The FARE Probation Experiment: Implementation and Outcomes of Day Fines for Felony
Offenders in Maricopa County
Author(s): Susan Turner and Judith Greene
Source: The Justice System Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1999), pp. 1-21
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27977001
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 FARE Probation
Experiment:
Outcomes
and
of
Implementation
in
Day Fines for Felony Offenders
The

Maricopa

County*

Susan Turner and Judith Greene
Day fines-fines thatare proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offend
er's financial resources-have been popular for decades inEurope as a sanction for a
wide range of criminal offenses. This article reports on the implementation and out
comes of a day fine program inMaricopa County (Phoenix), Arizona, involvingfelony

offenderswith low need for supervision and treatment. Findings show that theday fine
program was successful indiverting offendersfrom routine supervision probation and in
encouraging greaterfinancial payments while maintaining public safety,as measured by
arrests and technical violations.

Background
The serious overcrowding of jails and prisons and the continuing growth of probation
caseloads have piqued policymakers' interest in community-based sentencing options.
Many think that if a full spectrum of "intermediate sanctions"-fines, intensive proba
tion, electronic monitoring, and community service-can be implemented, judges will
be better equipped tomatch the seriousness of offenses with the severity of sanctions.1
Ultimately, more of those now sentenced to jail and prison might be sentenced, so to
speak, to the community. Such a system of "graduated sanctions" would offer other
benefits, such as saving money, protecting some offenders from the criminalizing effects
of incarceration, and reserving prison and jail space for themore serious offenders.
Equally important,many of those now supervised by probation officers could be handled
administratively, lightening officers' caseloads and giving themmore time to supervise
high-risk offenders. If appropriately imposed, monitored, and enforced, criminal fines
could become a credible intermediate sanction, rather than just a means of addressing
trivial offenses.

This research was supported by Grant Number 91 -DD-CX-0037
awarded to RAND
by the National
Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of views or opinions stated in this document are those
of the authors and do not necessarily represent the position or policy of RAND or the U.S. Department of
Justice. We wish to thank theMaricopa County Superior Court judges and probation staff involved in the

FARE Program for the opportunity to conduct this research.
1 Discussions
of the theoretical reasoning for intermediate sanctions can be found inMorris and Tonry
(1990) and von Hirsch, Wasik, and Greene (1989). Program and practical information is contained in Byrne,
Lurigio, and Petersilia (1992) and McCarthy (1987).

The JusticeSystemJournal,
Volume 21, Number 1 (1999)

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 THE JUSTICESYSTEM JOURNAL

in the United
States
Fines
Criminal
Fines for criminal convictions are not new to U.S. sentencing. In fact, they are
authorized in all American jurisdictions (Greene, 1988) and widely used in conjunction
with other sanctions (e.g., probation) or as standalone sentences for less serious crimes,
such as trafficoffenses (Hillsman, 1990). Fines are big business forAmerican courts.
Hillsman and Mahoney (1988) note that although the total revenue from fines for all
American courts at the local, state, and federal levels is difficult to determine, estimates
of annual figures are over $1 billion for fines alone and over $2 billion for all monetary
sanctions.

Judges generally impose fines well below the statutory limits-despite legislative
action to raise these limits to punish a broader range of offenses. At present,American
judges tend to impose fines for certain offenses according to an informal "tariff or
"going rate." Often, these tariffrates are set at the lower end of the scale to enable pay

ment by modest income offenders. Over time, low fines applied only to the least seri
ous crimes have become the norm inmost courts (Greene, 1988). In the long run, these
tarifffines depress fine amounts, diminish the punitive weight of fines for better-off
offenders, and constrict the range of offenses forwhich judges view a fine as appropri
ate (Winterfield and Hillsman, 1993). Fixed fines also give an advantage to offenders
with higher incomes. When fines are set at standard amounts for similar crimes, they
the key
have a disparate punitive impact across differing income classes-distorting
principles of proportionality and equity in the justice system.
Judges seem hesitant to use fines more broadly because of several concerns. They
are unsure that fine sentences protect the public iffines divert persons from incarcera
tion. Judges also worry about poor enforcement of fine payments (McDonald, 1992). In
addition, they fear that fines will unduly penalize the poor (Hillsman and Mahoney,
1988; Cole, Mahoney, Thornton, and Hanson, 1988). But perhaps themost inhibiting
influence against an increased use of fines is the deep skepticism among American
criminal justice practitioners about the ability of judges to set fines large enough to pun
ish those convicted of crimes and deter individuals from repeated offenses (Winterfield
and Hillsman, 1993).

Fines
The European "day fine" addresses these concerns. European practice makes the
imposition and amount of a fine commensurate with the offender's ability to pay and the
seriousness of the offense. Western European countries have successfully used fines as

Day

the sole sanction formany nontrivial cases, such as property and assault convictions, and
in several countries, fines serve as a major alternative to imprisonment (Hillsman and
Greene, 1988; Gillespie, 1980). The European system of graded fines is based on the
concept thatpunishment should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and

have a roughly similar impact-in terms of economic "sting"-upon persons with dif
fering financial resources who are convicted of the same offense (Winterfield and
Hillsman, 1993).

