Case 3:14-cv-30211-MGM Document 152 Filed 01/04/16 Page 1 of 12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
WESTERN DIVISION
TAMARA GREEN et al.,
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim
Defendants,
v.

Case No.: 3:14-cv-30211-MGM

WILLIAM H. COSBY, JR.,
Defendant/Counterclaim
Plaintiff.
CAMILLE COSBY’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF HER
EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY HER DEPOSITION, CURRENTLY SET FOR
JANUARY 6, 2016, PENDING THE RESOLUTION OF HER APPEAL OF THE
MAGISTRATE’S ORDER (DKT. 146) DENYING HER MOTION TO QUASH HER
DEPOSITION SUBPOENA

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................1
FACTS .............................................................................................................................................2
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................3
I.

THIS COURT HAS DISCRETION TO STAY MRS. COSBY’S DEPOSITION
DURING THE PENDENCY OF AN APPEAL. .................................................................3

II.

AN EMERGENCY STAY IS NECESSARY SO THAT THIS COURT MAY
CONSIDER A MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION ON THE
MASSACHUSETTS MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION RULE. .....................................4
A.

The Marital Disqualification Rule Has Been Established To Protect
Marital Communications. ........................................................................................4

B.

Notwithstanding The Broad Nature Of The Marital Disqualification Rule,
The Magistrate Decided That The Rule Does Not Apply At Deposition. ...............5

C.

A Stay Is Also Necessary Because Plaintiffs Intend To Provide Intimate
Details Of Mrs. Cosby’s Marriage To The Press. ....................................................7

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................8

i

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Ares-Serono, Inc. v. Organon Int'l B.V.,
153 F.R.D. 4 (D. Mass. 1993) ....................................................................................................4
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Currie Enterprises,
142 F.R.D. 8 (D. Mass. 1991) ....................................................................................................4
Gallagher v. Goldstein,
402 Mass. 457 (1988) ........................................................................................................5, 6, 7
Goodwin v. City of Boston,
118 F.R.D. 297 (D. Mass. 1988) ................................................................................................4
Miller v. Miller,
448 Mass. 320 (2007) ................................................................................................................6
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Dresser Industries,
628 F.2d 1368 (D.C.Cir.) ...........................................................................................................4
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) ......................................................................................................................8
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) ............................................................................................................1, 4, 7, 8
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 20 ...................................................................................1, 2, 5, 6
LR, D. Mass. 7.1(a)(2) ....................................................................................................................2
LR, D. Mass. 40.4 ............................................................................................................................4
Other Authorities
MA R. Evid. § 504 ...........................................................................................................................5

ii

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Non-party Camille Cosby brings the present emergency motion to stay her deposition,
noticed for January 6, while this Court considers her appeal of the Magistrate’s ruling on her
motion to quash. Mrs. Cosby’s appeal concerns an issue of first impression on the application of
Massachusetts’ Marital Disqualification Rule (“Disqualification Rule”) to testimony at
deposition.
The Disqualification Rule prohibits any spouse from testifying as to their private marital
conversations in “any proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before a person who has authority
to receive evidence.” 1 Pursuant to that Rule, Mrs. Cosby filed a motion to quash Plaintiffs’
deposition subpoena to her. On December 31, 2015, the Magistrate denied Mrs. Cosby’s motion
to quash, deciding that the Disqualification Rule only restricts testimony at trial, so that a spouse
would have to testify at deposition about marital communications, even though that same
testimony would be barred and inadmissible at trial.
Upon review of the Magistrate’s order, Mrs. Cosby immediately informed Plaintiffs that
she intended appeal the order to the District Court, and asked if Plaintiffs would agree to
postpone the deposition during the pendency of the appeal. Plaintiffs refused and, among other
things, threatened to seek the assistance of federal marshals to compel Mrs. Cosby’s deposition
on January 6. Accordingly, Mrs. Cosby brings this emergency motion to stay her deposition so
that the District Court may have a full opportunity to review the Magistrate’s order, pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

