UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-----------------------------------x
NICHOLAS MERRILL,
Plaintiff,

14-CV-9763

(VM)

DECISION AND ORDER

- against LORETTA E. LYNCH, in her official
Capacity as Attorney General of
The United States, and
JAMES B. COMEY, in his official
Capacity as Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Defendants.

-----------------------------------x
VICTOR MARRERO, United States District Judge.

Plaintiff
seeking
Lynch,

Nicholas

injunctive

Merrill

relief

("Merrill")

against

brought

defendants

suit

Loretta

E.

in her official capacity as Attorney General of the

United States, and James B. Corney, in his official capacity
as

Director

of

(collectively,
1

Rule

56

or

motion
of

Bureau

of

Investigation

"Defendants" or "the Government") . 1 (Dkt. No.

("Complaint"

Merrill's

Federal

the

the

"Compl. ") . )
for

summary

Federal

Rules

Now

before

judgment,
of

Civil

made

the

Court

is

pursuant

to

Procedure

("Rule

1 The Court notes
that, at the time Merrill initiated this litigation,
Eric Holder, Jr. served as the Attorney General of the United States,
and in that official capacity, was a named defendant. Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the Court substitutes Loretta E.
Lynch for Eric Holder, Jr.

 56") /

seeking

requirement

that

an

order

to

lift

a

non-disclosure

imposed by a National Security Letter

from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the "FBI")
Nos.

16,

17.)

The

Government

opposes

Merrill's

( "NSL")

(Dkt.
summary

judgment motion, and also moves to dismiss the Complaint or
for summary judgment.

(Dkt. Nos. 24, 25.)
I.

In 2004,

BACKGROUND2

Nicholas Merrill was the owner and operator

of Calyx Internet Access

("Calyx") ,

a

now-defunct company

that provided a number of internet services to its clients,
including an interface for maintaining their own websites,
2
The factual summary presented herein derives from the following
documents: Complaint, filed Dec. 11, 2014, Dkt. No. l; Plaintiff's
Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, dated
Mar. 10, 2015, Dkt. No.
16
("Pl. Mem."); Plaintiff's Rule 56.l
Statement, dated Mar. 10, 2015, Dkt. No. 18; the Declaration of
Nicholas Merrill in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
dated Mar. 10, 2015, Dkt. No. 19 ("Merrill Deel."); the Declaration of
Jonathan Manes in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
dated Mar.
10,
2015,
Dkt. No.
20
("Manes Deel."); Government's
Memorandum of Law in Support of the Government's Motion to Dismiss or
for Summary Judgment, and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, dated Apr. 24, 2015, Dkt. No. 25 ("Gov't Mem."); the
Declaration of Gary Perdue in Support of the Government Motion, dated
Apr. 23, 2015, Dkt. No. 30 ("Perdue Deel."); the Government's Rule 56.1
Counter-Statement, dated Apr. 24, 2015, Dkt. No. 26; Reply Memorandum
of Law in Further Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
and in Opposition to Government Motion to Dismiss or for Summary
Judgment,
dated June 11,
2015, Dkt. No.
36
("Pl. Reply Mem.");
Plaintiff's Rule 56.l Counter-Statement, dated June 11, 2015, Dkt. No.
37; the Second Declaration of Jonathan Manes in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Government Motion to
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, dated June 11, 2015, Dkt. No. 38
("Second Manes Deel.") ; Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of
the Government's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, and in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated July 31,
2015, Dkt. No. 42 ("Gov't Reply Mem."). Except where specifically
referenced, no further citation to these sources will be made.

- 2 -

 electronic
2004,
NSL")

file

storage,

and email

accounts.

In February

an FBI agent served Merrill with an NSL
was

which

I

"Attachment")
from Calyx.

by

accompanied

an

(the

"2004

attachment

(the

listing the types of records the FBI sought
Under the USA PATRIOT Act,

Pub.

L.

No.

107-56

§505(a), 115 Stat. 272, 365 (2001) , 3 in effect then (and now
under the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015,
Stat.

the

268) /

administrative
and

electronic

records

transactional

service

Initially,

can

records"
18

type

a

of

"subscriber information

information,

provider.

114-23, 129

NSLs,

issue

subpoena requesting

billing

toll

communication

(1)

FBI

Pub. L. No.

or

from

electronic
wire

a

u.s.c.

or

2709 (a) .

§

the 2004 NSL prohibited Merrill from disclosing:

that he was the recipient of an NSL,

(2)

the identity

of the target of the underlying investigation,

and (3)

the

contents of both the 2004 NSL and the Attachment.
The

Court

first

examined

the

2004

NSL

Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
Doe

I,

the

Section 2709

Court

found

an

in

Doe

v.

("Doe I"). In

earlier version of

18

U.S.C.

("Section 2709"), which provides the statutory

3 The relevant statutory provisions regarding NSLs were amended by The
USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005,
§§
115,
116(a), Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192, 211-14 (Mar. 9, 2006) ("the
Reauthorization Act"), and the USA Patriot Act Additional Reauthorizing
Amendments Act of 2006, § 4(b), Pub. L. No. 109-178, 120 Stat. 278, 280
(Mar. 9, 2006) ("Additional Reauthorization Act") .

- 3 -

 for

authorization

unconstitutional on its face.

Further,

Section

requirement

2709

nondisclosure

NSLs,

issue

to

FBI

the

to

be

the Court found the
unconstitutional

under the First Amendment as an unjustified prior restraint
and

content-based

appealed

to

the

Second Circuit,
amended

restriction
United

on

States

Court

2709

to

include

prohibit disclosure of an NSL,
disclosure may result
to

the

interference

of

The

Government

Appeals

for

and while the appeal was pending,

Section

danger

speech.

requirement

security

of

criminal,

a

counterintelligence

investigation,

diplomatic

relations,

or danger

safety of

any person."

that,

the

i.e.,

United

to

interference
the

life

or
with

or physical

2709(c) (1).

