THE STATE OF AMERICA’S

BORDER SECURITY
Senator Ron Johnson, Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

114th Congress
November 23, 2015

MAJORITY STAFF REPORT

 Table of Contents
Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................3
Key Highlights .....................................................................................................................7
Part I: The U.S. – Mexico Border ...............................................................................................15
Physical Barriers and Technological Detection Capabilities in the Sectors ..................................16
Fencing and Infrastructure ................................................................................................17
Technologies ......................................................................................................................22
Experiences on the Border .............................................................................................................28
Border Patrol .....................................................................................................................28
Local Law Enforcement .....................................................................................................29
Local Landowners ..............................................................................................................30
Transnational Crime at the Southwest Border ...............................................................................31
Cartels ................................................................................................................................31
Drug Smuggling .................................................................................................................32
Human Smuggling and Trafficking ....................................................................................34
Gangs, Criminal Aliens, and Special Interest Aliens .........................................................35
Part II: The U.S. – Canada Border ............................................................................................36
U.S. – Canada Joint Operations .....................................................................................................38
Threats to the Northern Border ......................................................................................................39
Terrorism ...........................................................................................................................39
Drug Smuggling .................................................................................................................43
Human Smuggling and Trafficking ....................................................................................44
Threats on Tribal Lands.....................................................................................................44
Part III: The Maritime Border ...................................................................................................46
Agency Collaboration and Joint Missions .....................................................................................46
Threats along the Maritime Border ................................................................................................48
The Atlantic Coast and Caribbean .....................................................................................50
The Pacific Coast ................................................................................................................52
The Great Lakes ..................................................................................................................54
U.S. Ports ............................................................................................................................54
Part IV: U.S. Ports of Entry ........................................................................................................56
Visa Waiver Program .....................................................................................................................56
1

 Refugee Resettlement ....................................................................................................................59
Biometric Entry-Exit Program .......................................................................................................61
Preclearance Agreements ...............................................................................................................64
Part V: Understanding the Root Causes of Immigration.........................................................66
Central American Migration to the U.S. ........................................................................................67
HHS Response ....................................................................................................................68
DOJ Response ....................................................................................................................70
DHS Response ....................................................................................................................71
Mexico Response ................................................................................................................74
U.S. Assistance to Central America and the Dependency on Remittances........................75
Unauthorized Immigrant Populations ............................................................................................77
Demographics of the Foreign-Born and Native Born Population.....................................79
Labor Participation and Incentives ...................................................................................81
Conclusion and Recommendations for Proposed Legislation .................................................83
Appendix A: Key Findings of Fact from Border Security Hearings and Roundtables.........94
Appendix B: Key Findings of Central America Trip ...............................................................99
Appendix C: Acronyms .............................................................................................................103

2

 Executive Summary
For decades, politicians from both parties have vowed to secure our national borders and fix our
broken immigration system. Unfortunately, the tough talk has yielded little, if any, real or
lasting results.
Since the 1986 comprehensive immigration reform that promised to fix the problem once and for
all, Congress has passed dozens of laws promising significant reform while the illegal immigrant
population has steadily grown from a supposedly 3.5 million in 1986 to approximately 11
million today.
Since becoming Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, I have made border security a top priority. The Committee has held 13 hearings and 3
roundtables related to the subject and visited the southwest border, northern border, and Central
America. Our efforts represent the necessary first step in solving any problem: a sincere attempt
to fully understand and properly define it.
Despite dedicated and often heroic efforts from both the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) and local law enforcement, the accumulated testimony and information the Committee
has gathered yields an inescapable conclusion: America’s borders are not secure. This current
state of affairs is clearly unacceptable. A secure border is not only a prerequisite to a functioning
legal immigration system, but it is essential to maintaining national security and protecting
public health and safety.
To understand how porous our borders truly are, consider testimony from former Drug Czar
General Barry McCaffrey and Rear Admiral Peter Brown stating we are interdicting less than 10
percent of drugs crossing our land borders and only 11-18 percent crossing our maritime borders.
These metrics not only reveal the lack of a secure border, they also point to a root cause—
perhaps THE root cause—of the problem: America's insatiable demand for drugs.
This demand fueled the rise of drug cartels and transnational criminal organizations that have
grown and expanded their product lines to include most forms of illegal drugs and human
trafficking. Sex trafficking is extensive and the drug cartels often use economic migrants as a
diversion for even higher value drug and human smuggling. As product moves through Central
America the drug cartels have dramatically weakened the public institutions and rule of law
within those nations. The resulting corruption and criminal impunity enjoyed by gangs and
extortion racketeers have led to high murder rates, destroyed economic opportunity, and created
significant incentives to migrate to America—the so called “push factors” of illegal immigration.
Although significant, these push factors pale in comparison to the pull factors, or incentives, that
fuel illegal immigration. Even during periods of slow economic growth, the opportunities that
abound in America relative to other countries are the most powerful incentives for both legal and
illegal immigration. The significant wage gaps that exist between America and our southern
neighbors are the metrics that prove the point.
3

 While economic opportunity is the single greatest incentive, we have created numerous other
incentives within our laws, regulations, and through the lack of enforcement. We create
sanctuary cities where criminals are able to avoid deportation and allow our welfare and tax
systems to be abused by non-U.S. citizens. Combined with the 2008 Human Trafficking bill
containing extended adjudication rights to unaccompanied minors from non-contiguous
countries, President Obama's Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals (DACA) sparked the
dramatic upsurge in unaccompanied children from Central America arriving at the southwest
border staring in 2012.
Regardless of whether or not these laws, regulations, and executive actions actually apply to
individuals, the reality is that illegal immigrants are allowed to stay in America. Through the use
of social media, that fact is widely known and becomes its own powerful incentive for even more
illegal immigration.
In order to secure our borders we must clearly identify and eliminate these incentives. One way
to eliminate an incentive would be to immediately return those who illegally cross our borders to
their country of origin. Both current and former DHS officials have seen firsthand that expedited
removal of illegal immigrants works as a deterrent. The surge of 30,000 immigrants from Brazil
in 2005 was virtually stopped in its tracks by responding to it with expedited removal. As this
example illustrates, we know what works and we simply need the political will and commitment
to implement smart policy.
But the problem remains multi-faceted and complex. Unfortunately, the Administration has
declared it will oppose a process of incremental progress insisting instead it will only support
comprehensive reform. The last three decades of failed attempts to secure our borders and fix a
horribly broken legal immigration system lend very little credence to a compressive approach.
It’s well past time to begin identifying individual problems and enacting solutions on a step-bystep basis.
This report provides a summary of findings from the Committee’s border security hearings, as
well as a primer on key border security issues and recommendations for “first step” reforms that
could begin improving security at our borders. The Committee has already begun crafting and
passing a number of these initial reforms. Six bills related to border security have been reported
out of Committee, one of which was recently signed into law.
Based on the information gathered by the Committee, the report presents the following findings:
1. Despite spending more than $100 billion over the last decade to fund security
measures along the border, the border is still not secure. America’s insatiable demand
for drugs, coupled with smugglers insatiable demand for profit, is one root cause
(perhaps THE root cause) preventing the achievement of a secure border.
2. In certain areas and aspects, the border has become more dangerous and lawless over
the years. The porous border has made the U.S. more vulnerable to criminal and
potential terrorist activity.
4

 3. To truly secure our border, we must identify and eliminate—or at least drastically
reduce—the incentives for illegal immigration. Some key incentives driving
unlawful migration are the opportunity to work and the security in knowing that, upon
illegal entry, you will probably be able to remain in the U.S.
a. The wage gap, or the difference between wages in the United States and
countries south of the U.S.-Mexico border, is a driving factor for migration to
the U.S. and will remain a factor for a very long time.
b. Both current and former DHS officials agree that expedited removal of illegal
immigrants works as a deterrent. Unfortunately, the current Administration is
not removing illegal immigrants, including unaccompanied minors, on an
expedited basis.
c. Due to powerful incentives, immigration of unaccompanied minors from
Central America has exceeded that of Mexican unaccompanied minors. To
combat this, both pull and push factors should be analyzed and addressed.
Until the political will exists on a bipartisan basis to solve these problems, comprehensive
reforms to the state of our border security and immigration system will be difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve. There are, however, piecemeal steps we can take now to prepare for
bigger reforms down the road. These steps will not provide total border security, but they will
move us in the direction of making our borders more secure. This report presents as
recommendations the following reforms that the Chairman believes, with leadership and
cooperation from both parties, can be achieved this Congress:
A. Require adequate metrics to measure border security across all U.S. borders—land,
air, and sea, with appropriate oversight and transparency.
B. Ensure sufficient safeguards are in place in both the U.S. Refugee Resettlement
Program and Visa Waiver Program.
C. Initiate a concentrated public relations campaign to dissuade all Americans, but in
particular young people, from using and becoming addicted to drugs.
D. Reform the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
of 2008 (TVPRA) to eliminate incentives for illegal immigration.
E. Provide Border Patrol agents access to federal lands.
F. Require DHS to examine the threats on the northern border.
G. Call on the Chief of the Border Patrol to move agents to areas of high risk.
5

 H. Provide and maintain adequate manpower on our border and satisfy hard to fill
vacancies at our ports of entry.
I. Complete the Congressionally mandated fencing requirement along the southwest
border and understand our country’s fencing needs and other border security assets to
determine what more is necessary.
J. Require each border security technology acquisition program to demonstrate it has an
approved baseline for costs, schedule, and performance.
K. Ensure that successful state and local programs, such as Operation Stonegarden, are
used appropriately and efficiently to maximize manpower at and near U.S. borders.
L. Cut off federal funding for sanctuary cities that release criminal aliens into local
communities, endangering public safety, and provide immunity to law enforcement
officers so that courts cannot prevent them from honoring federal detainers.
M. Ensure the continuation of current Border Patrol programs, such as Operation
Streamline, that provide penalties to recent border crossers in order to reduce
recidivism.
N. Emphasize intelligence-based strategies at our borders.
O. Authorize the Department’s preclearance agreements.
The Chairman is hopeful that this report will provide useful and authoritative information to the
public and elected officials regarding a path forward on border security and immigration reform.

6

 Key Highlights
1. Despite spending more than $100 billion over the last decade to fund security measures
along the border,1 the border is still not secure. America’s insatiable demand for drugs,
coupled with smugglers insatiable demand for profit, is one root cause (perhaps the
root cause) preventing the achievement of a secure border.
The Department of Homeland Security has pointed to a declining number of apprehensions along
the southwest border as an indicator of success in controlling the border and deterring would-be
trespassers.2 However, this does not paint a comprehensive picture of security at the border.
For one, apprehension data alone ignores the drug smuggling threat along our borders.
Americans’ insatiable demand for drugs is largely driving this trade. Despite spending $25
billion annually on our war on drugs,3 some estimates state that more than 60 percent of illegal
crossings are related to drugs.4 According to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the “new
face of organized crime in America” is “[t]he growing relationship between Mexican-based drug
cartels and domestic street gangs, coupled with … an unlimited supply of illegal guns.”5 In
addition to being the key drivers of the drug trade, the Mexican cartels have become experts at
evading the Border Patrol. A former U.S. official testified that CBP “seizes just 5-10 percent of
the illegal drugs smuggled across the border, and interdicts less than 1 percent of the $20 billion
plus laundered to Mexico each year.”6 Regarding the maritime border, the U.S. Coast Guard
testified that it only interdicts 11 to 18 percent of the estimated drug flow into the U.S.7
Moreover, independent experts believe that apprehension rates along the southwest border are
somewhere between 40 and 55 percent.8 In some sectors, Border Patrol agents and local law

1

See Lisa Seghetti, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DHS BORDER SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY,
APPROPRIATIONS, AND METRICS 4–6 (2014) (on file with Majority Staff) (noting that from FY2006 through FY2013,
Congress appropriated $86 billion to CBP and in total about $131 billion on “enforcement-related spending.”).
2
Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, Border Security in the 21st Century, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/10/09/remarks-secretary-homeland-securityjeh-johnson-border-security-21st-century.
3
See Lisa N. Sacco & Kristin Finklea, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41535, REAUTHORIZING THE OFFICE OF
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY: ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION 11 (2014).
4
Data provided by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Tucson, Arizona
Sector (Feb. 2015).
5
All Hands on Deck: Working Together to End the Trafficking and Abuse of Prescription Opioids, Heroin, and Fentanyl Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of John “Jack”
Riley, Acting Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement Agency).
6
Securing the Border: Assessing the Impact of Transnational Crime: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (RET.),
Former Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy).
7
See Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Maritime Border: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Rear Admiral Peter J.
Brown, Assistant Commander for Response Policy, U.S. Coast Guard).
8
Bryan Roberts, Edward Alden, John Whitley, Managing Illegal Immigration to the United States: How Effective is
Enforcement?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 2–3 (2013) (“The Obama administration has not offered, and
Congress has failed to insist on, any accountability for the effectiveness of these huge enforcement expenditures).

7

 enforcement estimated interdiction rates to be between 30 and 40 percent.9 In other sectors,
agents estimated they caught one-in-three in areas with a fence, and only one-in-20 in areas
where no fence was present.10 Of the 2,000 mile U.S-Mexico land border, only 653 miles, or
less than 33 percent, is fenced.11 Finally, at a Committee hearing, a witness testified that agents
who reported more than 20 “got-aways” had to verify their report with a supervisor and would
likely face retribution.12 Senior officials at DHS have denied this assertion.13
It is clear from these numbers and statements that the border is still not secure, and continues to
be taken advantage of by cartels and other transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) seeking
to smuggle humans and drugs unlawfully into the country.
2. In certain areas and aspects, the border has become more dangerous and lawless over
the years. The porous border has made the U.S. more vulnerable to criminal and
potential terrorist activity.
The Committee has heard numerous anecdotes suggesting the border has become more
dangerous and lawless over the years. For example, a local law enforcement official testified
that cartels are responsible for numerous crimes in border towns, including home invasions,
felony vehicle evasions, extortion, and sexual assault.14 He also explained that violent
transnational gangs, such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), operate on both sides of the border and
since 2011 the number of MS-13 members encountered at the border has increased each year.15
One rancher testified before the Committee that parks that were previously used for recreation
are no longer used for that purpose, because they have simply become too dangerous.16 The
same rancher told the Committee about his irrigation district workers being shot at by cartel
members attempting to scare them off to allow the gangs to smuggle drugs across the border.17
Others who live in border regions spoke of similar experiences. One witness testified that a
neighboring farmer witnessed smugglers cutting holes in his fence and then driving 46 trucks
9

Majority Staff observations during Senators Johnson, Carper, and Sasse CODEL to the Texas Rio Grande Valley
Sector (Feb. 2015); see also Ongoing Migration from Central America: An Examination of FY2015 Apprehensions:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of
Chris Cabrera, National Border Patrol Council).
10
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Tucson, Arizona Sector (Feb. 2015).
11
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, FACILITIES
MANAGEMENT & ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE BORDER PATROL FACILITIES & TACTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE (2015) (on file with Committee staff).
12
See Securing the Southwest Border: Perspectives from Beyond the Beltway: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).
13
Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Northern Border: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).
14
Securing the Border: Assessing the Impact of Transnational Crime: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Benny Martinez, Chief Deputy Sheriff, Brooks
County, Texas).
15
Id.
16
See Securing the Southwest Border: Perspectives from Beyond the Beltway: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Othal E. Brand, Farmer, McAllen,
Texas).
17
Id.

8

 loaded with drugs across his property.18 That farmer was later told by a property appraiser that
the value of his property had decreased significantly, due to its proximity to the border. Illegal
immigration and drug smuggling are obvious deterrents to potential investors.19
The National Border Patrol Council estimates that criminal aliens—individuals who have
committed crimes in the U.S., served time in jail, and have been deported—constitute 10 to 20
percent of those who are apprehended at the border.20 The July 2, 2015 murder of Kathryn
Steinle in San Francisco, California by a criminal alien that had been deported five times with
seven prior felony convictions has brought renewed attention to criminals entering and remaining
in the U.S.21 According to ICE, between January 1, 2014 and June 30, 2015, there have been
16,495 detainers issued that have not been honored in approximately 200 local “sanctuary”
jurisdictions.22 Of those who were released after an ICE detainer was not honored in the first
eight months of 2014, “approximately 1,900 were later rearrested 4,300 more times on 7,500
different charges.”23 Between FY2010 and FY2014, 121 criminal aliens were released into the
U.S. and “were subsequently charged with a homicide-related offense,” according to U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Director Sarah Saldana.24
While drug smuggling and illegal entry represent important threats to our porous borders, there is
also a concern that terrorists may be able to exploit these weaknesses to enter the U.S.
undetected.25 Experts have strong disagreements on the likelihood of terrorists transiting the
southwest border, but the potential for exploitation is real, given the changing dynamics and
backgrounds of the individuals being apprehended at the southwest border in the last few years.26
Apprehensions include individuals from Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, and Egypt.27
18

Id. (statement of Howard G. Buffett, Chairman and CEO, Howard G. Buffer Foundation and Arizona
Landowner).
19
Id.
20
Response to Questions for the Record from Shawn Moran, Vice President, National Border Patrol Council,
Deferred Action on Immigration: Implications and Unanswered Questions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (“These are not economic immigrants in search of
a better life. These are hardened criminals who are facing real jail time”).
21
Michelle Moons, Breaking: Pier 14 Murder Suspect Had Been Deported 5 Times With 7 Felonies, BREITBART
(July 3, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/texas/2015/07/03/breaking-pier-14-murder-suspect-had-been-deported-5times-with-7-felonies/.
22
Letter to the Honorable Kelly Ayotte, Senator, Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, from the
Honorable Sarah R. Saldana, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Aug. 14, 2015).
23
Jessica Vaughn, Protect the Public, not Criminal Immigrants, NAT’L REVIEW (July 8, 2015),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/420898/illegal-alien-criminal-steinle (data from Jan. 1, 2014-Aug. 31, 2014).
24
Joel Gehrke, ICE Failed to Deport 121 Convicts Now Facing Murder Charges, NATIONAL REVIEW (June 15,
2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/419781/ice-failed-deport-121-convicts-now-facing-murder-chargesjoel-gehrke (citing a letter from Sarah Saldana, Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement).
25
TEXAS DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, OPERATION STRONG SAFETY REPORT TO THE 84TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE AND
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 2 (2015) (Unclassified Version).
26
U.S. Northern Command and Southern Command: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 114th Cong.
(2015) (statement of General John F. Kelly, U.S. Southern Command)
27
TEXAS DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, OPERATION STRONG SAFETY REPORT TO THE 84TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE AND
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 2 (2015) (Unclassified Version); see also American’s Heroin Epidemic at the Border:
Local, State, and Federal Law Enforcement Efforts to Combat Illicit Narcotic Trafficking: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Brandon Judd, President,
National Border Patrol Council).

9

 As to the northern border, “the U.S.-Canada border is the longest common border in the
world.”28 Due to its length and the relatively low number of agents patrolling it, experts believe
that vulnerabilities could be exploited.29 In 2011, Alan Bersin, former CBP Commissioner, told
the Senate Judiciary Committee that regarding terrorism, “it’s commonly accepted that the more
significant threat comes from the U.S.-Canada border.”30 In FY2014, the Blaine sector in
Washington State alone apprehended migrants from 32 different countries.31 Finally, there is
also the possibility that terrorists may exploit legal avenues to enter and remain in the U.S. For
example, in 2011 the U.S. discovered two Iraqi refugees were plotting to send missiles, cash, and
sniper rifles to insurgents to kill American soldiers abroad.32 Other potential vulnerabilities
include the Visa Waiver Program, student visas, and visa overstays.
3. To truly secure our border, we must identify and eliminate—or at least drastically
reduce—the incentives for illegal immigration. Some key incentives driving unlawful
migration are the opportunity to work and the security in knowing that, upon illegal
entry, you will be able to remain in the U.S.
a. The wage gap, or the difference between wages in the United States and countries south
of the U.S.-Mexico border, is a driving factor for migration to the U.S. and will remain
a factor for a very long time.
“The main economic factor influencing migration is the wage gap, or the difference between
what a potential migrant can earn in the U.S. compared to the migrant’s home country.
Differences in average wages for similar workers between developed and developing countries
constitute the single largest price distortion remaining in global markets.”33 Over the last several
decades, migrant survey data suggested that the wage gap based on actual labor market outcomes
in the U.S. and Mexico was approximately $7 to $1, if valued at the commercial exchange rate.34
Today, this gap has fallen to as low as $5 to $1.35 However, this wage gap is expected to
continue to be above $3 to $1 until 2075.36 The wage gap between the U.S. and Central
28

U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NORTHERN BORDER STRATEGY 4 (2012),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/policy/dhs-northern-border-strategy.pdf.
29
Garrett Graff, Fear Canada: The Real Terrorist Next Door, POLITICO MAGAZINE (Oct. 16, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/fear-canada-not-mexico-111919.html#.VSYmIpN0eYM.
30
Improving Security and Facilitating Commerce at America's Northern border and Ports of Entry: Hearing Before
the S. Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and Border Security of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
(2011) (statement of Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection).
31
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 2015).
32
See, e.g., James Gordon Meek and Brian Ross, Terrorists Once Used Refugee Program to Settle in U.S., ABC
NEWS (Nov. 18, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/International/terrorists-refugee-program-settleus/story?id=35252500.
33
Bryan Roberts, Edward Alden, John Whitley, Managing Illegal Immigration to the United States: How Effective
is Enforcement?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 8 (2013) (citing Michael Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, and
Lant Pritchett, The Place Premium: Wage Differences for Identical Workers across the U.S. Border, CENTER FOR
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT (2008)).
34
Bryan Roberts, Edward Alden, John Whitley, Managing Illegal Immigration to the United States: How Effective
is Enforcement?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 8 (2013).
35
Id.
36
Id. at 9.

10

 American countries in terms of income is larger than the wage gap between the U.S. and
Mexico.37 According to economists, people will relocate if the ratio is above $2 to $1.38
Therefore, the incentive to enter the U.S. for work will continue far into the future. If
immigrants cannot find a lawful path to enter the U.S. where they will receive higher wages, they
will enter the U.S. unlawfully.
b. Both current and former DHS officials agree that expedited removal of illegal
immigrants works as a deterrent. Unfortunately, the current Administration is not
removing illegal immigrants, including unaccompanied minors, on an expedited basis.
Both DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson and former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff recognize that
those seeking to unlawfully migrate to the U.S. are highly responsive to incentives and
disincentives. During the Committee’s DHS Budget Hearing, Secretary Johnson admitted, “you
have to show the population in Central America that you are sending people back.”39
In 2005, a large number of Brazilians sought to enter the U.S. illegally due to a change in
Mexican policy in which the government suspended a visa requirement for Brazilians, allowing
easy travel.40 According to one account, the number of Brazilians detained at the U.S.-Mexico
border tripled from the previous year to more than 30,000.41 In response, DHS dedicated bed
space, detained, and expedited the removal of Brazilians.42 According to Secretary Chertoff:
“The word spread surprisingly swiftly; within its first thirty days, the operation had
already begun to deter illegal border crossings by Brazilians. In fact, the number of
Brazilians apprehended dropped by 50%. After 60 days, the rate of Brazilian illegal
immigration through this sector was down 90%, and it is still significantly depressed all
across the border. In short, we learned that a concentrated effort of removal can actually
discourage illegal entries by non-Mexicans on the southwest border.”43
Secretary Johnson has seen similar results. Recently, organized smugglers in the Dominican
Republic have taken advantage of a U.S. policy that eliminated expedited removal of Haitians
after the 2010 earthquake by smuggling Haitian immigrants to Puerto Rico.44 By the end of
37

Id. at Appendix 2: Wage Gap and Other Trends in Central American Source Countries,
http://www.cfr.org/immigration/managing-illegal-immigration-united-states/p30658.
38
Michael Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett, The Place Premium: Wage Differences for
Identical Workers across the U.S. Border, CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT (2008).
39
See The Homeland Security Department’s Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2016: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).
40
Chris Kraul & Nicole Gaouttte, No-Visa Agreement Backfired on Mexico, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2005),
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/sep/14/world/fg-mexbrazil14.
41
Id.
42
Comprehensive Immigration Reform II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005)
(statement of Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
43
Id.
44
See Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Maritime Border: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015); U.S. COAST GUARD, MARITIME
BORDER SECURITY (2015) (on file with Majority Staff).

11

 FY2013, 1,760 Haitian migrants attempted to enter the U.S. through the Mona Passage, as
compared to 39 Haitians in FY2012.45 In FY2014, 1,994 Haitian migrants made the same
dangerous attempt.46 DHS resumed expedited removal in October 2014 for non-criminal Haitian
migrants who landed on U.S. Territories in Puerto Rico and the islands of the Mona Passage.47
After the first removal, Haitian maritime flow in the Mona Passage decreased by 80 percent.48 In
the first three quarters of FY2015, only 277 Haitian migrants attempted to enter the U.S. via the
Mona Passage compared to 1,430 for the same period in FY2014.49
Similarly, after the President’s December 17, 2014 announcement regarding the U.S.’s change in
policy towards Cuba, Cuban migration increased, as many feared that the current “wet-foot, dryfoot” policy—allowing any Cuban reaching U.S. land to stay and pursue citizenship, while those
caught at sea are returned to Cuba50—would end. Prior to the President’s announcement, from
December 1-16, 2014, the Coast Guard interdicted 80 Cubans.51 After the President’s
announcement, from December 17-31, 2014 the Coast Guard interdicted 419 Cubans—a 423
percent increase.52 To address this, the Coast Guard deployed direct repatriation and
immediately began sending those interdicted in the waterways back to Cuba.53 As a result,
Cuban interdictions fell to 254 from January 1-21, 2015 and have returned to normal levels.54
While employing expedited removal at our maritime border has kept Cuban migration at normal
levels, due to the U.S. wet-foot, dry-foot policy, Cubans may not be removed once they reach
U.S. soil. As a result, Cubans arriving at U.S. POEs has increased by 78 percent since the
President’s announcement.55
c. Due to powerful incentives, immigration of unaccompanied minors from Central
America has exceeded that of Mexican unaccompanied minors. To combat this, both
pull and push factors should be analyzed and addressed.
In FY2012, more than 24,000 unaccompanied alien children (UACs) were apprehended at the
U.S.-Mexico border.56 In FY2014, that number grew to nearly 69,000.57 Also in FY2014, for
the first time, the number of UACs from Northern Triangle Countries—El Salvador, Guatemala,
45

Id.
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Data Provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Sept. 15, 2015); see Miriam Jordan,
U.S. News: More Cubans Migrate to U.S., WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 21, 2015).
56
Securing the Border: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Central American Migration to the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015)
(statement of Alan D. Bersin, Acting Assistant Secretary and Chief Diplomatic Officer, Office of Policy, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security).
57
Id.
46

12

 and Honduras—exceeded the number of UACs from Mexico.58 The Committee heard that many
factors led to the increased migration of unaccompanied minors from Central America, and these
factors can be attributed to both the conditions of violence in Central America, as well as
accurate and inaccurate perceptions regarding the American immigration system.59
According to the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), factors leading to this increased migration
include the perception of U.S. policy that led people to believe they would be able to remain in
the U.S.60 Policies contributing to this pull factor include the President’s DACA, DHS’s catch
and release policies, and the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA).61 Meanwhile, factors contributing to the push factor
include violence, extortion, and lack of opportunities in the Northern Triangle.62
The ability of persons from noncontiguous countries to stay in the U.S. pending a hearing has led
to campaigns in which smugglers claim that the U.S. is issuing a new “permiso” for minors
reaching the U.S.63 In reality, when unaccompanied minors are apprehended by Border Patrol
they are released in the U.S. with a notice to appear (NTA) in court. At this point, many assume
that they are “home free” and that “by the time they need to appear, there is going to be an
amnesty or legalization.”64 According to one Committee witness, from July 2014 through
February 2015, 62 percent of the children who were ordered to appear before an immigration
judge for a hearing failed to show up.65 All of them were ordered deported, but ICE’s recent
enforcement priorities make removal highly unlikely.66 Since 2009, DHS has apprehended
approximately 122,700 unaccompanied children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras,
but has only repatriated approximately 7,700, or 6 percent.67 In this case, reality reinforces
perception.68
58

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, SOUTHWEST BORDER UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN,
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children.
59
Securing the Border: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Central American Migration to the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015); The
2014 Humanitarian Crisis at our Border: A Review of the Government’s Response to Unaccompanied Minors One
Year Later: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).
60
EL PASO INTELLIGENCE CENTER, MISPERCEPTIONS OF U.S. POLICY KEY DRIVER IN CENTRAL AMERICAN MIGRANT
SURGE (2014) (finding that children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras arrived in large numbers after
hearing rumors that the U.S. Government would stop issuing free passes or permisos after June 2014).
61
Section 235 of TVPRA codified expedited removals for children from contiguous countries and mandated the
transfer of children from non-contiguous countries to the Department of Health and Human Services. Pub. L. No.
110-457 (2008).
62
See Securing the Border: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Central American Migration to the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).
63
Id. (statement of Roger F. Noriega, Visiting Fellow, American Enterprise Institute and Former Assistant Secretary
for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State).
64
See id.
65
Id. (statement of William Kandel, Analyst in Immigration Policy, Congressional Research Service).
66
See The 2014 Humanitarian Crisis at our Border: A Review of the Government’s Response to Unaccompanied
Minors One Year Later: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong.
(2015).
67
Data provided to Majority Staff by U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Oct. 20, 2015).
68
Ongoing Migration from Central America: An Examination of FY2015 Apprehensions: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Kimberly M.

13

 In response to this humanitarian crisis, the Administration has proposed a $1 billion aid package
largely focused on the Northern Triangle, advocating that investing in Central American
communities can decrease the need to migrate and significantly reduce the business of human
smugglers.69 Absent new accountability and reforms in Central America, experts question the
value of additional resources.70 In many of these countries, “police and prosecutors are often
incapable of, or prevented from, carrying out their law enforcement responsibilities,” according
to an expert at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.71 This is often the result
of “fear or intimidation by criminal networks,” but also from corruption of the state.72
For example, Guatemalan Vice President Roxana Baldetti resigned earlier this year amid a
corruption scandal in which officials allegedly “defrauded the state of millions of dollars by
taking bribes to charge lower customs duties.”73 On September 2, 2015, Guatemalan President
Otto Perez Molina also resigned, just days before a new election, due to implications of his
involvement.74 Shortly thereafter he was jailed in Guatemala City.75 Meanwhile, at a
Committee hearing, one witness testified that Honduras recently “saw millions of dollars stolen
from its national hospital system by the very people charged with overseeing the system.”76
A recent GAO report highlighted concerns with the effectiveness of assistance the U.S. is
already providing to Central America.77 For example, in El Salvador GAO observed a computer
lab filled with computers recently provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) but no teachers in the classrooms.78 Apparently, the Salvadoran Ministry of Education
had not yet provided salaries for the teachers.79 GAO concluded that such ineffectiveness “could
lead to higher levels of migration to the United States, which is not only potentially costly in
terms of U.S. taxpayer resources but costly and dangerous to the migrants and their families.”80
Gianopoulos, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office) (explaining that children use
social media to let those in their home countries know they made it to and were able to remain in the U.S.).
69
WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: PROMOTING PROSPERITY, SECURITY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL
AMERICA, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/29/fact-sheet-promoting-prosperity-security-andgood-governance-central-ame.
70
See Securing the Border: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Central American Migration to the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015)
(statement of Eric L. Olson, Associate Director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Guatemala Vice President Roxana Baldetti Resigns Amid Corruption Scandal, NY DAILY NEWS (May 8, 2015),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/guatemala-vice-president-resigns-corruption-scandal-article-1.2216056.
74
Rafael Romo & Greg Botelho, Otto Perez Molina Out as Guatemalan President, Ordered to Jail, CNN (Sept. 3,
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/03/americas/guatemala-president-arrest-warrant/.
75
Id.
76
See Securing the Border: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Central American Migration to the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015)
(statement of Eric L. Olson, Associate Director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars).
77
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-707, CENTRAL AMERICA: IMPROVED EVALUATION EFFORTS COULD
ENHANCE AGENCY PROGRAMS TO REDUCE UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN MIGRATION (2015).
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 41.

