RAIMONDO 7080 N. Marks Avenue Suite 117 FRESNO, CA 93711 Raimondo Associates Anthony Raimondo, #200387 apr@raim0nd0associates. com Gerardo V. Hernandez, #292809 gvh@raim0rzd0associates. com 7080 N. Marks Avenue, Suite 117 Fresno, California 93711 Telephone: (559) 432-3000 Facsimile: (559) 43 2-2242 Attorneys for Petitioner, SILVIA LOPEZ STATE OF CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD GERAWAN FARMING, INC. Employer, And SILVIA LOPEZ, Petitioner, And UNITED FARM WORKERS Certi?ed Bargaining Representative. GERAWAN FARMING, INC. Respondent, And UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA, Charging Party. TO THE CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD: COMES NOW Petitioner Silvia Lopez to demand the disquali?cation of Agricultural Labor Case No. (39 ALRB No. 20) Case Nos: 2012-CE-047-VIS 2013-CE-027-VIS 2013-CE-039-VIS 2013-CE-042-VIS 2013-CE-045-VIS PETITIONER SILVIA PETITION TO DISQUALIFY BOARD MEMBER SHIROMA RAEMONDO 8. ASSOCIATES 7080 Marks Avenue Surte 1?57 FRESNO, CA 93711 Relations Board Member GENEVIEVE A. SHIROMA such that she not participate in any manner in the above entitled matter. Petitioner respectfully requests a hearing on the instant Petition in order to introduce evidence demonstrating the urgency of this request. Petitioner asserts that, as outlined in prior ?lings, she has been denied due process and a fair hearing in this matter due to prosecutorial misconduct, and faces a further violation of her statutory and Constitutional rights due if Member Shiroma is permitted to preside over this matter. INTRODUCTION Since 2012, Petitioner and her co-workers have strived tirelessly to organize themselves to assert their right to vote, but sadly, their greatest obstacle has been the very agency charged with protecting their rights. Under Shiroma?s leadership as Chair, the ALRB has, at every turn, thwarted the workers? efforts to assert their rights. Now, having been deprived due process due to prosecutorial misconduct, Petitioner and her co-workers must rely on Shiroma to impartially review her case and the conduct of an investigation and prosecution that bene?ts her friends and political allies. The circumstances demonstrate that Shiroma cannot sit in judgment in this matter, and her disquali?cation is mandatory. Member Shiroma? conduct, including her failure to recuse herself, unquestionably violates the Canons of Judicial Ethics, and Petitioner asserts that she is entitled to an impartial decision maker who conducts herself according to the highest ethical standards. REQUEST FOR DISOUALIFICATION ALRB regulations provide that administrative law judge1 shall try any motion, hearing, or other proceeding which involves a contested issue of law or fact when it shall be established as hereinafter provided that such administrative law judge is prejudiced against any party or attorney or the interest of any party or attorney appearing in such action or proceeding.? (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 8, 20263(a)) 1 ALRB regulation 20125 de?nes ?administrative law judge? as ?the agent of the Board conducting hearings pursuant to Chapters under Chapter 5 of the Act when consolidated with a hearing under Chapter 4 or 6. The term shall include the Board or a member of the Board when conducting a hearing pursuant to Chapters under Chapter 5 of the Act when consolidated with a hearing under Chapter 4 or 1 In addition, ?(w)henever an administrative law judge shall have knowledge of any fact, which 2 by reason of bias or prejudice makes it appear probable that a fair and impartial hearing cannot be held 3 before him or her, it shall be his or her duty to immediately notify the executive secretary, setting forth 4 all reasons for his or her belief.? (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 8, 20263(b); and see ?Administrative 5 Adjudication Bill of Rights,? Gov. Code, 1 1425 .40 of?cer is subject to disquali?cation 6 for bias, prejudice, or interest in the 7 ALRB regulation 20263(c) permits ?any party? to ?request the administrative law judge to 8 disqualify himself or herself whenever it appears that it is probable that a fair and impartial hearing 9 cannot be held by the administrative law judge to whom the matter is assigned.? 10 In the present matter, Petitioner is unable to achieve a fair and impartial hearing with Member 1 1 Shiroma serving in the capacity of a judicial of?cer. What is at stake is the most central and critical 12 issue confronted by farm workers who organize themselves will their voice be heard? But the stakes 13 are even higher for the ALRB, which must demonstrate to the world that it can fairly adjudicate 14 dif?cult issues and protect workers? rights, even when to do so compels the agency to act against a 15 union that has been a long-time ally and friend to the Governor. 16 The case involves a group of workers who dared to challenge apolitically connected union, the 17 Governor, and the agenda of hand-picked political appointees. Shiroma?s career is so inexorably 18 linked to the political goals of the union that she cannot possibly render a fair and objective decision 19 in this matter. 2O SHIROMA HAS ACTED CONSISTENTLY TO BENEFIT THE UFW AT THE 21 EXPENSE OF FARM WORKERS 22 Ms. Shiroma is the longest-tenured Board member, and a former chair of the Board, placing 23 her in a unique position of in?uence. Her long term of service has placed her in the best. position to 24 protect the workers? rights and the integrity of the process, something she has deliberately failed and 25 refused to do because of her close af?liation with the United Farm Workers, and her bias in favor of 26 the union. Shiroma has failed and refused to adequately supervise the General Counsel, the 27 pro secutor, allowing corruption and pro secutorial misconduct to run rampant at the expense of worker 28 rights. (Exhibit A to the Declaration of Anthony P. Raimondo is a true and correct copy of a RNMONDO a. ASSOCEATES 7080 N. Marks Avenue Suite 117 3 FRESNO. CA 93711 RAIMONDO ASSOCIATES 7030 N. Marks Avenue Suite 117 FRESNO, CA 93711 Department of Finance Report addressing the General Counsel?s abuse of public funds; Exhibit are documents related to an ALRB employee blowing the whistle on unethical conduct and abuse of authority by the General Counsel) The ALRB has a Solemn Duty to Protect Worker Rights California modeled the Agricultural Labor Relations Act after the NLRA, and made workplace democracy its cornerstone. (Labor Code Sections 1148; 1152). Forty years after the Wagner Act established workplace democracy as a basic human right, California?s Legislature made a bold proclamation to the state?s farm workers, promising workers ?full freedom of association, self- organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,? a franchise of their own. (Labor Code Section 1 140.2, emphasis added) Shiroma has allowed this principle to wilt in the face of political expediency and her allegiance to a well-connected union. Shiroma used her Position as Chair to avor the UF at the Expense of Workers Under Ms. Shiroma?s leadership and guidance, she has allowed and encouraged the Board to establish and adhere to a position that a union is ?certi?ed until decerti?ed,? an overly technical view of the Act that has had a devastating effect on the workers? right to due process. While it is true that stability of established contractual relations is a goal of the ALRA, ?the right of workers to decertify their bargaining representative is more important,? a principle that the Board has abandoned under Shiroma? 3 leadership. (Cadiz v. ALRB, 92 Cal.App. 3d 365, 378 (1979). There is certainly no question that the right to vote outweighs stable collective bargaining relationships. Shiroma?s impact on worker rights is tangible. While Shiroma was Chair of the Board, she led the charge as the ALRB litigated the impact of the union?s failure to represent the workers in any way for almost two decades. (Gerawan Farms (2013) 39 ALRB No. 5) Without any notice to the workers or opportunity for them to be heard, Shiroma?s decision established a View of the Act that silenced the workers, denied them due process, and forced a bargaining representative upon them who had violated their rights by failing to carry out its legal duties under the certi?cation. Shortly thereafter, Shiroma used the legal ?ction of her ?rst decision to deny farm worker Lupe Garcia his right to be heard in the MMC proceeding that directly impacted the workers constitutional rights and ?nancial future. (Gerawan arms (2013) 39 ALRB No. 5) These decisions were condemned by the Court of Appeal, 4 RAEMONDO B. ASSOCEATES 7050 N, Marks Awnue Suite 117 FRESNO, CA 93711 which held that a union that fails to engage the employer on behalf of the workers for 17 years has no right to speak on their behalf. (Exhibit to the Declaration of Anthony Raimondo) As the Court of Appeal understood and Shiroma ignored, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) allows an employer to lawfully withdraw recognition unilaterally from an incumbent union when that union loses majority support while the ALRA does not. (Levitz Furniture C0. of the Paci?c, Inc, (2001) 333 NLRB 717) To test an incumbent union?s majority status under the federal Act, an employer may petition for a NLRB~conducted election ?by demonstrating good-faith reasonable uncertainty . . . as to [the] unions? continuing majority status.? (111) These rules re?ect the primacy placed upon employee support as the authorizing instrument of a union certi?cation. While the ALRA differs from the NLRA with respect to the withdrawal of recognition, there is nothing to indicate that the Legislature intended to abandon employee support as the foundation of a union?s legitimacy. Under the ALRA, an agricultural employer cannot withdraw recognition unilaterally from an incumbent union or petition for an election when majority support is in doubt. (F Growers Assn. v. ALRB (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 667, 674-675) Instead, ?only employees or labor organizations [may] certify a union by petition and election procedures.? (1d. at 675) The reason for this distinction is the frequently seasonal nature of agricultural employment, and the high turnover inherent in agricultural operations. The Legislature wanted to ensure that employers did not use ordinary changes in the composition of the workforce to withdraw recognition from unions, not to protect unions that fail in their representative duties. The problem is that the continuing enforcement of the certi?cation on behalf of a recalcitrant union places an unacceptable burden on the workers to decertify a union that has already demonstrated that it is unwilling or unable to represent them. Under her leadership, the Board created a legal framework that protected a union whose neglect did untold harm to the workers? rights under the Act. Shiroma?s blind adherence to the glib principle of ?certi?ed until decerti?ed? without context for the rule serves no one except failed labor organizations. The decerti?cation requirement exists solely to prevent agricultural employers from exploiting inherent ?uctuations in the identity of the workforce to question majority status and rid themselves of a democratically legitimate 5 @00le RAIMONDO 8. ASSOCIATES 7030 N. Marks Avenue Suite 117 FRESNO. CA 93711 representative that has been actively representing the workers. Growers Assn. v. ALRB (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 667) Here, it has become a tool to prevent workers from expressing their choice. Remarkably, Shiroma cited a case identifying the Board? 3 duty to protect workers from union neglect in order enforce the certi?cation and supplant the voice of the workers with that of a recalcitrant union. As the Board has stated unequivocally, certi?ed bargaining representative may lose its representative status by its inability or unwillingness to continue to represent employees.? (emphasis added, Dole Fresh Fruit Co. 22 ALRB No. 4 (1996)) In Dole Fresh Fruit, the ALRB stated that it has the ongoing responsibility to ensure that unions carry out their obligations to the workers: Because the Board has an obligation to further the purposes and policies of the Act, it must be alert to situations in which the certi?ed labor organization rests on its bargaining rights, as such neglect serves to erode and undermine the right to be represented that is granted to employees. Since the Board may be called upon to examine conduct in bargaining, it follows that the absence of conduct should also fall within the Board?s purview of holding accountable labor representatives it has authorized to represent employees. (Dole Fresh Fruit C0. (1996) 22 ALRB No. 4, pp. 17, 23-24, emphasis added.) Under Shiroma? 3 leadership, the Board ignored its self?de?ned duty to protect workers from a union that rested on its bargaining rights for almost two decades2 and the harm done to employee rights by that union neglect. Indeed, the framework created under Shiroma? leadership has rewarded a union that has damaged workers? rights by failing to bargain for them. Shiroma?s view encourages labor organizations to bargain whenever they get around to it, because no delay will impact the certi?cation, and decerti?cation is an impossible obstacle. Shiroma has effectively protected the UF from any consequences resulting from its failure to carry out its legal duty to the workers, and has ensured that a certi?cation lasts forever, no matter how badly the union abuses its duty to the workers. This is not the record of an objective decision maker, and Petitioner has uncovered her political 22 There is no dispute that the UP did not engage the employer concerning any term or condition of employment, including many unilateral changes to those terms and conditions, from approximately 1995 to 2012. The UF may de?ne ?representing? workers broadly, but the Act requires them to engage the employer and bargain, something they did not do. RAIMONDO 8. 7080 N. Marks Awenue Suite 117 FRESNO. CA 93711 alliance with the UFW. In this case, the principle is being perverted to reward a union that has abrogated its legal duty to the workers by failing to represent them for decades. It simply cannot be that the Legislature intended to protect and reward unions that fail in the most fundamental duty conferred by certi?cation: to collectively bargain with the employer concerning the terms and conditions of employment. The only explanation is that Shiroma was and continues to be determined to serve the union at the expense of the workers, a goal that is inconsistent with her purported role as an impartial decision-maker in this case. Under Shiroma?s view, it was not the union?s responsibility to organize the workers to earn their votes, it was the workers? responsibility to organize themselves, ?nd counsel, and ?ght amassive legal battle against the State of California, a well-funded and politically connected union, and an employer with vast resources. Shiroma cannot be allowed to achieve her goals by using this decerti?cation process to silence the workers and permanently establish her ally as the only voice of the workers who were abandoned. Shiroma Oversaw the Replacement Staff with UF Supporters The Regional staff and General Counsel3 are delegates of the Board who answer to the Board and whom the Board has an obligation to supervise (Labor Code Section 1142(b)) For many years, the ALRB Regional of?ces enjoyed signi?cant stability in personnel, which created internal expertise and an institutional memory that served the goals of the ALRB. Shiroma and the Governor?s hand? picked General Counsel, Sylvia Torres-Guillen, purged experienced staff and replaced them with inexperienced, unquali?ed individuals whose primary quali?cation was their UFW support. Most dramatic, an attorney with almost two decades of experience was passed over for the Regional Director position for Silas Shawver, who admitted under oath that less than 10% of his prior legal experience involved labor relations law. This change has led to litigation, as clearly quali?ed 3 While the General Counsel is not an agent of the Board, the Board has direct supervisory authority over the Regional of?ces. Under Chair Shiroma?s leadership, the distinction between the General Counsel and the Regional staff was eliminated, with both groups becoming one and the same. Shiroma allowed the General Counsel to use these circumstances to avoid scrutiny, abuse her ?duciary duty to the State, and run roughshod over workers? rights. RAIMONDO ASSDCEATES 7080 N, Marks Avenue Suite 11? FRESNO, CA 93711 attorneys were passed over in favor of neophytes like Shawver. (Exhibit to the Declaration of Anthony P. Raimondo) Since the time of the hearing in this matter, it has become clear that Shawer?s primary quali?cation was his longtime relationships with UFW leadership, his longtime support for the union, and his willingness to do whatever he could to help the UFW. (Exhibit is a true and correct copy of an article published in the ?Flash Report? reporting on bias) As Chair at the time of the purge, it is clear that Shiroma made sure that apprOpriately sympathetic people held critical positions where they could protect the interests of her allies. Shiroma Engages in Joint Political Advocacv with the UF In the above?entitled matter and others, an individual named Ritchie Ross has acted directly as advisor, consultant, lobbyist and paid representative of the United Farm Workers Mr. Ross? experience with the UFW includes advising the organization in matters directly related to this and other others cases involving the ALRB . (Exhibit to the Declaration of Anthony Raimondo are true and correct c0pies of Mr. Ross? public ?lings) In this way, Mr. Ross is an actual party to this matter, as he is an agent of the UFW, and is directly involved in advocacy related to this matter pending before the Board. Mr. Ross also has had an ongoing close business relationship with Chair Shiroma for a period of more than a decade, a relationship that Shiroma has curiously failed to disclose throughout her term of of?ce while she quietly set the stage to protect the UP W. Upon information and belief, Chair Shiroma?s campaign committee for the Board of Directors for the Sacramento Municipal Utilities District paid Mr. Ross as a campaign consultant. Chair Shiroma?s 2002 campaign for SMUD paid Mr. Ross $1,069 for ?radio airtime and production costs.? (Exhibit to the Declaration of Anthony Raimondo is a true and correct copy of Shiroma?s campaign disclosure) Notably, in 2002, Chair Shiroma was already a member of ALRB and Mr. Ross was already registered to lobby for the UFW. To Petitioner?s knowledge, Shiroma has never disclosed her political work in collusion with an agent of the UFW. In 2006, Ross was hired again by a committee partially controlled by Chair Shiroma to act as a campaign consultant for the committee, strengthening her political alliance with the UFW and 8 RAIMONDO ASSOCAATES 7080 N, Marks Avenue Suite FRESNO. CA 93711 ?nancially bene?tting Ross. The Customers Say YES on Measure for Lower Rates? campaign committee was primarily formed by Chair Shiroma, as president of the SMUD board and other board members to support Measure L, which would have allowed SMUD to annex property in Yolo County. In fact, on the Form 990 returns of Customers Say YES on Measure for Lower Rates? Genevieve Shiroma is listed as a member of the board of directors and as anyof?cer of the organization (Secretary). (Exhibit to the Declaration of Anthony Raimondo is a true and correct copy of the orm 990 for the campaign) Customers Say YES on Measure for Lower Rates? hired Richie Ross, presumably at Shiroma?s direction, and paid him well for his work. (Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Anthony Raimondo are true and correct copy of Forms 460) Of grave concern, Richie Ross has lobbied for bills that directly increased the power and in?uence of Chair Shiroma?s ALRB, indicating that this political entanglement is more than coincidental. Ross was involved in lobbying for State Senator Darrell Steinberg?s Senate Bill 25 (2014), would have given Shiroma?s ALRB board much more power by, among other provisions, allowing the UF and the ALRB to unilaterally force an employer into mandatory mediation at any time. (Exhibit The bill was strongly supported by the UFW, and presumably by Ross? colleague Shiroma, because it would have increased the ability to empower the UP through legal proceedings without bothering with the inconvenience of elections and counting ballots. The bill, which was vetoed by Governor Brown in September 2014, was criticized as a bill that would have resulted in ALRB enforcement ?rst, judgment later, a goal that characterized Shiroma?s time as Chair.4 As the workers have learned, Shiroma has little patience for proceedings that do anything other than benegreat af?nity for legal proceedings that force the union on the workers regardless of their wishes. Most disturbing of all, Shiroma hired Ross the very same year that he successfully lobbied for the passage of the mandatory mediation law the very statute used to silence the workers and force 4 Perhaps not coincidentally, on information and belief, Chair Shiroma was a campaign contributor to Senator Steinberg just before he introduced SB 25. 9 1 union representation upon them against their will. It appears that Shiroma rewarded Ross handsomely 2 for his success in helping their common ally. (Exhibit is a true and correct copy of an article 3 reporting on Ross?s hiring) 4 While Shiroma enjoys exercising her First Amendment rights without restriction, it appears her 5 subordinates to not believe that farmworkers enjoy those same freedoms. Petitioner and some of her 6 colleagues have been condemned by Shiroma?s merged Regional attorney/ General Counsel for 7 participating in a trip to Sacramento to Oppose SB 25. (Exhibit to the Declaration of Anthony 8 Raimondo is a true and correct copy of a letter from the Legislature condemning the interference with 9 the workers? First Amendment Rights) During the hearing, the workers were mocked as being too 10 uneducated and too simple to understand the bill, and the trip was cast as employer support for the 11 decerti?cation. The cross examination devolved into mockery of the workers as the 12 prosecutors interrogated them on their understanding of the language of the bill. Employees face the 13 loss of their right to vote because of their political advocacy, but Shiroma faces no consequences for 14 her ?nancial and political entanglements with the union whose cases she decides. 15 BIAS COMPELS DISQUALIFICATION 16 California law takes a very dim view of bias in judicial and quasi-judicial processes. In the 17 context of administrative hearings, the hearing of?cer acts as the judge but also as the jury the trier 18 of fact. (See, e. g, Gov. Code, 11513 [Hearing of?cer acts as a trier of fact in administrative l9 proceedings].) As with parties to a jury trial, respondents in administrative hearings are to be afforded 20 the ?right to an impartial trier of fact.? (Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bell, (1981) 28 21 Ca1.3d 781, 790.) As a member of the ALRB hearing the administrative appeal in this matter, there is 22 no question that Shiroma is acting in a judicial capacity, particularly in light of the fact that there are 23 only three members of the ALRB at the present. 24 When a jury is a trier of fact, California law holds that any uror may be dismissed for ?implied 25 bias? - when, among other disquali?ers, a juror maintains the ?existence of a state of mind in the juror 26 evincing enmity against, or bias towards, either party.? (Code Civ. Proc., 229.) This is similar to 27 the standard in ALRB regulation 20263(b) calling for disquali?cation of an ALRB hearing of?cer 28 when the of?cer has knowledge, ?which by reason of bias or prejudice makes it appear probable that a ASSOCIATES 7080 N, Marks Avenue Suite?? 10 FRESNO, CA 93711 RAIMONDO ASSOCIATES 7080 N. Marks Avenue Suite 1?17 FRESNO. CA 93711 fair and impartial hearing cannot be held? before the hearing of?cer. (See also Evans 12. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, (1930) 107 Cal.App. 372, 3 80 [?The words 'bias? and 'prejudice' as used in the law of the subject under consideration refer to the mental attitude or disposition of the judge towards a party to the litigation. . . A plain reading of CCP section 229 demonstrates that a person is incompetent to serve as a trier of fact where he or she has an implied bias where, by virtue of certain close relationships between the trier of fact and the parties to the case, there is created in the trier, consciously or unconsciously, a special interest in the success of either party. (Code Civ. Proc., A juror as a trier of fact may be dismissed for ?implied bias? when that juror maintains speci?cally a ?principal and agent? relationship with a party or to an of?cer of a corporation which is a party.? (Code Civ. Proc., The failure to exclude a biased trier of fact violates due process and the federal constitutional right to trial before an impartial tribunal. (See, e. g, Johnson v. Armontrout, (8th Cir. 1992.) 961 F.2d 748; Burton v. Johnson, (10th Cir. 1991) 948 F. 2d 1150.) In addition to the foregoing, Government Code section 11475.20 adapts the Code of Judicial Ethics with respect to administrative law judges. Because Chair Shiroma sits in adjudication of administrative matters, the Code of Judicial Ethics rightfully applies to her actions sitting as an administrative adjudicator as well.5 The Code of Judicial Ethics is meant to supplement other standards applicable to conduct of an administrative decision?makers, including disquali?cation for bias. (See Gov. Code, 11475.20.) Government Code section 11475.20 (?Governing code for hearing and nonhearing conduct of judge or other presiding of?cer?) provides that ?the Code of Judicial Ethics adopted by the Supreme Court for the conduct of judges governs the hearing and nonhearing conduct of an administrative law judge or other presiding of?cer to which this article applies.? (See also Mathew Zaheri Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle 351., (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1317 [?There is no principled basis to distinguish between an ALJ and a judge in the judicial branch for purposes of the ethical strictures against ex parte There is certainly no serious 5 Even where hearings are conducted by members of the relevant state agency, the APA applies. (Gov. Code, 1 1405.80, 1 1445.40.) ALRB hearings are subject to APA rules. (Gov. Code, 11 RAIMONDO ASSOCIATES 7080 N. Marks Avenue Suite 1t? FRESNO, CA 937t1 argument that can be made that the members of the ALRB are not subject to the highest ethical standards applicable to judges in general. A number of Judicial Canons apply to Chair Shiroma?s relationship with Richie Ross as she sits as an adjudicator involving one of Mr. Ross? organizations (emphasis added): Canon 2. A JUDGE SHALL AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL OF THE ACTIVITIES A. Promoting Public Con?dence. A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public con?dence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. A judge shall not make statements, whether public or nonpublic, that commit the judge with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the courts or that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial of?ce. ADVISORY COMMITTEE CANONS 2 AND 2A Public con?dence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept restrictions on the judge's conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by other members of the community and should do so freely and willingly. The prohibition against behaving with impropriety or the appearance of impropriety applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge. The test for the appearance of impropriety is whether a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to act with integrity, impartiality, and competence. Canon 3. A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE IMPARTIALLY, COMPETENTLY, AND DILIGENTLY C. Administrative Responsibilities (1) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge?s administrative responsibilities impartially, on the basis of merit, without bias or prejudice, free of conflict of interest, and in a manner that promotes public con?dence in the integrity of the judiciary. A judge shall not, in the performance of administrative duties, engage in speech, gestures, or other conduct that would reasonably be perceived as bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon 12 RAEMONDO E- ASSOCIATES 7030 N. Marks Avenue Suite $17 FRESNO, CA 93711 race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political af?liation, or sexual harassment. ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY: CANON In considering what constitutes a con?ict of interest under this canon, a judge should be informed by Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision Canon 4. A JUDGE SHALL SO CONDUCT THE AND EXTRAJUDICIAL ACTIVITIES AS TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF CONFLICT WITH JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS A. Extraj udicial Activities in General. A judge shall conduct all of the judge?s extrajudicial activities so that they do not (1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially, (2) demean the judicial of?ce, (3) interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties, or (4) lead to frequent disquali?cation of the judge. ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY: CANON 4A Complete separation of a judge from extrajudicial activities is neither possible nor wise; a judge should not become isolated from the community in which he or she lives. Expressions of bias or prejudice by a judge, even outside the judge's judicial activities, may cast reasonable doubt on the udge's capacity to act impartially as a judge. Expressions that may do so include inappropriate use of humor or the use of demeaning remarks. See Canon 2C and accompanying Commentary. Because a judge's judicial duties take precedence over all other activities (see Canon 3A), a judge must avoid extrajudicial activities that might reasonably result in the judge being disquali?ed. Canon 5. A JUDGE OR CANDIDATE FOR JUDICIAL OFFICE SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN POLITICAL OR CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY THAT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY, OR IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDICIARY A. Political Organizations. Judges and candidates for judicial of?ce shall not (1) act as leaders or hold any of?ce in a political organization; (2) make speeches for a political organization or candidate for nonj udicial of?ce, or publicly endorse or publicly oppose a candidate for nonjudicial of?ce; or (3) personally solicit funds for a political organization or nonjudicial candidate; or make contributions to a political party or political l3 RNMONDO 8. 7030 Marks Avenue Suite 11? FR ESNO. CA 93711 organization or to a nonjudicial candidate in excess of $500 in any calendar year per political party or political organization or candidate, or in excess of an aggregate of $1,000 in any calendar year for all political parties or political organizations or nonjudicial candidates. ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY: CANON 5A This provision does not prohibit a judge or a candidate for judicial of?ce from signing a petition to qualify a measure for the ballot, provided the judge does not use his or her of?cial title. In judicial elections, judges are neither required to shield themselves from campaign contributions nor are they prohibited from soliciting contributions from anyone, including attorneys. Nevertheless, there are necessary limits on judges facing election if the appearance of impropriety is to be avoided. In soliciting campaign contributions or endorsements, a judge shall not use the prestige of judicial of?ce in a manner that would reasonably be perceived as coercive. See Canons l, 2, 2A, and 2B. Although it is improper for a judge to receive a gift from an attorney subject to exceptions noted in Canon a judge's campaign may receive attorney contributions. Although attendance at political gatherings is not prohibited, any such attendance should be restricted so that it would not constitute an express public endorsement of a nonjudicial candidate or a measure not affecting the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice otherwise prohibited by this canon. Subject to the monetary limitation herein to political contributions, a judge or. a candidate for judicial of?ce may purchase tickets for political dinners or other similar dinner functions. Any admission price to such a political dinner or function in excess of the actual cost of the meal will be considered a political contribution. The prohibition in Canon does not preclude judges from contributing to a campaign fund for distribution among judges who are candidates for reelection or retention, nor does it apply to contributions to any judge or candidate for judicial of?ce. Under this canon, a judge may publicly endorse a candidate for judicial of?ce. Such endorsements are permitted because judicial of?cers have a special obligation to uphold the integrity, impartiality, and independence of the judiciary and are in a unique position to know the quali?cations necessary to serve as a competent judicial of?cer. Although family members of the judge or candidate for judicial of?ce are not subject to the provisions of this code, a judge or candidate for judicial of?ce shall not avoid compliance with this code by making 14 ASSOCIATES 7050 Marks Avenue Suite 11 7 FRESNO, CA 93711 contributions through a spouse or registered domestic partner or other family member. ?Impartiality? has been de?ned to entail the ?absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind.? (Haworth v. Superior Court, (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 389.) Shiroma?s business and political relationship with Mr. Ross, whose organization is before the ALRB in the present matter, rises to the level to disqualify Chair Shiroma as a trier of fact. The Shiroma/Ross relationship is a business relationship, a political alliance, and likely a social relationship as well. Most signi?cant, there is an unacceptable interrningling of the political activities of the UFW and the political activities of Shiroma. Their rich historical relationship (which additionally includes joining together to support a candidate for Mayor of Sacramento in 2006) patently indicates an ?implied bias? which precludes Chair Shiroma from rendering an impartial verdict in matters involving the UFW. Indeed, not even an expurgatory oath would be appropriate to overcome the possible bias, and permit Chair Shiroma to participate in the present matter. This is particularly true in a situation where it was Shiroma?s ethical responsibility to disclose her relationship with Ross and the UFW, and she instead chose to actively conceal it while working behind the scenes for the bene?t of her political ally. Shiroma? 