§

"a

States,

counterterrorism,

to

u.s.c.

18

Congress

the FBI must certify that

in an enumerated harm

national
with

a

the

Congress

also enacted a section providing for judicial review of an
NSL request or related non-disclosure requirement.
U.S.C.

§

See 18

3511 ("Section 3511"). The Second Circuit remanded

to this Court for further consideration in light of these
amendments.

See

Doe

v.

Gonzales,

449

F.3d

415

(2d

Cir.

2006).
On remand,
(S.D.N.Y.

2007)

in Doe v.

Gonzales,

("Doe II"),

500

F.

Supp.

2d 379

the Court again found Sections
-

4

-

 2709 (c)

and

3511 (b)

unconstitutional

on

their

face.

The

Court ruled that the nondisclosure requirement violated the
First

Amendment

because

scope or duration.

it

was

Further,

not

narrowly

the Court

tailored

found the

in

judicial

review provision violated the constitutional principles of
checks and balances, as well as separation of powers.
The Government appealed Doe II, and the Second Circuit
affirmed

in part

and

Mukasey,

549 F.3d 861

reversed

in part.

(2d Cir.

2008).

See

John Doe

v.

The Second Circuit

invalidated two primary aspects of Sections 2709 and 3511:
(1)

that FBI certification of certain risks is entitled to

a conclusive presumption (absent bad faith)
and

(2)

the

judicial

failure

review.

to

See

provide
at

id.

for

by the courts;

Government-initiated

884.

The

Circuit

Court

construed the remaining parts of Sections 2709 and 3511 to
provide certain procedural safeguards
and

held

that,

with

those

(as discussed infra),

safeguards,

those

statutory

sections were constitutional. See id. at 883-85.
The

Second

determine
reading
provided,

Circuit

whether,
of

the

in

then

the

statute

remanded

light

and

the

of

to

the

this

Court

Circuit

procedural

to

Court's

guidance

it

the non-disclosure requirement was constitutional

as-applied to the NSL issued to Merrill. On remand,
- 5 -

in Doe

 v. Holder, 665 F. Supp. 2d 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

("Doe III"),

the Court found the Mukasey standard satisfied.
held

that

a

"good

existed

reason"

to

The Court
that

believe

"disclosure may result in a harm related to an authorized
ongoing

investigation

to

protect

against

international

terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities," and that
the

"link between disclosure

and the

risk of

harm

[was]

substantial." Id. at 432.
Following

Doe

III,

Merrill

moved

for

partial

reconsideration of Doe III as it applied to the Attachment.
See

Doe

v.

Holder,

703

F.

Supp.

2d

313

(S.D.N.Y.

2010)

("Doe IV"). The Court granted the motion in part and denied
it

in

Court

part,

ordering

found that

certain

information

disclosed.

The

two categories of material contained in

the Attachment should be disclosed:

(1) material within the

scope of what the NSL statute identifies as permissible for
the FBI to obtain through the use of NSLs, and (2) material
that

the FBI has publicly acknowledged it has previously

requested by means of NSLs.

See id. at 316. The Court was

"not persuaded that disclosure of these two categories of
information would raise a substantial risk that any of the
statutorily enumerated harms would occur."

Id.

As

to the

rest of the Attachment, the Court found that the Government
- 6 -

 had demonstrated a

"reasonable

of

in

the

Attachment

targets

of

law

entirety

enforcement

particular target
this action,

its

of

the

likelihood that disclosure
could

inform

investigations,

Government's

current

including

ongoing

the

inquiry in

as well as, potentially future targets,

as to

certain types of records and other materials the Government
seeks

through

NSLs."

Id.

otherwise

at

national

security

317.

so

In

investigations

finding,

the

Court

innocuous bits and pieces of data,
could

together,

inform

current

and

employing
noted

that

when pieced

potentially

future

targets of the investigation as to the types of records and
other materials sought by the government.
After

the

Court

decided

Doe

IV,

Merrill

and

the

Government reached an agreement under which Merrill could
identify

himself

Ashcroft,

No.

as

the

04-cv-2614

recipient
(S.D.N.Y.),

of

the

Dkt.

NSL.
No.

(Doe

204

("July

30, 2010 Stip. and Order of Dismissal").) And in 2014,
parties

reached

an

agreement

that

discuss most aspects of the NSL,
its

target,

but

he

could

not

Merrill

could

v.

the

freely

including the identity of
discuss

the

Attachment

identifying certain types of records the FBI sought, except
for

those

disclosure

portions
in

Doe

IV.

of

the
(Doe

Attachment
v.

- 7 -

Ashcroft,

identified
No.

for

04-cv-2614

 (S.D.N.Y.),

Dkt.

No.

227

("April 15,

2014

Stip.

and Order

Mod. J.").)
Shortly
filed

the

Complaint

Merrill

filed

allowed

NSL

requirements
Mar.

9,

on

thereafter,

against

his

the

annually.

4

June 1,

to

18

§

At

Section

proceeds as a separate action from Doe I

the

time

3511(b) (3)

35ll(b) (3)

As such,

Merrill

non-disclosure

challenge

U.S.C.

2015).

2014,

11,

Government.

action,

instant

recipients

2006 -

December

(in effect

Merrill's Complaint
and its progeny.

