UNCLASSIFIED UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF 71 IS SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-510] CCDC-COS BUT 08 2015 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Classi?cation Determination Report of Investigation into the Civilian Casualty Near Al Hatra, Iraq, 13 March 2015 1. Pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and the May 5, 2011 memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, SUBJECT: Delegation of Top Secret Original Classi?cation Authority, I am a TOP SECRET original classi?cation authority for all documents that originate within or are classi?ed by Headquarters USCENTCOM and/or our subordinate units. 2. United States Air Force Central Command, submitted a report of investigation, with exhibits, Of the civilian casualty (CIVCAS) investigation after execution of an air strike near Al Hatra, Iraq, on 13 March 2015. The report of investigation, as originally submitted, included a number of documents and photographs that bore various Information Security classi?cation markings. In order to ensure that all markings are appropriate and correctly annotated, I directed that a team Of subject matter experts from across this Headquarters review the full report Of investigation for anticipated public release. 3. In my capacity as a TOP SECRET Original Classi?cation Authority, I have now thoroughly reviewed the team?s complete proposal and personally adopt their various classi?cation and annotation recommendations in their entirety as well as approve a publicly releasable version of the Investigating Of?cer?s report that fully redacts all classi?ed material, in addition to other appropriate redactions of information, as authorized by the Freedom of Information Act. 4. A copy of this memorandum will be appended at or near the beginning of each version of the report that is kept on ?le within this Headquarters or that may be shared with others outside of this command. Points of contact for this matter are the Special Security Of?ce SSO) and the Staff Judge Advocate?s Of?ce. RR Major General, US. Army UNCLASSIFIED USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 10/9/2015 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central Command, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina SUBJECT: Executive Summary of Allegations of Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) Resulting from March 13, 2015 Airstrike in the vicinity of (IVO) Al Hatra, Iraq 1. On March 13, 2015, coalition aircraft conducted a dynamic airstrike on a manned ISIL checkpoint near Al Hatra, Iraq. The ISIL checkpoint was successfully destroyed as a result of the airstrike. Unfortunately, the airstrike is assessed as likely resulting in the deaths of four civilians. el ea se 2. In mid-March 2015, the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT), received a report made by an Iraqi citizen that a coalition airstrike destroyed her vehicle on 13 March 2015, and resulted in the deaths of five civilians whom she stated were passengers in her vehicle. The description in the report of an airstrike near Al Hatra, Iraq was consistent with the dynamic airstrike on the ISIL checkpoint referenced above. ed fo rR 3. In April 2015, CAOC personnel completed a civilian casualty Credibility Assessment, finding the information in the Iraqi citizen’s report correlated with the coalition airstrike on the manned ISIL checkpoint near Al Hatra, Iraq. After receiving the Credibility Assessment, the Commander, United States Air Forces Central Command, appointed a Commander-Directed Investigation (CDI) to inquire into the civilian casualty claim. Ap pr ov 4. The Investigating Officer (IO) interviewed U.S. and coalition personnel involved in the coordination and execution of the March 13 airstrike, and reviewed the initial civilian casualty Credibility Assessment, intelligence information reports, imagery of the strike area, and tactical guidance applicable to the airstrike, as well as the targeting process in place at the time of the airstrike. 5. The IO determined by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike likely resulted in the deaths of four civilians at the targeted location, based on a review of the available evidence. The approved target for the March 13, 2015 airstrike consisted of ISIL personnel and the checkpoint. However, before coalition air forces could complete the airstrike, two vehicles arrived at the checkpoint and parked within the target area. The drivers of the two vehicles exited and interacted with the checkpoint personnel for approximately 40 minutes, while several other vehicles passed through the checkpoint after a brief stop. The aircrew executing the airstrike relayed the arrival of the two vehicles and described the actions taken by the drivers to the CAOC strike cell. Based upon the actions on the ground by the personnel at the check point, the aircrew and CAOC personnel assessed that the drivers and vehicles, as well as the checkpoint, were ISIL and therefore lawful targets. The strike on the checkpoint and the additional vehicles USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 001 10/2/2015 was authorized. The aircrew completed the approved strike, resulting in the destruction of the ISIL checkpoint, two vehicles, and all associated personnel within the target area. se 