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 TURNER and GREENE

Structured fines were first introduced in Sweden in the 1920s. In the 1970sWest
Germany adopted structuredfines as part of a set of sentencing reforms aimed at reduc
ing the use of short-term incarceration (Greene, 1990). Fines reduced the number of
prison sentences (for terms of less than six months) from over 110,000 to just above

10,000 from 1968 to 1976. Furthermore, theywere the sole sanction for 75 percent of
offenders convicted of property crimes and two-thirdsof those convicted of assaults.
The implementation of a day fine system involves three steps. First, the number of
fine units for offenses is determined based on severity. This element weights the sever
ityof the offense without regard to an offender's means. Second, planners develop a
process for placing a dollar value on these units based on net daily income, hence the
name "day fine." The total amount of the day fine is calculated bymultiplying the num
ber of day fine units by the unit valuation. The share of an offender's income used to

value theday fine units varies, as do methods for accounting for the offender's assets and
family responsibilities, but the basic scheme assures routine imposition of variable, but
equitable, fines with a punitive impact proportional to the crime (Greene, 1988:41).
Third, policymakers establish a collection and enforcement program often staffed by

officers who develop payment schedules for defendants, send notification letters, and
administer graduated sanctions for noncompliance.
In 1988 researchers at theVera Institute of Justice developed a pilot project to use
fines
for low-level offenders handled in Staten Island, New York, courts. The pro
day
ject proved feasible and successful on a number of dimensions. The majority of fines
imposed were paid in full. Nonabiding offenderswere sanctioned (returned to court and
resentenced), but only 10 percent of offenderswith completed cases had to be jailed for
default. In addition, substantial revenue was collected. Less than twelve months after

the pilot year, 77 percent of the approximately $93,000 infines imposed by judges had
been collected (Greene, 1990).
Despite the recent attention to fines, there is little research to guide policymakers.
Reliable data do not exist on the frequency or amount of financial sanctions imposed on
differentoffenders, on how imposed sanctions are monitored and enforced, or on their
effectiveness relative to other sentences. As with other intermediate sanctions, debate
centers

on whether

fines

are

appropriate

as enhancements

or as alternatives

to either

pro

bation, jail, or prison. Consequently, it is difficult for court systems to assess how they
might implement a structured system of day fines, todetermine what the targetgroup for
day fine sentences might be, or to predict the potential costs and benefits that greater
reliance on fines might offer.
The Bureau of JusticeAssistance (BJA) developed theStructuredFines Demonstration
Project to provide some of these needed data. Begun in late 1991, the project was
designed to enhance the application and enforcement of structuredfines (day fines) as
sanctions for drug offenders and other misdemeanants
participated in the demonstration effort: Maricopa

and felons. Four jurisdictions
County (Phoenix), Arizona;
Polk
andMarion, Malheur, Coos,
Connecticut;
Iowa;
(Des
Moines),
County
Bridgeport,
and Josephine counties inOregon. Although the data available to evaluate the project
differed across the participating sites, the results in these communities showed thatday

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 THE JUSTICESYSTEM JOURNAL

fines could be imposed as an alternative sanction and that itwas possible to augment fine
collection without increasing either technical probation violations or arrests. The sites
did experience substantial implementation difficulties; namely, statutory constraints,
staffingneeds, and continuing education about day fines for judges, defense counselors,
prosecutors, and othermembers of the court (Turner and Petersilia, 1996).
Because
the circumstances of Maricopa County permitted a quasi-experimental

evaluation, itprovided the richest set of data of the four sites. Consequently, this article
presents findings forMaricopa County, which is the participating jurisdiction with the
longest history of operation among theBJA demonstration sites.2

The Maricopa

County

(Phoenix)

FARE Program

Initially funded by grants from the State Justice Institute and theNational Institute of
to
the Maricopa
Related
Corrections,
(Financial Assessment
County FARE
was
in
FARE
1991.
initiated
indicted
offenders
felony
Employability) Program
targeted
who had littleneed for supervision and treatment.The intentwas to draw offenders from
among those who had traditionally received routine probation. FARE was planned to be
less restrictive than routine probation, but more restrictive than summary probation.3
FARE'S targeting of low-risk, low-need defendants was intended to reduce expensive
probation services used for routine probationers and to save supervision dollars.
Offenders sentenced toFARE were not under routine supervision or required to fol
low the standard listof probation conditions. The termsof theirprobation were that they
remain crime free and pay financial obligations imposed by the judge. A special FARE
probation order was designed to incorporate these provisions and was set at sentencing
to terminate automatically upon final payment of themonetary obligation in full. Early
termination of probation upon full payment served both as an incentive to the offender
and

as a
potential

cost-savings

mechanism.

The twomajor objectives of FARE were 1) to create a system thatallowed equitable
consideration of the offender's offense and means in determining the total financial
penalty and 2) to provide an intermediate sanction in lieu of routine probation for an
offender who did not require special services or structured supervision.
of Fines
in the Jurisdiction
History
Approximately 65 percent of Arizona's population lives inMaricopa County, the
largest county in the state. The FARE Program was initiated in the Superior Court of
Maricopa County, a general jurisdiction trialcourt thathandles all felonies and has juris

2

Findings on the implementation of other sites are contained inTurner and Petersilia (1996).
Routine probation usually entails supervision of an offender by a probation officer, with monthly person
al, phone, and collateral contacts.
Summary probation is the least restrictive form of probation, with no
contacts
the
officer.
by
probation
required
3