At issue in this litigation is whether the Government
can

continue

to

prohibit

disclosure

Attachment under Sections 2907 and 3511
2,
the

of

the

redacted

(as amended on June

2 015) . Merrill asserts three causes of action:
non-disclosure

Attachment is a
speech"

prohibiting

discussion

order

by
is

the

First

not

Amendment;

justified

under

because the Government cannot establish a
believe

that

of

disclosure

may

result

in an

(2)

the

that

Section

terrorism

or

the
3511

"good reason"

to

enumerated harm

related to an authorized investigation to protect
international

that

"permanent or effectively permanent ban on

prohibited

nondisclosure

order

( 1)

clandestine

against

intelligence

As amended, Section 3511 no longer requires an NSL recipient who
unsuccessfully challenged a nondisclosure requirement to wait a year or
more before again seeking judicial relief. (See Gov't Reply Mem. 3.)
4

- 8 -

 activities;
once

an

himself,

and

NSL

(3)

that,

recipient

under

has

Sections

been

2709

permitted

and

to

3511,

identify

to identify the target of the NSL, and to disclose

the outcome of the NSL, then the FBI cannot continue a nondisclosure
Merrill

order

argues

contribute

regards

that

to

"electronic

as

he

public

other

seeks

of

the

in

order

to

the

types

of

that

the

disclosure

discussion

communications

aspects

as

to

transaction

records"

NSL.

FBI has sought and continues to seek through NSLs.
For the reasons discussed below,
the

Government

demonstrating a

not

has

"good reason"

the Court finds that

satisfied

its

burden

of

to expect that disclosure of

the NSL Attachment in its entirety will risk an enumerated
harm,

pursuant

to

Sections

2709

and

3511.

Therefore,

Merrill's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED,
Government's cross-motion to dismiss

the

and the

complaint or,

in

the alternative, for summary judgment is DENIED.
II.

DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Merrill
Rule

56,

has

and

moved

the

for

summary

Government

has

judgment,

cross-moved

pursuant
to

dismiss,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b) (6)
12 (b) (6) "),

or

in

the

alternative
- 9 -

for

summary

to

("Rule

judgment,

 pursuant

to Rule

56.

In considering a

motion

to dismiss,

the Court may rely on the factual allegations set forth in
the complaint itself and not on additional matters asserted
in

exhibits

affidavits,

conjunction
York,

with

the

210 F.3d 79,

or

other

motion.

83-84

See

papers

Friedl

submitted

v.

City

of

in
New

(2d Cir. 2000). Because both sides

have submitted substantive declarations or other materials
not

included

in

the

Complaint,

the

Court

considers

the

Government's motion as one for summary judgment.
The Court may grant summary judgment only if it finds
that

"there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.

R.

such a
but

Civ.

P.

motion

56(a).

"is not

The

role of

a

court

in ruling on

to resolve disputed issues of

to assess whether there are any factual

tried,

while

inferences

resolving

against

States Fire Ins.

issue

of

the

Co.,

moving party bears
material

ambiguities

fact

burden of
exists

paucity

of

rational

factf inder could find

and drawing

party."

804 F.2d 9,

the

evidence

moving

or

presented

11

Knight

(2d Cir.

proving
that
by

by

the

in favor of

- 10 -

issues

that

fact
to be

reasonable
v.

United

1986)

The

no genuine

reason

of

the

non-movant,

no

the non-moving

 party.

See Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d

1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994).
B. NON-DISCLOSURE ORDERS UNDER SECTIONS 2709 AND 3511

On June 2, 2015, Congress enacted the USA FREEDOM Act,
which, among other statutory changes, revises Sections 2709
and

3511.

The

Government

has

indicated

its

belief

that

these changes to Sections 2709 and 3511 "ratify and codify
the Second Circuit's decision in
Mem.

at 2.)

[Mukasey] "

(Gov' t

Reply

The Government notes that the House Committee

Report explicitly indicated that the revisions to Section
3511 "correct[ ] the constitutional defects in the issuance
of NSL nondisclosure orders found

[in Mukasey]

and adopts

the concepts suggested by that court for a constitutionally
sound process."

(Gov't Reply Mem. at 2 n.2

(quoting H. Rep.

No. 114-109, at 24 (2015)) .)
In Mukasey,
Second

Circuit

disclosure

because of disagreement on the panel,
left

orders

open

were

less-exacting

scrutiny. 5

either

of

level

the

question

subject
See

scrutiny,

to

549

strict
F.3d

however,

5

whether

at

the

NSL

scrutiny
877-78.
Second

the
non-

or

a

Under
Circuit

The Second Circuit did note that,
for purposes of the specific
litigation before it in Mukasey, the Government "conceded that strict
scrutiny is the applicable standard."
549 F.3d at 878. Here, too, the
Government has conceded that the "high, indeed strict, scrutiny applied
by [Mukasey] controls this case." (Gov't Mem. at 11.)

- 11 -

 identified two limitations required by the First Amendment:
(1)

the Government must

disclosure

requirements

non-disclosure

initiate
if

an

individual

so

requirement

judicial review of non-

this

that,
(1)

second

limitation,

the

and

requests,

judicial review must be meaningful.
to

subject

See id.

Second

the Government has the burden to

reason exists to expect that

( 3)

(2)

the
that

at 878-83.

Circuit

to satisfy First Amendment procedural

(2)

to

As

indicated

requirements,

show that a good

disclosure of receipt of

an NSL will risk an enumerated harm. 6 Id. at 881.
First, by placing the burden on the government to show
a good reason,

a district court does not have to "find a

negative,

that no good reason exists to believe that

i.e.,

disclosure may risk one of

the enumerated harms."