6. The identification of the two vehicles and the drivers interacting with the checkpoint personnel as valid military targets was consistent with previous coalition analysis of ISIL TTPs based upon the information available to command personnel and the aircrew at the time the aircrew released weapons on the target area. Post-strike imagery analysis of onboard weapons system video footage indicated that four additional personnel whose status was unknown, and previously undetected, exited the two vehicles after the aircrews had released weapons on the target and immediately before the weapons impacted the target area. Video footage review indicates the aircrew had no opportunity to detect the presence of the likely civilians in the target area prior to weapons impact. Ap pr ov ed fo rR el ea 7. Due to the presence of unknown individuals in the immediate target area moments before weapons impact, the investigating officer concluded that, more likely than not, those individuals were civilians. The investigating officer determined the proper status of those four unknown personnel was that of civilians/non-combatants because CAOC targeting personnel, previously unaware of their presence inside the vehicles within the targeting area, did not execute procedures to positively identify those individuals. The investigating officer’s conclusion is consistent with the operational presumption that unidentified individuals are civilians/noncombatants unless an analysis of the facts and circumstances shows they meet the definition of a “hostile force.” That presumption, coupled with the initial Iraqi citizen’s report that five civilian passengers were killed by coalition airstrikes that destroyed her vehicles on 13 March 2015, led the investigating officer to conclude those individuals were, more likely than not, civilians. 2 USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 002 10/2/2015 SEW DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE UNITED STATES AIR FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND AL UDEID AIR BASE QATAR - -- ,7 _fI-'t MN 28 2315 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD FROM: USAF SUBJECT: Appointing Authority Approval Possible IVCAS IVO Al Hatra Checkpoint, Iraq, 13 Mar 15 I have reviewed the commander-directed investigation completed by Investigating Of?cer (IO) (MO). (MS) land the subsequent legal review of the investigation. I concur with the fmdings and conclusions of the IO, who substantiated by a preponderance of the evidence that civilian casualties had occurred, and also noted an apparent comm1mication error during the target approval process. I believe the strike was lawful, and the target approval process error, now addressed, did not affect the ?nal outcome. JO W. HESTERMAN Lieutenant General, USAF Commander SEW USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 003-10/2/2015 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE UNITED STATES AIR FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND AL UDEID AIR BASE QATAR 20 April 2015 MEMORANDUM FOR (MO). (bX6) I FROM: USAF SUBJECT: Commander-Directed Investigation (CDI) into Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) Alleged to Have Occurred on 13 March 2015 at an ISIL Checkpoint in Hatra District, Iraq I. You are hereby appointed as CDI Investigating Of?cer (IO) to assess the veracity of a CIVCAS claim. On 2 Apr 15, received a claim alleging that a 13 Mar 15 Coalition airstrike on an ISIL checkpoint in Hatra District, Iraq, resulted in the deaths of ?ve non- combatant civilians, two women and three children. On 14 Apr 15, an Initial CIVCAS Credibility Assessment concluded the claim was credible based on an initial correlation of details in the CIVCAS allegation related to strike on a Hatra ISIL Checkpoint (13 Mar 15, ATO DO). 2. (U) This appointment has been coordinated with your commander, Brig Gen Darren Hartford, 379 This is your primary duty until you have submitted your ?nal report and it has been approved by me. Until then, you should not go TDY, unless necessary to facilitate your investigation, or take leave until I have accepted your ?nal report. I authorize you to interview personnel, take sworn statements or testimony, and examine /copy all relevant Air Force records, ?les, and correspondence pertinent to this CDI. 3. (U) In conducting the CDI, follow the guidance in the Commander-Directed Investigation Guide. Prepare and submit to me a report of investigation in the format described in the Guide. You must submit your report to me no later than 30 days from the date of this appointment memo unless you request, and I grant, an extension. Include in your report any recommendations that you deem appropriate. 4. (U) Prior to beginning your investigation, you will meet withl (bxa), (axis) 1, who will be your designated legal adviser for purposes of conducting this CDI. You may reach him via phone at DSN via email at] (bxs) lod (W3). (W5) 1. 