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 TURNER and GREENE

diction over misdemeanors not otherwise provided for by law. At the time of theFARE
Program, the superior court was handling more than 15,000 felony filings per year,
resulting inmore than 10,000 felony convictions.
Several years before implementation of theFARE Program, the superior court and
the adult probation department engaged in a planning effort to develop an array of inter
mediate sanctions, ranging from summary probation to prison. As part of thiswork,
planners began to consider how they could improve the imposition and enforcement of
fines. In 1986 data were collected to help the county better understand the extent to
which monetary penalties were being imposed by the court and how monies were being
collected (Hillsman, 1991). In 1991 additional planning specific to theFARE program
was conducted on approximately 750 randomly selected cases disposed of in superior
court. Overall sentencing patterns revealed thatmany offenders received sentences com
bining both jail and probation and thatvery few defendants received a fine as a sole sanc
tion. Over three-fourthsof offenders (78 percent) were sentenced to probation supervi
sion. Split sentences-with some jail or prison time imposed as a condition of proba
tion-accounted for 42 percent of these cases. Prison was imposed on approximately

one-fifthof offenders.
Fines were imposed as part of the sentence in 26 percent of the sampled cases.
Fines were coupled with a probation order inmost of these cases. The majority of fines
were imposed under themandatory fine provisions in theArizona code: drug and drunk
en driving offenses accounted for 81 percent of fines imposed in the sample. The fines

clustered around certain going rates,with 70 percent above $1,000.
Fines are not the onlymonetary sanction used by the court. In fact,monetary penal
ties comprise a complex package of components in the county. The court frequently

orders restitutionbecause the law requires offenders to pay full restitutionwhen the vic
tim has suffered a monetary loss. In addition to fines and restitution,each felony con
viction carries a $100 penalty assessment earmarked for the victim's compensation fund,
a probation service fee of $30 per month, and a mandatory time payment fee of $8-a
service charge if the offendermakes extended payments rather than immediate payment
of all monetary penalties-for delaying payment if the offender is unable to pay imme
diately. Additional specialized assessments may also be imposed. A fixed-percentage
surcharge is added on top of all felony fines; before FARE implementation, it stood at
37 percent of the amount of thefine.
In interviews conducted early in the planning process, many superior court judges
expressed the view that the criminal fine was not a particularly attractive sentencing
option. They felt that the patchwork ofmonetary penalties contributed to the erosion of
the sentencing process-at
least in regard to noncustodial sanctions. In particular, the
then new mandatory minimum drug fines required in each felony drug conviction-cou

pled with the requirement that restitutionorders could not be tailored tofit an offender's
ability to pay and the proliferation of other fees, assessments, and fine surcharges-had
leftmany judges with the sense that,given themodest level of financial resources pos
sessed by themajority of the county's criminal offenders, theywere just settingmany
probationers up for failure.

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 THE JUSTICESYSTEM JOURNAL

To address these issues, the planners sought to craft the day fine concept to include
the entire sum of financial assessments to be imposed by the judge as an "affordable"
and appropriate sanction for eligible offenders. By multiplying a number of penalty
units set to reflect the relative seriousness of the offense by a factor representing a fair

share of the offender's financial means, the resulting dollar figure could thenbe imposed
by a sentencing judge as a sole sanction-a sort of "financial pie" to be sliced up and
distributed-i.e., apportioned among the variety of financial obligations imposed by the
Arizona sentencing statutes. Planners made a few modifications to take into account
large restitution and fine amounts. Cases where full-damage restitution (as in the case
where an offender was required to pay for an expensive vehicle) exceeded the calculat
ed FARE amount were excluded from the program. In addition, any fine amount above
the total FARE financial penalty was excluded from the FARE imposition but was
imposed in a judgment order lodged against the defendant at sentencing. This amount
remained as an outstanding obligation after the FARE amount had been satisfied and
probation terminated.

Units
Offense
and Assigning
Severity
Penalty
Scaling
Planners devised a classification framework of fourteen severity levels for offenses.
Offenses deemed to be themost serious were placed in level one; the least serious, in
level fourteen. This structureprovided a more refined grading system than the general
classes of criminal code offenses (felony classes one through six, and misdemeanor

classes one through three). Furthermore, each offense was graded without regard to its
penal law classification so that its rank would more accurately reflect the relative seri
ousness of the actual criminal behavior involved. That is to say, the ranking system
allowed for grading a fourth-degree offense involving bodily harm at a level that reflect
ed a higher measure of gravity than a third-degree, nonviolent property offense.
Next, the planners determined the penalty units appropriate for each of the offenses
within the fourteen severity levels. The highest three levels were determined to be inap
propriate for day fine sentencing because themajority of offenders convicted for these
offenses were sentenced to prison. Apart from these felonies, planners assigned each of
the remaining eleven categories a range of penalty units and each individual offense a spe
cific unit score. Penalty units spanned 350 points, from a floor of 10 to a ceiling of 360.
For example, conviction of possessing drug paraphernalia resulted in a penalty score of
40; a score of 25 was assigned to theunlawful use of transportation,theftof property val
ued under $250, and possession of less than one pound of marijuana. A more serious
offense such as second-degree burglary was assigned a much higher score: 340 units,
slightly higher than the 320 score assigned for the transportor sale of a narcotic drug.

to Penalty
Amounts
Units
Dollar
Assigning
A variety of important concerns arose as the planning committee developed a for
mat for determining a fairway to value penalty units for individual offenders. The value
assigned each penalty unit needed to be set in direct relation to an offender's economic
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 TURNER and GREENE

means, generally defined as "daily net income" (e.g., take-home pay divided by the num
ber of days in a pay period, or the amount of a public assistance grant divided by the
period of time it is intended to cover).
The proportion of income to be "sheltered" from consideration in valuation may be
determined by the purposes forwhich the sanction is introduced. If the sanction is to be
reserved for relatively low level, petty offenses, which would normally draw relatively
light sanctions, a court might want to shelter all but purely discretionary income, dis
counting daily net income by a generous proportion to allow for normal living expenses
and furtheradjusting the amount downward to account for family responsibilities-result
ing in lenient fine amounts. On the other hand, ifa monetary sanction has the specific
intentof displacing termsof incarceration, a courtmight draw much more heavily from
an offender's full daily "take-home pay" to produce fines thatwill be appropriately stiff.
The policy committee determined to steer a middle course in developing theFARE
valuation formula for two reasons. The court expected to impose the new penalty for a
broad range of offenses, which had been filed as felonies and were typically disposed as
such, even thoughFARE'S targetingmechanism would exclude defendants bound for jail
or prison from eligibility. The FARE formula was also calibrated to produce monetary
assessments thatwould be neither too lenient nor too stifffor the targeted offenders.