Id.

at

876. Second, as to the "good reason" requirement:
[A] reason will not qualify as 'good' if it surmounts
only a standard of frivolousness. We understand the
statutory requirement of a finding that an enumerated
harm 'may result' to mean more than a conceivable
6 When Mukasey was
decided, Section 3511 provided that a court could
modify or set aside a nondisclosure requirement if it found "no reason
to believe that disclosure may endanger the national security of the
United
States,
interfere
with
a
criminal,
counterterrorism,
or
counterintelligence investigation, interfere with diplomatic relations,
or endanger the life or physical safety of any person." 18 U.S. C. §
35ll(b) (2)-(3)
(in effect Mar.
9,
2006
June 1, 2015)
(emphasis
added) . At that time, under Section 3511, a court was also to treat an
official certification of that danger as "conclusive" absent a finding
of bad faith. This version of the statute remained in effect -- except
in the Second Circuit as modified by Mukasey - - until June 2, 2015,
when the USA FREEDOM Act took effect.

- 12 -

 possibility. The upholding of nondisclosure does not
require the certainty, or even the imminence of, an
enumerated harm, but some reasonable likelihood must
be shown. The Government acknowledges that while the
"reason to believe" standard in subsection 35ll(b)
unquestionably contemplates a deferential standard of
review, in no way does it foreclose a court from
evaluating the reasonableness of the FBI's judgments.
Id. at 875.
The Second Circuit then addressed whether courts could
be required to apply a conclusive presumption

(absent bad

faith) to the FBI certification:
While
the
court
will
normally
def er
to
the
Government's considered assessment of why disclosure
in a particular case may result in an enumerated harm
related
to
such grave
matters
as
international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, it
cannot, consistent with strict scrutiny standards,
uphold a nondisclosure requirement on a conclusory
assurance that such a likelihood exists.
Id. at 881. Instead, the Government must "at least indicate
the nature of the apprehended harm and provide a court with
some basis to assure

itself

that the

link between

disclosure and the risk of harm is substantial." Id. at 881
(emphasis added) .
Finally,
Circuit

as

to

stated that

the
the

third

"keyed

to

the

information

sought

by

an

investigation

the

Second

statutorily enumerated harms

necessarily

authorized

requirement,

to

same
NSL,

standard
i.e.

protect

- 13 -

f

that

relevant

against

are

governs
to

an

international

 terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities."

Id.

at

875.
The sections of the USA FREEDOM Act amending Sections
2709 and 3511 incorporate portions of Mukasey's holding and
reasoning.

As

in earlier versions

of

the

statute,

under

Section 2709, the government may require non-disclosure for
four

statutorily

enumerated

from an FBI official:

reasons,

with

certification

if disclosure could implicate

( 1)

danger to the national security of the United States;
interference

with

counterintelligence

criminal,

a

investigation;

(2)

counterterrorism,

or

interference

( 3)

a

with

diplomatic relations; or (4) danger to the life or physical
safety of any person.
Section

2709

now

18 U.S.C.

also

§

provides

2709(c) (1) (B).
an

that

However,

NSL

or

a

nondisclosure requirement accompanying an NSL is subject to
judicial review under Section 3511,

and that an NSL must

include notice of the availability of judicial review.

u.s.c.

§

18

2709(d).

Most relevant to the

issue at hand,

the USA FREEDOM

Act made significant changes to Section 3511, the statutory
provision governing
version

of

procedure"

Section
(see

judicial
3511

Mukasey,

review of

includes
549

a

F.3d at

- 14 -

NSLs.

The

"reciprocal
879)

current
notice

providing

for

 government-initiated review of a non-disclosure requirement
after notice by the recipient of
non-disclosure requirement.

intent

18 U.S.C.

§

to challenge the
3511(b) (1) (A).

And

no longer does Section 3511 state that courts are to give a
conclusive presumption, absent bad faith,

to the official's

certification. Now, under Section 3511:
Standard.
A district court of the United States
shall issue a nondisclosure order
if the court
determines that there is reason to believe that
disclosure
of
the
information
subject
to
the
nondisclosure requirement during the applicable time
period may result in (A)

(B)

(C)
(D)

18

u.s.c.

a danger to the national security of the United
States;
interference with a criminal, counterterrorism,
or counterintelligence investigation;
interference with diplomatic relations; or
danger to the life or physical safety of any
person.
§

35ll(b) (3)

The Court agrees with the Government that, at least as
concerns the relevant statutory provisions for the case at
hand, the amended Sections 2709 and 3511 codify the Mukasey
standard
requirement

for

judicial
i.e.,

review

of

a

non-disclosure

that the Government has the burden to

show that a good reason exists to expect that disclosure of
receipt of an NSL will risk an enumerated harm. 7 Therefore,

7
The Government argues
amended Section] 2709 (c)

that "[u] ltimately, the question under [the
and [Mukasey] is whether the government has

- 15 -

 the Court will now turn to the application of the Mukasey
standard,

as reflected in Sections 2709 and 3511,

portions

of

the

Attachment

that

Merrill

is

to the

currently

prohibited from discussing publicly.
B. APPLICATION TO THE ATTACHMENT

The

Court

now

turns

satisfied its burden of

to

whether

showing a

the

Government

good reason exists

has
to

believe that disclosure of the Attachment could result in a
statutorily
ongoing

enumerated

investigation

harm
to

related

protect

an

to

against

authorized

international

terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.
Government

The

argues

disclosure

that

of

the

Attachment would reveal law enforcement techniques that the
FBI

has

not

acknowledged

in

the

context

of

NSLs,

would

indicate the types of information the FBI deems important
for

investigative

purposes,

and

could

lead

to

potential

targets of investigations changing their behavior to evade
law enforcement detection.
agrees

that

constitute
Circuit

(See Gov't Mem. at 6.) The Court

such

reasons

could,

"good"

reasons

for

stated in Mukasey,

in

some

disclosure.

circumstances,
As

the

Second

"it is obvious and unarguable

met its burden of showing a 'good reason' to expect that disclosure
will risk an enumerated harm, and 'some basis' to conclude that the
disclosure is linked to the risk." (Gov't Reply Mem. at 8.)

