This document is scheduled to be published in the
Federal Register on 12/31/2015 and available online at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2015-32973, and on FDsys.gov

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
U.S. Copyright Office
[Docket No. 2015-7]
Section 512 Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment
AGENCY: U.S. Copyright Office, Library of Congress.
ACTION: Notice of Inquiry.

SUMMARY: The United States Copyright Office is undertaking a public study to
evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the DMCA safe harbor provisions contained in
17 U.S.C. 512. Among other issues, the Office will consider the costs and burdens of the
notice-and-takedown process on large- and small-scale copyright owners, online service
providers, and the general public. The Office will also review how successfully section
512 addresses online infringement and protects against improper takedown notices. To
aid in this effort, and to provide thorough assistance to Congress, the Office is seeking
public input on a number of key questions.
DATES: Written comments must be received no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on
March 21, 2016. The Office will be announcing one or more public meetings to discuss
issues related to this study, to take place after initial written comments are received, by
separate notice in the future.
ADDRESSES: All comments should be submitted electronically. Specific instructions
for the submission of comments will be posted on the Copyright Office website at
http://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512 on or before February 1, 2016. To meet
accessibility standards, all comments must be provided in a single file not to exceed six
megabytes (MB) in one of the following formats: Portable Document File (PDF) format

 containing searchable, accessible text (not an image); Microsoft Word; WordPerfect;
Rich Text Format (RTF); or ASCII text file format (not a scanned document). The form
and face of the comments must include the name of the submitter and any organization
the submitter represents. The Office will post all comments publicly in the form that they
are received. If electronic submission of comments is not feasible, please contact the
Office using the contact information below for special instructions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jacqueline C. Charlesworth, General
Counsel and Associate Register of Copyrights, by email at jcharlesworth@loc.gov or by
telephone at 202-707-8350; or Karyn Temple Claggett, Director of the Office of Policy
and International Affairs and Associate Register of Copyrights, by email at kacl@loc.gov
or by telephone at 202-707-8350.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I.

Background
Congress enacted section 512 in 1998 as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright

Act (“DMCA”).1 At that time, less than 5% of the world’s population used the internet,2
and bulletin board services were the popular online platforms.3 Even then, however,
Congress recognized that “the [i]nternet . . . made it possible for information—including
valuable American copyrighted works—to flow around the globe in a matter of hours,”

1

Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
See Internet Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.internetlivestats.com/internetusers/#trend (In 1998, there were only 188 million internet users; today, there are over 3.25 billion.).
3
See The History of Social Networking, DIGITAL TRENDS (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.digitaltrends.com
/features/the-history-of-social-networking/ (providing a timeline for the development of social networks).
2

2

 and, as a consequence, copyright law needed to be “set . . . up to meet the promise and
the challenge of the digital world.”4
In enacting section 512, Congress created a system for copyright owners and
online entities to address online infringement, including limitations on liability for
compliant service providers to help foster the growth of internet-based services.5 The
system reflected Congress’ recognition that the same innovative advances in technology
that would expand opportunities to reproduce and disseminate content could also
facilitate exponential growth in copyright infringement. Accordingly, section 512 was
intended by Congress to provide strong incentives for service providers and copyright
owners to “cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in
the digital networked environment,” as well as to offer “greater certainty to service
providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may occur in the course
of their activities.”6
Congress was especially concerned about the liability of online service providers
for infringing activities of third parties occurring on or through their services. To address
this issue, Congress created a set of “safe harbors”—i.e., limitations on copyright
infringement liability—“for certain common activities of service providers.”7 But the safe
harbors are not automatic. To qualify for protection from infringement liability, a service
provider must fulfill certain requirements, generally consisting of implementing measures
to expeditiously address online copyright infringement.
4

144 CONG. REC. S11,889 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21 (1998) (noting that the DMCA, including section 512 of title 17,
“balance[s] the interests of content owners, on-line and other service providers, and information users in a
way that will foster the continued development of electronic commerce and the growth of the [i]nternet”).
6
Id. at 49-50.
7
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 19 (1998).
5

3

 Recent research suggests that the volume of infringing material accessed via the
internet more than doubled from 2010 to 2012, and that nearly one-quarter of all internet
bandwidth in North America, Europe, and Asia is devoted to hosting, sharing, and
acquiring infringing material.8 While Congress clearly understood that it would be
essential to address online infringement as the internet continued to grow, it was likely
difficult to anticipate the online world as we now know it—where, each day, users post
hundreds of millions of photos, videos and other items, and service providers receive
over a million notices of alleged infringement.
As observed by the House Judiciary Committee’s Ranking Member in the course
of the Committee’s ongoing multi-year review of the Copyright Act, and consistent with
the testimony of the Register of Copyrights in that hearing, the operation of section 512
poses policy issues that warrant study and analysis.9 Section 512 has also been a focus of
the U.S. Department of Commerce in recent years, which has noted ambiguities in the
application of the safe harbor and encouraged service providers and rightsholders to
discuss and pursue voluntary improvements.10

8

See DAVID PRICE, SIZING THE PIRACY UNIVERSE 3 (2013), http://www.netnames.com/digital-piracysizing-piracy-universe (infringing bandwidth use increased by 159% between 2010 to 2012 in North
America, Europe, and [the] Asia-Pacific, which account for more than 95% of global bandwidth use).
9
Register’s Perspective on Copyright Review: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong.
6 (2015) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights and Director, U.S. Copyright Office)
(“We are . . . recommending appropriate study of section 512 of the DMCA. . . . [T]here are challenges
now that warrant a granular review.”); id. at 49 (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Member, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary) (“[T]here are policy issues that warrant studies and analysis, including section 512,
section 1201, mass digitization, and moral rights. I would like the Copyright Office to conduct and
complete reports on those policy issues . . . .”).
10
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND
INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 54, 56 (Jul. 2013),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/news/publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf (“COPYRIGHT POLICY,
CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY”); DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK
FORCE, DMCA MULTISTAKEHOLDER FORUM, DMCA NOTICE-AND-TAKEDOWN PROCESSES: LIST OF GOOD,
BAD, AND SITUATIONAL PRACTICES 3 (2015),