Planners were asked tomaintain the current level of revenue generated through the
existing sentencing practices. The program's planners tested theirunit valuations with a
historical analysis of the convictions ofmore than 300 offenders who would have been
eligible for a FARE sentence. A spreadsheet program was used to forecast various sce
narios of "shelters and discounts." Planners were able to demonstrate that the formula
combination of an across-the-board income shelter and a house
ultimately chosen-a
hold support discount, which increased proportionally as family size increased-would
not reduce the bottom line forprobation fees or general fund revenues. For example, for
an offenderwith a daily income of $50, the discount resulted in an actual assessment of
$23 a day for a family of four. This formula was then incorporated in a simple-to-use
"tax-table"

format

for use

by presentence

investigators.

of FARE Sentence
Imposition
Cases were screened for the FARE sentence at the presentence investigation-the
moment at which all informationnecessary for screening and calculation of the FARE
monetary penalty was available. The specifics of eligibility were:
.
.
.

The defendant must have been convicted of a probation-eligible offense.
The defendant was not in need of formal supervision (did not pose a threatof dan
ger to the community and was not a chronic offender).
The defendant did not have personal or social problems requiring treatment,educa
tion, or

training.

To determine the FARE financial obligation, a presentence investigatormultiplied
fine units for the offense by the adjusted net daily income (including the

the FARE

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 THE JUSTICESYSTEM JOURNAL

income shelters and family size discount). This amount then became the full financial
obligation for the defendant fromwhich disbursements for the time payment fee, victim
compensation fund, fine and surcharge, restitution, and reimbursement and probation
service fee were computed.
After the defendant was deemed eligible for FARE, the investigator completed a

short presentence report, attached the FARE paperwork, and forwarded the package to
theFARE judge, who thenmade thedecision whether to impose theFARE sentence rec
ommended by thepresentence investigator.Defendants sentenced by the judge toFARE
reported immediately to theFARE probation officer,who set up the conditions of their
payment schedule and explained the termsof FARE probation.
FARE Probation
Collection
System
In normal court system operations, responsibility for collection and enforcement of
financial assessments is "decentralized"-which
is to say, fragmented. Various actors
a
court
role
administrators, clerks, probation officers,
play
(judges, county attorneys,
etc.), but no single agent is accountable for the overall efficiency or effectiveness of the

The

collection system.
One of themost importantaspects of planning for theFARE Program was develop
a
ing model for centralized collections; i.e., a dedicated, accountable staffwith a prima
ry focus on collection and enforcement of all financial assessments imposed by the court
on the offenders under its supervision. The FARE Program was designed to ensure
effective, efficient collection of monetary sanctions through the following measures:
.
.

.
.
.
.

Using the day fine technique to ensure imposition by sentencing judges of fair,
affordable, and thus collectable dollar amounts in individual cases
Setting appropriate individualized schedules for payment within time frames that
were as short as possible, given the offender's personal and household responsibili
ties, and providing preaddressed envelopes to facilitate prompt, regular installment
payments
Providing timely notification when each payment was due
Responding rapidly when a payment was not received on time
Investigating promptly and responding appropriately when a payment became delin
quent
Continuing rapid, persistent responses to delinquency-and
quickly moving cases
of unresponsive offenders back to the court for revocation and issuance of a warrant

At the start,offenders were allowed tomake theirpayments by mail. When a pay
ment was missed, a letterwas mailed to the offender, usually followed by a call by the
FARE officer to the defendant's place of employment or residence. Second and third
delinquency letterswere followed up by a personal visit by theFARE officer. If pay
ments were still not forthcoming, the conditions of the original order could be modified
by the court. If nonpayment appeared willful and FARE probation no longer seemed

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 TURNER and GREENE

viable, the offender could be resentenced to routine probation, perhaps with incarcera
tion, or

to a more

Evaluation

serious

sanction,

including

state-level

incarceration.

of FARE

The evaluation of theFARE Program was designed to answer key questions concerning
the program's implementation and its impact on financial payments by offenders and
recidivism, including:
.
.
.
.

What financial penalties were imposed forFARE offenders, and how did theycom
pare with those of similar offenders not sentenced toFARE?
Did FARE actually serve as an intermediate sanction between summary and routine
probation?
Was FARE associated with increased financial obligation payment by offenders?
What impact did FARE have on public safety as measured by technical violations
and arrests for new crimes?

To evaluate the impact of FARE, our research design took advantage of pilot FARE
implementation agreed upon by the adult probation department and the court.4 Two
judges within each of the county's fourmajor judicial quadrants had been selected to
participate in theFARE program; the two remaining judges in each quadrant did not par
ticipate. Following existing case assignment policy in the county, all cases were ran
domly assigned to judges within quadrants, ensuring that individual judges received the
same mix of cases in the long run. In thismanner, the jurisdiction laid the framework
for an evaluation in which offenders who might have been eligible for FARE, but

appeared before non-FARE judges (and, therefore,were not eligible for the pilot pro
gram) could be studied as a comparison group.
The

major

research

strategy

was

to consider

the FARE

offenders

as

the experimen

tal group and to construct a comparison group fromoffenders sentenced by non-day-fine
judges. Although the strongest design would have involved randomly assigning FARE
eligible offenders to either FARE or traditional sentencing, this option was not possible.
The

actual

design,

however,

had

several

advantages

over

many

quasi-experimental

designs. Comparison group offenderswere from the same time period as FARE offend
ers, reducing the possible confounding effects of historical changes in sentencing or
supervision practices. In addition, thecomparison defendants were drawn from the same
geographical areas, controlling for the types of offenses and offenders represented in the
county's

four quadrants.

