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Exhibit A

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Proposed Modifications to the Handschu Guidelines
GUIDELINES FOR INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING POLITICAL ACTIVITY
PREAMBLE
Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on the City of New York on September 11,
2001 which resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and the total destruction of the
World Trade Center complex, it became apparent that the City faces unprecedented threats to its
continued safety and security. In the view of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, the
prevention of future attacks requires the development of intelligence and the investigation of potential
terrorist activity before an unlawful act occurs.
As a result of a federal court order entered in 1985, the New York City Police Department was bound by
guidelines, known as the Handschu Guidelines, which governed the investigation of political activity.
The Handschu Guidelines (i) limited the investigation of political activity to those circumstances when
there was specific information of criminal activity and (ii) established the Handschu Authority to
oversee compliance. After evaluating the impact of the Handschu Guidelines on the need to investigate
terrorism in a changed world, the City made an application to modify the order so as to eliminate the
restrictions contained in the Handschu Guidelines and the oversight of the Handschu Authority with
respect to those restrictions. The City did not seek to eliminate the Handschu Authority’s role to
investigate an individual’s complaint that the NYPD had engaged in unconstitutional conduct in the
investigation of political activity.
The Court granted the City’s application to modify the decree provided the City adopt the internal
guidelines set forth below and distribute the guidelines to supervisory personnel who, in turn, were to
make them known to those under their command. These guidelines were subsequently incorporated into
an order of the Court in 288 F.Supp.2d 411, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) and are enforceable as set out in 679
F.Supp.2d 488, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). They shall remain in effect unless otherwise ordered by the Court.
These guidelines are binding on all members of the service who are engaged in the investigation of
political activity. It is the purpose of these guidelines to enable officers to perform their duties with
greater certainty, confidence and effectiveness while at the same time protecting the guarantees of the
Constitution.
I. STATEMENT OF POLICY
It is the policy of the New York City Police Department that investigations involving political
activity conform to the guarantees of the Constitution, including the guarantee of equal protection. It
is the policy of the New York City Police Department that care be exercised in the conduct of those
investigations so as to protect constitutional rights, including the right to be free from investigation
in which race, religion, or ethnicity is a substantial or motivating factor. It is the policy of the New
York City Police Department and that matters investigated be confined to those supported by a
legitimate law enforcement purpose.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
(1) In its effort to anticipate or prevent unlawful activity, including terrorist acts, the NYPD must, at
times, initiate investigations in advance of unlawful conduct. It is important that such
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investigations not be based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment. It is also
important that investigations not intrude upon rights of expression or association in a manner that
discriminates on the basis of race, religion or ethnicity, where such discrimination is a substantial
or motivating factor for the investigation. When, however, statements advocate unlawful
activity, or indicate an apparent intent to engage in unlawful conduct, particularly acts of
violence, an investigation under these guidelines may be warranted, unless it is apparent, from
the circumstances or the context in which the statements are made, that there is no prospect of
harm.
(2) Based upon the circumstances of a given case, investigative action may be required under exigent
circumstances. Exigent circumstances are circumstances requiring action before authorization
otherwise necessary under these guidelines can reasonably be obtained, in order to protect life or
substantial property interests; to apprehend or identify a fleeing offender; to prevent the hiding,
destruction or alteration of evidence; or to avoid other serious impairment or hindrance of an
investigation.
When any investigative action, taken under exigent circumstances, would require an approval
under ordinary conditions, such approval shall be obtained as soon as practicable in accordance
with the provisions of these guidelines. Where a regular approval or request is required to be in
writing, the approval or request following exigent circumstances shall also be in writing.
(3) Investigations shall be terminated when all logical leads have been exhausted and no legitimate
law enforcement purpose justifies their continuance.
III. APPLICABILITY
These guidelines apply only to investigations which involve political activity. They do not apply to,
or limit, other activities of the NYPD in the investigation or detection of unlawful conduct, the
preservation of the peace and public safety or other legitimate law enforcement activities which do
not involve political activity.
IV. ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISIONBUREAU
(1) Investigation of political activity shall be initiated by, and conducted under the supervision of the
Intelligence DivisionBureau. Nothing in this paragraph, however, is intended to prevent any
member of the service from reporting his or her observations of suspicious conduct which
involves political activity to his or her commanding officer or to the Intelligence DivisionBureau.
(2) The Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence shall periodically inform and advise the Police
Commissioner concerning the status of any investigations conducted pursuant to these
guidelines.
V. LEVELS OF INVESTIGATION
These guidelines provide for three levels of investigative activity. They are intended to provide the
NYPD with the necessary flexibility to act well in advance of the commission of planned terrorist
acts or other unlawful activity. However, if the available information shows at the outset that the
threshold standard for a Preliminary Inquiry or Full Investigation is satisfied, then the appropriate
investigative activity may be initiated immediately, without progressing through more limited
investigative stages.