4

 The present study will review the statutory requirements of section 512 and
evaluate its current effectiveness and impact on those who rely upon it. The key aspects
of section 512 that are the subject of this review, including notable legal and practical
developments, are summarized below.
A. Overview of Section 512 Safe Harbors
Section 512 provides safe harbors from infringement liability for online service
providers that are engaged in qualifying activities and that also meet certain eligibility
requirements. There are four distinct safe harbors, detailed in sections 512(a), (b), (c), and
(d), respectively. These safe harbors are available when a service provider engages in one
or more of the following corresponding activities: (a) serving as a conduit for the
automatic online transmission of material as directed by third parties; (b) caching (i.e.,
temporarily storing) material that is being transmitted automatically over the internet
from one third party to another; (c) storing (i.e., hosting) material at the direction of a
user on a service provider’s system or network; or (d) referring or linking users to online
sites using information location tools (e.g., a search engine).
A service provider that meets the relevant eligibility requirements for one or more
of the safe harbors is not liable for monetary relief and is subject only to limited
injunctive relief for infringing activities conducted on or through its system or network.11
In the case of a service provider that qualifies for a safe harbor under 512(b), (c), or (d),
this injunctive relief is limited to: (1) disabling access to infringing material; (2)
terminating the infringer’s account(s); and (3) providing such other relief as may be

http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DMCA_Good_Bad_and_Situational_Practices_Docum
ent-FINAL.pdf (“DEP’T OF COMMERCE MULTISTAKEHOLDER FORUM RECOMMENDED PRACTICES”).
11
17 U.S.C. 512(a)-(d).

5

 necessary to address infringement at a particular online location; provided, however, that
the relief is “the least burdensome [form of relief] to the service provider.”12 For a service
provider that qualifies for the 512(a) safe harbor, the court may order only termination of
an infringer’s account(s) or blocking of access to a “specific, identified, online location
outside the United States.”13
In order to qualify for the limitation on liability provided under section 512(a), (b),
(c), or (d), the service provider must comply with certain threshold requirements. Two of
these requirements apply to all four safe harbors: (1) the adoption and reasonable
implementation of a policy to terminate “repeat infringers”;14 and (2) the accommodation
of “standard technical measures” that identify or protect copyrighted works and have
been developed according to broad consensus between copyright owners and service
providers, to the extent any such measures exist.15 A service provider that acts as a mere
conduit for online transmissions qualifies for the limitation on liability provided by
section 512(a) if the provider satisfies these two threshold requirements.
Service providers seeking protection under the safe harbors in section 512(b), (c),
or (d), however, must, in addition, maintain a compliant notice-and-takedown process by
responding expeditiously to remove or disable access to material claimed to be infringing
upon receipt of proper notice from a copyright owner or the owner’s authorized agent.16

12

Id. at 512(j)(1)(A).
Id. at 512(j)(1)(B).
14
A service provider must adopt, “reasonably implement[],” and inform subscribers and account holders of
a policy “that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of . . . repeat infringers.” Id. at
512(i)(1)(A).
15
Id. at 512(i)(1)(B), (i)(2).
16
Id. at 512(b)(2)(E), (c)(1)(C), (d)(3). The process for notification under the 512(c) and (d) safe harbors is
set out in 512(c)(3); the process differs somewhat under the 512(b) safe harbor in that, in addition to
following the requirements of 512(c)(3), the complaining party must also confirm that the content or link
13

6

 A service provider seeking to avail itself of the section 512(c) safe harbor for user-posted
content is further required to designate an agent to receive notifications of claimed
infringement and provide contact information for the agent on its website and to the
Copyright Office, which, in turn, is to maintain a public directory of such agents.17
The statute prescribes that a copyright owner’s takedown notice must include
“substantially the following”: (i) the signature of the copyright owner or an authorized
agent (i.e., the complaining party); (ii) identification of the copyrighted work claimed to
have been infringed, or, if multiple works are on a single site, “a representative list of
such works”; (iii) identification of the infringing material or activity (or the reference or
link to such material) and “information reasonably sufficient” to permit the service
provider to locate the material (or the reference or link); (iv) contact information for the
complaining party; (v) a statement that the complaining party has “a good faith belief that
use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner,
its agent, or the law”; and (vi) a statement that the information is accurate and, under
penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the
copyright owner.18 A copyright owner’s communication that does not substantially
comply with these criteria will not serve as effective notice for purposes of the statutory
process.19 Further, under section 512(f), as discussed more fully below, “[a]ny person

has been removed or disabled by the originating site or that a court has ordered that it be removed or
disabled.
17
Id. at 512(c)(2). Although section 512(d) does not itself expressly require service providers to designate
an agent to receive notifications of infringement, it incorporates the notice provisions of section 512(c)(3),
which require that notices be sent to “the designated agent of the service provider.” The statutory scheme
thus indicates that service providers operating under section 512(d) would also designate agents to receive
takedown notices. See id. at 512(c)(3).
18
Id. at 512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(vi).
19
See id. at 512(c)(3)(B)(i) (“[A] notification . . . that fails to comply substantially . . . shall not be
considered . . . in determining whether a service provider has actual knowledge or is aware of facts or

