measures.
First, the Secretary may decide whether a class of
aliens warrants deferred action. Congress has long
been aware of DHS’s “regular practice” of granting
deferred action, AADC, 525 U.S. at 483-484, including
for classes of aliens. But Congress has done nothing
that would prevent the Secretary from deferring action for the class of parents and children here. App.
149a-150a (dissent). To the contrary, Congress has
protected deferred-action decisions from judicial intervention, see 8 U.S.C. 1252(g); AADC, 525 U.S.
at 485 & n.9, and repeatedly recognized that the Secretary has authority to defer action for classes of
aliens by directing him to use that authority for additional classes of aliens, see p. 8, supra. Contrary to
the majority’s stilted inference, statutes encouraging
the Secretary to use this preexisting authority in more
circumstances do not prevent him from using it elsewhere.
The Secretary has similarly longstanding authority
to decide whether a class of aliens should be eligible to
be lawfully employed. See pp. 22-23, supra. In 1952,
Congress authorized the Secretary to issue regulations for the administration of the INA. 8 U.S.C.
1103(a). And since 1981, regulations governing work
authorization—including for deferred-action recipients—have been in place as a “necessary incident”

 27
of that authority. 44 Fed. Reg. at 43,480; see 46 Fed.
Reg. at 25,080. Otherwise, aliens whose presence
DHS has officially countenanced would be unable to
support themselves through lawful work.
In IRCA, Congress imposed penalties on employers who knowingly employ an “unauthorized” alien. 8
U.S.C. 1324a(a). And in that same statute, Congress
provided that this proscription does not apply to hiring aliens who are “authorized to be so employed by
[the INA] or by the [Secretary].” 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(3)
(emphasis added). The “or” confirms that work authorization is not conferred solely by the INA itself:
“the [Secretary]” may also authorize categories of
aliens to be lawfully hired. Ibid. This language thus
signals that Congress “implicit[ly] approv[ed]” the
“longstanding” work-authorization regulation. App.
152a (dissent). Since Congress enacted IRCA, DHS
has repeatedly provided deferred action and other
similar relief—as well as work authorization—to categories of aliens as a matter of discretion, including to
substantial populations. See pp. 7-8, supra (collecting
examples). And although Congress has amended
Section 1324a six times, e.g., Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009-3010, it has not limited the Secretary’s
authority in any way relevant here. Instead, it has
further shielded the Secretary’s discretion from judicial interference. See 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B) and (g).
Second, according deferred action and work authorization for the parents here is consistent with the
INA. The majority noted that parents who could
obtain deferred action are not currently entitled to
become lawful permanent residents or seek cancellation of removal under the INA. App. 71a-74a. But by
definition, deferred action is relevant only when aliens

 28
lack lawful status or are otherwise removable, and
thus when the Secretary could exercise discretion to
pursue removal. His choice instead to defer action is
consistent with the INA both because that discretion
is a “principal feature” of immigration enforcement,
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499, and because deferred
action provides lesser relief. Permanent residents
and aliens who receive cancellation of removal under
8 U.S.C. 1229b are no longer removable and have legal
rights to remain in the United States. Aliens with
deferred action, by contrast, are removable and may
remain present only so long as DHS continues to
forbear. See App. 413a (Deferred action “does not
confer any form of legal status.”).
Granting deferred action and work authorization to
the parents of children who are U.S. citizens or permanent residents is also consistent with the INA’s
longstanding aims of protecting family unity and selfreliance. Indeed, these parents must work to support
themselves and their children—who are U.S. citizens
and permanent residents. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct.
at 2499 (enforcement discretion may “embrace[] immediate human concerns,” including “whether the
alien has children born in the United States”). And
because the Guidance only covers parents and children who have “long ties to the community,” ibid.,
deferred action and work authorization will make
these individuals more likely to be self-reliant and pay
taxes, and less likely to harm American workers by
working for below-market wages. See App. 96a (dissent); Wash. State et al. C.A. Amicus Br. 4-8 (anticipating that the Guidance will benefit States).

