IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION GENERAL CHANCERY SECTION BRANDON SMITH, Plaintiff, Case No. 2015 CH 11780 v. Calendar 03 Honorable Franklin U. Valderrama CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This matter cOmes to be heard on Plaintiff, Brando-n Smith?s Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted. On the evening of October 20, 2014, seventeen year Old Laquan McDonald was involved in an incident with of?cers Of the Chicago Police Department (the ?Department?). The incident resulted in an Of?cer-involved shooting and McDonald?s death. The Department subsequently secured copies Of videos ?lmed by dashboard cameras installed on Department vehicles that responded to the incident. The Department?s Records Division is the custodian of the dashboard camera videos. The Independent Police Review Authority commenced an investigation of the of?cer?involved shooting following the October 20, 2014 incident. IPRA is responsible for investigating, among other things, incidents in which a member of the Department discharges his or her ?rearm. IPRA makes recommendations to the Superintendent of the Department regarding appropriate disciplinary action against an of?cer Of the Department found to have violated Department rules and regulations. investigation of the incident included securing and viewing copies of dashboard camera video recordings from Department vehicles at the scene of the incident. IPRA also conducted a preliminary interview Of the Of?cer involved in the incident and other witnesses prior to obtaining a copy of the video Of the incident. One video obtained by IPRA recorded parts of the incident. IPRA investigators ?rst viewed the video on October 27, 2014. On October 29, 2014, an IPRA investigator forwarded a copy Of the video to the Cook County State?s Attorney? 5 Of?ce. The facts recited herein are derived from the admissions in the Department?s Answer to Smith?s Complaint and Smith?s Answer to the Department?s Af?rmative Defenses, as well as the af?davits submitted by the Department. 735 ILCS (West 2012). The United States Attorney?s Of?ce for the Northern District of Illinois (the Attorney?) was also provided a COpy of the video and the USAO along with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the and the Cook County State?s Attorney?s Of?ce (the ?State?s Attorney?) launched a joint investigation of the incident. On or about December 15, 2014, investigators from IPRA and the FBI began to jointly interview witnesses. From December 15, 2014 to February 25, 2015, IPRA and FBI investigators jointly interviewed ?ve witnesses. A federal grand jury has been convened to hear evidence related to the October 20, 2014 incident. The federal grand jury proceeding remains pending. IPRA has not re-interviewed the of?cer involved in the October 20, 2014 incident because, according to IPRA, it must ?rst determine whether the of?cer will be charged with a criminal offense. It is a condition of employment for every Department of?cer and agency of the City of Chicago to c00perate with IPRA investigation. Matters that are not investigated by IPRA are referred to the Department for investigation. If the of?cer involved in the October 20, 2014 incident is not charged with a criminal offense, IPRA intends to serve on the of?cer a Department Form titled ?Administrative Proceedings Rights? prior to his interview. That form provides, in pertinent part, that any admissions or statements made by the of?cer may be the basis for a suspension or charges seeking the of?cer?s removal or suspension for more than 30 days. A Chicago police of?cer who has been given an Administrative Proceedings Rights Form does not have the right to remain silent. Instead, the of?cer has an obligation to answer questions truthfully. If an of?cer of the Department who has been given an Administrative Proceedings Rights Form refuses to answer questions, he or she will be ordered by a superior of?cer to answer the questions. If the of?cer refuses to answer questions after being ordered to do so by a superior of?cer, the of?cer is subject to discharge for violating Department rules and regulations. Of?cers of the Department who are given an Administrative Proceedings Rights Form are advised that any statements they make cannot be used against them in a subsequent criminal proceeding. An of?cer of the Department subject to an administrative proceeding has the right to counsel and is given a reasonable time to obtain counsel. IPRA has not concluded its investigation of the incident. On May 26, 2015, Brandon Smith (?Smit a resident of Illinois, requested from the Department pursuant to the Illinois Freedom of Information Act 5 ILCS 140/1, et seq, the video depicting the incident as well as other records regarding the videos. After several extensions, the Department, on August 4, 2015, provided some documents to Smith but denied the FOIA request as to the dashboard camera video of the incident, citing exemptions pursuant sections and of FOIA. The Department explained that as of August 4, 2015, investigation into the shooting was still ?ongoing.? The release of the video, according to the Department, would ?create a substantial likelihood or irreparable harm, affecting the integrity of the investigation and potentially depriving the involved of?cer(s) of an impartial hearing.? On August 5, 2015, Smith ?led a Complaint against the Department seeking an order requiring the Department to produce the requested records and enjoin the Department from withholding non-exempt public records from under FOIA. On September 10, 2015, the Department ?led its Answer and Af?rmative Defenses. The Department?s Af?rmative Defenses assert that the dashboard camera video is exempt from disclosure pursuant to sections and 7(1)(d)(vii) Speci?cally, the Department?s First Af?rmative Defense alleges that the Department, IPRA, the Cook County State?s Attorney?s Of?ce, and the FBI are conducting a criminal investigation into McDonald?s death and that a federal grand jury is investigating McDonald?s death. The Department asserts that release of the video, before the federal grand jury proceeding has been completed, could interfere with law enforcement proceedings and, as such, is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section of FOIA. The Department?s Second Af?rmative Defense asserts that the requested video is exempt pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(vii) of FOIA because release of the video would obstruct the criminal investigation. The Department?s Third Af?rmative Defense alleges that the requested video is exempt pursuant to FOIA Section because release would interfere with an active administrative proceeding. The Department notes that investigation is an active administrative proceeding. In addition, states the Department, IPRA, as part of its investigation, intends to interview the of?cer who discharged his ?rearm and other witnesses. Smith, in turn, ?led an Answer to the Department?s Af?rmative Defenses, in which he denied the material allegations of the Department?s Af?rmative Defenses. Presently before the Court is Smith?s Motion for Summary Judgment (the ?Motion?). SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment should be granted when ?the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on ?le, together with the af?davits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact? and the ?moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.? 