14

 Part I: The U.S.-Mexico Border
Each of the nine sectors of the U.S.-Mexico border has unique terrain and faces endemic
challenges.81 For example, the RGV sector border is in the middle of the Rio Grande, a narrow,
often shallow, and easily navigable river. Smugglers cross the Rio Grande by foot, raft, or, in
some locations, vehicles.82 This makes enforcement and security quite daunting. In Arizona,
two mountain ranges provide concealment for smugglers and illegal crossers. Additionally,
protected lands, including national forests, wildlife refuges, military training ranges, and a Native
American Reservation, restrict access to approximately 80 percent of the border in the Tucson
and Yuma sectors.83
Figure 1: Nine Sectors of the U.S.-Mexico Border

Image provided by DHS.

Securing one high-risk sector usually leads to shifting pressures on other borders sectors. For
example, San Diego was previously one of the most highly trafficked areas for illegal crossers
between ports of entry.84 In the mid-1990s, added personnel and other infrastructure resources
such as fencing through Operation Gatekeeper in the San Diego sector decreased total

81

Nine border sectors abut the U.S.-Mexico border: San Diego, El Centro, Yuma, Tucson, El Paso, Big Bend, Del
Rio, Laredo, and Rio Grande Valley. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL –
SECTORS AND STATIONS, http://ecso.swf.usace.army.mil/maps/SectorP.pdf.
82
On a CODEL in South Texas, Chairman Johnson observed a truck drive across a shallow portion of the Rio
Grande River.
83
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE, ARIZONA INTELLIGENCE OVERVIEW (2015)
(on file with Majority Staff).
84
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, SAN DIEGO SECTOR CALIFORNIA. http://www.cbp.gov/bordersecurity/along-us-borders/border-patrol-sectors/san-diego-sector-california (“During the seventies, illegal alien
traffic steadily increased, rising to more than 100,000 in 1973 and more than 250,000 by 1976. In 1986, the sector
recorded its highest number of apprehensions in a single year – more than 628,000. . . San Diego was the busiest
sector for illegal entries, accounting for more than 40 percent of nationwide apprehensions in the early nineties.”).

15

 apprehensions by 95 percent.85 These efforts to halt illegal crossers in San Diego did not reduce
the overall flow of illegal activity. Instead, the flow shifted to Arizona in the El Paso and Tucson
sectors.86 Today, RGV is the busiest sector for illegal crossers between ports of entry, and was at
the epicenter of last year’s UAC crisis.87
Figure 2: Timeline of Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector 1980-2014

Physical Barriers and Technological Detection Capabilities in the Sectors
DHS has worked to address these challenges through deploying various different technologies
and tactical infrastructure along the southwest border, including nearly 700 miles of fencing, 70
miles of border lighting, 11,863 border sensors to detect illicit migration, 107 aircraft from the
Office of Air and Marine, 8 unmanned aerial systems, 84 vessels patrolling waterways on the

85

San Diego Fence Provides Lessons in Border Control, NPR (Apr. 6, 2006),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5323928.
86
H. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, BLUEPRINT FOR SOUTHERN BORDER
SECURITY 2 (2014).
87
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, SOUTHWEST BORDER UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN,
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children.

16

 southwest border, and other new surveillance tools.88 Each sector has different physical barriers
and technological solutions to address its unique terrain challenges.
Fencing and Infrastructure
While sometimes cost prohibitive, fencing, where appropriate, is an important and necessary tool
in securing our borders. In 1993, Sandia Laboratory issued a study that concluded multiple
barriers were needed to stop and delay illegal border crossers in San Diego. 89 The study
determined that “[a] three-fence barrier system with vehicle patrol roads between the fences and
lights will provide the necessary discouragement.”90
Shortly thereafter, the Border Patrol, with the assistance of the U.S. Department of Defense’s
(DOD) Army Corps of Engineers, commenced the first fencing along our southwest border, with
a 10-foot-high, welded-steel fence covering approximately 14 miles of the San Diego sector.91
Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Congress
instructed immigration authorities to construct barriers along our international borders to deter
unauthorized crossers.92 Specifically, immigration authorities were instructed to supplement the
14-mile “Sandia fence” in San Diego with two additional layers of fencing. 93 However, resulting
environmental concerns and litigation significantly delayed the fulfillment of this requirement.94
DHS has still not completed this project.95 Today, of its 60 mile border, the San Diego sector
has 46 miles of primary fence, 13 miles of which include secondary fencing.96
Building off the San Diego fence lessons, Congress amended IIRIRA in the REAL ID Act of
2005 to authorize the DHS Secretary “to waive ‘all legal requirements’ necessary to ensure
expeditious construction” of security barriers at the U.S. border.97 DHS has executed five
environmental waivers related to fence construction along the southwest border to expedite

88

Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, Border Security in the 21st Century, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/10/09/remarks-secretary-homeland-securityjeh-johnson-border-security-21st-century.
89
Michael John Garcia, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43975, BORDER SECURITY: THE SAN DIEGO FENCE (2007).
90
Id.
91
Michael John Garcia, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43975, BARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. BORDERS: KEY AUTHORITIES
AND REQUIREMENTS 4 (2015).
92
Id. at 1; Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, §102(a)-(c) (1996).
93
Id. at 7; Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, §102(a)-(c) (1996).
94
Michael John Garcia, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43975, BORDER SECURITY: THE SAN DIEGO FENCE 4 (2007).
95
Michael John Garcia, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43975, BARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. BORDERS: KEY AUTHORITIES
AND REQUIREMENTS 7, 22 (2015) (while IIRIRA Section 102(c) expressly authorized the waiver of the Endangered
Species At and the National Environmental Policy Act, other federal laws remained applicable to border
construction projects); see also Michael John Garcia, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43975, BORDER SECURITY: THE
SAN DIEGO FENCE (2007).
96
No triple layered fencing currently exists at the San Diego sector. Majority Staff observations during bipartisan,
bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 2015).
97
Michael John Garcia, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43975, BARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. BORDERS: KEY AUTHORITIES
AND REQUIREMENTS 22 (2015); Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, §102 (2005).

17

 construction.98 But, issues remain. For example, during the Secure Border Initiative project,
land acquisition problems prevented DHS from meeting its goals to complete fencing projects on
time.99 Most fencing in California, Arizona, and New Mexico was built on federal land, but in
Texas, DHS had to purchase most of the land from private individuals. 100
In 2006, IIRIRA was amended again by the Secure Fence Act, which called for the deployment
of roughly 850 miles of “at least 2 layers of reinforced fencing, [and] the installation of
additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors” along five stretches of the
southwest border.101 Shortly thereafter, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 modified
the Secure Fence Act to allow for the construction of not less than 700 miles of fence and gave
the DHS Secretary waiver authority that reads in part: “nothing in this paragraph shall require the
Secretary of Homeland Security to install fencing, physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and
sensors in a particular location along an international border of the United States, if the Secretary
determines that the use or placement of such resources is not the most appropriate means to
achieve and maintain operational control over the international border at such location.” 102
Today, according to DHS, there is approximately 652.6 miles of front-line fencing on the
southwest border: 352.8 miles of primary fence,103 36 miles of secondary fencing, 104 and 299.8
miles of vehicle barrier fence.105 The U.S.-Mexico border is nearly 2,000-miles long. DHS is
short of the statutory requirements to construct fencing of “not less than 700 miles of the
southwest border.”106 According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), while there is no
deadline for the completion of the fencing, “changes in DHS’s border enforcement strategy and
prioritization of resources” appears to have halted further construction of fencing along the U.S.Mexico border.107

98

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, FACILITIES
MANAGEMENT & ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE BORDER PATROL FACILITIES & TACTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE (2015) (on file with Committee Staff).
99
Observations on Deployment Challenges: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Homeland Security, 110th Cong.
(2008) (statement of Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability
Office).
100
N. C. Aizenman, Border Fence Would Slice Through Private Land, WASH POST (Feb. 16, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/15/AR2008021503303.html.
101
Michael John Garcia, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43975, BARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. BORDERS: KEY
AUTHORITIES AND REQUIREMENTS 8–9 (2015); Pub. L. No. 109-367, §3(2006).
102
Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. E, §564(a) (2008).
103
Primary fence is designed to prevent (or at least slow down) people on foot from crossing the border and disable
a vehicle traveling 40 miles per hour.
104
Secondary fence is also known as “double-layered fencing.” Of the double-layered fencing approximately 9 miles
is located in the Yuma, Arizona sector; 13 miles is located in the El Paso, Texas sector; and 13 miles is located in
the San Diego, California sector.
105
Vehicle barrier fence consists of barriers used primarily in remote areas to prohibit vehicles engaged in drug
trafficking and human smuggling operations to cross the border. These fences can be easily navigated by those on
foot.
106
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, §102(a)-(c) (1996), as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, §102 (2005); Pub. L.
No. 109-367, §3 (2006); and Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. E, §564(a) (2008).
107
Michael John Garcia, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43975, BARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. BORDERS: KEY
AUTHORITIES AND REQUIREMENTS 2 (2015).

18

 Many interpret the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 as having eliminated the
requirement of double-layered fencing, now only calling for “a single layer of reinforced
fencing.”108 This, of course, does not prohibit additional layers of fencing.109 The Act also
provides more flexibility in regards to fencing location and border infrastructure.110
The construction of border infrastructure is complex. Prior to erecting additional fencing, Border
Patrol has to 1) determine the environmental impact of the fence; 2) acquire land; and, when
possible, 3) secure assistance of the National Guard or U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to reduce
labor costs.111
Figure 3: Examples of Fencing Styles

Bollard Fencing in Tucson Sector (left); Legacy Fencing in Tucson Sector (middle); Vehicle Barrier Fence
– Normandy in El Centro Sector (right). Images provided by DHS.

Border Patrol determines which fencing style is appropriate based on the topography of each
area.112 DHS considers primary fencing prototypes based on the ability to disable a vehicle
traveling 40 miles per hour, its effects on animal migratory patterns, and costs. 113 Similarly,
DHS builds secondary fencing in areas with large populations. Border Patrol believes that
pedestrian fencing is necessary in populous cities because illicit crossers can easily blend into the
community before they can be apprehended.114 Since Border Patrol’s strategy prioritizes fencing
and personnel resources in or near border cities, illegal traffic has shifted to remote areas. 115
Border Patrol claims that this approach disrupts traditional crossing routes in border cities or
along highways and redirects illegal crossers to terrain where Border Patrol agents have a tactical
advantage and more time to apprehend the illegal crosser.116

108

Id. at 9.
Id.
110
Id. at 9–10.
111
Chad C. Haddal, Yule Kim, Michael John Garcia, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33659, BORDER SECURITY:
BARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL BORDER (2009).
112
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-244R, SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE FENCE CONSTRUCTION COSTS 6
(2009).
113
Id.
114
The Rise of the Mexico Drug Cartels and U.S. National Security: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Oversight
and Government Reform, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Todd Owen, Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner,
Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection).
115
Securing the Southwest Border: Perspectives from Beyond the Beltway: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Mark Dannels, Sheriff, Cochise
County, Arizona).
116
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, FACILITIES
MANAGEMENT & ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE BORDER PATROL FACILITIES & TACTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE (2015) (on file with Committee staff).
109

19

 To date, CBP has spent approximately $2.3 billion on fencing. 117 Fencing costs vary based on
the type of terrain, materials used, land acquisition, contractors, and the need to meet an
expedited schedule.118 Whether fencing is built on public or private land drives cost differences,
as well as whether the fencing is primary fencing or vehicle barrier fencing (see Figure 3).119
Private land acquisition remains the primary driver of delay in completing border fencing.120
According to DHS, out of the approximately 400 cases in which the government needed to
acquire land, 330 required legal means to acquire property through condemnation proceedings
because the landowner would not voluntarily sell to the government (126 cases), ownership was
unknown (11 cases), or the government underwent “friendly” condemnation cases in which there
was no dispute on price, but titles were not fully cleared by the government or the court because
of multiple landowners (193 cases).121 Of these 330 cases, 136 remain open.122 DHS estimates
that it could cost an additional $50 million to settle these cases.123 These cases include a class
action suit in south Texas challenging the location of 40 border gates. Until this case is settled,
large gaps in fencing will remain.124
During previous projects, Border Patrol agents and DOD personnel built fencing to save money
on labor costs.125 However, during the Secure Border Initiative fencing projects, DHS
subcontracted to private companies because using Border Patrol agents removed them from their
primary responsibility and DOD informed DHS that it would no longer be able to provide
military personnel to build border fencing.126 Fencing constructed by private contractors is
generally more expensive than fencing built by the Border Patrol agents or the military.127 In
2009, a GAO report found that in a 70-mile fence project, where 40 percent of the fencing was
built by Border Patrol and DOD personnel, taxpayers paid $2.8 million per mile.128 Conversely,
in a 65-mile project completed solely by private contractors, the average cost was $5.1 million
per mile.129
117

Id.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-244R, SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE FENCE CONSTRUCTION COSTS 7
(2009); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-131T, SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE: OBSERVATIONS ON
SELECTED ASPECTS OF SBINET PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION (2007).
119
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-244R, SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE FENCE CONSTRUCTION COSTS 8
(2009) (explaining that by design, it is less expensive to construct vehicle fencing).
120
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-896, SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYMENT
DELAYS PERSIST AND THE IMPACT OF BORDER FENCING HAS NOT BEEN ASSESSED 19 (2009).
121
See id. at 20; see also U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & OFFICE OF
BORDER PATROL, FACILITIES MANAGEMENT & ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE BORDER PATROL FACILITIES &
TACTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE (2015) (on file with Committee staff).
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, FACILITIES
MANAGEMENT & ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE BORDER PATROL FACILITIES & TACTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE (2015) (on file with Committee staff).
125
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-244R, SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE FENCE CONSTRUCTION COSTS 7
(2009).
126
Id.
127
Id. at 8.
128
Id.
129
Id.
118

20

 A life-cycle cost study estimated that the “deployment, operations, and future maintenance for
tactical infrastructure will total $6.5 billion.”130 However, the completion of fencing has led to
untold economic developments on both sides of the border, greatly enhancing the economies of
border communities.131 CBP has reported that fences have a lifespan of approximately 20 years
and a large portion of its maintenance funding is to repair breaches in the fence.132 As of May
2009, DHS reported 3,363 breaches, with an average cost of $1,300 to repair.133 According to
GAO, “the fewest breaches occurred in the bollard-style fencing, while more occurred in wire
mesh fence.”134 With the move towards bollard-style fencing, fence cutting has decreased.135
Today, a growing cost for CBP is clearing the vegetation growth surrounding fences.136
While fencing can reduce or impede illegal entry, it alone cannot secure the border.137 Cartels
and other TCOs are creative in their efforts to circumvent border deterrents. Since 1990, ICE
and Border Patrol have discovered more than 150 tunnels along the U.S.-Mexico border, 56 of
which have been located in the San Diego sector.138 The Sinaloa Cartel is particularly notorious
for their elaborate tunnels, most recently constructing a mile-long air-conditioned tunnel in
central Mexico for their boss, El Chapo Guzman, to escape prison.139 Importantly, Border Patrol
in not aware of any people being smuggled across the border via the tunnels.140 Instead, due to
the large investments made by the cartels, these tunnels are primarily used to smuggle high value
narcotics.141

130

GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-896, SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYMENT
DELAYS PERSIST AND THE IMPACT OF BORDER FENCING HAS NOT BEEN ASSESSED 19, 23 (2009) (this estimate
includes deployment and operations and future maintenance costs for all tactical infrastructure, including, among
other things, the fence, road, and lighting).
131
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 2015).
132
Id. at 23.
133
Id. While these are the latest figures available to the Committee, Majority Staff recently requested that GAO
provide updates to these figures.
134
Id.
135
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, FACILITIES
MANAGEMENT & ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE BORDER PATROL FACILITIES & TACTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE (2015) (on file with Committee staff).
136
Id.
137
The Rise of the Mexico Drug Cartels and U.S. National Security: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Oversight
and Government Reform, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Todd Owen, Executive Director, Cargo and Conveyance
Security, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection).
138
Sophisticated U.S.-Mexico ‘Drug Tunnels’ Discovered, BBC (July 13, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldlatin-america-18823975; see also Candice Nguyen, Go Inside Secret Border Tunnel Near San Diego, NBC (Apr. 30,
2015), http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/San-Diego-Border-Tunnel-Go-Inside-Video-301822991.html
(reporting Border Patrol discovered a sophisticated tunnel with a rail-cart system near the San Ysidro port of entry);
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 2015) (San
Diego has the best terrain for tunneling of all the southwest border sectors and the majority of these tunnels are 80
feet deep).
139
See Christopher Woody, ’El Chapo’ Guzman’s Role in the Global Cocaine Trade is Becoming Clearer,
MCPHERSON SENTINEL (Aug. 16, 2015),
http://www.mcphersonsentinel.com/article/ZZ/20150816/BUSINESS/308169989/-1/news.
140
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 2015).
141
Id.

21

 An alternative to pedestrian fencing includes a virtual border fence comprised of highly
integrated fixed sensor towers. In 2005, DHS attempted to deploy such a system under the
Secure Border Initiative-network (SBInet), but after repeated technical problems, cost overruns,
and scheduled delays in 2009, Secretary Napolitano froze funding, except for ongoing
deployment in Arizona.142
Beyond fencing, Border Patrol has requested funding to construct all-weather roads, gates,
lighting and electrical systems, low-water crossings, bridges, drainage structures, as well as
vegetation and debris removal in various sectors.143
Technologies
As discussed above, in 2009, DHS largely suspended SBInet, a networked system of sensors,
radars, and tactical communications.144 Today, after spending approximately $1 billion, close to
53 miles of coverage, out of the 387-mile Mexico-Arizona border, exists.145
The Alternative [Southwest] Border Technology Plan, or Arizona Technology Plan, replaced
SBInet.146 The plan called for various technology capabilities across Arizona, including
Integrated Fixed Towers (IFT), Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS), Mobile
Surveillance Capability (MSC), Mobile Video Surveillance Systems (MVSS), Agent-Portable
Surveillance Systems, Thermal Imaging Devices, and Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS). 147
IFT, RVSS, and MSC constituted approximately 97 percent of the plan’s estimated costs.148
“According to CBP,” as GAO reported, “the majority of these technologies will provide the
mission benefits of improved situational awareness and agent safety,” as well as “help enhance
the ability of Border Patrol agents to detect, identify, deter, and respond to threats along the
border.”149

142

After SBInet- The Future of Technology on the Border: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Border and
Maritime Security of the Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th Cong., (2011) (statement of Mark Borkowski,
Michael Fisher, and Nicale Kostelnik, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
143
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-896, SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYMENT
DELAYS PERSIST AND THE IMPACT OF BORDER FENCING HAS NOT BEEN ASSESSED 22-23 (2009).
144
See, supra note 142; see also U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION
(2015) (on file with Majority Staff).
145
Id.; see also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-411T, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
PLAN ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 1 (2014); GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-22, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY MORE INFORMATION ON
PLANS AND COSTS IS NEEDED BEFORE PROCEEDING 2 (2011).
146
Id. at 7; see also U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file
with Majority Staff).
147
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority
Staff); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-171SP, HOMELAND SECURITY ACQUISITIONS MAJOR PROGRAM
ASSESSMENTS REVEAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY 44 (2015).
148
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-411T, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 2 (2014).
149
Id. at 9.

22

 Figure 4: Integrated Fixed Towers

IFT with images transmitted to a Border Patrol station. Images provided by DHS.

IFTs contain surveillance equipment, such as “ground surveillance radars and surveillance
cameras mounted on fixed [] towers.”150 Originally, the Arizona Technology Plan called for six
IFTs, but Border Patrol currently is funded for three.151 One IFT has been located in Nogales,
Arizona.152 Border Patrol has determined that locating a tower in the Tohono O’odham
Nation—stretching 74 miles across the U.S.-Mexico border—is their highest priority.153
Therefore, DHS plans to delay funding for an additional tower for approximately 18 months
while environmental and tribal negotiations are worked out.154 DHS has indicated that it does
not plan to deploy IFTs on the northern border because the geography is not suitable for radar
use.155
Figure 5: Remote Video Surveillance System

RVSS with images transmitted to Border Patrol station. Images provided by DHS.

RVSS constitutes 30- to 90-foot towers with two pairs of cameras each—these cameras provide
multiple color and infrared images.156 RVSS differs from IFTs in that it lacks radars.157 RVSS
is remotely controlled by Border Patrol with images transmitted to their stations.158 The purpose
of this technology is to “monitor large areas of the international border or critical transit

150

Id. at 8.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-171SP, HOMELAND SECURITY ACQUISITIONS MAJOR PROGRAM
ASSESSMENTS REVEAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY 45 (2015).
152
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority
Staff);
153
Id.
154
Id. (Note, the time estimate of 18 months was provided in May, 2015).
155
Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Jeh Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, The Homeland Security Department’s Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2015: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014).
156
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-368, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 8 (2014).
157
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-411T, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 2 (2014).
158
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-368, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 8 (2014).
151

23

 routes.”159 Although originally proposed for Arizona, RVSS has been re-prioritized for the
RGV, Texas sector.160 Additional RVSS technology is deployed in the San Diego and Blaine,
Washington sectors161 and is scheduled to be deployed on the northern border in the Swanton
Sector.162
Figure 6: Mobile Surveillance Capability and Mobile Video Surveillance Systems

MSC (left) and MVSS (right). Images provided by DHS.

MSC consists of a truck carrying a mounted camera and radar.163 MVSS, also known as a
“Scope Truck,” is similar, but consists only of a camera, and no radar.164 Secretary Johnson
recently emphasized that MSC is a priority for his agency.165 The current MSC fleet consists of
49 systems in Arizona with plans to locate more in Texas.166 While the Arizona Technology
Plan originally called for MVSS, these systems have also been relocated to RGV to address the
change in threat to that sector.167 MVSS is also located in other sectors along the border,
including the San Diego sector.168
Agent portable surveillance systems are “ground-sensing radar and surveillance system[s]”
mounted on tripods that are “operated by Border Patrol agents where truck-mounted systems are
unable to be deployed.”169 Thermal image devices provide Border Patrol the ability to see “up to
5 miles in areas that are dimly lit or in total darkness.”170 The feed from this device can be

159

Id.
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority
Staff).
161
On the northern border, the Blaine Sector has 32 RVSS and is the only sector with a fiber optic camera system.
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 2015).
162
Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Jeh Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, The Homeland Security Department’s Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2015: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014).
163
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-368, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 8 (2014).
164
Id.
165
See FY16 Department of Homeland Security Budget: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Homeland Security of
the Comm. on Appropriations, 114th Cong, (2015).
166
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority
Staff).
167
Id.
168
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 2015).
160

169

GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-368, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 8 (2014).
170
Id.

24

 shown on agent laptops.171 Finally, UGS are buried underground across the border and are used
to detect movement.172 This is a fairly inexpensive option for very remote areas.173 However,
UGS are subject to false alarms, such as animals triggering the alarm or sensor dysfunctions.174
In Arizona, CBP intended to procure UGS with Imaging Sensors (IS); however, problems of
inadequate bandwidth in its current radio frequencies arose during testing. 175 CBP will not
procure UGS with IS technology until it resolves these issues.176
Figure 7: Other Technologies

Agent-Portable Surveillance System (left) and Thermal Imaging Device (right).

Importantly, while several delays have occurred in implementing the Arizona Technology Plan,
DHS has realized some taxpayer savings. CBP initially estimated that the total life-cycle costs of
the new plan would be about $1.5 billion for Arizona.177 However, the Department saved 75
percent on its IFT contract.178 These savings have allowed DHS to procure other resources, such
as tactical aerostats, which, for the most part, have been located in the RGV sector. 179 Aerostats
have high-definition cameras with 10 miles of visibility, depending on the wind. However,
smuggling is so pervasive that it is difficult for agents to address everything aerostats
detect.180 Despite detection success, aerostats also experience weather and maintenance
171

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority
Staff).
172
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-368, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 8 (2014).
173
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority
Staff).
174
Robert Lee Maril, The Fence: National Security, Public Safety, and Illegal Immigration along the U.S.-Mexico
Border, TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY PRESS 99 (2011) (stating that, according to Border Patrol agents, in 2005 false
alarms ranged from 50 to 80 percent).
175
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-368, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 12 (2014).
176
Id.
177
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority
Staff); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-22, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY MORE
INFORMATION ON PLANS AND COSTS IS NEEDED BEFORE PROCEEDING 7–8 (2011).
178
The Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan and its Impact on Border Security: Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Border and Maritime Security of the Comm. on Homeland Security, 113th Cong., (2014) (statement of
Mark Borkowski, Assistant Commissioner and Chief Acquisition Executive, Office of Technology Innovation and
Acquisition, Department of Homeland Security).
179
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority
Staff).
180
See Securing the Border: Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology Force Multipliers: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015);

25

 challenges and are only operational 60 percent of the time.181 It is estimated that each Aerostat
currently costs $5 million, per year, to operate and maintain.182
Figure 8: Tactical Aerostat

Images provided by DHS.

While Border Patrol has begun experimenting with tactical aerostats to locate illegal pedestrian
crossers, CBP’s Office of Air and Marine (OAM) deploys tethered aerostat radar systems
(TARS) to identify and locate illegal aircraft crossing the border.183 OAM has six TARS located
along the U.S.-Mexico border, as well as two additional TARS located in the Florida Keys and
Puerto Rico, which provides OAM with persistent surveillance of the air environment along the
southwest border.184
OAM also utilizes the Predator B UAS for detection capabilities, particularly with the advent of
attaching a Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER) to the UAS. OAM currently
operates four VADERs and is scheduled to acquire two additional VADERs by the end of
2016.185 VADER monitors movement on the ground and is very precise; however, if the target is
static, VADER will not see it.186 Since 2012, sensor data obtained from VADER is streamed to
the Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC). 187
Figure 9: Predator B Land Mission UAS

Image provided by DHS.

OAM has UAS Ground Control Stations in Corpus Christi, Texas; Sierra Vista, Arizona; Grand
Forks, North Dakota; and Jacksonville, Florida. OAM currently possesses nine Predator B UAS,
181

Majority Staff observations during Senators’ Johnson, Carper, and Sasse CODEL to the Texas Rio Grande Valley
Sector (Feb. 2015).
182
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority
Staff).
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Data Provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Sept. 9, 2015).
186
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Tucson, Arizona Sector (Feb. 2015).
187
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OIG-15-17, 90-DAY STATUS UPDATE
TO RECOMMENDATIONS FROM U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION’S UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
PROGRAM DOES NOT ACHIEVE INTENDED RESULTS OR RECOGNIZE ALL COSTS OF OPERATIONS (2015).

26

 eight of which are operational.188 Six of these are assigned to the southwest border, with two
used for maritime operations, and the other two are assigned to the northern border.189 The
Predators have slanted cameras that provide 10 mile coverage and a laser illuminator that allows
Border Patrol agents with night vision goggles to locate illegal crossers. The aircraft can remain
airborne for up to 21 hours; however approximately 30 percent of UAS missions are cancelled
due to weather conditions.190
In December, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a report that found that the
UAS program has not achieved satisfactory or expected results.191 Specifically, the OIG found
that CBP’s unmanned aircrafts were “not meeting flight hour goals” and the estimated cost to
operate the program was “$12,255 per flight hour.”192 Ultimately, the OIG concluded, “CBP has
invested significant funds in a program that has not achieved the expected results, and it cannot
demonstrate how much the program has improved border security.” 193
The Department has disputed the findings of the OIG report in Committee hearings, asserting
that the UAS contributes to many apprehensions that are not directly credited unless the aircraft
follows the illegal crosser until the apprehension is made.194 Instead, unattended aircrafts are
often used to detect illegal crossings, notify Border Patrol, and continue flying to other locations
of potential illegal activity. 195 In Arizona, this makes sense, as it often takes illegal crossers days
to get through the mountains, giving agents more time and opportunity to make an apprehension.
Moreover, the UAS are often used in drug interdiction operations, and CBP points out that as of
August 2015, UAS has interdicted over 68,000 pounds of contraband (cocaine and marijuana),
with a retail value of over $547 million, or $126,000 per flight hour.196
In order to leverage intelligence resources, DHS collaborates with DOD through the Joint
Interagency Task Forces.197 In addition, DOD has deployed National Guard troops to assist with
surveillance efforts and to provide training on recent technologies during Operation Jump Start
and Operation Phalanx.198 In 2012, DOD deployed 1,200 National Guard troops to the U.S.188

Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 2015).
Id.
190
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, OFFICE OF AIR AND MARINE, CORPUS CHRISTI PRESENTATION (2015)
(on file with Majority Staff).
191
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OIG-15-17, U.S. CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION’S UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM PROGRAM DOES NOT ACHIEVE INTENDED RESULTS OR
RECOGNIZE ALL COSTS OF OPERATIONS (2014).
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Securing the Border: Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology Force Multipliers: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Randolph Alles, Assistant
Commissioner, Office of Air and Marine, U.S. Customs and Border Protection).
195
Quantitatively, this is logged as “detection,” not “apprehension,” even if it results in an apprehension. Id.
196
Data Provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Aug. 28, 2015).
197
Homeland Threats and Agency Reponses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs, 112th Cong., (2012) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
198
Boots on the Ground and Eyes in the Sky: How to Best Utilize the National Guard to Achieve Operational
Control: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Border and Maritime Security of the Comm. on Homeland
Security, 112th Cong., (2012) (statement of Ronald Vitiello and Martin Vaughan, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security).
189

27

 Mexico border. Specifically, the National Guard has assisted CBP’s OAM and Border Patrol to
expand their aerial capabilities by providing military electronic sensor systems that far exceed
CBP’s ground-based and mobile systems.199 CBP has been flying the Predator B UAS with
DOD’s VADER at the southwest border.200 Moreover, the tactical Aerostats and TARS
mentioned above come from DOD. Currently, DHS is in receiving ownership of over 3,900
items of excess DOD technology, including Marcbot, which are robots used in San Diego for
tunnel detection, and Advanced Radar Surveillance Systems (ARSS). 201
Finally, when examining U.S. border technology, it is important to consider that smugglers are
also leveraging the latest technology. Recently, a drone transporting more than six pounds of
methamphetamine crashed in the San Diego sector.202 Arizona and San Diego are seeing an
increasing use of “short landers” and “Ultralight Aircraft” (ULAs) described as “flying
lawnmowers,” used to fly over fences and drop illegal drugs.203 Alarmingly, cartels have begun
to use minors to fly ULAs due to their light weight and the unlikelihood of their prosecution.204
Experiences at the Border
Border Patrol
DHS has devoted a growing number of resources to the southwest border, including increasing
the number of Border Patrol agents (those that operate between ports of entry) from 8,617 in
2000 to 18,127 in 2014205 and Office of Field Operations (OFO) officers (those that operate at
ports of entry) from 4,667 in 2003 to 6,323 in 2015.206
In 2011, former DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano said that “the border is better now than it has
ever been.”207 Similarly, DHS Secretary Johnson points to a declining number of apprehensions
along the southwest border as a key indicator of border security.208 For example, DHS
apprehensions totaled 479,000 for FY2014, down from approximately 1.6 million apprehensions
199

Homeland Threats and Agency Reponses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs, 112th Cong., (2012) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
200
Id.
201
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority
Staff).
202
Laura McVicker, Drone Carrying Meth Crashed Near San Ysidro Port of Entry, NBC SAN DIEGO (Jan. 22,
2015), http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/Drone-Carrying-Meth-Crashes-Near-San-Ysidro-Port-of-Entry289353601.html.
203
ARIZONA HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, THREAT ASSESSMENT 2014 62 (2014).
204
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 2015).
205
Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, Border Security in the 21st Century, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/10/09/remarks-secretary-homeland-securityjeh-johnson-border-security-21st-century.
206
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 2015).
207
Jennifer Epstein, Janet Napolitano: Border security better than ever, POLITICO (Mar. 25, 2011),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/51925.html.
208
Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, Border Security in the 21st Century, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/10/09/remarks-secretary-homeland-securityjeh-johnson-border-security-21st-century.