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A. Checking of Leads
The lowest level of investigative activity is the “prompt and extremely limited checking out of
initial leads,” which should be undertaken whenever information is received of such a nature that
some follow-up as to the possibility of unlawful activity is warranted. This limited activity
should be conducted with an eye toward promptly determining whether further investigation
(either a Preliminary Inquiry or a Full Investigation) should be conducted.
Example: If the NYPD receives an allegation that an individual or group has advocated the
commission of violence, and no other facts are available, an appropriate first step would be
Checking of Leads to determine whether the individual, group, or members of the audience have
the apparent ability or intent to carry out the advocated unlawful act.
B. Preliminary Inquiries
(1) In cases where the NYPD receives information or an allegation not warranting an Full
Iinvestigation - because there is not yet a “reasonable indication” of unlawful activity - but
whose responsible handling requires some further scrutiny beyond the prompt and extremely
limited checking out of initial leads, the NYPD may initiate an “inquiry” in response to the
allegation or information indicating the possibility of unlawful activity. The possibility of
unlawful activity to initiate a Preliminary Inquiry requires an allegation or information that is
articulable and factual. However, such allegation or information need not have been verified
as true or accurate. Whether it is appropriate to open a Preliminary Inquiry immediately, or
instead to engage first in a limited Checking of Leads, depends on the circumstances
presented.
Example: If the NYPD receives an allegation that an individual or group has advocated the
commission of violence, and no other facts are available, an appropriate first step would be
Checking of Leads to determine whether the individual, group, or members of the audience
have the apparent ability or intent to carry out the advocated unlawful act.
(2) The authority to conduct inquiries short of a Full Investigation allows the NYPD to respond
in a measured way to ambiguous or incomplete information, with as little intrusion as the
needs of the situation permit. This is especially important in such areas as where there is no
complainant involved or when an allegation or information is received from a source of
unknown reliability. Such inquiries are subject to the limitations on duration under paragraph
(4)four below and are carried out to obtain the information necessary to make an informed
judgment as to whether a Full Investigation is warranted.
Example: Officers are not required to possess information relating to an Individual’s
intended unlawful use of dangerous biological agents or toxins prior to iInitiating
investigative activity. If an individual or group has attempted to obtain such materials, or has
indicated a desire to acquire them, and the reason is not apparent, investigative action, such
as conducting a Checking of Leads or initiating a Preliminary Inquiry, may be appropriate
to determine whether there is a legitimate purpose for the possession of the materials by the
individual or group. A Preliminary Inquiry is not a required step when facts or
circumstances reasonably indicating unlawful activity are already available. In such cases, a
Full Investigation can be immediately opened.
(3) A Preliminary Inquiry may be authorized by the Chief of IntelligenceCommanding Officer or
Executive Officer of the Intelligence DivisionBureau, or the Commanding Officer of the
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Criminal Intelligence Section (“the Authorizing Officials”). The Authorizing Official must
assure that the allegation or other information which warranted the inquiry has been recorded
in writing. Upon such authorization a notification must be made for final approval by the
Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence.
(4) Inquiries shall be completed within 180 days after initiation of the first investigative step. The
date of the first investigative step is not necessarily the same date as the date on which the
first incoming information or allegation was received. An extension of time in an inquiry for
succeeding 90 day periods may be granted by the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence. Any
such request for extension shall be in writing and shall include a statement of the reasons
why further investigative steps are warranted when there is no reasonable indication of
unlawful activity. The action taken on any such request for extension shall also be recorded
in writing.
(5)

A Preliminary Inquiry shall be subject to a review every 6 months by the Chief of
Intelligence, or an appropriate executive of the Intelligence Bureau designated by him, to
discuss the status of the Preliminary Inquiry, including, what operational steps should be
taken.