 29
III. THE GUIDANCE IS EXEMPT FROM NOTICE-ANDCOMMENT REQUIREMENTS

The court of appeals’ notice-and-comment ruling
warrants this Court’s review because it threatens farreaching consequences by constraining needed flexibility to adapt enforcement policies to changing circumstances and priorities. The APA exempts from
notice-and-comment all “general statements of policy.” 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A). Those are “statements issued
by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the
manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a
discretionary power.” Vigil, 508 U.S. at 197 (quoting
Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act 30 n.3 (1947)). Enforcement policies lie at the heart of this exception, as
they inform the public how an agency will exercise its
discretion to enforce (or forbear from enforcing) the
law. E.g., App. 231a-232a (Higginson, J., dissenting).
And the Guidance fits the bill: It embodies “the Secretary’s tentative decision, based on an assessment of
the best uses of DHS’s limited resources and under
his
congressionally
delegated
authority
to
‘[e]stablish[] national immigration enforcement policies and priorities,’ not to remove qualifying applicants for a certain period of time.” App. 108a (dissent)
(citation omitted; brackets in original).
The majority nonetheless concluded that respondents were likely to establish that the Secretary could
not issue the Guidance without notice-and-comment
rulemaking, because the Guidance “would not genuinely leave the agency and its employees free to exercise discretion.” App. 64a; see App. 54a-64a. But the
majority’s speculation about how individual DHS
agents might act in the future overlooks that the dis-

 30
cretion being exercised belongs in the first instance to
the Secretary.
See 6 U.S.C. 202(5); 8 U.S.C.
1103(a)(1)-(3). The Guidance reflects the Secretary’s
discretionary judgment that the stated threshold
criteria describe individuals who, in his view, are likely to warrant deferred action as a matter of discretion.
App. 414a-415a.
The APA does not require senior officials to use
notice-and-comment procedures whenever their discretionary policies preclude subordinates from exercising their discretion in a different way. For example, the memorandum in Vigil announced a decision
about resource allocation from which agency employees could not deviate. See 508 U.S. at 188. The “passive enforcement” policy in Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598, 601 (1985), categorically exempted all
but 286 of a possible 674,000 violators—99.96% of the
total—from prosecution for the continuing offense of
failing to register for the draft. Id. at 604 & n.3. And
the expanded Family Fairness policy in 1990 directed
that officials “will” grant relief when an applicant
satisfied stated criteria, without mentioning case-bycase deviation. Memorandum from Gene McNary,
Comm’r, Family Fairness 1-2, reprinted as 67 No. 6
Interpreter Releases 153, App. I (Feb. 2, 1990).
In any event, the Guidance expressly requires
agents to make discretionary case-by-case decisions.
“[A]pplying the[] threshold criteria itself involves an
exercise of discretion.” App. 124a (dissent). For example, USCIS must determine whether the applicant
is an enforcement priority, App. 417a, which depends
on whether the alien is “a threat to national security,
border security, or public safety” or has “significantly
abused” a visa program. App. 425a. Agents also must

 31
exercise discretion whether to deny an application for
deferred action even when those criteria are satisfied.
App. 122a (dissent). Indeed, DAPA’s stated criteria
require agents to determine that a request “present[s]
no other factors that, in the exercise of discretion,
make[] the grant of deferred action inappropriate.”
App. 417a. The majority viewed all this discretion as
“merely pretext.” App. 56a. But as both dissenting
judges concluded, it is plainly wrong to conclude that
the discretion apparent on the Guidance’s face is “pretextual” when, among other things, this is a facial
challenge to a policy that “has yet to be implemented.”
App. 131a; see App. 234a-242a.
It is also immaterial that, under preexisting
law, deferred action triggers “eligibility for [certain]
federal benefits—for example, under title II and
XVIII of the Social Security Act.” App. 44a. The
APA does not impose procedural roadblocks before an
agency can adopt policies that have this consequence.
Indeed, it exempts from notice-and-comment requirements agency action on any “matter relating to
* * * benefits.” 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(2). Many agencies
have waived the APA’s benefits exception, but DHS
has not. App. 68a & n.155. Accordingly, if the Guidance were reviewable because deferred action renders
aliens eligible for benefits, see App. 44a-45a, it would
be exempt from notice-and-comment because it would
“relat[e] to” those same benefits.
Moreover, the consequences of deferred action result from pre-existing regulations that are independent of the Guidance and were adopted through noticeand-comment rulemaking. App. 111a-113a (dissent).
DHS’s predecessor followed notice-and-comment
procedures when adopting the regulations providing

 32
that aliens with deferred action may obtain work authorization, 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14); 46 Fed. Reg.
at 25,080, and that they may become eligible for Social Security, 8 C.F.R. 1.3(4)(vi); 61 Fed. Reg.
at 47,041. 5 Under the APA, once is enough. See
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978).
IV. THIS CASE WARRANTS IMMEDIATE REVIEW

The court of appeals’ judgment enjoins nationwide
a federal policy of great importance to federal law
enforcement, to many States, and to millions of families with longstanding and close connections with this
country. A twice-divided court of appeals should not
have the last word on whether that policy can be implemented.
A. As set forth above, the majority has permitted
some States (over the objection of others) and a federal court to interfere with the Secretary’s exercise of
discretion in establishing policies regarding enforcement of the federal immigration laws. That is unprecedented and momentous. Moreover, the majority’s
decision is “very damaging to DHS’s immigration
enforcement policy, which has operated, from time to
time, on a class-wide basis.” App. 111a (dissent).