- 16 -

 that no governmental interest is more compelling than the
security of the nation."
Agee,

453

U.S.

380,

549 F.3d at 878

307

(1981)).

(quoting Haig v.

Similarly,

the

Second

Circuit has indicated that the government has a compelling

racketeering." Sanitation & Recycling Indus.,
of

New

York,

interests

107

F.3d

985,

parallel

some

of

998
the

and

corruption,

crime,

"combat ting

in

interest

(2d

Inc. v.

City

1997).

Such

Cir.

Section

2709

enumerated

harms -- i.e., whether disclosure could implicate a danger
to

the

national

interference

security

with

a

held,

courts

cannot,

United

States

counterterrorism,

criminal,

counterintelligence investigation.
Court

the

of

However,

consistent

or
or

as the Mukasey
with

the

First

Amendment,

simply accept

the Government's assertions

disclosure

would

interests.

The Government must still provide a court with

implicate

and

create

"some basis to assure itself

a

risk

to

that
these

that the link between

disclosure and risk of harm is substantial." See Mukasey,
549 F.3d at 881 (emphasis added).
Here,

the

Government

has

not

demonstrated

a

good

reason to expect that public disclosure of the parts of the
Attachment that remain confidential would risk one of these
enumerated harms; nor has the Government provided the Court
- 17 -

 with

some

basis

disclosure

and

to

assure

itself

of

risk

harm

that

the

link

between

is

substantial.

The

Government's justifications might constitute "good" reasons
if

the

information

contained

in

the

Attachment

that

is

still redacted were not,

at least in substance even if not

in

already

the

precise

form,

disclosed

by

government

divisions and agencies, and thus known to the public. Here,
publicly-available

government

documents

provide

substantially similar information as that set forth in the
Attachment.
that

it

For

matters

that

reason,

that

the

these

Court

other

is

not

documents

persuaded
were

not

disclosed by the FBI itself rather than by other government
agencies, and that they would hold significant weight for a
potential

target

of

a

national

security

investigation

in

ascertaining whether the FBI would gather such information
through an NSL. The documents referred to were prepared and
published

by

various

government

FBI' s authority to issue NSLs,

divisions

discussing

the

the types of materials the

FBI seeks, and how to draft NSL requests.
Indeed, one of these documents is a publicly-available
Department of Justice Off ice of Legal Education manual that
provides a sample attachment that encapsulates much of the
redacted-information in the Attachment here in dispute. The
- 18 -

 sample attachment included therein would authorize the FBI
to request from a hypothetical NSL recipient:
(A)

The
following
customer
or
subscriber
account
information for each account registered to or
associated with sample@sample.com for the time
period [date range] :
1. subscriber names, user names, screen names, or other
identities;
2. mailing addresses,
email
addresses,
information;

residential addresses, business
and
other
contact
addresses,

3. local
and
long
distance
telephone
connection
records, or records of session times and durations;
4. length of service (including start date)
of service utilized;

and types

5. telephone or instrument number or other subscriber
number
or
identity,
including
any
temporarily
assigned network address; and
6. means and source of payment for such service
(including any credit card or bank account number)
and billing records.
(B)

All records and other information relating to the
account(s) and time period in Part A, including:
1. records of user activity for any connections made to
or from the account, including the date, time,
length, and method of connections, data transfer
volume,
user name,
and source and destination
Internet Protocol address(es);
2. telephone records, including caller identification
records, cellular site and sector information, GPS
data, and cellular network identifying information
3. non-content information associated with the contents
of any communication or file stored by or for the
- 19 -

 account(s) such as the source and destination email
addresses and IP addresses.
4. Correspondence and notes of records related to the
account(s).
(Manes Deel. Ex. Lat 222-23.)
The

information

this

substantially similar,

sample

attachment

reveals

in some instances identical,

is

to the

material that the FBI argues should not be disclosed in the
Attachment.

The Government contends

that

if

the parts of

the Attachment that remain secret are disclosed,
targets

could

their

change

behavior

to

potential
evade

law

enforcement. But those targets can already learn, based on
publicly available information,
such

information

indicates

that

through
the

that the FBI could obtain

NSLs.

FBI

can

sample

The

seek

account

attachment
information

relating to "records of user activity for any connections"
including the "method of connections, data transfer volume,
user

name,

and

source

and

destination

Internet

Protocol

address (es) . " This is substantially similar to some of the
redacted
"DSL

categories

account

of

the Attachment

information,"

and

address assigned to the account."

at

"Internet

issue

i.e.

f

Protocol

(IP)

Nor would it be a

leap

for someone to determine that other redacted categories in
the Attachment

i.e.,

"website information registered to
- 20 -

 the

account"

and

"Uniform resource

assigned to the account"

locator

(URL)

address

-- might fall into the categories

identified in the sample attachment.

Likewise,

the sample

attachment requests the "length of service (including start
[relating

date)

to

an

account] , "

which

is

substantially

similarly to the currently-redacted category of the "[d]ate
the account opened or closed."
Merrill also points to a 2002 letter from the Deputy
Attorney
Letter"),
2003

General

to

which was

Senate

Report.

Senator

Patrick

Leahy

later reprinted as
In

that

letter,

(the

"Leahy

an appendix

the

to a

Deputy Attorney

General states:
NSLs can be served on Internet Service Providers to
obtain information such as subscriber name, screen
name or other on-line names,
records identifying
addresses of electronic mail sent to and from the
account,
records
relating
to
merchandise
orders/ shipping
information,
and
so
on
but
not
including message content and/or subject fields.
(See Manes Deel. Ex. J). Though
public
Rep.
seeks

information published

No.

108-40,

89-90

to

prevent

Attachment

sought

this
in a

(2003),

Merrill

communication
Senate

Report,

is
see

now
S.

the Government nonetheless
from

"Records

disclosing

relating

to

that

the

merchandise

orders/shipping information for the last 180 days" as well
as "Order forms."