1

See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 20 (“Section 20”) (“Any person of sufficient
understanding, although a party, may testify in any proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or
before a person who has authority to receive evidence, except as follows: […] neither husband
nor wife shall testify as to private conversations with the other.”
1

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FACTS
The Subpoena to Mrs. Cosby. On December 3, 2015, Plaintiffs’ counsel announced to
the press that he intended to take the deposition of Camille Cosby on January 6, 2016. Six days
later, on December 9, 2015, Plaintiffs served a deposition subpoena on Mrs. Cosby, seeking her
deposition testimony in connection with the claims brought by Plaintiffs herein. (See Dkt. 1282.) On December 9 and 15, 2015, and pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(a)(2), counsel to Mrs. Cosby
conferred with Plaintiffs’ counsel regarding the viability and scope of her deposition subpoena.
(See Dkt. 128 at 3.)
Mrs. Cosby’s Motion to Quash. On December 18, 2015, Mrs. Cosby filed a motion to
quash her deposition subpoena, or, in the alternative, for a protective order (“Motion”). (See
Dkt. 127; Dkt. 128; Dkt. 141.) Mrs. Cosby’s motion pointed out that, pursuant to the
Disqualification Rule, she is barred from testifying about marital conversations. Plaintiffs filed
their opposition to Mrs. Cosby’s Motion on December 21, 2015 (see dkt. 130), to which Mrs.
Cosby replied on December 30, 2015 (see dkt. 141).
The Magistrate’s December 31, 2015 Denial of the Motion. On December 31, 2015, the
Magistrate entered an order denying Mrs. Cosby’s motion in its entirety (the “Order”). (See Dkt.
146.) Although the Disqualification Rule broadly prohibits any spouse from testifying as to their
private marital conversations in “any proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before a person
who has authority to receive evidence,” 2 the Magistrate decided that the Disqualification Rule
only applies to limit testimony at trial. According to the Magistrate, “the rule’s underlying
character—i.e., competence, not privilege—concerns admissibility of evidence at trial, and not a
2

See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 20 (“Any person of sufficient understanding,
although a party, may testify in any proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before a person who
has authority to receive evidence, except as follows: […] neither husband nor wife shall testify as
to private conversations with the other.”
2

 Case 3:14-cv-30211-MGM Document 152 Filed 01/04/16 Page 6 of 12

privilege against discovery.” (See id at 6.) Thus, notwithstanding the prohibitions of the
Disqualification Rule, “there is nothing precluding [Mrs. Cosby’s] deposition as a tool to
discover information gleaned from conversations between Mrs. Cosby and the defendant.” (See
id. at 10) (emphasis in original.)
Plaintiffs’ Refusal to Postpone the Deposition During Pendency of an Appeal. Upon
review of the Magistrate’s Order, on December 31, 2015, counsel informed Plaintiffs’ counsel
that Mrs. Cosby intended file an appeal with the District Court, and asked if Plaintiffs would
agree to stay the deposition during the pendency of the appeal. To that end, counsel suggested
that Mrs. Cosby’s deposition could proceed during the third week of January in the event the
appeal was denied. (See Exhibit A.)
Plaintiffs responded that they would oppose any appeal or stay of the Order. (See id.)
Plaintiffs also threatened, absent an order from this Court, to “enforce [Mrs. Cosby’s]
appearance, on the date of the deposition, by whatever legally appropriate means are available”
including by “obtaining the assistance of the U.S. Marshalls to secure her attendance.” (See id.)
Plaintiffs further threatened to seek attorneys’ fees and costs if Mrs. Cosby did not comply with
the notice of deposition and subpoena. (See id.)
Accordingly, Mrs. Cosby has brought the instant emergency motion.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT HAS DISCRETION TO STAY MRS. COSBY’S DEPOSITION
DURING THE PENDENCY OF AN APPEAL.
This Court should stay Mrs. Cosby’s deposition while she fully briefs her appeal of the

Magistrate’s Order. Mrs. Cosby’s deposition has been noticed for January 6, 2016, but
Plaintiffs’ counsel has refused to postpone the deposition during the pendency of Mrs. Cosby’s
appeal of the Magistrate’s ruling on her motion to quash.

