LUJN EXPEDITE El No hearing set El Hearing is set Honorable Erik D. Price Calendar: Friday, December 4, 2015 at 9:00 am. SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR THURSTON COUNTY GLENDA NISSEN, NO. 11-2-02312-2 Plaintiff, DEFENDANT PIERCE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF PIERCE COUNTY, a Public Agency; PIERCE DEPUTY PROSECUTOR COUNTY OFFICE, a Public Agency, Defendants. I. INTRODUCTION Defendant Pierce County (?County?) seeks appointment of a special deputy prosecutor to independently advise it on this case and another closely-related matter pending in the Court of Appeals. The Washington Supreme Court?s ruling of August 27, 2015 imposes af?rmative duties on both Pierce County Prosecutor Mark Lindquist and the County. These duties create an apparent or actual con?ict between the County and its chief legal advisor under the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct As a result, Pierce County Executive Pat McCarthy recently requested that Prosecutor Lindquist voluntarily appoint a special deputy prosecutor to advise the County on how to fully comply with the Washington Supreme Court?s ruling. As detailed more fully herein, Prosecutor Lindquist initially declined to do so, then abruptly appointed another attorney with extensive prior involvement in the current case DEFENDANT PIERCE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY PROSECUTOR - 1 Williams. Kastner Gibbs PLLC 601 Union Street, Suite 4100 Seattle, Washington 98101-2380 (206) 628-6600 56l9704.4 directly supporting Prosecutor Lindquist?s litigation efforts. As a result, the County remains without con?ict-free representation. Consequently, the County now seeks judicial intervention in order to ensure independent representation and to fully and comply with the Washington Supreme Court?s order. 11. RELIEF REQUESTED Pursuant to RCW 36.27.030 and RCW 36.27.040, the County moves this Court to appoint Williams, Kastner Gibbs, PLLC, as a special deputy prosecutor to represent the County in this case and the related matter pending in the Court of Appeals (No. 45039-9 Wash. Ct. App. 2015). STATEMENT OF FACTS The facts underlying this case are well known to the Court. The procedural history is recounted at length in the Supreme Court?s ruling of August 27, 2015. See Nissan v. Pierce County, at at, 183 Wn.2d 863, 869-73 (2015). In brief, this matter originates with two Public Records Act requests submitted by Plaintiff Glenda Nissen. Id. at 869. Both requests sought records related to Prosecutor Lindquist?s cellular telephone records. Id. at 869-70. The requests resulted in litigation originating in this Court, proceeding to the Court of Appeals, and ultimately being appealed to the Washington Supreme Court. At all relevant times in the litigation, the County has been represented either by Prosecutor Lindquist, his deputies, andlor private attorneys Michael Patterson and Philip Talmadge. See Decl. of P. McCarthy, at On August 27, 2015, the Washington Supreme Court issued a ruling requiring a two- part document review process to be undertaken in response to the PRA request by Plaintiff. Speci?cally, the order stated the following: DEFENDANT PIERCE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY PROSECUTOR - 2 Williams, Kastner 8.: Gibbs PLLC 601 Union Street, Suite 4100 Seattle, Washington 98101-2380 (206) 628-6600 561970444 [Pierce County Prosecutor Mark] Lindquist must obtain a transcript of the content of all text messages at issue, review them, and produce to the County any that are public records consistent with our opinion. The County must then review those messages just as it would with any other public record and apply any applicable exemptions, redact information if necessary, and produce the records and any exemption log to [Petitioner Glenda] Nissen. As to text messages that Lindquist in good faith determines are not public records, he must submit an af?davit to the County attesting to the personal character of the messages. The County must also produce that af?davit to Nissen. Id at 888. On November 10, 2015, County Executive Pat McCarthy submitted a letter to Prosecutor Lindquist. See Dec]. of Pat McCarthy, at 115. The letter summarized the requirements of the August 27, 2015 order and observed that the terms appeared to create a con?ict between Prosecutor Lindquist and the County. Id., Exh. A. As a result, the letter requested that Prosecutor Lindquist undertake three actions: 1) Cease all representation in this case and the related