Since this information has already been
- 21 -

 substantially disclosed

in

correspondence

by

the

Justice

Department to Congress,

as indicated by the Leahy Letter,

the Court is not persuaded that there is a substantial risk
that

disclosure

of

substantially the

same

information in

the Attachment would lead future targets of investigations
to change their behavior to evade law enforcement to any
materially

greater

information

they

extent

have

that

already

would

they

available

in

from
a

the

publicly-

available Senate Report. 8
the

Similarly,
reason

to

subscriber
and

prevent

disclosure

information"

related

generally

Government

in

subscriber

known

that

claims

of

the

the

there

phrase

category

information."

the

FBI

information" through NSLs; indeed,

can

is

a

"and related

"Subscriber
However,

collect

good

it

name
is

"subscriber

"subscriber information"

is expressly identified in Section 2709(a)

in granting the

statutory authority for the issuance of NSLs. See 18 U.S.C.
§

2709 (a)

("A

wire

or

electronic

communication

service

The Court notes that the Leahy Letter does not reveal the "180 day"
time period in which the FBI sought order and shipping information from
Merrill. The Perdue Declaration argues that if this 180-day period is
revealed, then "potential terrorists" could manipulate orders to avoid
having those orders fall within the 180 day period. (Perdue Deel. ,
64.) The Court is not persuaded. A "potential terrorist" does not know
when, if ever, the FBI will issue a related NSL. The 180-day period
clearly relates to the date Merrill received the NSL, and it is hard to
imagine any person outside of the FBI having the knowledge about when
an NSL might be issued, and changing their behavior as a result.
8

- 22 -

 comply

shall

provider

.");

information.

(Memorandum Opinion

see
for

for

request

a

also
the

Manes

FBI' s

length,

at

discusses,

that

with

Deel.

General

Ex.

I

at

Counsel

3-5

Office

"subscriber

term

the

subscriber

information") . 9 Therefore, the Government has not provided a
reason

good

"subscriber"
2709

non-disclosure

justify

to

and similar iterations of

the

of

that word;

word

Section

and public government documents make clear that NSLs

seek "subscriber information."
realizing

Perhaps

the

tenuous

connection

of

the

disclosure of such information in the instant Attachment to
enumerated

harms,

the

briefing its motions,
longer

needed

for

Government,

during

certain

categories

of

in particular,

the request for

provider

(ISP),"

e-mail

"[a]ll

of

addresses

records

the

FBI

"Internet service
associated

with

account," and "[s] creen names or other on-line names

associated with the account."

(See Gov't Mem. Attach.) That

the Government conceded to disclosure of
only

course

conceded that non-disclosure was no

seeks

[the]

the

when,

during

the

course

of

these categories

litigation,

it

was

9 A publicly-available March 2007 Report from the Department of Justice
Office of the Inspector General also indicated that the FBI can obtain
through NSLs
"[s]ubscriber information associated with particular
telephone numbers or e-mail addresses, such as the name, address,
length of service, and method of payment." (Manes Deel. Ex. Kat 10.)

-

23

-

 statutorily

required

justifying
argument

to

provide
lends

non-disclosure,

that,

for

enforced against

years,

the

him was

the

FBI

certification

credence

to

Merrill's

non-disclosure

overly broad and

requirement

could

not

be

supported by a "good reason. 111 0 (Compare Merrill Deel. Ex. C
with Gov't Mem. Attach.)
Indeed,

many

of

the

remaining

redactions

in

the

Attachment are even harder to justify than the categories
discussed thus

Merrill

prevent
requested
though

far.

For example,

from

disclosing

"Subscriber day/evening

the

"telephone

Government
number"

persuaded that

can

there

now
be

is a

the Government
the

that

telephone

concedes
disclosed.

that
The

"good reason"

seeks

to

Attachment

numbers"
the
Court

even

phrase
is

to believe

not
that

disclosure of the fact that the Government can use NSLs to
seek both day and evening telephone numbers could result in
an enumerated harm,
known

that

the

especially if

Government

can

it
use

is already publicly
NSLs

to

obtain

a

telephone number, more generally.

10 Also
interestingly, the Perdue Declaration argues that the category
of "[a] ny other information which [the recipient] consider [s] to be an
electronic communication transactional record" should not be disclosed.
(See Perdue Deel. , 70.) However, this category was not redacted by the
Government in its submissions or even in the Perdue Declaration.

- 24 -

 As

another

character
believes

of

example

these

that

of

the

extreme

redactions,

while

the

the

public

and overly broad

Government

can

know

apparently

that

it

seeks

records of an "address" and a "telephone number," there is
a "good reason" to prevent disclosure of the fact that the
Government
(See

can

Gov't

seek

Mem.

Government's

"addresses"

redactions

investigation,

In

Attach.)

even

a

and
any

alone,

a

alphabet,

that

potential
one,

on

the

target

of

an

would

almost

simply by running through

"telephone

"telephone numbers."

numbers."

based

event,

dim-witted

certainly be able to determine,
the

"telephone

could

numberll"

only

be

Redactions that defy common sense

such as concealing a single letter at the end of a word
diminish
reason"

the

force

of

the

Government's

to keep information under seal,

argument
information

that
in

disclosure
the

of

the

Attachment

can

claim

to

"good

and undermine its
currently-redacted
be

linked

to

a

substantial risk of an enumerated harm.
As a

third example,

disclosure

of

"associated

with

the

the Government seeks

phrases

the

"related

account"

for

to

certain

to prevent

account"

and

categories

of

records sought, even though the Government has acknowledged
that

there

is

no

need

for
-

25

non-disclosure
-

of

the

main

 information the NSL sought to collect -- i.e.,
related to

an

"address"

and

"billing."

