Case 3:16-cv-00006-DJH Document 1 Filed 01/04/16 Page 1 of 9 PageID #: 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
Electronically filed
JOHN DAVID BOGGS,

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Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM H. MERIDETH,
Defendant.

3:16-cv-6-DJH
Case No. _____________

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND DAMAGES
For his Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Damages against Defendant, Plaintiff,
John David Boggs, alleges the following:
INTRODUCTION
This case involves the intentional downing of Plaintiff’s unmanned aircraft by Defendant.
Plaintiff was flying his aircraft within Class G airspace and was neither trespassing nor invading
anyone’s privacy. Defendant has argued to the media and the courts that he was justified in
using physical force to prevent what he perceived as an invasion of privacy and trespass upon his
property. A state district court judge, dismissing criminal charges against Defendant, ruled that
Defendant acted “within his rights.” This turn of events has set the stage for a conflict between
state-based claims of trespass to property, invasion of privacy, and trespass to chattles and long
standing exclusive federal jurisdiction over the national airspace and the protection of air safety.
The tension between private property rights and right to traverse safely the national airspace was
resolved during the formative days of manned aviation. The issue is now arising in the context
of unmanned aircraft, also known as “drones.” Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment from this

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Court to resolve that tension and define clearly the rights of aircraft operators and property
owners.
PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff, John David Boggs, is a resident of Bullitt County Kentucky.

2.

Defendant, William H. Merideth, is a resident of Bullitt County Kentucky.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3.

This is an action for a declaratory judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, for the

purpose of determining a question of actual controversy between the parties as more fully
appears below. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because
this action involves issues arising from the laws of the United States. The supplementary state
law claims underlying this case implicate significant federal issues. More specifically, plaintiff’s
right to relief as well as the defendant’s defenses, will necessarily require resolution of a
substantial question of federal law, to wit, the boundaries of the airspace surrounding real
property, the reasonable expectation of privacy as viewed from the air, and the right to damage
or destroy an aircraft in-flight, in relation to the exclusive federal regulation and protection of air
safety, air navigation, and control over the national airspace.
The Court has supplementary jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim arising under state law,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, because that claim is part of the same case or controversy.
4.

Venue is proper in this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because a substantial

part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this District.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
5.

The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) has the exclusive authority to

govern airspace within the United States and the operation of aircraft. The federal government's

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interest in regulating aviation is paramount. Federal statutes and regulations, including the
Transportation Laws of the United States, 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 et seq., and the Airline
Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713, and the regulations promulgated by the Federal Aviation
Administration pursuant to those laws, preempt state law in that area.
6.

The FAA’s airspace designations state that Class G airspace includes uncontrolled

airspace that does not fall within any other classification between the surface and any overlying
Class E airspace. Class G airspace is part of the navigable airspace the regulation of which
substantially affects interstate commerce.
7.

The FAA defines an “aircraft” as “a device that is used or intended to be used for

flight in the air.” 14 C.F.R. § 1.1.
8.

On July 26, 2015, Plaintiff was operating by wireless controller an unmanned

aircraft (also referred to as a “drone”) at an altitude of approximately 200 feet above ground level
in Class G airspace over Bullitt County, Kentucky.
10.

Plaintiff’s aircraft contained an onboard camera capable of recording video and

still photographs. Plaintiff’s aircraft recorded video of the horizon, woods and the rooftops of
various houses. At no time was Plaintiff capturing video or still images of Defendant or anyone
on his property.

Below is the last image recorded by the aircraft prior to being shot by

Defendant:

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11.

After approximately two minutes of flight, Defendant shot Plaintiff’s unmanned

aircraft down with a shotgun, resulting in damage to Plaintiff’s property. Defendant later alleged
that Plaintiff’s unmanned aircraft may have been taking video or still images of Defendant’s
daughter while hovering over Plaintiff’s property, thus Defendant asserts he was protecting his
family’s privacy rights and preventing further trespass.
12.

Defendant was charged by Kentucky authorities with felony wanton

endangerment and criminal mischief. On October 26, 2015, Kentucky District Court Judge
Rebecca Ward dismissed the criminal charges against Defendant saying that Defendant “had a
right to shoot” at the aircraft.
13.

Defendant, using the nickname “The Drone Slayer,” continues to assert that he

was justified in shooting Plaintiff’s aircraft and vows to do it again, as evidenced by his
Facebook page:

https://www.facebook.com/william.merideth.7
14.

Indeed, Defendant has implicitly encouraged others to engage in the same conduct

by selling shirts depicted below:

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15.

Given the foregoing, Plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment, as set forth in

more detail below.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment)
16.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in the foregoing paragraphs as

though fully set forth.
17.