4

This partial implementation was agreed upon and implemented by planners before RAND
in the evaluation.

became

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involved

 THE JUSTICESYSTEM JOURNAL

The research design involved threemajor steps:
.
.
.

Identification of defendants who received a FARE sentence in 1991 and 1992
Screening of sentenced defendants by non-FARE judges, using FARE eligibility cri
teria tomatch theFARE participants
Coding of historical and twelve-month follow-up information for both FARE and
comparison group offenders fromprobation and clerk files on offense records,mone
tarypayments, technical violations, and arrests occurring during the follow-up period

Offenders
Group
Comparison
Screening
Our goal was to select a match for each FARE client-a defendant who would have
met theFARE eligibility criteria had he or she been sentenced by a FARE judge and who
was similar to theFARE client in termsof conviction offense (theft,drug, white collar,
other), felony or misdemeanor conviction, age (under 21, 21-25, 26-30, and over 30),
race, sex, conviction date (in calendar-year quarters), and judicial quadrant.
Unfortunately, no directmechanism existed to create thepool of comparison offend
ers. The actual matching process encompassed a broad computer-assisted screen, fol

lowed bymanual examination of the records of cases potentially eligible forFARE. For
the computer screen, FARE clients were classified according to the seven background
and offense variables outlined above. Subsequently, superior court sentencing data for
1991 and 1992 were obtained from the adult probation department for non-FARE
judges. The most serious violent offenders were dropped from consideration as poten
tial comparison group cases because theywould not be eligible forFARE.
In addition,
cases
were
or
tem
of
the
5
sentenced
approximately percent
by temporary pro
judges for
whom itwas impossible to identifya quadrant. These were also dropped from the eli
gibility pool. For each FARE client, up to five potential comparison group offenders
were identified for furtherconsideration.
The second stepwas to conduct manual screening for almost 2,000 potential matches,
using FARE criteria. Manual screening was required because the automated data did not
contain

variables

we

could

use

to assess

"low-risk,"

"low-need"

requirements

for

a

offender. RAND staff created a FARE-eligibility screening form tomirror the
process used by presentence investigation officers in theirdetermination of FARE eligi
bility. The formwas devised in collaboration with theFARE probation officer tomake

FARE

sure that our process paralleled as closely as possible the actual FARE criteria.
Specifically, the form requested summary information about any substance abuse prob
lems; prior criminal record; likelihood of posing a threat to the community; personal or
social problems requiring treatment, training,or education; employability; other reasons

why thedefendant would be in need of formal supervision; and the total amount of resti
tution. The FARE monetary calculation was also performed on the coding sheet to
ensure that cases with large restitutionwere not included.
Probation files were located for each of thepotential comparison group defendants.
From these records, RAND

on-site coders abstracted information from the presentence

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 TURNER and GREENE

investigation for the screening items related to risk and need and for theFARE calcula
tion. If the offender's record contained evidence of need or risk as identified by the
screening tool, or if the restitution amount exceeded the FARE amount, the case was
dropped from consideration as a comparison group offender.

Data

Collection
Final sample sizes for the evaluation included 191 FARE and 191matched compari
son offenders. Once the sample had been identified, two separate data collection forms
were filled out for each offender, using probation files and clerk payment records. A
background form recorded detailed characteristics of thedefendant (prior drug use, prior
criminal record), basic demographic characteristics, current offense information (arrest
and conviction charges, disposition of offense, sentence), employment and income infor
mation, and risk/needs assessment items. A twelve-month follow-up form recorded
informationon each offender's criminal justice status at follow-up; supervision and con
finement during the twelve months; technical violations and arrests for new criminal
behavior; contacts and services from probation; drug tests; payments of monetary con
ditions; and payment enforcement activities.

Sample

Characteristics

Matched vs. Total FARE Sample. During the two-year pilot evaluation period, 257
offenders were sentenced to FARE. Our matching protocol identifiedmatches for 191,
or about 75 percent of theFARE sample. The matched sample is similar to the full sam
ple with one slight difference. The matched sample has relativelymore white offenders
and fewer black and Hispanic offenders than the full sample; distributions for age, sex,
offense, current conviction, and sex are similar, suggesting thematched FARE sample is
representative of the full FARE sample (see Table 1).
Matched FARE vs. Comparison Groups. FARE and comparison groups were simi
larwith respect to sex, race, age at conviction, and offense type. Slight differences in
offense, prior record, and risk score suggested thatFARE offenders were slightly less
serious than comparison group offenders. FARE and comparison group offenders also
had similar employment profiles. Over half were employed full- or part-time; the aver
age monthly income was approximately $1,000 (see Table 2).
Sentence Imposed. One of thegoals of FARE was toprovide offenders an alternative
sanction to routine probation. An analysis of offender sentences showed thatFARE, as
planned, drew itsclients from thegroup thatwould have normally received routine proba
tion. Over 77 percent of the comparison group offenderswere placed on routine probation
(modal lengthof probation was threeyears); only a very few (3.8 percent) were sentenced
to summary probation. Interestingly, 15.9 percent of the comparison offenderswere sen