3 relationship with Mr. Ross precludes her as a matter of law from sitting as a trier of fact or judge in any action involving the UFW, under ALRB regulation 20263(a) which, again, provides that administrative law judge shall try any motion, hearing, or other proceeding which involves a contested issue of law or fact when it shall be established as hereinafter provided that such administrative law judge is prejudiced against any party or attorney or the interest of any party or attorney appearing in such action or proceeding.? Shiroma?s relationship with Mr. Ross creates at the very least a reasonable belief to an objective observer that she is prejudiced against any party opposing the UFW, and her actions as Chair con?rm that her pro?UFW agenda has negatively impacted her ability to carry out her duties impartially. As a result, Petitioner requests that chair Shiroma disqualify herself on the basis that ?it is probable that a fair and impartial hearing cannot be held? with Shiroma presiding. Moreover, by virtue of her close relationship with a party/party representative on whom she 15 4sASSOCIATES 7080 N. Marks Avenue Suite 117 FRESNO. CA 83713 proposes to sit in judgment, Shiroma has also violated the Judicial Canons, and should be disquali?ed for her failure to disclose her close relationship and political allegiance with the UP and its paid lobbyist. Shiroma?s close relationship with Mr. Ross? and his organization, the UP W, as well as her failure to disclose that relationship and recuse herself, has created an unmistakable ?appearance of impropriety? in violation of Judicial Canon 2A. According to Advisory Committee Commentary: judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety.? Any reasonable mind would conclude that Shiroma is too enmeshed with the UP and its representatives to render a fair judgment. In addition, Shiroma also appears to have run afoul of Judicial Canon 4. Shiroma was a political contributor to State Senate Pro Tem Darrell Steinberg just before Sen. Steinberg introduced SB 25, which would have dramatically increased the powers of the ALRB in cases involving the UP W. The bill was strongly and aggressively supported by the UFW, and Shiroma ?nancially supported the author of the legislation. This contribution casts heavy ?reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially.? (According to Advisory Committee Commentary: ?Expressions of bias or prejudice by a judge, even outside the judge?s judicial activities, may cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge?) If the workers can be condemned because of their political activity, it stands to reason that Shiroma should face the same scrutiny. Indeed. The legislature itself has condemned the agency?s interference with the workers? political activities. (Exhibit K) Shiroma likely has violated Judicial Canon 5 by virtue of her leadership role in a political organization. (According to Advisory Committee Commentary: ?Although attendance at political gatherings is not prohibited, any such attendance should be restricted so that it would not constitute an express public endorsement of a nonjudicial candidate or a measure not affecting the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice otherwise prohibited by this canon?) Finally, Shiroma is an active major political donor in the state of California, supporting solely Democrat candidates and political causes, and particularly those that are allied with the UP W. ?Major Donors,? as de?ned in the Political Reform Act, are individuals who have given $10,000 or more to 16 RAIMONDO 7080 N. Marks Avenue Suite 117 FRESNO. CA 93?11 candidates and political committees in a calendar year. Shiroma (whose FPPC Major Donor Filer Id. is 1236184) has recently given more than $42, 000 in political campaign contributions, making her a powerful friend to those she supports. (Exhibit to the Declaration of Anthony Raimondo is a true and correct copy of Shiroma?s disclosure) Shiroma?s personal contributions to Democrat candidates and political causes runs afoul of Judicial Canon 5 (?shall not make contributions to a political party or political organization or to a nonjudicial candidate in excess of $5 00 in any calendar year per political party or political organization or candidate, or in excess of an aggregate of $1,000 in any calendar year for all political parties or political organizations or nonjudicial candidates?). Shiroma has blatantly disregarded her responsibility in her adjudicatory role as a member of the ALRB. Shiroma?s one-sided political support indicates a blatant predisposition favoring her political allies in any matter where the UP is before the ALRB, and a disregard for the ethical rules that bind her. CONCLUSION As a practical matter, a government official in an adjudicatory role, including an administrative hearing of?cer, is unlikely to expressly admit to harboring bias. Additionally, most are likely inclined to indicate and believe that they will be impartial and listen with an open mind to the evidence. Nonetheless, where facts indicate that a fair, unbiased and impartial hearing cannot be had, principles of fairness and due process require that such trier of fact be disquali?ed from sitting in judgment. We have seen bias infect ALRB proceedings throughout this process, as former Regional Directors Silas Shawver and Alegria de la Cruz were blinded by their close personal connections to the UFW that they failed to protect workers from abuse by the union. l7 RAIMDNDO ASSOCIATES 7080 NA Marks Avenue Suite 117 FRESNO, CA 93711 Such is the case here. Shiroma has maintained a close business and political alliance (and likely friendship) with a party in the above-entitled matter. Under no circumstances can Shiroma sit in judgment in an impartial fashion, and no fair hearing may be had with her sitting as a judicial officer in this matter. In the alternative, Petitioner requests that the Board set a hearing on disqualification where all parties can submit evidence and argument Dated: January 22, 2015 RAIMONDO ASSOCIATES Ii/ Anthony Raimondo Attorneys for Petitioner 18 .RAIMONDO ASSOCIATES 7030 N. Mark: Avenue Suite 117 FRESNO, CA 93711 Raimondo Associates Anthony Raimondo, #200387 apr@raz'mondoassocz'ates. com Gerardo V. Hernandez, #292809 @raz'mondoassociates. com 7080 N. Marks Avenue, Suite 117 Fresno, California 93711 Telephone: (559) 432-3000 Facsimile: (559) 432-2242 Attorneys for Petitioner, SILVIA LOPEZ STATE OF CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD GERAWAN FARMING, IN C. Employer, And SILVIA LOPEZ, Petitioner, And UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA, Certi?ed Bargaining Representative. GERAWAN FARMING, INC. Respondent, And UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA, Charging Party. Case No. (39 ALRB No. 20) Case Nos: 2012-CE-041-VIS 2012-CE-046-VIS 2013-CE-038-VIS 2013-CE-043-VIS DECLARATION OF ANTHONY RAIMONDO IN SUPPORT OF PETITION TO DISQUALIFY BOARD MEMBER SHIROMA I, Anthony P. Raimondo, hereby declare as follows: ASSOCIATES 7080 N. Mark: Avenue Suite 117 FRESNO. CA 93711 l. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of California. I am the lead attorney in this action, and am familiar with the ?les and papers in this matter. 2. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a Department of Finance Report addressing the General Counsel?s abuse of public ?mds. 3. Attached as Exhibit are true and correct copies of documents related to reports of an ALRB employee blowing the whistle on unethical conduct and abuse of authority by the General Counsel. 4. Attached as Exhibit is a true and correct copy of the Court of Appeal Decision Case No. 068526. 5. Attached as Exhibit is a true and correct copy of the Complaint ?led by Francisco Aceron in the Sacramento County Superior Court. 6. Exhibit is a true and correct copy of an article published in the ?Flash Report? reporting on bias by the General Counsel. 7. Attached as Exhibit Fare true and correct c0pies of Mr. Ross? public ?lings and disclosures. 8. Attached as Exhibit tare a true and correct copies of Shiroma?s SMUD campaign disclosures. 9. Attached as Exhibit is a true and correct copy of the Form 990 for the Measure campaign. 10. Attached as Exhibit I are true and correct copy of Forms 460 ?led by the Measure L. campaign. 1 1. Attached as Exhibit is a true and correct copy of a Sacramento Bee article reporting on Ross?s hiring. 12. Attached as Exhibit is a true and correct copy of a letter from the Legislature condemning the interference with the workers? First Amendment Rights. 13. Attached as Exhibit are true and correct copies of Shiroma?s political contribution disclosures. ASSOCIATES 7060 N. Marks Avenue Suite 117 FRESNO. CA 93711 I hereby declare under Penalty of Perjury under the laws of the state of California that the foregoing is true and correct, and if called as a witness I would testify competently to the same. Executed this 22nd day of January, 2016 at Fresno, California by: Anthony P. Raimondo EDMUND G. JR. - EDVERNDR B1 5 STREET II SACRAMENTO CA I 95314-37135 I Transmitted via e-mail February 4, 2015 Mr. David Lanier, Secretary California Labor and Workforce Development Agency 800 Capitol Mall, Suite 5000 Sacramento, CA 95814 Mr. Wiliiam B. Gould lV, Chairman Agricultural Labor Relations Board 1325 Street, Suite 1900 Sacramento, CA 95814 Ms. Sylvia Torres-Guiil?n, General Counsel Agricultural Labor Relations Board 1325 Street, Suite 1900 Sacramento, CA 95814 Final Report?Agricultural Labor Relations Board Performance Audit The Department of Finance, Office of State Audits and Evaluations, has completed its performance audit of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) for fiscal years 2009-10 through 2013-14. The enclosed report is for your information and use. The Labor and Workforce Development Agency?s (Agency) response to the report observations is incorporated into this final report. Agency agreed with our observations and we appreciate its willingness to work with ALRB to implement corrective actions. The observations in our report are intended to assist management in improving operations. This report will be placed on our website. A detailed Corrective Action Plan (CAP) addressing the observations and recommendations is due within 60 days from receipt of this letter. The CAP should include milestones and target dates to correct all deficiencies. We appreciate the assistance and cooperation of the Agency and ALRB. if you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Susan Botkin, Manager, or Sherry Ma, Supervisor, at (916) 322-2985. Sincerely, Original signed by: Richard R. Sierra, CPA Chief, Office of State Audits and Evaluations Enclosure cc: On following page cc: Mr. Jay Sturges, Associate Secretary, Fiscal Policy, California Labor and Workforce Development Agency Ms. Rivera?Hernandez, Board Member, Agricultural Labor Relations Board Ms. Genevieve Shiroma, Board Member, Agricultural Labor Relations Board Mr. Paul Starkey, Acting Executive Secretary, Agricultural Labor Relations Board AUDIT REPORT Agricultural Labor Relations Board Performance Audit Fiscal Years 2009-10 through 2013-14 Prepared By: Office of State Audits and Evaluations Department of Finance 157300001 October 2014 MEMBERS OF THE TEAM Susan Botkin, CGFM Manager Sherry Ma, CRP Supervisor Ava Bradford Cristine Chan Erick Ramirez Bianca Sandoval Marilyn Santiago Jedediah Thompson Kathleen Wong Final reports are available on our website at You can contact our office at: Department of Finance Office of State Audits and Evaluations 915 Street, Floor Sacramento, CA 95814 (916) 322?2985 TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary .. iv Background, Scope and Methodology .. 1 Results .. 6 Appendix A Organizational Charts .. 15 Appendix Key Documents and Activities .. 20 Response .. 24 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY in accordance with the Department of Finance?s fiscal responsibilities, the Office of State Audits and Evaluations conducted a performance audit of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB). The audit?s purpose was to collect data about processes, to assist in the resource deliberative process and quantify workload needs forfuture years, as requested by the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (Agency) and the Department of Finance?s Forecasting, Labor, and Transportation Unit. Specifically, our objectives were to: 0 Evaluate whether mission and operations comply with the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (Act) and California Code of Regulations, title 8, division 2. 0 Assess how ALRB utilized its resources from fiscal years 2009-10 through 201314. We identified significant weaknesses preventing ALRB from producing reliable workload and financial data. Workload data was incomplete, unavailable, or inaccurate for quantifying current resource utilization, as well as limiting the ability to forecast resource needs. ALRB is responsible for ensuring accurate financial and administrative reporting. Although the roles and responsibilities performed by ALRB appear consistent with the broad purpose of the Act, the following weaknesses impair ALRB from justifying or supporting, with data, its operational decisions on how best to accomplish its program goals: inability to justify effectiveness or efficiency of resource utilization. ineffective organizational structure. Misuse of limited?term blanket authority. inefficient use of state funds. Incomplete and inaccurate accounting records. ALRB must implement and strengthen internal controls related to the above-described weaknesses to produce reliable metrics to assist in managing and forecasting its resources. ALRB must develop a corrective action plan to address the observations and recommendations noted in this report. BACKGROUND, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY BACKGROUND The California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (Agency) and the Department of Finance?s Forecasting, Labor, and Transportation Unit (FLT) requested an audit of the California Agricultural Labor Relations Board?s (ALRB) workload to ensure operations conformed with the Agricultural Labor Relations Act'l (Act) and identify how resources were utilized. Using the results of the audit, the data gathered could potentially assist Agency, FLT, and ALRB in determining future resource needs. Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) The Act was established to ensure peace in the fields of California by guaranteeing justice for all agricultural workers and stability in agricultural labor relations. The Act created ALRB with two principal functions: (1) conducting secret ballot elections to determine whether agricultural employees wish to be represented by a labor organization, and (2) preventing practices that the Act regards as impediments to the exercise of agricultural employee free choice, i.e. unfair labor practices. ALRB is comprised of the Office of the Board and the Of?ce of the General Counsel. Both have distinct roles under the Act and both are essential to ensure implementation and compliance of the Act.2 ALRB is headquartered in Sacramento and has four regional offices: Salinas, Visalia, Oxnard, and El Centro. An Administration unit supports ALRB in conducting its administrative operations. in addition to the Act, ALRB program operations are regulated by the California Code of Regulations, title 8, division 2. ALRB is overseen by Agency. Of?ce of the Board (Board) The Board is headed by five Board Members appointed by the Governor and subject to confirmation by the Senate; however, only three member positions were filled from fiscal years 2009-10 through 201344. The Board is responsible for overseeing and certifying the results of secret ballot elections. Elections, facilitated by employees in the regional offices, determine whether a majority of the employees of an agricultural employer wish to be represented by a labor organization or, if the employees are already represented, to determine whether they wish to continue to be represented by that labor organization, another labor organization, or no labor organization. Because of the seasonal nature of agriculture and the relatively short periods of peak employment, the Act provides for a speedy election process, mandating that elections be held within seven days from the date an election petition is filed, and within 48 hours after a petition has been filed in the case of a strike.3 The Act provides further detail and requirements regarding the conduct of an election. 1 Aiatorre?Zenovicthunlap-Berman Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975, hereafter referred to as the Agricultural Labor Relations Act or Act. Labor Code sections 1140 through 1166.3. 2 See Appendix A organization charts of ALRB, Office of the Board, Office of the General Counsel, and Administration unit. See Appendix for additional descriptions of ALRB?related activities in addition to elections, and references to applicable code sections or regulations. The Board is also responsible for deciding unfair labor practice cases brought before it by the General Counsel. The Board has delegated its authority to hear unfair labor practices to Administrative Law Judges. Administrative Law Judges take evidence and make initial recommendations in the form of written decisions with respect to issues of fact or law raised by invoived parties. Any involved party may appeal the Administrative Law Judge?s findings, conclusions, or recommendations to the Board. For appeals, the Board reviews the record and issues its own decision and order. Parties dissatisfied with the Board?s order may petition for review in the California Courts of Appeal. Attorneys for the Board defend the decisions rendered by the Board" The Act also describes the Board?s responsibilities reiated to contract dispute resolution. The Board may issue orders directing parties, i.e. employers or labor organizations, to mandatory mediation and conciliation of their issues after certain criteria prescribed in the Act are met. Office of the General Counsel The Office of the General Counsel is headed by a General Counsel appointed by the Governor and subject to confirmation by the Senate. The General Counsel supervises and coordinates personnel in regional offices who are responsibie for preventing, investigating, and prosecuting unfair labor practices, which are brought by external parties to ALRB for adjudication. The General Counsel is also responsibie for settling cases where appropriate. A component of preventing unfair labor practices is outreach activities. The General Counsel and her staff participate in outreach events aimed at educating agricultural employees, employers, and labor organizations of the requirements of the Act and the rights of agricultural employees granted by the Act. Administration Unit The Administration unit provides support to the Office of the Board and Office of the General Counsei in the form of accounting, business services, information technology, and human resources. In addition to the Administration unit accounting staff, ALRB receives accounting support through an interagency agreement with the Department of Industrial Relations. Until June 2014, the Administration unit reported to the General Counsel. The Administration unit now reports directly to Agency through an ALRB Acting Chief of Administration. This reporting change was made to address weaknesses identified by Agency. The new reporting structure is intended to be temporary. 4 lbid. SCOPE in accordance with the Department of Finance?s (Finance) fiscal responsibilities, the Office of State Audits and Evaluations conducted a performance audit of ALRB. The audit?s purpose was to collect data about processes, to assist in the resource deliberative process and quantify workload needs for future years, as requested by Agency and FLT. Specifically, our objectives were to: - Evaluate whether mission and operations comply with the Act and California Code of Regulations, title 8, division 2. 0 Assess how ALRB utilized its resources from fiscal years 2009?10 through 2013-14. Our audit was limited to evaluating and analyzing existing information made available to us by ALRB and Agency. We did not evaluate the merit or content of individual unfair iabor practice charges, complaints, or Board Decisions. ALRB management is responsible for ensuring accurate financial and administrative reporting, and compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and administrative requirements. METHODOLOGY To address the audit objectives, we performed the following general procedures: 0 Reviewed the Act, California Code of Regulations, title 8, division 2, and other applicable reg uiations, policies, procedures, and guidelines. 0 Reviewed ALRB website and Board Decisions to gain an understanding of mission and operations. - Conducted research on government entities responsibie for performing iegal?reiated work regarding the structure, monitoring, and forecasting of attorney workloads. Reviewed audit and review reports and other publications significant to the audit objectives. - Performed a risk assessment to define detailed audit procedures. 0 identified opportunities for ALRB to control costs and increase efficiency. Additionally, specific procedures were performed as follows: . . .. .. Evaluate whether interviewed a sample of Board, General Counsei, and mission and Administration staff to gain an understanding of operations comply with mission, operations, and employee roles and responsibilities. the Act arid Caiifomia - Observed tasks performed by employees, such as witness COde 0f interviews, trial preparation, a pre-hearing conference, a title 8: diViSiOn 2. hearing, an outreach event, a Board meeting, compliance verifications, and administrative tasks. 0 Reviewed a sample of ALRB-related documents and work products, including but not limited to, orders and decisions, briefs, complaints, charges, and correSpondence. 0 Reviewed empioyee duty statements and job specifications. is}; "if? Assess how ALRB Reviewed reports from time tracking system (Case utilized its resources Time), case tracking system (Case Management), and internai from 2009-10 through outreach tracking table. 201344. - identified employees who consistently used Case Time to record hours worked on different tasks. 0 Reviewed and analyzed Case Time reports to identify the types of data captured by the system. Evaluated Case Time, Case Management, and outreach reports and data for completeness, accuracy, and usefulness. On a sample basis, verified if case information and milestones were appropriately and accurateiy recorded in Case Management. - Aggregated the number of activities performed by ALRB by type, based on Case Management data. 0 identified the number of blanket and limited term employees employed by ALRB as of June 2014. Verified whether use of blanket authority to hire employees complies with State Administrative Manual, State Personnel Board, and Department of Finance requirements. 0 Evaluated whether staff roles and responsibilities are commensurate with theirjob specifications and duty statements. 0 Analyzed accounting reports to quantify and classify expenditures by type. 0 Reviewed a sample of expenditures to determine if they were supported, accurately recorded, supported mission and operations, and were an efficient use of resources. The accuracy of information obtained during interviews with ALRB staff was confirmed by observation, available documentation, and corroborating interviews with other staff, when possible. information obtained during interviews was evaluated for relevance to the audit objectives, and is incorporated into the Results section. in conducting our audit, we obtained an understanding of internal controls, including any information systems controis, which we considered significant within the context of our audit objectives. We assessed whether those controls were properly designed and implemented. Any deficiencies in internal controi that were identified during our audit and determined to be significant within the context of our audit objectives are included in this report. With regard to information systems controls, we assessed the reiiability of the data from Case Time and Case Management systems, which are used by both the Office of the Board and the Office of the General Counsel, by: (1) obtaining and anaiyzing available system reports, (2) reviewing existing information about the data and the systems from which they were produced, (3) interviewing ALRB employees knowledgeable about the data and the systems, and (4) reviewing existing supporting documentation related to the data sources. We determined that the data in the Case Time system was not sufficiently reliable or complete for the purposes of this report. The impact of this is further detailed in the Results section. in order to gather information to identify trends in workioad data, the audit period inciuded five fiscal years: 2009-10 through 2013-14. expenditures during these fiscal years were also included in the audit scope. However, ALRB was unabie to provide reports needed to evaluate expenditures for a major portion of the audit period. Detailed expenditure reports for 2010-11 and 2013?14 were availabie, while 2009-10 and much of 201 1-12 and 2012-13 were unavailable. The impact of this is further detailed in the Results section. Except as discussed in the following paragraph, we conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted government performance auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, apprOpriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our observations and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our observations and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Finance and ALRB are both part of the State of California?s Executive Branch. As required by various statutes within the California Government Code, Finance performs certain management and accounting functions. Under government auditing standards, performance of these activities creates an organizational impairment with respect to independence. However, Finance has developed and impiemented sufficient safeguards to mitigate the organizational impairment so reliance can be placed on the work performed. RESULTS Significant weaknesses prevent the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) from producing reliable workload and financial data. inability to adequately and completely capture workload and financial data precludes efforts to determine whether existing resources were efficiently and effectively utilized for fiscal years 2009-10 through 2013-14, as well as limiting its ability to forecast its future resource needs. ALRB has broad authority over the implementation of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (Act). As described in the Background section, ALRB is comprised of the Offices of the Board and General Counsel. Both perform various duties supporting the goals of the Act. Our observation of employees and review of documents confirmed assigned roles and responsibilities of ALRB staff appeared consistent with the Act, California Code of Regulations, title 8, division 2, and respective employee duty statements. In performance of these duties, ALRB staff process and produce various documents and perform activities, which are further detailed in Appendix B. Although the roles and responsibilities performed by ALRB appear consistent with the broad purpose of the Act, significant weaknesses exist with internal controls compromising its ability to justify or support, with data, its operational decisions on how to efficiently and effectively accomplish its goals and mission. The inability to justify operational decisions with supporting data could detract from its accomplishments by raising questions about the appropriateness of resource utilization. To improve internal controls and operational monitoring, we provide the following observations and recommendations. The results of our audit are based on our review of available documentation, observations of ALRB operations and employees, interviews with key staff, and other information made available to us. Observation 1: inability to Justify Effectiveness or Efficiency of Resource Utilization Workload data was incomplete, unavailable, or inaccurate for quantifying current resource utilization, as well as limiting the ability to forecast resource needs. ALRB uses two customized information systems to track staff time and manage workload: Case Time and Case Management. Case Time allows employees to record time worked by different categories for specific cases. Case Management is a database containing information on ALRB documents and activities such as case status, Administrative Orders issued, Board Decisions, complaints filed, elections performed, and hearings conducted. The systems should be used in tandem to provide a comprehensive picture to assess workload and resource needs. See Appendix for a list of ALRB documents and definitions of the activities reported. Weaknesses exist with these two systems and their use that prevent ALRB from accurately monitoring employee time spent on tasks and effectively managing workloads, as explained below. Government Code section 13401, subdivision states each state agency must maintain effective systems of internai accounting and administrative control as an integral part of its management practices. Monitoring internal controi systems and processes is vital to facilitating public resources and other decisions by ensuring the availability of accurate and reliable information. With regard to two workload tracking information systems, we observed the following weaknesses: Case Time Data is Unreliable The data within Case Time cannot be reiied on to accurately determine workload in terms of hours or employees, for the following reasons: 0 Lack of participation: 28 of 53 employees1 as of June 2014 did not consistentiy use the Case Time system, inciuding essential employees within ali levels of the organization. Non-participating empioyees were from the Office of the Board, Office of the General Counsei, and the Administration unit. 0 Employees do not always accurately track the hours spent on specific tasks. For example, aithough a Staff Services Analyst worked on a specific case, he would track hours worked as ?Clerical? with no reference to the case number. Several employees? hours were incomplete because some months or weeks went unrecorded in Case Time, which was inconsistent with other documentation indicating they were working during that time. 0 Case Time does not aliow for hours to be recorded to closed cases, although workflow may continue after a case is officially closed. 0 Case Time does not include a sufficient level of detail to allow for management oversight of tasks performed. The availabie categories for employee hours are broad, sometimes lacking sufficient detail indicating what staff worked on, such as ?Other.? These weaknesses prevent ALRB from accurately determining the total hours spent on cases, tasks, and activities. Without fuli participation, the data collected by any workioad time tracking system is not useful to ALRB, and a meaningfui, comprehensive analysis of workload and trends cannot be com pleted. If the data within Case Time was complete and accurate, management could use the information to readiiy manage employee workloads, project future workload demands, justify utilization of current resources, and identify needed increases or decreases in resources. These management tasks cannot be compieted using the current Case Time data. 1 As of June 2014, 53 empioyees worked at ALRB. Three of these employees were borrowed positions from other Labor and Workforce Deveiopment Agency departments. Case Management System Structure is Ineffective The information captured in Case Management is not readily accessible for employees to use when working on ALRB documents and activities. The Case Management system is designed to track case status. lnformation from ALRB documents such as motions, decisions, and investigations are manually input into the system. The system generates reports based on date ranges or regions. The data within Case Management appears to be accurate, but the data?s usefulness in daily operations is limited. The system design and controls only allow one user to access, input, and retrieve information. This responsibility has been assigned to the Acting Chief of Administration (Acting Chief). Because other employees do not have access to the database, they must obtain reports from the Acting Chief. Information input to the system and the production of reports is soleiy dependent on the Acting Chiefs avaiiability. As a result, backlogs in data entry and report generation occur and key person dependency exists. Additionally, the available reports and data fields are pro-defined and cannot be customized for current operational needs due to a iack of inshouse information technology expertise. Because reports must be requested from the Acting Chief, and due to system limitations, employees independently track case information through other methods such as Excel spreadsheets or Word documents, duplicating and expanding on the work performed by the Acting Chief. Further, the Case Management system does not track all operational activities. As an example, the General Counsei?s outreach efforts are soiely tracked in an Excei worksheet. We evaiuated the information within the General Counsei?s outreach worksheet by comparing data to available supporting documentation. We noted 6 of 32 outreach events sampled contained inaccurate information or activities that couid not be supported by source documentation. As a result, reliance could not be placed on the outreach worksheet. A sample of the documents and activities captured in Case Management for the period 2009-10 through 2013-14 are presented in Tabie 1. The average length of time for an activity to conclude is presented in Table 2. Although the information in the tabies is avaiiable in Case Management, absent reliable information regarding staffing and hourly resources needed to work on these milestones, this data alone cannot be used by ALRB or other interested parties to effectively plan, identify trends, and forecast future resource needs. Without accompanying staffing and hourly data, information within Case Management does not provide an accurate depiction of workioad. For example, for 2013?14 in Table 2 below, an average of 3538 days eiapsed from when an unfair labor practice charge was filed to when it was closed; however, the average number of employees or hours needed to close a charge is not captured due to system design. Given the com piexity and the numerous variables associated with working unfair labor practice charges, the hours and number of employees working on each charge varied from day~to?day and/or case-by-case. Therefore, one cannot use the Case Management system to translate average days elapsed into staff days or hours worked. Further, relying on the average days elapsed as a workload metric may lead to inaccurate conciusions because of the potential uniqueness of each charge, as weil as other variables affecting the disposition of a charge that are inconciusive when solely iooking at days elapsed. Table 1: ALRB Documents and Activities Reported in Case Management Fiscal Years 2009-10 through 2013-14 Notices of intent to Take Access 9 Notices of intent to nize 7 Eiection Petitions Filed 6 Unfair Labor Practices Filed Com Issued 19 Heari 2 0 Board Decisions Remedies Com or Closed Mediations 0 Administrative Orders 15 212 24 Total 187 200 Tabie 2: Average Length of Time for an Activity to Conclude per Case Management Fiscal Years 2009-10 through 2013-14 8.3 353.8 182.4 mm11 182.0 122.0 4.0 3.3 282.9 255.6 478.6 0 9.6 8.5 3 640.8 1 177.8 871.0 158.3 7.0 432.3 457.4 4.5 201.9 124.5 7.0 284.8 490.8 2.3 1 105.2 Elections Unfair Labor Practice Charges Com piaints Hearings Remedies Completed or Closed Mediations (ADM 6701;: (D 10 13 See Appendix for definitions of documents and activities. One hearing occurred from June 2011 through September 2011. it is included in the total for both fiscal years when the hearing took place. This was a continuation of a iitigation initiated in 2009-10. These were a continuation of iitigations initiated in 2011-12 and 2012-13. Notices of intent to Take Access, Notices of intent to Organize, Board Decisions, Litigations, and Administrative Orders are not included in this table because a definitive start and end date was not applicabie to the document or activity type or could not be determined by the data in Case Management. Average indicates number of days from election petition filed to election held. Oniy instances where elections were heid are included in the caicuiation, Le. election petitions that were blocked, dismissed, or withdrawn are not included. Average indicates number of days from when an unfair iabor practice charge is filed to ciosed. For the purpose of this analysis, charges are considered closed when they are dismissed, settled, withdrawn, or a complaint is issued. Average indicates number of days from when a compiaint is issued to closed. For the purpose of this analysis, complaints are considered closed when they are dismissed, withdrawn, settled, reieased for compliance, or a decision or order has been issued. Average indicates the number of days a hearing was held. One hearing inciuded days in fiscal years 2010-11 and 2011-12. Most of this hearing occurred in 2011-12; therefore, the total hearing days are included in the average caicuiation for 2011?12. 