3

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Emergency relief may be sought when issues raised on a motion to quash will not be
decided before the date of the deposition. See Goodwin v. City of Boston, 118 F.R.D. 297, 298
(D. Mass. 1988); see also Local Rule 40.4. Upon such motion, this Court has discretion to
fashion the terms of a protective order to accommodate the needs of the interested party. See
Ares-Serono, Inc. v. Organon Int’l B.V., 153 F.R.D. 4, 6 (D. Mass. 1993). Indeed, this Court
may impose a stay on discovery for a finite period of time, or limit discovery for finite amount of
time, so long as the postponement is in the interest of justice. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Currie
Enterprises, 142 F.R.D. 8, 12 (D. Mass. 1991) (citing Securities & Exchange Commission v.
Dresser Industries, 628 F.2d 1368, 1375 (D.C.Cir.) (court may impose protective orders or
postpone civil discovery in the interests of justice)).
II.

AN EMERGENCY STAY IS NECESSARY SO THAT THIS COURT MAY
CONSIDER A MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION ON THE MASSACHUSETTS
MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION RULE.
Here, this Court should grant Mrs. Cosby emergency relief, staying her deposition

pending her appeal of the Magistrate’s Order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The Order raises
an issue of first impression concerning the scope of the Marital Disqualification Rule. In the
Order, the Magistrate concluded that the Marital Disqualification Rule does not apply to limit
deposition testimony on spousal communications. (See Dkt. 146 at 10.) No Massachusetts state
case, nor any federal case, has ever so interpreted the Rule. Accordingly, this Court should stay
the deposition so that it may consider full briefing and argument over the scope of the Rule.
A.

The Marital Disqualification Rule Has Been Established To Protect Marital
Communications.

The Disqualification Rule broadly prohibits any spouse from testifying as to the private
conversations with the other in “any proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before a person

4

 Case 3:14-cv-30211-MGM Document 152 Filed 01/04/16 Page 8 of 12

who has authority to receive evidence.” See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 20. 3 Unlike
Massachusetts’ spousal privilege—which only restricts testimony “in the trial of an indictment,
complaint, or other criminal proceeding”—the Disqualification Rule does not contain any such
limitation. See Section 20, First (“[N]either husband nor wife shall testify as to private
conversations with the other.”); c.f. Section 20, Second ([N]either husband nor wife shall be
compelled to testify in the trial of an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding against
the other”); see also MA R. Evid. § 504. 4
Instead, the Rule serves to protect several important policy considerations that the
Massachusetts Legislature has protected for over a century—e.g., preserving the confidentiality
of marital communications as well as preventing any marital disharmony caused by an
examination which might call for unfavorable, yet protected testimony (see Gallagher v.
Goldstein, 402 Mass. 457, 460-61 (1988))—by prohibiting any spouse from providing testimony
that discloses their confidential marital communications. Availing herself to the Disqualification
Rule’s broad protections, Mrs. Cosby filed her motion to quash.
B.

Notwithstanding The Broad Nature Of The Marital Disqualification Rule,
The Magistrate Decided That The Rule Does Not Apply At Deposition.