The

information

Court

is

not

persuaded that there is a good reason for non-disclosure of
the

fact

account;

that

these

obviously,

requests
the

were

keyed to a

Government

uses

particular

NSLs

to

obtain

information related to a particular subscriber or account.
(See,

~,

Manes Deel. Ex.

I at 5

(Memorandum Opinion for

the FBI's General Counsel Office discussing "local and long
distance toll billing records" that could be attributed to
"a particular account.")
the

Additionally,

11

Government

seeks

to

keep

some

information redacted despite publicly conceding that those
types of records

(i.e.,

"radius log"

information,

cell-tower based phone tracking information)
sought through NSLs.
this

information

which is

are no longer

Yet the Government still argues that

should remain

redacted because

it

would

reveal techniques that might be used at some undetermined
time under a

hypothetical policy promulgated by a

administration.

(See Perdue Deel.

~

future

59.) This reason is not

a "good" reason; neither is the link between disclosure and

11
Similarly,
the publicly-available March 2007 Report from the
Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General indicated that
electronic
communication
transactional
records
include
"e-mail
addresses associated with the account;
screen names; and billing
records and method of payment." 11 (Manes Deel. Ex. Kat 10.)

-

26 -

 the

risk

argues,
log

of

harm

it is

"substantial."

"no secret"

information,

Furthermore,

as

Merrill

that the FBI can access radius

and the

other

information identified in

the Attachment through means other NSLs.

(See Pl.

Mem.

at

19; Pl. Reply Mem. at 11, 21-22.)
Therefore, the Court finds that the Government has not
demonstrated
targets

a

of

good

national

reason

to

security

believe

that

investigations

their behavior to evade detection,

potential

will

change

or that disclosure of

the Attachment in its entirety would create a

substantial

risk of one of the statutorily enumerated harms.
The Court's ruling here is consistent with the Court's
prior

decisions

relating

to

the

NSL

issued

to

Merrill.

First, the present challenge can be factually distinguished
from Doe III and Doe IV. In Doe III, this Court found that
the Government had carried its
reason

to

including

keep
the

confidential.
ongoing,

of

entire

identity
In Doe IV,

of

showing a

NSL

letter

and

the

recipient

good

Attachment,
and

target,

while the investigation remained

the Court found that specific information in the

Attachment
scope

the

burden of

could

be

information

disclosed:
that

the

both
NSL

material
statute

within

identifies

the
as

permissible for the FBI to obtain through the use of NSLs,
-

27 -

 and material that the FBI has publicly acknowledged it has
previously requested by means of NSLs. See 703 F. Supp. 2d
at 316.
Since

then,

the

Government's

investigation

has

been

closed, and the parties have reached agreement that Merrill
can identify himself as the 2004 NSL recipient and disclose
the identity of the target. Now,
of

this

keeping

litigation,
the

protecting
relevant

the

Attachment
law

asserted

future

Government

confidential

enforcement

to

unlike earlier iterations

or

is

found

reason."

such

a

solely

on

sensitive

information

potential

national

justification

(Gov't Reply Mem.

in

based

investigations. The Government argues that,
Court

interest

to

at 8 n.

in Doe IV,

However,

a

the Court

In Doe IV,

Court

demonstrated

that

"the

Government

has

the

"good

did not make such a broad statement there.
found

is

security

constitute

6.)

that

the
a

reasonable likelihood that disclosure of the Attachment in
its

entirety

could

inform

enforcement investigations,

current

targets

of

law

including the particular target

of the Government's ongoing inquiry in this action, as well
as,

potentially,

future targets."

703 F.

Supp.

2d at 317.

The Government claims that the term "future targets" were
"obviously,

not

the

subjects

of

- 28 -

an

'ongoing'

underlying

 investigation."
point,

Reply

referred

to

Mem.

in

at

IV

Doe

8

too

assumes

Government

the

targets"

(Gov' t

n.

6.)
The

much.

were,

more

On

that

"future

accurately,

limited to future targets of that same investigation, which
was not yet closed or publicly known. 12
In any event,
changed

since

investigation
prohibits

as discussed supra,

has

closed,

disclosure

investigation's

receipt

Merrill's

Government

the

and

many,

redacted investigative techniques at
disclosed
strains

by

other

credulity

government

not

longer
or

all,

the

of

the

issue here have been

agencies.

future

that

no

identity

if

the

NSL

the

Merrill's

of

target,

of

circumstances have

Therefore,

targets

of

it

other

investigations would change their behavior in light of the
currently-redacted information,
according to the Government,

when those targets

(which,

include "sophisticated foreign

adversaries," see Perdue Deel.

~

56) have access to much of

12 The Court is not holding that there are no circumstances in which the
Government might be able to provide a "good reason" for non-disclosure,
even when that reason is keyed to authorized investigations to protect
against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities,
generally, rather than to a particular ongoing investigation. Instead,
based on the facts and submissions before it, the Government has not
satisfied its burden that there is a good reason to expect that
disclosure here
with these particular factual circumstances
raises a substantial risk that any of the statutorily enumerated harms
would occur.

- 29 -

 this same information from other government divisions and
agencies.
Relatedly,

the case at hand can be distinguished from

case law cited by the Government
11-12)

for

disclosed

(see Gov't Reply Mem.

the proposition that

made

disclosure of the protected information.

See,

CIA,

involve

586

the

F.3d 171

Freedom

classified

specific

information need only be
had

v.

if

of

agency

(2d Cir.

2009).