7

 who knowingly materially misrepresents . . . that material or activity is infringing” can be
held liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, incurred by an alleged
infringer who is injured by the misrepresentation.
In addition to responding to takedown notices, service providers that seek
protection under the section 512(c) and (d) safe harbors must also act expeditiously to
remove or disable access to material when they have “actual knowledge” of infringement
or, in the absence of such actual knowledge, when they have “aware[ness] of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent”—the “awareness” standard
often referred to as “red flag” knowledge.20 But, while service providers are not free to
ignore infringement of which they have actual or red flag knowledge, section 512 at the
same time provides that an online entity has no duty to “monitor[] its service or
affirmatively seek[] facts indicating infringing activity, except to the extent consistent
with a standard technical measure.”21
Finally, to qualify for the section 512(c) and (d) safe harbors, a service provider
must not “receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a
case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity.”22 The
statutory financial benefit/right to control test does not incorporate a knowledge
element.23

circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.”); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488
F.3d 1102, 1112-14 (9th Cir. 2007) (“CCBill LLC”) (“[A] service provider will not be deemed to have
notice of infringement when ‘the notification . . . fails to comply substantially with all the provisions of [17
U.S.C. 512(c)(3)(A)].’”).
20
See 17 U.S.C. 512(c), (d).
21
Id. at 512(m)(1).
22
Id. at 512(c)(1)(B), (d)(2).
23
See id. at 512(c)(1)(B), (d)(2).

8

 In addition to the general limitations on infringement liability, the statute provides
specific protections for service providers that remove material in response to takedown
notices, as well as for users who post material that is claimed to be infringing. Under
section 512, a service provider is not liable for the good-faith removal or disabling of
access to material “claimed to be infringing or based on facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent”—even material not ultimately found to be
infringing—so long as the provider takes reasonable steps to promptly notify the user
who posted the material that it has been removed and also complies, as applicable, with a
statutory counter-notification process.24
Section 512(g) allows a user whose content has been removed in response to a
takedown notice to submit a counter notification to a service provider’s designated agent
requesting that the content be reposted. The counter notification must include: (i) the
signature of the subscriber (i.e., the counter-notifying party); (ii) identification of the
material that was removed or to which access was disabled, as well as the location where
it previously appeared; (iii) a statement under penalty of perjury that the subscriber has a
“good faith belief” that the material “was removed or disabled as a result of mistake or
misidentification of the material to be removed or disabled”; and (iv) the subscriber’s
contact information, as well as a statement that the subscriber consents to the jurisdiction
of the federal district court for the relevant judicial district and agrees to accept service of
process from the party who provided the takedown notice (or that party’s agent).25 To
preserve its safe harbor immunity, the service provider must repost the content within 10
to 14 business days of receiving the counter notification unless the service provider first
24
25

Id. at 512(g)(1).
Id. at 512(g)(3).

9

 receives notice from the party who provided the takedown notice that a judicial action has
been filed “seeking . . . to restrain the subscriber from engaging in infringing activity
relating to the material on the service provider’s system or network.”26 As in the case of
misrepresentations in takedown notices, under section 512(f), any person who knowingly
materially misrepresents that “material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or
misidentification” may be held liable for monetary damages, including costs and
attorneys’ fees.27
B. Key Developments
Since the enactment of section 512, stakeholders have adopted practices and
systems to implement it, and courts have been called upon to interpret its provisions—
from eligibility for safe harbors to the requirements for valid takedown notices to the
standards that govern misrepresentations in the notification process. Some stakeholders
have created best practices, entered into voluntary agreements to streamline enforcement
procedures, and/or pursued other non-judicial approaches. Notwithstanding these
developments, many on both sides of the equation express significant frustration with the
process. A brief overview of the most salient issues follows.
Notice-and-Takedown Process
Today, copyright owners send takedown notices requesting service providers to
remove and disable access to hundreds of millions of instances of alleged infringement
each year.28 The number of removal requests sent to service providers has increased

26

Id. at 512(g)(2)(C).
Id. at 512(f).
28
See Section 512 of Title 17: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3 (2014) (“Section 512 Hearing”) (written statement of Rep.
Jerrold Nadler) (noting that in 2013, Google received notices requesting removal of approximately 230
27

10

 dramatically since the enactment of section 512. For example, one search engine now
“receive[s] removal requests for more URLs every week than [it] did . . . from 1998 to
2010 combined.”29 Technology has come to play a significant role in the notice-andtakedown process, as automated processes that use fingerprinting, hash values, and
keyword/metadata searches can identify movies, sound recordings, and other types of
content that is being posted and disseminated.30 But regardless of increasing
technological capabilities, stakeholders frequently voice concerns about the efficiency
and efficacy—not to mention the overall sustainability—of the system.31
Many smaller copyright owners, for example, lack access to third-party services
and sophisticated tools to monitor for infringing uses, which can be costly, and must
instead rely on manual search and notification processes32—an effort that has been
likened to “trying to empty the ocean with a teaspoon.”33 In addition to the burden of