1 Not appiicabie. Average number of days was not calculated for this activity because there were zero activities of this type reported in Case Management during this fiscal year. Average indicates number of days from when a case entered the remedy phase to when the remedy was completed and ciosed. Average indicates number of days from when a request for mediation was made to when an order or decision was issued. 9 Recommendations: Reevaluate workload tracking information systems by: (1) developing policies and procedures to maximize the usefulness of existing systems, and (2) consider alternative systems to efficiently and effectively track and manage workloads. Workload tracking system design and policies and procedures should be supported by ALRB executive management and: - ldentify and capture the information management and employees need to perform their daily tasks and manage workloads for Case Management or an equivalent system. For example, information captured could include: activity types, activity status and dates, activity location, and assigned resources. 0 Ensure outreach efforts are tracked within the system. 0 Provide access to all staff with appropriate levels of system security. For example, read-only, read-write, or report generating roles. Require full employee participation in the workload time tracking system, including executive management. 0 Ensure accurate recording of employee time by category, task, or specific case regardless of classification. 0 Ensure regular supervisory review of employee time and workload data for accuracy. 0 Ensure timekeeping and workload tracking systems are integrated or reconcilable, i.e. systems should track data at the same level of detail for accurate comparisons and conclusions about ALRB activities. 0 Develop customizable reports for management and employees to use in their daily tasks and to manage workloads. - Develop metrics such as total workload, total resources available, and total unassigned workload or resources for effective annual planning. 0 Establish protocols to periodically review agreed-upon tracking information to ensure relevancy of data. After strengthening workload tracking methods, use the time tracking and workload data captured to improve operations, identify trends in workloads, increase efficiency, and respond to questions from oversight agencies. Observation 2: A More Effective Organizational Structure is Needed Historically, the organizational placement of Administration unit under the Office of the General Counsel was not effective, included internal control weaknesses, and lacked appropriate accountability and responsibility. Labor Code section 1149 states the General Counsel shall have other duties as the Board may prescribe or as may be provided by law. in the past, the Board assigned the duty of overseeing Administration unit to the General Counsel. As described in Observations 3 through 5, this structure fostered an environment that allowed for the performance of administrative actions inconsistent with state regulations. Additionally, the Board did not provide sufficient oversight of administrative activities. Agency recognized weaknesses existed; therefore, effective June 2014, the Administration unit within ALRB began reporting directly to Agency. This reporting structure is a short-term solution, but is not sustainable because it does not require ALRB to be directly accountable for its administrative functions, or for the monitoring and oversight of its administrative operations as required by government code. 10 Government Code section 13402 requires entity management be responsible for the establishment and maintenance of a system of internal accounting and administrative control, and effective, independent, and objective monitoring of the internal accounting and administrative controls within their agencies. Recommendations: ALRB should establish an independent administrative function to support the operations of the Office of the Board and the Office of the General Counsel. The unit chief should have sufficient authority to develop and implement ALRBewide administrative policies and procedures, prevent the override of established controls, and ensure operational consistency. ALRB should exercise adequate oversight of the Administration unit by: Ensuring Administration staff possess the necessary experience and are sufficiently trained and knowledgeable of state administrative laws, rules, and regulations. - Periodically reviewing established policies and procedures to ensure they are functioning as intended. - Consistently monitor operational activities to ensure they are in compliance with the Act, risks are mitigated, assets are safeguarded, and resources are efficiently utilized. Observation 3: Misuse of Limited-Term Blanket Authority The Office of the General Counsel did not justify the need for its seven limited-term, blanket position employees. As of June 2014, ALRB had a total of ten employees hired in blanket positions, which included three retired annuitants and seven limited-term employees. The seven limited?term employees consisted of one Administration unit employee and six General Counsel employees. The hiring documentation for the limited-term employees did not include an analysis orjustification of why a limited-term position was appropriate or necessary in lieu of an authorized, permanent position, as required by State Personnel Board ?Personnel Management Policy and Procedures Manual? section 3317. For 2011?12 through 2013-14,14 ALRB budgeted $10,000 annually for temporary help (or blanket positions); however, actual expenditures incurred for these positions per State Controller?s Of?ce (SCO) reports were $195,797, $221,928, and $293,649, respectively. Although California State Accounting and Reporting System (CALSTARS) and SCO reports can be used as a tool to monitor temporary help expenditures, ALRB continued to exceed its temporary help budget for these years. At the time these limited-term employees were hired, discussions between the General Counsel and Associate Personnel Analyst occurred regarding the need for the appointments, but these discussions were not documented or retained in the hiring files. After we inquired regarding the lack of written documentation, General Counsel staff subsequently provided a memorandum dated September 25, 2014 explaining the justification for the seven positions. Although the memorandum explained the need for the limited-term positions and included past Budget Change Proposals requesting additional permanent positions, the memorandum did not include workload metrics specifically justifying each position, or an analysis of the fiscal impact of each position on current resources. Without such fiscal evaluation, ALRB is unable to ensure accurate budget management as well as monitoring whether appropriations will be exceeded. Government Code section 13324 and Budget Act Control section 32.00 subdivision state 14 State Controller?s Office Blanket Balance Reports listing total blanket position expenditures were not available for 2009-10 and 2010-11. 1 1 that those who incur expenditures in excess of the fiscal year budget are personally liable for the amount of the excess expenditures. State Administrative Manual section 6518 defines blanket positions as authorizations in the Budget Act (Salaries and Wages Supplement) in terms of full-time equivalent personnel years and salaries and wages that may be spent for short-term or intermittent uses. Such uses are characterized as temporary, seasonal, or intermittent, as contrasted with classified positions which are normally used for longer-term, more permanent staffing needs. Without thorough written documentation justifying limited-term appointments, ALRB is unable to substantiate to control agencies such as Finance or State Personnel Board, its need for limited?term appointments in lieu of permanent appointments authorized through the annual Budget Act, or its need for exceeding the amount of temporary help expenditures projected in the annual Budget Act. Recommendations: Follow the requirements for blanket positions prescribed by the State Administrative Manual, the State Personnei Board ?Personnel Management Policy and Procedures Manual,? and Finance Budget Letters, which include documenting a thorough justification for the limited?term appointments and the need for using a limited-term appointment in lieu of a permanent appointment. Strengthen forecasting techniques to better estimate temporary help positions and expenditures in the annual Salaries and Wages Supplement. Observation 4: Inefficient Use of State Funds The El Centro regional office incurred $18,905 in rent expenses from May 2013 through June 2014 for a vacant office, and continues to incur $1,350 per month. in April 2013, this office became vacant when its single employee transferred to the General Counsel headquarters in Sacramento. At the May 2013 Board meeting, the General Counsel stated her desire to relocate the El Centro regional office. Subsequent discussions were held at Board meetings regarding the appropriateness of this office location; however, as of September 2014, a decision had not been reached regarding office closure or relocation, and rent expenses continue to be incurred. Although Labor Code section 1142, subdivision allows the Board to establish offices in other cities as it deems necessary, incurring rent expense on unused office space is not an efficient use of funds. Government Code section 13403, subdivision states internal accounting and administrative controls, if maintained and reinforced through effective monitoring systems and processes, can provide reasonable assurance that assets are safeguarded and operations are efficient. Finance Budget Letter 14-12 states departments must control costs and increase efficiency. Recommendations: Reach an immediate resolution regarding the status of the El Centro regional office. if the decision to close the office is made, provide notice of rental termination and cease rent payments. Regularly assess the appropriateness and cost effectiveness of the physical locations of regional offices to ensure services are provided where most needed. 12 Observation 5: Incomplete and Inaccurate Accounting Records The Administration unit?s processes for recording and maintaining accounting records need improvement. The weaknesses described in the following paragraphs impair ability to accurately evaluate and rely on reported expenditures. Government Code section 13401, subdivision states each state agency must maintain effective systems of internal accounting and administrative control as an integral part of its management practices. Monitoring internal control systems and processes is vital to ensuring the availability of accurate and reliable information. We observed the following weaknesses: Incomplete Accounting Records The Administration unit was unable to provide the CALSTARS transaction detail reports for fiscal years 2009-10 and parts of 201 1?12 and 2012-13. For the years where detailed reports were available, it was also unable to provide supporting documentation for some of the transactions selected for testing. policy is to retain accounting files for the current year plus the four previous years; therefore, records dating from 2010-11 should have been available. ALRB states that records were not available due to its transition of accounting duties to contracted agencies, as well as its relocation of headquarter offices in Sacramento. The incomplete accounting records prevent ALRB from substantiating claims made and prevented us from thoroughly evaluating, categorizing, and verifying expenditures for the entire period of 2009-10 through 2013-14. Administration staff stated the supporting documentation for expenditures, such as claim schedules, may have been available for these time periods. However, without CALSTARS reports to reconcile to, supporting documentation alone was of limited value to categorize, evaluate, and validate expenditures. Errors in Recording Accounting Transactions We identified multiple transactions that were recorded incorrectly in the 2013-14 accounting records, and were not identified or corrected through existing review process. Specifically, we observed: - Salaries for seven temporary employees were recorded as permanent employees, totaling $172,940. a Salaries and benefits totaling $63,140 for a General Counsel headquarter employee were recorded as though the employee worked in the El Centro regional office. Also, operating expenditures totaling $10,366 were recorded for the vacant El Centro office during 2013?14. a A space planning invoice totaling $2,280 was recorded as a postage expense. These incorrectly recorded transactions were a result of staff errors during the Department of industrial Relations? process of recording accounting transactions. These erroneously recorded transactions caused the related expenditure categories to be misstated in official accounting records. Although ALRB contracted with the Department of industrial Relations to perform accounting work during 2013?14, the responsibility of maintaining accurate and reliable accounting records ultimately lies with ALRB management. For example, ALRB should regularly review transactions for accuracy and ensure errors are corrected timely. 13 Recommendations: Follow the existing record retention scheduie to ensure accounting records, reports, and supporting documentation are retained for ALRB management?s use, and for state control agencies. Strengthen controls over recording accounting transactions, including supervisory review and reconciliations. Accounting transactions processed by partner agencies should be regularly reviewed and reconciled to maintain accurate and reliable accounting records. 14 APPENDIX A The following organizational charts present the Agricultural Labor Relations Board?s (ALRB) organizational structure as of June 2014, as provided by the Labor and Workforce Development Agency and Of?ce of the Board, Of?ce of the General Counsel, and Administration unit. ?15 Agricultural Labor Relations Board Overview - June 2014 Governor California Labor and Workforce Development Agency Office of the Of?ce of the 1 General Counsel Board Administration 1 BoaclM . ardM mb Genera, Counsel (2186;?) er Board Member Chairperson Board Member 0 Aet'ng Chief of (Vacant) Administration 1 Beginning in June 2014, the Administration unit temporarily began reporting directly to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency through an ALRB Acting Chief of Administration. 16 Agricultural Labor Relations Board, Of?ce of the Board June 2014 The Board I Chairperson I I Board Member I Senior Board Senior Board Senior Board Counsel Counsel Counsel Board Member (Vacant, Board Member Board Member (Vacant) Attorney lWSpeciai Board eojngey it t. Counsel (EDD2 Borrowed - I - (Rem an 3?93? ecretary Position, Z?year Limited- semor Lega Typ?St Blanket Posrtron) Term) Assocme - - Hearin Of?cer I Heart Of?cer I Governmeth Hearing Of?cer '3 EXECUTWE Heanng Of?cer "g (Retired Annuitant, Borrowed Program Analyst secmtaw (Part Time) Blanket Position) Position} I i Employment Development Department Hearing Of?cer is the job classification used for ALRB Administrative Law Judges 4 California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board 17 Agricultural Labor Relat?ons Board, Of?ce of the General Counsel June 2014 General Counsel Sacramento Headqua rters Of?ce i. Salinas Oxnard Visalia El Centro Regional SubuRegional Regional Sub-Regional Of?ce Of?ce Of?ce Of?ce Attorney IV {Retired Annuitant, Blanket Position} Regional Director . Attorneyr (1 ?year Regional Director senior, Legal (Associate General Asystam Genera; Limited?Term, [Associate General Typi51 Counsel ULP5) Blanket Position) Counsel ULP) (Vacant) Attorney Attorneyr (2-yea Limited-Tenn, Blanket Position} Attorney (1 -year Lim fled-Term, Blanket Position) Legal Secretary Field (Pagl'gf?i?a Examiner ll! Field Field Examiner ill Niamey Examiner I Attorney Field Field Administrative Assistant Governmental Program Analyst (T~year Lim ited? Tem-r, Blanket He'd Attorney He?d w. a Examiner Attorney Attorney Associate Examiner ll a . al Counsel Examiner 99 Position) Examiner Attorney Field Legal Secretary (Vacant) Examiner; Legal Counsel Staff Services He?d Analyst (2?year . LegaiSecretary Limited-Term, 33mm" Blanket Position} 5 tor?m Unfair Labor Practices lnteragency agreement Department of industrial Relations The Attorney and Legal Counsel classi?cations are both responsible for performing professional legal work and investigations, as described in the State Personnel Board job speci?cations, with similar minimum qualifications, knowledge, and abilities. Staff Services Analyst (2?year Limited-Term, Blanket Position) 18 Agricultural Labor Relations Board, Administration Unit June 2014 Acting Chief of Administration Staff Services Manager I, Specialist) Business Services Business Services Of?cer9 (Associate Governmental Program Analyst) Accounting Personnel 7 Information Technology Personnei Accounting Accountant Associate Specialist (2?year Of?cer Trainee Personnel Analyst Limited?Term, Blanket Position) 9 As of June 2014, the Business Services Of?cer became the Acting Chief of Administration. Associate Information Systems Anatyst 19 APPENDIX De?nitions of Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) Key Documents and Activities ?Notice of Intent to Take Access California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 20900 ?The Board will consider the rights of employees under Labor Code section 1152 to include the right of access by union organizers to the premises of an agricultural employer for the purpose of meeting and talking with employees and soliciting their support.? Captured in the Case Management System A labor organization Will ?le this notice when they wish to have access to agricultural employees on an employer?s property. This form must be filed with and accepted by the ALRB or a labor organization cannot enter the private property of an employer. Notice of intent to Organize California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 20910 ?Any labor organization that has filed within the past 30 days a valid notice of intent to take access as provided in section 200900(e) (1) (B) on a designated employer may file with the appropriate regional office of the Board two (2) copies of a written notice of intention to organize the agricultural employees of the same employer.? A labor organization will file this notice to gain access to a current list of agricultural employees. Labor organizations must provide employee cards that have been signed by at least 10 percent of an employer?s active employees. Once the notice is filed, the employer is notified to prepare the list of employees. Signed employee cards are reviewed by ALRB to determine accuracy and then both the labor organization and the employer will be notified of the results of review. Election Petitions Filed Labor Code section ?Upon receipt of a signed petition, as described in subdivision the board shall immediately investigate the petition. if the board has reasonable cause to believe that a bonafide question of representation exists, it shall direct a representation election by secret ballot to be held, upon due notice to all interested parties and within a maximum of seven days of the filing of the petition.? When agricultural employees wish to certify or decertify a labor organization, they will file a petition for an election. The petition must show a majority of the employees desire an election, evidenced by signatures submitted along with the petition. Regional office employees perform elections. in the event of a large election, ALRB has historically received support from other agencies to complete the election within statutory timelines. 1 information obtained from A Handbook on the California Agricultural Labor Relations Law, FY 2009?1 0 ALRB Report to the Legislature, and discussions with ALRB management and staff. 20 mm Unfair Practices Filed 8, section 20201, ?Any person may file a charge that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice.? agricultural employee or labor organization may file an unfair labor practice charge when they believe an unfair labor practice has occurred. Charges are typically filed at regional offices with Office of the General Counsel attorneys or field examiners. Charges are investigated by attorneys and field examiners to determine if there is a reasonable basis for the charge. The charge can be dismissed if there is insufficient evidence to prove that an unfair labor practice has been committed. Complaints issued Labor Code section 1160.2, ?Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the board, or any agent or agency designated by the board for such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect.? if there is sufficient evidence to prove that an unfair labor practice has been committed, a complaint will be issued for the related unfair labor practice charge. The complaint is a legal document which identifies the conduct that is alleged to be an unfair labor practice. Complaints are prepared by Office of the General Counsel staff and served to the involved parties. Complaints may consolidate multiple charges, if appropriate. Hea?ng Repons California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 20260, ?if there is a conflict in the evidence upon which an unfair labor practice is based, an evidentiary hearing shall be held. The hearing shall be public. if there is no conflict in the evidence, the parties may, where appropriate, file with the Board a stipulated set of facts and briefs and request permission to make oral arguments concerning matters of law.? California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 20279, ?The administrative iawjudge shall file a decision with the executive secretary within 30 days of the administrative lawjudge?s receipt of all transcripts or records of the proceedings, exhibits, and briefs from those parties who submit briefs, or within such other period as the executive secretary may direct in extraordinary Complaints are brought by the Office of the General Counsel before Administrative Law Judges in hearings. The Office of the Board Executive Secretary schedules and arranges hearings. Hearings can occur at regional offices or other locations such as hotel conference rooms. Hearings typically involve an Administrative Law Judge, Office of the General Counsel employees, respondents or respondents? attorneys, charging parties, court reporter, translator(s), and witnesses. Administrative Law Judges will hear the case during which both the attorneys for the respondent and charging parties have an opportunity to present their evidence. After the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge receives, reviews, and analyzes the post hearing briefs from all parties. The Administrative Law Judge will then draft and issue his or her decision on the case. 21 3153.55? 'Heanng Repons (con?nued) contain findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the reasons for the conclusions.? circumstances.,The decision shall Board Decisions California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 20286(b), ?Where one or more parties take exception to the decision of the administrative law judge, the Board shall review the applicable law and the evidence and determine whether the factual findings are supported by a preponderance of the evidence taken.? If exceptions are filed on Administrative Law Judges? case decisions, the Board, acting as a reviewing court, reviews the record, deliberates, and renders their decision for that case. Senior Board Counsels aid the Board in developing, researching, and drafting decisions. Board Decisions set precedence for future cases. Litigations Labor Code section 1160.8, ?Any person aggrieved by the final order of the board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeal.? Parties to Board Decisions may file petitions for review in the California Courts of Appeal. Therefore, a portion of the Board?s workload is comprised of writing and filing appellate briefs and appearing for oral argument in appeal cases. Occasionally, the Board is required to defend against challenges to its jurisdiction and other types of collateral actions in both state and federal courts. Senior Board Counsels and Staff Counsel iVs assist in this process. Remedies California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 20279, ?if the administrative law judge finds that an unfair labor practice has been committed, the decision shall contain an order for such affirmative action by the respondent as will effectuate the policies of the Act.? if the Administrative Law Judge?s decision is that an unfair labor practice has been committed, then the decision may include a remedy, or a set of instructions, intended to cure whatever damage may have been caused by the unfair labor practice. The Board may delegate enforcement of these remedies to Office of the General Counsel employees. Examples of remedies may include informing agricultural employees that a violation of their rights occurred or calculating back pay settlements. Remedies may also include other settlements agreed to by involved parties, occurring at various times throughout the complaint process. 22 i. - "tabbe?bde'geaiom 64 ?Upon receipt of a declaration pursuant to subdivision the board shall immediately issue an order directing the parties to mandatory mediation and conciliation of their issues.? in select circumstances where the labor organization and the employer are unable to reach a collective bargaining agreement, mandatory mediation can be provided. The mediator tries to help the parties involved reach an agreement, but if that is not successful, the mediator issues a report that contains the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The Board oversees and facilitates this process. Administrative Orders California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 20287, ?All board decisions published in the format bearing a volume and decision number shall constitute precedent for future cases. Numbered administrative orders shall be precedential only if expressly so designated by the Board.? The Board rules on requests made for appeais of Administrative Law Judge orders granting or denying motions to hearing parties, Executive Secretary decisions, or Mediations. Administrative Orders generally only apply to the parties that are involved and are made in place of Board Decisions for more routine matters. 23 RESPONSE 24 STATE OF Labor 8: Workforce Development Agency common Edmund G. Brown Jr. SECRETARY David Lanier Agricultural Labor Relations Board - California Unemployment insurance Appeals Board California Workforce investment Board Department of industrial Relations Empioyment Development Department - Emptoyment Training Panel Public Employment Relations Board January 16,2015 Mr. Richard Sierra, CPA Chief, Of?ce of State Audits and Evaluations 915 Street Sacramento: CA 95814 Dear Mr. Sierra, Thank you for the Opportunity to respond to the performance audit of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) for fiscal years 2009-40 through 2013?14. The Labor and Workforce Development Agency (Agency) appreciates your effort and that of your staff in conducting this review and compiling the recommendations that provide valuable insight as to how the ALRB can improve its operations and ful?ll its mission. While it is unfortunate that the data collected cannot be immediately used to fully measure and substantiate the current and future workload needs of the ALRB as originally anticipated, we generally agree with the recommendations and will work with the Office of the General Counsel, the Of?ce of the Board, and the Administrative Unit to develop appropriate corrective action plans to address the recommendations in the report. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Jay Sturges, Associate Secretary, at (916) 653-9900. Sincerely. Original signed by David Lanier Secretary, Labor and Workforce Development Agency Enclosure cc: Mr. William B. Gould lV, Chairman, Agricultural Labor Relations Board Mr. Paul Starkey, Acting Executive Secretary, Agricultural Labor Relations Board Ms. Sylvia Torres-Guillen, General Counsel, Agricultural Labor Relations Board Mr. Andre Schoorl, Undersecretary, Labor and Workforce Development Agency Mr. Jay Sturges, Associate Secretary, Labor and Workforce Development Agency 800 Capitol Mall, Suite 5000 MIC 55 - Sacramento, CA 95814 - TEL (916) 653-9900 - no: (916) 653-6913 a fir? {i me i The Labor and Workforce DeveiopmentAgency (Agency) response to the Office of State Audits and Evaiuations Draft Report on the Agricuiturai Labor Relations Board (ALRB) Performance Audit: Observation inability toJ ustify Effectiveness or Efficiency ofResource Utilization Recommendation: Reevaluate workload tracking systems by: (1)deveioping poticies and procedures to maximize the usefulness of existing systems and (2) consider alternative systems to efficientiy track and manage workload. We agree with these recommendations and are considering the most prudent course of ?mpiementation. This includes deveioping procedures to ensure fuli em pioyee participation, appropriate ievelofaccess, accurate reporting, and supervisory review ofthe current workload tracking systems or anyfuture workload tracking systems thatare implemented. improved workload data and integrated time tracking willimprovetheALRB's ability to identify efficiencies, improve operations, identify workload trends, and appropriateiyjustify future resource requests. Observation 2: A More Effective Organizational Structure is Needed Recommendation: The Board Chair should establish an independent administrative function within the unitchiefshould have sufficient authority to deveiop and impiementALRB-wide administrative poiicies and procedures, preventthe override ofestablished controls, and ensure operational consistency. We concurwith these recommendations and are inthe process of'mplementing them. As identified inthe report, the reporting structure forAdm-inistrative Unit was adjusted in June 2014 to ensure administrative actions are performed in accordance with state rules and regulations whiletheALRB estabi'shes policies and procedures to ensure that the unit can function independently. The goal of is to assure compliance with all statutes, regulations, and state administrative procedures. Observation 3: Misuse of Limitemeerm Blanket Authority Recommendation: Follow the requirements for blanket positions prescribed by the State Administrative Manuai, the State Personnel Board, and Department of Finance. Document a thorough justification for iimited-term appointments and the need for using a imited-term appointment. Strengthen forecasting techniques to better estimate temporary help positions and expenditures. We agree with the recommendations related to following processes prescribed by the control agencies and are establishing procedures to ensure the requirements outiined in the State Administrative Manual, the Personnel Management Poiicy and Procedures Manual, and Budget Letters are followed. The ALRB will monitor all expenditures reiated to iimited-tenn blanket empioyees to ensure these expenditures do not result in the department exceeding its appropriation authority. The implementation of the independent administrative function in recommendation 2 will contribute signi?cantly to the ability to successfully implement these recommendations. Observation 4: inef?cient Use of State Funds Recommendation: Reach an immediate resolution regarding the status of the El Centro regional office and regularly assess the appropriateness and cost effectiveness of the physical location of regional of?ces. We agree with the recommendations. Observation 5: incomplete and inaccurate Accounting Records Recommendation: Follow the existing record retention schedule to ensure accounting records, reports, and supporting documentation are retained. Strengthen controls over recording accounting transactions, including supervisory review and reconciliations. We agree with these recommendations and are reviewing the record retention schedule and related policies to ensure appropriate accounting records, reports, and supporting documents are maintained. ALRB is evaluating its existing expenditure review processes and will examine and modify current processes as needed to ensure the integrity of accounting information. The implementation of the independent administrative function in recommendation 2 will contribute signi?cantly to the capacity to implement these recommendations. STATE OF CAUFORNIA EDMUND G. BROWN JR. Governor AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 1325 Street. Suite 1900-8 SACRAMENTO, CA 95814 (916) 653-3711 FAX (916) 653-8750 lntemet: October 30, 2015 VIA PDF EMAIL AND U.S. MAIL Michael Waller Senior Reporter American Media Institute 109 N. Henry Street Alexandria, VA 22314 Re: Notice to Parties of Receipt of Prohibited Communications regarding Gerawan Farming Ina, Gerawan Farming, Ina, Dear Mr. Waller: Prohibited communications are governed by Chapter 7 of the Board regulations (8 Cal. Code Regs, 20740 et seq.).i (Copy enclosed.) This response concerns matters covered by Chapter 7 and is made on behalf of the Of?ce of the Executive Secretary. This letter serves as noti?cation to the parties and shall be made part of the public file, as required by Board rule. (8 Cal. Code Regs, 20750, subd. As provided by that rule, ?Within 10 days after mailing of such copies, any party may file with the executive secretary and serve on all other parties, a statement setting forth facts or contentions to rebut those contained in the prohibited communication.? Chapter 7, concerning Prohibited Communications, as de?ned, addresses unilateral (?ex parte?) communications between the Board and a party that concern ?the disposition of the action while the action is pending before the Board? or, as applicable here, ?a communication [by any person] 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all sections cited refer to Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations. Michael Waller October 30, 2015 Page 2 which may be expected to affect the interest of a party in the case.? The rule further provides ?No person shall solicit another person to make a communication prohibited by these rules. (8 Cal. Code Regs, 20700.) The purpose of the regulation is to protect against unilateral Turning ?rst to your media questions about the administrative law judge decision in Gerawan Farming, Ina, that case is pending before the Board and is therefore sub Turning to your media questions concerning ?Whistleblower in questions 1 and 2, relating to TRO litigation, are the subject matter of the pending case in Gerawan arming, Ina, Questions 3 and 4, relating to the Board?s investigation, also are the subject of that pending case. Further, in August of this year, the Board commenced an investigation, which. is pending completion. Accordingly, the Board will not comment. Question 5 concerns matters within the purview of the Governor?s Of?ce. See enclosed print out. Question 6 concerns personnel matters, upon which the Board does not comment. Questions 7 and 8 are covered by the response to questions 3 and 4. Question 9 is covered in the response to questions 1 and 2. Question 10 is directed to the General Counsel, not the Board. Question 1] is covered by the re5ponse to questions 3 and 4. For reasons explained above, the Board declines comment. Sincere! PA I. M. Special Board Counsel/Acting Executive Secretary Agricultural Labor Relations Board cc: Counsel of Record Enclosures From: Michael Waller Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2015 11:12 AM To: Gould IV, Cc: Shiroma, Genevieve?ALRB; chernandez?alrb.ca.gov; Starkey, Blanco, Lanier, David@Labor; Barbosa, J. Antonio@ALRB Subject: Whistleblower in ALRB media questions Dear Chairman Gould: This correspondence is a followup media query for an on-the record response concerning a whistleblower inside the ALRB general counsel's office, who alleged last May that ALRB attorneys used misleading and fabricated statements to receive you and the other board members into taking legal action against Gerawan Farming. Because my questions are detailed, i would like to spell them out for you, so that the ALRB may address them as comprehensively as possible. According to a May 12 memorandum from Samantha Cooper to Mr. Barbosa, the ALRB employee alerted the Board that it would be receiving a packet for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Gerawan, and that that packet contained deceptive information to deceive the board into approving the THO. Ms. Cooper stated in the memorandum that ALRB attorneys wrote what she called "false statements, inaccuracies and vague informations" in order to dupe the Board. Nevertheless, the Board proceeded to approve the TRO despite receiving the warning. The Court denied the TRO on June 10. Meanwhile, key individuals suddenly "resigned" from the ALRB general counsel?s office: General Counsel Sylvia Torres?Guillen, Salinas Regional Director Algeria de la Cruz, and Visalia Regional Director Silas Shawver. No explanation for these sudden departures was given. in addition to an official general comment about the whistleblower and the circumstances of the sudden, unexplained high-profile departures from the ALRB General Counsel?s office, i would like to ask the Board the following questions for the record: 1) Why did the Board ignore the whistleblower and approve the general counsel's request for a 2) Did the Board attempt to inform the Court that it had reason to believe that ALRB general counsel attorneys provided false information in order to secure Board approval of the 3) What internal investigation did the Board conduct about the falsification of information from the General Counsel's office to the Board? 