5

DHS’s policy that aliens with deferred action cease accruing
time for the three- and ten-year bars, see p. 6, supra, was
not adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking. But that
policy has no bearing on respondents’ asserted injury. It is
relevant only “[f]or purposes of ” DHS’s computation of a barrier
to admissibility if aliens depart the country.
8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(9)(B)(ii). Tolling also will not help “[m]ost adult beneficiaries” of the Guidance because they already face the maximum
barrier if they depart. App. 44a n.99.

 33
The nationwide injunction also has far-reaching
and irreparable humanitarian impact. It bars approximately 4 million parents—who have lived in this
country for years, would pass a background check, are
not priorities for removal, and have “a son or daughter
who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident,”
App. 417a—from requesting deferred action under the
Guidance and receiving authorization to work lawfully.
See OLC Op. *30. In so doing, it has a profound effect
not only on those parents but also on their children.
One study estimated that “there are 6.3 million children who live in a household with a DAPA eligible
mom or dad, and of that, 5.5 million are U.S. citizens.”
Manuel Pastor et al., The Kids Aren’t Alright – But
They Could Be: The Impact of [DAPA] on Children 1
(Mar. 2015). And although respondents have not challenged the Secretary’s 2012 DACA memorandum for
providing deferred action, the majority’s expansive
reasoning places a cloud over the deferred action
accorded to more than 600,000 people under that policy, all of whom came here as children and many of
whom have never known another home. App. 4a.
Most of the parents and children the Guidance
would affect “are hard-working people who have become integrated members of American society,” lived
here for years, have not committed serious crimes,
and “are extremely unlikely to be deported given
* * * limited enforcement resources.” App. 415a.
Deferred action would give these parents and children
the dignity of coming forward and “be[ing] counted.”
Ibid. Without work authorization, they are more
likely to work for employers who will hire them illegally, often at below-market wages, thereby hurting

 34
American workers and giving unscrupulous employers
an unfair advantage.
The injunction also undermines the Secretary’s efforts to “focus [DHS’s] resources on removing those
undocumented aliens most disruptive to the public
safety and national security of the United States.”
Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2015),
petition for cert. pending, No. 15-643 (filed Nov. 12,
2015). The Guidance would complement those priorities by having millions of low-priority aliens pay for
and pass a background check. App. 417a. If lawenforcement officials later encountered such an individual, ICE could “quickly confirm the alien’s identity
through a biometric match” and confirm that he or she
does not warrant the effort of removal. D. Ct. Doc.
150-1 ¶ 15 (Feb. 23, 2015); see id. ¶¶ 14-17. But without the Guidance, ICE would have to do the underlying legwork every time—and it would be ICE footing
the bill, thus depleting its already-limited resources.
See id. ¶¶ 14-17; D. Ct. Doc. 150-2 ¶¶ 7-13 (Feb. 23,
2015).
B. This Court’s review is warranted now. Although the court of appeals ruled in the context of a
preliminary injunction, this Court decided Arizona in
the same posture. 132 S. Ct. at 2498. The court of
appeals held that Texas’s “standing is plain”; that
Texas “satisfies the zone-of-interests test”; that the
Guidance “is not an unreviewable agency action . . .
committed to agency discretion by law”; that Texas is
likely to establish that it must go through notice-andcomment; and that it is “manifestly contrary to the
INA.” App. 11a, 37a, 50a, 68a, 76a.
It is unlikely any other court of appeals will address the questions presented here. The injunction

 35
has prevented DHS from putting the Guidance into
operation anywhere in the country, including in States
that have actively supported the Guidance in this
litigation. The only other pre-enforcement challenge
to the Guidance was brought by a county sheriff and
was dismissed for his lack of standing, without reaching any question under the APA. See Arpaio, 797
F.3d at 15.
The great and immediate significance of the Secretary’s Guidance, the irreparable injury to the many
families affected by delay in its implementation, and
the broad importance of the questions presented,
counsel strongly in favor of certiorari now.
CONCLUSION

This Court should grant the petition for a writ of
certiorari.
Respectfully submitted.

STEVAN E. BUNNELL
General Counsel
U.S. Department of
Homeland Security

NOVEMBER 2015

DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR.
Solicitor General
BENJAMIN C. MIZER
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Deputy Solicitor General
BETH S. BRINKMANN
Deputy Assistant Attorney
General
ZACHARY D. TRIPP
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
DOUGLAS N. LETTER
SCOTT R. MCINTOSH
JEFFREY CLAIR
WILLIAM E. HAVEMANN
Attorneys