28

 in FY2000.209 However, as a report issued by Dr. Coburn emphasizes, “[t]he apprehensions
figure for FY2014 follows a three-year trend of steady increases in the number of apprehensions
since FY2011, when DHS data shows that Southern border apprehensions hit a low of
327,000.”210 Moreover, experts point out that even if apprehensions have decreased, there is
limited information of the role immigration enforcement has played in this decline.211
Apprehension rates might also be down due to a lack of effectiveness on the southwest border.
According to independent experts, apprehension rates along our southwest border are 40 to 55
percent.212 Most Border Patrol agents and local law enforcement estimated interdiction rates in
the RGV to be 30 to 40 percent.213 In the Tucson sector, Border Patrol agents predicted they
caught one-in-three in areas where there was a fence and one-in-20 where no fence was present,
which is often in the remote mountainous areas.214
Finally, it is unclear as to the impact that misreported apprehension data has had on the final
numbers.215 Border Patrol agents claim that the difference in their experiences and those
reported by DHS are due to manipulation of these statistics.216 Specifically, a Border Patrol
agent testified to the Committee that agents faced retribution for reporting more than 20
footprints—a key indicator of “got-aways.”217
Local Law Enforcement
While Border Patrol agents provide a key level of security at our border, their efforts are often
buttressed by local law enforcement. The relationship and connectivity between local law
enforcement, landowners, and Border Patrol is vital and cannot be overstated.
Operation Stonegarden, a grant program operated through the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), provides funding to state and local governments to increase operational
capacity at the U.S. border.218 While those who use the program have emphasized its success, it
209

Id. slide 26
Senator Tom Coburn, A Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Missions and Performance (Jan.
2015).
211
Bryan Roberts, Edward Alden, John Whitley, Managing Illegal Immigration to the United States: How Effective
is Enforcement?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 2 (2013) (“The Obama administration has not offered, and
Congress has failed to insist on, any accountability for the effectiveness of these huge enforcement expenditures.”).
212
Id. at 3.
213
Securing the Southwest Border: Perspectives from Beyond the Beltway: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Chris Cabrera, Border Patrol Agent,
Rio Grande Valley Sector, U.S. Customs and Border Protection).
214
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Tucson, Arizona Sector (Feb. 2015).
215
According to the Border Patrol Council, Border Patrol Agents are required to submit apprehension numbers to
supervisors. Moreover, staff has been told that agents are instructed to count illegal crossers not caught by border
patrol agents as “pending law enforcement resolution” rather than as a “got away.”
216
Securing the Southwest Border: Perspectives from Beyond the Beltway: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Chris Cabrera, National Border
Patrol Council).
217
Id.
218
HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS, OPERATION STONEGARDEN,
http://www.homelandsecuritygrants.info/GrantDetails.aspx?gid=21875.
210

29

 is important to ensure that the program is being utilized effectively to achieve its intended and
important goals. Moreover, illegal activity at the southwest border stretches beyond the border
communities themselves. Brooks County, Texas, which operates a checkpoint more than 70
miles from the border, reported 443 deaths related to illegal immigrants in the past six years.219
States have also deployed significant resources to increase manpower at U.S. borders. 220 For
example, former Texas governor Rick Perry’s Operation Strong Safety deployed the Texas
Department of Public Safety to the border, which, according to a recent report, was effective.221
It is also important to emphasize the other resource impacts our insecure border has on local
communities. When local law enforcement and Border Patrol agents catch more people, jails fill
up. Prosecutors refuse to prosecute interdictions below a certain drug possession level due to
heavy demands on resources. Captured illegal crossers need to be housed and provided medical
care, which is also fiscally impactful on local budgets. When considering new federal border
security measures, more boots on the ground is an important component, but not a solution to be
considered in isolation.
Local Landowners
Some landowners experience significant damages to their property due to illegal crossers. Their
fences have been battered, either from pedestrian illegal crossers or by stolen vehicles.
Landowners are responsible for repair costs, some totaling up to $100,000 a year. 222
Landowners also face threats of break-ins and violence. Firearms, ammunition, cash, jewelry,
and small electronics have all been reported stolen. One Arizona sheriff told the Committee
about a rancher who lives in his jurisdiction that has had his home broken into four or five
times.223 That same rancher has also encountered scouts for the cartel sitting on his property,
adding even more fear to his situation.224 According to several witnesses at a Committee
hearing, scouts face little to no fear of retribution for their presence or assistance to the cartels.225
219

Securing the Border: Assessing the Impact of Transnational Crime: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Benny Martinez, Chief Deputy Sheriff, Brooks
County, Texas); see also Texas’ Brooks County is ‘Death Valley’ for Migrants, NBC NEWS (July 9, 2014),
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/texas-brooks-county-death-valley-migrants-n152121.
220
See generally Securing the Border: Assessing the Impact of Transnational Crime: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).
221
TEXAS DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, OPERATION STRONG SAFETY REPORT TO THE 84TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE AND
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 2 (2015) (Unclassified Version).
222
Statement by Fred Cappadona, Double C Cattle Co., South Texans’ Property Rights Association Roundtable,
during Senators’ Johnson, Carper, and Sasse CODEL to the Texas Rio Grande Valley Sector (Feb. 2015).
223
Securing the Southwest Border: Perspectives from Beyond the Beltway: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Mark Dannels, Sheriff, Cochise
County, Arizona).
224
Id.
225
See Securing the Border: Assessing the Impact of Transnational Crime: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (Elizabeth Kempshall, Executive Director, Arizona
HIDTA stated, “it has been a challenge for us to prosecute the scouts” due to the lack of laws specific to them, while
Benny Martinez, Chief Deputy Sheriff of Brooks County, Texas confirmed “a good percentage of [scouts] walk.”).

30

 Cartels have also threatened violence against landowners for contacting the Border Patrol. For
example, in 2010, Robert Krentz, a prominent rancher in Cochise County, Arizona, was killed by
an illegal crosser on his property. 226
Committee witnesses who live on the border have said that an important metric to determine
whether our border is secure is not quantitative, but rather qualitative: the border is secure when
landowners on the border have a reasonable expectation that they can leave their homes and
ranches and their property will not be battered or vandalized.227
Transnational Crime at the Southwest Border
Cartels
Cartels have evolved from smaller, primarily family run smuggling groups to multinational
entities.228 The cartels are often equipped with weapons, communications and surveillance
equipment, and other paramilitary capabilities that compete with U.S. law enforcement.229 To
protect their routes, cartels invest heavily in enforcement.230 According to a Committee witness,
scouts wear “camouflage uniforms with padded boots for non-tracker, with $2,500 solarpowered, encrypted satellite phones, with AK-47s.”231
According to a Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) report, “cartels have also been
effective in corrupting U.S. law enforcement officials at all levels, which not only facilitates
organized crime, but undermines the public trust in law enforcement.”232 Specifically, officials
at DHS are very aware of attempts by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) “to infiltrate the
CBP workforce through conspired hiring operations and aggressive targeting” of agents.233
According to the Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA):

226

Randal Archibold, Ranchers Alarmed by Killing near Border, NY TIMES (Apr. 4, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/05/us/05arizona.html.
227
Securing the Southwest Border: Perspectives from Beyond the Beltway: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Mark Dannels, Sheriff, Cochise
County, Arizona).
228
Response to Questions for the Record from Shawn Moran, Deferred Action on Immigration: Implications and
Unanswered Questions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong.
(2015).
229
Diane Washington Valdez, Report: Mexican Drug Cartels Adopting Military Tactics, EL PASO TIMES (Aug. 7,
2011), http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci_18632455.
230
Shannon K. O’Neil, Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, The United States, and the Road Ahead 127 (Oxford
University Press 2013).
231
Securing the Border: Assessing the Impact of Transnational Crime: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (RET.),
Former Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy).
232
TEXAS DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, OPERATION STRONG SAFETY REPORT TO THE 84TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE AND
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 2 (2015) (Unclassified Version).
233
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-59, BORDER SECURITY: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO
STRENGTHEN CBP EFFORTS TO MITIGATE RISK OF EMPLOYEE CORRUPTION AND MISCONDUCT 2 (2012).

31

 “The Sinaloa Cartel is considered the most influential and strongest cartel in Mexico, as it
maintains an extensive corruption network at the local, state, and Federal level, giving it
more political and judicial cover to protect and secure drug trafficking activities.
Historically, Sinaloa Cartel operatives maintained a greater ability to adapt to law
enforcement challenges and foresee potential changes in the drug market more effectively
than other Mexican cartels.”234
From FY2005 through FY2012 GAO found tha, “144 current or former CBP employees were
arrested or indicted for corruption,” representing “less than 1 percent of the entire CBP
workforce per fiscal year.”235 In 2014, Secretary Johnson “delegated to CBP the authority to
investigate its employees for alleged criminal misconduct.”236 On June 29, 2015, the Homeland
Security Advisory Council issued an interim report that found that corruption among Border
Patrol agents and officers “may be increasing” and that “arrests for corruption of CBP personnel
far exceed, on a per capita basis, such arrests at other federal law enforcement agencies.”237
Local law enforcement officials and public officials have also been found guilty of taking bribes
from drug traffickers.238 And, corruption is not limited to the U.S. Recently, 14 Mexican
“Federales” were arrested for running a kidnapping operation near the Texas border that targeted
Mexican businessmen.239
Drug Smuggling
Cartels smuggle illicit drugs into the U.S., and rely on U.S.-based gangs to distribute the drugs
throughout the U.S.240 More than 90 percent of all cocaine entering the country transits the
Mexican-Central American corridor from countries further south.241 “Mexico remains the
primary foreign source of marijuana and methamphetamine destined for U.S. markets and is also

234

ARIZONA HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, THREAT ASSESSMENT 2015, 11 (2015); see also DEA Maps
Show Kingpin ‘El Chapo’ Guzman’s Cartel Controls Nearly the Entire U.S. Drug Market, FORBES (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/doliaestevez/2015/11/10/dea-maps-show-kingpin-el-chapo-guzmans-cartel-controlsnearly-the-entire-u-s-drug-market/.
235
Id. at 8.
236
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, CBP BORDER SECURITY REPORT
FISCAL YEAR 2014 (2014).
237
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, INTERIM REPORT OF THE CBP INTEGRITY ADVISORY PANEL 6 (2015).
238
Shannon K. O’Neil, Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, The United States, and the Road Ahead 131 (Oxford
University Press 2013).
239
Ildefonso Ortiz, 14 Mexican Federales Arrested for Running Kidnapping Crew Near Texas Border, BREITBART
(Mar. 7, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/texas/2015/03/07/14-mexican-cops-arrested-for-running-kidnapping-crewnear-texas-border/.
240
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL SOUTHWEST
BORDER COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGY 34 (2013); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE NAT’L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER,
NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 11 (2011).
241
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL SOUTHWEST
BORDER COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGY 1 (2013).

32

 a source and transit country for heroin.”242 Observations from Border Patrol agents suggest there
has also been a recent rise in cocaine, meth, and heroin deriving directly from Mexico.243
Mexican DTOs are known to use minors as young as 12 years old to smuggle drugs between and
through POEs.244 In FY2014, Arizona apprehended 39 minors as pedestrians “with illicit drugs
taped to their bodies, concealed within clothing, or in bags.”245 DTOs also recruit high school
and middle school students—the majority of which are U.S. citizens—believing students “are
less likely to be identified by law enforcement” and if identified will not be prosecuted.246
Mexican DTOs have become experts at evading the Border Patrol. According to General
McCaffrey, former Director of the White House’s Office of National Drug Control Policy, the
Border Patrol seizes just 5 to 10 percent of the illegal drugs smuggled across the border.247 The
decreasing cost of drugs in the U.S., particularly heroin, illustrates the point.
Figure 10

242

Id.
While refusing to draw a direct inference, Border Patrol agents pointed out that since states have begun to
legalize marijuana, drugs smuggled into this U.S. have shifted being predominately marijuana to harder drugs.
244
See Evelio Contreras, Inside the Life of a Drug-Trafficking Teen, CNN (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/12/us/inside-the-life-of-a-drug-trafficking-teen/index.html?eref=rss_latest
(documenting how the Los Zetas gang forced a 12-year-old illegal immigrant living on the Texas side of the border
to smuggle drugs for them).
245
ARIZONA HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, THREAT ASSESSMENT 2015 56 (2014).
246
Id.; see also Lourdes Medrano, Along Key Stretch of US-Mexico Border More Kids Running Drugs, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (July 16, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2013/0716/Along-keystretch-of-US-Mexico-border-more-kids-running-drugs; Securing the Southwest Border: Perspectives from Beyond
the Beltway: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).
247
Securing the Border: Assessing the Impact of Transnational Crime: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (RET.),
Former Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy).
243

33

 Between the POEs, smuggling groups use “an extensive system of scouts armed with radios,
solar-powered radio repeaters, cellular telephones, and weapons situated on high points along
drug trafficking routes.”248 This type of structure provides smugglers with a high level of
situational awareness of law enforcement presence on both sides of the border.
At the POEs, cartels have begun smuggling drugs in smaller packages and using deep
concealment to increase their likelihood of success. Officers at the Otay Mesa POE in the San
Diego sector have found drugs hidden in batteries, gas tanks, jalapeno jars, and fire
extinguishers.249 Media reports indicate cartels have concealed drugs in “frozen sharks,
sprinkled on donuts, and crammed into cucumbers.”250
Human Smuggling and Trafficking
To enter the U.S., more than 90 percent of immigrants hire coyotes that control the routes from
Mexico to the U.S. Coyotes move illegal immigrants across the border and into the interior of
the U.S. through a series of stash houses.251 Coyotes often use energy drinks to keep people
awake as they are smuggled across the border and frequently leave behind or “sacrifice” those
incapable of keeping pace.252 Moreover, at a Committee Hearing a Border Patrol agent testified
that coyotes use migrants as a diversion in order to sneak higher value drugs across the border.253
For example, rather than directing unaccompanied children and families to bridges and ports of
entry along the Rio Grande where they could immediately and safely seek asylum, coyotes
forced them to take the more dangerous route across the river, tying up Border Patrol agents and
leaving the border unguarded.254
Sex trafficking organizations also use coyotes to transport victims across the border en route to
destinations throughout the U.S.255 According to the Texas DPS report, “[c]artels, gangs, and
international sex trafficking organizations have worked closely together for many years now,
uncharacteristically crossing traditional rivalries in order to traffic drugs and people for large
profits.”256

248

Id. (statement of Elizabeth Kempshall, Executive Director, Arizona Region of the Southwest Border, High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, Office of National Drug Control Policy).
249
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 2015).
250
See Christopher Woody, ’El Chapo’ Guzman’s Role in the Global Cocaine Trade is Becoming Clearer,
MCPHERSON SENTINEL (Aug. 16, 2015),
http://www.mcphersonsentinel.com/article/ZZ/20150816/BUSINESS/308169989/-1/books/?Start=1.
251
TEXAS DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, OPERATION STRONG SAFETY REPORT TO THE 84TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE AND
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 29 (2015) (Unclassified Version).
252
Majority Staff observations during Senators’ Johnson, Carper, and Sasse CODEL to the Texas Rio Grande Valley
Sector (Feb. 2015).
253
Ongoing Migration from Central America: An Examination of FY2015 Apprehensions: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Chris Cabrera, National
Border Patrol Council).
254
Id.
255
TEXAS DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, OPERATION STRONG SAFETY REPORT TO THE 84TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE AND
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 34 (2015) (Unclassified Version).
256
Id.

34

 Gangs, Criminal Aliens, and Special Interest Aliens
Violent transnational gangs such as MS-13 and Los Zetas have a stronghold in border states such
as Texas, while the Hells Angel Motorcycle Club (HAMC) controls Arizona.257 These gangs
“maintain a buyer and seller relationship with Mexican DTOs.”258
Moreover, the number of criminal aliens coming into the U.S. has increased. The Border Patrol
Council estimates that the number of individuals who have committed crimes in the U.S., served
time in a jail here, and have been deported constitute 10 to 20 percent of those apprehended.259
As an example, on March 6, 2015, Border Patrol agents in the Laredo sector arrested an illegal
immigrant from Mexico convicted of murder in 1992 in Jacksonville, Florida.260 “The subject
was sentenced to 20 years and was released in 2002, after serving 10 years.”261 Different reports
indicates there are somewhere between 200-300 sanctuary jurisdictions in this country in which
local governments refuse to assist in the enforcement of our immigration laws. The recent
shooting of a young woman in San Francisco, California by a criminal alien that had been
deported five times with seven prior felony convictions has brought renewed attention to
criminals entering and remaining in the U.S., largely as a result of sanctuary policies.262
Finally, legitimate concerns remain that terrorists could exploit our country’s southwest border to
enter the U.S. undetected.263 While the likelihood of a terrorist group using the southwest border
as an entry point to complete a terrorist attack is an area of debate, the potential for exploitation
should be taken seriously given that there was a 70 percent increase from FY2013 to FY2014 in
OTMs crossing the border.264 This included individuals from Iraq, Syria, and Egypt.265
According to Border Patrol agents on the ground, 51 percent of all Border Patrol apprehensions
are currently OTMs.

257

Id. at 1; ARIZONA HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, THREAT ASSESSMENT 2014 22 (2014) (HAMC is
known to be involved in murder, drug trafficking, prostitution, weapons trafficking, extortion, arson, and vehicletheft offenses).
258
Id. at 24; FBI NATIONAL GANG INTELLIGENCE CENTER, 2011 NATIONAL GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT; DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, MEXICO: CROSS-BORDER GANGS AND THEIR MEXICAN DRUG CARTEL AFFILIATIONS (2011).
259
Response to Questions for the Record from Shawn Moran, Vice President, National Border Patrol Council,
Deferred Action on Immigration: Implications and Unanswered Questions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (“These are not economic immigrants in search of
a better life. These are hardened criminals who are facing real jail time.”).
260
Laredo Sector Border Patrol Agents Arrest an Undocumented Immigrant from Mexico Convicted of Murder,
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/201503-06-000000/laredo-sector-border-patrol-agents-arrest.
261
Id.
262
Michelle Moons, Breaking: Pier 14 Murder Suspect Had Been Deported 5 Times With 7 Felonies, BREITBART
(July 3, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/texas/2015/07/03/breaking-pier-14-murder-suspect-had-been-deported-5times-with-7-felonies/.
263
TEXAS DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, OPERATION STRONG SAFETY REPORT TO THE 84TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE AND
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 1 (2015) (Unclassified Version).
264
Brandon Darby, Leaked CBP Report Shows Entire World Exploiting Open US Border, BREITBART (Aug. 3,
2014), http://www.breitbart.com/texas/2014/08/03/leaked-cbp-report-shows-entire-world-exploiting-open-usborder/.
265
Id.

35

 Part II: The U.S. – Canada Border
The United States and Canada share the longest common land border in the world.266 The
binational border is 5,525 miles long.267 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the continental
border along the 49th parallel from Washington State to Maine is almost 4,000 miles.268
Each day, more than 350,000 people and $2 billion in trade cross the U.S.-Canada border.269
Canada is the United States’ largest trading partner, with over 120 operating POEs along the
U.S.-Canada border.270 The busiest ports are located in Detroit, Michigan; Buffalo, New York;
and Blaine, Washington.271 Additionally, CBP has nine pre-clearance locations at Canadian
airports to assist in processing the estimated 750 daily commercial flights to the U.S., as well as
pre-inspection locations at Canadian rail stations.272
The Border Patrol divides the northern border into eight sectors: Blaine, Spokane, Havre, Grand
Forks, Detroit, Buffalo, Swanton, and Houlton. Each sector’s terrain is different and the
challenges are evolving. For example, in the Great Lakes region, TCOs use small vessels during
the summer and snowmobiles during the winter to transport illicit contraband.273 Similarly, in
Washington State and Maine, dense forests and open waters provide criminals cover, making it
difficult for authorities to detect cross-border illegal activity. 274 CBP deploys different
technologies such as UAS, ground and water sensors, “buckeyes”275 and trail cameras with live
feeds to maintain domain awareness in areas that are difficult to patrol.276
266

U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NORTHERN BORDER STRATEGY 4 (2012).
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 225 ( 2012) (including the
Alaska-British Columbia-Yukon Territory portion).
268
Id.
269
Protecting our Northern Border: Enhancing Collaboration and Building Local Partnerships: Hearing Before the
S. SubComm. on the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Federal Programs and the Federal Workforce of the Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Christopher Richards, Havre Sector
Chief Patrol Agent, U.S. Border Patrol); Fact Sheet: Beyond the Border Facilitating Travel at the United StatesCanada Border, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/12/06/factsheet-beyond-border-facilitating-travel-united-states-canada-border.
270
Id.
271
Majority Staff observations during a staff briefing on the northern border presented by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (Apr. 2015).
272
Protecting our Northern Border: Enhancing Collaboration and Building Local Partnerships: Hearing Before the
S. SubComm. on the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Federal Programs and the Federal Workforce of the Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Christopher Richards, Havre Sector
Chief Patrol Agent, U.S. Border Patrol); Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine,
Washington Sector (Aug. 2015). For a discussion on preclearance operations, see Part IV.
273
Id.
274
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 2015).
275
Buckeyes are off the shelf technology designed for hunters that consist of portable cameras with motion sensors
that, when triggered, connect to a cell tower and send images to the agent’s phone, revealing what triggered the
camera. This saves significant resources, as agents are prevented from checking on a sensor that was triggered by
animals or other non-threat sources.
276
Protecting our Northern Border: Enhancing Collaboration and Building Local Partnerships: Hearing Before the
S. SubComm. on the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Federal Programs and the Federal Workforce of the Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Christopher Richards, Havre Sector
Chief Patrol Agent, U.S. Border Patrol).
267

36

 Figure 11: Eight Sectors of the U.S.-Canada Border

Image provided by DHS.

There is currently no fencing on the northern border. Instead, the demarcation line between the
two countries is often marked by a ditch, approximately six inches deep.277
Figure 12: The U.S.-Canada Border Demarcation in Blaine, Washington

Image taken during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 2015)

There are currently 2,093 Border Patrol agents and 3,600 Office of Field Operations officers
stationed on the northern border.278 DHS believes that current staffing numbers are sufficient to
manage and address northern security threats, because illegal crossing apprehensions and drug
smuggling volumes at the northern border are much lower than at the U.S.-Mexico border.279
Additionally, agents have more time and resources to target each threat, as well as better
information sharing with Canada.280
While both the northern and southwest borders are highly active, crossing volumes are different.
For example, in FY2014, northern border officers apprehended 3,338 individuals for attempting
to enter the U.S. illegally, while agents patrolling the southwest border reported a total of
479,371 apprehensions.281
277

Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 2015).
Data provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (April 8, 2015) (as a comparison,
there are 2,500 Border Patrol agents stationed in the San Diego sector alone).
279
Id.
280
Id.
281
U.S. BORDER PATROL, STATS AND SUMMARIES, http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/mediaresources/stats?title=sector+profile. The Majority Staff notes that DHS has refused to release figures for FY2015.
278

37

 Table 1. Comparison of Apprehensions at U.S. Borders FY2011-FY2014282
Sector
FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014
6,123
4,210
3,230
3,338
Northern Border Total
Southwest Border Total 327,577 356,873 414,397 479,371
Also in FY2014, the U.S.-Canada border recorded a slightly greater volume of trucks and trains,
while the southwest border processed more buses, personal vehicles, and pedestrian crossings. 283
Table 2. Recorded Crossing at Both U.S. Borders in FY2014 284
Border POEs
Trucks
Trains
Buses
Personal Vehicles Pedestrians
5,802,211 28,643
103,749
31,979,736
423,605
Northern
5,414,568 10,414
213,780
69,623,693
41,223,292
Southwest
U.S. – Canada Joint Operations
Currently, to secure, monitor, and manage the northern border, the United States and Canada
coordinate efforts through the Beyond the Border Initiative (BTB). 285 The key priorities of BTB
are: 1) identifying and addressing threats before they reach the U.S.-Canada border; 2)
facilitating legitimate trade; 3) integrating cross-border law enforcement efforts; and 4)
coordinating approaches to critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. 286 This approach enhances
law enforcement cooperation, provides the framework to address security gaps, and ensures that
lawful trade and travel are not significantly affected by increased security measures. 287 BTB
enables DHS to improve the allocation of resources, because operation chiefs coordinate with
their Canadian counterparts to avoid duplicating patrol and surveillance efforts. 288
Since 2011, the BTB Initiative has institutionalized several information and intelligence sharing
mechanisms. DHS states that these air, land, and maritime mobile partnerships provide a greater
penetration of intelligence, affording U.S. and Canadian law enforcement agencies an advantage
point to disrupt terrorist and transnational criminal activity before it reaches the U.S.-Canada
border.289
Since 1997, intelligence-driven law enforcement teams have been responsible for securing the
northern border.290 Currently, there are 24 Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET)
282

Id.
BUREAU OF TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS, BORDER CROSSING/ENTRY DATA: QUERY DETAILED STATISTICS
(2014), http://transborder.bts.gov/programs/international/transborder/TBDR_BC/TBDR_BCQ.html.
284
Id.
285
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FACT SHEET: BEYOND THE BORDER UNITED STATES-CANADA LAW
ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION (2011).
286
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, BEYOND THE BORDER IMPLEMENTATION REPORT 4 (2013).
287
Observations presented at Canada Institute, Wilson Center, Beyond the Border Implementation Report Update,
(2014), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/beyond-the-border-implementation-report-update.
288
Data provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (April 8, 2015).
289
Id.
290
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG POLICY CONTROL, NATIONAL NORTHERN
BORDER COUNTERNARCOTICS S TRATEGY 12 (2014).
283

38

 locations, with the majority monitoring the Great Lakes region, including four that are operated
by American and Canadian personnel.291 The five law enforcement agencies contributing to
IBETs efforts are: 1) CBP; 2) ICE; 3) U.S. Coast Guard; 4) the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP); and 5) the Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA).292
In addition, since 2005, Border Enforcement Security Taskforces (BESTs) have been
investigating criminal activity at, near, and across the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders, as
well as maritime seaport locations.293 At a Committee hearing a DHS official testified that
“[c]urrently, ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) has 37 BEST units located across 16
states and Puerto Rico,” four on the northern border, 14 on the southwest border, and 19
maritime seaport locations.294 According to DHS, these ICE-led operations are successful
because they leverage the efforts and resources of more than 150 federal, state, local, tribal, and
international law enforcement agencies.295 Specifically, BESTs have been recognized for
infiltrating and dismantling TCOs operating in vulnerable areas of upstate New York. 296
While DHS states that inter-agency partnerships are critical to secure the northern border, a 2011
GAO report found that the Department needs to increase oversight to ensure its components are
coordinating and sharing information.297 For example, northern border state and local law
enforcement officials, as well as their Canadian counterparts, complained that Border Patrol, ICE
the U.S. Forest Service, and the DEA do not always share information on operations, which
leads to duplication and inconsistent compliance with the numerous cross-border agreements to
confront threats.298
Threats to the Northern Border
Terrorism
In 2011, then CBP Commissioner Alan Bersin, told the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding
terrorist threats, “[i]t’s commonly accepted that the more significant threat comes from the U.S.Canada border.”299 More recently, witnesses before HSGAC echoed Bersin’s testimony, stating
291

U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, BEYOND THE BORDER: A SHARED VISION FOR PERIMETER SECURITY AND
ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS (2015), http://www.dhs.gov/beyond-border.
292
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NORTHERN BORDER STRATEGY 10 (2012).
293
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FACT SHEET: BEYOND THE BORDER UNITED STATES-CANADA LAW
ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION (2011).
294
See Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Maritime Border: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Peter Edge, Executive
Associate Director, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement).
295
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG POLICY CONTROL, NATIONAL NORTHERN
BORDER COUNTERNARCOTICS S TRATEGY 11 (2014).
296
Id. at 30.
297
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-508T, BORDER SECURITY: DHS PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN
SECURING THE U.S. SOUTHWEST AND NORTHERN BORDERS 14 (2011).
298
Id. at 15.
299
Improving Security and Facilitating Commerce at America's Northern border and Ports of Entry: Hearing
Before the S. Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and Border Security of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. (2011) (statement of Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection).

39

 that a terrorist trying to cross the border into the U.S. would be able to enter the country much
more easily from the north than from the south.300
In 1997, Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer entered the U.S. near the Blaine, Washington POE.301 After
being returned three times, the FBI eventually detained him during a counter-terrorism raid in
Brooklyn, New York, after being tipped off that Mezer planned to detonate a bomb in a New
York City subway station.302 Similarly, in 1999, Ahmed Ressam, a.k.a. the millennium bomber,
was stopped at Port Angeles, Washington (also located in the Blaine sector) with components
used to produce a bomb.303 After admitting that he was planning to bomb the Los Angeles
International Airport, he was sentenced to 37 years in prison for terrorist activity. 304 In FY2014,
the Blaine sector alone apprehended migrants from 32 different countries. 305
Recently, Canada has been struggling to confront radicalization and homegrown terrorism.306
On February 3, 2015 the RCMP charged three men for recruiting and facilitating the terrorist
activity of the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL). 307 One is in custody, while the other two were
charged in absentia, as authorities presume that they have left for Syria.308 In addition, Quebec
and Ontario have been reporting an exodus of young men and women heading to Syria and Iraq
to fight for ISIL.309 For example, in February, responding to Islamic extremism propaganda,
four young men and two female teenagers left Montreal.310 Police and community leaders are
now scrambling to prevent further radicalization and recruitment.311 In March, CBSA arrested a
man in Toronto for plotting to bomb the U.S. Consulate and several other buildings in the
Toronto financial district.312
300

Securing the Border: Assessing the Impact of Transnational Crime: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (RET.),
Former Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy); id (statement of John P. Torres, Former Acting Director,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t).
301
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GAZI IBRAHIM ABU MEZER, http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/9803/brbrp2.htm.
302
Gilbert M. Gaul & Mary Pat Flaherty, Potential Bomber Shows Resolve in Trips to U.S., WASH. POST (Oct. 7,
2001), http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/10/07/potential-bomber-shows-resolve-in-trips-tous/5c43eb16-673d-4135-9d08-7baf080bb628/.
303
FBI, MILLENNIUM PLOT/AHMED RESSAM, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/millennium-plotahmed-ressam.
304
Id.
305
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 2015).
306
Garrett Graff, Fear Canada: The Real Terrorist Next Door, POLITICO MAGAZINE (Oct. 16, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/fear-canada-not-mexico-111919.html#.VSYmIpN0eYM.
307
See Stewart Bell, Undercover Informant Infiltrated a Suspected ISIS Recruiting Network in Ottawa, Leading to
Arrest, NATIONAL POST (Feb. 4, 2015), http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/undercover-rcmp-informantinfiltrated-a-suspected-isis-recruiting-network-in-ottawa-leading-to-arrest.
308
Id. Maguire is reported to have died fighting in Syrian in January, 2015.
309
Allan Woods, Quebec Stunned by Exodus of Four Young Men, Two Women to Join Islamic State, THE STAR
CANADA (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/02/27/quebec-stunned-by-exodus-of-fouryoung-men-two-women-to-join-islamic-state.html.
310
Id.
311
Id.
312
Steward Bell, ISIS Sympathizer Arrested After Plotting to Bomb U.S. Consulate in Toronto: CBSA, NAT’L POST
(Mar. 11, 2015), http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/isis-sympathizer-arrested-after-plotting-to-bomb-u-sconsulate-in-toronto-cbsa.