4) What wrongdoing did the Board uncover? 5) Did Governor Brown remove Ms. Torres-Guilien as general counsel because ofthat wrongdoing? 5) Did Ms. Alegria de la Cruz and Mr. Shawver resign because of that wrongdoing? 7) Does the Board have probable cause to believe that any laws were broken? If so, which laws might have been broken? if not, why not? Has has the Board requested an independent outside criminal investigation to remove all doubt? if not, why not? 8) Even if no laws were broken, do you believe that Ms. Torres~Guiilen, Ms. de la Cruz, and Mr. Shawver acted ethically as members ofthe bar? 9) Has the ALRB made any amends to Gerawan for seeking the falsely procured 10) Whydoes the ALRB General Counsel?s office continue to employ at ieast one attorney with a documented record as a biased union activist, who was part ofthe disgraced faction that was removed over the summer? 11) What is the Board you doing to investigate and punish any past or continued wrongdoing? Thank you for your attention. i may be reached either by email at the above address, or by mobile phone at 202-258-5229. Sincerely, Michael Waller Michael Waller I Senior Reporter American Media institute N. St. Alexandria. VA 22314 Of?ce: 703?8373724440 x109 Cell: 2020585229 From: Michaei Waller Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2015 12:07 PM To: Gould IV, William Cc: chernandez?airb.ca.gov; Starkey, Blanco, David?Labor; Barbosa, J. Antonio@ALRB; Shirorna, Genevieve@ALRB; Rivera-Hemandez, Subject: Judge Sobie on lack of independence of ALRB general counsel Dear Chairman Gould: This is another media question for your or the ALRB's on-the~record comment. As before, since the information is rather complicated, l'd like to spell out my specific questions so that you may answer them with as much detail as you choose. In his September 17 ruling recommending to the ALRB that the Gerawan workers? 2013 ballots not be counted, ALRB Administrative Law Judge Soble made a comment that the ALRB General Counsel's office was improperly colluding with the UFW attomeys during the hearing process. Judge Soble?s comment appears to confirm the ALRB whistleblower?s warning in May that the (biased) ALRB general counsel attorneys provided false and misleading information to dupe you and the rest of the Board into approving a TRO against Gerawan. The ALRB judge?s comment also appears to confirm what an independent state judge told ALRB attorney Silas Shawver last year, that the ALRB appeared to be "in cahoots" with the UFW. I would like your personal comments, or the institutional comments, concerning what Judge Soble stated about his observations about the ALRB attorneys' inappropriate collusion with the union lawyers during the hearings on the Gerawan case: a "The record should make clear,? Mr. Soble said, "should the General Counsel and UFW attempt to characterize their litigation strategy as completely independent, that portrayal would be inaccurate.? - "Throughout the hearing,? Mr. Soble said, regional attorneys and UFW counsel would often pass post?it notes back and forth to one another. Regional attorneys and UFW counsel would also sometimes huddle during short breaks in the testimony.? - Mr. Soble said that such cooperation is not always improper, but that this case, it compromised the "independent" litigation strategy. My questions to you are: 1) What is your official comment about Judge Soble?s observation that the ALRB general counsel?s office tainted the ALRB's "independent" litigation strategy?? 2) What steps have you taken to ensure that the ALRB conducts itself in an impartial manner as required by law, and that it does not lend itself to the impression of being biased? 3) Since it is against state law for the ALRB to be colluding improperly with employers or unions, what has the ALRB done to ensure that the wrongdoers in the general counsel?s office are officially investigated and if there is probable cause lawfully accused, and criminally prosecuted? 4) A pattern of bias and misconduct has emerged in the Gerawan case: 1. in 2013, the Board overruled the general counsel lawyers who had sought to prevent a decerti?catiOn vote and ordered the vote to proceed; 2. the vote proceeded, but under the supervision of the same ALRB lawyers who had been trying to prevent the vote; a 3. those same ALRB lawyers then prevented the ballots from being counted, accusing the employer of wrongdoing; 4. the Board had to issue a ruling that forbids the General Counsel?s office from seeking injunctions without prior board approval; 5. in 2014 an independent statejudge said that he found the same ALRB lawyers to be "in cahoots'I with the union against Gerawan; 6. in 2015 a whistleblower from within ALRB came forward and indicated that those same ALRB lawyers were now lying to the Board to deceive the board into approving their TRO request against Gerawan; 7. in the summer of 2015, some of the most prominent ALRB lawyers pushing this case suddenly resigned; 8. in his September 17, 2015 ruling to recommend that the Gerawan workers? votes not be counted, Judge Soble conceded that the ALRB lawyers acted improperly and in collusion with the UFW throughout the entire hearing process, and that the ALRB litigation strategy was not independent of the UFW. So, since it has been established that the ALRB acted unethically and perhaps illegally in the Gerawan case, will the ALRB count the Gerawan workers' 2013 ballots anyway? if not, why not? Sincerely, Michael Waller Michael Walter Senior Reporter American Media Institute [09 N. Henry St. Alcxant?rim VA 223 34 Office: 703872-7840 x109 ICC-H: 2012585229 AUTHORITY: Note: Authority cited: Sections 1141, 1142, 1144, 1145, 1146 and 1149, Labor Code. Reference: Part 3.5, Division II (commencing with Section 1140), Labor Code. HISTORY: 1. Repealer of Chapter 6 (Sections 20600-206002, not consecutive) and new Chapter 6 (Section 20600) ?led 10~19~76 as an emergency; effective upon ?ling (Register 76, No. 43). 2. Certi?cate of Compliance ?led l~12~77 (Register 77, No. 3). CHAPTER 7. PROHIBITED COMMUNICATIONS 20700. Prohibited Communications Parties to an action before the Board may not communicate with employees of" the Board about the disposition of the action while the action is pending before the Board. No person, even though not a party, may volunteer a communication which may be expected to affect the interest of a party in a case, whether or not the person acts with the knowledge or consent of a party. No person shall solicit another person to make a communication prohibited by these rules. While an action is pending, there shall be no communications regarding the disposition of the action between Board members or Board counsel. and the investigative hearing examiner or administrative law judge assigned to the matter. AUTHORITY: Note: Authority cited: Section 1144, Labor Code. Reference: Sections 1 142(b), 1145 and 1160.2, Labor Code. HISTORY: 1. Repealer of Chapter 7 (Sections 20700.1?207003, inclusive) and new Chapter 7 (Sections 20700?20760, not consecutive) ?led 10-19?76 as an emergency; effective upon ?ling (Register 76, No. 43). 2. Certi?cate of Compliance ?led 1-12-77 (Register 77, No. 3). 3. Amendment of section and Note ?led 11-1-99; operative 12-1-99 (Register 99, No. 45). 20720. De?nitions Parties. Parties include the participants in elections and the parties of record in an unfair labor practice case, including the general counsel. Board employees. Board employees include, in all actions, members of the Board and their stath and the executive secretary and his or her staff, including investigative hearing examiners and administrative law judges. Action. An action is (1) objections to an election under Labor Code Section (2) post-election challenge ballot proceedings; (3) unfair labor practice proceedings, including injunctive proceedings; (4) a. proceeding under Section 203 82; or a petition under Section 20385. Pending. Actions are pending as follows: (1) any proceeding relating to an election petition is pending from the time the election. petition is ?led until the election is certi?ed and not subject to review via a related unfair practice charge or until the petition is dismissed or withdrawn. or until the election is overturned; (2) an unfair labor practice case is pending from the time the charge is ?led until the time the charge is dismissed without right to further review, the charge is withdran or settled, or the Board makes a ?nal order on a complaint arising from such charge; (3) a proceeding under Section 203 82 is pending from the time the petition is ?led until it is granted or denied by the Board, or it is withdrawn; and (4) a petition under Section 20385 is pending from the time the petition is ?led until the regional director's report becomes final, the petition is withdrawn, or the Board makes a ?nal determination. AUTHORITY: Note: Authority cited: Section 1 144, Labor Code. Reference: Sections 115], 1156.3 and 1160.2, Labor Code. HISTORY: l. Amendinent of subsection and new Note ?led 7a8*99; operative 8~7~99 (Register 99, No. 28). 2. Amendment of subsection repealer of subsection subsection renumbering, and amendment of newly designated subsections ?led 1 1-1- 99; operative 12-1?99 (Register 99, No. 45). 20740. Communications Not Prohibited Prohibited communications under Section 20700 shall not include: Written communications of the type described in section 20700 if copies of them are contemporaneously served by the communicator on all parties to the proceeding in accordance with the provisions of section 20166 and following; Oral communications of the type described in Section 20700 if advance notice of them is given by the communicator to all parties in the proceeding and adequate opportunity is afforded to all parties to be present; Oral or written communications which relate solely to matters which the investigative hearing examiner, regional director, administrative law judge, or member of the Board is authorized by law or Board rules to entertain or dispose of on an ex parte basis; Oral or written requests for information solely with respect to the status of a proceeding; Oral or written communications which all the parties to the proceeding agree, or which the responsible of?cial formally rules, may be made on an ex parte basis; Oral or written communications proposing settlement, or an agreement for diaposition of any or all issues in the proceeding; Oral or written communications which concern matters of general signi?cance to the ?eld of labor management relations or administrative practice and which are not speci?cally related to pending proceedings; or (11) Communications by or with the executive secretary and his or her staff pursuant to the executive secretary's investigation of election objections under Section 20365 of these regulations. AUTHORITY: Note: Authority cited: Section 1144, Labor Code. Reference: Sections 1151, 1156.3 and 1160.2, Labor Code. HISTORY: 1. Change without regulatory effect amending subsection ?led 11-4-91 pursuant to section 100, title 1, California Code of Regulations (Register 92, No. 12). 2. Amendment of subsection and new Note ?led 7v8-99; operative 8-7-99 (Register 99, No. 28). 20750. Receipt of Prohibited Communications; Reporting Requirements Any Board employee of the categories de?ned in Section 20720(b) to whom a prohibited oral communication is attempted to be made shall refuse to listen to the communication, inform the communicator of this rule, and advise him or her that if he or she has anything to say it should be said in writing with copies to the parties. Any such Board employee who receives a written communication which he or she has reason to believe is prohibited by this chapter shall forward such communication to the of?ce of the executive secretary if the proceeding is then pending before the Board or before an administrative law judge, or to the regional director involved if the proceeding is then pending before him or her. If the circumstances in which the prohibited communication was made are not apparent from the communication itself, a statement describing those circumstances shall also be submitted. The executive secretary or the regional director to whom such a communication is forwarded shall then place the communication in the public ?le maintained by the agency and shall serve copies of the communication on all other parties to the proceeding and attorneys of record for the parties. Within 10 days after the mailing of such copies, any party may ?le with the executive secretary or regional director serving the communication, and serve on all other parties, a statement setting forth facts or contentions to rebut those contained in the prohibited communication. Upon appropriate motion to the regional director, or the administrative law judge, or the Board, before whom the proceeding is pending, under circumstances in which such presiding authority shall determine that the dictates of fairness so require, the prohibited communication and response thereto may be made part of the record of the proceeding, and provision made for any further action including reopening of the record, which may be required under the circumstances. No action taken pursuant to this provision shall constitute a waiver of the power of the Board to impose an appropriate penalty under Section 20760. AUTHORITY: Note: Authority cited: Section 1144, Labor Code. Reference: Sections 1151, 1156.3 and 1160.2, Labor Code. HISTORY: 1. Amendment of subsections and and new Note ?led 743-99; operative (Register 99, No. 28). 20760. Penalties and Enforcement Upon notice and hearing, the Board may censure, suspend, or revoke the privilege of practice before the agency of any non-attorney who knowingly and willfully makes or solicits the making of a prohibited communication. However, before the Board institutes formal proceedings under this section, it shall ?rst advise the person or persons concerned in writing that it proposes to take such action and that they may show cause, within a period to be stated in such written advice, but not less than seven days from the date thereof, why it should not take such action. Attorneys who knowingly and will?illy engage in conduct prohibited by this chapter shall be reported to the State Bar for disciplinary action. To the extent permitted by law, the Board may, under appropriate circumstances, deny or limit remedial measures otherwise available under the Act to any party who shall, directly or indirectly, knowingly and will?illy make or solicit the making of a prohibited communication. The Board may censure, or, to the extent permitted by law, suspend, dismiss, or institute proceedings for the dismissal of any Board employee who knowingly and willfully violates the prohibitions and requirements of this chapter. A Board employee, as de?ned in section 20720, subdivision who initiates a communication prohibited by this chapter, in addition to adhering to the reporting requirements of section 20750, shall disqualify himself or herself from participation in the action to which the prohibited communication relates. AUTHORITY: Note: Authority cited: Section 1144, Labor Code. Reference: Sections 1151, 1156.3 and 1160.2, Labor Code. HISTORY: 1. Amendment ?led 12?31?82; effective thirtieth day thereafter (Register 83, No. 2. New subsection and amendment of Note ?led 11-1-99; operative 12-1-99 (Register 99, No. 45). CHAPTER 8. PRACTICE BEFORE THE BOARD 20800. Practice Before the Board Attorneys and other representatives of parties appearing before the Board or engaged in any hearing or proceeding institute pursuant to the Act shall not engage in disruptive or abusive conduct with respect to persons operating under authority delegated by this Board or any hearings convened pursuant to the authority conferred upon this Board. Such conduct during the course of any of?cial proceedings including, but not limited to, pre~election conferences, conduct of elections, and any hearings under the Board's auspices shall be grounds for summary exclusion from the proceeding by the agent of the Board in charge of such proceeding. Aggravated misconduct, when engaged in by a non?attorney representative of a party during the course of any of?cial proceedings including, but not limited to, pie-election conferences, conduct of elections, or any investigations or hearings conducted under the Board?s auspices, shall be grounds for suSpension or disbarment from practice before the Board after due notice is given and a hearing is held. Attorneys who engage in aggravated Page 1 of 2 Amber Alert 1 Save ourWz GOVERNOR BROWN ANNOUNCES APPOINTMENTS LateSt News Govern: 624-201 5 10604 SACRAMENTO - Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. today announced the following appointments. Syivia Torres?Guilien? 49, of Los Angeies, has been appointed special counsel in the Of?ce of the Governor. has served as general counsel at the California Agricultural Labor Relations Gavan? Board since 2011, She served as a deputy federal public defender at the Office of the Federal Pubiic Comma; Defender for the Centrai District of California from 1993 to 2011. Torres~Guillen was a member of the [359.01% State Bar of California Council on Access and Fairness from 2010 to 2013, co?chair of the Hispanic National Bar Association's Latina Commission from 2010 to 2011 and co-president of the Latina Lawyers Bar Association and vice~president of the Mexican American Bar Foundation from 2009 to 2011. She earned a Juris Doctor degree from the University of California, Berkeley School of Law. This Govemt position does not require Senate con?rmation and the compensation is $162,852. Torres?Guillen is a cayifom Democrat, Henry Ortiz, 50! of Studio City. has been appointed to the Caiifornia Science Project Advisory Board. m? Ortiz has been an instructional coordinator of Student integration Services for the Los Angeles Uni?ed Schoot District since 2014. where he served in several positions from 1993 to 2009. including science specialist secondary teacher adviser and teacher. Ortiz was a teacher and chair of the Science Rotten Department at North Hollywood High School from 2011 to 2014 and executive director at NetureBridge, Santa Monica Mountains and Channel islands from 2009 to 2011, He is a member of the Associated Administrators of Los Angeles and the California Environmental Literacy Task Force. Ortiz earned a Master of Education degree in educational administration from California State University, Northridge. This position does not require Senate con?rmation and there is no compensation. Ortiz is not registered to vote. Francis Lau, 60, of San Francisco, has been appointed to the California State Council on Deveiopmental Disabilities. Lau has been a vice president and area manager at First Bank since 2000. He was co~manager and vice president at the Washington Mutual Bank Retail Banking Division from photo 1997 to 2000. a corporate devetopment director and director of finance at Pharmakon international . induc?o Laboratory Ltd. from 1994 to 1995 and a branch manager at Welis Fargo from 1992 to 1994, where he held several positions from 1977 to 1992, including assistant vice president, manager of the Private Banking Department and lending of?cer in the retail banking grouo He is treasurer at the Donaidina Cameron House and a member of the Operation HOPE Advisory Councii and the Habitat for Humanity. Goverm Greater San Francisco Famiiy Selection Committee. Lau earned a Master of Business Administration 10234 degree from the University of San Francisco School of Management. This position does not require Senate con?rmation and the compensation is $100 per diem. Leo is registered without party preference. Ana Ubensmith, 57. of San Diego, has been appointed to the California State Councii on Govern: Developmentai Disabilities. Ubensmith was an attomey in the Law Of?ces of John Corral in 1993 and - Childrer in the Law Of?ces of James McDermott from 1991 to 1993. She was co~director at Parentto Parent of Summit San Diego County from 1989 to 1991 . a mediator at the San Diego Community Mediation Center from Next We 1987 to 1989 and an attorney at the US Environmental Protection Agency from 1985 to 1987. She earned a Juris Doctor degree from the University of Notre Dame Law School. This position does not require Senate con?rmation and the compensation is $100 per diem. Ubensmith is registered without party preference. Govern: Efforts 10/3 0/2015 Gerawan Farming. inc. STATE OF CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL (101321, 2015.5 COP.) 1 am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the County of Sacramento. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within entitled action. My business address is: 1325 Street, Suite 1900-13, Sacramento, California 95814. On October 30, 2015, 1 served the within NOTICE TO PARTIES OF RECEIPT OF PROHIBITED on the parties in said action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Sacramento, California, addressed as follows: U.S. MAIL U.S. MAIL Ronald H. Barsamian Michael P. Maliery Patrick S. Moody General Counsel Barsamian Moody Gerawan arming H41 West Shaw Avenue, Suite 104 7l08 N. Fresno St, Ste. 450 Fresno. CA 93711 Fresno, CA 93720 Mario Martinez HAND DELIVERED Martinez Aguilasocho A Professional Law Corporation Mark Woo~Sam. Acting General Counsel P.O. Box 11208 Jorge Gaitan Bakers?eld, CA 93389?1208 ALRB 1325 .I Street, Suite Sacramento, CA 958M David A. Schwarz U.S. MAIL lrell Manella LLP 1800 Avenue of the Stars. Suite 900 Rafael Marquez Aman Los Ange-lcs, CA 90067-4276 1425 N. 9th Street Fresno, CA 93703 Delia Martinez, Regional Director Susana Naranjo Visalia ALRB Regional Of?ce 1642 West Walnut Avenue Visalia, CA 93277?5348 Executed on October 30, 2015, at Sacramento, California. I certify (or declare), yoder penalty of Perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. j. Leslie Sonia Gerawan Fanning, inc. 2013-RD-003-VES. et a1. STATE OF CALIFORNIA A RAL LABOR RELATION OARD PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL (1013a, 2015.5 COP.) 1 am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the County ofSacramento. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a, party to the within entitled action My business address is: 1325 Street, Suite Sacramento California 95814. On October 30, 2015, I served the within NOTICE TO PARTIES OF RECEIPT OF PROHIBITED COMMUNICATIONS on the parties in said action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Sacramento, California, addressed as follows: U.S. MAIL David. A. Schwarz IRELL LLP 1800 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 900 Los Angeles, CA 90067?4276 Ronald H. Barsamian BARSAMIAN 8: MOODY 1141 West Shaw Avenue: Suite 104 Fresno, CA 9371 1 Mario Martinezfi?homas P. Martinez Aguilasocho A Professional Corporation PO. Box 11208 Bakers?eld CA 93389? 1208 Paul 1. Bauer Tracy Blair WALTER LAW GROUP Professional Corporation 205 E. River Park Circle, Suite 410 Fresno, CA 93720 U.S. MAIL Anthony Raimondo RAIMONDO ASSOCIATES 7080 N. Marks Ave, Suite 1 17 Fresno, CA 9371 Delia Martinez, Acting Regionai Director Visalia ALRB Regional Of?ce 1642 W. Walnut Ave. Visalia, CA 93277-5348 HAND DELIVERED Mark Woo-Sam Acting General Counsel Agricultural .abor Relations Board, 1325 .1 Street, Suite Sacramento? CA 95814 Executed on October 30, 2015, at Sacramento, California I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Leslie Smile 7080 N. Marks Avenue, Suite 117 Fresno, CA 93711 Telephone: 559.432.3000 A IAT 8 Fax: 559.432.2242 v; 0 P. a I 0 apr@raimondoassociates.com i VIA E-MAIL June 4, 2015 Chairman William B, Gould IV Board Member Genevieve A. Shiroma Board Member Rivera?Hernandez c/o Paul Starkey, Esq. Agricultural Labor Relations Board 1325 I. Street, Suite 1900 Sacramento, California 95 8 14?2944 Re: General Counsel/Regional Director Corruption and Bias Dear Honorable Chairman and Members of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board: As you know, this of?ce represents Silvia Lopez, the Petitioner in the Gerawan Decerti?cation matter, and regularly represents parties before the ALRB. We are gravely concerned about the integrity of the agency in light of the disturbing history of unfair conduct by the General Counsel, her subordinate Silas Shawver, and the damage done to the agency?s integrity by their continued employment. Of course, this integrity is further compromised by the deliberate exclusion of the Petitioner?s counsel from the earlier correspondence on these matters by the UFW, an omission repeated by the ALRB. As has been the case for some time now, the voice of the Gerawan workers is repeatedly ignored and silenced. While I admit that I am a late arrival to these new factual allegations, it appears from the recent correspondence that a whistleblower from within the agency has called attention to efforts by the General Counsel and/0r Regional staff to manipulate witness testimony and possibly other evidence to the advantage of the UFW. Mr. Martinez apparently has ?led an unfair labor practice charge suggesting that Gerawan is somehow behind the internal misconduct at the agency, and appears to have inside information about the investigation of these allegations. Meanwhile, there was unrebutted and undisputed testimony by former UFW employees that the UFW actively suborns perjured declarations and feeds misleading and manufactured evidence to the ALRB in the course of agency investigations. Given the high degree of collusion and collaboration between attorneys for the General Counsel and the UP at the hearing, such allegations are disturbing to say the least. What is more disturbing is that all involved ignore the fact that the Region is currently investigating charges filed by Ms. Lopez that the feeding of manufactured ?evidence? to the General Counsel coerces employees in the exercise of their protected rights. It increasingly appears that these ?investigations? are nothing more than the fox guarding the henhouse. Chairman William B. Gould IV, et al. June 8, 2015 Page 2 The ALRB faces a unique challenge that does not confront the NLRB, the agency upon which the ALRB is modeled. The NLRB is a large, sprawling agency that handles matters involving thousands of local unions and thousands of employers. This scope prevents the agency from becoming beholden to any particular interest, and naturally protects against bias in favor of any particular union or any particular employer. But the ALRB is different. The ALRB is a small agency, headquartered in Sacramento with only two Regional of?ces. The case load of the Regions and the Board itself are largely dominated by a single union the UF W. From the published decision just in the last few years, it is clear that the viability of the agency and the job security of the Regional staff and General Counsel attorneys depends entirely upon the vitality and activity of the UF W. In 2015, three of the four published decisions have been cases involving the UFW. in 2014, 10 of 12 published decisions involved the UP W. In 2013, 18 of 21 published decisions involved the UFW. In 2012, all 12 published decisions involved the UP W. The General Counsel herself has boasted in a self-serving pat on her own back that the 5 budget has doubled during the last three and one half years, a period that coincides with an increase in UP activity surrounding the efforts to revive abandoned certi?cations at the expense of workers? right to self-determination. (Exhibit A) The General Counsel has hired an army of young attorneys to carry out their mission, and their continued employment depends upon a caseload that justi?es their presence. The agency depends upon the UFW for that caseload, and thus must guard itself against a natural inclination toward bias. Of course, any effort to avoid the appearance of bias has long been discarded by Mr. Shawver and Ms. Torres-Guillen. The disturbing recent history of the General Counsel and the Regional staff is well known to those of us who practice before the Board. After Ms. Torres- Guillen?s appointment as General Counsel, she conducted a purge at the Regional level to eliminate all staff who might oppose her agenda, and in particular, made sure to discharge staff who would not fall in line with her mission to protect and promote the UFW. In conducting this purge, she wiped clean the institutional memory and expertise of the agency, replacing experienced personnel with labor relations novices. It certainly appears that some of those left behind are not willing to jump on board with Ms. Tonestuillen?s mission to support the UFW at the expense of workplace democracy. Perhaps her most signi?cant hire was Silas Shawver, who admitted under oath that less than 10% of his experience as an attorney was in in labor relations prior to his hire at the ALRB. Despite his almost total lack of experience in a technical and Specialized area of practice, Mr. Shawver inexplicably rocketed to the top, ?nding a home in the Regional Director?s chair while simultaneously acting as an attorney for the General Counsel. Of course, we now know that Mr. Shawver?s greatest quali?cation was his ability to serve as a quisling for the UFW, and protect the union?s interests from the chair. He has unlawfully prevented workers from voting, and has carried out his of?ce as an advocate for the UFW, not an objective government of?cial. The Region conducts investigations that examine only evidence that supports their pre-forrned conclusions rather than investigating to ?nd the truth. He accepts evidence from the UP without question, while presuming that contradictory evidence is unreliable. He has ignored the UFW pattern and practice, con?rmed in the recent Gerawan Chairman William B. Gould IV, et al. June 8, 2015 Page 3 decerti?cation hearing, of pressuring witnesses to provide perjured testimony to support UF allegations. Most disturbing, we now apparently bhave allegations from a whistleblower in the agency that Shawver and his UFW acolytes have been intimidating witnesses themselves to secure testimony favorable to the General Counsel?s position. The Board itself had to intervene to stop Shawver?s unlawful blocking of elections, and now it should intervene to stop his unlawful manipulation of investigations. Shawver fails to carry out his duties in an impartial manner, and cannot avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Recently, photographs from his lickr account were published showing the Regional Director jumping up and down in a UFW t?shirt. Fresno County Superior Court Judge Jeffrey Hamilton has questioned Shawver?s veracity after he lied to the court, observed that the Region appeared to be ?in cahoots? with the UP W, and that Shawver appeared to be doing everything he could to deny the workers the right to vote. When ?ling her petition, Silvia Lapez faced hours of interrogation by Shawver as he attempted to confum his belief that she was supported by the employer. Most damning, worker after worker appeared at the Gerawan hearing to testify under oath that they saw Shawver as a person who was interfering with their protected rights, a person who was abusing them who could not be trusted. Hundreds of workers have protested holding signs asking why Shawver is denying them their rights. After the public exposure of his personal bias in the Gerawan decerti?cation matter, there is simply no way that any worker who opposes decerti?cation could ever feel comfortable approaching Shawver or the Visalia Region to exercise their rights. The workers know that Shawver?s of?ce is barred to them. At the hearing, the workers gave him a clear no?con?dence vote, a vote that needs to be heard in Sacramento. What workers would trust him now? Sadly, Shawver?s response to his indictment by the Gerawan workers is to refuse to investigate or prosecute charges ?led by employees who are harassed or abused by the union. Our of?ce has ?led a number of charges on behalf of Gerawan employees who have been harassed or intimidated by the UF for their participation in the decerti?cation, but not one of these charges has been litigated at a hearing. These investigations are conducted at lightning speed, in some cases without even interviewing the charging party, and are dismissed because of lack of credibility or some other specious pretext. In contrast, charges against employers (particularly those that are important to the UFW) are aggressively investigated for extended periods of time with the purpose of ?nding evidence to prove guilt, not to discover the truth. In most cases, the General Counsel presumes that pro?union workers are telling the truth. At Gerawan, she presumes that workers are lying because they oppose the union that she treasures. The truth is that Ms. Torres~Guillen and Mr. Shawver have sent the message to farm workers in the San Joaquin Valley that if they oppose the UF W, they are on their own. The ALRB will not protect the rights of workers who oppose the union; the agency exists for the UFW and the UFW alone. There is nothing remotely resembling the appearance of unbiased law enforcement in the of?ce of the General Counsel and the Visalia Region. They investigate only to reaf?rm their predetermined conclusions, and blindly accept manufactured evidence from the union without question,?while simultaneously doubting the integrity of actual farm workers who ?le charges. It is not possible for Shawver or any other member of his staff to investigate these matters as he and they are hopelessly intertwined in a tangled net of their own creation. Indeed, the General Counsel Chairman William B. Gould IV, et June 8, 2015 Page 4 has effected a sea change in the investigation and prosecution of unfair labor practices; she no longer asks employers to submit a statement of position as she has no interest in what anyone but the UFW have to say. Mr. Shawver has publicly identi?ed his role as that of a law enforcement of?cer. He would be well served to consider the ethical obligations of such an officer: The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest. . . is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very de?nite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suf?zr. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. (Berger v. United States (1935) 295. U.S. 78, 88) ALJ Soble must be involved in this matter, as it is the only way to avoid the waste of the resources invested by all parties in the hearing. ALJ Soble made a critical error that undermines con?dence in the hearing process; he denied Petitioner her right to examine the relationships and collusion between the Visalia Region and the UFW. Petitioner was handicapped at the hearing by her inability to attack the credibility of the investigation by exploring the degree of collusion between the UP and the General Counsel, and the prowUFW bias that runs rampant in the Region. The agency must act to restore its credibility, credibility that cannot exist when those who are bound to be impartial are loudly and publicly identi?ed as supporters of the only union that uses the agency. The General Counsel and her minion Shawver have publicly identi?ed themselves as supporters of the UFW, and have con?rmed this support with their conduct. We reSpectfully request that the Board call for the resignations of Ms. Torres?Guillen and Mr. Shawver to restore worker con?dence in an agency that appears to have abandoned them, just like the UP abandoned a generation of workers who trusted the union with their votes. If this agency is to succeed in its mission, it must have the trust of the farm workers whose rights it is bound to protect. Very truly yours, Antho Raimondo A ssociates Enclosure 21115 menu COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT By DEPT. 502 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF FRESNO UNLIMITED CIVIL DIVISION, B.F. SISK COURTHOUSE AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Petitioner, V. GERAWAN FARMING, Respondent. base No. ORDER DENYING EX RARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Petitioner, Agricultural Labor Relations Board of the State of California (?petitioner? or applies ex parte for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and order to show cause re: preliminary injunction, accusing respondent, Gerawan Farming, Inc. (?Gerawan? or ?respondent?) of violating section 1153(a) of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act by engaging in unfair labor practices that are interfering with, restraining, and coercing agricultural employees? right to self? organization, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection. Specifically, petitioner claims respondent retaliated against and unlawfully suspended and then terminated its employee, Rafael Marquez Amaro, for engaging in protected union activity and testifying at an ALRB hearing. Petitioner seeks the reinstatement of Mr. Marquez and other relief. Respondent opposes all of petitioner?s requested relief. Respondent argues no urgency exists justifying the issuance of a TRO, citing the approximately one month delay which has already occurred since the General Counsel sought and obtained permission from petitioner to file an enforcement petition and seek a TRO. Reapondent also argues the General Counsel?s investigation was badly tainted based on the allegations of a whistleblower concerning the veracity of the declarations submitted to the ALRB in support of the charges and that the ALRB has impermissibly injected itself into the matter by providing advice to Mr. Marquez. Finally, respondent argues its termination of Mr. Marquez was proper because he repeatedly violated company policy and his termination was in no way related to his past or present union activities. The standard to be applied by the court in evaluating petitioner?s application is set forth in Agric. Labor Relations Tex~Cal Land Mpmt., Inc. (1985) 165 Cal. App. 3d 429. There, the court states: 1 Section 1160.4 is similar to section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and section 3541.3, subdivision of the Educational Employment Relations Act (HERA) (Citations.) Cases construing one of these sections provide applicable guidance in construing the others. (Citation.) The.Mbdesto City Schools Dist. caSe provides a recent statement of this court's view of the EERA section that is equally applicable to the ALRA. ?Before injunctive relief may be granted on the request of either the NLRB or ALRB, the trial court must determine that there exists reasonable cause to believe an unfair labor practice has been committed and that the relief sought is just and proper. (Citations.) Naturally, the court retains discretion to issue any order that is ?just and proper' under the circumstances and is not bound by the recommendation of the NLRB or the ALRB. we believe that traditional equitable considerations would certainly come into play during this part of the test (italics in original}. (Citation.) ?In construing whether there is reasonable cause to believe an unfair labor practice has been committed within the meaning of the NLRA and the ALBA, it has been stated that PERB is required to sustain a minimal burden of proof: 'It need not establish an unfair labor practice.has in fact been committed (Citation), nor is the court to determine the merits of the case (Citation.) Rather, the reasonable cause 'aspect of the twonpronged test is met if the ALRB's theory is neither insubstantial nor frivolous. (Citation.) I (Agric. Labor Relations Bd. v. Temeal Land Mpmt., Inc., supra, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 438?39.) ?Traditional equitable standards" are properlf considered in a section 1160.4 action, but the traditional idea of irreparable harm or harm.for which there is no adequate legal remedy is met when the employer?s practices may frustrate the purpose of the ALRA. (Id. at 440.) In support of its application, petitioner submits the declaration of Mr. Marquez himself and its Assistant General Counsel, Ms. Naranjo. Only Mr. Marquez has personal knowledge of the circumstances related to his termination- In opposition, respondent submits the declarations of a number of Mr. Marquez; co-workers, all of whom paint a decidedly different picture of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Marquez' termination. While Mr. Marquez describes his union activities and, in relatively benign terms, requests for breaks and ?whistling,? and surmises that his termination was caused not by his ?whistling? but rather by his union activities, his co~workers describe the actual and pervasive disruption to the work environment caused by Mr. Marquez' whistling. On this record, given the deficiencies in the investigation conducted by the ALRB, the apparent embroilment of the staff in the investigation and its involvement in the termination of Mr. Marquez, and the strong evidence disputing petitioner?s claim that Mr. Marquez was terminated for his union activities; the court concludes that petitioner has not shown reasonable cause to believe an unfair labor practice has been committed by petitioner. Moreover, given the strong evidence regarding Mr. Marquez' disruptive activities in the workplace, the court also finds that petitioner has not shown that the relief requested is just and proper. Accordingly, petitioner?s application for a temporary restraining order and order to show cause re: preliminary injunction is denied. Wm db?dld S. Black Judge of the Superior Court Dated: 69 -5- l? \x SUPERIOR COURT OF COUNTY OF FRESNO Civil Unlimited Department, Central Division 1 130 Street Fresno, California 93724-0002 (559)451-1900 mu OF CASE: Agricultural Labor Relations Board of the State of California vs Gerawan Farming, lrrc. s_.1 For: comer use ONLY CERTIFICATE OF MAILING CASE NUMBER: 15CEC601718 i certify that i am not a party to this cause and that a true copy of the Order Denying Exporte ApplicationFor Temporary was piaced in a sealed envelope and: Deposited with the United States Postal Service, mailed ?rst class, postage fully prepaid, addressed as shown below. Placed for collection and mailing on the date and at the place shown below following our ordinary business practice. lam readily familiar with this court's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing. it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United 3 tes Postal Service with postage fully prepaid. Place of mailing: Fresno. California 93724-0002 on: Date: June it. 2015 Clerk, by N. Wireless ?7 Torres-Guillen ot the Attorney General 1325 J. Street. Ste. 1900A Sacramento, Ca. 95814 David Schwarz 1800 Ave of the Stars, Ste 900 Los Angeles, Ca. 5?0067 El Clerk's Certi?cate of Mailing Additional Address Page Attached TM ROE-06 CERTIFICATE or MAILING . Deputy JL JL JL . IRELL MANELLA A LM WEEHIP IWHG WOW WHOM 54c: NEWPORT DRIVE. sum: not: TELEPHONE 277-10?) NEWPORT BEACH. CA 52660?6324 IBOD AVENUE or THE STARS. SUITE 900 TELEPHONE ?949: 73043991 {aim aoaqmg tone: 73045200 LOS ANGELES, 90057-4276 June 8, 2015 VIA EMAIL AND FACSMILE J. Antonio Barbosa Agricultural Labor Relations Board 1325 J. Street, Suite 1900 Sacramento, California 95814-2944 Re: Gerawarz arming, Inc./ Our letter of June 5, 2015 to ALJ Soble Dear Mn Barbosa: We respond to Mr. Martinez?s email of Friday, June 5, 2015, at 12:03 pm, in which he objects to any attempt to communicate with the ALJ regarding the subject matter of our letter to ALJ Soble of the same day. We are not aware of any regulation or rule which would permit one party to instruct the Executive Secretary to withhold communications to the ALJ in an election proceeding. Nor have we seen any letter from the UFW offering any basis to block our letter to ALJ Soble, though one was supposed to have been sent by Friday afternoon. As we advised Soble in our letter of Friday, June 5, 2015, Gerawan Farming (?Gerawan?) received on June 4, 2015 an un?led unfair labor practice charge, submitted to the ALRB by the UF W. This charge alleges that ?Gerawan Farming?s counsel and certain ?eld examiners in the ALRB Visalia Regional Of?ce have interfered with investigations and the proper performance of ALRB duties through the following: certain ?eld examiners in Visalia?s ALRB Regional Of?ce providing con?dential information concerning investigations into unfair labor practice charges against Gerawan to Gerawan?s counsel, and through Gerawan?s counsel requesting and receiving such information.? The ULP charge was signed under penalty of perjury by a UF paralegal, David Rodriguez. Our letter of Friday referenced the following facts: During the hearing, the General Counsel obtained, and then attempted to use, a recording of a privileged conversation between Gerawan and its counsel. The General Counsel then provided this recording to counsel for the UP W. The UF sought to use this recording to disqualify counsel for Gerawan. ALJ Soble summarily denied this motion. ALJ Soble made the following ?ndings. First, after the General Counsel obtained the recording, it provided the privileged portion of the recording to the UP W. 11/5/14 Tr. at 3435438.! 02 IRELL MANELLA LLP J. Antonio Barbosa June 8, 2015 Page 2 95:24-9613. Second, the General Counsel ?knew not only . . . that the company was asserting that it was privileged information, but that it was something that Soble] was not going to immediately rule on.? Id., at 96:4-6. Third, that ?during the [hearing] break [the General Counsel] then provided that information to the Id, at 96:8-9. ALJ Soble concluded that it was inappropriate for the General Counsel to have provided what he deemed the privileged excerpt of the recording to the UFW: don?t believe that the General Counsel should have done that. And while the UFW makes the argument that they relied upon the General Counsel?s analysis of that, I also have my doubts with respect to that.? Tr. at 96:10-13. He faulted both the UFW and the General Counsel for having ?looked at things that are attorney/client privilege.? 1d,, at 96:16-4 7. Soble held that the privileged portion of the recording could not be used; believe it is inappropriate for the ALRB or the UFW to keep or disseminate those materials for any purpose, not just for the purpose of this hearing.? TL, at 97:9?11 (emphasis added). Judge Soble tentatively denied Gerawan?s motion to disqualify counsel for the ALRB and the UP W, subject to the following condition: [M]y ruling is going to be that so long as the General Counsel?s attorneys and the UFW counsel?s attorneys return all copies of both oral and transcribed of the portion that is attorney/client privileged . . . by no later than [the following] morning, at 8:10 am, that I?m not going to disqualify them from the remainder of the case, which I believe I have the authority to do both under general case law, and under my powers as an ALJ under Regulation 20262. I ?m not going to take any action with respect to this matter so long as all of those materials are returned by that time. Iwill consider a violation of this order something that, both under case law or under my ability to exclude anyone from the hearing, under the Board?s own regulations, as a potential basis to do so. Tr., at 9712298: 23. The ALRB counsel, Ms. Hurtado, understood the scope of order, and his injunction on any use of the privileged information. Claiming that the order ?impair[ed] our ability to continue to investigate? this matter, she argued that the Board ?need[ed] to use this information . . . in order to conduct our internal investigations into the matter and to proceed appropriately.? Tn, at 9920400120. ALJ Soble responded, noting that if the General Counsel determined that it would disregard his order and use the privileged information, probably shouldn?t even wait until [tomorrow] to decide to disqualify your entire of?ce.? 161., at 102:6-10. 34364381 02 MANELLA LLP I WEBSTEREJ LIMITED WW 13mm INCLUDIM MOW CORPORATIONS J. Antonio Barbosa June 8, 2015 Page 3 Neither the General Counsel nor the UFW appealed ALJ Soble?s ruling. Notwithstanding ALJ Soble?s clear directive, it appears that the UFW and Mr. Martinez repeatedly violated it. We renew our request that our June 5, 2015 letter be forwarded to ALI Soble, if that has not already occurred. We also request that this letter be provided to ALJ Soble, together with Mr. Martinez?s email of last Friday. While we understand that the Board may review his orders, this is in the ?rst instance a matter for the ALJ to review, so as to make the necessary ?ndings of fact and conclusions of law. We do not believe that a party may unilaterally instruct the Executive Secretary to bar such communications with the ALJ, or to interfere with his obligations under case law and Board regulations to insure compliance with his orders. ReSpectfully submitted, David A. Schwarz cc: Sylvia Torres-Guinea, Esq. Silas Shawvcr, Esq. Mario Martinez, Esq. Anthony Raimondo, Esq. Paul Bauer, Esq. Ronald H. Barsamian, Esq. 3436433.} 01 MANELLA LLP A ?cm LIABW LAW WHIP 3W Pnoresstmuw canvoannuns 54c: NEWPORT center: carve. sutTE ?09 H300 AVENUE OF THE STARS. SUITE 900 NEWPORT BEACH.CA cacao-sass TELEPHONE (31m 2774 0'0 ran-ass: L05 ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90087-4276 {3?03 2037,99 ?cashlle (?given-neon WEBSITE: DIRECT I Aha-1:4: hielwau?u?mem June 18, 2015 VIA E-MAIL AND FACSIMILE Paul Starkey Special Board Counsel Agricultural Labor Relations Board 1325 Street, Suite 1900-B Sacramento, CA 95814 pstarkey@alrb.ca.gov Re: Germvan Farming, Inc. v. ALRB, Case No. 34401530002100 Dear Mr. Starkey: This letter is in response to your email from Tuesday afternoon, in which you asked ?in view of the TRO outcome,? whether Gerawan is willing to withdraw its PRA demand, "and save the ?ght for another day.? The outcome to which you refer is the Superior Court's denial of the TRO and OSC re: Preliminary Injunction that the ALRB sought. Gerawan will not withdraw its PRA demand. In light of that outcome, Gerawan asks the Board to reconsider its refusal to produce the documents Gerawan requested pursuant to its PRA request. I also renew our request that you respond to my letter of June 11, 2015, where I provided to you the reasons why the Board?s claimed exceptions under the PRA are not defensible. There are many reasons why Gerawan will continue to press its PRA request. These are also the reasons why the Board should no longer ?ght the request. If the pleadings ?led by the ALRB in Superior Court are identical in substance to the TRO packet, there can be no basis to refuse to produce of these documents. If that?s the case, the Board already produced these in court. Why would the Board waste taxpayer dollars contesting uncontestable matters, or force Gerawan to expend additional resources? If, on the other hand, the documents submitted to the Superior Court differ from the TRO packet submitted to the Board, Gerawan is entitled to ascertain why documents submitted to the Board for its review and authorization were altered. We expect that the Board would like to know more about why what was ?led was different from that submitted to the Board. As explained in my letter of last week, Gerawan is entitled to know these facts. No claim of privilege can support withholding this information. 34?l946 MANELLA LLP REGISTIHED LIMITED LIABILITY mamas Human?. mw??ms Paul Starkey June 18, 2015 Page 2 The Court?s denial of the Board?s request for a TRO highlights why the Board cannot, and should not, withhold these documents. Judge Black speci?cally commented on the whistleblower allegations, and the claim that the Board?s investigation was tainted. Gerawan raised these issues in its opposition papers. The General Counsel did not. The Court also commented on the ?apparent embroilment of the sta? in the investigation, and its involvement in the termination of Mr. Marquez.? We do not know whether these facts were brought to the Board's attention before it gave the General Counsel conditional authorization to ?le the enforcement petition. We think it?s important for the public to see; 1) what documents the whistleblower was blowing the whistle on; (2) whether the General Counsel told the Board about the General Counsel?s involvement in circumstances leading to the termination at issue; (3) the conditions prescribed by the Board when it authorized the ?ling of the petition; and (4) the General Counsel?s e??ort to investigate its own investigation. We doubt the whole story was disclosed to the Board, including the possibility that Silas Shawver inadvertently or intentionally orchestrated the events leading to the termination. The absence of that disclosure to the Board would be of grave concern. It certainly was of concern to the Superior Court. An attorney owes a duty of candor to its client, the court, and to opposing counsel. That obligation is esPecially important where attorneys represent an agency of the state, and are invoking its prosecutorial powers. The General Counsel may have failed to meet this duty in its submission to the Board. The General Counsel certainly failed to advise the Court of the fact that a staff member accused the General Counsel of submitting a false declaration. These charges are of the utmost gravity, as they raise a serious question as to whether the General Counsel misled Gerawan, the Board and the Superior Court, not only as to the underlying allegations, but whether its ?reinvestigation? of its investigation avoided, omitted, or covered up facts that undermined the Board?s theory of the case and its basis to seek relief. It is inexplicable as to why the General Counsel did not disclose the whistleblower issue to the Superior Court. As you have not told us whether the TRO packet is identical, or substantially identical, to the documents ?led in Court, we must assume that the TRO packet differs from the documents provided to us, to the Superior Court, and to the Board. The Board relied on the General Counsel?s representations of facts, as well as sworn testimony, when it authorized the filing of this action. Certainly the ?conditional? authorization it grew the General Counsel related to what the Board was given. The General Counsel averred vaguely that it met the Board?s conditions to ?le the petition, but does not explain what those conditions entail, or what the General Counsel did to meet them. By making these representations to the Court, the General Counsel (and hence the Board), not only waived any claim of privilege, but put at issue the integrity of its investigation, as well as the factual basis for the claim that the General Counsel was ?confident in the result in the reasonable cause determination that was made by the general counsel at that time and at this time . . . 344 946 MANELLA LLP AREGSTERED LIMITED LIABILITY LAW WDNAL Paul Starkey June 18, 2015 Page 3 We would not be here if there were considerable inconsistencies, if there were factual inaccuracies in the declarations that we put forth, signed under penalty of perjury." (Tr. In my June 5, 2015 letter to Chairman Gould and the members of the Board, and in our opposition to the TRO, Gerawan noted more than a systematic failure on the part of the General Counsel to conduct a thorough and balanced investigation. The General Counsel engaged in questionable interviewing conduct as to at least one crew member, in order to validate its theory of the case. When confronted with the sworn declaration of that witness, the General Counsel told the Court that his testimony was ?completely inconsistent" with the interview conducted by the staff. Though asked by the Court, the General Counsel could not provide any declaration ?om that employee. When asked by Gerawan to provide the evidence in support of the representations made in open court, the General Counsel refused. Did the General Counsel advise the Board, as it claimed in open court, that this witness corroborated the General Counsel?s allegations? Given that the employee has certainly been identi?ed and has given testimony via his declaration submitted by Gerawan, and farther identi?ed by the counter-representations made by De La Cruz, any declaration the employee provided to the General Counsel should have been provided to the Board, as part of the TRO packet. It should also be provided to Gerawan in advance of any administrative hearing since the employee?s identity is now known. If this employee, or any other previously identi?ed employee, told the General Counsel that Mr. Marquez engaged in insubordinate conduct for which he was suspended, such information should have been disclosed to the Board when it sought authorization to ?le the TRO. It would have to be provided to Gerawan, under section 20236(d) of the Board?s regulations, upon written request after the ?ling of an administrative complaint. But the General Counsel has not ?led an administrative complaint. This is more than a telling sign that there is no claim to prosecute. It is a troubling indication that this o?ice seeks to skirt its disclosure obligations to Gerawan and the Board in order to avoid revealing any evidence other than the self-serving declarations of the complainant, Mr. Marquez, and the staff attorney who conducted an allegedly tainted investigation. At the same time, Ms. De La Cruz claimed 100 percent certainty that Mr. Marquez was suspended, and later ?red, for engaging in protected activities. But for the ?ling of an administrative complaint, the General Counsel has attempted to prosecute its case against Gerawan in Superior Court, while refusing to reveal to the Court or Gerawan the evidence in support of its representations. At this point, there is ample cause to believe that the General Counsel obtained the Board?s authorization to file the TRO through a selective or misleading pro?'er of ?evidence? to support the allegations in the petition, or - worse n? the use of false testimony. When the General Counsel asked to invoke the Board?s power to commence this proceeding, Chairman Gould and its members well understood that the only reason for the 344 I 946 MANELLA LLP A REGISTERED LMED UAHLITY LAW MRTNERSHIP MOW mm Paul Starkey June 18, 2015 Page 4 much of this point in Superior Court. It argued that the delay in adjudicating administrative actions would forfeit important rights, and undermine the Board?s ability to enjoin conduct that would chill protected activities. The General Counsel claimed that a TRO was necessary to vindicate the Board?s statutory purpose, and to insure that any adjudication by the Board would not be a ?itile act. The General Counsel had a month to ?le an administrative complaint, someth'mg it could have done well in advance of seeking the TRO. No action has been ?led with the Board, and it is likely one will never be ?led. Given the General Counsel's absolute certainty that a violation of the Act occurred, we must conclude that the only reason the General Counsel has not ?led an action before the Board is to avoid the General Counsel?s disclosure obligations under the Board?s regulations, and to continue to conceal exculpatory evidence or the extent to which that o?ice selectively presented allegations in the TRO packet, including through di??ering versions of declarations, or drafts of declarations. The Board should have reason to be concerned that its statutory authority has been misused, in its name, by the General Counsel. It should be equally concerned that it has no immediate or readily available means to police such misconduct in an administrative proceedings (see, for example, section 20238 of the Board?s regulations), given that none has been ?led. As to the embroilment of the sta?? in the investigation, and its involvement in the termination of Mr. Marquez wwe do not know whether these facts were disclosed to the Board. The Court deemed these facts important. It is not unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Shawver?s actions were part of an attempt to orchestrate the termination of Mr. Marquez, and thus give both reason and urgency to the 1R0. The conduct of the General Counsel calls into question the integrity of its entire operation, and raises legitimate concerns that, in its quest to obtain a TRO, the General Counsel not only conducted a sham investigation, but hid material facts that would reveal a calculated effort to set up a charge against Gerawan. This is not the ?rst time that Gerawan has raised concerns regarding the General Counsel?s selective presentation of evidence, or its refusal to produce evidence of an exculpatory nature. During the hearing before ALJ Soble, that o?ice sought repeatedly to quash the subpoena compelling the testimony of Mr. Shawver, as to his actions to remediate any ?taint? associated with the alleged involvement of Gerawan crew bosses in the decerti?cation petition drive. As the Board well knows, the fact of Mr. Shawver?s supervision of company-wide noticing at Gerawan, and his direct involvement in training every one of Gerawan?s supervisors, was not mentioned in his letter dismissing the employees? decerti?cation petition. When the Board reversed his dismissal, it speci?cally commented on Mr. Shawver?s failure to discuss the remedial impact of the General Counsel?s efforts to ?cure? the taint - though access and noticing was deemed essential to any effort to assure a free and fair election, as Mr. Shawver represented to the Superior Court in August 2013. 34439-16 IRELL MANELLA LLP ?sameness LAW PROFESSWL comm Paul Starkey June 18, 2015 Page 5 Yet again. the General Counsel failed to provide any declaration from Mr. Shawver concerning his embroilment in this matter. He certainly could have given testimony when the Genera] Counsel appeared before Judge Black, as he was in the court room. Gerawan proffered sworn declarations as to his admission that, by injecting himself into this investigation, and advising Mr. Marquez to return to work, he may have precipitated-his termination. Mr. Martinez went further, essentially blaming Mr. Shawver?s ?direction? to Mr. Marquez as the event which led to his ?ring. The purpose of the Public Records Act is to vindicate the public?s fundamental right of access to information that enables them to monitor the functioning of their government. US. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Com. for Heedom of Press (1989) 489 U.S. 749; Inc. Block (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646; Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325. This right is part of our state constitution. It exists so that the people of this state may understand the conduct of public of?cers, and shine a light on the abuses or misuses of powers granted to these of?cials. The pendency of the enforcement petition is, obviously, relevant to Gerawan?s PRA request. Gerawan was forced to expend considerable resources, and a great deal of time during its busiest season, to oppose the Board?s meritless application for relief. The de?ciencies of the investigation were revealed in open court; still undiscovered is the extent to which the General Counsel suborned perjury, mislead the Board and the Court, and whitewashed or fabricated evidence. But Gerawan, no less than any other citizen of this state, is entitled to the information it seeks from the Board, whether or not it has been on the receiving end of enforcement actions by the General Counsel. Gerawan has ample reason to believe that there has been prosecutorial misconduct. It has serious doubts that the merits of the TRO application were fairly presented to the Board. It should be obvious from the Superior Court?s questions and order that it shares these concerns. We believe that Chairman Gould also shares these concerns. In his March 6, 2015 memorandum to Ms. Torres-Guillen, he made it clear that the Board ?must be forever vigilant about speaking for the Agency with one voice whenever there is contact with the judiciary. . . . In no arena is this more vital than that of temporary injunctive relief.? This was said in the context of eXplaining why the Board deemed it necessary to withdraw its delegation of plenary authority" to the General Counsel to ?le enforcement petitions. That decision was based on the Board?s conclusion that the General Counsel had taken positions in another TRO proceeding against Gerawan that ?do not comport with settled law and are not only erroneous, but even prejudicial to this Board?s role as the primary interpreter of the rights and responsibilities under the The General Counsel?s conduct in this matter does not reveal vigilance in speaking with one voice on behalf of the ALRB. It suggests that the General Counsel misused the 3441946 IRELL MANELLA LLF It REGISTERED LIMITED LIABLITY LAW INCLUDNB PROM-AL Paul Starkey June 18, 2015 Page 6 Board?s authority to pursue frivolous claims against Gerawan, and that it may have misled the Board when it sought its authorization to ?le this petition. These actions cause lasting damage to the credibility of an agency charged with protecting worker rights. The Board has every reason to be concerned that its standing before the judiciary has been ?nther diminished by the conduct of the General Counsel, in this and in prior, failed applications for inj unetive relief. Farm workers and the public have even greater reason to doubt the ability of the Board to ?ll?ll its mission. These concerns go to the heart of Gerawan?s PRA request. Given the importance of these issues, Gerawan intends to seek expedited review of its petition, now ?led in Sacramento Superior Court. It is our hope that the Board will reconsider its position, and produce the documents requested. We ask that you take up this request with the Board, so that it may weigh whatever bene?ts it attributes to maintaining the secrecy of these documents against its presumptive duty to open government and its obligations of candor to the Court and opposing parties. If the Board intends to continue to resist production of the documents requested, we ask that you provide to us the basis for its position, by way of a response to this letter, and my letter of June 11, no later than by close of business on Monday, June 22, 2015. As to a brie?ng schedule: I am mindful of your vacation plans, and I am con?dent that we can come up with a schedule that would have this matter fully briefed no later than mid? to late?July. If the Board stands on its objections, Gerawan proposes that it shall ?le its opening brief seven business days after the Board advises us of its position. We are agreeable to give the Board ten business days to respond, with ?ve business days for Gerawan to ?le its reply brief. We trust that the Board will not oppose this schedule, and will join in our request fer an expedited hearing. Let me know if that is not the ease. Sincerely, (patriotan David A. Schwarz DAS 3-1439?: Filed 5/14/15 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GERAWAN FARMING, IN C., Petitioner, v. AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent; UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA, Real Party in Interest. GERAWAN FARMING, IN 0., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Defendant and Respondent; UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. F068526 (39 ALRB No. 17) F068676 (Super. Ct. No. 13CECG01408) OPINION ORIGINAL PROCEEDIN petition for writ of review. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Donald S. Black, Judge. Irell Manella, David A. Schwarz; Georgeson, Belardinelli and Noyes, C. Russell Georgeson; Barsamian Moody and Ronald H. Barsamian for Petitioner, Plaintiff and Appellant. NFIB Small Business Legal Center, Luke A. Wake; Benbrook Law Group, Bradley A. Benbrook, Stephen M. Duvernay; Walter Wilhelm Law Group, Paul J. Bauer; McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte Carruth, Anthony Raimondo; California Farm Federation, Carl G. Borden; Ventura County Agricultural Association, Robert P. Roy; Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, John C. Eastman, Anthony T. Caso; Western Growers Association and Jason B. Resnick for Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner, Plaintiff and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Douglas J. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Mark R. Beckington and Benjamin M. Glickman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent. Mario Martinez, Edgar Aguilasocho; Altshuler Berzon, Scott A. Kronland and Jonathan Weissglass for Real Party in Interest and Respondent. ?00000- Agricultural employer Gerawan Farming, Inc. (Gerawan) and United arm Workers of America (UFW) have never reached mutually acceptable terms to enter a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) regarding Gerawan?s agricultural employees. UFW was certi?ed as the employees? bargaining representative in 1992, but after engaging in initial discussions with Gerawan, disappeared from the scene for nearly two decades. In late 2012, UFW returned and both parties renewed negotiations. A few months later, at request, the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (the Board) ordered the parties to a statutory ?Mandatory Mediation and Conciliation? (MMC) process pursuant to Labor Code section 1164 et seq.1 Under the MMC process, if a 30-day mediation period does not succeed in producing a CBA by voluntary agreement, the mediator decides what the terms of the CBA should be and reports that determination to the Board. Once the mediator?s report becomes the ?nal order of the Board, the report 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all ?irther statutory references are to the Labor Code. establishes the terms of an imposed CBA to which the parties are bound. (See 1164, 1164.3.) Here, following the Board?s ?nal order adOpting the mediator?s report, Gerawan petitioned this court for review under section 1164.5, challenging the validity of the order and the MMC process on both statutory and constitutional grounds.2 Among Gerawan?s claims is the contention that absence resulted in an abandonment of its status as the employee?s bargaining representative. We agree with Gerawan?s statutory argument that it should have been given an opportunity to prove abandonment to the Board once UFW requested the MMC process. More fundamentally, we agree with Gerawan?s constitutional arguments that the MMC statute violates equal protection principles and constitutes an improper delegation of legislative authority. Accordingly, the Board?s order, Gerawan Farming, Inc. (2013) 39 ALRB No. 17, is set aside. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Gerawan Farming Gerawan is a family owned farming business that has been in Operation since 1938. Gerawan grows, harvests and packs stone fruit and table grapes on about 12,000 acres of farmland located in Fresno and Madera Counties, employing several thousand direct-hire workers and farm labor contractor employees.3 As was the case in the proceedings below, Gerawan?s petition for review presents a description of its Operations and business model, presumably because of its concern that 2 Gerawan makes many of the same arguments in its related appeal, Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. ALRB, case No. 068676, which we have consolidated herewith for purposes ofthis opinion. The appeal in case No. 068676 is from the superior court?s denial of a petition for writ of mandate by which Gerawan sought to set aside the Board?s order directing the parties to the MMC process. We discuss case No. 068676 herein following our discussion of the issues raised in the petition for review case No. F068526). 3 In a brief ?led with the Board, Gerawan estimated that in 2012 it employed approximately 5,100 direct?hire workers, plus an additional 6,300 farm labor contractor employees. such practices would be impeded by the CBA established under the MMC process. We summarize that description here, not to agree or disagree, but simply to accurately portray Gerawan?s stated perspective. According to Gerawan, since the 1980?s it has placed a major emphasis on quality control and on keeping well-trained, productive employees. To ensure the quality of its produce, it has developed unique interactive methods to maintain quality control at each step of the harvesting and packing process, including an ability to respond to problems in any individual worker?s performance in real time. Allegedly, throughout the process, individual workers are noti?ed of any problems, are given additional training or instruction and, if necessary, receive corrective action. Additionally, Gerawan asserts that to retain good workers it has consistently paid its direct-hire employees substantially more than the average industry wage, with many being compensated on a sliding-scale system (within a targeted per hour range) based on quality and productivity. In Gerawan?s view, these operational features have been and still are central to its ongoing success, but would be hampered or prevented by the imposed CBA.4 Certification in 1992 On July 8, 1992, following a runoff election in 1990, UFW was certi?ed as the exclusive bargaining representative for Gerawan?s agricultural employees. On July 21, 1992, UFW sent a letter to Gerawan requesting negotiations. On August 13, 1992, Gerawan accepted request to begin bargaining and invited UFW to submit any proposals it wished to make. UFW did not send a proposal to Gerawan until 4 The mediator?s report to the Board stated that Gerawan?s position that proposals would result in lower quality or productivity by interfering with GeraWan?s business model) was not adequately substantiated: ?The Company predicts, without any evidentiary support, that there will be a cost in terms of lower productivity, morale, retention, and competitiveness if many of the Union?s proposals are implemented, because this business model will be disrupted.? November 22, 1994. In February 1995, the parties held one introductory negotiating session.5 After that, UFW did not contact Gerawan again until late 2012. UF W?s Reappearance in 2012 and the Renewal of Bargaining On October 12, 2012, UFW sent a letter reasserting its status as the certi?ed bargaining representative for Gerawan?s agricultural employees and demanded that Gerawan engage in negotiations. Gerawan responded by letter dated November 2, 2012, expressing its willingness to bargain in good faith, but also raising a number of questions and concerns based on absence from the scene. An explanation of absence was requested, but UFW refused. Nonetheless, the parties proceeded with negotiations. Between January 17, 2013 and March 29, 2013, the parties held 10 or more bargaining sessions. MM Process Ordered by the Board On March 29, 2013, UFW ?led a declaration with the Board requesting that the Board issue an order referring the parties to the MMC process pursuant to section 1164 et seq. Gerawan ?led an answer objecting to request on the grounds that the requirements of sections 1164 and 1164.11 were not satis?ed and UFW had abandoned its status as the employees? bargaining representative. On April 16, 2013, the Board rejected Gerawan?s arguments and ordered the parties to begin the MMC process. Gerawan ?led a petition for a writ of mandate in the superior court, asking the court to set aside the Board?s order sending the parties to the MMC process. The superior court denied the petition.?5 5 According to Gerawan?s negotiator, the February 1995 session focused on introductions and on de?ciencies in proposal. The session ended with an understanding UF would make a revised proposal and would contact Gerawan about future negations. Neither of these things happened. 6 Gerawan appealed from the superior court?s denial of its petition for writ of mandate. As noted, we have consolidated that separate appeal herewith. A mediator was impaneled in May 2013 and conducted several mediation sessions with the parties. After the voluntary mediation phase of the MMC process was exhausted without any agreement being reached on the terms of a CBA, the mediator conducted on the record hearings in which he received testimony and evidence and made rulings on objections.7 Thereafter, the mediator alone crafted the subject CBA. On September 28, 2013, the mediator submitted his report his determination of the terms) to the Board. The Board Adopts the Mediator ?s Report Gerawan ?led a petition with the Board objecting to the mediator?s report, both generally and as to its particular terms. The Board granted review and remanded the matter back to the mediator as to six issues. After further meetings were held with the parties, the mediator issued a second report to the Board dated November 6, 2013. On November 19, 2013, the Board adopted the mediator?s second report and it became the ?nal order of the Board as set forth in Gerawan Farming, Inc, supra, 39 ALRB No. 17, the legal effect of which was to establish the mediator?s proposed CBA (as reported) as the ?nal order of the Board. (See 1164.3.) The Prior Decertification Election Two weeks beforehand, on November 5, 2013, with the Board?s authorization, Gerawan?s employees held an election to decide whether to decertify UFW as their bargaining representative. The ballots were impounded by the Board and have not yet been counted, pending the Board?s resolution of claims of misconduct relating to the election. Shortly after the employees? votes were cast, Gerawan requested that the Board stay the MMC proceedings until the outcome of the election was known. The Board 7 The mediator excluded Gerawan?s employees from attending the on the record portion of the MMC proceedings. The Board ruled that such exclusion was proper. Gerawan ?led a declaratory relief action in superior court, challenging the exclusion on constitutional grounds. That matter is not part of the present appeal. denied the stay request on November 14,2013, without explanations Thus, it is undisputed that when the Board adopted the mediator?s report on November 19, 2013, and thereby approved the CBA as determined by the mediator, it did so deSpite the intervening decerti?cation election, which may have ousted UFW. Gerawan ?5 Petition for Review On December 16, 2013, Gerawan ?led a petition for review (or more speci?cally, a petition for a writ of review) to this court, seeking our review under section 1164.5 of the Board?s ?nal order in Gerawan Farming, Ina, supra, 39 ALRB No. 17. In its petition, Gerawan contends that the Board?s order was invalid on various statutory and constitutional grounds. The statutory grounds focus on Gerawan?s claims that the criteria for ordering the parties to the MMC process were not satis?ed, including because UFW allegedly abandoned its status as the employee?s bargaining representative. In its constitutional arguments, Gerawan asserts the MMC process violates guarantees of equal protection and due process, and also constitutes an improper delegation of legislative powers. Furthermore, Gerawan maintains that the right to freedom of contract prevents the State from imposing a CBA by administrative ?at. Upon our consideration of the petition, the parties? brie?ng, and the Board?s certi?ed record, we issued a writ of review and formally noti?ed the parties of our review of Gerawan Farming, Ina, supra, 39 ALRB No. 17, pursuant to section 1164.5. 8 On November 13, 2013, senior UFW of?cials made improper ex parte communications to senior Board counsel on matters that were before the Board in regard to Gerawan and UFW, including the decerti?cation vote and desire to immediately enforce the mediator?s CBA. The ex parte communications were disclosed by the Board to all parties herein by letter dated November 19, 2013. In light of the ex parte communications, Gerawan asked the Board to vacate its ?nal order. We have not been made aware of the Board?s response (if any) to that request. Gerawan does not raise the ex parte communications or the Board?s handling of same as issues herein. DISCUSSION In addressing the contentions raised in Gerawan?s petition for review (case No. 068526), our approach will be to discuss the statutory issues ?rst and the constitutional questions second. Lastly, we will brie?y address the separate appeal ?led by Gerawan (case No. F068676), which has been consolidated herewith. THE STATUTORY ISSUES Inasmuch as we will conclude that the MMC statute unconstitutionally deprives Gerawan of equal protection and unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority, we could con?ne our opinion to a discussion of those issues alone. However, the parties have extensively briefed other issues relating to statutory interpretation and application of the MMC statute. We are not the highest court of review and hence do not presume to have the last word on this subject. We deem it appropriate to address the following statutory issues should they become relevant following a higher court ruling or a future attempt by the Legislature to enact another version of the MMC statute. Additionally, we reach the statutory issues as an alternative basis for our ruling; that is, even if the MMC statute were constitutionally sound, we would still conclude under the statutory arguments that the Board abused its discretion. For the sake of ef?ciency, we place our discussion of the statutory issues ?rst because doing so will provide a thorough overview of the MMC statute how it works and its purpose), which will give helpful background to our consideration of the constitutional issues. I. Overview of the Statutory Framework The Labor Code provisions creating the MMC process 1164?1 164.13; the MMC statute) were added in 2002 as a new chapter (ch. 6.5) to the part of the code dealing with agricultural labor relations (div. 2, pt. 3.5), commonly known as the Agricultural Labor Relations Act 1140 et seq.; the ALRA). (See Stats. 2002, ch. 1 145, 2.) Therefore, to understand how the MMC statute ?ts within its larger statutory framework, we begin with a brief description of the ALRA. A. The ALRA In 1975, the California Legislature enacted the ALRA ?to provide for collective- bargaining rights for agricultural employees? 1140.2) by putting into place a system of laws generally patterned after the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 151; the NLRA). (JR. Norton Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Ed. (1979) 26 Cal.3d 1, 8 (JR. Norton see 1148 [in implementing the ALRA, the Board follows applicable precedents of the The ALRA declares it is the policy of the State of California ?to encourage and protect the right of agricultural employees to full freedOm of association, self?organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.? 1140.2.)9 As noted by our Supreme Court, central feature in the promotion of this policy is the procedure for agricultural employees to elect representatives ?for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.? (Id, 1156 et seq)? (JR. Norton Co, supra, at p. 8.) Under that election procedure, if a proper petition has been filed, the Board directs that an election be held by a secret ballot vote of employees to determine an issue of employee representation, such as whether a particular labor organization shall be the employees? bargaining representative.10 1156, 1156.3.) Except in certain runoff elections, every ballot ?shall provide the employee with the opportunity to vote against representation by a labor organization by providing an appropriate Space designated ?No Labor Organizations.? 1156.3, subd. After the election, the Board ?shall certify? the result unless it determines based on a sustained election challenge ?that there are 9 The same employees also have the right ?to refrain from any or all of such activities .. . 1152.) 10 A similar procedure exists by which the agricultural employees may vote to decertify a labor organization, so that it is no longer their representative. 1156.7.) suf?cient grounds to refuse to do so.? (?1156.3, subd. [stating grounds for such refusal].) If a labor organization a union)11 is certi?ed as the winner of such an election and thus becomes the employees? bargaining representative, certain legal consequences follow. First, a statutory bar exists to holding another representation election for at least the initial onemyear certi?cation period. 1155.2, subd. 1156.5, 1156.6.) Second, a duty to bargain is created, which is owed by the employer to the union and vice versa. 1152, 1153, subd. 1154, subd. However, unlike the election bar, the duty to bargain does not expire with the initial one-year period. That is because a union?s status as the employees? certi?ed bargaining representative continues beyond the one-year period for purposes of extending the parties? duty to bargain. (Montebello Rose Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Ed. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 1, 24?26, 29 (Montebello Rose) [af?rming conclusion that a certi?ed union continues to enjoy that status after the initial certi?cation year expires, based in part on NLRB precedent that there is a presumption of continuing majority status]; Growers Assn. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Ed. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 667, 672 (F Growers) [noting ??rebuttable presumption? under ALRA that a union continues to have majority support after initial one-year Consequently, it has been held that once a union is certi?ed as the bargaining representative of an employer?s agricultural employees, the employer?s duty to bargain with that union continues until the union is replaced or decerti?ed through a subsequent election pursuant to sections 11563 or 1156.7. (Montebello Rose, supra, at pp. 23?24, 29 [approving statutory interpretation adOpted by the Board in Kaplan ?s Fruit 11 The terms ?union? and ?labor organization? are used synonymously herein. 12 Although section 1155.2, subdivision refers to an initial one-year period of certi?cation (and allows for a one-year extension thereof), that time limitation has been held to relate only to the election bar, not to the duty?to-bargain aspect of certi?cation. (Montebello Rose, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at pp. 24?30.) 10. Produce Co., Inc. (1977) 3 ALRB No. 28 Adamek Dessert, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Ed. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 970, 983 (Adamek Dessert, Inc); Bruce Church, Inc. (1991) 17 ALRB No. 1, p. 13 [stating principle adhered to by the Board that ?a Union remains the certi?ed representative until decerti?ed?]; Pictsweet Mushroom Farms (2003) 29 ALRB NO. 3, p. 7 In summary, the ALRA recognizes, protects and promotes agricultural employees? right to collective bargaining 1140.2), and in the furtherance of that right the ALRA requires the agricultural employer and the employees? certi?ed representative to bargain collectively in good faith 1153, subd. 1154, subd. The ALRA de?nes the parties? mutual obligation to bargain collectively in good faith as follows: bargain collectively in good faith is the performance of the mutual obligation of the agricultural employer and the representative of the agricultural employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any questions arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.? 1155.2, subd. When an employer or labor organization fails to bargain in good faith as required, or when other unfair labor practices (or as de?ned in the ALRA have occurred, recourse to the Board is provided and the Board is empowered to issue orders or take remedial action to effectuate the purposes of the ALRA. 1160?11609; see, e. Harry Carian Sales 12. Agricultural Labor Relations Ed. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 209, 229--230 [discussing Board?s remedial authority relating to 13 A third consequence of certi?cation is that no CBA may be negotiated or entered into by the employer with any other (not currently certi?ed) labor organization. 1153, subd. The ALRA further declares that only a certi?ed labor organization may be a party to a legally valid CBA. 1159.) 11.. B. The MMC Statute In 2002, the Legislature made the following legislative declaration and ?ndings: need exists for a mediation procedure in order to ensure a more effective collective bargaining process between agricultural employers and agricultural employees, and thereby more fully attain the purposes of the ameliorate the working conditions and economic standing of agricultural employees, create stability in the agricultural labor force, and promote California?s economic well-being by ensuring stability in its most vital industry.? (Stats. 2002, ch. 1145, 1.) To that end, the Legislature enacted the MMC statute in 2002 (Stats. 2002, ch. 1145, 2, as amended by Stats. 2002, ch. 1146, 1), creating a binding interest arbitration procedure (what we have called the MMC process) that may be ordered by the Board as a means to establish the terms of an initial CBA where the parties failed to reach an agreement. (Hess Collection Winery v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1584, 1591, 1597 (Hess).)14 PrOponents of the law asserted that such measures were necessary because, after unions were certi?ed to represent agricultural employees, many employers ?refused to agree to the terms of (Hess, supra, at p. 1593.) The heart of the MMC process is described in section 1164. Pursuant to subdivision of that section, the employer or the certi?ed labor organization may seek to initiate the MMC process by ?ling a declaration with the Board requesting such relief. The declaration must show that the statutory requirements for ordering the parties to the 14 As Hess noted, the MMC process (also called ?interest arbitration?) does not involve ?interpreting an existing agreement to resolve a dispute,? but ?determining what the terms of a new agreement should be.? (Hess, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1597.) Thus, despite the law?s use of the term c?mediator,? the process ?amounts to compulsory interest arbitration.? And, although section 1164 refers to the end result being a ??collective bargaining agreement,? there ?is no agreement,? since the employer in that case (as here) did not agree to be bound by its terms nor to submit the matter to interest arbitration. (Hess, supra, at p. 1597.) Rather, ?[t]he terms of the ?agreement? determined by the arbitrator were imposed upon Hess by force of law.? (Ibid) 12. MMC process have been met, and it may only be ?led after the relevant time period speci?ed in the statute has expired. 1164, subd. see Cal. Code Regs, tit. 8, 20400.) In this regard, the precise wording of section 1164, subdivision is in part as follows: ?An agricultural employer or a labor organization certi?ed as the exclusive bargaining agent of a bargaining unit of agricultural employees may ?le with the board, at any time following (1) 90 days after a renewed demand to bargain by an agricultural employer or labor organization certi?ed prior to January 1, 2003, which meets the conditions speci?ed in Section 1164.1], (2) 90 days after an initial request to bargain by an agricultural employer or labor organization certi?ed after January 1, 2003, a declaration that the parties have failed to reach a and a request that the board issue an order directing the parties to mandatory mediation and conciliation of their issues.? (Italics added.) As the italicized language above states, section 1164.11 sets forth additional conditions that must be satis?ed (as prerequisites to the MMC process) if the certi?cation occurred prior to January 1, 2003. Section 1164.11 states: demand made pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision of Section 1164 may be made only in cases which meet all of the following criteria: the parties have failed to reach agreement for at least one year after the date on which the labor organization made its initial request to bargain, the employer has committed an unfair labor practice, and the parties have not previously had a binding contract between them.? When a declaration pursuant to subdivision of section 1164 is ?led with the Board and shows that the statutory requirements for ordering the MMC process are satis?ed, the Board ?shall immediately issue an order directing the parties to of their issues,?15 whereupon steps are taken to select a mediator. 1164, subd. 15 The Board also considers the answer (if any) ?led by the other party to the collective bargaining relationship. Pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 20401, 13. Upon his or her appointment, the mediator begins a 30-day mediation process seeking to resolve issues by voluntary agreement.16 1164, subd. If that mediation process is deemed exhausted no CBA is reached), then, ?[w]ithin 21 days, the mediator shall ?le a report with the board that resolves all of the issues between the parties and establishes the ?nal terms of a 1164, subd. The mediator?s report to the Board must include ?the basis for the mediator?s determination? and ?shall be supported by the record.? (Ibid) In resolving disputed issues and deciding what the terms should be, the mediator ?may consider those factors commonly considered in similar proceedings, including: (1) The stipulations of the parties. [fl] (2) The ?nancial condition of the employer and its ability to meet the costs of the contract in those instances where the employer claims an inability to meet the union?s wage and bene?t demands. (3) The corresponding wages, bene?ts, and terms and conditions of employment in other covering similar agricultural operations with similar labor requirements. [fl] (4) The corresponding wages, bene?ts, and terms and conditions of employment prevailing in comparable ?rms or industries in geographical areas with similar economic conditions, taking into account the size of the employer, the skills, experience, and training required of the employees, and the dif?culty and nature of the work performed. (5) The average consumer prices for goods and services according to the California Consumer Price Index, and the overall cost of living, in the area where the work is performed.? 1164, subd. Within seven days of the ?ling of the mediator?s report, either party may petition the Board for review of the report. 1164.3, subd. The grounds for such review subdivision the other party is permitted to ?le an answer to the declaration within three days of service of the declaration, identifying any statements in the declaration that are disputed. 16 The mediator may extend the 30-day mediation period for an additional 30 days on agreement of the parties. 1164, subd. 14. are that a provision of the CBA set forth in the mediator?s report is (1) unrelated to wages, hours, or other conditions of employment, (2) based on clearly erroneous ?ndings of material fact, or (3) arbitrary or capricious in light of the mediator?s ?ndings of fact. (Ibid.) If a prima facie case for review is not shown, or if no petition is ?led, the report becomes the ?nal order of the Board. 1164.3, subd. If the Board determines that a prima facie case for review is shown, it may grant review of the report. (Ibid.) If, upon review, the Board ?nds that one or more grounds for review have been established, it will order the mediator to modify the problematic terms of the CBA. (1d, subd. In that case, the mediator meets with the parties again and ?les a second report with the Board. (Ibid.) As before, the parties may petition the Board for review of the second report. subd. If no petition is ?led, the second report takes effect as the ?nal order of the Board. (find) If a petition is ?led but a prima facie showing is not made, the Board ?shall issue an order con?rming the mediator?s report and order it into immediate effect.? (Ibz'd.) If the Board accepts review and ?nds that the second report is defective, it will determine the remaining issues itself and issue a ?nal order. (Ibid.)17 Section 1164.5 provides for judicial review of the Board?s ?nal order. That section states: ?Within 30 days after the order of the board takes effect, a party may petition for a writ of review in the court of appeal or the California Supreme Court.? (Id, subd. Appellate review is limited to the grounds Speci?ed in section 1164.5, but those grounds include, inter alia, a consideration of whether the Board acted in excess of its powers, whether it failed to proceed in the manner required by law, whether the Board?s order or decision ?was an abuse of discretion,? and/or whether the Board?s order 17 The parties also have a right to ?le a petition to set aside the mediator?s report on the ground that the mediator?s report was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means, (2) there was corruption in the mediator, or (3) the rights of the petitioning party were substantially prejudiced by the misconduct of the mediator. If any of these grounds are found to exist, the Board will vacate the report, order the selection of a new mediator, and the mediation process starts over. 1164.3, subd. 15. or decision ?violate[d] any right of the petitioner under? the federal or state constitutions. (lat, subd. II. Standard of Review and Rules of Statutory Construction Having introduced the MMC statute, we next consider the nature of the statutory claims raised in Gerawan?s petition. In a nutshell, Gerawan argues the Board did not follow the law when it ordered the parties to the MMC process because several of the statutory requirements for such an order (set forth in sections 1164 and 1164.11) allegedly were not met. According to Gerawan, the Board adopted erroneous interpretations of the statutory provisions at issue, causing it to incorrectly conclude that the statutory requirements were satis?ed. Additionally, Gerawan asserts the Board improperly rejected its argument that UFW abandoned its status as the employees? bargaining representative and, therefore, lacked standing to invoke the MMC process under section 1164. It is clear that Gerawan?s claims involve questions of law relating to statutory construction. The rules governing statutory construction are well settled. ?We begin with the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. [Citations] To determine legislative intent, we turn ?rst to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citations] When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further.? (Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340 (Nolan).) In that case, ?no court need, or should, go beyond that pure expression of legislative intent. [Citation.]? (Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, 260.) ?If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute?s plain meaning governs.? (Wells v. 0ne20ne Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1190.) However, when the language of the statute ?is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, 16. contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. [Citations.]? (Nolan, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 340.) Using these extrinsic aids, we ??select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.? [Citation.]? (People v. Sirzohui (2002) 28 Cal.4th 205, 212.) Where judicial interpretation is required, courts give deference to an agency?s reasonable interpretation of the statutory enactment that the agency has been entrusted by law to enforce. (Montebello Rose, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 24.) Nevertheless, it is fundamental in statutory construction that courts should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (JR. Norton Co., supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 29.) Thus, while an administrative agency is entitled to deference when interpreting policy in its field of expertise, it cannot alter or amend the statute that it is interpreting, or enlarge or impair its sc0pe. (Ibid.; Adamek Dessert, Ina, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 978.) To the above, we add the following basic precepts regarding a court?s role in the interpretation of statutes. As expressed in Cadiz v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 365, at page 372: ?The guiding principle of interpretation was laid down by the Legislature in Code of Civil Procedure section 1858: ?In the construction of a statute or instrument, the of?ce of the Judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.? That prime rule of construction has been adopted and restated by the cases.? Furthermore, it is not a court?s function to second-guess the policy choices or wisdom of particular legislation: ??Courts do not sit as super?legislatures to determine the wisdom, desirability or propriety of statutes enacted by the Legislature.? [Citations.]