735 ILCS (West 2012); Safeway Ins. Co. v. Hister, 304 Ill. App. 3d 687, 691 (lst Dist. 1999). A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Williams v. Covenant Med. Ctr., 316 Ill. App. 3d 682, 689 (4th Dist. 2000). That is, summary judgment is appropriate when there is no dispute as to any material fact but only as to the legal effect of the facts. Dockery v. Ortiz, 185 Ill. App. 3d 296, 304 (2d Dist. 1989). The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact, but to determine whether one exists. Id. The burden of proof and the initial burden of production in a motion for summary judgment lie with the movant. Medow v. Flavin, 336 Ill. App. 3d 20, 28 (lst Dist. 2002). While the non-moving party is not required to prove his case in response to a motion for summary judgment, he must present a factual basis that would arguably entitle him to judgment under the applicable law. Pielet v. Pielet, 407 Ill. App. 3d 474, 490 (2d Dist. 2010). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to strictly construe all evidentiary material submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment and liberally construe all evidentiary material submitted in opposition. Kolakowski v. Voris, 83 Ill. 2d 388 (1980). 2 Though not raised by the parties, the Court notes that the Department?s af?rmative defenses which assert that the dashboard camera video are exempt from disclosure pursuant to sections and 7(l)(d)(vii) were not included as a basis for the Department?s denial of Smith?s request. Pl. Compl., Ex. Def. Ans, at 1 l3. 3 DISCUSSION Smith ?rst contends that he has satis?ed his burden with respect to his Complaint. Speci?cally, Smith maintains that the Department admitted in its Answer that the Department is a public body, that Smith made a request for the dashboard camera video of the incident to the Department, that the dashboard camera video of the incident is a public record, and that the Department denied his request. With reSpect to the exemptions asserted by the Department as af?rmative defenses, Smith argues that the exemptions asserted by the Department are inapplicable and as such, he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Speci?cally, Smith contends that each of the exemptions apply only to pending or contemplated law enforcement or administrative proceedings being conducted by the public body ?that is the recipient of the request.? Furthermore, argues Smith, each exemption requires proof that release of the information would ?interfere with or obstruct? those law enforcement or administrative proceedings. The Department, however, asserts Smith, fails to meet its burden. The Department counters3 that Smith?s Motion should be denied because the video recording responsive to Smith?s request is exempt from disclosure under subsections (1), and (vii) of section of FOIA. The Department argues that the video is exempt because it is a record in the possession . . . of an administrative or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes. As an initial matter, the Department contends that it is a law enforcement agency. While that term is not de?ned in the FOIA, the Department notes that the term ?law enforcement agency? as de?ned in the Code of Criminal Procedure, Firearm Concealed Carry Act and dictionary reveal that it is a law enforcement agency for purposes of section Next, the Department asserts that it possess the video for law enforcement purposes. In support of that contention, the Department cites the Department?s Special Order SOB-05 which describes the policy of the Department?s dashboard camera program. According to Special Order $03-05, the in-car video systems ?can provide members with an invaluable instrument to enhance criminal prosecutions by providing powerful evidence of criminal activity, limit civil liabilities, and objectively document of?cer conduct during individual interactions.? Def. ReSp., Ex. A, Klimas Aff, Ex. 5, Chi. Police Dep?t Special Order at 1. The Special Order further provides that the of?cers with dashboard cameras in their vehicles will ?activate the system to visually record the entire incident for all enforcement stops and for all arrests . . . Def. Resp, Ex. A, Klimas Aff, Ex. 5, Chi. Police Dep?t Special Order 803-05, at 2. As such, concludes the Department, it satis?es the threshold requirements of Section because the Department possess the video for law enforcement purposes. The Department further argues that the Department and IPRA both have an integral role in the administrative proceedings to investigate and discipline of?cers of the Department. Therefore, the Department maintains that it may assert Section exemptions to prevent interference with any stage of the administrative proceedings. IPRA, notes the Department, is vested with authority to investigate of?cers of the Department, make recommendations regarding discipline to the Department, and to perform other duties. IPRA and the Department, according 3 In support of its response, the Department submits the af?davit of Commander Robert J. Klimas of the Department and the af?davit of Joshua Hunt, an IPRA investigator, along with other exhibits. 4 to the Department cooperate regarding access to the Department?s records and personnel. The City of Chicago, observes the Department, has established comprehensive administrative proceedings for the investigation and discipline of of?cers of the Department that vest both IPRA and the Department with authority over phases of that process. Therefore, concludes the Department, the Department?s dependence on IPRA to ful?ll its role in the proceedings established by the City of Chicago Ordinance vests the Department with the authority to assert a Section exemption whether it or IPRA concludes that release of the Department records would interfere with those proceedings. The Department maintains that Smith?s interpretation that section is limited to ?the recipient of the request? is too narrow because it excludes agencies with bona ?de concerns about interference with pending criminal investigations, active administrative enforcement proceedings, or actual or reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings from its ambit. Smith?s construction of this exemption, argues the Department, disregards the importance of the Department?s cooperation with the pending investigations and proceedings and the signi?cance of the inter-agency cooperation illustrated by this case. Next, the Department contends that release of the requested video would interfere with the IPRA investigation and the grand jury proceedings and obstruct the criminal investigation. In support of this proposition, the Department submits the Affidavit of Joshua Hunt, an IPRA investigator. According to Hunt, investigation will remain active at least until it re- interviews the of?cer involved in