40

 Historically, security observers have argued that Canada represents a substantial vulnerability,
because it provides immigrant visas to individuals who pose a significant threat. 313 Witnesses
testified before the Committee that if someone gets into Canada, they will most likely be able to
enter the U.S.314 However, the Canadian government has changed its approach to national and
border security after two recent acts of homegrown terrorism. The wake-up call came from both
the 2013 detention of two men for conspiring to derail a VA Rail Canada train en route to New
York City, and the 2014 Parliament shooting where a military guard was killed during an
attack.315
Responding to this new reality, in January 2015 Prime Minister Harper introduced a new AntiTerrorism Act to broaden the powers of the intelligence and law enforcement officers, which was
signed into law on June 18, 2015.316 Essentially, Bill C-51 1) criminalizes publishing terrorist
propaganda; 2) creates a no-fly list of suspected terrorists; and 3) allows intelligence and law
enforcement agencies to share information on known or suspected terrorists with foreign
counterparts.317 DHS believes this law will improve cross-border counterterrorism efforts by
legalizing the implementation of a no-fly list that limits known and suspected terrorists’ access to
North America and enabling Canadian intelligence units to dismantle terrorist cells operating
mostly in Ontario and Quebec.318 To this end, the Canadian government is revoking the
passports of approximately 130 citizens who have joined violent terrorist groups in Syria and
Iraq, and is gathering evidence to prosecute more than 80 recently radicalized citizens and
permanent residents who have returned to Canada after engaging in terrorist-related activities
overseas.319
The Canadian government also plans to implement a screening system to deny those with a
criminal background or on a terrorist watchlist from entering Canada.320 According to DHS, by
the end of 2015 or early 2016, Canada will be prepared to fully implement its Electronic Travel
Authorization (eTA), which will require all visitors, except Americans, to submit their
biographic information before they board a Canada-bound airplane.321 Once implemented, all
travelers will be screened against Canadian and American watchlists.322

313

THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 81 (2004).
Securing the Border: Assessing the Impact of Transnational Crime: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).
315
Muslim Leader: Canada Terror Attack a ‘Wake-Up Call’, CBN NEWS (Oct. 29, 2014),
http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2014/October/Muslim-Leader-Speaks-Out-against-Canada-Attacks/.
316
PM Announces Anti-Terrorism Measures to Protect Canadians, OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER (Jan. 30, 2015),
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2015/01/30/pm-announces-anti-terrorism-measures-protect-canadians; PARLIAMENT OF
CANADA, ANTI-TERRORISM ACT 2015,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/legisinfo/BillDetails.aspx?billId=6842344&Language=E&Mode=1.
317
Id.
318
Data provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (April 8, 2015).
319
Doug Mataconis, The Attack on Canada’s Parliament and the ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorist, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/Politics-Voices/2014/1023/The-attack-onCanada-s-Parliament-and-the-lone-wolf-terrorist.
320
DEP’T OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, ELECTRONIC TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION (ETA) (2012).
321
Data provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (April 8, 2015).
322
Id.
314

41

 eTA efforts will complement the current bi-national effort to deny a visa or asylum status to
criminals and known or suspected terrorists. Since 2014, Canadian immigration officials have
been sharing biographic and biometric information on visa applicants with DHS and the State
Department.323 Previously, Canadian immigration officers would issue visas to individuals from
a country of interest without consulting American law enforcement and intelligence databases. 324
This initiative will reduce visa fraud and enable Canada to deny asylum or an immigrant visa to
individuals who could pose a threat.325
The nexus between known or suspected terrorists in eastern Canada and the northern parts of the
U.S. represent a significant national security threat.326 Communities in Minnesota and New
York, which are adjacent to Ontario and Quebec, have recently experienced apprehensions of
individuals on terrorist charges. For example, on November 26, 2014, two men in Minneapolis,
Minnesota were charged with recruiting and conspiring to provide support to ISIL. 327 Similarly,
on September 17, 2014, a man in Rochester, New York was arrested on similar charges after the
FBI provided evidence showing that he attempted to recruit fighters and funds for ISIL. 328
Recently, the U.S. and Canada, to prevent terrorist and criminal travel, agreed to share more
information on travelers crossing the northern border through land POEs.329 Under the border
data exchange program, CBP and CBSA share each traveler’s biographic data.330 Essentially, by
compiling this information, an entry into Canada constitutes an exit from the U.S. Currently,
border officials are collecting information on third country nationals, but the scope of the
program will be extended to include American and Canadian citizens by the end of 2015. 331
Canada will implement a similar program at air POEs, by requiring airlines to present a manifest
of all passengers departing the country. 332

323

DEP’T OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, CANADA/U.S. INFORMATION SHARING TREATY SUMMARY,
(2013).
324
Id.
325
Id.
326
Garrett Graff, Fear Canada: The Real Terrorist Next Door, POLITICO MAGAZINE (Oct. 16, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/fear-canada-not-mexico-111919.html#.VSYmIpN0eYM.
327
Paul McEnroe, 2 Minneapolis Men Charged with Attempting to Aid Terrorists, STAR TRIBUTE (Nov. 26, 2014),
http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis/283857371.html.
328
Pierre Thomas & Mike Levine, New York Man Charged with Trying to Recruit ISIS Fighters in US, ABC NEWS
(Sept. 16, 2014) http://abcnews.go.com/US/york-man-charged-recruit-isis-fighters-us/story?id=25552426.
329
Data provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (April 8, 2015).
330
Canada-U.S. Border Program Could Identify El Cheats, Terrorist, CBC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2014),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-u-s-border-program-could-identify-ei-cheats-terrorists-1.2512972.
331
Jim Bronskill, Many Visitors to Canada Will Pay $7 Fee Beginning Next Year Under Security Plan, CTV NEWS
(June 20, 2014), http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/many-visitors-to-canada-will-pay-7-fee-beginning-next-year-undersecurity-plan-1.1879146.
332
Canada-U.S. Border Program Could Identify El Cheats, Terrorist, CBC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2014),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-u-s-border-program-could-identify-ei-cheats-terrorists-1.2512972.

42

 Drug Smuggling
While Canada does not face the same drug threat as Mexico, TCOs exploit border security gaps
on the northern border to transport drugs and other illicit goods.333 Currently, criminal groups on
the northern border smuggle ecstasy and high potency marijuana into the U.S. and transport
cocaine, firearms, cash, and meth from Mexico and South America through the U.S. and into
Canada.334
Previously, Canada’s high potency marijuana, known as Canadian British Columbia Bud (BC
Bud), had a stronghold in the U.S., as it was able to compete against Mexico’s commercial grade
marijuana.335 However, with the legalization of marijuana in several western states and the surge
in U.S. local indoor production of high potency marijuana, the Canadian market has largely been
replaced by the domestic market, evidenced by the decline at the Washington-British Columbia
border of BC Bud seizures.336 However, it is also possible that “Southeast Asia growers have
moved their marijuana operations from Canada to Washington State in an effort to avoid
potential border control problems during transport.”337
Canada is the top foreign producer and “primary source of MDMA [commonly known as
ecstasy] in North America.”338 The majority of Canadian ecstasy is produced in British
Columbia, with FY2014 seizures totaling more than 48 kilograms.339 Washington State’s I-5
corridor “it the main transportation route into the Pacific Northwest and into British Columbia,
Canada,” where MDMA travels south and cocaine, firearms, and cash travel north—often
offered in direct exchange.340 Mexican criminal groups are the predominant transporters of
cocaine into and through Washington. 341 Recently, Washington State has seen an uptick in
unlawful crossers transporting drugs while dressed in camouflage, mimicking tactics seen on the
southwest border and indicating cartel involvement (most likely the Sinaloa Cartel).342
Like Mexican DTOs, their Canadian counterparts constantly reevaluate their smuggling
operations to evade U.S. law enforcement.343 For example, in FY2013, 75 percent of the seized
marijuana on the northern border was interdicted in the Swanton sector, which includes
333

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG POLICY CONTROL, NATIONAL NORTHERN
BORDER COUNTERNARCOTICS S TRATEGY 4 (2014).
334
NORTHWEST HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, THREAT ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY FOR PROGRAM
YEAR 2015 (2014).
335

Id. at 23.
Id. at 20.
337
Id. at 25.
338
Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Northern Border: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of David Rodriguez,
Director, Northwest High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area).
339
Id.
340
Id. (providing an example in which law enforcement dismantled a group that “regularly delivered 50,000
[ecstasy] pills to wholesalers in New York and Boston, returning with cash and several kilos of cocaine.”).
341
NORTHWEST HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, THREAT ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY FOR PROGRAM
YEAR 2015 33 (2014).
342
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 2015).
343
Id.
336

43

 Vermont, New Hampshire, and part of New York, while in FY2014, 68 percent of the marijuana
was seized in the Spokane sector, specifically in the states of Montana, Idaho, and
Washington.344
Human Smuggling and Trafficking
According to the State Department’s 2014 Trafficking in Persons Report, Canadian born and
other foreign girls and women, mostly from East Asia and Eastern Europe, are exploited in sex
trafficking along the U.S.-Canada border.345 In preparation for the 2014 Super Bowl in New
Jersey, an intelligence report advised that Canada-based traffickers would move their victims
from major cities such as Montreal, Toronto, Quebec City, and Ottawa to supply demand during
the event.346
Generally, highways along the U.S.-Canada border, including Highway 401, have been used to
move victims into the U.S.347 To address this, DHS implemented a 2012 U.S.-Canada
Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU).348 The agreement formalized an information sharing
mechanism on human trafficking, migrant smuggling networks, and suspected perpetrators. 349
Threats on Tribal Land
Concerns have been raised over the challenges faced by tribal lands directly adjacent or in close
proximity to the U.S.-Canada border.350 In Montana, Minnesota, Michigan, and New York,
some Native American reservations are located directly on the U.S.-Canada border, while in
Washington State, Wisconsin, Maine, and North Dakota, reservations are situated within a few
miles of the international boundary. 351 TCOs have used these lands to smuggle immigrants,
narcotics, and other illicit goods.352 For example, in 1998, U.S. and Canadian authorities
dismantled a human smuggling ring operated by 47 Chinese immigrants and members of the St.
Regis Mohawk Reservation in upstate New York. 353 U.S. authorities estimated that more than
3,600 Chinese immigrants were smuggled into the U.S. through this corridor, and that
individuals paid as much as $47,000 for the trip from China to the United States.354 Similarly,
344

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, SECTOR PROFILES FY2011-FY2014.
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 125 (2014).
346
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, HUMAN SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING CENTER, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: POSSIBLE SEX
TRAFFICKING DURING SUPER BOWL XLVII 1 (2014).
347
Id.
348
U.S. Embassy in Ottawa, U.S., Canada Cooperate to Fight Cross-Border Crime (Mar. 7, 2012)
http://canada.usembassy.gov/news-events/2012-news-and-events/march-2012/7-march-2012-u.s.-canada-cooperateto-fight-cross-border-crime.
349
Id.
350
Tim Johnson, Indian Reservations on both U.S. Borders Become Drug Pipelines, MCCLATCHY (June 16, 2010),
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/06/16/96003/indian-reservations-on-both-us.html.
351
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG POLICY CONTROL, NATIONAL NORTHERN
BORDER COUNTERNARCOTICS S TRATEGY 30 (2014).
352
Id.
353
Steven Holmes, Ring is Cracked in Smuggling of Illegal Chinese Immigrants, NY TIMES (Dec. 11, 1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/11/nyregion/ring-is-cracked-in-smuggling-of-illegal-chinese-immigrants.html.
354
Id.
345

44

 Mexican drug cartels are using these areas to evade northern border law enforcement
authorities.355 For example, in 2010, the DEA found 82,000 marijuana plants in tribal lands
located in Washington State.356
American and Canadian tribes are also involved in, or turn a blind eye to, cigarette smuggling
from the U.S. to Canada.357 The black market for this illicit good is conservatively estimated to
generate more than a billion dollars, rivaling profits of other low-end narcotics.358 Specifically,
black market dealers capitalize on Canada’s high tax on tobacco products. In some provinces
Canadians pay as much as $64 USD per carton; the average black market dealer sells a carton of
200 cigarettes for less than $7 USD.359
A 2011 GAO report found that because of a lack of DHS guidance, in some northern border
communities, tribal officials: 1) were not clear on what suspicious activity they should report; 2)
how to report it; and 3) to whom they should contact to report incidents.360 GAO stated that
consistent coordination with local and tribal law enforcement officers could help identify
terrorists and other criminals attempting to exploit the security gaps at the border. 361

355

Amy Harris, Marijuana Growers Find Cover on Tribal Lands, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 23, 2011),
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/marijuana-growers-find-cover-on-tribal-lands/.
356
Id.
357
William Marsden, Canada’s Boom in Smuggled Cigarettes: Indian Tobacco Factories, Organized Crime Control
a Billion-Dollar Black Market, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2009/03/27/2913/canadas-boom-smuggled-cigarettes.
358
Id.
359
Id.
360
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-508T, BORDER SECURITY: DHS PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN
SECURING THE U.S. SOUTHWEST AND NORTHERN BORDERS 16 (2011).
361
Id.

45

 Part III: The Maritime Border
Protecting America’s coastlines is integral to our border security strategy. The United States
coastline, which includes the Atlantic Coast, Caribbean, Pacific Coast, and Great Lakes region,
measures 95,471 miles—one of the longest coastlines in the world.362 According to the U.S.
Coast Guard, the strategy for a secure maritime border takes on a layered approach and addresses
illicit activity far from the U.S. shores.363 According to CBP’s Office of Air and Marine (OAM),
a secure maritime border has: 1) maritime domain awareness; 2) law enforcement information;
3) response capability and capacity; 4) unity of effort; and 5) small vessel accountability. 364
Agency Collaboration and Joint Missions
OAM and the Coast Guard frequently conduct joint missions. This is done through leveraging
OAM’s more than 250 aircraft and over 280 marine vessels.365 For example, in December 2013,
OAM and the Coast Guard worked together to interdict a panga boat, or, a small, outboardpowered fishing boat, off the coast of Southern California that was attempting to smuggle 1,500
pounds of marijuana.366 OAM Air Interdiction Agents first spotted the panga from their MultiRole Enforcement Aircraft.367 OAM then deployed a Black Hawk helicopter, and the Coast
Guard deployed a Jayhawk helicopter to track the suspect vessel.368 At the same time, three
OAM interceptor vessels and the Coast Guard cutter Blackfin also responded, heading to the
panga’s location.369 OAM and the Coast Guard were able to apprehend the vessel, the three
persons on board, and the marijuana, which had an estimated street value of $675,000.370
Earlier this year, an OAM Black Hawk helicopter fired warning shots at a panga boat off the
coast of La Jolla, California.371 The Coast Guard had first spotted the boat and requested OAM
assistance in stopping it.372 After the vessel failed to yield, OAM fired the warning shots, which
prompted the panga boat to stop, resulting in its apprehension by two CBP Midnight Express
interceptor boats.373

362

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, HOW LONG IS THE U.S. SHORELINE?,
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/shorelength.html.
363
See Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Maritime Border: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).
364
Id.
365
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, FROM THE AIR AND SEA, http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/air-sea.
366
CBP and Coast Guard Stop 1,500 Pound Marijuana Smuggling Attempt Off Southern California Coastline, U.S.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-1220-000000/cbp-and-coast-guard-stop-1500-pound-marijuana.
367
Id.
368
Id.
369
Id.
370
Id.
371
Michelle Moons, Warning Shots Fired at Panga Boat from CBP Helicopter Off CA Coast, BREITBART (Jan. 19,
2015), http://www.breitbart.com/california/2015/01/19/warning-shots-fired-at-panga-boat-from-cbp-helicopter-offca-coast/.
372
Id.
373
Id.

46

 Another way in which these two components work together is through the use of OAM’s UAS
program. This operation is overseen by the Common Unmanned Aircraft Systems Joint Program
Office, which was formed by OAM and the Coast Guard to address common requirements.
Recently, OAM finished a deployment of a UAS in El Salvador that netted $362 million in
contraband.374 These joint operations allow OAM to use drone technologies to track and stay
with suspects until Coast Guard assets are able to apprehend them.
As noted above, two of OAM’s eight operational UAS are dedicated for maritime use. In
partnership with the Coast Guard, OAM developed a maritime variant of the Predator B called
the Guardian, with the purpose of increasing reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and
acquisition capabilities in maritime operating environments.375 These Guardians were modified
with “the addition of a Raytheon SeaVue Marine Search Radar and an Electro-optical/infrared
sensor that is optimized for maritime operations.”376
In 2012, GAO issued a report that found that there were opportunities to improve the use of both
OAM and the Coast Guard’s air and marine assets.377 The report states that “OAM could benefit
from taking additional steps to better ensure that its mix and placement of resources meets
mission needs and addresses threats.”378 The report also found that “OAM has not documented
its analyses to support its resource mix and placement across locations.”379 Of the four
recommendations from that 2012 report, three remain open.380
ICE HSI teams also work with OAM and the Coast Guard to prevent illegal immigration and
drug trafficking through America’s maritime borders. In March 2014, the three agencies worked
together to seize two men and a “go-fast” boat transporting 533 pounds of cocaine, 22 nautical
miles southeast of Vieques, Puerto Rico.381 The shipment had an estimated street value of $5.7
million.382 The boat was first spotted by the Coast Guard, and the apprehension was conducted
by an OAM marine unit that also had an ICE special agent on board.383 According to OAM,
intelligence is crucial for maritime interdictions, particularly on the northern border where illicit
traffic is less frequent.384
374

Securing the Border: Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology Force Multipliers: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Randolph Alles, Assistant
Commissioner, Office of Air and Marine, U.S. Customs and Border Protection).
375
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, GUARDIAN UAS MARITIME VARIANT PREDATOR B,
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/guardian_b_6.pdf.
376
Id.
377
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-518, OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO ENSURE MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF
DHS’S AIR AND MARINE ASSETS (2012).
378
Id. at passim.
379
Id. at 28.
380
Id.
381
Federal Authorities Seize $5.7 Million in Cocaine, Detain Two Smugglers, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S.
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/usao-pr/pr/federalauthorities-seize-57-million-cocaine-detain-two-smugglers.
382
Id.
383
Id.
384
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 2015);
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 2015).

47

 The U.S. is also a partner in Operation Martillo (Hammer), which is a “U.S., European, and
Western Hemisphere effort targeting illicit trafficking routes in coastal waters along the Central
American isthmus.”385 Fourteen countries are currently participating in the operation.386
According to U.S. South Command, “[a]s of March 2015, Operation Martillo has resulted in the
disruption of over 400 metric tons of cocaine over the past four years, denying drug traffickers
$8 billion in potential revenue.”387 The U.S. contribution to this program “includes U.S. Navy
and Coast Guard vessels, aircraft from U.S. federal law enforcement agencies, and military and
law enforcement units from various nations.”388
In June 2015, OAM agents working as part of Operation Martillo assisted in detecting five
separate trafficking incidents that resulted “in the interdiction of more than 5,900 pounds of
cocaine, worth more than $441.8 million.”389 Similarly, in November 2014, a Coast Guard Law
Enforcement Detachment Team (LEDET) was involved in the interdiction of $35 million worth
of cocaine in an Operation Martillo event off the shores of Puerto Rico.390
Threats along the Maritime Border
While illegal immigration through America’s maritime borders is not as widespread as it is
through the southwest border, “[t]housands of people try to enter this country illegally every year
using maritime routes, many via smuggling operations.”391 The U.S. Coast Guard recently
testified in front of the Committee that illegal immigration is heavily influenced by U.S. policy
and perceptions of U.S. policy. 392
According to DHS, while the number of migrant interdictions has remained somewhat steady
over the last two decades, these numbers represent a significant drop from its peak in the early
1990s.393 From 1991 to 1995, the Coast Guard interdicted over 120,000 migrants from 23
countries.394 In 1994, the Coast Guard responded to two mass migrations from Haiti and Cuba,
in which 63,000 migrants were rescued and prevented from illegally entering the U.S.395
385

U.S. participation is led by Joint Interagency Task Force South. UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND,
OPERATION MARTILLO (2015), http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Operation-Martillo.aspx.
386
These countries are Belize, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, the
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Chile has also contributed to
the operation. Id.
387
Id.
388
Id.
389
CBP P-3 Crew Detects Cocaine Runs Reaching 2.9 Tons, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (June 11,
2015), http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2015-06-11-000000/cbp-p-3-crew-detects-cocaine-runsreaching-29-tons.
390
Operation Martillo Drug Bust Results in $35 Million of Cocaine, U.S. COAST GUARD (Nov. 29, 2014),
http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2426390/Operation-Martillo-drug-bust-results-in-35-million-of-cocaine-.
391
U.S. COAST GUARD, ALIEN MIGRANT INTERDICTION, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/amio.asp.
392
See Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Maritime Border: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Rear Admiral Peter J.
Brown, Assistant Commander for Response Policy, U.S. Coast Guard).
393
U.S. COAST GUARD, ALIEN MIGRANT INTERDICTION, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/amio.asp.
394
Id.
395
Id.

48

 Table 3. Comparison of Apprehensions at U.S. Borders FY2011-FY2014396
Sector
FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014
Northern Border Total
6,123
4,210
3,230
3,338
Southwest Border Total
327,577 356,873 414,397 479,371
Maritime Border
6,552
3,685
3,162
3,942
Coast Guard
2,474
2,955
2,094
3,587
Total Maritime
9,026
6,640
5,256
7,529
The Coast Guard and OAM have joint responsibility for maritime drug interdiction. The Coast
Guard’s mission is to reduce the supply of drugs by denying smugglers the use of air and
maritime routes in a seven million square-mile area called the Transit Zone, which includes the
Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific Ocean.397 Meanwhile, CBP’s OAM
patrols the 12 mile area directly off the U.S. coasts and provides its air and marine assets to assist
in securing the Transit Zone.398 Both components “coordinate[] closely with other federal
agencies and countries within the region to disrupt and deter the flow of illegal drugs.”399
The Coast Guard “accounts for nearly 56 [percent] of all U.S. government seizures of cocaine
each year.”400 In FY2014, the Coast Guard seized 93 vessels, 108,534 pounds of marijuana, and
198,636 pounds of cocaine.401 Already in FY2015, the Coast Guard has seized 72 vessels,
31,224 pounds of marijuana, and 147,268 pounds of cocaine.402
In a previous hearing, the Committee heard former drug czar Barry McCaffrey estimate that the
overall interdiction rate of drugs coming across our land borders is somewhere between 5 to 10
percent.403 Similarly, the Coast Guard is only able to target approximately 30 percent of the
illegal drugs it is aware of, resulting in the interdiction of only 11 to 18 percent of the maritime

396

Table 3 apprehensions at the southwest border, northern border, and maritime border represent those recorded by
the U.S. Border Patrol. See UNITED STATES BORDER PATROL TOTAL ILLEGAL ALIEN APPREHENSIONS BY MONTH,
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Total%20Monthly%20Apps%20by%20Sector%20and%20
Area%2C%20FY2000-FY2014_0.pdf. Since the U.S. Coast Guard also interdicts a significant number of migrants
at our maritime border, a full representation of maritime apprehensions adds these two data points together. See
U.S. COAST GUARD MARITIME MIGRANT INTERDICTIONS,
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/FlowStats/currentstats.asp.
397
THE WHITE HOUSE, TRANSIT ZONE OPERATIONS, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/transit-zone-operations.
398
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 2015).
399
U.S. COAST GUARD, DRUG INTERDICTION, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/drug_interdiction.asp.
400
U.S. COAST GUARD, ENFORCEMENT BRANCH, http://www.uscg.mil/d8/enforcement//.
401
U.S. COAST GUARD, COAST GUARD DRUG REMOVAL STATISTICS,
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/Drugs/stats.asp (updated as of April 30, 2015).
402
Id.
403
Securing the Border: Assessing the Impact of Transnational Crime: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015); see also Securing the Border: Fencing, Infrastructure, and
Technology Force Multipliers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th
Cong. (2015).

49

 known drug flow toward the U.S.404 However, when it does set itself on a known target, the
Coast Guard is 85 to 90 percent successful in completing the interdiction.405
As for CBP, in FY2014, “OAM’s P-3 aircraft flew 6,000 hours of counter-narcotics missions in
the drug Transit Zone between South America and the U.S.”406 These missions resulted in the
seizure or disruption of “126,489 pounds of cocaine with a value of nearly $9.4 billion.”407
The Atlantic Coast and the Caribbean
The Atlantic coastline and the Gulf of Mexico make up a large and important part of America’s
maritime borders. Due to this coast’s proximity to the Caribbean and many of the other small
island nations, many migrants attempt to enter the U.S. through maritime routes. In addition,
recent pressures in Central and South America have shifted some of the drug trade to the
Caribbean, increasing the need for border protection in these regions.
Most migrants attempting to enter the U.S. illegally via maritime routes come from Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, and Haiti.408 One factor that has led to the large number of apprehensions
along the maritime border is the United States’ “wet-foot, dry-foot” policy, which allows any
Cuban reaching U.S. land to stay and pursue citizenship, while those caught at sea are returned to
Cuba.409 This policy, formally known as the U.S.-Cuba Immigration Accord, was written into
law in 1995 as an amendment to the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act. 410 Without this policy, Cuban
migrants would be processed similar to other foreign nationals caught illegally in the country and
would be subject to deportation.411
Cubans seeking to make it to America use many different methods, including hiring organized
smugglers, homemade boats, or even clinging to inner tubes and hoping to float to the U.S.
mainland.412 In the maritime setting, these migrants travel from Cuba across the Florida Straits,
seeking to reach South Florida.413 With the recent shift in the relationship between Cuba and the
U.S., many Cubans are attempting to migrate to America, fearing that America will soon change

404

U.S. COAST GUARD, MARITIME BORDER SECURITY (2015) (on file with Majority Staff); Western Hemisphere
Drug Interdiction Efforts: Hearing Before the House SubComm. on Coast Guard and Marine Transportation of the
Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 114th Cong. (2015).
405
Id.
406
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, OFFICE OF AIR AND MARINE FACT SHEET,
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/oam-factsheet-20150701.pdf.
407
Id.
408
U.S. COAST GUARD, ALIEN MIGRANT INTERDICTION, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/amio.asp.
409
Jefferson Morley, U.S.-Cuba Migration Policy, WASH POST (July 27, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/27/AR2007072701493.html.
410
Pub. Law No. 89-732 (1996).
411
Cuban Migrants Continue Deadly Hide-and-Seek, REUTERS (June 12, 2015),
http://www.voanews.com/content/cuban-migrants-continue-deadly-hide-and-seek/2819281.html.
412
Frances Robles, In Rickety Boats, Cuban Migrants Again Flee to U.S., NY TIMES (Oct. 9, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/us/sharp-rise-in-cuban-migration-stirs-worries-of-a-mass-exodus.html.
413
Id.

50

 its wet-foot, dry-foot policy.414 Prior to the President’s announcement, from Dec. 1-16, 2014, the
Coast Guard interdicted 80 Cubans.415 After the President’s announcement, from Dec. 17-31,
2014 the Coast Guard interdicted 419 Cubans—a 423 percent increase.416 The Coast Guard
deployed direct repatriation and immediately began sending those interdicted in the waterways
back to Cuba.417 As a result, Cuban interdictions have returned to normal levels in the maritime
setting.418
While Cuban migration has leveled off in the maritime setting where direct repatriation may be
employed, it has drastically increased at U.S. POEs, where Cubans are able to gain admittance
and remain in the U.S. In fact, on a recent Congressional Delegation (CODEL) to Central
America, Members on the Committee heard that 50 Cubans a day are caught transiting Honduras
on their way to the U.S. and approximately 90 percent of the Special Interest Aliens caught in
Honduras are Cuban nationals.419
The Dominican Republic has also “historically been a major source country for undocumented
migrants attempting to enter the U.S.”420 These immigrants enter Puerto Rico by crossing the
Mona Passage, which is a “body of water between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico.”421
They are then smuggled to the U.S. by gangs in Yolas, which are homemade fishing vessels.422
In 2010, following the earthquake in Haiti, the U.S. ceased its policies of expedited removal of
Haitians illegally arriving in the U.S.423 By 2013, migrant smuggling organizations in the
Dominican Republic caught wind of this change in U.S. policy and began taking Haitian
immigrants to Puerto Rico via the Mona Passage.424 In fact, by the end of FY2013, 1,760
Haitian migrants attempted to enter the U.S. through the Mona Passage, as compared to 39
Haitians in FY2012.425 In FY2014, 1,994 Haitian migrants made the same dangerous attempt in
smuggling ventures, directly resulting in the death of 29 Haitians migrants at sea. 426 On October
6, 2014, DHS resumed expedited removal for non-criminal Haitian migrants who landed on U.S.
Territories in Puerto Rico and the islands of the Mona Passage. 427 After the first removal,

414

Cuban Migrants Continue Deadly Hide-and-Seek, REUTERS (June 12, 2015),
http://www.voanews.com/content/cuban-migrants-continue-deadly-hide-and-seek/2819281.html.
415
U.S. COAST GUARD, MARITIME BORDER SECURITY (2015) (on file with Majority Staff).
416
Id.
417
Id.
418
Id.
419
Observations during Johnson-Carper CODEL to Central America (Oct. 2015).
420
U.S. COAST GUARD, ALIEN MIGRANT INTERDICTION, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/amio.asp.
421
Id.
422
Id.
423
See Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Maritime Border: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015)
424
Surge of Migrants Being Smuggled to Puerto Rico, CBS NEWS (July 26, 2014),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/surge-of-migrants-being-smuggled-to-united-states-through-puerto-rico/.
425
See Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Maritime Border: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).
426
Id.
427
Id.

51

 Haitian maritime flow in the Mona Passage decreased by 80 percent.428 In the first three quarters
of FY2015, only 277 Haitian migrants attempted to enter the U.S. via the Mona Passage, as
compared to 1,430 for the same period in FY2014. 429
The Coast Guard has recognized that “[t]he Caribbean region is home to some of the most
indebted nations in the world” and the “[l]ack of economic resources in the region continues to
be a major factor in the failure to prevent contraband from entering the international supply
chain.”430 This “lack of state control and jurisdictional coordination challenges over vast areas
of maritime borders” creates opportunities for TCOs “to smuggle and traffic drugs, weapons, and
people.”431 In fact, as early as 2012, Members of the U.S. Senate recognized that there was the
potential for an increase in drug trafficking in the Caribbean due to increased security efforts in
Mexico, Central America, and the Eastern Pacific.432
In 2011, approximately four percent of cocaine brought to the U.S. transited through the
Caribbean.433 This increased to 16 percent by the end of 2013.434 TCOs such as Mexico’s
Sinaloa Cartel or the Italian ‘Ndrangheta are becoming more entrenched in the Caribbean as drug
flow in the region increases.435 These groups work with local counterparts, who are often paid a
percentage of the shipment or in commodities such as guns. 436
The Pacific Coast
The sheer magnitude of the Eastern Pacific Ocean, equivalent in size to the continental U.S.,
creates many challenges for maritime domain awareness and interdictions.437 Migrants
smuggled via maritime routes are typically found 60 to 70 miles up the coast of California. 438
Smugglers have no regard for the safety of these migrants. For example, when smugglers
discovered OAM could figure out the number of migrants who had absconded based on counting
the life vests deserted in the water, smugglers ceased distributing life vests to migrants—many of
whom cannot swim.439 Additionally, smugglers may require migrants to hug the engines of their
panga boats, preventing OAM from shooting the engine and safely stopping the boat. 440
428

Id.
Id.
430
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, WESTERN HEMISPHERE STRATEGY (2014),
http://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/docs/uscg_whem_2014.pdf (citing C. Ward, Regional Threats: Security
Capacity Imperatives in the Caribbean, Joint Force Quarterly, 2010, 26-31).
431
Id.
432
Id. (citing United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Preventing a Security Crisis in the
Caribbean, (2012), http://www.drugcaucus.senate.gov/sites/default/files/caribbean%20drug%20report.pdf).
433
Full Circle: An Old Route Regains Popularity with Drugs Gangs, THE ECONOMIST (May 24, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21602680-old-route-regains-popularity-drugs-gangs-full-circle.
434
Id.
435
Id.
436
Id.
437
See Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Maritime Border: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015)
438
Data provided to Majority Staff during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 2015).
439
Id.
440
Id.
429

52

 As another example, on June 18, 2015, Marine Interdiction Agents from OAM encountered a
vessel off the California Coast near Encinitas.441 Agents hailed the vessel and ordered the pilot
to yield, but the vessel failed to comply, even after warning shots were fired.442 After the failure
to comply, the marine interceptor vessel and the smuggling vessel collided, resulting in the
capsizing of the smuggling vessel.443 Twenty Mexican migrants were thrown into the water, and
one woman was later pronounced dead at a local hospital.444 All 20 people were suspected of
attempting to enter the U.S. illegally.445
The vast majority of drugs enter the U.S. through the U.S.-Mexico land border; however, some
cartels have started using panga boats to move drugs across the U.S. maritime border.446
Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel smuggles marijuana on 50-foot vessels, which are loaded with cargo as
far south as the port of Mazatlán, and then smuggled up the Pacific coast deep into California.447
Smugglers using longer-range boats and semi-submersible vessels have also begun taking
advantage of the remote coasts of Northern California, and have landed as far north as Santa
Cruz, 350 nautical miles north of San Diego.448 In July 2015, the Coast Guard in Northern
California seized six tons of cocaine from a semi-submersible vessel in the Pacific Ocean, to
date, the largest bust in Coast Guard history. 449
Earlier this year, the Oregon HIDTA released a report, which describes the threat that Oregon, as
a Pacific Coast state, faces from maritime drug trafficking.450 The HIDTA report concludes that
there is a lack of intelligence when it comes to the use of maritime smuggling, and that the threat
posed by maritime smuggling is “undoubtedly larger than law enforcement is aware.” 451
Washington State also faces unique maritime threats, with small U.S. islands located on the open
waters in close proximity to Canada. If a Canadian vessel is able to penetrate these islands, those
on board can catch a ferry to the mainland with very little interaction with U.S. law
enforcement.452

441

Christian De La Rosa, Woman Dies after CBP, Suspected Smuggling Boats Collide, FOX 5 SAN DIEGO (June 18,
2015), http://fox5sandiego.com/2015/06/18/woman-dies-after-cbp-suspected-smuggling-boats-collide/.
442
Id.
443
Id.
444
Id.
445
Id.
446
Western Hemisphere Drug Interdiction Efforts: Hearing Before the House SubComm. on Coast Guard and
Marine Transportation of the Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 114th Cong. (2015).
447
Drug Smugglers Take to the High Seas to Avoid Border Patrol, NY POST (Feb. 24, 2014),
http://nypost.com/2014/02/24/drug-smugglers-take-to-the-high-seas-to-avoid-border-patrol/.
448
Id.
449
Lisa Fernandez, Record Bust: Coast Guard Seizes 5 Tons of Cocaine Valued at $181 M, NBC SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/california/US-Coast-Guard-in-Alameda-Seizes-6Tons-12000-Pounds-of-Cocaine-Valued-at-181-Million-Largest-Bust-in-History--320897421.html.
450
OREGON HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, PROGRAM YEAR 2016 THREAT ASSESSMENT AND COUNTERDRUG STRATEGY (2015).
451
Id.
452
Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 2015).