Despite the broad and plain language of the statute, the Magistrate denied Mrs. Cosby’s
motion to quash. In so doing, the Magistrate decided that the Disqualification Rule only applies
to prohibit testimony at trial and does not limit testimony at deposition. (See Dkt. 146 at 6.)
According to the Magistrate, the Disqualification Rule does not apply to testimony at deposition,
so “there is nothing precluding [Mrs. Cosby’s] deposition as a tool to discover information
3

There are several statutorily-enumerated exceptions to the marital disqualification rule (see Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 233, § 20, First).
4
Although the Magistrate acknowledges that Mrs. Cosby’s brief cites to Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233,
§ 20 (see dkt. 146 at n.7), the Order nevertheless cites to MA. R. Evid. § 504 in its discussion of the Disqualification
Rule which (see id. at 5), while “derived” from the statute, does not contain the complete language of the Rule. See
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 20, First.

5

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gleaned from conversations between Mrs. Cosby and the defendant.” (See id. at 10.) Seemingly,
according to the Magistrate’s interpretation, Mrs. Cosby is required to disclose her private and
confidential martial communications to Plaintiffs during her deposition because her testimony
may be used as a discovery tool to discover other information based on her private
communications with her husband.
Neither Plaintiffs nor the Magistrate cited any Massachusetts or federal case holding that
the Disqualification Rule is limited only to trial testimony, nor has research located any such
case. To the contrary, the broad and plain language of the Disqualification Rule, prohibiting a
spouse from testifying in “any proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before a person who has
authority to receive evidence” suggests that the Rule’s prohibitions apply to all testimony. See
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 20 (emphasis added); see also Gallagher, 402 Mass. at 460-61
(“The language of [Section 20] is not to be enlarged or limited by construction unless its object
and plain meaning require it.”).
Additionally, the Magistrate’s Order requires a result that seems contrary to
Massachusetts law. The Order suggests that Mrs. Cosby is required to testify to the substance of
her marital communications at deposition. (See Dkt. 146 at 10) (finding that the
Disqualification Rule does not apply to deposition testimony). However, under Massachusetts
law, a spouse who provides an answer about such communications is considered to have waived
the privilege. Miller v. Miller, 448 Mass. 320, 326 (2007) (if no objection is made when the
prohibited testimony is introduced, “then the testimony may be admitted for its full probative
value”). As such, the Magistrate’s Order creating an exception for deposition testimony would
potentially swallow up the entire Disqualification Rule.

6

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Because the Disqualification Rule promotes policy implications protected and
enumerated by Massachusetts statute, this Court should grant Mrs. Cosby an emergency stay to
allow this Court to fully brief these issues upon appeal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
C.

A Stay Is Also Necessary Because Plaintiffs Intend To Provide Intimate
Details Of Mrs. Cosby’s Marriage To The Press.

Deciding the application of the Marital Disqualification Rule here is all the more
important because Plaintiffs have indicated that they intend to disclose Mrs. Cosby’s deposition
testimony, including her private marital conversations, to the press. In his Order, the Magistrate
has suggested that the Plaintiffs may ask Mrs. Cosby about the most intimate details of her
marital life, including her husband’s sexual “proclivities.” (See Dkt. 146 at 10; Dkt. 130 at 5.)
Plaintiffs have made clear that they will publicize all such testimony. (Dkt. 148 at 8-10.) A trial
objection will do Mrs. Cosby little good if the private and intimate details of her marital life are
discussed during deposition and released to the media thereafter. See Gallagher, 402 Mass. at
460-61.
Indeed, without a stay of her deposition, both Mrs. Cosby’s privacy and freedom will be
put at issue in a case to which she is not a party, and for which she is not alleged to have any
personal, first-hand knowledge. Plaintiffs have threatened using the U.S. Marshals to secure
Mrs. Cosby’s attendance at the January 6, 2016 deposition, rather than working with Mrs. Cosby
to afford this Court a proper opportunity to review the underlying issues of first impression that
that may be presented on appeal. An emergency stay of Mrs. Cosby’s deposition is warranted in
this case to preserve her substantive rights to privacy while this Court reviews the Magistrate’s
Order on appeal. 5

5

Additionally, since the time that Mrs. Cosby’s motion to quash was filed, on December 30, 2015,
Defendant Cosby was charged in a separate criminal proceeding, see Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. William