the shooting incident. Def. Resp, Ex. B, Hunt Aff., at 34, 35, 48. Hunt states that IPRA cannot re?interview the of?cer until IPRA determines whether to notify the of?cer of administrative or criminal rights pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Garritv v. New Jersey, 385 US. 493 (1967). Def. Resp, Exhibit B, Hunt Aff. at 1i 46. Hunt attests that IPRA is concerned that compelling an of?cer who may be charged with a criminal offense to answer questions using the Department?s Administrative Proceedings Rights Form would interfere with the criminal prosecution of that of?cer by potentially causing testimony and evidence derived from that testimony to be inadmissible in the criminal trial. Def. Resp, Exhibit B, Hunt Aff. at ii 47. In addition, asserts the Department, release of the video could affect the recollection and testimony of other witnesses who have not been interviewed as well as deprive the of?cer involved in the shooting incident of a fair trial. Lastly, the Department maintains that the exemptions asserted by the Department in this matter are consistent with the Illinois Attorney General?s interpretation of Section citing FOIA Request for Review 2011 PAC 17636.4 The Department concludes that it has met its burden of proving interference by clear and convincing evidence. 4 FOIA establishes a Public Access Counselor position within the Of?ce of the Illinois Attorney General. 5 ILCS (West 2012). Upon the denial of an individual's FOIA request, the individual may file a ?request for review? with the Public Access Counselor. 13L. If the Public Access Counselor determines that the alleged violation of FOIA is not unfounded and further action is warranted, ?the Attorney General shall examine the issues and the records, shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and shall issue to the requester and the public body an opinion in response to the request for review . . . 5 ILCS (West 2012). An opinion of the Attorney General is ?binding upon both the requester and the public body," and subject to administrative review under section 11.5 of 5 ILCS (West 2012). The Attorney General, however, ?may exercise his or her discretion and choose to resolve a request for review . . . by a means other than the issuance of a binding Opinion." I_d. 5 Smith replies that, contrary to the Department?s contention, in order to prevail on his Motion, he need only prove that he made a request for public records to a public body and that request was denied. On the other hand, asserts Smith, the Department must overcome the presumption of disclosure by clear and convincing evidence, based on detailed facts that the exemptions apply. The Department, according to Smith, fails to provide clear and convincing evidence that the requested video is actually being used for law enforcement purpose. Smith points out that none of the af?davits submitted by the Department establish that the Department has the speci?c video for law enforcement purposes. Because Laquan McDonald was killed by an of?cer of the Department, argues Smith, he cannot be the subject of any Department investigation and because the Department is not investigating its own of?cer, the video cannot be in the Department?s possession for the purpose of any such investigation. In fact, asserts Smith, the Department concedes it is not conducting any investigation or law enforcement proceeding. Nor is the Department one of the agencies participating in the inter?agency investigation. Responding to a federal subpoena maintains Smith, does not make a public body a participant in any such proceeding, citing Better Government Association v. Blagoievich, 386 Ill. App. 3d 808 (lst Dist. 2008). Nor does the Department, according to Smith, show that release of the video would interfere with any of the on?going investigations. First of all, contends Smith, IPRA is not conducting any ?active administrative enforcement proceeding.? Rather, asserts Smith, an IPRA proceeding is only an investigation that may or may not lead to a disciplinary proceeding, citing Kalven v. City of Chicago, 2014 IL App (lst) 121846. IPRA, notes Smith, may only recommend potential discipline against an of?cer of the Department. Rather, it is the Superintendent of the Department and the Police Board that initiate any potential disciplinary proceedings against an of?cer. Next, Smith contends that the Department provides no support for its conclusion that release of the video could affect the of?cer?s or other witnesses? recollection of events. Smith points out that the of?cer?s statement as well as that of ?ve other witnesses, have already been taken. Next, Smith rejects the Department?s argument that the IPRA investigation would be jeopardized by release of the video because this argument, according to Smith is based on a mistaken argument under Garrity. Nor has the Department proffered any evidence, asserts Smith, that the investigations by the US. Attorney, the FBI, the State?s Attorney, or the federal grand jury proceeding would be jeopardized by release of the video. Finally, Smith contends that the Department?s reliance on non-binding Attorney General opinions lack any weight and must be disregarded where said opinion contradicts the plain language of the FOIA, citing Egg v. Dep?t of Transn, 2013 IL App (lst) 121841 and Shehadeh v. Mac?gan, 2013 IL App (4th) 120742. The Court begins its analysis by examining the relevant provisions of FOIA. Section I of FOIA sets forth the public policy of FOIA and provides: Pursuant to the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of government, it is declared to be the public policy of the State of Illinois that all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the of?cial acts and policies of those who represent them as public of?cials and public employees consistent with the terms of this Act. Such access is necessary to enable the people to ful?ll their duties of discussing public issues fully and freely, making informed political judgments and monitoring government to ensure that it is being conducted in the public interest. The General Assembly hereby declares that it is the public policy of the State of Illinois that access by all persons to public records promotes the transparency and accountability of public bodies at all levels of government. It is a fundamental obligation of government to operate openly and provide public records as expediently and ef?ciently as possible in compliance with this Act. Restraints on access to information, to the extent permitted by this Act, are limited exceptions to the principle that the people of this State have a right to full disclosure of information relating to the decisions, policies, procedures, rules, standards, and other aspects of government activity that affect the conduct of government and the lives of any or all of the people. The provisions of this Act shall be construed in accordance with this principle. This shall be construed to require disclosure of requested information as expediently and ef?ciently as possible and adherence to the deadlines established in this Act. 51Lcs 140/1 (West 2012). The purpose of FOIA is ??to open governmental records to the light of public scrutiny.m Watkins v. McCarthy, 2012 IL App (lst) 100632, ii 13 (quoting Bowie v. Evanston Cmtv. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 65, 128 Ill. 2d 373, 3780989)). Thus, under FOIA, ?public records are presumed to be Open and accessible.? Stern v. Wheaten?Warrenville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 200, 233 Ill. 2d 396, 405 (2009). Illinois courts have repeatedly emphasized the fundamental principle of public access to government records that animates the FOIA. FOIA contemplates ?full and complete disclosure of the affairs of government and recognizes that such disclosure is necessary to enable the people to ful?ll their duties to monitor government.? The General Assembly, however, recognized that legitimate governmental interests and private interests could be harmed by the release of certain types of information. Accordingly, the General Assembly, in an effort to balance between the right of the public to know and the need to keep information in con?dence established exemptions. These exemptions are contained in section 7 of FOIA. Section 7(1) of FOIA states in pertinent part: [T]he following shall be exempt from inspection and copying: Records in the possession of any public body created in the course of administrative enforcement proceedings, and any law enforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that disclosure would: interfere with pending or actually and reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by any law enforcement or correctional agency that is the recipient of the request; (ii) interfere with active administrative enforcement proceedings conducted by the public body that is the recipient of the request; $4446 (vii) obstruct an ongoing criminal investigation by the agency that is the recipient of the request. 5 ILCS 140X7(l) (West 2012). A public body must comply with a valid request for information unless one of the narrow statutory exemptions set forth in FOIA applies. Watkins, 2012 IL App (lst) 100632, 1[ 13. ??If the public body seeks to invoke one of the exemptions in section 7 as grounds for refusing disclosure, it is required to give written notice specifying the particular exemption claimed to authorize the denial?? Ill. Educ. Ass?n v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 204 Ill. 2d 456, 464 (2003) (quoting Lieber v. Bd. of Trs. of S. 111. Univ, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 408 (1997)). ?Thereafter, if the party seeking disclosure of information under the Act challenges the public body?s denial in circuit court, the public body has the burden of proving that the records in question fall within the exemption it has claimed.? ?To meet this burden and to assist the court in making its determination, the agency must provide a detailed justification for its claim of exemption, addressing the requested documents specifically and in a manner allowing for adequate adversary testing.? (quoting Baudin v. City of Lake, 192 Ill. App. 3d 530, 537 (2d Dist. 1989) (emphasis in original)). ?However, ?if the public body?s claims are conclusory, merely recite statutory standards, or are too vague or sweeping,? affidavits will not suffice to satisfy the public body?s burden of proof.? Watkins, 2012 IL App (1st) 100632, ll 14 (quoting Ill. Educ. Ass?n, 204 Ill. 2d at 469). As the parties disagree regarding their respective burdens on Smith?s Motion, the Court will address the procedural posture of this case before addressing the substance of Smith?s Motion. Litigation regarding a public body?s denial of a FOIA request is, as here, generally initiated by the party that made the request. 5 ILCS 140/ 1 1(a) (West 2012) (?Any person denied access to inspect or copy any public record by a public body may file suit for injunctive or declaratory relief?). As the public body which is the recipient of a FOIA request has the ultimate burden to prove that a specific statutory exemption applies, it follows that a party that initiates litigation by ?ling a complaint in a circuit court subsequent to a public body?s denial of the party?s FOIA request has the burden to Show that the party made a valid requestwa request to a public body for a public record?and that the public body denied the request. As a result, statutory exemptions asserted by the public body which was the recipient of a FOIA request are af?rmative in nature, and may be raised by motion pursuant to section of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (the ?Code?) or by pleading the exemptions as af?rmative defenses in reSponse to the complaint. See, e. g, Better Gov?t Ass?n v. Zaruba, 2014 IL App (2d) 140071, 1] 7 (disclosure exemption under section of FOIA raised pursuant to section 2- 619(a)(9) of the Code); Kalven v. City of'Chicagg, 2014 IL App (lst) 121846, 7 (disclosure exemptions under sections and raised by cross-motions for summary judgment); Watkins, 2012 IL App '(lst) 100632, 1i 5 (disclosure exemptions under sections and raised pursuant to section of the Code); Dav v. City of Chicago, 388 Ill. App. 3d 70, 72 (lst Dist. 2009) (disclosure exemptions under sections and of FOIA raised pursuant to section 2- 619(a)9) of the Code); Better Gov?t Ass?n v. ngoievich, 386 111. App. 3d 808, 810 (4th Dist. 2008) (disclosure exemption under section of FOIA raised by motion for summary judgment). Here, rather than ?le a motion to dismiss pursuant to section of the Code, the Department opted to answer the Complaint and plead its asserted statutory exemptions as af?rmative defenses. Smith thereafter ?led the instant motion for summary judgment. As the movant, Smith bears the burden of making a primafacie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Williams, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 689. Smith contends that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to his Complaint as a result of the admissions in the Department?s Answer. The Court agrees. The Department admitted in its Answer that it is a public body under FOIA, that the dashboard camera video is a public record, that Smith requested the dashboard camera video from the Department, and that the Department denied Smith?s request. Def. Ans, at 6, 7, 14, 20. Therefore, the Court ?nds that Smith has satis?ed his initial burden to establish a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to his Complaint. Accordingly, the burden shifts to the Department to present a factual basis that would arguably entitle it to judgment under the applicable law. Pielet, 407 111. App. 3d at 490. The Court notes that the Department does not proffer evidence to negate the essential allegations of Smith?s Complaint, and cannot do so as a result of the admissions in the Department?s Answer. Instead, the gravamen of the Department?s response is that the evidence it has submitted, construed liberally in its favor and strictly against Smith, satis?es its burden of production on its af?rmative defenses thereby arguably entitling the Department to judgment as a matter of law and, thus, defeating Smith?s Motion. As every public record is presumed to be open to the public under FOIA, the recipient of a request has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the public record subject to a valid FOIA request is exempt from disclosure pursuant to a speci?c statutory exemption. 