5. (U) You may not release any information related to this CDI without my prior approval. Based on the information contained herein, this appointment letter is classified and should be treated appropriately. l?a JO W. HESTERMAN Lieutenant General, USAF Commander Attachment: CDI Guide USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 004 - 10/2/2015 556W REPORT OF INVESTIGATION COMMANDER DIRECTED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PREPARED BYI INVESTIGATING OFFICER CONCERNING POSSIBLE CIVCAS IN VICINITY OF AL HATRA CHECKPOINT 13 MAR 15 USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 005 - 10/2/2015 Ap pr ov ed fo rR el ea se SECRET//REL USA, FVEY SECRET//REL USA, FVEY USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 006 - 10/2/2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS Tab A: Appointment Letter Tab B: Authority and Scope Tab C: Background Tab D: Findings, Analysis, and Conclusion Tab E: Testimony Index of Witnesses: E-1: I ?mm I (M0). (M5) I I (bX3). (W6) I (WW I I (we) I i (bX3). (bxe). (bX1)1.4a I i (bX3). (bxs), I Tab F: Evidence Index of Exhibits F-1 USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 CAOC CIVCAS Credibility Inquiry 19 Mar 2015 MISREP, ATO DQ, mission I3653 t) Intelligence Information Reports (HR) Al Hatra Imagery of Al-Hatra area 10/2/2015 SEER-5W F-5: CFACC Operation Inherent Resolve Daily Spins extract F-6: Dynamic Targeting Legal Review, JT F-7: OneNote excerpt, JTM F-8: (mun-42 I31 Dec 14 Tab G: Legal Review Tab H: Appointing Authority Approval and Actions USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 008 - 10/2/2015 Authori and Sco Commanders have the inherent authority to conduct a Commander-Directed Investigation (CDI) to investigate matters under their command, unless preempted by higher authority. Pursuant to this authority, the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC), Lieutenant General Hesterman, appointed (mum) Ion 20 April 2015 to conduct an Investigation to assess the veracity of a civilian casualty (CIVCAS) claim alleging a 13 March Coalition airstrike on resulted in the deaths of five non-combatant civilians This CDI was conducted from 22 April 2015 to 1 June 2015. The Investigation Officer (IO) investigated the following allegations: Allegation(U): none. However, investing officer was tasked to determine the veracity of the CIVCAS claim. Additionally, with a stated intent of non-combat victims (NCV) the investigating officer was tasked to examine the targeting process to determine whether this objective was met. If not, the IQ was to conduct a thorough review of the JTM targeting and tasking cycle to determine if any errors occurred or process changes are required. USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 009 - 10/2/2015 Backgroundiulz (U) On or around 5 April 2015, received a forwarded email reporting the loss of a civilian owned vehicle and the death of two women and three children in a Coalition airstrike on 13 March 2015 at an ISIL checkpoint in Hatra District, Iraq. This claim has five points of correlation with a strike conducted under Joint Target Message (JTM) JT completed by ight, a two-ship of No open source reporting could be located that corroborates the CIVCAS claim. The initial TARGET JTM identified enemy personnel (EPAX) and an ISIL checkpoint structure as the two valid targets for this strike. However, during the time while the JTM was being briefed to the target engagement authority (TEA), two vehicles arrived and pulled off the side of the road next to the checkpoint structure within the target area outline (TAO). WW After dialogue with the Dynamic Targeting (DT) cell, callsignl mun.? lflight received verbal clearance to include the two vehicles and the associated passengers (pax) in the JTM strike. The vehicles struck match the description of those described in the original email claim. However, this change to the JTM was neither briefed to the TEA nor was it logged in any documentation medium other than recorded audio and their filed mission report (MISREP). ?ight successfully struck all EPAX, vehicles, and checkpoint building. Subsequent weapons system video (WSV) review by an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division (ISRD) imagery analyst confirmed at least 4 personnel associated with the two vehicles, with the possibility of one being a child. However, based on approximately one second of WSV prior to rounds impact, it is not possible to positively assess the makeup of the personnel. Furthermore, based on extensive tape review, there is no evidence that the aircrew had any opportunity to detect civilians prior to their strike. 55W USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 010 - 10/2/2015 FindingsI Analysis and ConclusionslU): Determine the veracity of a CIVCAS claim that a 13 March 2015 Coalition airstrike on an ISIL checkpoint in Hatra District, Iraq, resulted in the deaths of ?ve non-combatant civilians: two women and three children. Findings(U): (U) On 2 April 2015, received and email from a person named I m6) Ireported the loss of a civilian owned vehicle and the death of two women and three children in a Coalition airstrike on 13 March 2015 at an ISIL checkpoint in Hatra District, Iraq. The email sought reimbursement for the loss of property (tab F-1, pg 1-2). The email describes two vehicles, a GMC suburban and a black KIA sedan, that were stopped at the checkpoint of Hatra district." The letter claims that these two vehicles were struck by a missile of the International Air Forces and that both cars burned up. It further asserts that the families inside burned to death. The person authoring this email purported to be the owner of the black sedan and appears