million items); Joe Mullin, Google Handled 345 Million Copyright Takedowns in 2014, ARS TECHNICA
(Jan. 6, 2015), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/01/google-handled-345-million-copyrighttakedowns-in-2014.
29
GOOGLE, HOW GOOGLE FIGHTS PIRACY 15 (2013), https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BwxyRPF
duTN2dVFqYml5UENUeUE/edit?pli=1#!.
30
See, e.g., TheFlo, White Paper: Audio Fingerprinting, MAXIMUM PC (Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.
maximumpc.com/white-paper-audio-fingerprinting/ (explaining the use of algorithms to create unique
“audio fingerprints” to identify sound recordings); What is a Hash Value?, PINPOINT LABS (Dec. 10, 2010),
http://pinpointlabs.com/2010/12/what-is-a-hash-value/ (explaining use of hash values for text, audio, and
video); DEP’T OF COMMERCE MULTISTAKEHOLDER FORUM RECOMMENDED PRACTICES (discussing use of
automated tools to identify infringing material).
31
See, e.g., Section 512 Hearing at 9 (written statement of Sean M. O’Connor, Entrepreneurial Law Clinic,
University of Washington (Seattle)) (“[T]here are takedown notices now filed on millions of posts every
month. That is clearly unsustainable.”); COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE
DIGITAL ECONOMY 56 (“[R]ight holders and ISPs alike have identified respects in which [the notice-andtakedown system’s] operation can become unwieldy or burdensome.”).
32
See Section 512 Hearing at 100 (statement of Rep. Doug Collins) (“[I]ndividual songwriters and the
independent filmmakers . . . often have limited or no technical expertise or software at their disposal . . . .”);
id. at 88-89 (2014) (written statement of Sandra Aistars, Copyright Alliance) (Independent authors and
creators “lack the resources of corporate copyright owners” and instead issue “takedown notices themselves,
taking time away from their creative pursuits.”).
33
Trevor Little, Google and Microsoft Outline the Challenges Facing Online Intermediaries, WORLD
TRADEMARK REV. (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=DFF24612D6F7-4ED2-BFDB-383724E93D57 (quoting symposium comments by a vice president at Fox Group
Legal).

11

 policing infringement across the internet, copyright owners complain that material they
succeed in having taken down is often promptly reposted on the same site—the so-called
“whack-a-mole” problem.34 Under section 512 as it has been interpreted, providers are
not required to filter out or prevent the reposting of copyrighted content through the use
of content identification technologies or other means.35
Accordingly, some have proposed that the notice-and-takedown procedure be
revised to become a “notice-and-stay-down” procedure—that is, once a service provider
receives an effective and uncontested takedown notice for a particular work, the provider
should be required to make commercially reasonable efforts to keep that work from
reappearing on its site.36 Others, however, pointing to the very substantial efforts—
especially of larger service providers—to respond promptly to takedown notices, are of
the view that the existing system has “scaled well” over time to address the large volume
of takedown notices, and does not need to be changed.37
Of course, the burdens of the notice-and-takedown process do not fall on
copyright owners alone. Service providers must devote the time and resources necessary
to respond to the increasing number of takedown notices sent each day. Smaller providers,
34

Section 512 Hearing at 35 (written statement of Paul Doda, Elsevier) (The “same books are repeatedly
re-uploaded on the same sites hundreds of times after being taken down . . . .”); id. at 57 (written statement
of Maria Schneider, musician) (“As fast as I take my music down, it reappears again on the same site—an
endless whac-a-mole game.”).
35
17 U.S.C. 512(m); see UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1024 (9th
Cir. 2013) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that service provider should have “taken the initiative to use
search and indexing tools to locate and remove from its website any other content by the artists identified
in . . . notices”); Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 500, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“512(m)
and attendant case law make clear that service providers are under no affirmative duty to seek out
infringement . . . [and t]his remains the case even when a service provider has developed technology
permitting it to do so.”).
36
See Section 512 Hearing at 14-15, 39, 58 (written statements of Sean M. O’Connor, Entrepreneurial Law
Clinic, University of Washington (Seattle); Paul Doda, Elsevier; and Maria Schneider, musician).
37
Id. at 16 (statement of Annemarie Birdy, University of Idaho College of Law) (“The notice and takedown
regime in [s]ection 512(c) has scaled well for enforcing copyrights in the voluminous content hosted by
online service providers.”).

12

 in particular, may find the task to be a daunting one.38 In addition, service providers
complain that some notices do not meet the statutory requirements or, as discussed below,
concern materials and activities that are not in fact infringing.
Since the passage of the DMCA, courts have been called upon to address the
elements required for an “effective”—i.e., valid—takedown notice. Looking to section
512’s requirement to provide “information reasonably sufficient to permit the service
provider to locate the material,” courts have generally required a high degree of
specificity, such as the particular link, or uniform resource locator (“URL”), where the
infringing material is found.39 Likewise, service providers often request that the specific
URL for each allegedly infringing use be included in a notice.40 Such a requirement can
be burdensome in the case of a notice that references a large number of infringements at
multiple locations throughout the same site. Additionally, copyright owners question
whether this level of specificity is in conflict with the statute’s express language allowing

38

See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Multistakeholder Forum: Improving the Operation of the DMCA Notice
and Takedown Policy: Second Public Meeting, Tr. 63:03-05 (May 8, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/ip/global/copyrights/2nd_forum_transcript.pdf (Fred von Lohmann, Google) (“[W]hat large
service providers are capable of doing is very different from what smaller service providers are doing.”);
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Multistakeholder Forum: Improving the Operation of the DMCA Notice and
Takedown Policy: First Public Meeting, Tr. 34:16-38:06 (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/ip/
global/copyrights/First_Public_Meeting-Improving_Operation_of_DMCA_Notice_and_Takedown_
Policy.pdf (Ron Yokubaitis, Giganews) (describing burden of processing non-standardized notices for a
“small company [of] fifty-something people”).
39
See, e.g., Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d sub
nom., Wolk v. Photobucket.com, Inc., 569 F. App’x 51 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that an example of sufficient
information in a notice allowing a service provider to locate the infringing material “would be a copy or
description of the allegedly infringing material and the so-called ‘uniform resource locator’ (URL) (i.e.,
web site address)”) (citing Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2010),
vacated in part on other grounds, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012)).
40
See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Notice, AUTOMATTIC, https://automattic.com/dmcanotice (last visited Dec. 17, 2015); DMCA Copyright Notifications, TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com/
dmca (last visited Dec. 17, 2015); Copyright Infringement Notification, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.
com/copyright_complaint_form (last visited Dec. 17, 2015).