case pending in the Court of Appeals (No. 45039-9 Wash. Ct. App. 2015); 2) Appoint Jessie Harris of Williams, Kastner Gibbs, PLLC, as a special deputy prosecutor pursuant to RCW 3627040 to represent the County in this and the related case in the Court of Appeals; and 3) Inform the County Executive of his progress in complying with the Supreme Court?s order of August 27, 2015. Id. The letter requested a response by close of business on November 13, 2015. Id., at 115. On November 13, 2015, the County Executive received a response from Daniel Hamilton, Tort Section Lead for the County Prosecutor?s Of?ce. Id., at 116, Exh. B. The letter from Mr. Hamilton did not provide an update on the progress in complying with the Supreme Court?s order and declined to appoint a special deputy prosecutor to represent the County. Id. Speci?cally, the letter stated that ?Every position taken by the County in the Nissan litigation DEFENDANT PIERCE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY PROSECUTOR - 3 Williams, Kastner Gibbs PLLC 60l Union Street, Suite 4100 Seattle. Washington 98101-2380 (206) 628-6600 56197044 has been asserted exclusively in pursuit of the County?s interests.? Id., Exh. B., at 2. Moreover, the letter quoted RPC 1.7, but provided no substantive analysis. Id Instead, it stated the following: Similarly, under RPC there is no risk (let alone the required ?signi?cant risk?) that the representation of the County ?will be materially limited? by Prosecutor? Lindquist?s intervention in Nissan 1. Throughout the litigation, the legal positions of the County and the Intervenor have been consistently complimentary, and if anything the Supreme Court?s directive makes those legal positions even more compatible. Id., at 4. The letter also stated that any request for change of counsel is untimely in light of the case status in the related Court of Appeals matter. Id. Despite the assertions in the letter of November 13, 2015, Prosecutor Lindquist subsequently appointed Ramsey Ramerman as a deputy prosecutor on or around November 20, 2015. See Decl. of Mark Maenhout, at 112. Mr. Ramerman is an assistant city attorney for the City of Everett, WA and has extensive personal involvement in this case and related matters. Speci?cally, Mr. Ramerman ?led at least two prior legal briefs with the Washington Supreme Court in suppert of Prosecutor Lindquist?s legal assertions and conclusions. Id, at 113. The first was an amicus brief ?led on December 5, 2014 on behalf of the Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys encouraging the Washington Supreme Court to accept review of the Court of Appeals decision in this matter. Id, at 113, Exh. A. In it, Mr. Ramerman argues the following: The application of the PRA to the personal records of the elected Prosecuting Attorney would represent a massive invasion of the Prosecutor?s personal privacy (protected by Article 1, Section 7) and associational privacy (protected by Article 1, Section 5). This Court should accept review for all of the reasons set forth by the County and Prosecuting Attorney. Id. at 2-3. The second was an amicus brief ?led by Mr. Ramerman with the Washington Supreme Court on May 4, 2015 arguing the fundamental issue presented by this case: ?Individual elected of?cials, like courts, are not agencies, and therefore the Court should rule records maintained by elected of?cials in private locations are not ?public records.? Id. Exh. DEFENDANT PIERCE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY PROSECUTOR - 4 Williams, Kastner Gibbs PLLC 60 Union Street, Suite 4100 Seattle, Washington 98101-2380 (206) 628-6600 B, at 5. Moreover, he opines that use of a private cell phone provides a complete exemption to the disclosure requirements of the PRA: ?This does not mean Lindquist did anything wrong in posing the question about Nissen?s political support as long as Lindquist used his private phone.? 161., Exh. B., at 2. Finally, Mr. Ramerman was also previously retained by the County to review records of Detective Nissen, the Plaintiff in this matter, requested by a third-party to this litigation. Id., at 114. The appointment of Mr. Ramerman occurred without input or consultation from the County Executive?s of?ce, the Director of Judicial Services, or the County Risk Manager. Id., at 115. To date, no update has been provided to the County regarding the status in complying with the Supreme Court?s order. Id., at 1 6. IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES Should the Court appoint Williams, Kastner Gibbs, PLLC, as a special deputy prosecutor to represent the County in this and the related matter pending before the Court of Appeals, when an actual or apparent con?ict exists between the County and Prosecutor Lindquist under the RPCs, and when Prosecutor Lindquist appointed another attorney to represent the County who has extensive prior involvement supporting Prosecutor Lindquist?s legal arguments and conclusions in this matter? Yes. V. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON Defendant relies upon the Declaration of Pierce County Executive Pat McCarthy, the Declaration of Mark Maenhout, the Declaration of Jessie Harris, and the briefs and evidence ?led in this matter to date. VI. AUTHORITY The right to counsel is a closely- guarded and important right. An integral component of that right is the right to receive con?ict-free advice. Prosecutor Lindquist?s re?lsal to appoint an independent special deputy prosecutor places the County in the unacceptable position of DEFENDANT PIERCE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY PROSECUTOR - 5 Williams, Kastner Gibbs PLLC 601 Union Street, Suite 4100 Seattle. Washington 98101?2380 (206) 628-6600 56l9704.4 being a captive litigant, subject to the decisions of Prosecutor Lindquist and an attorney appointed by Prosecutor Lindquist with an extensive prior history of directly supporting the current litigation strategy and legal arguments. No independence is accorded by the appointment of Mr. Ramennan. The Court has the power to rectify the situation, and should do so. A. Prosecutor Lindguist and Mr. Ramerman are Con?icted From Representing the County in this Matter and the Related Matter Before the Court of Appeals Under RPC 1.7. Prosecutor Lindquist is the duly-elected Prosecutor for the County with all the duties and powers outlined in RCW 36.27.020. These include the following duties: I) To be ?legal advisor of the [County] legislative authority? (RCW 36.27.0200?; 2) To be ?legal advisor to all county and precinct all matters relating to their official (RCW 36.27 020(2); and 3) To ?Appear for and represent the state, county, and all school districts. ..in all criminal and civil proceedings in which the state or the county or any school district in the county may be a party.? (RCW 36.27.0200?. These powers, however, are not absolute. Among other requirements, RPC 1.7 provides the following: Except as provided in paragraph a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent con?ict of interest. A concurrent con?ict of interest exists if: (2) there is a signi?cant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer?s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. 1 This motion should not be construed as adverse comment regarding Mr. Ramerman?s professional capabilities. It is solely based upon the con?icts presented by Prosecutor Lindquist?s representation in this matter and the prior direct involvement in the case by Mr. Ramerman on behalf of WSAMA and his role in reviewing Detective Nissan?s communications. DEFENDANT PIERCE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY PROSECUTOR - 6 Williams, Kastner Gibbs PLLC 601 Union Street, Suite 4100 Seattle, Washington 98101-2380 (206) 628-6600 56197044 (emphasis added). The concern of representation in instances involving a ?personal interest of the lawyer? is re?ected in Comment 10 to RPC 1.7 which observes that ?if the probity of a lawyer?s own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be dif?cult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice.?2 Finally, as noted in Comment 1 to RPC 1.11, lawyer who has served or is currently serving as a public of?cer or employee is personally subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against concurrent con?icts of interest stated in Rule As a result, Prosecutor Lindquist remains subject to the RPCs in his service as Pierce County Prosecutor. Mr. Hamilton?s letter of November 13, 2015 stated that no con?ict exists under RPC 1.7. See Dec]. of P. McCarthy, Exh. B. Speci?cally, he contended that ?under RPC there is no risk (let alone the required ?signi?cant risk?) that the representation of the County ?will be materially limited? by Prosecutor? Lindquist?s intervention in Nissan Id., at 4. In support of this proposition, he states that the County?s and Prosecutor Lindquist?s positions have been ?consistently complimentary? throughout the litigation. Id. Despite the letter of November 13, 2015, Prosecutor Lindquist abruptly changed course late last week, appointing Ramsey Ramerrnan as a deputy prosecutor to represent the County in this matter. See Decl. of M. Maenhout, at 112. Mr. Ramerrnan has direct, extensive, and personal involvement in this case, including ?ling two briefs with the Washington Supreme Court supporting Prosecutor Lindquist?s legal arguments and conclusions. Id. at 113, Exhs A- B. Additionally, Mr. Ramerrnan was previously retained by the County to review records of Detective Nissen requested under the PRA. Id, at 1 4. 