? (Ibid) 17. Requirements of Section 1164.11 Gerawan contends that two of the conditions for relief stated in section 1164.11 were not shown by UFW and, therefore, the Board should not have ordered the parties to the MMC process. Under that section, where the union?s certi?cation occurred prior to January 1, 2003, no demand to the Board may be made for referral to the MMC process unless the following criteria are met: the parties have failed to reach agreement for at least one year after the date on which the labor organization made its initial request to bargain, the employer has committed an unfair labor practice, and the parties have not previously had a binding contract between them.? 1164.11; of 1164, subd. Speci?cally, Gerawan argues that the requirements of criteria and of section 1164.11 (hereafter sections 1164.11(a) and were not established based on Gerawan?s proposed interpretations of those provisions. As explained below, we reject Gerawan?s arguments regarding the construction of the statutory language and conclude that the Board followed the clear and unequivocal terms of section 1164.11 when it held that the requirements thereof were met. A. The Parties Failed to Reach Agreement for at Least One Year Section 1164.11(a) states a requirement for seeking the MMC process in cases involving pre?2003 certi?cations that ?the parties have failed to reach agreement for at least one year after the date on which the labor organization made its initial request to bargain.? (Italics added.) In the proceedings before the Board, Gerawan insisted this language meant there had to be good faith and sustained effort?? at negotiation for at least a one-year period. It further argued that since UFW did not make such a showing, the Board was constrained to deny request. The Board disagreed. It explained that section 1164.11(a) does not contain any language requiring proof of one year of sustained and active bargaining, but only that ?the parties failed to reach an agreement for at least one year? after the initial request to bargain, which the Board found to be the case. 18. In its opening brief herein, Gerawan argues the Board erred because the provision should be construed to speci?cally require a showing that the parties ?actively attempt[ed] to bargain for at last one year,? since ?one cannot ?fail? to reach an agreement if one does not try.? We reject Gerawan?s proposed interpretation. The plain language of section 1164.1 1(a) simply requires that 1) the parties have not reached agreement and (2) at least one year has passed since the initial request to bargain. The provision makes no mention of the particular circumstances surrounding the parties? failure to agree. Contrary to Gerawan?s suggestion, nothing in section 1164.11(a) mandates an affirmative showing of active and/or sustained bargaining over a one-year period. ?When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further.? (Nolan, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 340.) Whether or not it would have been wise to include a threshold requirement that before a party may invoke the MMC process, the party must demonstrate there was one year of sustained bargaining, the Legislature did not do so in the particular provision under consideration here. One may argue it should have, but we are constrained by the fact that it did not. That ends the matter, since it is not our function to insert what the Legislature has omitted, nor may we, ?under the guise of construction, rewrite the law or give the words an effect different from the plain and direct import of the terms used.? [Citation.]? (Pauple v. Lea] (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1008.) Although, as Gerawan points out, other provisions of the ALRA obligate the parties to bargain in good faith 1153, subd. 1154, subd. (0), 1155.2, subd. those provisions do not alter the plain meaning of what must be shown under section Even if, based on the general bargaining obligation, the parties should have engaged (or attempted to engage) in active and/or sustained bargaining 18 Of course, if a labor union re?lses to bargain in good faith, including a failure to respond to the employer within a reasonable time or other dilatory or evasive action, the employer can raise the union?s failure in a ULP charge pursuant to section 1154, subdivision (See Dole Fresh Fruit C0. (1996) 22 ALRB No. 4, pp. 22?25.) ?[T]he duty to bargain is not unilateral, neither are the Board?s processes.? (161., p. 23, En. omitted.) 19. during the one-year period speci?ed in section the latter provision does not require that such conduct be affirmatively demonstrated as part of the necessary prima facie showing to request the MMC process.19 In this case, it is not disputed that initial request to bargain was made in 1992. Additionally, UF followed up its request by making a contract proposal to Gerawan in 1994, and one bargaining session occurred between the parties in early 1995. Insofar as the parties have still not reached agreement, the discrete statutory requirement set forth in section 1 164.1 1. was clearly satisfied. Gerawan?s Further Arguments Do Not Persuade Us to Depart From the Plain Meaning of Section 1164.11(a) Having upheld the plain meaning of section 1 we brie?y explain why we have not accepted Gerawan?s arguments that we should depart from the statute?s clear and literal terms. In essence, Gerawan asserts that if the statute were treated as simply a passage-of- time requirement, it would lead to absurd results and contravene the overall legislative purposes of the ALRA and MMC statutes. To avoid that outcome, Gerawan argues that we should construe the provision to include an active or sustained bargaining requirement, even if that is not its plain meaning. (See, e. California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333, 340 [stating rule that a court need not follow the plain meaning of a statute when to do so would frustrate the manifest purpose of the legislation as a whole or lead to absurd results]; DaFonte v. Up?Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601 [stating rule that plain meaning may be disregarded only when that meaning is repugnant to the general purview of the act or for some other compelling 19 Consistent with our conclusion as to the plain meaning of this provision, we observe that each of the conditions set forth in sections 1164 and 1164.11 appear to be matters that are ordinarily capable of being readily and quickly ascertained (rather than debatable factual matters that might have to be litigated), which comports with the Legislature?s apparent wish to create an expedited process, at least in the usual or typical case. 20. reason].) In this regard, it is pointed out that the ALRA (of which the MMC statute is a part) has a purpose to promote good faith bargaining between the employer and the employees? chosen representative so they may potentially reach a mutually acceptable agreement, which purpose is supported by the duty to bargain collectively in good faith (see 1140.2, 1155.2, subd. According to Gerawan, if the Board?s interpretation20 were correct, a union could make an initial request to bargain and then simply wait out the clock or engage in surface bargaining until enough time had passed to demand the MMC process precisely what Gerawan contends happened here). Allegedly, a union in that situation would have no incentive to make voluntary concessions or otherwise engage in serious or genuine efforts to reach an agreement. In short, Gerawan maintains that the Board?s interpretation would lead to absurd results at odds with the legislative purposes by (1) undermining a union?s incentive to bargain in good faith and (2) potentially forcing employers to undergo the MMC process without a sustained period of good faith bargaining for an entire year. While Gerawan?s arguments identify signi?cant concerns as to the potential impacts of section we believe they fall short of showing that we should effectively rewrite the statute by construing it to include a sustained or active bargaining requirement that the Legislature did not put there. (See Unzueta 12. Ocean View School Dist. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1689, 1698 [absurdity exception to plain meaning rule ?should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we Violate the separation of powers principle of Among other things, Gerawan?s analysis of the statutory purposes fails to adequately account for the fact that the ALRA was amended by the MMC statute. The Legislature determined that the ALRA, in its original form, was not adequately fulfilling its purposes. (Stats. 2002, ch. 1145, 1; 20 That is, a literal reading of the statute according to its plain meaning, as we have adopted herein. 21. Hess, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1600.) New measures were deemed necessary because it was perceived that many employers were unwilling to enter into an initial CBA. (Hess, supra, at p. 1593.) Therefore, the MMC statute was enacted as an amendment to the ALRA to create a ?one-time? compulsory process to bring about an initial CBA between parties who have never entered into such an agreement, where certain statutory conditions were met. (Hess, supra, at pp. 1600?1601 [noting the purpose ?to change attitudes toward collective bargaining by compelling the parties to operate for at least one term? with an imposed Among those statutory conditions is the one now before us?mthe passage of the one-year time period described in section In that provision, the Legislature specified that expiration of the one? year time period without a CBA ?the parties have failed to reach agreement for at least one year after? the union?s initial request to bargain) was one of the threshold requirements for seeking a referral to the MMC process in cases involving pre-2003 certi?cations. Evidently, the Legislature believed that if more than one year elapsed without a CBA being reached, that fact reasonably indicated the MMC process was appropriate, assuming that the other requirements were also met. Viewed in light of the entire statutory context, we are unable to conclude that the one?year provision of section when accorded its plain and literal meaning, would substantially frustrate the main purpose of the as amended by the MMC statute, or otherwise lead to'absurd results. In a further effort to support its position on this issue, Gerawan notes that the Board?s own past decisions had, on at least two occasions, expressed an understanding of the relevant statutory provisions that sounded remarkably similar to Gerawan?s position. (See Pietsweet Mushroom Farms, supra, 29 ALRB No. 3, p. 12 [to be sent to MMC process, employer ?must have been through a period of bargaining for a year without having reached a contract?]; D?Arrigo Bros. Co. (2007) 33 ALRB No. 1, p. 7 process may not be invoked unless parties have attempted to negotiate on their own for 22. the statutory However, it appears that such comments were made by the Board in connection with tangential issues, and that once the Board directly considered the present issue of statutory construction, it followed the plain meaning (see, e. Gerawan Farming, Inc. (2013) 39 ALRB No. 5, p. 3). In any event, we are bound to do so here.22 Still, the Board?s earlier comments about the import of the relevant statutory provisions provide some evidence that Gerawan?s proposed construction is not mere wishful thinking on its part. There is cogency and common sense in Gerawan?s argument that active bargaining should precede the MMC process, and it is not unreasonable to suggest that the former should be a prerequisite to commencing the latter. But such argument is more properly presented to the Legislature, whose exclusive function is to enact statutes such as those at issue here. Moreover, if we were to adopt Gerawan?s interpretation, what additional speci?c language would we incorporate into the statute: sustained bargaining, active bargaining, actual bargaining, attempted bargaining? Would we likewise be expected to delineate how much or what quality of bargaining effort would constitute sustained, active, actual, or attempted bargaining? And if there was no bargaining during the one~year period under any definition, would it matter why there was no bargaining, or whose fault, if any, it was for the parties? failure to reach an agreement? These are some of the prickly questions that would be raised if this court, or any court, felt inclined to impose additional substantive requirements beyond those 21 Also, the Governor?s written signing message indicated that the bill?s (the MMC statute?s) provisions would ??Appl[y] to ?rst contracts only,? and as to pre?2003 certi?cations, parties must have attempted to negotiate for one year .. . (Historical and Statutory Notes, 44A West?s Ann. Lab. Code (2011 ed.) foll. 1164, p. 401.) 22 We must ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (1R. Norton supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 29.) Although an administrative agency is entitled to deference when interpreting policy in its ?eld of expertise, it cannot alter or amend the statute that it is interpreting, or enlarge or impair its scope. (Ibid.; Adamek Dessert, Ina, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 978.) 23. speci?ed in the statute before the Board could refer a case to the MMC process. The nature of these quandaries reinforces our concern that, if we went down that path, we would be intruding into the legislative arena. We decline to do so. As was aptly stated by another Court of Appeal: ?[E]xcept in the most extreme cases where legislative intent and the underlying purpose are at odds with the plain language of the statute, an appellate court should exercise judicial restraint, stay its hand, and refrain from rewriting a statute to ?nd an intent not expressed by the Legislature.? (Unzueta v. Ocean View School Dist., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1700.) B. The Employer Committed a ULP Gerawan also challenges the Board?s conclusion that section 1164.11(b) was satis?ed in this case. Section 1164.11(b) states an additional requirement to invoking the MMC process in cases involving pre~2003 certi?cations that ?the employer has committed an unfair labor practice.? (Italics added.) The Board held that this requirement was met as a result of two 1992 cases in which Gerawan was found to have committed ?The cases identi?ed by the UFW in its declaration, Gerawan Ranches (1992) 18 ALRB No. 5 and Gerawan Ranches (1992) 18 ALRB No. 16, which involved multiple committed in connection with the elections that resulted in the certi?cation of the UFW, including a refusal to bargain over unilateral changes made in the post-election, pre-certi?cation period, meet the requirement of . .. section that the employer ?committed an unfair labor practice.?? Gerawan contends the Board erred because the two cases relied upon by the Board allegedly did not come within the sc0pe of this provision. According to Gerawan, the cases did not qualify because the particular conduct constituting the (1) occurred prior to the date of certi?cation and (2) did not involve a ?nding that Gerawan resisted CBA negotiations with UFW after that union was certi?ed. We reject Gerawan?s assertion that section 1164.11(b) is limited solely to postcerti?cation conduct or to special types of in relation to the union. The actual language of the provision is 24. clear and explicit, stating simply that ?the employer has committed an unfair labor practice?; it contains no hint of the additional requirements or limitations urged by Gerawan. As with the requirement contained in section we follow the plain meaning with respect to section ?If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute?s plain meaning governs.? (Wells v. 0ne20ne Learning Foundation, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1190.) We conclude the Board correctly interpreted and applied this provision. IV. Requirements of Section 1164 and the Abandonment Issue Pursuant to section 1164, a union must be ?certi?ed as the exclusive bargaining agent of agricultural employees? to have the right to petition the Board for an order directing the parties to commence the MMC process. 1164, subd. italics added.) In the proceedings below, Gerawan challenged standing as the employees: certi?ed bargaining representative on the ground that such status was forfeited by abandonment based upon nearly two?decade absence. The Board summarily rejected the abandonment claim, relying on its prior holdings on that issue. (Gerawan Farming, Ina, supra, 39 ALRB No. 5, pp. As re?ected in its prior holdings, the Board?s position is that abandonment does not exist unless a union is either unwilling or unable to continue to represent the subject employees. (Bruce Church, Inc, supra, 17 ALRB No. 1, p. 13.) Further, the Board has elaborated in its holdings that a union will only be found unwilling to represent the employees where it has expressly disclaimed or abdicated its status as the employees? bargaining representative, and a union will only be found unable to carry out its responsibilities if it has become defunct as an organization. According to the Board, aside from these narrowly de?ned grounds for abandonment, a union?s status as the employee?s certi?ed bargaining representative continues unabated until that union is replaced or decerti?ed by a subsequent election. (See, e. San Joaquin Tomato Growers, Inc. (2011) 37 ALRB No. 5, pp. 3?4; Pictsweet Mushroom Farms, supra, 29 25. ALRB No. 3, pp. 7, 14; Dole Fresh Fruit Ca, supra, 22 ALRB No. 4, pp. 12-l3; Bruce Church, Inc, supra, p. 13.)23 Additionally, according to the Board?s analysis, ?what may appear to an employer to be abandonment may be overcome by the union?s demonstration that it is in fact able and willing to continue to represent employees.? (Dole Fresh Fruit supra, p. 12; see Pz'ctsweet Mushroom Farms, supra, p. 14,) Since at the precise time that UFW sought to invoke the MMC process it was purportedly able and willing to resume its representation of Gerawan?s employees, any past prolonged absence on the part of UFW would be, under the Board?s View, irrelevant. Gerawan contends the Board reversibly erred in disallowing the abandonment theory in the context of the MMC process. Among other things, Gerawan points out that under well-established case law, after the initial one-year period there is a rebuttable presumption that a union continues to be supported by a majority of employees. Since there is such a presumption, Gerawan asserts it is reasonable to consider whether there are circumstances (such as those present here) in which the presumption may be overcome. Additionally, Gerawan points out that the forfeiture of rights by abandonment is a recognized legal principle that should be given application here as in other cases. As to the employer?s continuing duty to bargain, Gerawan does not dispute that such a duty exists, but notes the MMC process is qualitatively different than consensual bargaining as de?ned in the ALRA (see 1155.2, subd. because, under the MMC process, voluntary negotiations quickly give way to a compulsory procedure that will mandate the imposition of a CBA by administrative edict. For these and other reasons, Gerawan maintains that when a union ?les a request to the Board for an order to commence the MMC process, the employer may defensively challenge the union?s presumed status as the ?labor organization certi?ed as the exclusive bargaining agent of [the] bargaining 23 Thus, the Board?s position on abandonment is sometimes referred to by the parties as an application of the general principle that a union is certified until decerti?ed. 26. unit? 1164, subd. by showing that the union forfeited that status through abandonment. After carefully considering the matter, we believe that Gerawan?s position is largely correct. Without disturbing the well?settled rule that an employer?s duty to bargain is a continuing one, we conclude that abandonment may be raised defensively in response to a union?s demand to invoke the substantial legal measures of the MMC process. Allowing such a challenge would not add to the MMC statute?s express provisions, but would simply permit the employer to negate a statutory element of section 1164?wthat is, the union?s representative status, which is a quali?cation for MMC relief. We now proceed to explain our conclusion. A. Prior Judicial Construction of Statutory Terminology A foundational step in our analysis of this dif?cult issue is to consider prior judicial construction of the statutory concept of a union?s certi?cation status. When the Legislature enacts a statute, it is presumed to have knowledge of the existing judicial decisions construing the statute or related statutes and to have enacted new statutes or amendments in light of those decisions. (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 659; People v. Yartz (2005) 37 Cal.4th 529, 538; Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 890, 900.) Furthermore, where the language of a statute uses terms that have been judicially construed, courts generally presume that the Legislature intended the terms to have the same precise meaning as was placed on them by the courts. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1046.) ?When legislation has been judicially construed and a subsequent statute on a similar subject uses identical or substantially similar language, the usual presumption is that the Legislature intended the same construction, unless a contrary intent clearly appears.? (People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1060.) Here, in light of the particular judicial decisions that have explained and ?eshed out the meaning of a union?s certi?cation status under the ALRA, we do not operate on a 27. blank slate and neither did the Legislature when it enacted the MMC statute in 2002. To the contrary, such prior judicial construction of the ALRA clearly set the stage for the Legislature?s usage of the certi?cation terminology in section 1164, subdivision A key decision construing the meaning and implications of a union?s certi?cation status under the ALRA was Montebello Rose, supra, 119 Ca1.App.3d 1. In that case, the issue to be determined on appeal was ?whether an employer?s duty to bargain with the certi?ed employee representative continues beyond the initial certi?cation year absent an extension of the certi?cation period as provided in section 1155.2, subdivision .. . (Id. at p. 6.)24 The employer had argued that it could not have violated the duty to bargain in good faith with the union because the union?s certi?cation period had lapsed; that is, the one-year period of certi?cation speci?ed under section 1155.2, subdivision had expired and no extension had been granted under that section. (Montebello Rose, supra, at pp. 23?24.) We disagreed with the employer?s argument and concluded that, for the reasons set forth in the Board?s decision in Kaplan supra, 3 ALRB No. 28, an employer?s duty to bargain continues beyond the initial certi?cation year. (Montebello Rose, supra, at pp. 29?30.) Our conclusion in the Montebello Rose case was based on two principal grounds. The ?rst was that analogous NLRA precedent had held that after the initial certi?cation year expired, there was a rebuttable presumption that a certi?ed union continued to enjoy majority support. (Montebello Rose, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 24.) Since no section of the ALRA negated this rule, the presumption of a union?s continuing majority status was held applicable to the ALRA. (Montebello Rose, supra, at p. 24; see 1148 [the 24 Section 1155.2, subdivision provides: ?Upon the ?ling by any person of a petition not earlier than the 90th day nor later than the 60th day preceding the expiration of the 12?month period following initial certi?cation, the board shall determine whether an employer has bargained in good faith with the currently certi?ed labor organization. If the board ?nds that the employer has not bargained in good faith, it may extend the certi?cation for up to one additional year, effective immediately upon the expiration of the previous 12-month period following initial certi?cation.? 28. Board must follow ?applicable? precedents of the On this point, we agreed with the Board?s analysis in Kaplan ?s that after the one-year period expired, certi?cation lapsed for the purpose of the election bar, but not for the purpose of the bargaining duty. (Monrebello Rose supra, at pp. 24?25.) Thus, the application of the rebuttable presumption rule to the ALRA system did not con?ict with section 1 155.2, subdivision (b).25 The second ground for our holding in Montebello Rose was the fact that, as was recognized in Kaplarz a number of agricultural policy considerations supported the conclusion that an employer?s duty to bargain did not lapse at the end of the certi?cation year. Among these policy considerations were the following: (1) good faith bargaining takes time to nurture; (2) if the process had to be compressed into one year, time pressures might lead to unnecessary strikes and other unrest; (3) once the one-year period lapsed, it would be dif?cult to hold another election until at least the next peak season, which would seriously impair the employees? right to be represented by a union; and (4) it would create an unreasonable burden to requireannual or biannual elections whenever the parties failed to reach an agreement within the initial certi?cation year. (Montebello Rose, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 25.) As to the latter consideration, we cited with approval the Board?s reasoning in Kaplan ?s that, where the union was still acting on behalf of the employees, there was ?no need to conduct a ritual reaf?rmance of a union?s certi?cation where the employees are satisfied with their representative.? (Montebello Rose, supra, at pp. 25?26.) A ?nal consideration was that the Legislature ?could not have intended to ?make the process of collective bargaining into a kind of sporting event in which the parties play against each other and against a clock at the same 25 We noted further that, in Kaplan the Board had stated in deciding this issue balance to be struck is between the employees? right to reject the incumbent union and the need for stability in the bargaining relationships. The employer?s ?right? not to bargain is no part of the equation.?? (Mantebello Rose, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 25, quoting from Kaplan supra, 3 ALRB No. 28, p. 4.) 29. time, with the employees? right to effective representation as the stakes (Id. at p. 26.) Our holding in Montebello Rose gave deference to Kaplan ?s ?somewhat strained? interpretation of the ALRA because it appeared to be true to the underlying purpose of the ALRA as a whole: It would promote stability in the agricultural ?elds through collective bargaining; it would avoid a beat the clock approach to collective bargaining, and it would allow the time necessary for the nurturing of the bargaining process. (Montebello Rose, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 29.) We therefore ?approve[d] Kaplan ?s on the employer?s duty to bargain beyond the initial certi?cation year.? (Id. at pp. 29? 30.) A second case, Growers Assn, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d 667, involved the issue of whether the rebuttable presumption rule may be used by an employer as a basis for refusing to bargain with an originally certi?ed union. In Growers, the employer refused to continue bargaining with the originally certi?ed union in that case, the UFW, because allegedly ?objective criteria revealed that a majority of employees in the bargaining unit no longer supported the UFW .. . (Id. at p. 670.) The employer had argued that since the rebuttable presumption rule had been found applicable to the ALRA, related NLRA precedents likewise should be adopted?including the rule allowing an employer to refuse to bargain with a certi?ed union if the employer had a good faith belief that the union had lost its majority support. (F Growers, supra, at pp. 672?677.) In its discussion of that issue, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that prior ALRA judicial (and Board) precedent had adopted the NLRA 'rule that ?a year after certi?cation, there is a rebuttable presumption that a union continues to be supported by a majority of employees? (F Growers, supra, at p. 672), but concluded that the loss?of? majority support defense to bargaining with a particular union was clearly inapplicable to the ALRA because of important differences between the ALRA and the NLRA. (F Growers, supra, at pp. 674?676.) For example, the NLRA permitted an employer to 30. bargain with a union that had demonstrated its majority status by means other than an election, but the ALRA only allowed an employer to bargain with a union that had won an election. Moreover, the NLRA permitted employers to petition for an election, but the ALRA did not allow employers to ?le election petitions regarding the certi?cation or decerti?cation of a union. (F Growers, supra, at pp. 674?678.) As noted in Growers, these distinctive provisions of the ALRA indicated the Legislature did not intend for an agricultural employer to participate in deciding whether or not it shall bargain with a particular union, or to have in?uence over the selection or deselection of a union. Such choices were left solely to the employees, and were removed from the employer. (F Growers, supra, at pp. 677M678.) For these reasons, the Court of Appeal held that employers could not refuse to bargain with a particular union based on a good faith belief in loss~of?majority status, since that would allow employers to do indirectly effectively decertify a union) what the Legislature had removed from the employer?s purview. (Id. at p. 677.) To recapitulate what we have said thus far, when the Legislature used ALRA certi?cation terminology in the MMC statute ?a labor organization certi?ed as the exclusive bargaining agent? of the agricultural employees, 1164, subd. it did so with an understanding of the nature and import of the certi?cation status as previously judicially construed. That prior judicial construction included the rulings in the Montebello Rose case, discussed above, that (1) after the initial one-year period, certi?cation expires for the purpose of the election bar, but continues for the purpose of the employer?s duty to bargain and (2) after the initial one-year period, a rebuttable presumption exists that a certi?ed union continues to enjoy majority support by the employees.26 It also included the clari?cation given in Growers that, 26 We recognize the one-year period may be extended for an additional year in certain circumstances (see 1155.2, subd. In the interest of brevity and ease of expression, our 31. notwithstanding the adoption of the rebuttable presumption rule, the ALRA did not permit an employer to refuse to bargain in good faith with the originally certi?ed union based on a belief that the union had lost its majority status. Since no contrary intention was indicated in the MMC statute, we conclude that the Legislature intended to adopt the same meanings and implications of the certi?cation status its nature and duration) as was decided by said prior judicial construction.27 This conclusion provides us with the basic framework for understanding the statutory certi?cation28 concept as we proceed to navigate through an analysis of the abandonment issue. B. The Duty to Bargain Does Not Prevent Raising Abandonment Issue at the MMC Stage As an initial premise for its position, Gerawan contends that the continuing duty to bargain did not prevent it from asserting, as a defense to the MMC process, that UFW abandoned its status as certi?ed bargaining representative of its agricultural employees. We agree with that contention. The decisions in Montebello Rose and Growers addressed the situation of employers who had refused to continue bargaining and, therefore, those cases are distinguishable. The rule that an employer must continue to bargain in good faith with the originally certi?ed union is not affected or impaired by allowing an employer to raise the issue of abandonment in response to a request to commence the MMC process. That is because, aside from a brief 30-day period of bargaining at the outset 1164, subd. the MMC process brings an end to voluntary negotiation and mutual consent, which are the hallmarks of bargaining under the ALRA 1155.2, subd. [good faith bargaining does not compel agreement or require either discussion has sometimes omitted qualifying statements such as ?unless extended for an additional year under section 155.2, subdivision 27 For this reason, we reject Gerawan?s contention that after one year, certi?cation lapsed for all purposes under section 1155.2, subdivision 28 For convenience, we sometimes refer to this as the union?s representative status. 32. party to make a concession]), as it shifts to a compulsory legal process whereby a CBA will simply be imposed by the force of law. Indeed, as the Board expressly recognized in Kaplan supra, 3 ALRB No. 28 at page 7, the rule that certi?cation continued beyond the ?rst year for purposes of the employer?s duty to bargain did not ?alter[] the statutory protection given to employers? because ?[t]heir duty to bargain, no matter how long its duration, does not compel them to agree to a proposal or require them to make a concession.? Thus, as the Board?s own precedent re?ects, any process by which parties are compelled to agree to imposed terms?which is the crux of the MMC process?does not fit into the parameters of bargaining under the ALRA. Accordingly, since the MMC process differs materially from bargaining and is largely a postbargaining process, the employer?s continuing duty to bargain is not an impediment to our recognition of the employer?s ability to raise, at that stage, a defense that the union forfeited its representative status by abandonment. For the same reasons, the so~called ?certi?ed until decerti?ed? rule does not preclude abandonment from being raised at the MMC stage, because that rule has its application to cases within the bargaining context to enforce the employer?s continuing duty to bargain. (See Montebello Rose, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at pp. 23-~24 [?employer?s duty to bargain does not lapse after one year but continues until such time as the union is officially decertified as the employee bargaining representative?], boldface added; Growers, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d 667 at p. 672 [?an employer?s duty to bargain does not lapse after one year even in the absence of an extension?], boldface added; Adamek Dessert, Ina, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 983 [?the company has a duty to bargain with the union until the union is decerti?ed through a second election?], boldface added.) Because the principal purpose of that rule is to prevent employers from refusing to bargain with a certified union (Montebello Rose, supra, at pp. 23w30; Growers, supra, at pp. 671?677; Kaplarz supra, 3 ALRB No. 28, pp. the reasons 33. for the rule or its strict application would seem to be largely absent outside of the bargaining context. Accordingly, we agree with Gerawan?s initial premise that the present case did not involve 1) the employer?s continuing duty to bargain or (2) the corresponding rule that certi?cation continues for purposes of the duty to bargain. Since these considerations did not come into play, it follows that Gerawan was not precluded on either of these grounds from asserting, as a defense to request to commence the MMC process, that the union had abandoned its representative status. Rather, as will be seen, that door was open. 3 C. Legal Support for Abandonment Theory Keeping in mind the particular procedural and factual context of our discussion, we proceed to discuss whether there is adequate legal justi?cation for allowing an abandonment theory in this case. We conclude that there is. Preliminarily, we note that the Board has itself accepted the proposition that a union may be found to have abandoned its representative status under the ALRA. In its prior holdings, the Board has stated that such abandonment takes place where the union is either unwilling or unable to continue in its responsibilities to represent the employees. (Dole Fresh Fruit Ca, supra, 22 ALRB No. 4, pp. 12?13; Bruce Church, Ina, supra, 17 ALRB No. 1, p. 13 [?the Board has defined abandonment as a showing that the Union was either unwilling or unable to represent the bargaining Thus, at least in principle, the Board has recognized that a union may be deemed to have abandoned its certification or representative status. However, the Board has also narrowly circumscribed the factual grounds for ?nding a union?s unwillingness or inability to situations involving either (1) an express disclaimer or (2) union defunctness. (San Joaquin Tomato Growers, Ina, supra, 37 ALRB No. 5, p. 4; Dole Fresh Fruit supra, 22 ALRB No. 4, pp. 12?13; Bruce Church, Ina, supra, 17 ALRB No. 1, p. 13.) While, as explained below, we disagree with the Board?s rigid limitation on the factual 34. grounds for abandonment,29 we note at this juncture that our conclusion allowing an abandonment claim premised on other conduct (such as a union?s long-term absence) does not adopt an entirely new theory into the ALRA, but merely expands on an already existing onef"0 The ?rst and most compelling reason for allowing an abandonment claim in the context of this case is that doing so upholds the core legislative purposes of the ALRA, of which the MMC statute is a part. As we have explained above, the present case is not about the employer?s continuing duty to bargain or the union?s certi?cation within the bargaining context. Once those potential concerns are placed to the side, what emerges is that the main statutory purposes of the ALRA are furthered by the decision we reach herein. In contrast, the Board?s blanket rule disallowing an abandonment claim in the circumstances of this case would eviscerate important ALRA policy and, therefore, we do not follow it. (JR. Norton Co., supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 29 [Board?s blanket rule regarding make whole remedy erroneous because it ?eviscerates important ALRA policy and fundamentally misconstrues the nature of and legislative purpose behind such relief?]; Harry Cariarz Sales v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 223 [statutes ??must be given such interpretation as will promote rather than defeat the general purpose and policy of the A fundamental purpose of the ALRA is to provide for and protect the right of agricultural employees ?to full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing? for the purpose of collective bargaining. 