(6) A Preliminary Inquiry shall be presumptively limited to a total duration of 18 months. This
presumptive period of duration may be exceeded in the sole discretion of the Deputy
Commissioner of Intelligence, in consultation with the Handschu Committee, where the
allegations or information continue to indicate the possibility of unlawful activity and either
that some further leads should be lawfully investigated or that there is a legitimate law
enforcement purpose to be pursued further. When the presumptive period of duration is
exceeded all other provisions regarding a Preliminary Inquiry continue to apply.
(7) All lawful investigative techniques, including the use of undercover operations and the
development of sources and informants may be used in an Preliminary Iinquiry except:
(a) Mail openings; and,
(b) Eavesdropping and Video Surveillance as those terms are defined in Article 700 of the
New York State Criminal Procedure Law.
(86) The following investigative techniques may be used in a Preliminary Inquiry without any
prior authorization from a supervisor:
(a) Examination of NYPD indices and files;
(b) Examination of records available to the public and other public sources of information;
(c) Examination of available federal, state and local government records;
(d) Interview of complainant, previously established informants, and other sources of
information;
(e) Interview of the potential subject;
(f) Interview of persons who should readily be able to corroborate or deny the truth of the
allegation, except this does not include pretext interviews or interviews of a potential
subject’s employer or coworkers unless the interviewee was the complainant; and

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(g) Physical, photographic or video surveillance of any person, provided that such
surveillance does not require a warrant. The use of any other lawful investigative
technique that is permitted in a Preliminary Inquiry shall meet the requirements and
limitations of Part VI and, except in exigent circumstances, requires prior approval by a
supervisor.
The use of any other lawful investigative technique that is permitted in a Preliminary Inquiry
shall meet the requirements and limitations of Part VII and, except in exigent circumstances,
requires prior approval by a supervisor.
(97) Where a Preliminary Inquiry fails to disclose sufficient information to justify an
investigation, the NYPD shall terminate the inquiry and make a record of the closing.
(108) All requirements regarding inquiries shall apply to reopened inquiries.
C. Full Investigation
A Full Investigation may be initiated when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that an
unlawful act has been, is being, or will be committed. A Full Investigation may be conducted to
prevent, solve or prosecute such unlawful activity.
(1) The standard of “reasonable indication” is substantially lower than probable cause. In
determining whether there is reasonable indication of an unlawful act an investigator may
take into account any facts or circumstances that a prudent investigator would consider.
However, the standard does require specific facts or circumstances indicating a past, current,
or future violation of law. There must be an objective, factual basis for initiating the
investigation; a mere hunch is insufficient.
(2) Where an unlawful act may be committed in the future, preparation for that act can be a
current violation of the conspiracy or attempt provisions of state law. The standard for
opening an investigation is satisfied where there is not yet a current substantive or
preparatory unlawful act, but facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that such unlawful
conduct will occur in the future.
(3) Any lawful investigative technique may be used in a Full Investigation, subject to the
requirements and limitations of Part VI hereof.
(4) Authorization and Renewal
a. A Full Investigation may be authorized by the Chief of IntelligenceCommanding Officer
or Executive Officer of the Intelligence DivisionBureau or the Commanding Officer of
the Criminal Intelligence Section (“the Authorizing Officials”) upon a written
recommendation setting forth the facts or circumstances reasonably indicating that an
unlawful act has been, is being or will be committed. Upon such authorization a
notification must be made for final approval by the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence.
b. A Full Investigation may be initially authorized for a period of up to a year. An
investigation may be continued upon renewed authorization for additional periods each
not to exceed a year. Renewal authorization shall be obtained from the Deputy
Commissioner of Intelligence. All requests for renewal authorization, and action thereon,
shall be in writing.
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c. Authorizations shall be reviewed by an Authorizing Official before the expiration of the
period for which the investigation and each renewal thereof is authorized.
d. A Full Investigation shall be subject to a review every 6 months by the Chief of
Intelligence, or an appropriate executive of the Intelligence Bureau designated by him, to
discuss the status of the Full Investigation, including, what operational steps should be
taken.
e. A Full Investigation shall be presumptively limited to a total duration of 3 years. This
presumptive period of duration may be exceeded in the sole discretion of the Deputy
Commissioner of Intelligence, in consultation with the Handschu Committee, where facts
and circumstances continue to reasonably indicate that an unlawful act has been, is being,
or will be committed and either that some further leads should be lawfully investigated or
that there is a legitimate law enforcement purpose to be pursued further. When the
presumptive period of duration is exceeded all other provisions regarding a Full
Investigation continue to apply.
(5) An investigation which has been terminated may be reopened upon a showing of the same
standard and pursuant to the same procedures as required for initiation of an investigation.
All requirements regarding investigations shall apply to reopened investigations.
D. Terrorism Enterprise Investigation
A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation is a Full Investigation but differs from a general
investigation of unlawful conduct in several important respects. As a general rule, an
investigation of a completed unlawful act is normally confined to determining who committed
that act and securing evidence to establish the elements of the particular offense. It is, in this
respect, self-defining. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation must determine the identity and
nature of the individual, group, or organization involved, its geographic dimensions, its past acts
and intended goals, including unlawful goals, and its capacity for harm, among other factors.
While a standard investigation of unlawful conduct terminates with the decision to prosecute or
not to prosecute, a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation does not necessarily end, even though one
or more of the participants may have been prosecuted. In addition, groups and organizations
exhibitprovide a life and continuity of operation not normally found in other types of unlawful
activity. As a consequence, these investigations may continue for several years. Furthermore, the
focus of such investigations may be less precise than that directed against more conventional
types of unlawful conduct. Unlike the usual case involving unlawful conduct, there may be no
completed offense to provide a framework for the investigation. It A Terrorism Enterprise
Investigation often requires the fitting together of bits and pieces of information, many
meaningless by themselves, to determine whether a pattern of unlawful activity exists. For this
reason, such investigations are broader and less discriminate than usual, involving the
interrelation of various sources and types of information. This section focuses on investigations
of enterprises that seek to further political or social goals through activities that involve force or
violence, or that otherwise aim to engage in terrorism or terrorism-related crimes. It authorizes
investigations to determine the structure and scope of the enterprise as well as the relationship of
the members.
1. General Authority
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a. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation may be initiated when facts or circumstances
reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose
of:
(i) furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve
force, violence or other unlawful acts;
(ii) engaging in terrorism as defined in N.Y. Penal Law § 490.05, or
(iii) committing any offense described in N.Y. Penal Law §§ 490.10, 490.15, 490.20,
490.25, 490.30, or 490.35, or other related statutes currently in effect or
subsequently enacted.
The standard of “reasonable indication” is identical to that governing Full Investigations
generally. In determining whether an investigation should be conducted, the NYPD shall
consider all of the circumstances including:
(i)