53

 The Great Lakes
There are three Border Patrol sectors that encompass the Great Lakes: Grand Forks, Detroit, and
Buffalo. These sectors have unique challenges regarding illegal migration and drug trafficking.
For example, Canadian smugglers often use smaller airports along the Great Lakes for quick
drop-offs before turning around and heading back to Canada, making it difficult for CBP to
apprehend these smugglers. 453 Additionally, Mexican-based TCOs now operate in the Great
Lakes region, including the Sinaloa Cartel, Los Zetas, and the Tijuana Cartel.454
In 2012, DHS released its Northern Border Strategy, which in part focused on the Great Lakes. 455
The report states that “as the shared internal waters of sovereign nations, the Great Lakes provide
equal opportunity access to both countries.” 456 The report noted that “[t]he vast maritime border
with Canada and the open access that small vessels have in the Great Lakes provide an additional
conduit for potential exploitation.”457 In order to address this challenge, DHS has implemented
the Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS), which develops and leverages a partnership with the
small vessel community, as well as the public and private sectors. 458
The ShipRider program is also integral to enforcement of the Great Lakes borders. 459 The U.S.Canada ShipRider program is a “cooperative approach to combating cross border crime” on
U.S.-Canada shared waters.460 The program “involves vessels jointly crewed by specially
trained and designated Canadian and U.S. law enforcement officers who are authorized to
enforce the law on both sides of the international boundary line.”461 This cooperative effort
allows law enforcement officials to secure the border “from threats to national security, as well
as prevent cross-border smuggling and trafficking.”462
U.S. Ports
America’s extensive port system is one of its most valuable assets, but also one that faces
numerous threats and weaknesses. From 2004 to 2013, American ports witnessed a 128 percent
453

Drug Bust in Michigan’s Thumb Exposes Use of Tiny Airports by Canadian Smugglers, AP (May 15, 2011),
http://www.toledoblade.com/local/2011/05/15/Drug-bust-in-Michigans-Thumb-exposes-use-of-tiny-airports-byCanadian-smugglers.html.
454
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER, NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 2011
(2011), http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf .
455
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NORTHERN BORDER STRATEGY (2012).
456
Id.
457
Id. at 12 (highlighting the challenges of deciphering between bad actors and the commercial trade, recreational
boaters, ice fishermen, and snowmobilers that also utilize the Great Lakes).
458
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SMALL VESSEL SECURITY STRATEGY (2008),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf.
459
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FACT SHEET: BEYOND THE BORDER: UNITED-STATES – CANADA LAW
ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION (2011), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/12/06/fact-sheet-beyond-border-united-states%E2%80%93-canada-law-enforcement-cooperation.
460
ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, CANADA-U.S. SHIPRIDER, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ibet-eipf/shipridereng.htm.
461
Id.
462
Id.

54

 growth rate, processing the second-most cargo of any port system in the world, second only to
China.463
In an attempt to improve security at America’s ports, the Security and Accountability for Every
Port Act (SAFE Port Act) was passed by Congress in 2006 and signed into law by President
George W. Bush.464 The Act codifies a number of programs to improve the security of U.S.
ports.465 These programs include additional requirements for maritime facilities, the
establishment of Interagency Operations Centers, a Port Security Grant Program, a Container
Security Initiative (CSI), and a Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism.466 The Act also
created the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within DHS, and appropriated funds
toward the Integrated Deepwater System Program, a long-term Coast Guard modernization
program.467
A 2007 GAO report on the SAFE Port Act found that federal agencies have improved overall
port security in numerous ways.468 For example, GAO noted that the Act “increased
requirements for the scope and frequency” of Coast Guard inspection of ports, leading to a
doubling in the frequency of both announced and unannounced inspections.469 However, GAO
also found that “agencies face resource constraints and other challenges” in meeting the Act’s
requirements.470

463

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PORTS AND HARBORS, WORLD CONTAINER TRAFFIC DATA 2014,
http://www.iaphworldports.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=A7oMk7mR0a4%3d&tabid=4879.
464
Pub. L. No. 109-347 (2006).
465
Id.
466
Id. Under CSI, CBP stations U.S. officers in 29 countries to work with host country counterparts to identify and
inspect potentially high-risk shipments before they reach the U.S. Today, more than 80 percent of maritime
containerized cargo destined to the U.S. originates in or transits through a CSI port and is screened prior to being
laden aboard a U.S. bound vessel.
467
Id.
468
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-126T, THE SAFE PORT ACT: STATUS AND IMPLEMENTATION ONE
YEAR LATER (2007).
469
Id. at 6.
470
Id. at passim.

55

 Part IV: U.S. Ports of Entry
The only lawful way to enter the U.S. is through an air, land, or sea port of entry. Upon reaching
a POE, CBP OFO officers inspect passengers and cargo to ensure threats do not enter the U.S.471
Working with other countries, the U.S. has established trusted traveler programs to expedite the
processing of low-risk passengers and cargo.472 For passengers, these programs include
SENTRI473 on the southwest border, NEXUS474 on the northern border and Global Entry475 at
airports. For cargo, FAST is available at 17 POEs on the northern border and 17 POEs on the
southwest border.476
Despite these programs, significant staffing is needed to process heavy volumes of traffic to
ensure commerce is not impeded. Therefore, manpower remains a concern across POEs. In
FY2013 Congress appropriated to CBP additional funding to hire 2,000 officers.477 However,
due to attrition and the time it takes to bring on new officers, CBP has only realized a net gain of
approximately 818 officers.478
While discussions of U.S. land and sea POEs are examined above, air POEs located across our
country are also highly active entry points into the U.S.
Visa Waiver Program
In 1986, Congress established the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) as a pilot program under the
Immigration Reform and Control Act.479 The main objective of the program was to facilitate
tourism and short-term business travel with allies.480 Prior to VWP, foreign nationals traveling
to the U.S. for a short-term visit needed a nonimmigrant “B” visa, requiring an in-person
interview at a U.S. consulate or embassy.481 On October 30, 2000, with bipartisan support,
Congress made permanent VWP in the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act.482
471

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, OPERATIONS, http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/portsentry/operations.
472
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, TRUSTED TRAVELER PROGRAMS, https://www.cbp.gov/travel/trustedtraveler-programs.
473
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, SECURED ELECTRONIC NETWORK FOR TRAVELER’S RAPID INSPECTION
(SENTRI), https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/184/~/secured-electronic-network-for-travelers-rapidinspection-(sentri).
474
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, NEXUS PROGRAM DESCRIPTION, http://www.cbp.gov/travel/trustedtraveler-programs/nexus/nexus-overview.
475
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, GLOBAL ENTRY, http://www.cbp.gov/travel/trusted-travelerprograms/global-entry.
476
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, FREE AND SECURE TRADE PROGRAM (FAST) FACT SHEET,
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ofo_fast_final_file_3.pdf.
477
Pub. L. No. 133-76.
478
Data Provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (June 2, 2015).
479
Pub. L. No. 99-603 (1986).
480
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-599T, ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO MITIGATE RISKS
AND STRENGTHEN OVERSTAY ENFORCEMENT 2 (2012).
481
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, VISA WAIVER PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS, http://www.dhs.gov/visawaiver-program-requirements
482
Pub. L. No. 106-396 (2000).

56

 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the plot by Richard Reid, also known as the
Shoebomber, in December 2001 motivated Congress to modernize VWP’s security
requirements.483 In 2007, Congress passed the Implementing the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations Act requiring the Director of National Intelligence to produce intelligence
reports to assess the threats from VWP countries and more reporting on lost or stolen
passports.484 As part of this modernization, on January 12, 2009, DHS deployed the Electronic
System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), an online portal to pre-approve VWP travelers for
travel to the U.S.485
At a hearing, the Committee heard that ESTA “is an example of how U.S agencies effectively
use information collected from visitors in advance of travel to prevent terrorists and serious
criminals from boarding a flight headed to the United States.”486 A witness from the State
Department explained that passengers from VWP countries must receive ESTA approval before
traveling, which:
“involves filling out an online questionnaire with biographic information and paying an
administrative fee, after which, similar to a visa application, ESTA screens against
interagency databases for watchlisted individuals. If there is a positive match, DHS may
deny the authorization, meaning the individual cannot utilize the VWP to board a U.S.bound air or sea carrier.”487
If approved, ESTA authorization is valid for multiple trips to the U.S. up to 90 days in duration
for a period of two years.488 Once a traveler arrives to the U.S., biometric data is collected by
CBP at the port of entry, prior to admission into the country.
VWP countries are required to sign agreements with the U.S. to share information related to
terrorists and criminals.489 The information sharing agreements initiated under VWP increase
the understanding of global security threats as well as the unique threat profiles of both VWP
members and at times, non-VWP members.490 Witnesses at a Committee hearing testified that
“[w]ithout the leverage that VWP provides, the U.S government likely would not receive the
same amount and quality of information.”491
483

Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001).
Pub. L. No. 110-53 (2007).
485
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, ELECTRONIC SYSTEM FOR TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION,
https://esta.cbp.dhs.gov/esta/.
486
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-599T, ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO MITIGATE RISKS
AND STRENGTHEN OVERSTAY ENFORCEMENT 2 (2012).
487
Id.
488
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, ESTA – LENGTH OF APPROVAL,
https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/1126/~/esta---length-of-approval.
489
See Visa Waiver Program: Additional Actions Needed to Mitigate Risks and Strengthen Overstay Enforcement:
Hearing Before the S. SubComm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Border Security of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. (2012) (Testimony of Rebecca Gambler and Michael J. Courts, Government Accountability Office).
490
Id.
491
Visa Waiver Program: Implications for U.S. National Security: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Mark Koumans & Maureen Dugan, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security).
484

57

 Under the 2007 Act, DHS and its VWP partners are required to check passports against
INTERPOL’s Lost or Stolen Documents database.492 In November 2014, DHS added data fields
to the ESTA application.493 These upgrades have arguably improved the security of the travel
ecosystem by encouraging common security standards for travel documents. 494
However, in a 2011 report, GAO stated that in 2010, two percent, or 364,000 VWP visitors,
boarded airplanes and arrived in the U.S. without proper ESTA clearance.495 Given that ESTA is
the security backbone to screen VWP travelers for security risks, this is a significant
vulnerability.496 DHS now notes that it has implemented new safeguards, including re-vetting
ESTA applications every 24 hours.497
Moreover, in the wake of the terror attacks in Paris, Brussels, and Copenhagen, the growing
number of Western foreign fighters traveling to Syria and Iraq, and the surge of Syrian refugees
entering Europe, there have been calls for oversight of VWP in the context of terrorist travel. 498
The visa-less nature of VWP raises concerns because terrorists not yet flagged by U.S. or foreign
intelligence could enter or re-enter the U.S. within their two-year ESTA period with little
interactions with U.S. authorities.499
On August 6, 2015, Secretary Johnson announced the Department’s intention to implement
additional security requirements to enhance VWP. 500 As part of the new directive, foreign
nationals from the 38 existing member countries501 and new candidate countries will be required
to use an e-passport in order to visit the U.S. under the visa free program, which are harder to
tamper with as it contains the electronic photograph, full name, and birthday of the foreign
492

Pub. L. No. 110-53 (2007).
The data fields include additional passport data, contact information, other potential names or alias, parents’
name(s), and employment information. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, STRENGTHENING SECURITY OF
THE VWP THROUGH ENHANCEMENTS OF ESTA, http://www.cbp.gov/travel/international-visitors/esta/enhancementsto-esta-faqs; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE ELECTRONIC
SYSTEM FOR TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION (ESTA) 2 (2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacypia-update-cbp-esta-11032014.pdf.
494
Letter to the Honorable Ron Johnson, Chairman, Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, from the
Honorable Jeh Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Mar. 20, 2015).
495
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-335, DHS HAS IMPLEMENTED THE ELECTRONIC SYSTEM FOR TRAVEL
AUTHORIZATION, BUT FURTHER STEPS NEEDED TO ADDRESS POTENTIAL PROGRAM RISKS 18 (2011).
496
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-599, ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO MITIGATE RISKS
AND STRENGTHEN OVERSTAY ENFORCEMENT 5 (2012).
497
Data provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Aug. 28, 2015).
498
Brian Naylor, Critics Worry Visa Waiver Could Allow Foreign Fighters To Slip in, NPR (Feb. 2, 2015),
http://www.npr.org/2015/02/02/383214948/critics-point-out-weakness-of-visa-waiver-program;
499
Letter from the Honorable Ron Johnson, Kelly Ayotte, and Thomas Carper, to the Honorable Jeh Johnson,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security(Mar. 2, 2015).
500
Statement by Secretary Jeh C. Johnson on Intention to Implement Security Enhancements to the Visa Waiver
Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Aug. 6, 2015),
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/08/06/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson-intention-implement-securityenhancements-visa.
501
The countries the U.S. currently has VWP agreements with are: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei,
Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom.
493

58

 national.502 In addition, VWP member countries will have to use the INTERPOL Lost and
Stolen Documents database to screen all travelers crossing their borders and allow more U.S.
federal air marshals on flights departing to the United States.503
Finally, DHS estimates that approximately five million of the current 11 million illegal
immigrants in the U.S. are visa overstays. 504 While DHS claims that the overstay rate of VWP
countries is collectively less than one percent, the Department has not released data on the
individual overstay rate of VWP countries, despite repeated requests for such information by
Congress.505 In its 2011 report, GAO indicated that in 8,200 of 34,700 cases, or roughly onequarter of VWP cases, ICE’s Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) could
not locate the suspected overstay. 506 Based on this percentage, the Majority Staff believes it fair
to conclude that today, close to a million passengers who entered the U.S. through VWP cannot
be found.
Refugee Resettlement
Each year the President, after consultation with Congress, sets an annual ceiling for the number
of refugees the U.S. will admit.507 For the past several years, the ceiling has been set at 70,000
refugees.508 The President recently announced plans to raise the refugee ceiling to 85,000 for
FY2016 and to 100,000 for FY2017.509 Moreover, the President has announced that of the
85,000 refugees that will be admitted into the U.S. in FY2016, 10,000 will come from Syria.510
Due to vetting, interviews, and required screenings, it takes on average between 18 and 24
months from the time a refugee is referred to the U.S. to their admittance into the country. 511
502

Id. This means that if you change the picture of a lost or stolen passport, it will not match with official biographic
records.
503
Michael S. Schmidt, Tougher Standards Set for U.S. Visa Waivers, Citing Militant Threat, NY TIMES (Aug. 6,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/07/world/middleeast/us-visa-waiver-program-europe-radicalization-isissyria-iraq.html?_r=0. Changes such as these have been recommended to DHS by key members of Congress. See
Letter from Senators Ron Johnson, Kelly Ayotte, and Thomas Carper, to the Honorable Jeh Johnson, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (Mar. 2, 2015).
504
FACT SHEET: Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 22,
2006), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2006/05/22/modes-of-entry-for-the-unauthorized-migrant-population/; see also
Alison Siskin, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32221, VISA WAIVER PROGRAM (2014).
505
See, generally, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-967, VISA WAIVER PROGRAM: ACTIONS ARE NEEDED
TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF THE EXPANSION PROCESS, AND TO ASSESS AND MITIGATE PROGRAM RISKS (2008).
506
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-335, DHS HAS IMPLEMENTED THE ELECTRONIC SYSTEM FOR TRAVEL
AUTHORIZATION, BUT FURTHER STEPS NEEDED TO ADDRESS POTENTIAL PROGRAM RISKS (2011).
507
Andorra Bruno, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31269, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND RESETTLEMENT POLICY 1
(2015).
508
Id. at 2.
509
U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Proposed
Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2016 Report to Congress Submitted on Behalf of the President of the United
States to the Committees on the Judiciary United States Senate and United States House of Representatives (2015).
510
White House: US Preparing to Accept at Least 10,000 Syrian Refugees in FY2016, AP (Sept. 10, 2015),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/db01f145696043bc8a264c47319bfd19/white-house-us-preparing-accept-least-10000syrian-refugees.
511
The Impact of ISIS on the Homeland and Refugee Resettlement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Anne C. Richard, Assistant Secretary for
Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State).

59

 Various federal agencies are involved in the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program. Put simply,
the U.S. Department of State is charged with processing the refugees while overseas, the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security determines eligibility for admission into the country, and the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services assists in the resettlement, placement, and
support of the refugees.
ISIS’s violence in Syria and Iraq has created a large population of vulnerable, displaced Syrian
and Iraqi citizens. Over 4 million registered Syrian refugees have left the conflict region.512 As of
August 2015, 121,535 Syrians have arrived in Europe, seeking asylum, 513 while 1,682 Syrians
were admitted to the U.S. as refugees in FY2015.514
According to the State Department, refugees go through a rigorous screening process in order to
be granted access to the United States,
All refugees undergo multiple security checks in order to be approved for
U.S. resettlement. Refugees are subject to the highest level of security
checks of any category of traveler to the United States. The screening
includes involvement of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC);
the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center; DHS; the Department of Defense;
and other agencies. Most of the details of the security checks are
classified. At the same time, refugees complete a health screening.515
At a Committee hearing, witnesses from both the State Department and DHS stated that the
vetting for refugees, particularly Syrian refugees, was more rigorous than for any other migrant
seeking to legally come to the country. 516 However, in February, FBI Assistant Director Michael
Steinbach told the House Homeland Security Committee that he was concerned about the risks
associated with bringing in Syrian refugees, due to our lack of on the ground collection and thus
incomplete databases.517 FBI Director Comey echoed this concern during HSGAC’s annual
“Threats to the Homeland” hearing in October, admitting that the U.S. faces deficits when it

512

The UN Refugee Agency’s Syria Regional Refugee Response Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal,
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php.
513
Drew Desilver, Europe’s Asylum Seekers: Who They Are, Where They’re Going, and Their Chances of Staying,
PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/30/europes-asylumseekers-who-they-are-where-theyre-going-and-their-chances-of-staying/.
514
Haeyoun Park, Paris Attacks Intensify Debate Over How Many Syrian Refugees to Allow into the U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/21/us/where-syrian-refugees-are-in-the-unitedstates.html?_r=0.
515
U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Briefing on the Mechanics of the United States Refugee Admissions Program,
(Sept. 11, 2015) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/09/246843.htm.
516
The Impact of ISIS on the Homeland and Refugee Resettlement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Anne C. Richard, Assistant Secretary for
Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State and Leon Rodriguez, Director, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
517
Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror: :
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Michael Steinbach,
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation).

60

 comes to vetting Syrian refuges. 518 NCTC Director Rasmussen expressed concerns at both
hearings explaining that the U.S. does not have the traditional diplomatic, military, and
intelligence footprint in Syria to provide law enforcement with lists of known or suspected
terrorists.519 Thus, while the U.S. may have a system that ensures that all databases are touched
during the vetting process, “you can only review against what you have.” 520
Biometric Entry-Exit Program
Terrorists have exploited the U.S. immigration system to enter and remain in the U.S., often by
entering the country lawfully but then unlawfully remaining in the country after their visa
expired.521 To address this, Congress has passed eight statutes mandating some form of an entryexit system to track those transiting the country.522 In 2004, the 9/11 Commission Report
recommended DHS “complete, as quickly as possible, a biometric entry-exit screening
system.”523 That year, DHS “fully implemented a biometric air entry solution into existing
inspection booths”524 and fully deployed a biometric land entry system in 2005.525 To date, DHS
has spent approximately $1 billion on the implementation of a biometric entry-exit program;
however, a biometric exit solution still does not exist.526
Non-U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents seeking to travel to the U.S. either obtain a
temporary visa at a U.S. consulate abroad or enter through the VWP (see above).527 All arriving
travelers that are not previously cleared through CBP’s preclearance program (see below) are

518

Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th
Cong. (2015) (statement of Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the
Director of National Intelligence).
519
Id. (“the intelligence picture we have of this particular conflict zone is not as rich as we would like it to be.”); see
also Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Nicholas J. Rasmussen,
Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence).
520
Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th
Cong. (2015) (statement of Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the
Director of National Intelligence).
521
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 527–528 (2004).
522
See Pub. L. No. 104-208 (1996); Pub. L. No. 106-215 (2000); Pub. L. No. 106-396 (2000); Pub. L. No. 107-56,
(2001); Pub. L. No. 107-173 (2002); Pub. L. No. 108-458 (2004); Pub. L. No. 110-53 (2007); Pub. L. No. 113-76
(2013).
523
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 389 (2004) (emphasis added).
524
Fulfilling A Key 9/11 Commission Recommendation: Implementing Biometric Exit, Hearing Before the House
SubComm. on Border and Maritime of the Comm. on Homeland Security, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of David
Hayman, John Wagner, and John P. Woods, U.S. Department of Homeland Security), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/09/26/written-testimony-cbp-and-ice-house-homeland-security-subcommitteeborder-and.
525
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S.-VISIT UPDATE: DHS COMPLETES FOUNDATION OF BIOMETRIC ENTRY
SYSTEM, http://www.fosterglobal.com/news/BiometricEntrySystem.pdf.
526
See Securing the Border: Biometric Entry and Exit at our Ports of Entry: Public Roundtable Before the Comm.
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong (2015).
527
Lisa Seghetti, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43356, BORDER SECURITY: IMMIGRATION INSPECTIONS AT PORTS OF
ENTRY 6 (2015).

61

 “subject to inspection [] by a CBP officer prior to entering the United States.”528 Travelers may
also “be selected through risk-based screening or at random” for further scrutiny.529
When a passenger makes an airline reservation, a Passenger Name Record (PNR) is created
which includes, among other things, the passenger’s itinerary, name, date of birth, and passport
details.530 The airline is required to provide to CBP the PNR up to and continuously within 72
hours in advance of travel so that CBP can begin to build a manifest of the passenger.531 For
international flights to the U.S., carriers must transmit passenger and crew manifests to CBP’s
Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) before departure, prior to securing the aircraft
doors, to confirm the passenger actually got on the plane.532 Both “PNR and APIS data [] are
forwarded to CBP’s National Targeting Center (NTC), where they are vetted against intelligence
and law enforcement databases.” 533 Thereafter, the data is sent to the Arrival and Departure
Information System (ADIS) to “be held for matching against departure records.”534 ADIS is a
biographic database that reads identity documents, such as a traveler’s name, date of birth,
nationality, gender, and passport number.535 APIS data sent to ADIS “allows DHS to identify air
travelers who may have overstayed their visas.”536 Entry-exit data is also stored in a biometric
database, known as the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT). IDENT is a fully
biometric database and includes biographic information, biometric data (all 10 fingerprints), and
a report regarding a person’s previous immigration record.537
DHS has utilized several different pilot programs to implement a biometric exit solution. From
2004 to 2007 DHS placed biometric collection kiosks inside secure checkpoints and biometric
collection mobile devices in departure gate areas at 12 airports and two seaports.538 However, a
series of GAO reports during this time period highlighted concerns with the pilot.539
528

Id.; see also U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, CBP SEARCH AUTHORITY,
http://www.cbp.gov/travel/cbp-search-authority.
529
Id.
530
See Securing the Border: Biometric Entry and Exit at our Ports of Entry: Public Roundtable Before the Comm.
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong (2015).
531
Lisa Seghetti, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43356, BORDER SECURITY: IMMIGRATION INSPECTIONS AT PORTS OF
ENTRY 9 (2015).
532
Id.; see also Eleven Years Later: Preventing Terrorists from Coming to America: Hearing Before the House
SubComm. on Border and Maritime of the Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Kevin
McAleenan, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection).
533
Lisa Seghetti, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43356, BORDER SECURITY: IMMIGRATION INSPECTIONS AT PORTS OF
ENTRY 10 (2015).
534
Implementation of an Entry-Exit System: Still Waiting After All These Years: Hearing Before the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of David Heyman, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Department of
Homeland Security).
535
Lisa Seghetti, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43356, BORDER SECURITY: IMMIGRATION INSPECTIONS AT PORTS OF
ENTRY 22 (2015).
536
Id. at 27.
537
Id. at 23.
538
Id. at 26.
539
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 04-586, HOMELAND SECURITY: FIRST PHASE OF VISITOR AND
IMMIGRATION STATUS PROGRAM OPERATING, BUT IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED (2004); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-05-202, HOMELAND SECURITY: SOME PROGRESS MADE, BUT MANY CHALLENGES REMAIN ON U.S.
VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT STATUS INDICATOR TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM (2005); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,

62

 Specifically, GAO found that, on average, only 24 percent of travelers subject to the pilot
complied with the exit procedure.540
In 2009, DHS employed a departure biometric pilot program at Atlanta International Airport and
Detroit Metropolitan Airport, collecting digital fingerprints of non-U.S. citizens at boarding
gates.541 Despite concluding that the pilot generally confirmed that biometric exit data could be
collected, in 2010, DHS adopted a plan to focus in the near-term on enhanced biographic data
collection and analysis to identify potential overstays, and to invest in research and development
of emerging biometric technology to be employed in a future exit system.542
In 2013, CBP and the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) announced their plan to
develop a test facility to examine biometric technology and operational concepts to advance a
biometric exit program at air and sea ports.543 Also in 2013, “CBP and S&T initiated a joint Air
Entry/Exit Re-Engineering (AEER) Apex project” to test both processes and technologies “to
determine how and when a biometric air exit concept would be feasible.”544 For example, at the
test facility, S&T is currently testing the efficacy of three biometric technologies—fingerprint,
retinal scan, and facial recognition equipment—and potential approaches to implement the
technologies at U.S. airports.545 Based on the best performing concepts and operations, in
FY2016, DHS plans to initiate a field trial at one U.S. airport.546
Meanwhile, in July 2015, CBP launched its testing of “an enhanced mobile device to collect
biometric exit data from a limited number of foreign national air travelers departing the U.S. at
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport.”547 As to the land border, CBP plans to initiate

GAO-06-296, HOMELAND SECURITY: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF KEY BORDER SECURITY
PROGRAM NEED TO BE IMPLEMENTED (2006); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 07-1044T, HOMELAND
SECURITY: PROSPECTS FOR BIOMETRIC US-VISIT EXIT CAPABILITY REMAIN UNCLEAR (2007).
540
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-296, HOMELAND SECURITY: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE
MANAGEMENT OF KEY BORDER SECURITY PROGRAM NEED TO BE IMPLEMENTED 45 (2006).
541
DHS Begins Test of Biometric Exit Procedures at Two U.S. Airports, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (May
29, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/05/29/dhs-begins-test-biometric-exit-procedures-two-us-airports.
542
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, COMPREHENSIVE BIOMETRIC AIR EXIT PLAN, FISCAL YEAR 2012 REPORT
TO CONGRESS 3 (2012).
543
See Securing the Border: Biometric Entry and Exit at our Ports of Entry: Public Roundtable Before the Comm.
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of John Wagner, Assistant
Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection).
544
Fulfilling a Key 9/11 Commission Recommendation: Implementing Biometric Exit: Hearing Before the H.
SubComm. on Border and Maritime Security of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement
of U.S. Customs and Border Protection & U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement).
545
Data provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection during a tour of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security Science & Technology facility in Maryland (Aug. 11, 2015).
546
Id.; see also Securing the Border: Biometric Entry and Exit at our Ports of Entry: Public Roundtable Before the
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Arun Vemury, Chief,
AEER Pilot, Directors of Science & Technology, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
547
CBP Begins Testing an Enhanced Handheld Mobile Device to Collect Biometric Data, U.S. CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION (July 14, 2015), http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/2015-07-14000000/cbp-begins-testing-enhanced-handheld-mobile-device.

63

 a facial recognition biometric pilot for pedestrians exiting the U.S. at the Otay Mesa POE in the
San Diego sector by early December 2015.548
Preclearance Agreements
The U.S. also operates a number of preclearance facilities at airports in foreign countries.
According to DHS, “Preclearance is the process by which CBP officers stationed abroad screen
and make admissibility decisions about passengers and their accompanying goods or baggage
heading to the U.S. before they leave a foreign port.”549 Committee witnesses have testified as to
the benefits of preclearance, in that it helps expand our borders and provide important
information to CBP officers prior to persons entering the country. 550 This effectively adds an
additional layer of defense.
Preclearance travelers go through customs, immigration, and agriculture inspections all before
leaving the foreign port.551 The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) requires that the
screening of both passengers and their property at foreign preclearance airports conforms to U.S.
aviation security screening standards.552 This ensures that, upon the arrival to the U.S.,
passengers can disembark without needing to be rescreened.553
The purpose of this process is to enable “CBP to stop potential threats before they arrive on U.S.
soil.”554 At a Committee briefing, CBP explained that current preclearance agreements save the
U.S. $25 million in detention costs annually. 555 In addition, preclearance helps streamline border
procedures by reducing congestion at POEs as well as facilitating travel between U.S. ports and
those foreign ports that are equipped for preclearance. Moreover, CBP has entered into publicprivate partnerships with foreign ports that enable the foreign port to fund up to 85 percent of
CBP’s preclearance operations.
Currently, preclearance is available at most major Canadian airports.556 There are also
preclearance locations in Aruba, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Ireland, and the United Arab
Emirates.557

548

Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 2015).
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, PRECLEARANCE LOCATIONS, http://www.cbp.gov/bordersecurity/ports-entry/operations/preclearance.
550
See Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Northern Border: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).
551
DHS Announces Intent to Expand Preclearance to 10 New Airports, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (May
29, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/05/29/dhs-announces-intent-expand-preclearance-10-new-airports.
552
Id.
553
Id.
554
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, DHS Announces Intent to Expand Preclearance to 10 New Airports, PRESS
RELEASE (May 29, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/05/29/dhs-announces-intent-expand-preclearance-10new-airports.
555
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, PRECLEARANCE OPERATIONS: OVERVIEW BRIEF (2015) (on file with
Majority Staff).
556
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, PRECLEARANCE LOCATIONS, http://www.cbp.gov/bordersecurity/ports-entry/operations/preclearance.
549

64

 On May 29, 2015, Secretary Johnson announced the U.S.’s intention “to enter into negotiations
to expand air preclearance options to ten new foreign airports, located in nine separate countries:
Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and
the United Kingdom.”558 According to the Department, CBP coordinated with TSA and the
State Department to identify these new airports “and prioritized them based on the greatest
potential to support security and travel facilitation.”559 Last year, approximately 20 million
passengers traveled to the U.S. from these 10 airports.560
DHS is also interested in expanding preclearance to other modes of transportation. On March
16, 2015, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson and Canadian Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness Steve Blaney signed the Agreement on Land, Rail, Marine, and Air Transport
Preclearance, which will provide the legal framework to locate CBP and CBSA personnel to
offer preclearance at more locations and modes of transportation in both countries.561
Essentially, this agreement will: 1) provide security updates that accurately reflect the post 9/11
operating environments; 2) enable preclearance at cruise, rail, and ferry terminals that currently
only receive pre-inspection;562 3) allow CBP and CBSA officers to carry firearms and restraining
devices at preclearance locations;563 and 4) “enable the exploration of co-location at small and
remote ports.”564 To implement, both the U.S. and Canada would have to enact legislation.