13

 complaining parties to submit a “representative list” of works alleged to be infringed “at a
single online site.”41
In addition, there is debate about whether search engine services must disable
access to (e.g., “de-list”) entire sites that copyright owners report as consisting largely of
infringing material.42 While the legislative history of section 512(d) observes that “safe
harbor status for a provider that views [a pirate] site and then establishes a link to it
would not be appropriate,”43 service providers assert that de-listing could lead to
censorship, and yet still not effectively address infringement, because the site would
remain online.44
Knowledge Standards
A good deal of litigation relating to section 512 to date has focused on the legal
standards for determining when a service provider has sufficient knowledge or awareness
to require it to remove or disable infringing material in order to remain eligible for the
safe harbor protections of section 512(c) or (d). Courts have held “actual knowledge” to
require evidence that the service provider subjectively knew that specific material on its
site infringed copyright.45 Alternatively, actual knowledge can be demonstrated with

41

17 U.S.C. 512(c)(3)(A)(ii).
Compare MPAA, Comments on Office of Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator Development
of the Joint Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property Enforcement 17 (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.regulations.
gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2015-0003-0058 (“Search engines should delist sites based on court orders
or other comparable judicial determinations of infringement . . . [meaning that] no results from a particular
site would appear in any search results.”) with Google, Comments on Office of Intellectual Property
Enforcement Coordinator Development of the Joint Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property Enforcement 7-8
(Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2015-0003-0061 (“Google, IPEC
Comments”) (“[W]hole-site removal is ineffective and can easily result in censorship of lawful material . . .
[and] would jeopardize free speech principles, emerging services, and the free flow of information online
globally and in contexts far removed from copyright.”).
43
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 48 (1998).
44
Google, IPEC Comments, at 7-8.
45
See, e.g., UMG Recordings, 718 F.3d at 1025 (quoting Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19,
31 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Viacom”)).
42

14

 evidence that a service provider received information about specific infringing material
through a statutorily effective takedown notice, i.e., a notice that includes “substantially”
all of the information required under section 512(c)(3).46
Courts have also recognized the common law doctrine of willful blindness in
addressing whether a service provider has actual knowledge of infringement.47 A service
provider is considered to have engaged in willful blindness when it is “aware of a high
probability” of infringement and has “consciously avoided confirming that fact.”48
Accordingly, courts have held that a service provider’s willful blindness to infringement
on its site and failure to remove or disable access to infringing material can disqualify it
from the protections of a section 512 safe harbor.49
As also noted above, sections 512(c) and (d) require a service provider to disable
access to material or activity if it has “red flag” knowledge, i.e., is aware of “facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.”50 In enacting the statute,
Congress explained that “a service provider [has] no obligation to seek out copyright
infringement, but it [does] not qualify for the safe harbor if it . . . turn[s] a blind eye to
‘red flags’ of obvious infringement.”51 The legislative history of section 512 also
suggests Congress’ view that the red flag test “has both a subjective and an objective
46

See UMG Recordings, 718 F.3d at 1020 (“[T]he DMCA notice protocol . . . [is] the most powerful
evidence of a service provider’s knowledge.”) (internal quotations omitted); cf. 17 U.S.C. 512(c)(3)(B)(i)
(stating that a notice “that fails to comply substantially” with the 512(c) notice requirements “shall not be
considered . . . in determining whether a service provider has actual knowledge.”).
47
See, e.g., Viacom, 676 F.3d at 35 (“[W]illful blindness doctrine may be applied, in appropriate
circumstances, to demonstrate knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement under the
DMCA.”).
48
Id. at 35 (quoting United States v. Aina-Marshall, 336 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2003)). For example, a
service provider was found to have “blinded itself” where it encouraged users to encrypt files so that the
service provider could not know the contents of particular files. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d
643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003) (“In re Aimster”).
49
See, e.g., Viacom, 676 F.3d at 30, 35; see also In re Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653, 655.
50
17 U.S.C. 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), (d)(1)(B).
51
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 57 (1998).

15

 element . . . the subjective awareness of the service provider of the facts or circumstances
in question . . . [and the objective assessment of] whether infringing activity would have
been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or similar
circumstances.”52 With regard to information location tools, for example, Congress
observed that if “an [i]nternet site is obviously pirate, then seeing it may be all that is
needed for the service provider to encounter a ‘red flag.’”53
Copyright owners have argued that Congress’ intent in creating the red flag test
was to “require[] less specificity than the actual knowledge” standard and to prevent
service providers from qualifying for safe harbor protection when they are aware of
widespread infringement.54 Courts, however, have largely rejected the notion that a
general awareness of infringement is sufficient to establish red flag knowledge.55 Instead,
courts have held that red flag knowledge requires “knowledge of specific and identifiable
infringements” because, in order to retain the protection of the safe harbor, the service
provider is required to expeditiously “remove or disable ‘the [infringing] material.’”56
In assessing these knowledge requirements, courts have also looked to the
language of section 512(m), which states that “[n]othing” in section 512 conditions the
availability of safe harbor protection on “a service provider monitoring its service or
affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity, except to the extent consistent