the magnitude of the threatened harm;

(ii)

the likelihood that it will occur;

(iii) the immediacy of the threat; and
(iv) any danger to privacy or free expression posed by an investigation.
In practical terms, the “reasonable indication” standard for opening a Terrorism
Enterprise Investigation could be satisfied in a number of ways.
Example: Direct information about statements made in furtherance of an enterprise’s
objectives which show a purpose of committing crimes described in N.Y. Penal Law §§
490.10, 490.15, 490.20, 490.25, 490.30, 490.35 or other related statutes currently in
effect or subsequently enacted, would satisfy the threshold.
Example: Activities such as attempting to obtain dangerous biological agents, toxic
chemicals, or nuclear materials, or stockpiling explosives or weapons, with no
discernible lawful purpose, may be sufficient to reasonably indicate that an enterprise
aims to engage in terrorism.
b. While no particular factor or combination of factors is required, considerations that will
generally be relevant to the determination as to whether the threshold standard for a
Terrorism Enterprise Investigation is satisfied include, as noted, a group’s statements, its
activities, and the nature of potential unlawful acts suggested by the statements or
activities. Thus, where there are grounds for inquiry concerning a group, it may be
helpful to gather information about these matters, and then to consider whether these
factors, either individually or in combination, reasonably indicate that the group is
pursuing terrorist activities or objectives as defined in the threshold standard. Findings
that would weigh in favor of such a conclusion include, for example, the following:
(1) Threats or advocacy of violence or other covered unlawful acts. Statements are made
in relation to or in furtherance of an enterprise’s political or social objectives that
threaten or advocate the use of force or violence, or statements are made in
furtherance of an enterprise that otherwise threaten or advocate unlawful conduct
within the scope of N.Y. Penal Law §§ 490.10, 490.15, 490.20, 490.25, 490.30,