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Comparison

Table 1
ofMatched and All FARE Offenders
All FARE
(N=257)
%

Matched
(N=191)
%
Sex

77.0

74.7

White
Black
Hispanic
Other

78.5
8.9
12.6
0.0

67.3
12.1
18.7
2.9

Age
Under 21
21 to25
26 to 30
Over 30

25.6
27.8
17.8
28.8

25.3
28.8
17.1
28.8

56.0
31.9
1.0
11.0

56.8
28.4

Male

Race

Offense

Theft
Drug
White collar
Other

Current Conviction

69.6
30.4

Felony
Misdemeanor

1.9

12.8
70.4
29.6

tenced to jail. Thus, itappears thatFARE functioned as a truealternative to routine pro
bation, not just as a sanction that increased the level of correctional supervision.
For each of the components of the total financial assessment, we present inTable 3
the percentage of each group sentenced to each monetary penalty plus themean amount
of each type of penalty, for those who received the penalty, as well as themean across
all offenders inFARE and the comparison group in parentheses. A slightly higher per
centage of FARE than of comparison group offenderswere sentenced tomonetary sanc
tions (93 percent vs. 100 percent for comparison and FARE offenders, respectively);
however, the total assessment for those who received FARE sentences, as planners had

intended,was not significantly different.
However, our examination of the distribution of fines imposed revealed an interest
The total range of financial penalties was broader forFARE than for com
pattern.
ing

parison group offenders, ranging from a low of $33 to a high of over $12,000. But, the
in contrast to over $1,000 for com
median for the FARE offenders was lower-$710,
FARE
achieved
its purpose in broadening
that
offenders,
parison group
demonstrating
the range of fine amounts imposed and discouraging a tariffapproach to fines.
Results
Probation Status at Twelve Months. One of the incentives of a FARE sentence is
that offenders are discharged from probation at the completion of their payments.
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 TURNER and GREENE

Table 2
Characteristics

Background

FARE

(N=191)
Sex (%)
Race

Male

77.0

White

79.6

Group

(N=191)

77.3

(%)
79.4
8.9 9.0
11.5
11.6

Black
Hispanic
Age

Comparison

27.1
27.2

at Current Conviction

Current Conviction

(%)*
28.2

Misdemeanor

OffenseType (%)
Homicide

0.0

Felony 71.8
18.1
0.0

0.0

Robbery

5.3

Burglary

0.5

Drug
Other

Risk Score

58.6
26.7
11.0

6.8

39.8
32.5

full-or part-time

5.2

Low22.0
10.3
48.9
49.1
High 23.7
14.7

15.2

26.1

62.4
59.4
66.0
69.9

(%)

(%)
Self-supporting
income**
Average monthly

Indicates

11.6

45.2
33.0
11.2

(%)*

Intensive

Chi-square
variables.

50.0
32.1

5.2

Moderate

Employed

1.1 1.6

Assault
8.5
Theft

Prior Record Summary (%)*
No prior record
Arrests only
Prior probation
Prior jail
Prior prison 2.6 1.6

81.9

$1,116$950

FARE and comparison
groups were significantly different, p < .05.
tests were used for categorized
t-tests for continuous
variables,

income is $548 for
Calculated
for those employed
full- or part-time. Mean
are con
if those with no part-time/full-time employment
controls and $681
sidered to have zero income.

However, if theydo not pay, theymay be sentenced to routine probation or even impris
onment for willful nonpayment. One year after sentencing, over half of the FARE
offenders had completed their termsof probation, compared to approximately 10 percent
of comparison group offenders.While slightlymore thanone-third of theFARE offend
ers remained on FARE afterone year, almost 70 percent of the comparison group offend
ers were still on probation at thispoint. None of theFARE offenders had their sentences
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Table 3
Financial Assessment

Restitution
Mean

amount

Probation
Mean

Fee*
amount

Fine
Mean

amount*

Victim Compensation
Mean
amount
Time Fee*
amount
Mean
Total Assessment*
Mean
amount

Imposed

FARE
(N=191)
33%
$670 ($221)
74%
$593 ($441)
35%
$765 ($264)
74%
$96 ($70)
95%
$8 ($8)
100%
$1,015 ($1,010)

Comparison

Group

(N=191)
26%
$550 ($141)
63%
$642 ($403)
36%
$1,319 ($476)
80%
$93 ($75)
79%
$8 ($6)
93%
$1,186 ($1106)

< .05.
FARE and comparison
groups were significantly different, p
were
t-tests
tests
continuous
for
used
for
variables,
Chi-square
categorized
in parentheses.
values for entire group are presented
variables. Mean
Indicates

revoked during the time period, and fewer than 5 percent had a warrant issued for
absconding. It is clear thatFARE moved offenders off the supervision rolls of the pro
bation department more quickly than routine probation.
Payment Outcomes. Payment outcomes are central to the success of theFARE pro
gram. Did the offenders pay theirfines? Did theFARE program result in revenue gains
using a more equitable formof fining,with thecollections being done by specialized staff?
Because of the automatic distribution of payments into thedifferentcomponents, themost
meaningful payment type is the percentage of offendersmaking any payment (see Table
4). Virtually all FARE fine participants paid something during their twelve-month follow
up, compared to 77 percent of the control offenders. For thosemaking payments, the aver
age amount paid was $694 forFARE and $447 for comparison group offenders-a statis
tically significant difference. Considering all offenders in each group, FARE offenders on
average paid $669, compared to $344 for comparison group offenders.

Total payments were higher forFARE participants, and the timeliness of theirpay
ments was noteworthy. For each quarter of the year, a significantly greater percentage
of FARE offenders paid in full. For instance, after threemonths, 21.4 percent of FARE

offenders had paid in full, while only 0.7 percent of the comparison group had. The
cumulative percentages for the six- and nine-month markers continued this pattern: in
half a year, 31.9 percent of FARE participants had completed financial obligations; 40.1
percent had done so in nine months. The completion numbers for the comparison group

were 3.6 and 8.0 percent, respectively.