5 140/11(f) (West 2012); 5 140/12 (West 2012); 111. Educ. Ass?n, 204 Ill. 2d at 464. Thus, to defeat Smith?s Motion, the Court ?nds that the Department has the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the dashboard camera video is exempt from disclosure pursuant to one of the exemptions the Department has pled as af?rmative defenses. Each of the exemptions asserted by the Department are contained within section of FOIA. The threshold requirement for application of the exemptions contained in section is that the records requested be in the ?possession law enforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes.? 5 ILCS (West 2012). As such, the preliminary issue before the Court is whether the video of the incident is in the possession of the Department for law enforcement purposes. The Department, as the public body, has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the requested dashboard camera video is being used for law enforcement purposes. 5 ILCS 140/1 1(t) (West 2012). The Department argues that pursuant to Special Order 803-05, the dashboard camera video is possessed by the Department for a law enforcement purposes. Special Order SOB-05 is entitled VIDEO SYSTEMS. The Policy of Special Order 303-05 is contained in Section II and provides in pertinent part: The in-car video systems can provide members with an invaluable instrument to enhance criminal prosecution by providing powerful evidence of criminal activity, limit civil liabilities, and objectively document of?cer conduct during individual interactions. Members assigned to a vehicle equipped with an in?car video system will use it pursuant to this directive. Def. Resp., Ex. A, Klimas Aff, Ex. A, Chi. Police Dep?t Special Order $03-05, at 1. Special Order SOB-05 also provides that: Uniformed Department members assigned to vehicles equipped with in?car video systems will activate the system to visually record the entire incident for all: 1. arrests and transports. 2. nonpursuit emergency vehicle operations. 3. any situation that the member, through training and experience, believes to serve a proper police purpose. Def. Resp, Ex. A, Klimas Aff, EX. A, Chi. Police Dep?t Special Order 803-05, at 2. Special Order 803?05 further provides that: If recorded, felony and misdemeanor arrests, motor vehicle pursuits, traf?c crashes resulting in property damage, personal injury, or a fatality, incidents, and failure to yield to an emergency vehicle will be automatically stored by the in?car video system indefinitely . . . . Def. Resp, EX. A, Klimas Aff, Ex. A, Chi. Police Dep?t Special Order 803-05, at 2. 10 Under the plain text of Special Order 803-05, the Department possesses dashboard camera videos for both law enforcement and non?law enforcement purposes. Contrary to Smith?s assertion, this dual purpose does not mean that the Department therefore, cannot possess the video for law enforcement purposes. As such, the Court concludes that the Department has satis?ed its burden as to the threshold requirement of section of FOIA. The Court next turns to the speci?c exemptions asserted by the Department, beginning with section of FOIA. INTERFERENCE WITH PENDING LAW ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS Section of FOIA exempts from disclosure records that would ?interfere with pending or actually and reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by any law enforcement or correctional agency that is the recipient of the request.? 5 ILCS (West 2012). The Department contends that it may assert this exemption because it is a law enforcement agency that is cooperating with the investigations of the incident by the US. Attorney, the FBI, and the State?s Attorney, and a federal grand jury proceeding. As a c00perating agency, reasons the Department, it may withhold records material to the investigations and proceedings conducted by other agencies. Smith counters that the Department concedes that it is not conducting any investigation or law enforcement proceeding. While IPRA may be conducting an investigation, argues Smith, IPRA is an independent agency of the City of Chicago, separate and distinct from the Department. Nor is the Department, asserts Smith, one of the agencies participating in the ?inter-agency? investigation. As for the fact that the Department is cooperating with the investigation, Smith notes that the Department is under a legal obligation to provide information, like any other entity. Resolution of the issue before the Court turns on construction of FOIA. The Court will apply generally recognized principles of statutory construction to construe section of FOIA. In construing a statute, a court?s task is to ?ascertain and give effect to the legislature?s intent,? the most reliable indicator of which is ?the language of the statute, which is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning.? Solon v. Midwest Med. Records Ass?n, 236 Ill. 2d 433, 440 (2010). To determine the plain meaning of statutory terms, a court should ?consider the statute in its entirety, the subject it addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it.? I_d, ?When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written, without resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction.? Ld_. A presumption also exists ?that the legislature did not intend absurd, inconvenient, or unjust consequences.? at 441. Additionally, courts must construe FOIA liberally and the statutory exemptions from disclosures must be read narrowly. m, 233 Ill. 2d at 405. The Court ?nds that the unambiguous language of section of FOIA exempts from disclosure by a law enforcement agency public records which would interfere with pending or actually and reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by the law enforcement agency that is the recipient of a FOIA request. 5 ILCS (West 2012). Here, the Department is unquestionably a law enforcement agency and was the recipient of Smith?s request for the dashboard camera video. Thus, for the Department to satisfy its burden ll as to the exemption under section the Department must establish by clear and convincing evidence that it, as the recipient of the request, is conducting pending law enforcement proceedings, or that it is actually and reasonably contemplating conducting law enforcement proceedings. 