2 RPC 1.7(b) contains, of course, a provision permitting the concurrent con?ict of interest to be waived, provided the attorney ?reasonably believes the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client,? ?the representation is not prohibited by law,? The representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against and ?each affected client gives informed consent, con?rmed in writing (following authorization ?'om the other client to make any informed disclosures)? No such informed consent has been requested by Prosecutor Lindquist from the County. See Decl. of Pat McCarthy, at 117. DEFENDANT PIERCE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT Williams, Kama, Gibbs OF DEPUTY PROSECUTOR - 7 601 Union Street, Suite 4101} Seattle, Washington 98101-2380 (206) 628-6600 56l9704.4 The letter of November 13, 2015 and the subsequent appointment of Mr. Ramerman illustrates the problem. Despite a request by the County Executive for an update on Prosecutor Lindquist?s progress in complying with the Supreme Court?s order of August 27, 2015, no update is provided, thereby leaving the County in the dark regarding the status of a case of signi?cant import. Moreover, the letter provides no analysis of the underlying facts of the case, and how the nature of the allegations and the required disclosures under the August 27, 2015 order place the County and Prosecutor Lindquist in an actual or apparent con?ict. Finally, in an apparent belated recognition of the con?ict, Prosecutor Lindquist appoints an attorney who, far from being an independent advisor to the County, has already ?led briefs in this matter directly supporting Prosecutor Lindquist?s legal theories. Indeed, Mr. Ramerman has already argued before the Washington Supreme Court that the matter should have been accepted on appeal, and that Prosecutor Lindquist?s actions were appropriate ?as long as Lindquist used his private phone.? Id, Exh. B, at 2. Moreover, he has already directly supported Prosecutor Lindquist?s position before the Washington Supreme Court (subsequently rejected by the Court) that individual elected of?cials are not agencies, ?and therefore the Court should rule records maintained by elected of?cials in private locations are not ?public records."? Id., at 5. Here, the con?ict is obvious. The case at issue, and the related casein the Court of Appeals, pertains to records on Prosecutor Lindquist?s personal cellular phone and direct allegations against him. The Washington Supreme Court?s order of August 27, 2015 requires Prosecutor Lindquist to take speci?c steps to produce the records and requires the County to review and redact, as necessary. See Nissan, at 888. The produced documents may substantiate or undermine allegations of misconduct against Prosecutor Lindquist. If substantiated, the allegations may have adverse legal, political, and professional consequences. Not knowing what records exist on Prosecutor Lindquist?s cellular phone, the County is in the DEFENDANT PIERCE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY PROSECUTOR - 8 Williams, 3: Gibbs PLLC 601 Union Street, Suite 4100 Seattle, Washington 98101-2380 (206) 628-6600 5619704.4 untenable position of being in litigation where the County Prosecutor has a personal stake in the outcome, while he is also the primary source of legal advice for the County. Regrettably, Prosecutor Lindquist?s personal interest in this litigation creates a concurrent con?ict of interest under RPC 1.7 and potentially other RPCs. Mr. Ramerman?s belated appointment as a deputy prosecutor in this matter does not obviate the conflict. Mr. Ramerman has already argued to the Washington Supreme Court that l) The Washington Supreme Court should accept review of the Court of Appeals decision in this case; 2) Prosecutor Lindquist did not violate the PRA disclosure requirements ?as long as Lindquist used his private phone?; and 3) Individual elected of?cials are not agencies, and the Court should rule ?records