52

Id. at 53; S. REP NO. 105-190, at 44 (1998); accord Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31.
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 58 (1998); see also Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d
1020, 1043 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Fung”) (finding that a service provider had red flag knowledge where
“material in question was sufficiently current and well-known that it would have been objectively obvious
to a reasonable person that the material . . . was both copyrighted and not licensed to random members of
the public”).
54
See, e.g., Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31-32 (internal quotations omitted).
55
See, e.g., UMG Recordings, 718 F.3d at 1022-23; Viacom, 676 F.3d at 32.
56
Viacom, 676 F.3d at 30-31 (emphasis omitted) (“[E]xpeditious removal is possible only if the service
provider knows with particularity which items to remove.”).
53

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 with a standard technical measure.”57 Based on this language, courts have concluded that
“the DMCA . . . place[s] the burden of policing copyright infringement . . . squarely on
the owners of the copyright.”58
Financial Benefit/Right to Control
Litigation regarding the Section 512(c) and (d) safe harbors has also addressed
what it means for a service provider to receive a “financial benefit directly attributable”
to infringing activity where it has the “right and ability to control” such activity.
Like the traditional standard for vicarious liability under common law, the
financial benefit/right to control test has been held not to turn on a service provider’s
knowledge of infringement.59 But courts have also indicated that “right and ability to
control” in the context of section 512 means that the service provider “‘exert[s]
substantial influence on the activities of users,’” i.e., “‘something more than’” the basic
ability to remove or block access to infringing materials.60 Such control may include, for
example, taking an active role in the listing of infringing material on a website, assisting
users in locating infringing files, or encouraging the uploading or downloading of
particular copyrighted works.61 These courts have reasoned that because the takedown

57

17 U.S.C. 512(m).
UMG Recordings, 718 F.3d at 1022 (quoting CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1113).
59
See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 36-38 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[17 U.S.C.] 512(c)(1)(B) does not include a specific
knowledge requirement” because to “import[] a specific knowledge requirement into [17 U.S.C.]
512(c)(1)(B) renders the control provision duplicative of [17 U.S.C.] 512(c)(1)(A).”); H.R. REP. NO. 105551, pt. 1, at 25-26 (1998) (“The financial benefit standard in subparagraph (B) is intended to codify and
clarify the direct financial benefit element of vicarious liability . . . . The ‘right and ability to control’
language in Subparagraph (B) codifies the second element of vicarious liability.”); 3 MELVILLE NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 12.04[A][2] (Matthew Bender rev. ed.) (“Notably lacking from
the foregoing two elements [of vicarious liability] is knowledge.”).
60
UMG Recordings, 718 F.3d at 1029-31 (quoting Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet
Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1173, 1181-82 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“Cybernet Ventures”).
61
Fung, 710 F.3d at 1043, 1046; see also Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38 & n.13 (“[C]ontrol may exist where the
service provider is ‘actively involved in the listing, bidding, sale and delivery’ of items.”) (quoting
Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001)); Cybernet Ventures, 213 F. Supp.
58

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 process itself requires the ability to remove or block access, Congress must have intended
a greater degree of control than just this, or it would undermine the availability of the safe
harbors.62
Sections 512(c) and (d) also exclude service providers from safe harbor protection
when they “receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.”63
While the legislative history suggests that merely requiring a periodic payment for
service does not constitute a direct financial benefit,64 courts have found such a benefit
when the service provider charges a subscription fee to its users and the “infringing
activity constitutes a draw for subscribers, not just an added benefit.”65 Financial benefit
has also been found when a service provider’s “ability to attract advertisers” and the
“amount of revenue” received from advertising are “tied directly to the infringing
activity.”66
Repeat Infringers
Under section 512(i), a service provider seeking to avail itself of any of the safe
harbors is required to “adopt[] and reasonably implement[]” a policy to terminate “repeat
infringers” in “appropriate circumstances.”67 Congress, however, did not define these
terms in the statute, so it has been left to courts to determine whether a service provider’s

2d at 1173 (finding that service provider had control where it required user websites to comply with
“detailed instructions regard[ing] issues of layout, appearance, and content”).
62
See, e.g., Viacom, 676 F.3d at 37.
63
17 U.S.C. 512(c)(1)(B), (d)(2).
64
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 54 (1998) (noting that financial benefit is not established through a
“one-time set-up fee [or] flat, periodic payments for service from a person engaging in infringing
activities”).
65
CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1117; Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004)).
66
Fung, 710 F.3d at 1045-46.
67
17 U.S.C. 512(i)(1)(A); BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-1611, 2015
WL 7756130, at *14 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2015) (“BMG Rights Mgmt.”) (denying 512(a) safe harbor
protection to service provider because it did not reasonably implement a repeat infringer policy).

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 repeat infringer policy is sufficient to qualify the provider for safe harbor protection. In
interpreting this aspect of the statute, courts have held that a repeat infringer is a user
“who repeatedly or blatantly infringe[s] copyright,” and that such a determination may be
based upon information from valid takedown notices and does not require a court
determination.68 Courts have further held that a reasonable policy, at a minimum, must
provide a mechanism to identify and keep a record of users responsible for files
referenced in takedown notices and, “under ‘appropriate circumstances,’” result in
termination of “users who repeatedly or blatantly infringe copyright.”69
Misuse of Takedown Process
Service providers and advocacy groups have raised concerns about fraudulent and
abusive section 512 notices that may restrain fair use, free speech, or otherwise misuse
the notice-and-takedown process.70 Some of the concerns arise from takedown notices for
content that appears to constitute an obvious fair use of a copyright work.71 Others relate
to efforts to remove criticism or commentary—such as negative reviews—under the
guise of copyright.72 While the posting party can invoke the counter-notification
procedure of section 512(g) to have the material reinstated, some believe that posters may
68

CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1109; Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11–20427–CIV, 2013 WL
6336286, at *20 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013) (“Hotfile”); see also BMG Rights Mgmt., No. 1:14-cv-1611,
2015 WL 7756130, at *13.
69
CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1109 (internal citation omitted); see also Hotfile, No. 11–20427–CIV, 2013 WL
6336286, at *21.
70
See, e.g., Section 512 Hearing at 48, 63-67, 246-47 (written statements of Katherine Oyama, Google Inc.;
Paul Sieminski, Automattic Inc.; and Library Copyright Alliance) (discussing misuse of takedown process).
71
See, e.g., id. at 65 (written statement of Paul Sieminski, Automattic Inc.) (noting concern for “companies
who issue DMCA notices specifically against content that makes use of their copyrighted material as part
of a criticism or negative review – which is classic fair use”).
72
See, e.g., Automattic Inc. v. Steiner, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (entering default
judgment against the submitter of takedown notices for knowingly materially misrepresenting that a blog
infringed its press release); Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (finding voting machine manufacturer liable under section 512(f) for “knowingly materially
misrepresent[ing]” that publication of email archive discussing technical problems with voting machines
was infringing).

19

 not be aware of this, or may be too intimidated to pursue a counter notification.73 A
related concern is that the improper takedown of legitimate material, even if for a limited
time, may harm important speech interests—for example, if a political advertisement is
wrongly removed at a critical time in a campaign.74
As noted above, a takedown notice must include a statement that the complaining
party has a “good faith belief” that the use is not authorized.75 Similarly, a counter
notification must include a statement that the sender has a “good faith belief” that the
material in question was removed as a result of “mistake or misidentification.”76 Section
512(f) provides for a cause of action and damages if a sender “knowingly materially
misrepresents” in a takedown notice that material is infringing, or, in a counter
notification, was wrongfully removed.77
In a number of cases challenging the validity of takedown notices, courts have
fleshed out the meaning and application of section 512(f). For example, courts have held
that the “good faith belief” requirement of section 512(c)(3)(A)(v) “encompasses a
subjective, rather than objective standard”; that is, the sender is not responsible for an
“unknowing mistake,” even if the sender’s assessment of infringement was objectively
unreasonable.78 But it has also been held that before sending a takedown notice, the

73

See, e.g., Brief for Org. for Transformative Works et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee and CrossAppellant at 16, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 13-16106, 13-16107)
(noting that creators worry about sending a counter notice because they may have to provide their real
names and addresses or become subject to a lawsuit they cannot afford).
74
See, e.g., CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., CAMPAIGN TAKEDOWN TROUBLES: HOW MERITLESS
COPYRIGHT CLAIMS THREATEN ONLINE POLITICAL SPEECH 1 (2010), https://cdt.org/files/pdfs/
copyright_takedowns.pdf.
75
17 U.S.C. 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
76
Id. at 512(g)(3)(C).
77
Id. at 512(f).
78
Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc., 391 F3d 1000, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2004); accord Lenz v.
Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th Cir. 2015). The Rossi and Lenz courts reasoned that to

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 complaining party must “consider the existence of fair use” in forming the subjective
good faith belief that the use is not authorized by the law.79 The need to consider fair use
may present challenges in the context of automated takedown processes relied upon by
copyright owners to address large-volume infringements, including how such processes
might be calibrated to accommodate this requirement and the necessity, if any, for human
review.80
Voluntary Measures
While interested parties continue to test and clarify aspects of section 512 in the
courts, some stakeholders have chosen to work together to develop voluntary protocols
and best practices to avoid litigation, improve online enforcement, and protect free
speech and innovation. Several of these initiatives have been undertaken with the support
of the U.S. government, including the Copyright Alert System, an effort supported by the
U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (“IPEC”),81 and the DMCA Noticeand-Takedown Processes: List of Good, Bad, and Situational Practices, stemming from
the efforts of the Internet Policy Task Force,82 both of which seek to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of notice-and-takedown procedures, as well as the IPEC-led

hold otherwise would conflict with Congress’ intent that a copyright owner only be penalized for “knowing”
misrepresentations. Rossi, 391 F3d at 1004-05; accord Lenz, 801 F.3d at 1134.
79
Lenz, 801 F.3d at 1133.
80
See id. at 1135-36. In Lenz, the Ninth Circuit was “mindful of the pressing crush of voluminous
infringing content that copyright holders face,” and noted, “without passing judgment, that the
implementation of computer algorithms appears to be a valid and good faith middle ground for processing a
plethora of content while still meeting the DMCA’s requirements to somehow consider fair use.” Id. at
1135. The court further addressed how an algorithm might accommodate fair use, observing that it was
“unaware of any [court] decision to date that actually addressed the need for human review.” Id.
81
See generally CTR. FOR COPYRIGHT INFO., THE COPYRIGHT ALERT SYSTEM: PHASE ONE AND BEYOND
(May 28, 2014), http://www.copyrightinformation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Phase-OneAnd_Beyond.pdf.
82
See generally DEP’T OF COMMERCE MULTISTAKEHOLDER FORUM RECOMMENDED PRACTICES (list of
recommended practices developed by a diverse group of copyright owners, service providers, and public
interest representatives).

21

 Payment Processor Best Practices, which seeks to cut off revenue to sites that promote
infringement.83 Other multistakeholder initiatives include the Trustworthy Accountability
Group certification process, aimed at curbing ad revenue supporting piracy websites,84
and the Principles for User Generated Content Services, which sets forth agreed
principles for screening and addressing infringing content.85
II.