to not have been at the location of the strike but is requesting remuneration for the loss of the vehicle only. No financial claim in reference to the alleged civilian deaths is made. Both the IQ and the 609 AOC attempted to verify the identity of the claimant and searched for corroborating open source reporting of civilian casualties that match the time, location, and description of the this claim. No corroboration on the persons involved or further communication from the claimant has been found. However, Coalition forces did conduct a strike on an ISIL checkpoint on the date and location as described in the letter. At 12182 on 13 March 2015, ight struck an ISIL checkpoint that included personnel (PAX), a structure, and two vehicles. The strike was executed as a Dynamic Targeting mission under the control of CFACC TEA with Joint Targeting Message (JTM) issued by he Dynamic Targeting Chief) at USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 011 - 10/2/2015 SEER-5W approximately 1210Z on 13 March 2015. The original JTM Line 3 (Track #/DMPl/Description) only included EPAX and Structure at active checkpoint. ?ight observed two vehicles on the side of the road and reported these to after receipt of the initial JTM. At 12152, after dialogue withl ?ight was verbally approved to include the two vehicles in the JT strike. )1 .4a Post-strike, it appears there are two adult-sized PAX who have exited the suburban vehicle. I In the 60 seconds prior to second pass commencement, little movement is seen at the target area. At 6 seconds prior to rounds impact, 4 PAX are seen emerging from both vehicles. Three originate from the SUV (larger) vehicle and one originates from the sedan (smaller) vehicle. One of the persons observed exiting the SUV presents a signature smaller than the other persons. This signature was assessed by an ISRD imagery analyst and AFFOR A3T (tab F-1, pg 8) as a possible child. The small signature is only visible for approximately one second before rounds impact meaning the pilot had completed firing before the small signature became visible. It is important to note that the 4 PAX seen, the last of which appears as a possible child, are only seen itargeting sensor WSV. The sizing assessment is only made USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 012 - 10/2/2015 SEW by pausing this tape on a large debrie?ng screen and measuring shadow height. There is no reasonable expectation that could have seen, assessed, and called for ABORT on the strike through real-time viewing of his targeting pod display inflight. Additionally, at his weapons employment envelope,would not have been able to discriminate between combatant and non-combatant personnel within the TAO at weapons release. Finally, based on the normal time of flight of the (3- 4 seconds), it is assessed that rounds were already in the air before the possible child signature is visible. Post-strike, both vehicles are on fire and it appears like there is one person still moving at the rear of the sedan. At 12202releases a single GBU-38 on the guard shack. Weapon successfully guides and goes high order at desired point of impact. Guard shack structure is destroyed and a crater typical of a 500lb munition with short delay is readily apparent. Prior to weapon impact, but after weapon release a single adult-sized PAX is seen slowly moving to the north. This person is knocked down by the weapon impact and is not seen moving again. At 12302flight checks off-station. Their inflight report passes a battle damage assessment (BDA) of 4 EKIA, 2 vehicles destroyed, and 1 structure destroyed. WSV review confirms this assessment to be accurate. Investing officer found no discrepancies with the 609 AOC CIVCAS credibility report strike assessment as follows: )1 .4a USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 013 - 10/2/2015 Analysis(U) (U) Based on this information and the initial email claim, the following facts corroborate the CIVCAS claim. a. The claimants date matches strike. b. (sweep) The claimant?s description of a black Kia Sorrento and a GMC Suburban matches the WSV of a dark colored sedan and an SUV c. (SALREE) The claimant confirms the general location (Hatra) and the fact that the vehicle was stopped at an ISIL checkpoint. d. The claimant?s description of burning vehicles is consistent with the WSV. Additionally, the 609 AOC assessed the claimant?s description of vehicle occupants as follows: ?the driver, two women and three children? roughly matches the imagery analyst?s assessment of women and children. The ?driver? may have been counted as one of the guards if they were outside of the vehicle/interacting with the guards. Conclusion(U) Corroborating evidence confirms that two vehicles matching type and description were struck at the place and location described in the email claim. These vehicles did not display characteristics typical of transient vehicles at checkpoints; instead, they were on the side of the road and static and appeared to be functionally and geospatially tied to the ISIL checkpoint and personnel authorized for strike under JTM While there exists the possibility that the PAX seen in the WSV may have included women and/or children, no positive identification can be made with reasonable certainty as to the person?s gender or age without further forensics or SEW USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 014 - 10/2/2015 on the ground investigation. However, based on the specificity and accuracy of the email claim on all other aspects that can be confirmed, and the evidence of pax associated with these vehicles being struck as a part of JTM the preponderance of the evidence supports the veracity of the CIVCAS claim. Therefore, the CIVCAS is SUBSTANTIATED. Tasking(U): Examine the targeting process to determine whether the objective was met. If not, conduct a thorough review of the JTM targeting and tasking cycle to determine if any errors occurred or process changes are required. Findings(U): (U) Based on the substantiated finding for tasking 1, above, the preponderance of the evidence supports that the objective was not met. Therefore, the JTM targeting and tasking cycle were examined as follows: Target development for the AI Hatra ISIL Checkpoint was conducted by the 609th AOC in support of the Dynamic Targeting Cell. This target was developed fromI (bxwa I Since as early as October 2014, multi-source reporting has indicated that ISIL had been using the Al-Hatra ruins area mm.? as a training camp for newly recruited members who join from the area southwest of Ninewa Province, Iraq (tab F-3). )1 .4c USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 015 - 10/2/2015 Ap pr ov ed fo rR el ea se Page 16 redacted for the following reason: --------------------(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c SEER-5W On 13 Mar 15, this target was validated by the CFACC TEA. The area was a functionally and geospatially defined object of attack and considered a legitimate militar tar et in accordance with LOAC and ROE.I In total, approximately 40 minutes passes where the DT cell is coordinating and briefing the TEA. During this time, the two vehicles in question drive up to the checkpoint, pull to the side of the road within the TEA, and their occupants begin to interact with the checkpoint personnel. Additionally seven different USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 017 - 10/2/2015 SEW vehicles pass through the checkpoint as transients. These transients slow to stop brie?y as checkpoint personnel interact with them and they drive on. On or about 12002, the CAOC Director, serving as TEA, directs JTM as follows: I ?mm-4a )1 .4a THIS JTIS VALID UNTIL RETASKED BY This JTM is relayed verbally overoordination frequency as Joint Targeting Message (JTM)issued bythe Dynamic Targeting Chief) at approximately 1210Z on 13 March 2015. After full receipt of the JTM, (informs the two vehicles that have been parked at the checkpoint for the past 40 minutes. Through comms back a forth between the DT cell and it is relayed that there are 5 total PAX with the vehicles and they appear to be working the checkpoint. USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 018 - 10/2/2015 According to the best recollection of the DT cell chief, in that eighty seconds he talked with] the Battle Director, for approval from the TEA. Shortly after his communication with the Battle Director he receives approval passed by[ bn behalf of the TEA to proceed on JTMincluding vehicles and all associated PAX. The OT cell chief was not present when lsought approval from the TEA authority on this amendment. Within the next three minutes conducts all strikes as previously described earlier in this report. In their MISREP, reports the following: However, in the DT Cell (mm authorization to strike vehicles is not mentioned. Legal Review does not include the struck vehicles in its sufficiency analysis. The TEA specifically does not recall being rebriefed and asked for clearance to include striking vehicles as a JTM Analysis(U): PID is established with reasonable certainty on the checkpoint and associated EPAX for the Al-Hatra ISIL checkpoint that is issued through USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 019 - 10/2/2015 SEW JTMI )1 .43 (bx1i1.4a The information that is passed to the TEA meets legal sufficiency. The OT cell team briefs, and the TEA directs, JTMully in accordance with LOAC and ROE. However, when the vehicles in the TAO are relayed to the DT cell, the JTM authorization no longer fully covers the target area situation. With the inclusion of the vehicles there is not a different target set requiring re-evaluation and rebrief to the TEA. In order to fully understand the situation,[ ?mum I have dialogue to describe the new situation within the (bx1)1.4a (bX1)1.4a USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 020 - 10/2/2015 )1 .4c Conclusion(U): USCENTCOM 021 - 10/2/2015 The NOV: 0 objective was not met. There were no problems noted with the established JTM cycle, and no changes are recommended to the process required for JTM execution. However, there were three execution errors leading to this objective not being met.l USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 022 - 10/2/2015 )1 .4a 6/23/2015 (0X6) Investigating Officer USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 023 - 10/2/2015 VIONY OFI (axe) I 0n 3 May 2015, at 13002; appeared at the investigation, was informed of privacy act rights, and testified substantially as follows: has held current position as Dynamic Targeting (DT) Cell Chief for the Combat Operations Division, sinceand a DT Chief sincearrival in In day to