5 ILCS (West 2012). The law enforcement proceedings upon which the Department relies in asserting the exemption under section of FOIA are the investigations of the incident by the US. Attorney, the FBI, the State?s Attorney, and the federal grand jury. However, to the extent that those investigations are law enforcement proceedings, they are not law enforcement proceedings conducted by the Department. Thus, the Court ?nds that the Department may not assert the investigations by the U.S. Attorney, the FBI, and the State?s Attorney, and the federal grand jury proceeding to support its claim of an exemption from disclosure of the dashboard camera video pursuant to section of FOIA. In this context, contrary to the Department?s contention, nowhere in section of FOIA does the exemption extend to public bodies cooperating with a law enforcement proceeding. As noted by Smith, if the General Assembly intended to create an exemption for a public body cooperating with a law enforcement proceeding, it could have done so, but it did not when it enacted section of FOIA. While the Department maintains that such a construction of section of FOIA is too narrow, the Court again emphasizes that the statutory exemptions from disclosures under FOIA must be read narrowly. Stin, 233 Ill. 2d at 405. The Department?s position ignores this command and, instead, advocates for an expansive construction that exceeds the bounds of the plain language of section of FOIA. ?No rule of statutory construction authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what it says.? Hocraffer v. Trotter Gen. Contr, Inc, 2013 IL App (3d) 120539, 11 12. Such a position is best addressed to the General Assembly. Additionally, the Court ?nds that the Department has failed to proffer any evidence that a law enforcement proceeding conducted by the Department is pending or actually and reasonably contemplated. The Court?s construction is also supported by the legislative history of section 7 of FOIA. Prior to March 1, 2010, the previous version of what is new section was found'in section section of which exempted records from disclosure to the extent that disclosure would ?interfere with pending or actually and reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by any law enforcement or correctional agency.? 2009 111. Laws 736, at 900. However, the General Assembly amended section 7 of FOIA effective March 1, 2010 and enacted section as it currently exists, limiting the exemption from disclosure records that would ?interfere with pending or actually and reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by any law enforcement or correctional agency that is the recipient ofthe request.? 5 ILCS (West 2012), 2009 111. Laws 1378, at 92 (emphasis added). Moreover, even if the Department could properly assert the investigations by the US. Attorney, the FBI, and the State?s Attorney, and the federal grand jury proceeding in support of an exemption under section of FOIA, the Department must also establish by clear and convincing evidence that disclosure of the dashboard camera video would interfere with any such pending or actually and reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings. 5 ILCS (West 2012). The Department asserts that disclosure of the dashboard camera 12 video could affect the recollections and testimony of witnesses to the incident. Additionally, the Department contends that release of the dashboard camera video could cause the officer involved in the incident to be tried in the court of public opinion which, in turn, could interfere with the any potential criminal prosecution. The Department?s assertions are purportedly supported by the affidavits of Commander Robert J. Klimas and Joshua Hunt. Def. Resp, Ex. A., Klimas Aff., at it 40; Def. Resp., Ex. B., Hunt Affpublic body ?can meet its burden only by providing some objective indicia that the exemption is applicable under the circumstances.? Ill. Educ. Ass?n, 204 Ill. 2d at 470 (emphasis in original). The Court finds that the Department?s assertions and the averments of Klimas and Hunt in support thereof are entirely conclusory and inadequate to sustain the Department?s burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that disclosure of the dashboard camera video ?would . . . interfere with pending or actually and reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings . . . 5 ILCS (West 2012) (emphasis added). See also, Day, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 77 (conclusory af?davits with mere ?sweeping generalities? insufficient to establish exemption). As such, the Court ?nds that the Department has failed to satisfy its burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that would arguably entitle it to judgment as a matter of law that the dashboard camera video is exempt from disclosure pursuant to Section of FOIA. However, as the Department need only satisfy one exemption to sustain its decision, the Court proceeds to analyze the exemption asserted by the Department under section 7(1)(d)(vii) of FOIA. . OBSTRUCTION OF AN ONGOING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION Section 7(1)(d)(vii) of FOIA exempts from disclosure by public bodies public records that would ?obstruct an ongoing criminal investigation by the agency that is the recipient of the request.? 5 ILCS (West 2012). The arguments and evidence upon which the Department relies to support that disclosure of the dashboard camera video is exempt under section 7(l)(d)(vii) of FOIA are identical to those on which the Department relies to support that disclosure of the dashboard camera video is exempt under section For the same reasons that the Court found that the Department failed to satisfy its burden as to section of FOIA, the Court finds that the Department has failed to satisfy its burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that would arguably entitle it to judgment as a matter of law that the dashboard camera video is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(l)(d)(vii) of FOIA. The plain language of section 7(l)(d)(vii) of FOIA exempts from disclosure by a law enforcement agency public records which would obstruct an ongoing criminal investigation by the law enforcement agency that is the recipient of a FOIA request. 5 ILCS (West 2012). Here, again, the Department is unquestionably a law enforcement agency and was the recipient of Smith?s request for the dashboard camera video. Thus, for the Department to satisfy its burden as to the exemption under section the Department must establish by clear and convincing evidence that it, as the recipient of the request, is conducting an ongoing criminal investigation. 5 ILCS (West 2012). 13 The ongoing criminal investigations upon which the Department relies in asserting the exemption under section 7(1)(d)(vii) of FOIA are the investigations of the incident by the US. Attorney, the FBI, the State?s Attorney, and the federal grand jury. However, to the extent that those investigations are ongoing criminal investigations, they are not ongoing criminal investigations by the Department. Thus, the Court ?nds that the Department may not assert the investigations by the US. Attorney, the FBI, and the State?s Attorney, and the federal grand jury proceeding to support its claim of an exemption from disclosure of the dashboard camera video pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(vii) of FOIA. Like section of FOIA, nowhere in section 7(1)(d)(vii) of FOIA does the exemption extend to public bodies cooperating with a criminal investigation. ?No rule of statutory construction authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what it says.? Hocraffer v. Trotter Gen. Contr., Inc., 2013 IL App (3d) 120539, i1 12. As noted by Smith, had the General Assembly intended to apply the exemption to a public body cooperating with a criminal investigation, it could have done so, but it did not when it enacted section 7(1)(d)(vii) of FOIA. Additionally, the Court ?nds that the Department has failed to proffer any evidence that a law enforcement proceeding conducted by the Department is pending or actually and reasonably contemplated. The Court, again, notes that the legislative history of section 7 supports the Court?s construction of section 7(1)(d)(vii) for the same reason it supports the Court?s construction of section Prior to March 1, 2010, the previous version of what is now section was found in section section of which exempted records from disclosure to the extent that disclosure would ?obstruct an ongoing criminal investigation.? 