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490.35, or other related statutes currently in effect or subsequently enacted which
may concern such matters as (e.g.), for example:
(i) engaging in attacks involving or threatening massive loss of life or injury, mass
destruction, or endangerment of the national security;
(ii) killing or injuring public officials, or destroying public facilities, or defying
lawful authority;
(iii) killing, injuring or intimidating individuals because of their status as United
States nationals or persons, or because of their national origin, race, color,
religion or sex; or
(iv) depriving individuals of any rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States or the State of New York.
(2) Apparent ability or intent to carry out violence or other covered activities. The
enterprise manifests an apparent ability or intent to carry out violence or other
activities within the scope of N.Y. Penal Law §§ 490.10, 490.15, 490.20, 490.25,
490.30, 490.35 or other related statutes currently in effect or subsequently enacted,
for examplee.g.:
(i)

by acquiring or taking steps towards acquiring, biological agents or toxins, toxic
chemicals or their precursors, radiological or nuclear materials, explosives or
other destructive or dangerous material (or plans or formulas for such
materials), or weapons, under circumstances where, by reason of the quantity or
character of the items, the lawful purpose of the acquisition is not apparent;

(ii)

by the creation, maintenance, or support of an armed paramilitary organization;

(iii) by paramilitary training; or
(iv) by other conduct demonstrating an apparent ability or intent to injure or
intimidate individuals, or to interfere with the exercise of their constitutional or
statutory rights.
(3) Potential Unlawful Act. The group’s statements or activities suggest potential
unlawful acts that may be relevant in applying the standard for initiating a Terrorism
Enterprise Investigation - such as crimes under the provisions of the N.Y. Penal Law
that set forth specially defined terrorism or support of terrorism offenses, or that relate
to such matters as aircraft hijacking or destruction, attacks on transportation,
communications, or energy facilities or systems, biological or chemical weapons,
nuclear or radiological materials, assassinations or other violence against public
officials or facilities, or explosives.
c. Mere speculation that force or violence might occur during the course of an otherwise
peaceable demonstration is not sufficient grounds for initiation of an investigation under
this sSubpart. But where facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that an individual or
group has engaged or aims to engage in conduct described in paragraph 1.a. above in a
demonstration, an investigation may be initiated in conformity with the standards of that
paragraph. This does not limit the collection of information about public demonstrations
by individuals or groups that are under active investigation pursuant to paragraph 1.a.
above or any other provisions of these guidelines.
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2. Purpose
The immediate purpose of a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation is to obtain information
concerning the nature and structure of the enterprise as specifically delineated in paragraph
(3) below, with a view to the longer range objectives of detection, prevention, and
prosecution of the unlawful activities of the enterprise.
3. Scope
a. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation initiated under these guidelines may collect such
information as:
(i) the identity and nature of an individual or group and its members, their associates,
and other persons likely to be acting in furtherance of its unlawful objectives,
provided that the information concerns such persons’ activities on behalf of or in
furtherance of the suspected unlawful activity of the individual, group, or
organization;
(ii) the finances of the individual, group, or organization;
(iii) the geographical dimensions of the individual, group, or organization; and
(iv) past and future activities and goals of the individual, group, or organization.
b. In obtaining the foregoing information, any lawful investigative technique may be used
in accordance with the requirements of these guidelines.
4. Authorization and Renewal
a. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation may be authorized by the Chief of
IntelligenceCommanding Officer or Executive Officer of the Intelligence
DivisionBureau or the Commanding Officer of the Criminal Intelligence Section
(“the Authorizing Officials”), upon a written recommendation setting forth the facts
or circumstances reasonably indicating the existence of an enterprise as described in
paragraph 1.a. above. Upon such authorization a notification must be made for final
approval by the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence. When exigent circumstances
exist, as described in these guidelines, a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation may be
commenced upon the verbal authorization of an Authorizing Official. However, in
such cases, the required written recommendation must be submitted as soon as
practicable.
b. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation may be initially authorized for a period of up to
a year. An investigation may be continued upon renewed authorization for additional
periods each not to exceed a year. Renewal authorization shall be obtained from the
Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence. The request for renewal and action thereon
shall be in writing.
c. Authorizations shall be reviewed by an Authorizing Official before the expiration of
the period for which the investigation and each renewal thereof is authorized. In some
cases, the enterprise may meet the threshold standard but be temporarily inactive in
the sense that it has not engaged in recent acts of violence or other unlawful activities
as described in 1.a., nor is there any immediate threat of harm - yet the composition,
goals and prior history of the group suggest the need for continuing law enforcement
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interest. The investigation may be continued in such cases with whatever scope is
warranted in light of these considerations.
d. All Terrorism Enterprise Investigations shall be subject to a review every 6 months
by the Chief of Intelligence, or an appropriate executive of the Intelligence Bureau
designated by him, to discuss the status of the Terrorism Enterprise Investigation,
including, what operational steps should be taken.
e. A Terrorism Enterprise Investigation shall be presumptively limited to a total
duration of 5 years, except where the subject of a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation
is a designated foreign terrorist organization. This presumptive period of duration
may be exceeded in the sole discretion of the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence,
in consultation with the Handschu Committee, where facts and circumstances
continue to reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise
for the purposes stated above and either that some further leads should be lawfully
investigated or that there is a legitimate law enforcement purpose to be pursued
further. When the presumptive period of duration is exceeded all other provisions
regarding a Terrorism Enterprise Investigation continue to apply.
f. An investigation which has been terminated may be reopened upon a showing of the
same standard and pursuant to the same procedures as required for initiation of an
investigation.
VI.