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 TURNER and GREENE

Payments Made

Table 4
During Twelve-month Follow-up
FARE
(N=191)
96%
$694 ($669)
31%
$477 ($150)
62%
$360 ($222)
37%
$602 ($220)
65%
$97 ($63)

Any Payment*
Mean
amount*
Restitution
Mean

amount

Probation
Mean

Fee
amount*

Fine
Mean

amount*

Victim Compensation*
amount*
Mean

Comparison

Group

(N=191)
77%
$447 ($344)
23%
$291 ($67)
66%
$187 ($124)
30%
$398 ($119)
50%
$51 ($26)

Indicates FARE and comparison
group were significantly different, p < .05.
testswere used for categorical variables, t-tests for continuous vari
Chi-square
in parentheses.
ables. Mean
values for entire group are presented

Recidivism Outcomes. An intermediate sanction that removes offenders from some
level of criminal justice supervision is open to the question of what impact it has on
recidivism. After all, the majority of the FARE offenders had been sentenced for
felonies in superior court, and public safetymust be assured. Comparison group offend
ers were significantlymore likely to incur a technical violation thanwere FARE offend

ers, primarily for failure to reportand failure to pay fines (see Table 5). Part of thismay
reflect the greater level of supervision afforded these offenders. As Petersilia and Turner
have shown (1990, 1993), increased supervision can lead to increased levels of techni
cal violations. Over 20 percent of comparison group offenders received at least one tech
nical violation, compared with 9.4 percent of FARE offenders. However, 9.4 percent of
FARE offenders incurred technical violations for failure to pay fines.
FARE and comparison group offenderswere not significantlydifferent in their like
lihood of being rearrested. Eleven percent of FARE offenderswere arrested during the
twelve-month follow-up, in contrast to 17.3 percent of the comparison offenders. In
otherwords, the lower level of supervision afforded FARE offenderswas not associated
with higher levels of recidivism, compared to routine supervision (as measured by tech
nical violations or new arrests).

Analyses
Multiple
Regression
Our matching protocol produced FARE and comparison groups thatwere similar on
most of the background characteristics. However, FARE clients were slightly less seri
ous in terms of criminal record and risk score. Multiple regression analyses were con
ducted to control for the few differences between FARE and comparison offenders on
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 THE JUSTICESYSTEM JOURNAL

Technical Violations

Table 5
and Arrests During Twelve-month
FARE

(N=191)

Comparison

%

Group

(N=191)
%_

violations

Technical

9.4

Any violation
Fail to report*
Drug violation*
Failure to maintain

1.1
0.0

21.5
16.2
9.4
7.3
0.5
0.5 5.2

employment*
service not performed*
Community,
13.1
9.4
Failure to pay fines
0.0
6.3
Treatment violation*
0.0
0.5
Abscond
1.6

violation*

Other
Arrests

Any arrest
Property
crimes

Other
*

Follow-up

Indicates
Chi-square

10.0

11.0

17.3
2.6 2.6

4.7

Person
6.8

6.3

Drugs*
11.0

2.6

6.8

FARE and comparison
group were
significantly
tests were used for categorical
variables.

different, p <

.05.

background characteristics. Four outcomes were considered: amount paid during fol
low-up, any payment during follow-up, any arrest during follow-up, and any technical
violation during follow-up. Each outcome was modeled as a function of offender age,
race, sex, offense, felony or misdemeanor, prior record, risk, and group (FARE or com
parison group). Logistic regression was used for categorical outcomes (any payment,
any technical violation, any new arrest). Ordinary least squares regression was used for
payment amount. Regression results confirmed the earlier findings: FARE offenders
made higher financial payments, had fewer technical violations, and had similar arrest
records compared to comparison group offenders (see Tables 6 to 9).

Numbers

of Eligible Offenders

for FARE

implementation, planners expected a fairly small number
During
of offenders-several hundred of the approximately 10,000 convictions processed each
year in superior court-to be sentenced toFARE. The question thatoften arises with a
new program is whether all eligible offenders are being referred to the program. Are
there substantial numbers of eligible offenders who, for some reason, are not referred?
the initial FARE

If so, additional

training and education may be needed for identifying and targeting

potential program participants.
Our data allowed us to estimate thepotential number of offenders eligible forFARE.
Recall that theFARE program was implemented by two judges in each of the four quad
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 TURNER and GREENE

OLS

Table 6
Regression Results for Total Payments Made
Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

Intercept

634.66

159.50

304.73

Misdemeanor

-305.02

DF

Variable

FARE
Black

Hispanic
Female

T forHO:
Parameter

Prob>

= 0

3.97

0.00

58.43

5.21

0.00

75.41

-4.04

0.00

-91.71

101.02

-0.90

0.36

-137.22

91.38

-1.50

0.13

-172.94

71.01

-2.43

0.01

Prior record

-71.75

30.70

-2.33

0.02

Risk score

-19.39

8.44

-2.2-9

0.02

Theft

-29.10

105.21

-0.27

0.78

Drug

96.90

105.77

0.91

0.36

0.18

Age

21-25

15.35

83.99

Age
Over

26-30

136.18

102.53

30

234.17

Model
Error
C

total

0.18

2.52

0.01

of Variance

Analysis
PF

Source

0.85

1.32

92.62

 T 

Sum of Squares

Mean

Square

12

25145952.73

2095496.06

339
351

96164631.88

283671.48

F Value

Prob>F

7.387

0.0001

121310584.63

0.20

R-square

0.17

Adj R-sq.