day activities?lls the role 0 leading aI (than on call I ?mom I within the target engagement area. This (bx1)1.4a I M15) as on station in the CAOC during the issuance of Al Hatra ISIS checkpoint strike under investigation. For JTMI (bx1)14a had been assignedight, a two ?ship of tasked to performI (browse I I th1)1.4a Isubsequently tasked ?ight to observd textma I was an ISIS checkpoint in IV 0 of the Al Hatra Ruins. As recalls, ISIS had been operating in and around these ruins for many months, and multiple strikes had occurred in this vicinity. (bx1)1.4a I I I I (bxm.4a I From the information provided by I Iin ?mom I more speci?city on the exact checkpoint informed the DT PID decision: explained that ight received its initial tasking to look at this POI based on this prior information and information from the target duty officer that showed that between I (bx1)1-4a Iwas erected at the strike location. The initial observation passed from ?ight was personnel in the open and one structure. elayed these pax appeared to be operating a checkpoint, as cars were slowed down, interacted with the personnel and then continued on. stated that with these confirmershad positive identi?cation (PID) of the speci?c targets -I (bxnma I USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 024 - 10/2/2015 The investigator reviewed the transcript of communication between I I with A?er approximately four minutes of TM passage, readback and some weaponeering discussion, states it is the ?rst time is informed bythat there are two vehicles and additional PAX stopped at the TM location. asked for some amplifying information on the additional PAX and vehicles. states that relayed that there were two vehicles at the checkpoint with up to ?ve pax, and that all appeared to be associated with the checkpoint. asked or an Following this communication withl I ITI seeks approval to target the vehicles and all associated PAX. states thattalked with the Battle Director, for approval from the TEA. Shortly after ormnunication with the Battle Directoreceives approval passed by I (bxs) on behalf of the TEA to proceed on 1 including vehicles and all associated PAX. was not present when I ls'ought approval from the TBA authority on this amendment. verbally relays to ey are cleared to execute JTM including vehicle and all associated PAX with PID. USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 025 - 10/2/2015 SW con?rms that this JTM amendment was verbally passed to and that the addition of PAX and two vehicles did not make it into the written OneNote log. did not recall if the TDO or LEGAD were consulted regarding the amendment, but stated has not attended a 1 man.? Itbx6l stated that usually a LEGAD representative would attend and provide any salient feedback to the DT cell. (axe) was asked about howconsidered vehicles at a checkpoint. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoii Air Base, Qatar, on 9 May 2015. I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at Al Udeid Air Base, Qaann 0 Mm: 701 5 (0X3). (0X6) nvestlgatmg Uttlcer USCENTCOM 026 -10/2/2015 SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OFI I (bX3). On 3 May 2015, at 10302, appeared at the investigation, was informed of) 6) Privacy Act rights, and testi?ed substantially as follows: has heldWcurrent position as deputy legal advisor to the Combat Operations Division, since I (0X6) to day activities, has provided legal support almost exclusively to the Dynamic Targeting (DT) Cell, but provides training, guidance and support throughout the COD, as needed. as been trained on, and is fully informed of the applicable Special Instructions (SPINS), Rules of Engagement (ROE), and Law of Armed Con?ict (LOAC) that must be applied on all DT strikes. has the ability to ?mnel information to the Combat Plans Division (CPD) for recommended changes or updates to the SPIN S, but has no direct role in their creation or modi?cation. states that a Judge Advocate (JA) legal advisor (LEGAD) that is involved in all DT strikes. As explains it, the DT Chief and the Targets Duty Of?cer (TDO) ?work? the target to establish Positive Identi?cation (PID). As they do so, they may bring the legal advisor at various times throughout the DT process. During this, the LEGAD provides input and/or recommendations on the PID determination. This advice is based on cunent operational guidance ROE and SPINS), as well as the target engagement authorities? intent and interest items. The LEGAD also gives advice on military necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanity in accordance with LOAC and stated ROE. Additionally, the LEGAD also aids the DT team by reviewing the Joint Targeting Message (JTM), and providing a second set of eyes to ensure coordinates within match information on the target coordinates. Once this is done and a dra? JTM is authored, the LEGAD is part of the team that briefs the TEA on the proposed DT strike. It is the role of LEGAD to provide legal recommendations on the strike to the TEA and to inform the TEA on any concerns the LEGAD has with the strike, including PID, and LOAC. states that prior to learning of this CIVCAS allegation, following TEA approval, would typically return toesk to handle post-TEA brief administrative duties. After learning of the allegation, amenderactice to observing the passing of the JTM and monitor the strike by remaining close to the DT Cell until completion of the strike. According to this allows the LEGAD one more chance to ensure that the intent is properly executed. Once complete, the LEGAD will ?ll out a dynamic target legal review for all strikes. The legal review for the JTtrike was provided by and is attached to this report. Finally the LEGAD will include any relevant pass down information in the IA Duty Log, but clays that this information tends to be very generic if there are no abnormalities during the DT process. If there are abnormalities or lessons learned about the intent, that is included in the duty log. USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 . 