An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and Defendant

concerning their respective rights and obligations with respect to the damage caused to Plaintiff’s
aircraft by Defendant.
18.

The United States Government has exclusive sovereignty over airspace of the

United States pursuant to 49 U.S.C.A. § 40103. The airspace, therefore, is not subject to private
ownership nor can the flight of an aircraft within the navigable airspace of the United States
constitute a trespass. Unmanned aircraft are aircraft consistent with Subtitle B of Public Law

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112-95 and the existing definition of aircraft in Title 49 of the United States Code, 49 U.S.C.
40102.
19.

In addition, even if Plaintiff had viewed the defendant’s property from the air,

which he did not, such viewing would not violate the defendant’s reasonable expectation of
privacy according to well established federal law. The U.S. Supreme Court has determined, as a
general rule, that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the area surrounding a home in
plain view from above. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210
(1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 109 S.Ct. 693, 102 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) (plurality
opinion).

Resolution of the current dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant requires the

application of this existing federal case law to an as yet unexamined technology – unmanned
aircraft.
20.

Further, Congress has indicated its unambiguous intent to ensure the safety of

aircraft. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 32, whoever “sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or
wrecks any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft
used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce” commits a felony.
Although this statute may not create a private right of action, the interpretation of the statute is
critical to the determination of the claims asserted herein. Should the court determine that this
statute applies to unmanned aircraft, as it should, that would leave no room for Defendant’s
assertion of the right to self-help or the Kentucky District Court Judge’s ruling that Defendant
was “within his rights” to shoot the aircraft.
21.

Conversely, Kentucky law regarding trespass does not specifically address the

rights of unmanned aircraft to traverse the skies above private property. It defines a trespasser as
“any person who enters or goes upon the real estate of another without any right, lawful authority

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or invitation, either expressed or implied.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 381.231. A trespasser may be
subject to civil suit and/or criminal prosecution. Kentucky law also permits resort to self-help in
response to trespass. A landowner may use physical force “upon another person when the person
believes that such force is immediately necessary to prevent the commission of criminal
trespass.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 503.080.
22.

Given the clear conflict of federal and state laws, as applied to the facts of this

action, Plaintiff desires a judicial determination of the respective rights and duties of Plaintiff
and Defendant with respect to Plaintiff’s rights to operate an aircraft within Class G airspace and
recover damages for trespass to chattel caused by Defendant’s intentional shooting of that
aircraft.
23.

Plaintiff is, herein, asserting a claim for trespass to chattels as a result of the

damages to his aircraft.
24.

The ruling of the Kentucky District Court and assertions made by Defendant

regarding his belief that his actions were justified because Plaintiff was engaged in trespass and
invasion of privacy are in direct conflict with established federal law governing the regulation of
manned aircraft and airways and cannot be resolved without addressing how this law applies to
unmanned aircraft
25.

For those reasons, Plaintiff seeks the following declaratory judgment:

(A)

An unmanned aircraft is an “aircraft” according to Federal law.

(B)

An unmanned aircraft operating in Class G airspace in the manner alleged above

is operating in “navigable airspace” within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
(C)

That Plaintiff was operating his unmanned aircraft in the navigable airspace

within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States and not within Defendant’s property;

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(D)

That the operation of his unmanned aircraft in in the manner alleged above did

not violate the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy; and
(E)

That a property owner cannot shoot at an unmanned aircraft operating in

navigable airspace within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States when that aircraft is
operating in the manner alleged above.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Trespass to Chattels)

26.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in the foregoing paragraphs as

though fully set forth.
27.

Defendant intentionally intermeddled with personal property in the possession of

Plaintiff, specifically, his unmanned aircraft.
28.

Defendant impaired the property as to its condition, quality, to value.

29.

Plaintiff’s property was damaged by the reduced value, condition and quality of

his aircraft in an amount of approximately $1,500.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiff demands the following relief:
1.

That the Defendant be served with process and answer the allegations and claims

set forth above;
2.

That the court enter the declaratory judgment requested in the First Cause of

Action, above; and
3.

That the Court award to the Plaintiff such other legal and equitable relief as it

deems appropriate, including monetary damages, prejudgment interest, and the costs of filing
this action.

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Respectfully submitted,

s/ Thomas C. Gleason
Thomas C. Gleason
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
400 West Market Street, 32nd Floor
Louisville, KY 40202
(502) 589-5400
(502) 581-1087 fax
tgleason@fbtlaw.com

s/ James E. Mackler
James E. Mackler (pro hac vice pending)
William L. Campbell, Jr. (pro hac vice
pending)
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
150 3rd Ave. S., Suite 1900
Nashville, TN 37201
(615) 251-5550
jmackler@fbtlaw.com
ccampbell@fbtlaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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