557

The airports are: Calgary International Airport, Edmonton International Airport, Halifax Stanfield International
Airport, Montreal-Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport, Ottawa Macdonald-Cartier International Airport,
Toronto Pearson International Airport, Vancouver International Airport, Winnipeg James Armstrong Richardson
International Airport (Canada), Bermuda International Airport (Bermuda), Grand Bahama International Airport,
Lynden Pindling International Airport (The Bahamas), Queen Beatrix International Airport (Aruba), Dublin Airport,
Shannon Airport (Ireland), Abu Dhabi Airport, Dubai International Airport (United Arab Emirates). Id.
558
DHS Announces Intent to Expand Preclearance to 10 New Airports, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (May
29, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/05/29/dhs-announces-intent-expand-preclearance-10-new-airports. (The
10 airports are: Brussels Airport, Belgium; Punta Cana Airport, Dominican Republic; Narita International Airport,
Japan; Amsterdam Airport Schipol, Netherlands; Oslo Airport, Norway; Madrid-Barajas Airport, Spain; Stockholm
Arlanda Airport, Sweden; Istanbul Ataturk Airport, Turkey; London Heathrow Airport, Manchester Airport, UK).
559
Id.
560
Id.
561
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATE AND CANADA SIGN PRECLEARANCE AGREEMENT,
(2015), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/03/16/united-states-and-canada-sign-preclearance-agreement.
562
While CBP conducts preclearance at Canadian airports, it currently only provides “pre-inspection” at Canadian
rail stations. Amtrak estimates that full preclearance could save the passenger 10 to 20 minutes per trip from
Canada to the U.S. by eliminating the required Customs stop in Blaine, Washington. Majority Staff observations
during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 2015).
563
Currently CBP officers stationed in Canada are not permitted to carry their firearms and must rely on Canadian
police if assistance is needed.
564
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATE AND CANADA SIGN PRECLEARANCE AGREEMENT,
(2015), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/03/16/united-states-and-canada-sign-preclearance-agreement.

65

 Part V: Understanding the Root Causes of Immigration
In FY2014, more than 479,000 people were apprehended along the southwest border, more than
3,300 people were apprehended at the northern border, and more than 7,500 were apprehended
across the maritime border.565 Moreover, countless people entered the U.S. lawfully at a port of
entry but have since overstayed their visas. While these numbers may be somewhat down from
the late 1990s and early 2000s when infrastructure, technology, and manpower at our borders
were virtually nonexistent, they still remain high. And, given, the powerful pull factors in this
country, migration to the U.S. will remain high for a very long time.
For starters, the wage gap, or the difference between what a migrant can earn in this country as
compared to his home country, remains “the main economic factor influencing migration.” 566 As
this gap sits at approximately $5 to $1 in Mexico and perhaps as much as $8 to $1 in Central
American countries, we can expect migration to the U.S. to continue as people seek the
opportunity to work and make money for their families.567
Moreover, U.S. policies create powerful pull factors that incentivize people to illegally migrate
to the country. As an example, due to current law the U.S. is unable to immediately repatriate
unaccompanied minors from noncontiguous countries.568 Instead, the minor must first receive an
immigration hearing. In practice, once these minors receive their immigration hearings and a
final order of removal is rendered, the federal government does not prioritize their removal. In
fact, since 2009, DHS has apprehended 122,700 unaccompanied children from El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras, but ICE has only repatriated approximately 7,700, or 6 percent.569 In
the last several years this powerful signal has resulted in a substantial influx of Central
Americans unlawfully migrating to and remaining in the U.S.570

565

See UNITED STATES BORDER PATROL TOTAL ILLEGAL ALIEN APPREHENSIONS BY MONTH,
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Total%20Monthly%20Apps%20by%20Sector%20and%20
Area%2C%20FY2000-FY2014_0.pdf. Since the U.S. Coast Guard also interdicts a significant number of migrants
at our maritime border, a full representation of maritime apprehensions adds these two data points together. See
U.S. COAST GUARD MARITIME MIGRANT INTERDICTIONS,
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/FlowStats/currentstats.asp.
566
Bryan Roberts, Edward Alden, John Whitley, Managing Illegal Immigration to the United States: How Effective
is Enforcement?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 8 (2013) (citing Michael Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, and
Lant Pritchett, The Place Premium: Wage Differences for Identical Workers across the U.S. Border, CENTER FOR
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT (2008)).
567
Id. at 9, Appendix 2: Wage Gap and Other Trends in Central American Source Countries,
http://www.cfr.org/immigration/managing-illegal-immigration-united-states/p30658.
568
Section 235 of TVPRA codified expedited removals for children from contiguous countries and mandated the
transfer of children from non-contiguous countries to the Department of Health and Human Services. Pub. L. No.
110-457 (2008).
569
See The 2014 Humanitarian Crisis at our Border: A Review of the Government’s Response to Unaccompanied
Minors One Year Later: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong.
(2015); Ongoing Migration from Central America: An Examination of FY2015 Apprehensions: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).
570
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, SOUTHWEST BORDER UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN,
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children.

66

 Central American Migration to the U.S.
In 2014, unaccompanied minors attempted to cross the southwest border in alarming numbers.
From FY2009 to FY2013, CBP officers apprehended mostly Mexican minors attempting to enter
the U.S.571 However, in FY2014 and for the first time, the number of UACs from El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras unlawfully entering the U.S. exceeded the number of UACs from
Mexico.572 In FY2015, apprehensions of UACs slightly declined, however numbers began to
increase in July, and by August monthly apprehensions surpassed that of FY2014.
Table 4. Unaccompanied Alien Children Encountered by CBP 573
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
Country
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
El Salvador
1,221
1,910
1,394
3,314
5,990
16,404
9,389
Guatemala
1,115
1,517
1,565
3,835
8,068
17,057 13,589
Honduras
968
1,017
974
2,997
6,747
18,244
5,409
Total
3,304
4,444
3,933
10,146 20,805 51,705 28,387
DHS, the State Department, and USAID currently have several programs that attempt to stem the
flow of Central American migrants to the U.S.-Mexico border. These efforts are focused on
confronting the perceptions of U.S. immigration law, dismantling human smuggling networks,
and tackling the corruption and citizen security in Central America.574 The Administration
argues that investing in Central American communities can decrease the need for those
countries’ citizens to migrate and significantly reduce the business of human smugglers, run by
coyotes.575 To that end, the Administration has proposed a $1 billion aid package aimed at
confronting the root causes of the 2014 UAC surge.576 However, the U.S. has provided billions
of dollars in assistance in the past (see Table 7), and CBP continues to report large numbers of
migrants attempting to enter the U.S.577
While some outside experts report that the spike in UACs last summer was generated by startling
levels of drug and gang-related violence in Central America, according to an EPIC report,
perceptions of U.S. immigration policy that led people to believe they would be able to remain in
571

Id.
Id.
573
Id.
574
Remarks by the President on Border Security and Immigration Reform, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 30, 2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/30/remarks-president-border-security-and-immigrationreform.
575
Unaccompanied Alien Minors: Pressing the Administration for a Strategy: Hearing Before the House SubComm.
on the Western Hemisphere of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Roberta S.
Jacobson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State).
576
WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: PROMOTING PROSPERITY, SECURITY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL
AMERICA, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/29/fact-sheet-promoting-prosperity-security-andgood-governance-central-ame.
577
Douglas Farah, Five Myths about the Border Crisis, WASH POST (Aug. 8, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-the-border-crisis/2014/08/08/1ec90bea-1ce3-11e4ab7b-696c295ddfd1_story.html.
572

67

 the U.S. also drove the surge.578 Such policies include the President’s DACA, DHS’s catch and
release policy, and the TVPRA of 2008.579 For example, according to interviews conducted by
GAO, Guatemalans believe they will be eligible for DACA or amnesty provided in
comprehensive immigration reform, while Hondurans told GAO they believed “migrant minors,
mothers traveling with minors, and pregnant women” can remain in the U.S.580 On a recent
CODEL to Central America the President of Honduras warned Members of the Committee to be
very clear in the laws that they draft, as ambiguities will be exploited by coyotes.
HHS Response
Pursuant to the TVPRA, children from noncontiguous countries that unlawfully enter the U.S.
must be transferred to HHS within 72 hours of apprehension while waiting for an immigration
court hearing; they cannot be immediately repatriated to their home countries.581 According to
HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), between October 1, 2013 and August 31, 2015,
HHS released a total of 77,220 UACs to sponsors in the United States.582
Table 5. States Accommodating UACs583
State
FY2014
FY2015*
Texas
7,416
2,769
California
5,842
3,061
New York
5,956
2,229
Florida
5,447
2,485
Maryland
3,885
1,497
Virginia
3,886
1,375
Wisconsin
84
33
All States
53,550
23,670
* FY2015 as of August 31, 2015

Total
10,185
8,903
8,185
7,932
5,382
5,261
117
77,220

ORR believes its responsibility to track and retain custody of UACs ends when the child is
released to the sponsor.584 ORR officials argue that sponsors are responsible for ensuring UACs
578

EL PASO INTELLIGENCE CENTER, MISPERCEPTIONS OF U.S. POLICY KEY DRIVER IN CENTRAL AMERICAN
MIGRANT SURGE (2014) (Children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras arrived in large numbers after
hearing rumors that the U.S. Government would stop issuing free passes or permisos after June 2014).
579
Section 235 of TVPRA codified expedited removals for children from contiguous countries and mandated the
transfer of children from non-contiguous countries to the Department of Health and Human Services. Pub. L. No.
110-457 (2008).
580
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-707, CENTRAL AMERICA: IMPROVED EVALUATION EFFORTS COULD
ENHANCE AGENCY PROGRAMS TO REDUCE UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN MIGRATION 10 (2015).
581
Id.
582
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, UNACCOMPANIED
CHILDREN RELEASED TO SPONSORS BY STATE, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/ucs/state-by-state-ucplaced-sponsors. Unfortunately, data provided by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ), and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is inconsistent and fails to
match up.
583
Id.
584
Data provided to Majority Staff by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (June 23, 2015).

68

 attend their court hearing and notifying DHS and the DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration
Review (EOIR) if the UAC relocates to a different address.585 The lack of follow-up and
secondary screening by has led to some dangerous situations for these unaccompanied minors.586
For example, press reports have revealed situations in which a 13-year-old boy was forced to
work rather than attend school to pay off his smuggling debt and eventually became homeless.587
In another case, a 14-year-old Salvadoran girl was placed with distant relatives who later passed
her on to other relatives that abused her.588 And, finally, a 16-year-old Honduran girl was
released to a man who had her smuggled in and then molested her.589
On June 16, 2015, ORR issued two new requests for proposals (RFPs) for contracts to aid
UACs.590 The first RFP seeks multiple regional contractors who have the capability to provide
legal services to UACs. These selected contractors would be responsible for 1) managing the
“Know Your Rights” presentations;591 2) legal screening procedures to identify UACs that meet
the criteria for immigration relief; 3) securing pro-bono legal counsel for hearings before EOIR;
and 4) at times directly representing UACs.592 ORR began the contracting process on August 1,
2015, for a period of three years.593
For the second RFP, contractors will be responsible for supporting child advocate programs in
Brownsville; Houston; Chicago; Newark; New York City; Washington, DC; Baltimore; Phoenix;
San Antonio; and Miami.594 ORR will spend $31 million for legal services and direct
representation, which, combined with other programs, will total $58 million in FY2015.595 As
for the child advocate program, ORR will spend $3.5 million between FY2015 and FY2017. 596

585

Id.
Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Young Immigrants Placed in Sponsor Homes are at Risk of Abuse, Experts Say, LA
TIMES (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigrant-sponsors-20150818-story.html.
587
Id.
588
Id.
589
Id.
590
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT (ON BEHALF OF THE
OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT), REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL, RFP 15-233-SOL-00264 (June 15, 2015); U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT (ON BEHALF OF THE OFFICE OF
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT), REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL, RFP 15-233-SOL-00327 (June 15, 2015).
591
“Know Your Rights” (KYRs) presentations provide information to UACs on why they are in custody, the various
forms of immigration legal relief, the sponsorship process, the various government agencies involved in the child’s
immigration case, and what to expect at immigration court. This information is provided to UACs via a cartoon
video. ORR also funds legal service providers local to the shelters to provide these KYRs to UACs.
592
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT (ON BEHALF OF
THE OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT), REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL, RFP 15-233-SOL-00264 (June 15, 2015).
593
Id.
594
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT (ON BEHALF OF THE
OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT), REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL, RFP 15-233-SOL-00327 (June 15, 2015).
595
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT (ON BEHALF OF
THE OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT), REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL, RFP 15-233-SOL-00264 (June 15, 2015).
596
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT (ON BEHALF OF THE
OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT), REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL, RFP 15-233-SOL-00327 (June 15, 2015).
586

69

 However, earlier this year the Senate Appropriations Committee rejected a $50 million request
by the Administration to pay for legal help for UACs. 597 During a HSGAC hearing ORR was
questioned about their authority to pay for legal counsel, as federal law calls on HHS to ensure
that unaccompanied minors receive counsel to the greatest extent practicable but at no expense to
the government.598 ORR asserted it believes it has the authority to pay for counsel, but it has an
obligation to rely on pro bono services to the greatest extent possible.599
DOJ Response
EOIR is responsible for adjudicating immigration cases as well as removal proceedings. 600
According to EOIR, since July 18, 2014, the agency has been prioritizing the cases of: 1)
unaccompanied children; 2) adults with a child or children who are a part of DHS’s Alternative
to Detention program (ATD); 3) adults with a child or children who are detained; and 4) recent
border crossers who are detained.601 Additionally, EOIR has set the goal for scheduling UAC’s
first master calendar hearing no less than 10 days and no more than 21 days from the date of
their issued NTA. For adults with children and those in the ATD program, EOIR attempts to
have them appear before an immigration judge no less than 10 days and no more than 28 days
from when DHS released them on parole with a NTA.602
EOIR began tracking UAC removals in July 2014, establishing a new case recording system that
coincided with the agency’s announcement of its revised adjudication priorities in response to
the UAC surge.603 EOIR data from July 18, 2014 through August 25, 2015 shows that DHS
issued 38,211 NTAs to UACs that unlawfully crossed the U.S. border in the past two fiscal
years.604 As of August 25, 2015, EOIR has processed 31,035 cases requiring UACs to appear
before an immigration judge for their initial master hearing. 605
Of these cases, 14,613 cases have been completed, of which in 7,571 cases the judge ordered the
UAC removed.606 Of these removal orders, 6,611 were rendered in absentia, meaning that the
UAC did not show up to the hearing.607 Decisions rendered in absentia proceed to a final order
of removal, generally clearing the legal hurdles for ICE to begin the UAC’s removal
597

Led by Shelby, Senate Blocks Legal Fund for Immigrant Children, AP (June 10, 2015),
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/06/led_by_shelby_senate_blocks_le.html.
598
See The 2014 Humanitarian Crisis at our Border: A Review of the Government’s Response to Unaccompanied
Minors One Year Later: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong.
(2015).
599
Id.
600
Id. (statement of Juan P. Osuna, Director, Executive Office of Immigration Review, U.S. Department of Justice).
601
Adults without children are eligible for expedited removal and do not need to go in front of an EOIR judge unless
they claim a certain protection, such as asylum.
602
Id.
603
Securing the Border: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Central American Migration to the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015)
(statement of William Kandel, Analyst in Immigration Policy, Congressional Research Service).
604
Data provided to Majority Staff by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (Sept, 1 2015).
605
Id.
606
Id.
607
Id.

70

 proceedings. However, ICE has not repatriated most UACs with a final order of removal,
claiming instead it prioritizes the repatriations of higher value targets, such as criminal aliens.608
DHS Response
On November 20, 2014 Secretary Johnson issued a memorandum on enforcement priorities, as
part of a larger package of executive actions announced by the President. 609 Currently, ICE’s
highest priority is the removal of individuals who represent a threat to U.S. national security,
border security, and public safety. 610 Priority 1 removals include illegal aliens engaged in or
suspected of terrorism or espionage and illegal aliens convicted or with a violent criminal
record.611 Priority 2 encompasses illegal aliens convicted of three or more misdemeanors and
illegal aliens who overstay their visas.612 Lastly, Priority 3 generally targets illegal aliens with a
final order of removal issued after December 31, 2013.613
Table 6. UAC Removals by Country of Citizenship, FY2009-FY2015614
Country
FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014
El Salvador
96
117
136
136
159
190
Guatemala
534
520
515
626
661
686
Honduras
352
326
297
430
461
503
Total
982
963
948
1,192
1,281
1,379

FY 2015
167
519
339
1,025

Since 2009, DHS has apprehended 122,700 unaccompanied children from El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras, but ICE has only repatriated approximately 7,700, or 6 percent.615
ICE was asked during a Committee hearing what signal is sent to people in Central America that
as an unaccompanied child, if you reach the U.S., you have more than a 90 percent chance of
being able to stay.616 ICE did not answer the question.617 According to El Salvador officials,
“when a potential migrant hears from someone in the United States who has managed to arrive
and remain there undocumented, the communications can strongly influence their decision on
608

See The 2014 Humanitarian Crisis at our Border: A Review of the Government’s Response to Unaccompanied
Minors One Year Later: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong.
(2015).
609
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, MEMORANDUM TO THOMAS S. WINKOWSKI, ACTING DIRECTOR, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, R. GIL KERLIKOWSKE, COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, LEON RODRIQUEZ, DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, AND ALAN D. BERSIN,
ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, FROM JEH CHARLES JOHNSON, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
POLICIES FOR THE APPREHENSION, DETENTION, AND REMOVAL OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS (Nov. 20, 2014).
610
Id.
611
Id.
612
Id.
613
Id.
614
Data provided to Majoirty Staff by the Department of Homeland Security (July 25, 2015).
615
See The 2014 Humanitarian Crisis at our Border: A Review of the Government’s Response to Unaccompanied
Minors One Year Later: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong.
(2015); Ongoing Migration from Central America: An Examination of FY2015 Apprehensions: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).
616
Id.
617
Id.

71

 whether to migrate.”618 GAO recently testified as a Committee hearing that children use social
media to let those in their home countries know they made it to and were able to remain in the
U.S., further incentivizing others to embark on the dangerous journey to the United States.619
In June 2014, DHS started to challenge perceptions of U.S. immigration policy. Secretary
Johnson warned Central American parents that their “child will not benefit from DACA if they
come here now,” reminding Central Americans that “DACA is for those who came here 7 years
ago.”620 DHS’s “Danger Awareness Campaign” aimed to dissuade parents from sending their
children with smugglers warning that: 1) “the journey is too dangerous;” 2) “children will not get
legal papers if they [arrive in the U.S.]”; and 3) children “are the future—let’s protect them.”621
The advertisements targeted communities in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, as well as
American cities with significant Central American populations such as Houston, Los Angeles,
Miami, and New York.622 In total, taxpayers spent approximately $1 million on billboards, TV
commercials, and radio announcements between June 30 and October 12, 2014.623 A recent
GAO report has called for more review on the effectiveness of these campaigns before
continuing them.624 According to GAO, DHS and the State Department’s lack of review as to
whether these campaigns have been effective is not only costly for the U.S. taxpayer, but also
costly to unaccompanied minors and their families who ignore the campaigns and risk their lives
to make the dangerous journey to the U.S.625 Despite this, in August 2015 DHS announced a
new $1.2 million campaign called “Know the Facts” to emphasize that pursuant to U.S. law and
policy immediate deportations will be a priority. 626
Other DHS efforts include working with the State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration (PRM) to employ a new refugee program to provide a legal alternative to parents who
618

GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-707, CENTRAL AMERICA: IMPROVED EVALUATION EFFORTS COULD
ENHANCE AGENCY PROGRAMS TO REDUCE UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN MIGRATION 11 (2015).
619
Ongoing Migration from Central America: An Examination of FY2015 Apprehensions: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Kimberly M.
Gianopoulos, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office).
620
Transcript of DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson’s Press Conference at U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Headquarters. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (July 12, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/transcript-dhs-secretaryjohnson’s-press-conference.
621
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, CBP ADDRESSES HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES OF UNACCOMPANIED
CHILD MIGRANTS, http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/humanitarian-challenges.
622
Feds Launch Campaign to Discourage Migrants from Dangerous Trek to U.S., CBS NEWS (July 3, 2014),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/federal-officials-launch-campaign-to-discourage-migrants-from-making-dangeroustrek-to-u-s/.
623
Id.
624
See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-707, CENTRAL AMERICA: IMPROVED EVALUATION EFFORTS
COULD ENHANCE AGENCY PROGRAMS TO REDUCE UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN MIGRATION 40–41 (2015).
625
See id. (“Carrying out ineffective campaigns could lead to higher levels of migration to the United States, which
is not only potentially costly in terms of U.S. taxpayer resources but costly and dangerous to the migrants and their
families.”).
626
Marty Graham, U.S. Ads Target Illegal Immigration from Central America, REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/18/us-usa-border-ads-idUSKCN0QN26920150818. Ironically, the Majority
Staff notes that these are not the facts and that it is actually highly unlikely that unaccompanied minors from Central
America will be deported, as indicated by the statistics provided above.

72

 wish to bring their children to the U.S.627 On November 14, 2014, Vice President Biden
announced the in-country refugee/parole program for minors in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras with parents lawfully present in the U.S.628 This program allows individuals living in
the U.S. to request a refugee visa for unmarried children under the age of 21. 629 Additionally, if
the second parent in Central America is lawfully married to the parent in the U.S., the second
parent will be included with the child’s petition, making the second parent a candidate for
refugee and parole status.630
Pursuant to this program, a parent under one of the following categories can request program
access: 1) Lawful Permanent Resident; 2) Temporary Protected Status; 3) Parolee, granted for at
least a year; 4) DACA recipient; 5) Deferred Action recipient, granted for at least a year; 6)
Deferred Enforced Departure recipient; and 7) Withholding of Removal grantee.631 The
Administration allocated 4,000 refuge visas for this program out of the 70,000 globally available.
According to the State Department, as of September 14, 2015, processing centers have received
4,253 applications: 3,636 in El Salvador, 532 in Honduras, and 85 in Guatemala.632
Finally, on June 24, 2015, Secretary Johnson announced a change to family detention
practices.633 Due to the TVPRA and Flores Agreement, DHS is unable to immediately repatriate
or hold unaccompanied minors in detention facilities. However, adults may be immediately
repatriated and family units can be detained. At a Committee Hearing, Secretary Johnson
attributed the decline in the migration of unaccompanied minors this year to the reduction in the
repatriation times for the adults, increased returning flights, and expanded family unit detention
space.634
Despite this recognition, two month later Secretary Johnson announced the Department’s plans
to release on bond detained family units able to present a credible fear case.635 According to
DHS, the family’s bond will be set “at a level that is reasonable and realistic, taking into account
627

Unaccompanied Alien Minors: Pressing the Administration for a Strategy: Hearing Before the House SubComm.
on the Western Hemisphere of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Roberta S.
Jacobson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State).
628
Ricardo Zuniga, Promoting Prosperity and Security in Central America, THE WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 14, 2014)
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/11/14/promoting-prosperity-and-security-central-america.
629
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION, IN-COUNTRY
REFUGEE/PAROLE PROGRAM FOR MINORS IN EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND HONDURAS WITH PARENTS
LAWFULLY PRESENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2014),
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2014/234067.htm.
630
Id.
631
Data provided to Majority Staff by U.S. Department of State’s Office of Bureau of Population, Refugees and
Migration (Sept. 22, 2015).
632
Id.
633
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, STATEMENT BY SECRETARY JEH C. JOHNSON ON FAMILY RESIDENTIAL
CENTERS, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/06/24/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson-family-residential-centers.
634
See The Homeland Security Department’s Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2016: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (Statement of Jeh Johnson, Secretary,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
635
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, STATEMENT BY SECRETARY JEH C. JOHNSON ON FAMILY RESIDENTIAL
CENTERS, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/06/24/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson-family-residential-centers.

73

 ability to pay, while also encompassing risk of flight and public safety.” 636 The Department still
appears to recognize that a recent ruling prohibiting all detention of illegal immigrant families
can actually entice more illegal immigration.637 According to DHS in filings with the court, “the
proposed remedies could heighten the risk of another surge in illegal migration across our
Southwest border by Central American families, including by incentivizing adults to bring
children with them on their dangerous journey as a means to avoid detention and gain access to
the interior of the United States.”638 DHS and the State Department have stated it is too early to
determine whether the recent increase in apprehensions at the border is related to this new policy.
Mexico Response
In FY2015, CBP apprehended 28,387 unaccompanied minors from Central America, somewhat
down from FY2014 levels.639 However, it is unclear how impactful U.S. efforts have been in
reducing the flow.640 According to research conducted by GAO, “individuals in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras give more credence to what they hear from relatives and friends than
to what they hear on the radio and television.”641 Instead, many experts point to Mexico’s
increased efforts to detain illegal migrants crossing the Mexico-Guatemala border as a major
reason behind lower apprehension numbers at the U.S.-Mexico border in FY2015.642
According to Mexico’s Ministry of Interior, from January 1 to August 31, 2015, Mexico detained
96,830 adults and 22,400 minors from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. These figures
represent a 64 percent increase in adults and 49 percent increase in minors compared to the same
period in the previous year, in which Mexico apprehended 58,930 Central American adults and
15,049 unaccompanied minors.643
In 2014, the State Department reprogrammed $80 million to help Mexico build up its border
patrol forces and capabilities to better manage its southern border.644 While the Mexican
Government has significantly increased its presence at the Mexico-Guatemala border, it still
faces many challenges.645 For example, on a recent CODEL to Central America, Members of the
636

Id.
Stephen Dinan, DHS Admits New Surge of Illegal Immigrant Families, Wash Times (Aug. 7, 2015),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/aug/7/dhs-admits-new-surge-illegal-immigrant-families/.
638
Id.
639
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, SOUTHWEST BORDER UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN,
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children.
640
See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-707, CENTRAL AMERICA: IMPROVED EVALUATION EFFORTS
COULD ENHANCE AGENCY PROGRAMS TO REDUCE UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN MIGRATION 36 (2015).
641
Id.
642
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-707, CENTRAL AMERICA: IMPROVED EVALUATION EFFORTS COULD
ENHANCE AGENCY PROGRAMS TO REDUCE UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN MIGRATION 4 (2015). (“Recent data
indicate the pace of migration from Central America remains high, though fewer migrants are being apprehended in
the United States.”).
643
Id.
644
Id.
645
Douglas Farah and Carl Meacham, Alternative Governance in the Northern Triangle and Implications for U.S.
Foreign Policy: Finding Logic within Chaos, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (Sept. 21, 2015),
http://csis.org/event/alternative-governance-northern-triangle-and-implications-us-foreign-policy-finding-logic-with
637

74

 Committee visited the Guatemala-Mexico border and witnessed a number of rafts, in broad
daylight, being utilized to transport contraband from Guatemala to Mexico.
Moreover, some observers suggest that increased UAC apprehensions in the U.S. in August and
September could be a result of smugglers finally finding new routes to avoid detection in
Mexico. This may explain why the Yuma and Big Bend sectors are seeing very large increases
in UACs, as compared to FY2014, as human smugglers begin to change their routes.
U.S. Assistance to Central America and the Dependency on Remittances
Including State Department and USAID regional programs, from FY2014 to FY2015, Congress
appropriated $754.8 million in bilateral assistance to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.646
Also, established in 2008 to assist Central American nations combatting TCOs, the Central
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) provides equipment, technical assistance, and
counternarcotic training to identify and dismantle TCOs and drug cartels.647 In FY2014, most of
CARSI’s $161.5 million budget was spent in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 648
Moreover, in 2006, El Salvador received a $461 million five-year compact through the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)649 to invest in education, public services, and
transportation infrastructure in its least developed region located near the border with Guatemala
and Honduras.650 Additionally, in 2014, El Salvador secured another $277 million compact to
fund a project to connect a border-crossing corridor with Honduras and to fund reforms aimed at
attracting foreign direct investment.651
While Guatemala has not received an MCC compact, in 2014 the MCC board approved a $28
million threshold program to support policies aimed at developing public-private partnerships
and to enhance the education system to meet 21st century workforce demands. 652 Finally,
Honduras secured a $205 million five-year grant in 2005 to fund transportation projects and to
improve rural development.653 This grant was not renewed because the government did not

646

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND RELATED
PROGRAMS, FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2015), http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/ebs/2016/.
647
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE PROGRAMS (INL/WHP), http://www.state.gov/j/inl/whp//.
648
Peter J. Meyer, Clare Ribando Seelke, Maureen Taft-Morales, and Rhonda Margesson, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R 43702, UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN FROM CENTRAL AMERICA: FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS (2015).
649
In 2004, Congressed established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to provide economic assistance to
developing countries committed to investing in its society, principles of economic freedom, and good governance.
650
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, EL SALVADOR COMPACT, https://www.mcc.gov/where-wework/program/el-salvador-compact.
651
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, EL SALVADOR INVESTMENT COMPACT, https://www.mcc.gov/wherewe-work/program/el-salvador-investment-compact.
652
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, GUATEMALA THRESHOLD PROGRAM, https://www.mcc.gov/where-wework/program/guatemala-threshold-program.
653
Maria Rizza Leonzon, No MCC Aid Renewal for Honduras, DEVEX (Jan. 7, 2011),
https://www.devex.com/news/no-mcc-aid-renewal-for-honduras-72002.

75

 address corruption. However, in 2013, the MCC approved a $15.6 million threshold program to
build Honduras’s public finances management capacity. 654
A recent GAO report highlighted concerns with the effectiveness of current U.S. assistance. 655
Specifically, GAO examined an interagency agreement between the State Department and DOJ
to train Honduran prosecutors and found upon its visit to Honduras that there were no active
prosecutors trying cases in Tegucigalpa, the country’s capitol.656 In El Salvador, GAO observed
“a computer lab filled with computers recently provided by USAID but with no teacher
present.”657 Apparently, the Salvadoran Ministry of Education had not yet provided salaries for
the teachers.658
Table 7. U.S. Assistance to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras659
FY2012-FY2016 in million dollars*
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014
FY2015
FY2016
Country/Program (expended)
(expended) (expended)
(allocated)
(requested)
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
USAID regional
State regional
CARSI
Total

54
102.6
93.2
N/A
N/A
Incl.
250

50
91.2
91.6
N/A
N/A
Incl.
232.8

44.5
88.1
78.0
N/A
N/A
Incl.
210.6

46.6
107.2
71.2
49.2
N/A
270
544.2

119.2
220.6
163
64.5
127.1
286.5
980.9

2,218.5

*FY2012 to FY2014 figures include aid provided by the State Department, USAID, DHS, and the Inter-American
Foundation. FY2015 to FY2016 figures only include funds from the State Department and USAID.

In an op-ed published earlier this year, Vice President Biden wrote about the Administration’s
response to the large migration from Central America in 2014 stating, “The challenges ahead are
formidable. But if the political will exists, there is no reason Central America cannot become the
next great success story of the Western Hemisphere.”660 Showing their commitment to
improving conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, on November 14, 2014, the
presidents of the Central American countries announced the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in
the Northern Triangle.661 The four goals of the plan are to: 1) stimulate the private sector; 2)
develop opportunities for the people of Central America; 3) improve public safety and access to
654

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, THRESHOLD PROGRAM (2013),
https://www.mcc.gov/pages/docs/story/story-cbj-fy2015-threshold-program.
655
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-707, CENTRAL AMERICA: IMPROVED EVALUATION EFFORTS COULD
ENHANCE AGENCY PROGRAMS TO REDUCE UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN MIGRATION (2015).
656
Id. at 39.
657
Id.
658
Id.
659
Id.
660
Joseph R. Biden Jr., Joe Biden: A Plan for Central America, NY TIMES (Jan. 29, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/30/opinion/joe-biden-a-plan-for-central-america.html?_r=0.
661
PLAN OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROSPERITY IN THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE: A ROAD MAP (2014).