Table 7
Results
forAny Assessment Paid
Logistic Regression
Analysis of Maximum
Parameter
PF

Variable
3.17

Intercept

Estimate

Error

1

FARE 1 2.14

Misdemeanor

Likelihood

Estimate

Standard

Standardized
Pr > Chi-square

0.95

0.00

Estimate

0.49

0.00

0.59

1

-0.32

0.47

0.48

-0.07

Black

1

-0.97

0.53

0.06

-0.15

Hispanic
Female

1

-0.31

0.54

0.55

-0.05

0.45

0.86

0.01

Prior record

1

0.16

0.00

-0.31
-0.19

1 0.07
-0.52

Risk score

1
-0.08

0.04

0.06

Theft

1

0.26

0.62

0.67

0.07

Drug

1

0.20

0.63

0.75

0.05

Age 21-25
Age 26-30
Over 30

1

-0.75

-0.18

1 0.58
1

-0.68
_Model

Criterion

Intercept Only
L
280.40
-2
LOG

0.55

0.16

0.83

0.48

0.11

0.61

0.26

-0.17

Fitting Information_
Intercept and Covariates
210.74

Chi-square
69.661

with

for Covariates
12 DF

(p=0.0001)

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 THE JUSTICESYSTEM JOURNAL

Table 8
forAny Arrest

Logistic Regression
Analysis

of Maximum

Likelihood

Parameter
Variable

DF

Estimate

Intercept

FARE

Estimates

Standard
Error

Standardized
Estimate

Pr > Chi-square

-3.81

0.89

-0.27

0.33

0.41

-0.07

1.01

0.39

0.01

0.23
0.04

Misdemeanor

0.00

Black

0.25

0.51

0.62

Hispanic
Female

0.12

0.49

0.79

0.02

0.39

0.40

0.33

0.09

Prior record

0.33

0.15

0.03

0.19

Risk score

0.12

0.04

0.00

0.29

Theft

0.00

0.60

0.00

Drug

0.37

0.59

0.52

1.00
0.09

Age

21-25

0.16

0.47

0.71

0.04

Age
Over

26-30

-0.02

0.59

0.96

-0.00

30

-0.31

0.55

0.56

-0.07

Model
Criterion

Fitting Information

Intercept Only

Intercept and Covariates

-2
L
294.79
LOG

262.11

Logistic Regression
Analysis

of Maximum

DF

for Covariates
12 DF

(p=0.0011

Table 9
Results forAny Technical Violation
Likelihood

Parameter
Variable

Chi-square
32.683 with

Estimate

Standard
Error

Estimates
Pr > Chi-square
0.00

Standardized
Estimate

-3.24

0.89

-0.92

0.33

0.00

-0.25

-0.03

0.41

0.93

-0.00

Black

0.39

0.50

0.43

0.06

Hispanic
Female

-0.43

0.54

0.42

-0.07

-0.28

0.41

0.49

-0.06

Prior record

0.17

0.15

0.24

0.10

Risk score

0.10

0.04

0.00

0.25

Intercept

FARE

Misdemeanor

Theft

0.13

0.61

0.83

0.03

Drug

0.44

0.61

0.47

0.11

21-25

0.72

0.47

0.12

0.18

Age 26-30
Over 30

0.48

0.59

0.41

0.09

0.52

0.54

0.33

0.13

Age

Model
Criterion
-2 LOG

L

Fitting Information

Intercept Only

Intercept and Covariates

305.11

273.67

Chi-square
31.441 with

for Covariates
12 DF(p=0.0017)

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)

 TURNER and GREENE

rants. The other judges' cases in thequadrants may have been eligible, but were not par
ticipating in the pilot project. In our screening of potential matches for comparison
group offenders in these lattercourts,we recorded whether theoffendersmet theday fine
criteria. Using information from our 1991 screening, we calculated the probabilities of

in FARE for selected background characteristics. We then applied these
to
all 1991 sentencing data to estimate the total percentage of the entire
probabilities
non-FARE judge caseload thatwould have been eligible forFARE.
Our estimates indicated that the number of potential FARE offenders was higher
than the number currentlybeing sentenced toFARE. Overall, 5.5 percent of defendants
in theFARE courts were sentenced to FARE, compared to estimates of 14.0 percent of
the non-FARE judge cases thatwould have been eligible forFARE sentences. Although
there is the potential to increase the number of day fine participants, the total percentage
eligible for a FARE sentence (less than 15 percent) represents only a minority of offend
being placed

ers

sentenced

Summary

in superior

and

court.

Conclusions

This evaluation supports the use of means-based monetary sanctions by those policy
makers and practitionerswho continue to search for rational, effective sanctioning options
for those offenderswho do not require incarceration. In addition, this effort to introduce
a new form of felony probation inMaricopa County demonstrated the power of the day
fine to bring a new degree of rationality and manageability to a hodgepodge of financial
assessments, which, over recent years, had grown to unwieldy proportions and had con

vinced many court officials thatprospects for administrative reformwere nearly hopeless.
Judges interviewed during the planning period revealed thatmost felt the finewas not an
attractive sentencing option and that the "mismatched array of monetary penalties they
felt obliged to impose at sentencing were contributing to an erosion of the credibility of
the sentencing process" (Greene, 1996). The pilot's policy group was able to define an
appropriate targetgroup, and probation staffcreated a screening system,which success
fully diverted a modest but steady stream of cases fromwithin the targetpool-evident
ly avoiding the common pitfall ofmerely "widening the net" of social controls.
Judging by key measures available, theFARE strategyappears to have worked well.
It enabled the collection of a just and affordable monetary sanction instead of tradition
al (and more costly) probation supervision, without increasing recidivism among the

diverted offenders. FARE offenders, on average, paid an additional $325 each month in
financial obligations over a twelve-month follow-up more than similar offenders who
received routine probation, resulting in increased collections of over $62,000. The data
indicate that the central concepts and practices tested in thepilot could be used through
out theMaricopa County courts. Indeed, such a sentencing practice may be suited to
other jurisdictions across the nation, jsj

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 THE JUSTICESYSTEM JOURNAL

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Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.

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