HANDSCHU COMMITTEE
(1)

There is hereby established a committee (the “Handschu Committee”) whose members
may attend and participate in monthly meetings at which investigations are presented for
opening, extension or closure by the Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence. All
attending members will be provided with the investigative statement pertaining to each
proposed opening, extension or closing for the monthly meeting. At the monthly
meeting, any member of the Handschu Committee may ask questions and offer opinions
regarding the opening, extension or closure of an investigation presented.

(2)

Members of the Handschu Committee from the NYPD will include the Deputy
Commissioner of Intelligence, the Chief of Intelligence, the Executive Officer of the
Intelligence Bureau, the Commanding Officer of IOAS (Intelligence Operations and
Analysis Section), the Executive Officer of IOAS, the Commanding Officer (or the
Executive Officer) of the Criminal Intelligence Section, the Director of Intelligence
Analysis, the Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters, Assistant Deputy Commissioner of
Legal Matters, Assistant Commissioner of Legal Matters for Intelligence Affairs, Special
Counsel for Intelligence Affairs, and/or their successors or persons who occupy similar
positions of authority or expertise.

(3)

There shall also be a Civilian Representative on the Handschu Committee who may
attend and participate in the monthly meetings for opening, extension, or closure of
investigations on the same terms and conditions as set forth in paragraph (1) above. The
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Civilian Representative shall be a lawyer who has never previously been an employee of
the NYPD. The Civilian Representative shall be appointed by the Mayor upon
consultation with the Police Commissioner. The Civilian Rrepresentative may be
replaced by the Mayor for good cause, with 14 days’ advance notice to Class Counsel
prior to such replacement. The position of Civilian Representative will exist for a
minimum of five years from the appointment of the first person to fill that role. After that
initial five year period, the position of Civilian Representative will continue unless
abolished or modified by the Mayor, upon which Class Counsel will receive 90 days’
notice in advance of such abolition or modification.

(a) The Civilian Representative shall submit to a background investigation conducted by
the Department of Investigation.
(b) The NYPD will facilitate an application for a federal security clearance for the
Civilian Representative.
(c) The Civilian Representative shall execute a Non-Disclosure Agreement with the
NYPD setting forth his or her undertaking that the proceedings of the Handschu
Committee, as well as all materials reviewed by the Civilian Representative for or at
the meetings of the Committee, shall be kept confidential and shall not be disclosed to
any person except as set forth therein.
(d) The Civilian Representative shall be required to familiarize himself or herself with
the Modified Handschu Guidelines governing the investigation of political activity by
the NYPD.
(e) If the Civilian Representative concludes that an investigation is being opened or
extended in violation of the Modified Handschu Guidelines, the Civilian
Representative shall record his or her objection to the investigation and the grounds
for the objection in the minutes of the Handschu Committee meeting.
(f) If the Civilian Representative concludes that an investigation is being opened or
extended in violation of the Modified Handschu Guidelines, the Civilian
Representative shall bring such investigation to the attention of the Police
Commissioner. The Civilian Representative shall be provided with means to contact
the Police Commissioner directly. The Police Commissioner shall inquire into the
investigation and report the findings of the inquiry to the Civilian Representative.
(g) If the Civilian Representative concludes that the NYPD is systematically and
repeatedly violating the Modified Handschu Guidelines to a degree sufficient to show
a NYPD policy to act in such a fashion, the Civilian Representative shall report the
alleged systematic violation to the Judge assigned to the Handschu case in the
Southern District of New York. In the event the Civilian Representative decides to
make a report to the Court based upon a perceived policy by the NYPD to violate the
Guidelines, a copy of the report shall first be served confidentially upon the Police
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Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence seven (7) days prior to
its submission to the Court. The report shall be submitted directly to the Judge in a
confidential manner, shall be kept confidential, and shall be filed under seal. Class
Counsel in the Handschu case shall be given notice that a report was submitted by the
Civilian Representative to the Court. The parties will then agree to a confidentiality
order governing disclosure of the contents of the report to Class Counsel or, in the
event that the NYPD believes the report in whole or in part should not be disclosed to
Class Counsel, the NYPD shall be provided an opportunity to inform the Court as to
the basis for objecting to disclosure in whole or in part to Class Counsel.
(4)

Nothing herein shall effect, limit, or diminish the authorization and approval provisions
for investigations, which grant exclusive approval authority to the Authorizing Officials
or the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence.