76

 the justice system; and 4) strengthen institutions to increase people’s trust in the state.662 Each
country is responsible for contributing $5 billion to fund these initiatives. 663
In January, the Administration released its FY2016 budget request to implement the “U.S.
Strategy for Engagement in Central America.”664 The budget requests a total of $1.005 billion
for Central America, the majority of which is allocated for programs in El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras.665
During the last two years, El Salvadorians, Guatemalans, and Hondurans living abroad, mostly in
the U.S., sent over $25.1 billion to relatives in their countries of origin.666 In 2014, remittances
accounted for 16.8 percent of the GDP ($4.2 billion) in El Salvador, 9.9 percent ($5.5 billion) in
Guatemala, and 17.7 percent ($3.44) billion in Honduras.667 However, the numbers might be
higher because each Central Bank uses a different methodology and some might not record all
transfers processed through private accounts.668 One theory by DHS and the State Department
for the recent surge at the border is that children and family units are now traveling to the U.S.
when a family member already in the U.S. sends them money to make the journey.
Unauthorized Immigrant Populations
In general, illegal immigration occurs in two ways: either “when immigrants cross the U.S.
border without authorization, or when they overstay a legal visa after it expired.”669
As of 2014, the Pew Research Center estimates the population of illegal immigrants in the U.S.
to be 11.3 million, or 3.5 percent of the total U.S. population of 316.1 million.670 In 2007 the
662

Id.
Slowing Migrants to U.S. will Cost $15 Billion, Guatemala says, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-26/slowing-migrants-to-u-s-will-cost-15-billion-guatemala-says.
664
THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: PROMOTING PROSPERITY, SECURITY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL
AMERICA (2015) https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/29/fact-sheet-promoting-prosperity-securityand-good-governance-central-ame.
665
Of the $1 billion requested, $24 million is allocated for programs in Belize, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama.
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND RELATED
PROGRAMS, FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2015) http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/ebs/2016/.
666
Manuel Orozco, Laura Porras, and Julia Yansura, Trends and Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean in
2014”, Inter-American Dialogue 5 (Inter-American Dialogue 2015), http://www.thedialogue.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/Trendsinremittancesin2014forLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanFINAL.pdf; see also World
Bank, Personal Remittances, Received (% of GDP),
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS.
667
Id.
668
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-210, INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES: DIFFERENT ESTIMATION
METHODOLOGIES PRODUCE DIFFERENT RESULTS (2006).
669
Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER 14 (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/11/18/unauthorized-immigrant-totals-rise-in-7states-fall-in-14/.
670
Jens Manuel Krogstad & Jeffrey S. Passel, 5 Facts about Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (July 24, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/07/24/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-theu-s/. In January 2013 it is estimated that there were 13.1 million lawful permanent residents (LPRs), making up 4.14
percent of the U.S. population and 11.3 million illegal residents, making up 3.54 percent of the U.S. population.
663

77

 illegal population peaked at 12.2 million, or 4 percent of the U.S. population, and declined
during the recent recession.671 In 2012, unauthorized immigrants made up about a quarter of the
foreign-born population of approximately 42 million.672
In 2012, more than half of the unauthorized immigrant population—approximately 60 percent—
lived in the following six states: California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and
Texas.673 Also of note, today African, Guatemalan and Salvadoran immigrants “have a
substantial presence in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area.”674 At the opposite end of the
spectrum, in 2012 fewer than 5,000 unauthorized immigrants lived in Maine, Montana, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia.675
According to some estimates, between 2008 and 2012, approximately 8.1 million unauthorized
immigrants were born in Mexico and other Central America countries (71 percent); 1.5 million
from Asia (13 percent); 817,000 from South America (7 percent); 455,000 from Europe, Canada,
or Oceania (4 percent); 317,000 from Africa (3 percent); and 225,000 from the Caribbean (2
percent).676 While Mexicans constitute a majority of unauthorized immigrants (52 percent in
2012), their numbers have declined in recent years.677 As the number of people unlawfully in the
779,929 LPRs naturalized to become U.S. citizens, resulting in 18 million naturalized citizens. That same year the
U.S. saw approximately 3.9 million births (12.4 per 1,000) and 2.6 million deaths (8.2 per 1,000). U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, ESTIMATES OF THE LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
JANUARY 2013, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_lpr_pe_2013.pdf; As Growth Stalls,
Unauthorized Immigrant Population Becomes More Settled, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 3, 2014),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/09/03/as-growth-stalls-unauthorized-immigrant-population-becomes-moresettled/; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S NATURALIZATIONS: 2013,
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_natz_fr_2013.pdf; CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, BIRTH DATA, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/births.htm; CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
DEATHS AND MORTALITY, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/deaths.htm.
671
Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER 6 (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/11/18/unauthorized-immigrant-totals-rise-in-7-statesfall-in-14/.
672
Id. at 14; UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: USA,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html.
673
Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER 6 (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/11/18/unauthorized-immigrant-totals-rise-in-7-statesfall-in-14/; see also Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration
in the United States, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Feb. 26, 2015),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states.
674
Marc R. Rosenblum and Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, An Analysis of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States by
Country and Region of Birth, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE 1 (2015),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/analysis-unauthorized-immigrants-united-states-country-and-region-birth
(meanwhile, Hondurans are largely located in Texas, Florida, and the Southeast).
675
Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER 7 (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/11/18/unauthorized-immigrant-totals-rise-in-7-statesfall-in-14/.
676
Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United
States, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requestedstatistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states.
677
Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER 9, 18 (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/11/18/unauthorized-immigrant-totals-rise-in-7states-fall-in-14/.

78

 U.S. from Mexico declined, the “unauthorized immigrant populations from South America,
Europe, and Canada held steady” and the “unauthorized immigrant populations from Asia,
Central America and the rest of the world” increased.678
From 2009 to 2012, seven states saw an increase in their unauthorized immigrant population:
Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.679 For example,
“[i]n Maryland, the estimated number of unauthorized immigrants grew to 250,000 in 2012,
compared with 220,000 in 2007.”680 In 14 states, the populations of unauthorized immigrants
decreased from 2009 to 2012: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, and Oregon.681 In
13 of these states, this decline was due to a decrease in illegal immigrants migrating from
Mexico.682 Illegal populations also decline when immigrants move to other states, “when fewer
new immigrants arrive, when a greater number decide to leave the country or through deaths.”683
Demographics of the Foreign-Born and Native Born Population
According to the Department of Labor, “the demographic composition of the foreign-born labor
force differs from the native-born labor force.”684 In 2014, the foreign born labor force had more
men and working adults between the ages of 25 to 54, as compared to the native-born labor
force.685 On the other hand, in 2014, “23.8 percent of the foreign-born labor force age 25 and
over had not completed high school, compared with 4.6 percent of the native-born labor
force.”686 The proportion of foreign-born (34.2 percent) and native-born (38.2 percent) persons
holding a bachelor’s degree or higher was more comparable.687 From 2013 to 2014, the
unemployment rate of foreign-born workers declined from 6.9 percent to 5.6 percent and fell for
the native-born from 7.5 percent to 6.3 percent.688
According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the labor force is expected to expand
more slowly in the future than in the 1980s and 1990s, slowing potential output. 689 Overall,
678

Id.; see also Marc R. Rosenblum and Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, An Analysis of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United
States by Country and Region of Birth, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE 6 (2015),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/analysis-unauthorized-immigrants-united-states-country-and-region-birth.
679
Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER 11 (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/11/18/unauthorized-immigrant-totals-rise-in-7states-fall-in-14/.
680
Id.
681
Id. at 12.
682
Id.
683
Id.
684
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN-BORN WORKERS (2014),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.nr0.htm.
685
Id. (foreign-born men: 58.1 percent; native-born men: 52.2 percent; foreign-born ages 25-54, 74.3 percent;
native-born ages 25-54, 62.7 percent).
686
Id.
687
Id.
688
Id.
689
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2015 TO 2025 4 (2015),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/49892-Outlook2015.pdf.

79

 CBO predicts that “growth in the potential labor force will be held down by the ongoing
retirement of the baby boomers; by a relatively stable labor force participation rate among
working-age women, after sharp increases from the 1960s to the mid-1990s; and by federal tax
and spending policies set in current law.”690 The labor force participation rate has dropped in
recent years, and is expected to continue to do so. CBO estimates that by the end of 2019, the
labor force participation rate will decline to 62 percent, most importantly due to the continued
retirement of the baby-boomer generation.691
Today, the U.S. is currently at a fertility rate of 1.9.692 According to one study, “as the eightymillion-strong baby-boomer generation [retires]. . . .The sixty-million Generation Xers that
follow will . . . leave[] approximately five million open jobs by 2018.”693 Many other countries
are facing decreasing fertility rates as well.694 Japan’s declining birth rate, for example, is
expected to result in less than 20 million people by 2050, from its peak of 127.5 million in
2005.695 Even Mexico is facing a decline in birthrates, forcing the country to import farm
workers from Guatemala.696 If current fertility rates in Europe remain constant, the total
population of the continent will go from 738 million in 2015 to 646 million by the end of the
century.697
Social Security is greatly affected by the number of workers in the labor force. While the
number of workers paying into Social Security has risen, it has not risen to the level of the
number of people retiring. In 1940, there were 35.4 million workers supporting 222,000 retirees,
or 160 workers for every pensioner.698 By 1950, the ratio fell to 16.5 workers for every retiree,
by 1980, 3.2 workers for every retiree, and by 2010, 2.9 workers were paying for the benefits of
each retiree.699 The Social Security Administration predicts that by 2034, the ratio of workersto-retirees will fall to just 2.1 workers for every retiree as a result of retiring baby boomers and
declining fertility rates.700 As the worker-to-retiree ratio drops, the tax burden increases.701
690

Id.
Id. at 43.
692
United Nations, World Population Prospects The 2015 Revision (New York, 2015).
693
Shannon K. O’Neil, Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, The United States, and the Road Ahead 57 (Oxford
University Press 2013) (citing Barry Bluestone and Mark Melnik, After the Recovery: Help Needed the Coming
Labor Shortage and How People in Encore Careers Can Help Solve It (Civic Ventures, 2010)).
694
S. Philip Morgan, Is Low Fertility a Twenty-First Century Demographic Crisis? 2 (Demography 2003) (Just 3
percent of the world’s population lives in countries that are not seeing fertility decline).
695
UNITED NATIONS POPULATION DIVISION, REPLACEMENT MIGRATION: JAPAN,
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migration/japan.pdf.
696
Miriam Jordan, U.S., Mexico Increasingly Competing for Farm Labor, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Jan. 23, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-mexico-increasingly-competing-for-farm-labor-1422043153 (citing the birthrate in
Mexico to be 2.05 children per woman); see also Shannon K. O’Neil, Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, The United
States, and the Road Ahead 57 (Oxford University Press 2013) (“After 2020, somewhere between one hundred
thousand and two hundred thousand fewer Mexicans will be coming of age each year compared to 2010. This
translates to at least a half million to a million fewer Mexican looking for jobs in the 2020s. The thirty-year wave of
supply-led migration between the United States and Mexico has now passed, and will likely never happen again”).
697
United Nations, World Population Prospects The 2015 Revision (New York, 2015).
698
SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, RATIO OF SOCIAL SECURITY COVERED WORKERS TO BENEFICIARIES CALENDAR
YEARS 1940-2010, http://www.ssa.gov/history/ratios.html.
699
Id.
700
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY (2008).
691

80

 Labor Participation and Incentives
In 2013, the foreign born share of the U.S. civilian labor force “accounted for nearly 17 percent
(26.2 million) of the 158.6 million workers in the civilian labor force.”702 From 1990 to 2013,
“the percentage of foreign-born workers in the civilian labor force more than tripled, from 5
percent to 17 percent.”703 As to wages, “[i]n 2014, the median usual weekly earnings of foreignborn, full-time wage and salary workers ($664) were 81.0 percent of the earnings of their nativeborn counterparts ($820).704
In 2012, 8.1 million illegal immigrants “were working or looking for work,” accounting for 5.1
percent of the civilian labor force.705 In testimony before the Committee, Pew stated that
“[u]nauthorized immigrants are more likely than the overall U.S. population to be of working
age.”706 Pew estimates that of the 11.2 million unauthorized immigrants in 2012, only 800,000
are children and approximately 150,000 are over 65—half of which remain in the labor force
despite being of retirement age.707 “Among the states, the share of unauthorized immigrants in
the labor force is highest in Nevada (10.2 percent in 2012),” followed by California (9.4 percent)
and Texas (8.9 percent).708
According to another study, in 2013, of the 7,741,185 unauthorized population in the workforce
nationwide, 704,726 (9.1 percent) worked in managerial or professional specialty roles;
1,157,583 (15 percent) worked in technical, sales and administrative support; 2,128,729 (27.5
percent) worked in services, such as janitors, maids, housekeepers, groundskeepers; 731,347 (9.4
percent) worked in farming, forestry, and fishing; 1,175,890 (15.2 percent) worked in precision
production, craft, and repair; and 1,671,511 (21.6 percent) worked as operators, fabricators, and
laborers.709
Of course, the numbers and percentages vary by state. In Wisconsin, for example, of the 61,254
unauthorized population in the workforce in 2013, 9,538 (15.6 percent) of the unauthorized
701

THE TAX FOUNDATION, SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE TAX RATES, 1937-2009.
Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United
States, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requestedstatistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states.
703
Id.
704
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN-BORN WORKERS (2014),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.nr0.htm.
705
Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER 8 (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/11/18/unauthorized-immigrant-totals-rise-in-7-statesfall-in-14/.
706
Securing the Border: Defining the Current Population Living in the Shadows and Addressing Future Flows:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Jeffrey
S. Passel, PH.D., Senior Demographer, Hispanic Trends Project, Pew Research Center).
707
Data provided to Majority Staff by Pew Research Center.
708
Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER 8 (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/11/18/unauthorized-immigrant-totals-rise-in-7-statesfall-in-14/.
709
CENTER FOR MIGRATION STUDIES, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED POPULATION FOR STATES,
http://data.cmsny.org/.
702

81

 population worked in farming, forestry, and fishing and 16,450 (26.9 percent) worked as
operators, fabricators, and laborers.710 On the other hand, In Delaware, of the 14,852
unauthorized population in the workforce, 2,524 (17 percent) worked in managerial or
professional specialty roles and 2,792 (18.8 percent) worked in technical, sales, and
administrative support roles.711
“The main economic factor influencing migration is the wage gap, or the difference
between what a potential migrant can earn in the U.S. compared to the migrant’s home
country. Differences in average wages for similar workers between developed and
developing countries constitute the single largest price distortion remaining in global
markets.”712
Over the last several decades, migrant survey data suggested that the wage gap based on actual
labor market outcomes in the U.S. and Mexico was approximately $7 to $1, if valued at the
commercial exchange rate.713 Today, this gap has fallen to as low as $5 to $1.714 However, this
wage gap is expected to continue to be above $3 to $1 until 2075.715 The wage gap between the
U.S. and Central American countries in terms of income is larger than the wage gap between the
U.S. and Mexico.716 According to economists, people will relocate if the ratio is above $2 to
$1.717

710

Id.
Id.
712
Bryan Roberts, Edward Alden, John Whitley, Managing Illegal Immigration to the United States: How Effective
is Enforcement?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 8 (2013) (citing Michael Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, and
Lant Pritchett, The Place Premium: Wage Differences for Identical Workers across the U.S. Border, CENTER FOR
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT (2008)).
713
Bryan Roberts, Edward Alden, John Whitley, Managing Illegal Immigration to the United States: How Effective
is Enforcement?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 8 (2013).
714
Id.
715
Id. at 9.
716
Id. at Appendix 2: Wage Gap and Other Trends in Central American Source Countries,
http://www.cfr.org/immigration/managing-illegal-immigration-united-states/p30658.
717
Michael Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett, The Place Premium: Wage Differences for
Identical Workers across the U.S. Border, CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT (2008).
711

82

 Conclusion and Recommendations for Proposed Legislation
It cannot be overstated: our borders are not secure. According to DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson,
we will not even have 100 percent situational awareness, much less operational control of our
borders, by the time this Administration leaves office.718 Rather than stall important reforms that
will make our country safer, the Chairman encourages the Administration to work with Congress
toward important, incremental improvements at our border.
This report makes the following recommendations for improving border security on America’s
southwest, northern, and maritime borders, as well as at our ports of entry. To truly secure our
borders, we must identify, eliminate, or drastically reduce the incentives for illegal immigration.
We also must add more boots on the ground, tactical infrastructure, and technology across all our
border sectors. This report does not propose major reforms to America’s border security
policies. Instead, it offers a list of realistic, important steps toward continuous improvement that
the Chairman believes could be achieved in the upcoming months.
•

Require adequate metrics to measure border security across all U.S. borders—land, air, and
sea, with appropriate oversight and transparency.

Over the course of the Committee’s border security hearing series, the Majority Staff found it
challenging to obtain basic and consistent information from DHS. One way to improve border
security is to properly define the problem. Therefore, DHS should utilize metrics that truly
define the threats across all of our borders. In order to ensure appropriate oversight, GAO should
confirm the adequacy of these metrics and the data used to arrive at these metrics should be
made available to the academic and law enforcement community, as well as the general public.
Ultimately, understanding these threats will help inform both elected officials and the public as
to what exactly our border security problems are. Getting this information now will put us on an
important path towards solving our immigration problems in the future.
Earlier this year, the Chairman introduced a bill outlining important metrics DHS should utilize
and provide to the public in order to fully define the security across our borders. This bill
cleared the Committee on a bipartisan basis. However, a small group of Democrats are currently
preventing this bill from proceeding, noting that it is not comprehensive immigration reform and
therefore should not advance.
•

Ensure sufficient safeguards are in place in both the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program and
Visa Waiver Program.

After the horrific attacks in Paris, both citizens and elected official across the country have called
for a review of U.S. security programs. Particular focus had been on the U.S. Refugee
Resettlement Program and the Visa Waiver Program. 719 In November, the House passed a veto718

See The Homeland Security Department’s Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2016: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).
719
The Impact of ISIS on the Homeland and Refugee Resettlement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).

83

 proof bipartisan bill that would require supplemental certifications and background
investigations on certain refugees before they are admitted to the United States. Other Members
are considering legislation to update the security safeguards in the Visa Waiver Program,
particularly since the known attackers in Paris were nationals of countries that are part of the
program.
Earlier this year, the President announced plans to raise the refugee ceiling to 85,000 for FY2016
and to 100,000 for FY2017.720 During a hearing focused on the topic, Chairman Johnson pointed
out to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) that this plan would
increase the agency’s caseload by 21 percent and 43 percent, respectively. 721 USCIS was
questioned whether the management solution to this increase would be to streamline the vetting
process.722 To provide the American public with assurances that the U.S. will not short-circuit
the vetting process, the Chairman introduced the Senate companion to the house-passed
legislation mentioned above. As this bill advances and new information regarding U.S.
vulnerabilities emerges, the Chairman is considering amending the bill to also include Visa
Waiver Program enhancements.


Initiate a concentrated public relations campaign to dissuade all Americans, but in
particular young people, from using and becoming addicted to drugs.

America’s insatiable demand for drugs is one root cause (perhaps the root cause) preventing the
achievement of a secure border. And yet, we have not had a significant, nationwide ad campaign
regarding the harms associated with drug abuse since Ronald Regan’s “Campaign Against Drug
Abuse” in the 1980s.723 While appropriate safeguards are needed to identify the costs and
expected results of such campaigns, it is important that the public understands the risks
associated with drugs use. Further, we must begin to break down the stigma associated with
drug use so people feel free to talk about their struggles and seek recovery options.
This year, the Committee has explored, and will continue to explore, how the country’s heroin
epidemic has devastated communities across the nation. In New Hampshire, the Committee
heard a father tell the story of his young daughter’s heroin addiction.724 The father explained
that for too long his family kept their daughter’s addiction quiet, ashamed that this was
happening to them.725 In November, the Committee traveled to Arizona to understand both how
heroin is crossing into the country and how its effects impact the Phoenix community. The
Committee also plans to travel to Milwaukee for an upcoming field hearing, as statistics show
720

U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Proposed
Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2016 Report to Congress Submitted on Behalf of the President of the United
States to the Committees on the Judiciary United States Senate and United States House of Representatives (2015).
721
Id.
722
Id.
723
Campaign Against Drug Abuse, WETA (Sept. 14, 1986),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/reagan-drug-campaign/.
724
All Hands on Deck: Working Together to End the Trafficking and Abuse of Prescription Opioids, Heroin, and Fentanyl
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of
Doug Griffin, Father of Courtney Griffin).
725
Id.

84

 that between 2008 and 2012, heroin overdose deaths in Wisconsin tripled.726 The first step in
problem solving is to admit that you have one. The Committee will continue to work to bring
public awareness to this issue.
•

Reform the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
(TVPRA) to eliminate incentives for illegal immigration.

Children entering the U.S. from Mexico and Canada are screened within 48 hours.727 Upon
determining that a child does not qualify for asylum or is not a victim of human trafficking, DHS
can then offer the minor voluntary removal or expedite their repatriation.728
Conversely, pursuant to the TVPRA, children from noncontiguous countries such as El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras, must be transferred to HHS within 72 hours of apprehension while
waiting for an immigration court hearing; they cannot be immediately transferred back to their
home countries.729 HHS releases under parole authority over 90 percent of UACs into the
interior of the country to relatives and sponsors living in the U.S.730
Institutionalizing a single, consistent procedure to process all UACs can reduce the incentive to
embark on the dangerous journey to the United States. DHS resources are better utilized when
legislation is consistent with how we treat those who unlawfully enter the U.S. While some also
advocate for additional immigration judges to resolve the crisis, a clearly defined definition of an
unaccompanied minor can simplify processing procedures and increase the number of expedited
removals, while continuing to protect victims of human trafficking. Moreover, additional judges
are of little value if minors are not showing up for their court dates.
As unaccompanied minors and family units arriving at the southwest border is again on the rise,
the Chairman is considering legislation that would allow for the expedited removal of all illegal
crossers in order to discourage children and families from taking the dangerous, sometimes
deadly journey, through Central America and Mexico and across the southwest border.
Not only would eliminating an incentive to migrate illegally to the U.S. protect the lives of many
children and families, it would also ensure that the very people who are eager to seek opportunity
remain in and improve their own countries. The Migration Policy Institute estimates that close to
one in five Salvadorans and approximately one in 15 Guatemalans and Hondurans already reside
in the U.S.731 On a recent CODEL to Central America, the president of Honduras told the
726

DEA Strategic Intelligence Section, National Heroin Threat Assessment, U.S Dep’t of Justice, Drug Enforcement
Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-022-15 at 44 (April 2015).
727
Pub. L. No. 110-457 (2008).
728
Id.
729
Id.
730
Dara Lind, Thousands of Children are Fleeing Central America to Texas-Alone, VOX (June 4, 2014),
http://www.vox.com/2014/6/4/5773268/children-migration-central-america-texas-unaccompanied-alien-childrenborder-crisis.
731
Marc R. Rosenblum, Unaccompanied Child Migration to the United States: The Tension between Protection and
Prevention, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE 12-13 (2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/unaccompaniedchild-migration-united-states-tension-between-protection-and-prevention.

85

 delegation that witnessing his people leave their country for opportunities in the U.S. was a “slap
in the face.” Meanwhile, the President-elect in Guatemala argued for a renewed sense of
nationalism in his country to motivate his people to remain in and fight for Guatemala.
•

Provide Border Patrol agents access to federal lands.

Various federal land agencies have different missions, guidelines, and management plans
regarding CBP access to federal land under their respective jurisdictions, which has historically
slowed or impeded CBP—and its predecessor agency—in conducting border security operations
on such land.732 In Arizona, 80 percent of the border has restricted access due to national forests,
wildlife refuges, military training ranges, and a Native American Reservation.733
In 2006, in an attempt to resolve ongoing conflicts between federal land managers and CBP over
access to federal lands, DHS, the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) and the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) entered into a nationwide MOU concerning border security operations on
federal lands.734 However, the MOU has not worked as intended, causing delays and
impediments that threaten the security of our border.
For example, a 2011 GAO report found that “14 of the 26 Border Patrol stations along the
southwestern border reported experiencing delays” in operations due to the time it took land
managers to complete environmental and historic assessments.735 In 2010, GAO cited a case
where Border Patrol needed to improve a road so that a truck could relocate an underground
sensor, but the federal land agency took eight months to perform a historic property
assessment.736 In another example, Border Patrol was required to wait four months for land
managers to make a decision to approve the relocation of a mobile surveillance system to a
different location.737 By the time the land manager completed the environmental assessments,
“illegal traffic had shifted to other areas.738 During this delay, Border Patrol agents lost their
ability to detect illegal crossers within a seven-mile radius.”739
At a Committee mark-up, the Committee considered a bill introduced by Senator McCain that
would provide Border Patrol agents access to federal lands in the Tucson and Yuma sectors.
While the Majority Staff recommends expanding this bill to all border sectors, the Chairman
732

E.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-38, SOUTHWEST BORDER: MORE TIMELY BORDER PATROL
ACCESS AND TRAINING COULD IMPROVE SECURITY OPERATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCE PROTECTION ON
FEDERAL LANDS 22 (2010).
733
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE, ARIZONA INTELLIGENCE OVERVIEW (2015)
(on file with Majority Staff).
734
Memorandum of Understanding Among U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of the
Interior and U.S. Department of Agriculture Regarding Cooperative National Security and Counterterrorism Efforts
on Federal Lands along the United States’ Border (Mar. 2006).
735
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-573T, SOUTHWEST BORDER: BORDER PATROL OPERATIONS ON
FEDERAL LANDS 10 (2011).
736
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-38, SOUTHWEST BORDER: MORE TIMELY BORDER PATROL ACCESS
AND TRAINING COULD IMPROVE SECURITY OPERATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCE PROTECTION ON FEDERAL LANDS
24 (2010).
737
Id. at 23.
738
Id.
739
Id.

86

 supports a piecemeal approach to this solution. Importantly, an amendment offered by Senator
Heitkamp called for a GAO study to consider the impacts of this access and implications for
applying this bill across all border sectors. The bill passed the Committee on a bipartisan basis.
•

Require DHS to examine the threats on the northern border.

During the Committee’s hearing on the northern border, a clear pattern emerged—the northern
border is far from secure, and this insecurity poses various threats to America. Experts have
testified that it is “commonly accepted” that the more significant terrorist threat comes from the
U.S.-Canada border.740 Canadian cities have seen a recent increase in terrorist threats, as
illustrated by the incident in October 2014, in which a Canadian soldier on duty was killed at the
National War Memorial in Ottawa.741
Additionally, the northern border presents significant opportunities for those looking to smuggle
illicit narcotics into America. A significant portion of the U.S.-Canada border is remote, dense
forest, making it easier for drug traffickers to cross the border undetected.742 Investigations have
shown that drug traffickers are utilizing these rural areas, as not only does the terrain provide
natural concealment, but law enforcement agencies lack cross-border detection equipment such
as radar in those areas.743
In addition to threats from terrorists and drug traffickers, the U.S.-Canada border is also transited
by human smugglers and traffickers. DHS HSI and Canadian law enforcement recently
intercepted an operation that involved the trafficking of young Romanian women through the
northern border.744
Because the threats at the northern border significantly differ from the threats associated with the
southwest border, Congress should call on the Department to conduct a threat analysis
specifically on the northern border. The Chairman joined Senators Ayotte, Heitkamp, and Peters
in introducing a bill that required this threat assessment. This bill unanimously passed the
Committee and is set to unanimously clear the Senate in the upcoming weeks.
•

Call on the Chief of the Border Patrol to move agents to areas of high risk.

Over time, different sectors of the border experience different levels of activity. San Diego was
previously one of the most highly trafficked areas of the border, but added resources and fencing
740

Improving Security and Facilitating Commerce at America's Northern border and Ports of Entry: Hearing
Before the S. Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and Border Security of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. (2011) (statement of Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection).
741
Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Northern Border: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Richard Hartunian, U.S.
Attorney for the Northern District of New York, U.S. Attorney’s Office, U.S. Department of Justice).
742
Id. (statement of David Rodriguez, Northwest High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), Office of National
Drug Control Policy.
743
Id.
744
Id. (statement of Richard Hartunian, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of New York, U.S. Attorney’s
Office, U.S. Department of Justice).

87

 shifted focus away from that sector (see Figure 2).745 The Tucson sector then became the most
heavily trafficked area until the recent influx in children from Central America, which made the
Rio Grande Valley the busiest sector.746
Given the ever-changing levels of traffic in the different sectors, the Chief of Border Patrol
should have the ability to move agents to the areas that are in the most need of more agents. By
allowing this, Border Patrol can ensure that the sectors of the border that require the most
attention are getting the manpower needed in order to ensure the security of the border.
•

Provide and maintain adequate manpower on our border and satisfy hard to fill vacancies at
our POEs.

One of the main problems with securing the border is the lack of manpower.747 The National
Border Patrol Council has testified at three Committee hearings that an additional 5,000 agents
are needed in order to fully secure the northern and southwest borders.748 At another Committee
hearing, witnesses spoke about Operation Strong Safety, in which Texas Governor Rick Perry
deployed the Texas Department of Public Safety to the border.749 According to the Texas DPS
report and witness testimony, the operation was extremely successful.750
Today, both officer and agent positions remain open on both the northern and southwest border,
as well as across our POEs. Members of the Committee have expressed concerns during
Committee hearings about the need to fill these positions.751 In FY2013, Congress appropriated
to the Department additional funding to hire 2,000 officers at our POEs. However, due to
attrition and the time it takes to bring on new officers, CBP has only realized a net gain of 818
officers. CBP should consider creative options to fill these positions, including utilizing
partnerships with the Department of Defense, the National Guard, and state and local
governments.

745

San Diego Fence Provides Lessons in Border Control, NPR (Apr. 6, 2006),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5323928.
746
H. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, BLUEPRINT FOR SOUTHERN BORDER
SECURITY (2014).
747
Securing the Southwest Border: Perspectives from Beyond the Beltway: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Chris Cabrera, National Border
Patrol Council).
748
Id.; see also Deferred Action on Immigration: Implications and Unanswered Questions: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Shawn Moran, Vice
President, National Border Patrol Council); Ongoing Migration from Central America: An Examination of FY2015
Apprehensions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015)
(statement of Chris Cabrera, National Border Patrol Council).
749
See generally Securing the Border: Assessing the Impact of Transnational Crime: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).
750
Id.; TEXAS DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, OPERATION STRONG SAFETY REPORT TO THE 84TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE
AND OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR (2015) (Unclassified Version).
751
Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Northern Border: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Senator Heidi Heitkamp).

88

 To begin to address this problem, the Chairman introduced a bill with Senators Flake, McCain,
and Schumer that would require CBP and DOD to identify separating service members with
duties that are transferable to CBP officer duties and make them aware of job opportunities
within CBP. This bill also requires that the agencies use existing authorities to expeditiously hire
these separating service members to fill open CBP officer positions at U.S. ports of entry. The
Border Jobs for Veterans Act of 2015 passed the Committee and Senate by unanimous consent.
Shortly thereafter, a companion bill cleared the House and Senate and was signed into law.
•

Complete the Congressionally-mandated fencing requirement along the southwest border and
understand our country’s fencing needs and current assets to determine what more is
necessary.

The U.S.-Mexico border is nearly 2,000-miles long. Today, according to DHS, there is
approximately 653 miles of front-line fencing on the southwest border: 353 miles of primary
fence, 36 miles of secondary fencing, and 300 miles of vehicle barrier fence. To reach its
statutory requirement to construct fencing “along not less than 700 miles of the southwest
border,”752 deploying additional fencing is necessary. As the Department does not appear to be
prioritizing resources to complete this Congressional mandate, 753 it is imperative that Congress
continue to provide oversight to ensure additional fencing is deployed.
Moreover, it is important to understand where current fencing exists along the southwest border,
what fencing is most effective, and what fencing needs to be repaired. Many of these questions
were asked at a Committee hearing but adequate answers could not be provided in an
unclassified setting.754 More information should be provided to the Committee and the public at
large on our fencing and tactical infrastructure needs. The Committee has called on GAO to
study this important issue and awaits that report to determine next steps.
•

Require each border security technology acquisition program to demonstrate it has an
approved baseline for cost, schedule, and performance.

At several hearings, the Committee heard how technology acts as an important force multiplier
towards border security enforcement.755 However, since 2005, GAO has identified DHS’s
acquisition management as an activity on their “High Risk List.”756 In March 2014, GAO found
that CBP had a schedule for seven programs within the Arizona Technology Plan—and “four of

752

Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, §102(a)-(c) (1996), as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, §102 (2005); Pub. L.
No. 109-367, §3 (2006); and Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. E, §564(a) (2008).
753
Michael John Garcia, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43975, BARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. BORDERS: KEY
AUTHORITIES AND REQUIREMENTS 9 (2015).
754
See Securing the Border: Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology Force Multipliers: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).
755
See, e.g., Securing the Border: Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology Force Multipliers: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Ronald Vitiello, Deputy
Chief, Office of Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border Prot.).
756
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-171SP, HOMELAND SECURITY ACQUISITIONS: MAJOR PROGRAM
ASSESSMENTS REVEAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (2015).