maintained by elected of?cials in private locations are not ?public records.? Decl. of M. Maenhout, Exh. B, at 2, 5. Given these clear assertions, it is not possible for Mr. Ramerman to subsequently provide differing legal opinion to the County, even if appropriate, as to do so requires disavowing his previous assertions on behalf of WSAMA. As a result, Mr. Ramerman is similarly con?icted under RPC 1.7 and his appointment does not provide the independent legal advice required by the County. Finally, Mr. Ramerman?s previous service reviewing Detective Nissen?s communications requested under the PRA only reinforces his extensive prior and personal involvement in this case. B. The Court Should Appoint a Special Deputy Prosecutor Under RCW 36.27.030 and RCW 36.27.040. Fortunately, the County is not without recourse: an independent special deputy prosecutor may be appointed by this Court to represent the County under RCW 36.27.030 and RCW 36.27.040. Washington case law contains various examples of elected county prosecutors being removed (or removing themselves) from cases due to ethical con?icts. In State v. Stenger, 111 Wn.2d 516 (1988), for example, the Washington Supreme Court addressed a situation where the Clark County Prosecutor declined to disqualify himself from a DEFENDANT PIERCE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY PROSECUTOR - 9 Williams, Kastner Gibbs PLLC 601 Union Street, Suite 4100 Seattle, Washington 98 [01-2380 (206) 628-6600 56197044 somummAwm? case where he previously advised the defendant while in private practice prior to his election as prosecutor. The Washington Supreme Court observed that RPC 1.9 prohibited representation in that case. Id. at 520. As a result, the Court noted that ?We need go no further in this capital case to conclude that it is appropriate that a special prosecuting attorney be appointed to handle and control the case.? Id. at 523. Irnportantly, the Court cited both RCW 36.27.030 and RCW 3627.040 as authority to do so. Id. In Herron v. McClanahan, 28 Wn. App. 552 (1981), the Pierce County Prosecutor appointed a special deputy under RCW 3627040 to address a recall petition against the elected prosecutor. When the appointment was challenged, the Court noted that ?To satisfy the statute, and at the same time avoid the obvious con?ict of interest,? the county prosecutor appointed another attorney to serve as a special deputy prosecuting attorney for Pierce County to review the recall charges. Id. at 556. Further, in response to a party?s claim that the Court should have appointed someone else under RCW 36.27.03 0, the Court noted that ?we ?nd it would have applied only if [Pierce County Prosecutor] Herron had refused to appoint an independent party to review the charges. Since a suitable person was appointed, there was no need for the trial court to invoke RCW 36.27.030.? Id. at 557. Finally, in Grant County Prosecuting Attorney v. Jasman, 183 Wn.2d 633 (2015), the Washington Supreme Court clari?ed the circumstances under which the judiciary may appoint a special prosecutor: court may appoint a special prosecutor for a party only if (1) the prosecutor has ?the authority and the duty to represent that party in the given matter?; and (2) ?some disability. . .prevent[s] the prosecutor from ful?lling that duty.? Id. at 647 (quoting Osborn v. Grant County, 130 Wn.2d 615, 624-25 (1996)); See also Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wn.2d 277, 298-300 (1994). Stenger, Herron, and Jasman all clarify that judicial action under RCW 36.27.030 and RCW 36.27.040 is permissible when a prosecutor refuses to withdraw from ethically-con?icted DEFENDANT PIERCE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY PROSECUTOR - 10 Williams, Kastner Gibbs PLLC 601 Union Street, Suite 4100 Seattle, Washington 98101-2380 (206) 628-6600 56l9704.4 representation. RCW 36.27.040 is the voluntary mechanism. As in Herron, it permits a county prosecutor to appoint ?one or more deputies who shall have the same power in all respects as their principal.? RCW 36.27.030 is the involuntary mechanism. As in Stranger, it provides that ?When from illness or other cause the prosecuting attorney is temporarily unable to perform his or her duties, the court orjudge may appoint some quali?ed person to discharge the duties of such of?cer in court until the disability is removed.? RCW 36.27.030. As noted previously, Herron addressed the interplay between these two statutory provisions. Herron noted that action under RCW 36.27.030 