Information Act

government

at

an

~,

or

Wilson

Those cases either

( "FOIA")

information,

official

issues

requests

of

related

to

disclosure of classified information by current or former
government

officials

who

were

under

a

contractual

obligation to keep classified information confidential. At
issue here,
not

however,

is law enforcement sensitive material

classified

justifications

for

information.

keeping

the

The

Attachment

Government's
confidential

implicate classified information contained in the ex parte,
in

camera

Perdue

Declaration.

seeking disclosure
seeks

disclosure

of
only

However,

the material
of

the

Merrill

is

contained therein.

Attachment,

which

is

not
He
not

classified.
Furthermore,

the plaintiff here is a private citizen,

not a government official who had a contractual obligation
- 30 -

 to

keep

information

significant

reasons

differently

from

confidential.
for

treating

classified

As

there

such,

the

material

information

that

at

is

are
hand

normally

accessible only to individuals with security clearance.

A

private citizen should be able to disclose information that
has

already

been

at

agency

publicly

disclosed

by

any

government

least once the underlying investigation has

concluded and there is no reason for the identities of the
recipient and target to remain secret. Otherwise,

it would

lead to the result that citizens who have not received such
an NSL request can speak about information that is publicly
known

(and acknowledged by other agencies),

individuals

who

have

received

such NSL

but

requests

the very
and are

thus best suited to inform public discussion on the topic
could not. Such a result would lead to "unending secrecy of
actions taken by government officials" if private citizens
actually

affected

by

publicly

known

law

enforcement

techniques could not discuss them. See Doe v. Gonzales, 449
F.3d 415, 422 (2d Cir. 2006)

(Cardamone, J., concurring)

If the Court were to find instead that the Government
has

met

its

disclosure

burden

here,

of

could

showing
Merrill

a

good
ever

reason
overcome

showing? Under the Government's reasoning,
- 31 -

for

non-

such

a

the Court sees

 only two such hypothetical circumstances in which Merrill
could prevail:
exists,

or a

a

world

in which

no

world in which the

accord and its own time,

threat

FBI,

of

terrorism

acting on its

own

decides to disclose the contents

of the Attachment. Such a result implicates serious issues,
both with respect to the First Amendment and accountability
of the government to the people. 13 As Judge Cardamone warned
in his concurrence in Doe v. Gonzales,
a

shroud

of

democratic

secrecy

concepts

in

perpetuity

and do

not

"a ban on speech and
are

fit

antithetical

to

comfortably with

the

fundamental rights guaranteed American citizens," and such
unending

secrecy

could

"serve

as

a

cover

for

possible

official misconduct and/or incompetence." 449 F.3d at 422.
Because the Court
shown a

good

Attachment,

reason

pursuant

(and should not)

for

First

that

the Government has not

continued non-disclosure

to Section 3511,

consider Merrill's

continued non-disclosure
his

finds

Amendment

here

rights

the

that

the

the

Court need not

other arguments

constitutes

and

of

a

that

violation

Government

of
has

exceeded its statutory authority for non-disclosure in the

Such unending secrecy is also at odds with President Obama' s 2014
remarks,
in which he directed the Attorney General to limit the
duration of NSL gag orders. (See Manes Deel. Ex. S.)
13

-

32 -

 instant
732

case. i 4

F.3d 131,

See

Kreisberg

138

may be

resolved

reach

a

v.

Heal thBridge

(2d Cir.

2013)

other

grounds,

on

("When,

as here,

courts
to

question

constitutional

Mgmt. ,

may

a

LLC,
case

decline

'avoid

to

deciding

constitutional issues needlessly.'").

III. STAY OF JUDGMENT
As the Court did in Doe I and Doe II,

in light of the

implications of its ruling and the importance of the issues
involved,

the Court will

pending appeal,

or for

this

to

give

Court,

appropriate

the

or

confidentiality

of

action,

for

Government

the

relief

its

judgment

the Government to otherwise pursue

any alternate course of
intended

stay enforcement of

Court
it

any

the

of

may

90

days.

opportunity

Appeals

seek

information

The

for

to

stay is
to

whatever

maintain

implicated

move

by

the
the

Court's ruling.
For
opinion
Attachment

those

same

those

reasons,

sections

are

Decision and Order,

portions

revealing

redacted

in

the

of

the

the

contents

public

filing

Court's
of
of

the
this

in order to preserve the Government's

opportunities for further appellate review of this Decision
14

As a result, the Court need not reach whether strict scrutiny applies
to Merrill's claims. The Second Circuit found the procedural safeguards
applied here are required under either strict scrutiny or a less
exacting scrutiny. See Mukasey, 549 F.3d at 879, 882.

- 33 -

 and Order
event

requiring disclosure

that

Attachment
appellate
will

be

this
is

not

review,
filed.

of

the

ruling

requiring

altered

in

an

See

the

unredacted

New

York

Attachment.
disclosure

course

version

Times

Co.

of
of

v.

In
of

the
the

any

further

this

opinion

U.S.

Dep't

of

Justice, 752 F.3d 123, 123 n.1 (2d Cir. 2014).
IV.

ORDER

For the reasons discussed above,

it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment

16)

of

Plaintiff

Nicholas

Merrill

is

(Dkt. No.
it

is

Complaint

or

Government

is

GRANTED;

and

further

for

ORDERED

that

summary

judgment

DENIED;

the

motion
(Dkt.

to

No.

dismiss
24)

of

the
the

and it is further

ORDERED

that

the

Clerk

of

Court

shall

file

the

redacted version of this Decision and Order on the public
docket; and it is further
ORDERED

accordingly

that
but

any appeal, or,

the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment

stay

enforcement

of

if no appeal is filed,

date of this Decision and Order.

- 34 -

the

judgment

pending

for 90 days from the

 The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion
for

summary

judgment

(Dkt.

No.

16)

and

the

motion

to

dismiss or for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 24), and to close
this case.
SO ORDERED.

Dated:

New York, New York
28 August 2015

/~
U.S.D.J.

-

35 -