7

 Case 3:14-cv-30211-MGM Document 152 Filed 01/04/16 Page 11 of 12

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should grant Mrs. Cosby’s emergency motion
to stay her deposition, currently set for January 6, 2016, while this Court considers her appeal of
the Magistrate’s ruling on her motion to quash.
Dated: January 4, 2016

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ John J. Egan
Christopher Tayback
Marshall M. Searcy III
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
SULLIVAN, LLP
865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90017-2543
(213) 443 3000
Monique Pressley
THE PRESSLEY FIRM, PLLC
1629 K Street NW, Suite 300
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: (202) 973-0181
John J. Egan
EGAN, FLANAGAN & COHEN, PC
67 Market Street
PO Box 9035
Springfield, MA 01102-9035
413-737-0260
Attorneys for Camille Cosby

Henry Cosby (Dkt. No.: MJ-38102-CR-0000131-2015). Neither the magistrate nor the parties briefed or discussed
the propriety potential implications of that criminal proceeding upon Mrs. Cosby’s deposition in this matter.

8

 Case 3:14-cv-30211-MGM Document 152 Filed 01/04/16 Page 12 of 12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on January 4, 2016, I caused the foregoing document and
corresponding exhibit to be electronically filed using the CM/ECF, which will automatically
transmit Notice of Electronic Filing to all attorneys of record, as follows:

Joseph Cammarata
Matthew W. Tievsky
Chaikin, Sherman, Cammarata & Siegel, P.C.
1232 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
Andrew M. Abraham
Abraham & Associates, P.C.
2 Center Plaza, Suite 620
Boston, MA 02108
Ira Sherman
The Law Building
1232 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
Alexandra B. Schmit
Michael A. Bressler
The Bressler Firm LLC
Suite 1800
180 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, IL 60601

/s/ John J. Egan
John J. Egan

 Case 3:14-cv-30211-MGM Document 152-1 Filed 01/04/16 Page 1 of 2
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tĞ ŝŶƚĞŶĚ ƚŽ ĨŝůĞ ĂŶ ĂƉƉĞĂů ŽĨ ƚŽĚĂLJ͛Ɛ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ  ŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ  ŽƵƌƚ ŽŶ DŽŶĚĂLJ͘ /Ŷ ƚŚĞ ĞǀĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŽƵƌ ĂƉƉĞĂů ŝƐ
ƵŶƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů͕ ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ŵĂŬĞ DƌƐ͘  ŽƐďLJ ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ĨŽƌ ĚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƚŚŝƌĚ ǁĞĞŬ ŽĨ :ĂŶƵĂƌLJ͘ >Ğƚ ŵĞ ŬŶŽǁ ŝĨ ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ
ĂŐƌĞĞĂďůĞ ƚŽ LJŽƵ͕ Žƌ ŝĨ ǁĞ ĂůƐŽ ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ ƐĞĞŬ Ă ƐƚĂLJ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ :ĂŶƵĂƌLJ ϲ ĚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ĚĂƚĞ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ  ŽƵƌƚ͘
/Ŷ ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ͕ ǁĞ Ɛƚŝůů ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ ĨŝŐƵƌĞ ŽƵƚ ǁŚĞƌĞ ǁĞ͛ƌĞ ŐŽŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŚĂǀĞ DƐ͘ DŽƌŝƚnj ĚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ :ĂŶƵĂƌLJ ϭϯ͕ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ƐŽŵĞ
ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ĚĂƚĞƐ ĨŽƌ ƉůĂŝŶƚŝĨĨƐ ĚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ͘
>Ğƚ ŵĞ ŬŶŽǁ ǁŚĞŶ LJŽƵ͛ƌĞ ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ͕ ĂŶĚ / ǁŝůů ŐŝǀĞ LJŽƵ Ă ĐĂůů͘
,ĂǀĞ Ă ŐƌĞĂƚ EĞǁ zĞĂƌ͘
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