2009 111. Laws 736, at 900. However, the General Assembly amended section 7 of FOIA effective March 1, 2010 and enacted section 7(1)(d)(vii) as it currently exists, limiting the exemption from disclosure records that would ?obstruct an ongoing criminal investigation by the agency that is the recipient ofthe request.? 5 ILCS (West 2012), 2009 111. Laws 1378, at 92 (emphasis added). Furthermore, even if the Department could properly assert the investigations by the FBI and the federal grand jury in support of an exemption under section 7(1)(d)(vii) of FOIA, the Department must also establish by clear and convincing evidence that disclosure of the dashboard camera video would obstruct any such ongoing criminal investigation. 5 ILCS (West 2012). The Court ?nds that the Department?s assertions, and the averments of Klimas and Hunt in support thereof, that release of the dashboard camera video could affect the recollection and testimony of witnesses to the incident, and could cause the of?cer involved in the incident to be tried in the court of public opinion are conclusory and inadequate to sustain the Department?s burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that disclosure of the dashboard camera video ?would . . . obstruct an ongoing criminal investigation . . . 5 ILCS (West 2012) (emphasis added). See also, my, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 77 (conclusory af?davits with mere ?sweeping generalities? insuf?cient to establish exemption). Therefore, the Court ?nds that the Department has failed to satisfy its burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that would arguably entitle it to judgment as a matter of law 14 that the dashboard camera video is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(vii) of FOIA. Accordingly, the Court proceeds to analyze the ?nal exemption asserted by the Department under section of FOIA. INTERFERENCE WITH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS Section of FOIA exempts from disclosure by public bodies public records which would ?interfere with active administrative enforcement proceedings conducted by the public body that is the recipient of the request.? 5 ILCS (West 2012). Applying generally recognized principles of statutory construction to construe section of FOIA, the Court ?nds that the plain text of section of 01A exempts from disclosure by a law enforcement agency public records which would interfere with active administrative enforcement proceedings conducted by the law enforcement agency that is the recipient of a FOIA request. 5 ILCS (West 2012). To reiterate, there is no dispute that the Department is a law enforcement agency and the recipient of Smith?s request for the dashboard camera video. Thus, for the Department to satisfy its burden as to the exemption under section the Department must initially establish by clear and convincing evidence that it, as the recipient of the request, is conducting active administrative enforcement proceedings. 5 ILCS (West 2012). The Department argues that it may assert the investigation by IPRA into the incident as an administrative enforcement proceeding to support its position that the dashboard camera video is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section of FOIA. The Department contends that section 257-040 of the Chicago Municipal Code establishes a comprehensive administrative enforcement proceeding, in which the Department plays an integral role. Smith retorts that the Department cannot claim this exemption because an IPRA investigation is not an ?administrative enforcement proceeding? under FOIA. An IPRA investigation, observes Smith, is only an investigation that may or may not lead to disciplinary proceeding. If investigation, notes Smith, reveals misconduct, IPRA may only recommend potential discipline against an of?cer of the Department. It is the Superintendent of the Department and the Police Board that initiates any potential disciplinary proceeding against the officer of the Department. In the alternative, Smith argues that even if an IPRA investigation were an administrative proceeding, it must still be an active one to qualify for the exemption, and it is not. IPRA, according to Smith, has not done anything for approximately eight months. The question of whether an IPRA investigation is an administrative enforcement proceeding is apparently an issue of ?rst impression. The Court, however, need not address this issue of ?rst impression or the issue of whether the IPRA investigation into the incident is active because, even if the IPRA investigation of the incident is an active administrative enforcement proceeding within the meaning of section of FOIA, it is not being conducted by the Department. The Department notes that it cooperates with IPRA during IPRA investigations regarding access to the Department?s records and personnel. Additionally, the Department maintains that when IPRA alerts an of?cer of the Department to appear for an interview, IPRA uses the Department?s noti?cation procedures. Def. Resp, Ex. B, Hunt Aff., at $1 16. The Court ?nds this evidence insuf?cient to establish that the IPRA investigation into the incident is an 15 active administrative enforcement proceeding conducted by the Department. IPRA is established as an of?ce of the City of Chicago which ?shall be located in a facility outside the department of police.? Chi. Mun. Code 2-57-020. Thus, the Department and IPRA are distinct and independent, if interrelated, Of?ces of the City of Chicago. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Department may not assert the IPRA investigation as an active administrative enforcement proceeding to support the Department?s assertion that the dashboard camera video is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section of FOIA. Additionally, the Court ?nds that the Department fails to proffer any evidence that it, as the recipient of Smith?s request for the dashboard camera video, is conducting an active administrative enforcement proceeding. Once more, the Court notes that the legislative history of section 7 supports the Court?s construction of section for the same reason it supports the Court?s construction of sections and Prior to March 1, 2010, the previous version of what is now section was found in section section of which exempted records from disclosure to the extent that disclosure would ?interfere with pending administrative enforcement proceedings conducted by any public body . . . 