was necessary only if the prosecutor refused to appoint an independent party to review the charges. Herron, at 557. Jasman, meanwhile, confirms that appointment is appropriate if there is both the authority and duty for the prosecutor to represent the party in a given matter, and there is the requisite ?disability? under RCW 36.27.030. In this case, both requirements are satisfied. Prosecutor Lindquist has a duty to represent the County in this matter as the County is the real party in interest in this case. See Osborn, 130 Wn. 2d at 625. Additionally, Prosecutor Lindquist labors under a ?disability? due to the con?icts presented under the circumstances of this case. Here, the County faces the precise situation envisioned in Herron: Prosecutor Lindquist refuses to appoint an independent party to advise the County in a matter that presents con?icts under the RPCs. Instead, he appointed someone who has already made legal assertions in this case directly supportive of Prosecutor Lindquist?s legal positions in this matter. In this case, however, the situation is arguably even more dire than that in Herron. In Herman, the con?ict pertained to a recall election against the Prosecutor with no obvious court-imposed actions or deadlines pending. Herron, at 708-09. Here, however, the County and Prosecutor Lindquist each have af?nnative obligations imposed on them by the Washington Supreme Court?s August 27, 2015 ruling. The County wishes to ensure full and prompt compliance with the order and is in the untenable position of relying on an attorney whose action is at issue (or his DEFENDANT PIERCE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY PROSECUTOR - 11 Williams, 3r. Gibbs PLLC 601 Union Street, Suite 4100 Seattle, Washington 98101-2380 (206) 628-6600 hand-picked successor), and whose records are subject to the order, for guidance regarding how to comply and pursue resolution of this case. As Prosecutor Lindquist re?ises to voluntarily appoint an independent special deputy under RCW 36.27.040, the Court should take action under RCW 36.27.030. VII. CONCLUSION For all the reasons above, Defendant requests that the below-signed attorney be appointed as a special deputy prosecutor in this case and the related case pending in the Court of Appeals. The credentials of the below-signed attorney are outlined in the Declaration of Jessie Harris filed contemporaneously with this motion. A proposed order is similarly ?led. DATED this ?42623; of November, 2015. WILLIAMS, KASTNER GIBBS PLLC Jess' arris, W3 A #29399 . Abell, WSBA #37223 601 Union St, Suite 4100 Seattle, WA 98101 Phone: (206) 628-6600 Fax: (206) 628?6611 Email: jharris williamskastner.com habell williamskastner.com Attorneys for Defendant DEFENDANT PIERCE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY PROSECUTOR - l2 Williams, Kastner Gibbs PLLC 601 Union Street, Suite 4100 Seattle, Washington 98101-2380 (206) 628-6600 56 [9704.4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on the 2 day of November, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, ?Defendant Pierce County?s Motion for Appointment of Deputy Prosecutor? to be delivered in the manner indicated below to the following counsel of record: Co-Counsel for Plaintiff: Greg Overstreet Moneytree, Inc. 6720 Fort Dent Way, Suite 230 Tukwila, WA 98183-2589 Email: Co-Counsel for Plaintiff: Christopher Roslaniec Cole, Wathen, Leid, I-lall, PC 303 Battery St Seattle, WA 98121-1419 Email: Counsel for Defendants: Daniel Ray Hamilton and Michael Lee Sommerfeld Pierce County Prosecutor?s Office 955 Tacoma Avenue South, Suite 301 Tacoma, WA 98402-2160 Email: dhamiltt?i?co.pierce.wa.us msommer@co.pierce.wa.us Counsel for Defendants: Ramseyr E. Ramerman c/o City of Everett 2930 Wetmore Avenue, Suite 100 Everett, WA 98201-4067 Email: t? Dated this 1 ay of November, 2015. M: Fax El ABC Legal Services El Express Mail Regular US. Mail E-?leIE-mail SENT VIA: Fax El ABC Legal Services El Express Mail Regular US. Mail E-?ler?E-mail m: El Fax ABC Legal Services El Express Mail Regular US. Mail E??le E-mail SENT VIA: El Fax El ABC Legal Services El Express Mail Regular U.S. Mail E-tiler?E-rnail Dena Levitiri, Legal Assistant on behalf of Hunter M. Abell, WSBA #3 7223 601 Union St, Suite 4100 Seattle, WA 98101 Attorneys for Defendant Pierce County ??illinms, Kaslner 8r Gibbs PLLC 60 Union Street, Suite 4100 Seattle. Washington 9810l?2380 DEFENDANT PIERCE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY PROSECUTOR - I3 56 {206) 623-6600