VII. INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
(1) When conducting investigations under these guidelines, the NYPD may use any lawful
investigative technique permitted by these guidelines. The choice of investigative techniques is
a matter of judgment, which should take account of:
(i) the objectives of the investigation and available investigative resources;
(ii) the intrusiveness of a technique, considering such factors as the effect on the privacy of
individuals and potential damage to reputation;
(iii) the potential effect on the political or religious activity of individuals, groups or
organizations and the potential effect on persons who, although not a target of the
investigation are affected by or subject to the technique;
(ivii) the seriousness of the unlawful act; and
(iv) the strength of the information indicating its existence or future commission of the
unlawful act.
(2) Where the conduct of an investigation presents a choice between the use of more or less
intrusive methods, the NYPD should consider whether the information could be obtained in a
timely and effective way by the less intrusive means. The NYPD should not hesitate to use
any lawful techniques consistent with these guidelines in an investigation, even if intrusive,
where the intrusiveness is warranted in light of the seriousness of the crime or the strength of
the information indicating its existence or future commission. This point is to be particularly
observed in investigations relating to terrorist activities.
(3) Authorized methods in investigations include, among others, use of confidential informants,
undercover activities and operations, eavesdropping and video surveillance (as defined in
Article 700 of the NY Criminal Procedure Law), pen registers and trap and trace devices,
consensual electronic monitoring, and searches and seizures.
a. Undercover Operations
(i) Undercover operations, including confidential informants, may be used when taking into
account all the circumstances of the investigation, including the need for the information
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and the seriousness of the threat, it has been determined that the information sought in the
investigation could not be reasonably obtained in a timely and effective way by a less
intrusive means such operations are the most effective means of obtaining information,
taking into account all the circumstances of the investigation, including the need for the
information and the seriousness of the threat. The use of undercovers and confidential
informants must be authorized by the Deputy Commissioner of the Intelligence Division
priorBureau prior to commencement of the undercover operation. The request to use
undercovers or confidential informants and action taken on the request must be in writing
and must include a description of the facts on which the investigation is based and the
role of the undercover.
(ii) The use of an undercover or confidential informant will be approved for a period of
90120 days and may be extended for additional periods of 90120 days with the approval
of the Deputy Commissioner of the Intelligence DivisionBureau. Such extensions may be
approved for as long as the investigation continues when it has been determined that the
information sought in the investigation could not reasonably be obtained in a timely and
effective manner by less intrusive means the use of the undercover is the most effective
means of obtaining information. The request to extend the use of undercovers and action
taken on the request must be in writing and must include the reason for the extension.
(iii) Undercovers are strictly prohibited from engaging in any conduct the sole purpose of
which is to disrupt the lawful exercise of political activity, from instigating unlawful acts
or engaging in unlawful or unauthorized investigative activities.
b. Eavesdropping and Video Surveillance (as defined in Article 700 of the NY Criminal
Procedure Law), Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices, and Consensual Electronic
Monitoring
(i) All requirements for the use of such methods under the Constitution, applicable statutes,
and NYPD regulations or policies must be observed.
(4) Whenever an individual is known to be represented by counsel in a particular matter, the
NYPD shall follow applicable law and Department procedure concerning contact with
represented individuals in the absence of prior notice to their counsel.
VIII. DISSEMINATION AND MAINTENANCE OF INFORMATION
A. Dissemination
The NYPD may disseminate information obtained during the Checking of Leads, Preliminary
Inquiries and investigations conducted pursuant to these guidelines to federal, state or local law
enforcement agencies, or local criminal justice agencies when such information:
(i)

falls within the investigative or protective jurisdiction or litigative responsibility of the
agency;

(ii)

may assist in preventing an unlawful act or the use of violence or any other conduct
dangerous to human life;