027 - 10/2/2015 was askedpinion and understanding of PID as it pertained to the TM strike. xplained that the TEA must have reasonable certainty of PID in order to approve a strike. While the authority rests with the TEA, anyone in the chain or DT cell has the responsibility to call an abort on the strike if conditions change. In order to satisfy the requirement for multi-source intelligence for the DT cell team will talk to the TEA about information beyond the direct line of sight sensors, such as previous activity, previous strikes, traffic density, SIGINT, HUMINT, and enemy Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) observed. For the JTMI Irelayed thatoes not remember the specifics based on the time and number of other similar strikes been involved in since. However, in reviewing DT legal reviewrecalled that] (DX3). (DXG) . I bX3). (b)(Gl (b)(5l Finally, we discussed procedures by which the DT cell would be appraised on SPINS changes or information passed via] Istated that the LEGAD attendance to these briefs was limited to whichever LEGAD was on duty and that a representative from the DT cell rarely attended due to their inability to leave their posts for an extended time during their shifts. is CC ?ed on the distro of these slides, but does not now if the DT cell is on the distro list. Additionally, there is no requirement or sign off for LEGADS to read these slides. When a LEGAD becomes aware of a change to the SPle or AOD is annotated in the A duty log to notify the other LEGADs to read the updated document; however, there is no requirement or sign off log for these changes. I I declare under pean perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, oii' 2015. (DX5) USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 028 - 10/2/2015 I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at A1 Udeid Air Base, USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 atar rm 1 Mav 7m (DX3). (DXG) Investigating Of?cer 029 - 10/2/2015 SIMMARIZEILTESTIMONY OF I (bx3). (bxo 1' (MO). (bxs) I On 5 May 2015, at 10002, (mum) lappeared at the investigation, was informed of Privacy Act rights, and testi?ed substantially as follows: has been present aturrent duty location in sinc As a part 0 normal duties, is assigned to be a Target Duty O?'lcer (TDO), working with the Dynamic Targeting (CT) Cell in the Combat Operations Division (COD). typical work week will be 6 days on, one day off. In a typical daywill spend 6 hours on the ??oor? working wiDT cell team, and 6 hours in the ISRD workingtarget job. as had no real exposure to the there is nothing that mandate reading or awareness of these instructions. As a TDO, focuses on target development and collateral damage concern estimates (CDE). While in the ISRD focus is on BDA and data mining of collected intelligence for target development. relays that usually there is a dedicated position to support the TDO in the COD. However] 4* I was asked about ho developed. provided the investigator multiple documents queued up to to look at. related that once (mm-4a Iwas told that the checkpoint was active, and that there were individuals manning the structure, stop! ing vehicles,- bega_n- CDE process. M6) 2 (0X3). (0X6) USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 030 - 10/2/2015 was asked if any vehicles were included in the brie?ng to the TEA, and responded that no. stated that they only vehicles knew about had departed to the second possible checkpoint location, and were not included in this JTM request. As far as) recalls, the TEA only approved strike onto EPAX and the structure at active checkpoint. does recall that there was comm about additional vehicles now at the checkpoint as relayed (MW-48 not hear all of the comm between (bX1)1-4a ?Wt-does remember thatl Imade a phone call to the Battle Director seeking approvalto strike on the newly arrived vehicles.stated that this coordination was all verbal, and was accomplished in 80 seconds in line with transcript of communication between[ (bX1)1-4a I Post-strike, relayed there was nothing signi?cant to report (N STR) other than the BDA passed of 4 EKIA, 2 vehicles destroyed, and 1 guard shack destroyed. The second checkpoint was still active after ?rst strike was accomplished, and ?ight checked off soon after due to fuel. provided some very good insight to the DT process and how they consider positive identi?cation (PID), CDE, and potential for civilian casualty I USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 031 - 10/2/2015 relayed that if there were WSV onstation for this strike then there would have been DGS capability to perform pre-emptive scans, have better ?delity on the PAX, and provide CDE of the vehicles themselves. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.,Executed at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, on 9 May 2015. (DX3). (0X6) I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at Al Udeid Air Base, atar, on 9 May 2015. Investigating Officer USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 032 - 10/2/2015 9 SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OFI (axe) I (bxe) On 3 May 2015, at 10302, lappeared at the investigation, was informed of privacy act rights, and testi?ed substantially as follows: I (axe) I In May to day role position is fairly separated from the specific actions of the Dynamic Targeting (DT) Cell. Instead, duties requiro a broad view execution of the whole Air Tasking Order (ATO). As day to day duties pertain to DT,may have awareness of their action, but ultimately goes direct to the Target Engagement Authority (TEA) for JTM approval. The is not in the target engagement chain for DT. I (W) szplained that there are four DT cell chiefs that rotate in a cycle to provide 24 hour manning. (bxm.4a I I I I (bX3). the) lexplained that it is the DT chief who writes the 5W5 HY) for any DT strike. This 3 May interview was the ?rst timeI (axe) Iwas made aware of a potential Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) incident at the Al Hatra Checkpoint on 13 Mar 15 (JTMI (bX1)1.4aI I (was) Iwas asked ihad ever attended a1 (bxnm I?Itbx6)Ireplied thatad not, but perhapsImI deputy or the DT cell chiefs had. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, on 3 May 2015. (0X3). (OX6) I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at Al Udeid Air Base. Qatar. on 3 May 2015 (bX3). (0X6) Investigating Of?cer USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 033 - 10/2/2015 (bxe) I SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY (DXG) On 8 May 2015, at 10302, appeared at the investigation, was infomed privacy act rights, and testi?ed substantially as follows: Sincel Ihas served as the CAOC director here at Al Udeid Air Base. As a part of his normal duties, serves as the Target Engagement Authority (TEA) for lethal strikes against ISIL and KG in Syria and in designated areas of western Iraq, as delegated by CDR CJTF-OIR. is familiar with the strike associated with JTM the vicinity of (NO) the Al Hatra ruins in Iraq. recalls that this strike was intended to employ weapons against enemy personnel (EPAX) and a guard shack associated with an ISIL checkpoint. described the information provided by the DT Cell team (DT Chief, TDO, LEGAD) in order to seek authorization for engagement. was briefed that the target was in Iraq,[ Al Hatra, in and around a known ISIL location where multiple previous strikes had been conducted. was briefed that the intended target was EPAX and a recently constructed guard shack. was provided imagery analysis showing the location, the ISIL checkpoint, and the new structure. con?rmed that this checkpoint had a single use purpose, and that throughput was limited. was briefed a gameplan of strafe froml (man-4a l?t l? (MW-42 VI and a single GBU-38 on the structure. At no point was there any discussion of vehicles in association with this strike. gave authorization for JTM I (bX1)1-4a of the EPAX and guard shack, and included in remarks for aircrew to clear for transients prior to weapons release. Until the mail surfaced alleging vehicles and collateral persons struck,heard or saw no further information on this strike. Investigator showed timeline and audio transcript from WSV to In it, was shown that the JTM was verbally amended in its transmission fro to include the following language: ou?re cleared to execute JTM including vehicles and all associated PAX with stated that was not briefed on this change to the target environment, nor did grant the authority to strike any vehicles in conjunction with this JTM. )1 4a explained to the investigator that based on the (bX1)1.4a [even if the aviators could identify the vehicles as hostile, (bxwa Ithere was still no authority to strike without requesting authorization for a JTM change from the TEA. relayed that this dialogue did not happen. USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 034 - 10/2/2015 As clari?ed by the DT chief should have understood clearly what the limit of the authority was, and when there was a change in the target environment should have recognized it and rebriefed the TEA. Investigator informed that the DT Chief?s statement stated that the DT Cell Chief relayed the requested JTM change to the Battle Director, and at some point was granted verbal authority to the change to include vehicles. again a?irmed that the request was never presented to nor was authorization given. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, on 8 May 2015. I declare under penalty that the' foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at Udeid Air Base, Qatar, on 3 May 2015. Investigating O?icer USCENTCOM FOIA 154m? 035 10/2/2015 SEW SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY or] (bxs). ?mm On 27 May 2015, at 18002, (bXe) lappeared at the investigation via video teleconference betweenAlUdeidAirBaseand lwasinformed of privacy act rights, and testi?ed substantially as follows: Froml mum) lservedasaCombat Mission Read I 00(6) II