2009 Ill. Laws 736, at 900. However, the General Assembly amended section 7 of FOIA effective March 1, 2010 and enacted section as it currently exists, limiting the exemption from disclosure records-that would ?interfere with active administrative enforcement proceedings conducted by the public body that is the recipient offhe request.? 5 ILCS (West 2012), 2009 Ill. Laws 1378, at 92 (emphasis added). Moreover, even if the Department may assert an IPRA iIWestigation as an active administrative enforcement proceeding in support of an exemption under section of FOIA, the Department must also establish by clear and convincing evidence that disclosure of the dashboard camera video would interfere with any such active administrative enforcement proceedings. 5 ILCS 14077(1)(d)(ii) (West 2012). The Department, supported by Hunt?s af?davit, maintains that IPRA does not want the officer under investigation to View the video prior to re-interviewing the of?cer because doing so could affect the of?cer?s recollection of the incident. Def. Resp, Ex. B, Hunt Aff., at 11 49. However, the Court notes that neither the Department nor Hunt provide any support for the proposition that IPRA has the power to prevent the officer from viewing the dashboard camera video prior to being re?interviewed. Furthermore, the Court ?nds Hunt?s af?davit to be entirely conclusory and inadequate to sustain the Department?s burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that disclosure of the dashboard camera video ?would . . . interfere with active administrative enforcement proceedings . . . 5 ILCS (West 2012) (emphasis added). See also, my, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 77 (conclusory af?davits with mere ?sweeping generalities? insuf?cient to establish exemption). The Court also deems it appropriate to address the Department?s assertion that IPRA has not yet re-interviewed the officer subject to investigation and will not do so until a determination has been made on whether to charge the of?cer with a criminal offense. The Department contends that decision to wait to re-interview the of?cer are due to its concerns with the requirements of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Garritv v. New Jersey, 385 US. 493 (1967). Garrity merely held that testimony compelled by threat of dismissal from employment could not be used in a criminal prosecution of the witness. Garrity, 385 US. at 500. Under Garrity, then, any statement made to IPRA by the of?cer under 16 investigation under threat of discharge from employment is inadmissible against the of?cer in any criminal prosecution. Perhaps IPRA has an interest in awaiting a determination as to whether the of?cer subject to its investigation will be charged with a criminal offense before deciding whether to re-interview the of?cer pursuant to the Administrative Proceedings Rights Form on the basis that statements pursuant thereto, and evidence derived therefrom, would not be admissible in a criminal trial. However, the Court ?nds that the holding of Garrity, and its effect on investigation inapplicable and irrelevant to the issues presented in this case. Accordingly, the Court ?nds that the Department has failed to sustain its burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that would arguably entitle it to a judgment that the dashboard camera video is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section of FOIA. CONCLUSION FOIA contemplates ?full and complete disclosure of the affairs of government and recognizes that such disclosure is necessary to enable the people to ful?ll their duties to monitor government.? Stem, 233 Ill. 2d at 405. To that end, courts must construe FOIA liberally and the statutory exemptions from disclosure must be read narrowly. Smith, as the movant, bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Williams, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 689. Therefore, the Court ?nds that Smith has satis?ed his initial burden to establish a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to his Complaint. The burden then shifts to the Department to present a factual basis that would arguably entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. M, 407 Ill. App. 3d at 490. As such, the Department has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the dashboard camera video is exempt from disclosure pursuant to a speci?c statutory provision. 5 ILCS 140/11(f) (West 2012); Ill. Educ. Ass?n, 204 Ill. 2d at 464. The Department asserts that the dashboard camera Video is exempt from disclosure under sections and 7(1)(d)(vii) of FOIA. Section of FOIA exempts from disclosure public records to the extent that their disclosure would ?interfere with pending or actually and reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by any law enforcement or correctional agency that is the recipient of the request.? 5 ILCS (West 2012) (emphasis added). Section of FOIA exempts from disclosure public records to the extent that their disclosure would ?interfere with active administrative enforcement proceedings conducted by the public body that is the recipient of the request.? 5 ILCS (West 2012) (emphasis added). Section 7(l)(d)(vii) of FOIA exempts from disclosure public records to the extent that their disclosure would ?obstruct an ongoing criminal investigation by the agency that is the recipient 0fthe request.? 5 ILCS (West 2012) (emphasis added). To defeat Smith?s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Department has the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the Department, as the recipient of the request, is conducting or actually and reasonably contemplating a law enforcement proceeding, is conducting an active administrative enforcement proceeding, or is conducting an ongoing l7 criminal investigation, respectively. Rather than point to any investigation or proceeding being conducted or actually and reasonably contemplated by the Department itself, the Department relies on the investigation by IPRA, the joint investigation by the State?s Attorney?s Of?ce and the FBI, and the pending federal grand jury proceedings. As the investigations and proceedings relied upon by the Department are not being conducted by the Department, the Court ?nds that the Department has failed to sustain its burden on that issue. Moreover, the Department also has the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that disclosure of the dashboard camera video would interfere with or obstruct such an investigation or proceeding conducted by the Department. The Court ?nds that the Department has failed to sustain its burden on that issue as well. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff, Brandon Smith?s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The Department shall release the dashboard camera video responsive to Smith?s request to Smith on or before November 25, 2015. I it if. it. i: ENTERED: Jagimaminaugm?mm NOV 1 2015 . uoaorm am" - or THE much my coca coum'i: i110??- Franklin U. Valderrama, Judge Presiding DATED: November 19, 2015 18