(iii) is required to be disseminated by interagency agreement, statute, or other law.
B. Maintenance
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All documentation required under these Guidelines shall be maintained by the Intelligence
DivisionBureau in accordance with general police department practice and applicable
municipal record retention and destruction rules, regulations and procedures. Under these rules
and practices documents are retained for no less than five years.
IXVIII. COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVITIES AND OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS
In order to carry out its mission of preventing the commission of terrorist acts in or affecting the
City of New York and the United States and its people, the NYPD must proactively draw on
available sources of information to identify terrorist threats and activities. It cannot be content to
wait for leads to come in through the actions of others, but rather must be vigilant in detecting
terrorist activities to the full extent permitted by law, with an eye towards early intervention and
prevention of acts of terrorism before they occur. This Part accordingly identifies a number of
authorized activities which further this end, and which can be carried out even in the absence of a
checking of leads, Preliminary Inquiry, or Full Investigation as described in these guidelines. The
authorizations include both activities that are specifically focused on terrorism and activities that
are useful for law enforcement purposes in both terrorism and nonterrorism contexts. The
authorized law enforcement activities of the NYPD include carrying out and retaining information
resulting from the following activities.
A. COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVITIES
1. Information Systems
The NYPD is authorized to operate and participate in identification, tracking, and information
systems for the purpose of identifying and locating potential terrorists and supporters of
terrorist activity, assessing and responding to terrorist risks and threats, or otherwise detecting,
prosecuting, or preventing terrorist activities. Systems within the scope of this paragraph may
draw on and retain pertinent information from any source permitted by law, including
information derived from past or ongoing investigative activities; other information collected
or provided by governmental entities, such as foreign intelligence information and lookout list
information; publicly available information, whether obtained directly or through services or
resources (whether nonprofit or commercial) that compile or analyze such information; and
information voluntarily provided by private entities. Any such system operated by the NYPD
shall be reviewed periodically for compliance with all applicable statutory provisions and
Department regulations and policies.
2. Visiting Public Places and Events
For the purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist activities, the NYPD is authorized to visit
any place and attend any event that is open to the public, on the same terms and conditions as
members of the public generally. No information obtained from such visits shall be retained
unless it relates to potential unlawful or terrorist activity.
B. OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS
1. General Topical Research
The NYPD is authorized to carry out general topical research, including conducting online
searches and accessing online sites and forums as part of such research on the same terms
and conditions as members of the public generally. “General topical research” under this
paragraph means research concerning subject areas that are relevant for the purpose of
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facilitating or supporting the discharge of investigative responsibilities. It does not include
online searches for information by individuals’ names or other individual identifiers, except
where such searches are incidental to topical research, such as searching to locate writings on
a topic by searching under the names of authors who write on the topic, or searching by the
name of a party to a case in conducting legal research.
2. Use of Online Resources Generally
For the purpose of developing intelligence information to detect or prevent terrorism or other
unlawful activities, the NYPD is authorized to conduct online search activity and to access
online sites and forums on the same terms and conditions as members of the public generally.
3. Reports and Assessments
The NYPD is authorized to prepare general reports and assessments concerning terrorism or
other unlawful activities for purposes of strategic or operational planning or in support of
other legitimate law enforcement activities.
IX. PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND OTHER LIMITATIONS
A. General Limitations
The law enforcement activities authorized by this Part do not include maintaining files on
individuals solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or
the lawful exercise of any other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Rather, all such law enforcement activities must have a valid law enforcement purpose and must
be carried out in conformity with all applicable statutes and Department regulations and policies.
B. Construction of Part
This Part does not limit any activities authorized by or carried out under other Parts of these
guidelines. The specification of authorized law enforcement activities under this Part is not
exhaustive, and does not limit other authorized law enforcement activities of the NYPD.
XI.

RESERVATION
Nothing in these guidelines shall limit the general reviews or audits of papers, files, contracts, or
other records in the possession of the NYPD or City of New York, or the performance of similar
services at the specific request of another government agency. Such reviews, audits, or similar
services must be for the purpose of detecting or preventing violations of law which are within the
investigative responsibility of the NYPD.
Nothing in these guidelines is intended to limit the NYPD's responsibilities to investigate certain
applicants and employees, or to pursue efforts to satisfy any other of its legal rights, privileges, or
obligations. These guidelines are set forth solely for the purpose of internal NYPD guidance. They
are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or
procedural; enforceable at law by any party in any matter, civil or criminal, nor do they place any
limitation on otherwise lawful investigative and litigative prerogatives of the NYPD or City of New
York.

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