89

 the programs would not meet their originally planned completion dates.”757 Additionally, the
status of the Integrated Fixed Tower program’s initial operational capability date moved from the
end of FY2013 to the end of FY2015.758 While full operational capability was scheduled to
occur by September 2015, the date has now been pushed back seven years to March 2022.759
At a Committee hearing, GAO testified that “CBP has identified the mission benefits of its
surveillance technologies such as improved situational awareness and agent safety.”760
However, per GAO recommendations, “CBP needs to develop and implement performance
measures and analyze data it is now collecting to be able to fully assess the contributions of its
technologies to border security.”761
There is a clear need for DHS to acquire and implement technologies in a timely manner, which,
to date, has not occurred. Technology and other force multipliers play an important role in
securing the border, and will reach their maximum effectiveness if they are both acquired and
installed in accordance with set timelines. Once the technologies are installed, there should be
stated and achievable performance metrics that will determine whether these technologies are
meeting their performance thresholds.
Senator McCain recently introduced a bill requiring that each border security technology
acquisition program demonstrate that it has a cost, schedule, and performance baseline approved
by the relevant DHS authority, and who also certifies that each program meets the thresholds.
This bill was unanimously approved by the Committee.
•

Ensure that successful state and local programs, such as Operation Stonegarden, are used
appropriately and efficiently to maximize manpower at and near U.S. borders.

Operation Stonegarden, a grant program operated through FEMA, has proven beneficial to those
who live and work at the border.762 The program provides funding to state and local
governments to increase operational capacity at the border as well as enhance coordination
among local, state, and federal enforcement agencies. However, in order to ensure that
Operation Stonegarden remains successful, it is important to confirm that funds are used
757

GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-595T, BORDER SECURITY: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN DHS’S
EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT AND ASSESS INFRASTRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGY 3 (2015) in Securing the Border:
Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology Force Multipliers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Sec. and Justice,
Gov’t Accountability Office).
758
Id.
759
Id.
760
Securing the Border: Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology Force Multipliers: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director,
Homeland Sec. and Justice, Gov’t Accountability Office).
761
Id.
762
See Securing the Southwest Border: Perspectives from Beyond the Beltway: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015); see also U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2013,12 (2014) (“Stonegarden funds
increase operational capabilities for multijurisdictional law enforcement entities, promoting a layered, coordinated
approach to law enforcement.”).

90

 appropriately for actual border security functions. To that end, the Majority Staff will continue
to conduct oversight on the use of these funds.
•

Cut off federal funding for sanctuary cities that release criminal aliens into local
communities, endangering public safety, and provide immunity to law enforcement officers
so that courts cannot prevent them from honoring detainers.

At a Committee hearing, ICE testified that it is not repatriating unaccompanied minors that
unlawfully entered the country last summer because it prioritizes its resources on criminal
aliens.763 However, recently a young woman was shot by a criminal alien who had been
deported five times and had seven felony convictions.764 ICE testified that in that particular case,
the criminal alien was released because San Francisco did not honor the ICE detainer.765 In fact,
the criminal alien located to San Francisco because of its lenient enforcement policies.766
Sanctuary jurisdictions that do not cooperate with the enforcement of federal immigration laws
or do not honor federal immigration detainers should not receive federal funding. Moreover,
legislation should be passed that provides immunity to jurisdictions that honor federal detainers
and hold criminal aliens until ICE can pick them up. This is necessary, as recent court decisions
have led many jurisdictions to release criminal aliens due to liability concerns.
In October, the Senate considered a bill offered by the Chairman, along with Senators Vitter,
Toomey, Grassley, Cruz, Cornyn, Sullivan, Perdue, Isakson, Rubio, and Barrasso, that cut off
federal funding of certain grants for jurisdictions that follow sanctuary city policies.
Unfortunately, the Democrats chose to block this important reform.
•

Ensure the continuation of current Border Patrol programs, such as Operation Streamline, that
provide penalties to recent border crossers in order to reduce recidivism.

Border Patrol has created a Consequence Delivery System guide to demonstrate what
consequences are most effective in reducing recidivism for various types of unlawful crossers.
According to the guide, voluntary returns and similar programs are the least effective and
efficient.767 On the other hand, programs that emphasize expedited removal have been shown to
763

See The 2014 Humanitarian Crisis at our Border: A Review of the Government’s Response to Unaccompanied
Minors One Year Later: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong.
(2015).
764
Michelle Moons, Breaking: Pier 14 Murder Suspect Had Been Deported 5 Times With 7 Felonies, BREITBART
(July 3, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/texas/2015/07/03/breaking-pier-14-murder-suspect-had-been-deported-5times-with-7-felonies/.
765
See The 2014 Humanitarian Crisis at our Border: A Review of the Government’s Response to Unaccompanied
Minors One Year Later: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong.
(2015).
766
Jonah Lustig and Emily Shapiro, San Francisco Pier Shooting Suspect Francisco Sanchez Allegedly Used
Federal Agent’s Gun, Sources Say, ABC NEWS (July 8, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/US/san-francisco-piershooting-suspect-francisco-sanchez-meant/story?id=32281587
767
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2013,64
(2014).

91

 be extremely effective and efficient. According to CBP, recidivism has decreased each year
since the implementation of the Consequence Delivery System in 2011.768
Operation Streamline expedites the criminal processing of illegal border crossers by allowing
groups to have their charges heard at the same time, often resulting in jail time.769 According to
the Consequence Delivery System, Operation Streamline has shown itself to be the most
effective and efficient with those who are apprehended for the first time, those who have been
apprehended two or three times, and those who are a “persistent alien.”770 In addition, Operation
Streamline has shown itself to be highly effective and efficient with suspected smugglers,
targeted smugglers, and criminal aliens.771 Despite its successes, the Committee has recently
been notified that the DOJ has indicated that Operation Streamline should no longer apply to first
time border crossers.772
Policies that eliminate or reduce incentives for illegal immigration should be continued, not
limited. Therefore, at a future mark-up, the Committee will consider a bill the Chairman
introduced with Senators Flake, McCain, and Grassley that expresses the Sense of the Senate that
Operation Streamline is a successful program that should continue to apply to first time border
crossers.
•

Emphasize intelligence-based strategies at our borders.

The Committee has heard that smugglers recruit high school and middle school students because
they believe students are less likely to be identified by law enforcement and this age group will
not be prosecuted.773 Smuggling networks also utilize scouts who operate along both sides of the
border with impunity, notifying smugglers of when to cross.774 To get to the source of the
problem, DHS should use intelligence-based strategies to investigate, arrest, and prosecute scouts
and smugglers. DHS should also impose heavier penalties for smugglers who utilize minors to
carry out their criminal activity.
•

Authorize the Department’s preclearance agreements.

DHS components and the American intelligence community benefit from preclearance
partnerships. By posting immigration and customs officials in foreign countries, DHS expands
768

Id.
Lisa Seghetti, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43356, BORDER SECURITY: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT BETWEEN
PORTS OF ENTRY 8 (2014).
770
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, TUCSON SECTOR: CONSEQUENCE DELIVERY SYSTEM GUIDE, FY2014
(2015) (on file with Majority Staff).
771
Id.
772
Letter from Leon N. Wilmot, Sheriff, Yuma County to the Honorable Jeff Flake (Aug. 19, 2014),
http://www.flake.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/9d45f51e-521b-42e1-9df8-407e5d24388f/flake-jeff-re-operationstreamline-08192014.pdf. This letter was subsequently confirmed by Customs and Border Protection.
773
See Securing the Southwest Border: Perspectives from Beyond the Beltway: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015).
774
On a CODEL in South Texas, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Senator Sasse observed a
presumed scout perched along the Mexican side of the Rio Grande.
769

92

 America’s virtual borders to the point of departure. Preclearance operations help U.S. law
enforcement authorities better understand threats emanating from participating countries and
identify terrorists and criminals before they arrive at a U.S. port of entry.775
In addition, preclearance operations increase efficiencies because foreign travelers are screened
and cleared abroad, reducing immigration lines and transit times at major international airports in
the United States.776 In 2013, 69.6 million foreign travelers visited the United State, representing
a 2.6 million increase from FY2012, a growth pattern of about four percent expected to continue
through 2018.777
By reducing the number of foreign travelers that need to be processed at U.S. ports of entry,
DHS components can allocate resources to target high-risk travelers. However, Congress should
ensure that the 10 new international airports DHS is considering expanding preclearance
agreements to meet the same rigorous standards as U.S. airports prior to approving them for such
operations. The Committee recently took up and passed a bill that would address this issue.

775

The Abu Dhabi Pre-Clearance Facility: Implications for U.S. Businesses and National Security, Hearing Before
the House SubComm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 113th Cong
(2013) (statement of Kevin McAleenan, Acting Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection).
776
DHS Announces Intent to Expand Preclearance to 10 New Airports, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (May
29, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/05/29/dhs-announces-intent-expand-preclearance-10-new-airports.
777
Mark Johanson, US Received Record Number of Visitors in 2012 Thanks to These 15 Countries, INT’L BUSINESS
TIMES (June 11, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/us-received-record-number-visitors-2012-thanks-these-15countries-1300347.

93

 Appendix A: Key Findings of Fact from Border Security Hearings and Roundtables
2/04/2015 — Deferred Action on Immigration: Implications and Unanswered Questions
• Individuals granted deferred action under the President’s executive actions will receive a
Social Security number, which is a permanent identifier that enables individuals to receive
Social Security and Medicare benefits.
• Questions remain regarding what financial benefits will flow to non U.S. citizens; how DHS
plans to combat against fraudulent documents; and the adequacy of background checks.
• If past is prologue, the President’s unilateral actions create the potential for renewed surges at
our borders, similar to the surge of minors last summer in response to DACA.
3/10/2015 — Visa Waiver Program: Implications for U.S. National Security
• The Visa Waiver Program was designed to ease travel and promote commerce and today is
utilized by 40 percent of travelers to America, or 19 million visitors annually.
• However, with the rising concern of Western foreign fighters, the U.S. and European Union
Members must work together to prevent terrorist travel and address vulnerabilities: the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found loopholes that have allowed travelers to
arrive in the U.S. without proper approval and identified ICE’s inability to locate individuals
who overstay their 90 day visa free period.
3/17/2015 — Securing the Southwest Border: Perspectives from Beyond the Beltway
• Four out of five witnesses testified: the southwest border is not secure.
• Chris Cabrera, a Border Patrol agent in the Rio Grande Valley sector testified that we are
only interdicting 30 to 40 percent of illegal crossers, contrary to testimony from U.S. Border
Patrol leaders, claiming interdiction rates of over 70 percent.
• Cabrera also testified that Border Patrol agents have “a lot of problems” accessing Federal
lands and Native American Reservations, which drug smugglers and coyotes use to their
advantage. According to Cabrera, smugglers “know exactly what we can and cannot do,
where we can and cannot go, and they exploit it.”
• Cochise County, Arizona Sheriff Mark Dannels confirmed that due to limited resources,
some local jurisdictions along the border will not prosecute smugglers possessing less than
500 pounds of marijuana.
• Sheriff Dannels also testified that drug traffickers often use teenagers to smuggle drugs, as it
is unlikely that minors will be prosecuted.
• Many witnesses raised the issue of collaboration: the federal, state, and local levels of
government need to work together.
3/17/2015 — Central American Ministers of Northern Triangle (Member Roundtable)
• In 2013, remittances from the U.S. accounted for 16.4 percent of the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) in El Salvador, 10 percent in Guatemala, and 16.9 percent in Honduras.
• Central American Ministers are strongly supportive of receiving $1 billion in aid from the
U.S. and believe now is the time to invest in Central America.
94

 3/24/2015 —U.S. Ambassadors to Central America (Member Roundtable)
• Plan Colombia (a partnership between the U.S. and Colombia) worked because of strong
leadership and the political will to solve the problem of crime and terrorism. Corruption is
still present (if not rampant) in Central American countries. According to the Ambassador
from Guatemala, “corruption is killing Guatemala; there is no confidence in government.”
• According to the Ambassadors, the wage differential between the U.S. and Central American
countries is as high as $8 to $1.
3/24/2015 — Securing the Border: Understanding the Presence of Transnational Crime
• According to former drug czar General Barry McCaffrey, the U.S. is only interdicting 5 to 10
percent of illegal drugs crossing our southwest border.
• McCaffrey also testified that in 1,000 communities, 200 major metropolitan areas, “the
principle threat to the American people and organized crime comes out of Mexican cartels.”
• Benny Martinez, Chief Deputy Sheriff of Brooks County, Texas asserted “until the United
States is serious about securing the border, the transnational criminal organizations will
continue to operate on the border and within small communities throughout the major cities
of the Nation.”
• Several witnesses confirmed there is a difference in equivalence between problems in Mexico
and problems in Canada, and importantly, “there is first-rate intelligence cooperation between
Canadian and U.S. authorities.”
• Witnesses also confirmed that it is extremely difficult to prosecute scouts that are
apprehended and “a very good percentage of them walk.”
3/25/2015 — Securing the Border: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Central
American Migration to the United States
• More than 50,000 unaccompanied minors and a similar number of families from Central
America were apprehended in FY2014, three times more than in FY2009.
• While numbers are down this year—they are still significantly higher than pre-2012 levels.
• Before the Administration’s DACA announcement, fewer than 5,000 Central American
minors arrived at the border annually (3,304 in 2009; 4,444 in 2010; 3,933 in 2011).
• According to the Congressional Research Service, 62 percent of unaccompanied minors
failed to show up for their court date from July 2014 through February 2015.
• A former Assistant for Latin America and the Caribbean at USAID quoted a journalist who
interviewed dozens of people in Guatemala in the summer of 2014, “Coyotes may appear to
be uniformed and unsophisticated smugglers, but they pay close attention to U.S.
immigration laws. One smuggler asserted, quote, ‘Obama has helped us with the children
because they are able to stay in the United States. That is the reason so many children are
coming.’”
• Another witness testified that human smuggling is a $6 billion business.

95

 3/26/2015 — Securing the Border: Defining the Current Population Living in the Shadows and
Addressing Future Flows
• Many witnesses agreed: the wage gap is a primary incentive for illegal immigration.
• According to the Pew Research Center, in 2012 the illegal population stood at 11.2 million.
• Of the 11.2 million, 8.1 million people are working or looking for work.
• Witnesses testified that a good guest worker program is flexible, market driven, allows for
circularity and portability, and ensures more interior enforcement.
4/22/2015 — Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Northern
Border
• Experts testified that the northern border threats are different from those of the southwest
border, as there are less illegal crossings and better information sharing with Canada.
• The U.S.-Canada border is a “vast, over-5,000-mile border, with incredibly diverse terrain”
and “areas that are tremendously porous.” The government appears to be addressing this
vulnerability through “working closely with the Canadians.”
• We should continue working with Canada to improve information sharing, particularly as it
relates to information on the U.S. and Canadian watchlist and no-fly lists, which today are
separate and not shared.
4/28/2015 — Securing the Border: Biometric Entry and Exit at our Ports of Entry (Public
Roundtable)
• While DHS has implemented biometric entry, biometric exit is still being developed and no
timeline for completion has been provided.
• It will be expensive and more difficult to fully implement biometric exit along our air, sea,
and land ports of entry, but biometrics will offset the costs with the added benefit and
security of catching things such as name misspellings and forged documents that biographic
information will not.
4/29/2015 — The Homeland Security Department’s Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2016778
• Secretary Johnson recognizes that those migrating from Central America are “very marketsensitive” and that “you have to show the population in Central America that you are sending
people back.”
• Secretary Johnson attributed the decline in the migration of unaccompanied minors this year
to the reduction in the repatriation times for the adults, increased returning flights, and
expanded family unit detention space, expressing the Department’s interest in expanding
detention centers, saying that “detention is appropriate in many circumstances.”
• Secretary Johnson admitted that the U.S. will not achieve “100 percent situational awareness”
of our borders before the end of this Administration.

778

While border security was significantly discussed during this hearing, the Committee does not count this towards
the number of border hearings held, as this is an annual hearing to discuss various Homeland Security issues.

96

 5/13/2015 — Securing the Border: Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology Force Multipliers
• In 2006 Congress mandated DHS construct at least 700 miles of reinforced fencing across the
2,000 mile U.S.-Mexico border but DHS has only constructed 653 miles; half of which is
primary fencing and half of which is vehicle barrier fencing.
• DHS considers the location and type of fencing across the border “law enforcement
sensitive,” making it difficult for Congress and the public at large to fully understand our
country’s fencing resources and future needs.
• Previous legislation has provided DHS with waiver authorities from environmental and other
laws but does not waive the constitution or people’s claims during condemnation cases.
7/07/2015 — The 2014 Humanitarian Crisis at our Border: A Review of the Government’s
Response to Unaccompanied Minors One Year Later
• Since 2009, DHS has apprehended approximately 122,700 unaccompanied children from El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, but we have only repatriated approximately 7,700, or 6
percent.779
• ICE claims it is prioritizing the deportation of criminal aliens over unaccompanied minors,
but current events indicate many criminal aliens are being released by sanctuary cities and
avoiding ICE deportation.
• ICE could not dispute that it sends a strong signal to those living in Central America when
those illegally entering the U.S. are able to remain.
• The number of unaccompanied minors unlawfully entering the U.S. this fiscal year is down
because “Mexico is doing a far better job of policing its southern border, increasing their
apprehensions by 79 percent.”
• HHS says its responsibility to track and retain custody of unaccompanied minors ends when
the child is released to the sponsor. This lack of follow-up and secondary screening has led
to dangerous situations for children.
7/15/2015 — Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Maritime
Border
• The maritime border constitutes the U.S.’s longest border, and yet we have very little domain
awareness of this environment.
• Multiple federal agencies, including various components within DHS, work in partnerships to
secure the maritime border.
• According to the U.S. Coast Guard, it only interdicts 11 to 18 percent of the estimated drug
flow entering the U.S. from our maritime borders.
• U.S. policies create direct incentives and disincentives for illegal immigration. For example,
when the U.S. temporarily suspended expedited removal for Haitians, the illegal entry of
Haitians spiked until expedited removal was re-employed.

779

At the time of the hearing, 109,000 unaccompanied minors from Central America had been apprehended and ICE
figures indicated we had only repatriated just over 6,000, or 5.7 percent. The figure above has been updated to
reflect FY2015 data.

97

 9/14/2015 —All Hands on Deck: Working Together to End the Trafficking and Abuse of Prescription
Opioids, Heroin, and Fentanyl
• Heroin is not produced in America but instead is manufactured outside the country and
smuggled across the U.S. border via Mexican Cartels, particularly the Sinaloa Cartel.
• According to the DEA, “The growing relationship between Mexican-based drug cartels and
domestic street gangs, coupled with … an unlimited supply of illegal guns, has really created
the perfect storm for law enforcement.”
• To deter drug trafficking, CBP “interdict[s] heroin in all modes, air, land, and sea, and in both
the travel and cargo environments.”
• Several witnesses talked about the need for increased information sharing, with the DEA
suggesting that “bad guys really count on law enforcement not talking to each other and not
connecting the dots.”
• Ultimately, we must target criminal organizations, not addicts.
10/21/2015 — Ongoing Migration from Central America: An Examination of FY2015
Apprehensions
• Although the apprehensions of UACs were down 50 percent in FY2015, this is no cause for
celebration. We still apprehended 30,000 UACs and 40,000 family groups this fiscal year.
• A representative of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops recognized that when children
leave Central America, the countries are “losing their best and their brightest, and it’s tragic.”
• According to GAO, “Social media outlets enable migrants who arrive in the Unites States to
share messages and pictures with families in their home countries. This can serve as a
powerful and influential endorsement of the decision to migrate.”
• Another witnesses testified that we are “very far” from having low enough levels of
corruption and a strong enough rule of law to provide for opportunities lacking in Central
America.
11/23/2015 — America’s Heroin Epidemic at the Border: Local, State, and Federal Law
Enforcement Efforts to Combat Illicit Narcotic Trafficking
• According to the Arizona HIDTA, “Arizona is a primary entry point, trafficking corridor and
distribution hub for drugs transported from Mexico to the United States by the Sinaloa
Cartel.”
• Mexican DTOs are highly sophisticated—an Arizona sheriff testified that “Aside from the
normal use of human backpackers (mules), clandestine tunnels, and vehicles, the trafficking
organizations have resorted to the use of ultra light aircraft which cannot be detected by
normal radar, cloned vehicles appearing to be law enforcement or other legitimate companies,
and most recently the use of catapults which hurl bundles of marijuana into the U.S. to
awaiting co-conspirators.”
• One key indicator of the increased supply of drugs into this country is the significant price
drop in heroin, nationwide. In 1981, the average price per gram of pure heroin was $3,260
(in 2012 U.S. dollars) by 2012 the price per gram decreased to $465 (in 2012 U.S. dollars).
98

 Appendix B: Key Findings of Central America Trip
Guatemala
International Bridge between Guatemala and Mexico Borders:
 While the bridge had a check point at the Mexico side, contraband crossed the river on both
sides of the bridge with impunity.
 The thriving contraband trade across the river indicates that the Mexico-Guatemala border is
totally open and uncontrolled.
 The border checkpoint is only used if doing so is to the person’s advantage.
 According to Mexican immigration officials, approximately 2,000 individuals use the formal
crossing point, while thousands use informal alternatives.
Guatemalan Migrant Repatriation Center
 Members of Congress watched 136 Guatemalan adults (31 of which were women) offload an
ICE flight from the U.S. to a “Welcome Center” in Guatemala.
 The Welcome Center was clean, professional, and well managed, and the Guatemalans were
given clothing, food, and transportation.
 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) representatives waited outside the center to
provide assistance and information to the deportees and their families.
 During the re-orientation speech the Guatemalans were told “it doesn’t matter how poor or
rich, small or big, your country is, this is still your motherland. Remember that you have to
love your country. Please consider that before attempting to leave for the United States.”
Upon this statement, the Guatemalans erupted in applause.
El Rufugio de la Ninez, Guatemala City
 This home without an address protected little girls—the youngest age 11— who had been
victims of trafficking and were prepared to testify against their trafficker.
 This particular shelter was designed to house 20-25 girls, but 40 girls were currently living
there. The average age of the girls was 14. Cribs were also located in this shelter.
 What the Members of Congress saw were a bunch of little girls, playing board games,
hugging everyone as they entered the shelter, and joyfully singing.
 The girls can only stay at the shelter until they are 18 years old. The programs offered there
attempt to prepare them for an independent life if they cannot be returned to their hometown
to live with their families.
Meeting with Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in Guatemala
 Guatemala should leverage the Catholic Church to help its citizens. The church is a way out
for those who are part of the gangs.
 Civil society and NGOs should get U.S. funding. There is a concern when you give funding
to government officials that it will not be used effectively.
 While broad concepts of funding transportation, economic opportunity, and education have
been outlined, there needs to be more granular detail of which programs and organizations
will actually receive U.S. funding.
99

 Meeting with Guatemala President-Elect Jimmy Morales
 Morales won his election on Oct. 25, by 70 percent of the vote on an anticorruption platform.
 President-Elect Morales has a keen intellect and understands what he needs to do. He
recognizes that impunity is a national problem and must be dealt with quickly.
 Morales plans to re-instill civic love for country and a nationalistic pride. He believes
Guatemalans must love Guatemala in order to fix it and plans to create opportunities that
ensure that his people want to stay in Guatemala.
 Morales also talked about reforming the public ministry, tax administration, general
controller, and prisons. He said they had the will, just needed the patience.
Final Guatemala Takeaways:
 People pay smugglers, up front, $10,000-$15,000 for three tries to get into America. Most
children are able to remain once they reach the U.S.—the U.S. repatriates about 700
Guatemalan UACs a year. Due to U.S. law, UACs spend 4-5 years in the U.S. going through
the courts system, at a cost of approximately $100 million a year per child.
 There is an 80 percent chance that a girl will be assaulted during her journey to the U.S.
 We must stop incentivizing Guatemalan children from leaving their home country. It is not
compassionate to incentive a country to de-populate itself.
 Those migrating to the U.S. to seek opportunities are the ones who want a stable, secure
system.
 In Guatemala there are the extortionists that prey on the middle and lower class and drug
cartels that generally want to be left alone. In fact, in some cases drug lords have provided
security in certain regions. One of the first things that must be done is to solve the layers of
violence and corruption in Guatemala.
 Guatemala also suffers from its lack of capability to collect money in order to fund its
budget. Businesses may not be paying their fair share, although they argue this is because
they are concerned about where their money goes when they give it to the government.
Honduras
Honduran National Police, Special Interagency Response Force (TIGRES)
 Both the U.S. and Colombians are providing advisors to train the Honduran National Police
 The Honduran National Police is very small, with only 10,000 police officers for a
population of close to 9 million. As a comparison, New York City has a similar sized
population with 35,000 police officers.
 90 percent of the Honduran National Police’s budget goes towards salaries, often forcing
officers to pay for their own uniforms and bullets. Low salaries and extra expenses could
incentive the police to work with the drug cartels.
 Women were well-represented in the TIGRES training and historically have always been a
part of the Honduran National Police.
 The Honduran government’s policy to shoot down known “narco planes” has actually
hampered its progress in deterring traffickers.
100

 Model Police Precinct, Tegucigalpa
 At this model police precinct, the U.S. has helped the Hondurans create an economic,
educational, community safe zone where Hondurans felt confident they could trust the police.
This is a valid strategy that has been successfully implemented in this particular community.
 Again, Colombians are working with the U.S. to assist the Hondurans.
 Model police precincts are vital, as security is the first condition for a successful society.
 When Members asked Honduran children about their dreams, they all talked about future
professions in Honduras. No one said they dreamed of migrating to the U.S.
 One 12-year-old stated: “the youth of Honduras decide what this country is going to be.”
 These children knew what they wanted but a conversation later with the Honduran adults in
the community made it clear that we need a clear path forward on better education. Funding
to Central America should be spent on teachers and schools.
 Honduran mothers and teachers argued that their society is losing its family values and
respect for one another because men and children are migrating to the United States. The
pillars of a healthy society are disintegrating.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Road Checkpoint
 CBP and ICE have vetted units in Honduras in which one agent trains 30-50 Hondurans on
conducting border checkpoints.
 Impressive technology is being using in Honduras, such as technology that slows down
traffic in order to scan vehicles to locate illicit drugs and occupants.
 While the checkpoint was impressive, there is a concern that this will just redirect the flow of
illegal contraband and people to somewhere else.
 At this checkpoint Members were told that Hondurans caught close to 50 Cubans a day.
Close to 90 percent of the “Special Interest Aliens” caught in Honduras are Cuban nationals.
Honduras has a catch and release policy.
 During the observation, Members witnessed the Hondurans pull two females from a bus,
suspected of trying to unlawfully migrate to the U.S. Both were sent to Child Protective
Services in Honduras.
Don Bosco Vocational School, Tegucigalpa
 This vocational program provided Hondurans with skills and training to help them obtain
internships and jobs.
 For programs like this to really work, you need a growing, successful economy. In order for
economies to grow, you need security.
 One business owner mentioned that he gets 1,400 applications per vacancy. This
demonstrates that Honduras’s economy is not growing at a significant rate to keep up with
the increasing number of young adults who are joining the workforce each year.
Private Sector Roundtable
 In order for businesses to be successful, they need the government to provide security and
infrastructure. For example, agriculture requires roads and tourism requires that people who
travel to the country feel safe.
101

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


Honduras also may have access to geothermal electricity. If the country can find ways to tap
into that and have cheap power, there is the potential for manufacturing.
The business class in Honduras is prepared to pay their fair share, but they want transparency
in where their tax dollars go.
Of a country of close to 9 million, only 100,000 are registered with the country’s tax
administration.

Meeting with Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez
 President Hernandez said it was a “slap in the face” to him personally that so many people
would want to flee his country.
 President Hernandez expressed that he did not want to see children leave Honduras and that
the U.S. needs to be clearer when developing its laws. Unclear laws create mixed messages,
which coyotes misrepresent and use to encourage children and families to migrate.
 The President also talked about how the country was improving under his leadership, with
the economy growing at 2.8 percent and the murder rate decreasing.
Briefing and Tour at Soto Cano Base
 Honduras is falling victim to the trafficking of serious weapons, such as RPGs.
 Hand guns appear to be moving from the U.S. to Central America. Meanwhile Honduras is
sending marijuana southbound (not northbound).
 The Honduran military does not have control of an eastern state slightly larger than
Connecticut. Drug trafficking organizations take advantage of this situation and fill the
power vacuum created by the lack of government presence.
Final Honduras Takeaways
 There are not major differences from the Northern Triangle (Honduras, Guatemala, and El
Salvador) and Costa Rica and Belize. The real difference between the countries is marketing.
 American workers, the state department, and all the agencies represented in Honduras are
doing extraordinary work that they care about.
 Unfortunately, often the goal in Honduras is to divert the flow of illicit drugs away from the
country. While this will help Honduras, it ultimately will harm the country where the flow is
redirected to.

102

 Appendix C: Acronyms
ADIS
AEER
AMOC
AMSP
AoR
ARSS
ATD
BC Bud
BEST
BTB
CARSI
CBO
CBP
CBSA
CODEL
CTCEU
DACA
DEA
DHS
DNDO
DOI
DOJ
DPS
DTO
EOIR
EPIC
ESTA
eTA
FAST
FEMA
FY
GAO
GDP
HAMC
HHS
HIDTA
HSI
IBET
ICE
ICMLEO
IDENT
IFT
IIRIRA

Arrival and Departure Information System
Air Entry/Exit Re-Engineering
Air and Marine Operations Center
Area Maritime Security Plan
area of responsibility
Advanced Radar Surveillance System
DHS Alternative to Detention program
Canadian British Columbia Bud, a type of marijuana
Border Enforcement Security Taskforce
Beyond the Border Initiative
Central America Regional Security Initiative
Congressional Budget Office
Customs and Border Protection
Canada Border Service Agency
Congressional Delegation
U.S. ICE Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit
Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals
Drug Enforcement Administration
Department of Homeland Security
DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
Department of the Interior
Department of Justice
Department of Public Safety
drug trafficking organization
Executive Office for Immigration Review
El Paso Intelligence Center
Electronic System for Travel Authorization
Electronic Travel Authorization
Free and Secure Trade
DHS Federal Emergency Management Agency
Fiscal Year
U.S. Government Accounting Office
Gross Domestic Product
Hells Angel Motorcycle Club
Department of Health and Human Services
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
ICE Homeland Security Investigation team
Integrated Border Enforcement Team
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement Operation
Automated Biometric Identification System
Integrated Fixed Tower
Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996
103

 IS
ISIL
JIATF
LEDET
LPR
MCC
MDMA
MOU
MS-13
MSC
MVSS
NGO
NTA
NTC
OAM
ORR
OTM
PED
PNR
POE
PRM
RCMP
RFP
RGV
RPG
RVSS
SAFE Port Act
SBInet
SENTRI
S&T
TARS
TCO
TECS
TVPRA
UAC
UAS
UGS
USAID
USCIS
USD
USDA
VADER
VWP

Imaging Sensor
Islamic State in the Levant
Joint Interagency Task Force
U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment Team
lawful permanent resident
Millennium Challenge Corporation
3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine, commonly known as ecstasy
Memorandum Of Understanding
Mara Salvatrucha
Mobile Surveillance Capability
Mobile Video Surveillance System
Non-Governmental Organization
Notice to Appear
CBP National Targeting Center
CBP Office of Air and Marine
HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement
other-than-Mexicans
Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination
Passenger Name Record
port of entry
State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
request for proposal
Rio Grande Valley
Rocket-Propelled Grenade
Remote Video Surveillance System
Security and Accountability for Every Port Act
Secure Border Initiative-network
Secured Electronic Network for Traveler’s Rapid Inspection
DHS Science and Technology Directorate
tethered aerostat radar system
Transnational Criminal Organization
Treasury Enforcement Communication System
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
of 2008
Unaccompanied Alien Children
unmanned aircraft systems
Unattended Ground Sensor
U.S. Agency for International Development
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
U.S. Dollars
Department of Agriculture
Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar
Visa Waiver Program
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