Subjects of Inquiry
The Copyright Office seeks public input, including, where available, empirical

data on the efficiency and effectiveness of section 512 for owners and users of
copyrighted works and the overall sustainability of the system if, as appears likely, the
volume of takedown notices continues to increase. The Office invites written comments
in particular on the subjects below. A party choosing to respond to this Notice of Inquiry
need not address every subject, but the Office requests that responding parties clearly
identify and separately address each numbered subject for which a response is submitted.
General Effectiveness of Safe Harbors
1. Are the section 512 safe harbors working as Congress intended?
2. Have courts properly construed the entities and activities covered by the section 512
safe harbors?

83

See INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2011 U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 46 (2012),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/ipec_annual_report_mar2012.pdf (describing a
June 2011 agreement among American Express, Discover, MasterCard, PayPal, and Visa to abide by best
practices to “stop sites distributing counterfeit and pirated goods from conducting financial transactions
through payment processors”).
84
See Press Release, Trustworthy Accountability Group, Advertising Industry Launches Initiative to
Protect Brands Against Piracy Websites (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.tagtoday.net/advertising-industrylaunches-initiative-to-protect-brands-against-piracy-websites.
85
See Principles for User Generated Content Services, http://www.ugcprinciples.com (last visited Dec. 16,
2015).

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 3. How have section 512’s limitations on liability for online service providers impacted
the growth and development of online services?
4. How have section 512’s limitations on liability for online service providers impacted
the protection and value of copyrighted works, including licensing markets for such
works?
5. Do the section 512 safe harbors strike the correct balance between copyright owners
and online service providers?
Notice-and-Takedown Process
6. How effective is section 512’s notice-and-takedown process for addressing online
infringement?
7. How efficient or burdensome is section 512’s notice-and-takedown process for
addressing online infringement? Is it a workable solution over the long run?
8. In what ways does the process work differently for individuals, small-scale entities,
and/or large-scale entities that are sending and/or receiving takedown notices?
9. Please address the role of both “human” and automated notice-and-takedown
processes under section 512, including their respective feasibility, benefits, and
limitations.
10. Does the notice-and-takedown process sufficiently address the reappearance of
infringing material previously removed by a service provider in response to a notice?
If not, what should be done to address this concern?
11. Are there technologies or processes that would improve the efficiency and/or
effectiveness of the notice-and-takedown process?

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 12. Does the notice-and-takedown process sufficiently protect against fraudulent, abusive
or unfounded notices? If not, what should be done to address this concern?
13. Has section 512(d), which addresses “information location tools,” been a useful
mechanism to address infringement that occurs as a result of a service provider’s
referring or linking to infringing content? If not, what should be done to address this
concern?
14. Have courts properly interpreted the meaning of “representative list” under section
512(c)(3)(A)(ii)? If not, what should be done to address this concern?
15. Please describe, and assess the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of, voluntary measures
and best practices—including financial measures, content “filtering” and takedown
procedures—that have been undertaken by interested parties to supplement or
improve the efficacy of section 512’s notice-and-takedown process.
Counter Notifications
16. How effective is the counter-notification process for addressing false and mistaken
assertions of infringement?
17. How efficient or burdensome is the counter-notification process for users and service
providers? Is it a workable solution over the long run?
18. In what ways does the process work differently for individuals, small-scale entities,
and/or large-scale entities that are sending and/or receiving counter notifications?
Legal Standards
19. Assess courts’ interpretations of the “actual” and “red flag” knowledge standards
under the section 512 safe harbors, including the role of “willful blindness” and
section 512(m)(1) (limiting the duty of a service provider to monitor for infringing

24

 activity) in such analyses. How are judicial interpretations impacting the effectiveness
of section 512?
20. Assess courts’ interpretations of the “financial benefit” and “right and ability to
control” standards under the section 512 safe harbors. How are judicial interpretations
impacting the effectiveness of section 512?
21. Describe any other judicial interpretations of section 512 that impact its effectiveness,
and why.
Repeat Infringers
22. Describe and address the effectiveness of repeat infringer policies as referenced in
section 512(i)(A).
23. Is there sufficient clarity in the law as to what constitutes a repeat infringer policy for
purposes of section 512’s safe harbors? If not, what should be done to address this
concern?
Standard Technical Measures
24. Does section 512(i) concerning service providers’ accommodation of “standard
technical measures” (including the definition of such measures set forth in section
512(i)(2)) encourage or discourage the use of technologies to address online
infringement?
25. Are there any existing or emerging “standard technical measures” that could or
should apply to obtain the benefits of section 512’s safe harbors?
Remedies
26. Is section 512(g)(2)(C), which requires a copyright owner to bring a federal lawsuit
within ten business days to keep allegedly infringing content offline—and a counter-

25

 notifying party to defend any such lawsuit—a reasonable and effective provision? If
not, how might it be improved?
27. Is the limited injunctive relief available under section 512(j) a sufficient and effective
remedy to address the posting of infringing material?
28. Are the remedies for misrepresentation set forth in section 512(f) sufficient to deter
and address fraudulent or abusive notices and counter notifications?
Other Issues
29. Please provide any statistical or economic reports or studies that demonstrate the
effectiveness, ineffectiveness, and/or impact of section 512’s safe harbors.
30. Please identify and describe any pertinent issues not referenced above that the
Copyright Office should consider in conducting its study.

Dated: December 28, 2015.

_________________________
Maria A. Pallante
Register of Copyrights
U.S. Copyright Office

[BILLING CODE 1410-30-P]
[FR Doc. 2015-32973 Filed: 12/30/2015 8:45 am; Publication Date: 12/31/2015]

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