1140.2; see 1152.) As stated by our Supreme Court, ?the NLRA and ALRA purpose 29 See footnote 31, post, regarding another of the Board?s limitations on the abandonment defense that we reject in the present context. 30 In addition to the reasons for our decision that are discussed below, we note the Board?s insistence that the factual basis for abandonment must be restricted to express disclaimer and institutional defunctness appears, at least in the present MIVIC context, to be arbitrary. 35. is not exclusively to promote collective bargaining, but to promote such bargaining by the employees? freely chosen representatives.? (JR. Norton supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 34; see NLRB. v. Mid?States Metal Products, Inc. (5th Cir. 1968) 403 F.2d 702, 704 is primarily a grant of rights to employees rather than a grant of power to unions].) It is clear that the employees? right to a representative of their own choosing would be seriously jeopardized in the situation of abandonment by a union where, as here, the absentee union suddenly reappeared on the scene to demand the MMC process. A union that has had little or no contact with the employees or the employer over many years (here, decades) would be unlikely to have an adequate working knowledge of the employees? situation or their wishes. From the employees? standpoint, that union would be reappearing on the scene as something of a stranger. Most importantly, during the union?s long absence, the employees? working conditions, wages and attitude toward the union (if they even knew they had a union) may have signi?cantly changed over the years. Indeed, it may be the case that the employees do not want to be represented by that union or any other union, which Gerawan asserts was the situation here. Against that potential backdrop is the prospect that, in the MMC process, a CBA will be imposed whether the employees want it or not; and it will be imposed with the formerly absent union, whether the employees want its representation or not. For these reasons, as the present case illustrates, where a union has arguably abandoned the employees but later returns to invoke the MMC process, that situation may create a crisis of representation. Accordingly, it is appr0priate to allow the employer to raise the abandonment issue at that stage, because only that result will preServe the purpose of protecting the employees? right to choose.31 31 In light of the consequences at stake when an MMC request is made, and the need to protect the employees? right to a representative of their own choice, we ?nd the Board?s blanket rule that as long as the reappearing union is able and willing to resume its representation of 36. The usual answer that the employees could mount a decertification effort against the returning union is not adequate in the circumstances under consideration. First, because of the union?s absence from the scene, the employees would be at a disadvantage, since they would have no time-tested relationship with the union from which to base a decision on whether or not to seek decerti?cation. Second, in light of the rapid time frame in which an absentee union may return to the scene and invoke the MMC process (see 1164, subd. [90 days after renewed demand to bargain]), it is reasonably likely that the MMC process would be commenced long before the employees would be able to disseminate adequate information, organize a decerti?cation drive, petition for and hold an election, and obtain the Board?s certi?cation thereof. Realistically, a decerti?cation option would often be too late to stop the MMC process. We add that if the Board were unable to consider an employer?s claim of union abandonment when deciding on whether to grant a union?s request to commence the MMC process, many of the strong policy considerations enumerated in Montebello Rose, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d, which were found to be ?true to the underlying purpose of the as a whole to promote stability in the agricultural ?elds through collective bargaining? (id. at p. 29), would be undermined or compromised. Instead of promoting the policy that nurturing the bargaining process requires (in addition to good faith effort) the passage of considerable time (ibz'd), the Board would have to disregard a union?s longtime abandonment of the bargaining relationship. Instead of avoiding a destabilizing, beat-the?clock approach to bargaining (id. at pp. 25, 29), the Board would be forced to reward that approach by sending the parties to the MMC process once the employees at the time of the MMC request, any past abandonment (no matter how egregious) is irrelevant (see, Dole Fresh Fruit C0., supra, 22 ALRB No. 4, p. 12), to be wholly arbitraiy and untenable. For the reasons stated, a union?s mere reappearance coupled with an MMC request cannot undo the negative effect of its long-term absence or disappearance, but in fact may exacerbate the problems created thereby; and, in any event, the Board?s blanket rule cannot be reasonably justi?ed in this context. 37. 90-day period of section 1164, subdivision expired, even if the union had only recently returned from a long-term absence and made no serious economic proposals. Finally, instead of there being an ongoing union relationship with the employees within which a ?ritual reaf?rmance? of the union?s certi?cation status would be unnecessary since it could be safely assumed ?the employees are satis?ed with their representative? (Monrebello Rose, supra, at pp. 25?26), at the moment of the MMC request by a formerly absent union, that objective basis for presuming the existence of employee support for the union would not be there. These policy objectives, and the negative effect on them if we were to adopt a different result, further demonstrate the soundness of our conclusion that the employer may raise abandonment defensively in response to an MMC request before the Board. A second reason for recognizing an abandonment claim in the present case is the impact of the rebuttable presumption rule. As we have noted above, Monrebello Rose found a rebuttable presumption exists that a union continues to enjoy majority status after its initial certification year. (Montebello Rose, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 24; see Growers, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 672.) The adoption of a rebuttable presumption rule in the ALRA statutory scheme implies that there may be some circumstances, however rare or exceptional, in which an employer may be permitted to show the union has lost its representative status. We believe that such an occasion existed here, where Gerawan sought to oppose the MMC request by showing UFW forfeited its representative status through abandonment. Although Growers held an employer could not refuse to bargain with a particular union based on a good faith belief that the union lost its majority support, that holding related to the continuing duty to bargain and did not address situations or proceedings outside the ordinary bargaining context such as the MMC process. We believe there is a meaningful distinction between an employer who af?nnatively refuses to bargain with a union, and an employer who is willing to bargain in good faith but who seeks to defend itself against a union?s apparently 38. unwarranted demand to commence the MMC process. In the latter case, we hold the union?s representative status may be challenged by the employer. We understand that showing abandonment of a union?s representative status and overcoming the presumption of majority support are not precisely the same things. Although the two concepts substantially overlap in cases such as this one, they are not identical: Abandonment focuses on the union?s conduct, while overcoming the presumption focuses on the employees? support (or lack thereof) for the union. But the two concepts are closely related in the present case, because abandonment of the sort that arguably occurred here would tend to support an inference of a lack of majority support. (See, Dole Fresh Fruit supra, 22 ALRB No. 4 at pp. 13416 [noting that in NLRA, abandonment is a factor in determining whether union lacked majority support]; Cf. NLRB. v. Flex Plastics, Inc. (6th Cir. 1984) 726 F.2d 272, 275 [union inactivity as to employees a factor in lack of majority support defense, but all the circumstances must be considered]; Pennex Alum. Corp. (1988) 288 NLRB 439, 442 [same].) Thus, the same evidence might be introduced in support of either or both theories. Moreover, both concepts are analogous because they share the same function or purpose of challenging the union?s status as bargaining representative. In light of the commonalities of the two theories, we hold that the impact of the rebuttable presumption rule (in the MMC context here) was that it opened the door to asserting either or both of them. That is, since the employer could have sought to overcome the presumption in that setting, it likewise was free to assert abandonment there. Finally, without discounting the unique aspects of labor law under the ALRA, we note that our conclusion is consistent with general principles of law applied in analogous situations. It is not unusual for courts to look to comparable legal concepts for guidance, especially in resolving difficult issues. (See, e. Gay Law Students Assn. v. Paci?c el. el. C0. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458, 472?473, 476 [analogizing union?s exclusive bargaining agent status to state?granted franchise].) As pointed out by Gerawan, since a 39. union?s status as exclusive bargaining representative is analogous to other public grants of a monopolistic power or franchise, it is reasonable to suppose that its status may similarly be subject to being lost by abandonment. (See, Tehama 12. Paci?c Gas Elec. C0. (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 465, 471 [a franchise may be lost by subsequent abandonment]; County v. Southern Cal. Tel. C0. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 378, 384 [privilege of a public franchise lasts only so long as holder meets the obligations in consideration of which the right was granted]; County of Kern v. Paci?c Gas Electric Co. (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 418, 423 [a franchise may terminate on failure to provide services in consideration of which the right was granted]; Gay Law Students Assn. v. Paci?c Tel. Tel. supra, at pp. 472?473, 476 [state-granted utilities franchise analogous to a union?s monopolistic power].) Additionally, we observe there is an established principle in the common law that rights may be forfeited by abandonment or waiver. (See, Gerhard v. Stephens (1968) 68 Cal.2d 864, 890 [easement rights may be lost by abandonment]; Lohn v. Fletcher Oil Co., Inc. (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 26, 30 [abandonment of contract rights implied from acts of parties]; cf. 13 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Equity, 16?19, pp. 302?308 [defense of laches applicable to certain claims where there has been prejudicial delay].) While we do not directly rely on these analogous legal theories in reaching our conclusion that an employer may raise union abandonment in defense of the MMC process, we believe they provide additional substantiation of that outcome by showing the broad legal acceptance for the abandonment concept, including in the comparable situation of a publically granted franchise. D. Conclusion Regarding Abandonment In accordance with the forgoing, we hold that an employer, in defending against a union?s request to institute the MMC process, may challenge the union?s status as the employees? bargaining representative by raising a claim of abandonment based on the union?s conduct, such as long-term absence or disappearance from the scene, long-term 40. failure to carry out its duties, and/or lack of meaningful contact with the employees and the employer over an unreasonably long period of time.32 The gist of the defense is that by virtue of such longstanding absence, lack of contact, etc., the union has effectively abdicated its statutory role by gross abandonment thereof. As we have stated throughout this opinion, we have reached this holding within the peculiar context of this case?~ namely, the employer?s ability to defend a union?s MMC request. Our Opinion is intended to be limited to that context. As our ruling makes clear, the Board applied the wrong legal standard when it held that abandonment could not be based upon factors such as those present in this case. Further, because the Board summarily rejected the viability of Gerawan?s abandonment claim, it never adequately considered the import of Gerawan?s evidentiary showing on that issue. It follows that the Board abused its discretion when it ordered commencement of the MMC process without properly considering Gerawan?s claim of union abandonment. Since the Board improperly sent the parties to commence the MMC process, the Board?s subsequent order premised thereon in Gerawan Farming, Ina, supra, 39 ALRB No. 17 (to approve the mediator?s report) is rendered invalid. Generally speaking, when the Board applies the wrong standard, we return the case to the Board so that it can apply the proper standard. (JR. Norton supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. ??It is a guiding principle of administrative law that ?an 32 We note the Board has suggested in its holdings that abandonment might conceivably be found in exceptional circumstances where a union was ??totally absent from the scene?? (Dole Fresh Fruit Ca, supra, 22 ALRB No. 4, p. 18) or ?effectively left the scene altogether? (Bruce Church, Ina, supra, 17 ALRB No. l, p. 13). The Board has also stated that it has ?an obligation to be alert to situations in which the certified labor organization rests on its bargaining rights, as such neglect serves to erode and undermine the right to be represented that is granted to employees.? (Dole Fresh Fruit C0., supra, p. 24.) 33 Even if it might be proper (hypothetically) to decide the issue of abandonment as a matter of law on appeal, we would decline to do so in this case because (1) it does not appear that all the relevant facts were presented by both sides, (2) it is unclear whether the facts are undisputed, and (3) remand is preferable because the Board is the tribunal vested with the discretion to make such determinations in the ?rst instance in ALRA statutory proceedings. 41. administrative determination in which is embedded a legal question open to judicial review does not impliedly foreclose the administrative agency, after its error has been corrected, from enforcing the legislative policy committed to its charge.? (JR. Norton Co., supra, at p. 39.) If we followed this general rule here, we would remand the present matter to the Board for new proceedings to be conducted on the issue of abandonment in accordance with the principles set forth herein, to allow the Board to determine, based on the totality of the union?s conduct and any other relevant circumstances, the question of whether UFW abandoned its status as the employees? bargaining representative. Here, however, remand is not available because, as discussed below, the MMC statute is constitutionally invalid. As a result, the appropriate diSposition concerning the Board?s statutory error and abuse of discretion is to simply set aside and reverse the Board?s approval of the mediator?s report in Gerawan Farming, Ina, supra, 39 ALRB No. 17. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES Gerawan raises several constitutional challenges to the MMC statute, including that the law is invalid under the protections afforded to the liberty of contract by substantive due process, fails to comply with equal protection principles, unlawfully delegates legislative powers, violates procedural due process, and constitutes a taking of private property without just compensation. As explained below, we conclude the MMC statute violates equal protection of the law and improperly delegates legislative authority. Since we hold the MMC statute is constitutionally deficient on these two grounds, we find it unnecessary to address the several additional arguments made by Gerawan that the MMC statute is unconstitutional. (See Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (l 995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 230 [courts refrain from rendering unnecessary constitutional law decisions].) 42. V. Equal Protection of the Laws Gerawan attacks the validity of the MMC statute on the ground that it violates the constitutional requirement of equal protection of the laws. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: ?No State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.? (US. Const., 14th Amend, 1.) The California Constitution expressly provides the same guarantee. (Cal. Const., art. I, 7, subd. In essence, equal protection of the law means that all persons who are similarly situated with respect to a law should be treated alike under the law. (Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) 473 US. 432, 439; Arcadia Development Co. v. City of Morgan Hill (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1534.) ?Of course, most laws differentiate in some fashion between classes of persons. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike. [Citation.]? (Nordlinger v. Hahn (1992) 505 US. 1, 10.) ?The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classi?cation drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. [Citations] When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude, [citations], and the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be recti?ed by the democratic processes.? (Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, 473 US. at p. 440; accord, FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. (1993) 508 US 307, 313w314.) As Justice Robert Jackson explained many years ago: ?[C]ities, states and the Federal Government must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable di?erentiation fairly related to the object of regulation. This equality is not merely abstract justice. The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law 43. which of?cials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those of?cials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation.? (Railway Express v. New York (1949) 336 US. 106, 112?113, italics added (conc. opn. Jackson, J.), cited with approval in Hays v. Wood (1979) 25 Cal.3d 772, 786? 787.) The same rational basis standard is applied for purposes of the equal protection provision of the California Constitution. (Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 481? 482; County ofLA. v. Southern Cal. Tel. supra, 32 Cal.2d at pp. 389?390.) This deferential standard ??invests legislation involving such differentiated treatment with a presumption of constitutionality and ?requir[es] merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose.? (Warden v. State Bar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 628, 641.) ?Past decisions also establish that, under the rational relationship test, the state may recognize that different categories or classes of persons within a larger classi?cation may pose varying degrees of risk of harm, and properly may limit a regulation to those classes of persons as to whom the need for regulation is thought to be more crucial or imperative.? (Id. at p. 644, citing Williamson v. Lee Optical C0. (1955) 348 US. 483, 489 [?Evils in the same ?eld may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. [Citation] Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative A key principle that must be applied in the present analysis is that administrative order, legislative in character, is subject to the same tests as to validity as an act of the Legislature. [Citations.]? (Knudsen Creamery Co. v. Brock (1951) 37 44. Cal.2d 485, 494 (Knudsen Creamery As the majority opinion in Hess correctly observed, the action of the Board in approving a ?nal CBA submitted by the mediator is essentially legislative in character: ?There can be no doubt that the compulsory interest arbitration scheme provides for quasi-legislative action. Although the statutes refer to the end result as a ?collective bargaining agreement,? there is no agreement. In this case Hess not only did not agree to be bound by the terms of employment imposed by the mediator, it did not agree to submit to interest arbitration at all. The terms of the ?agreement? determined by the arbitrator were imposed upon Hess by force of law. The statutory scheme is not quasi-judicial. An administrative action is quasi-judicial, or quasi- adjudicative, when it consists of applying existing rules to existing facts. [Citation] The creation of new rules for future application, such as is done here, is quasi-legislative in character. [Citation] This is so even though the action is, as here, taken in an individual case. [Citation.]? (Hess, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1597?1598.) Accordingly, when under the MMC statute the Board approves or adopts a mediator?s report (such as the one in this case regarding Gerawan) and thereby establishes an enforceable CBA as to a particular employer and union, the resulting CBA is legislative or regulatory in character and is ?subject to the same tests as to validity as an act of the Legislature? (Knudsen Creamery Ca, supra, at p. 494), including the test of constitutionality under the equal protection clause. Here, in attacking the MMC statute on equal protection grounds, Gerawan makes essentially the same argument that Justice Nicholson made in his dissenting opinion in Hess. In Justice Nicholson?s dissent, he gave the following explanation of why he believed the MMC statute violated equal protection principles: assume, for the sake of argument, that treatment of an agricultural employer that does not reach agreement with the union on an initial collective bargaining agreement can be different from the treatment of an agricultural employer that reaches an agreement with the union on an initial collective bargaining agreement because of the state?s interest 45. in promoting collective bargaining agreements. Here, however, the disparate treatment is not just between employers with initial collective bargaining agreements and employers without such agreements. Application of . .. section 1164 and the related statutes results in disparate treatment within the class of employers without an initial collective bargaining agreement because the agreement imposed on each employer in this class will be different. While the legitimate state interest that I assume for argument exists may justify disparate treatment between classes, it cannot justify disparate treatment within the class. (Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, supra, 473 US. at p. 439.) ?[S]ection 1164 sets forth the classi?cation at issue in this case: agricultural employers who, for whatever reason, do not agree to the terms of an initial Within this class, the law does not treat the individual employers similarly. Instead, each employer will be subjected to a different legislative act, in the form of a Thus, similarly situated employers are treated dissimilarly. ?Beyond the classi?cation set by section 1164, there is no rational way to break the agricultural employers down into smaller groups. The statute makes no such attempt, except, of course, to break it down so that every agricultural employer is the one and only member of the class. This means of classi?cation, however, is the very antithesis of equal protection. While the Legislature may have intended this as a way to avoid the political retribution it might incur if it enacted laws applicable equally across the class, that motivation is entirely insuf?cient to justify the disparate treatment. (See Hays v. Wood, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 786?787.) purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State?s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents?? [Citations.]? (Village of Willowbrook v. Olech (2000) 528 US. 562, 564.) Here, the discriminationmthat is, holding Hess, and no other agricultural employer, to the terms of a private legislator?s decision?~is intentional 46. because the mediator has no power to extend the enactment to other agricultural employers. The mediator could have had no intent other than to impose a enforceable only as to Hess and no other agricultural employer. Furthermore, the discrimination is arbitrary because there are no standards set forth pursuant to which the mediator?s decision in this case will be the same as a mediator?s decision in any other case under section 1164 and the related statutes. Enforcement of the mediator?s decision violates equal protection principles and, therefore, should be set aside.? (Hess, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1615?1617, italics added (dis. opn. of Nicholson, Gerawan urges us to adopt Justice Nicholson?s reasoning. To further make its point, Gerawan focuses on one single aspect of any CBA that is imposed on an employer pursuant to the MMC processmnamely, wages. In this regard, Gerawan argues as follows: ?The State has the right to establish a minimum wage for all employers or for all employers in a particular industry. But the State cannot constitutionally set different minimum wages for different companies [in the same industry] without a rational reason for doing so. Because the MMC Statute by design sets different minimum wages for different companies [in the same industry], it must be struck down as unconstitutional. [11] Indeed, the whole point of the MMC Statute is to single out one employer and create a special set of rules for that employer alone.? We think the force of Gerawan?s argument is magni?ed when it is considered that a CBA is not a limited document con?ned to wages only, but it covers a wide array of various rights, duties and relationships: ?The states the rights and duties of the parties. It is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases. which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. The covers the whole employment relationship.? (Inlandboatmens Union of Paci?c v. Dutra Group (9th Cir. 2002) 279 F.3d 1075, 1079, quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior Gulf Co. (1960) 363 U.S. 574, 578? 579.) Since a CBA is a diverse set of rules covering the whole employment relationship, that is the nature of what is being imposed in each case under the MMC process. 47. The response given by the Hess majority opinion (Hess, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1604), and argued now by the Board and UFW, is that the factors set forth in section 1164, subdivision (6), ensure that similarly situated employers will be treated alike. Section 1164, subdivision states: ?In resolving the issues in dispute, the mediator mayl34] consider those factors commonly considered in similar proceedings, including: (1) The stipulations of the parties. [1i] (2) The ?nancial condition of the employer and its ability to meet the costs of the contract in those instances where the employer claims an inability to meet the union?s wage and bene?t demands. (3) The corresponding wages, bene?ts, and terms and conditions of employment in other covering similar agricultural operations with similar labor requirements. (4) The corresponding wages, bene?ts, and terms and conditions of employment prevailing in comparable ?rms or industries in geographical areas with similar economic conditions, taking into account the size of the employer, the skills, experience, and training required of the employees, and the dif?culty and nature of the work performed. (5) The average consumer prices for goods and services according to the California Consumer Price Index, and the overall cost of living, in the area where the work is performed.? According to the Hess majority opinion, ?[t]hese requirements reasonably ensure that contracts of different employers will be similar? and, therefore, no equal protection violation was found. (Hess, supra, at p. 1604.) We fail to see how the statutory factors listed in subdivision of section 1164 cure the fundamental equal protection violation pointed out by Justice Nicholson in Hess. The requirement that every mediator conducting the MMC process shall consider this list of factors in making his or her various decisions as to the multiple terms and conditions of a particular CBA to be imposed on an individual employer does not even come close 34 To prevent the required criteria from being rendered ?illusory,? the Court of Appeal in Hess construed the word as meaning ?must.? (Hess, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p.1607) 48. to ensuring that similarly situated employers will receive the same or similar results under the law. It only means that such factors will in fact be considered and that the particular determinations of the mediator must have some minimal support in the record. 1164, subds. Inevitably, each imposed CBA will still be its own set of rules applicable to one employer, but not to others, in the same legislative classi?cation concerning such matters as wages, bene?ts, working conditions, hiring, disciplinary and termination procedures, union dues, union membership requirements, duration of the CBA, and other terms and conditions of employment and/or of the employer~union relationship. Thus, the necessary outworking of the MMC statute is that each individual employer (within the class of agricultural employers who have not entered a ?rst contract) will have a distinct, unequal, individualized set of rules imposed on it.35 This is, as Justice Nicholson put it, ?the very antithesis of equal protection.? (Hess, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1616.)36 Additionally, the results would not only be unequal, but also arbitrary. Because of the differences of each employer and the subjectivity of a process whereby the only objective standard or goal to be met in the MMC statute is to resolve issues so that a ?rst contract may be imposed (see 1164, subd. it would appear to be unavoidable that even similar employers will be subject to signi?cantly different outcomes. 37 Since the 35 Although the process might be roughly the same in each case, we keep in mind that the administrative result ordered by the Board in each case each CBA) would have to be considered for equal protection purposes. 36 We distinguish the situation in which a local municipality a city or a county) requires by ordinance that compulsory interest arbitration be used to resolve an impasse with certain public employees such as ?re?ghters or police of?cers (or with the unions representing them), since in those cases there is essentially only one employer. 37 This is illustrated by the following scenarios. In Case A, an employer and a union cannot agree to the terms of a CBA and the matter undergoes the MMC process before Mediator X. The mediator receives evidence that employer currently pays wages that are below the industijy average in the same geographic area, and that employer consistently earns pro?ts at the high end of the industry range. Mediator 49. factors in subdivision of section 1164 are broad and varied enough to permit a mediator to select from among a wide range of potential CBA terms that he or she may think best (as long as minimal support for the decision is provided), the risk is simply too great that results will be based largely on the subjective leanings of each mediator or that arbitrary differences will otherwise be imposed on similar employers in the same classi?cationm?particularly as there is no objective standard toward which the mediator is required to aim.38 . In so holding, we disagree with the Board and UFW that the MMC statute is analogous to a rent control ordinance where one apartment building in a municipality may be granted a right to charge a higher rent than another different results would be acceptable as long as they were rationally based). In the case of a rent control ordinance, a local board or commission attempts to determine a rent ceiling or a rent adjustment based upon an administrative standard (such as a ??fair and reasonable return. on investment??) by using a speci?ed formula or a list of factors. (Fisher v. City of then drafts a CBA, which includes a wage increase requiring employer to pay wages greater than the industry average and which, in turn, reduces employer is pro?ts to the local industry average. In Case B, Mediator receives evidence that is substantially identical to that in Case A. Mediator then drafts a CBA, which includes a slight wage increase to bring wages to the industry average, which, in turn, reduces employer ?s pro?ts but its pro?ts remain above the local industry average. In Case C, Mediator receives evidence that is substantially identical to that in Cases A and B. Mediator then drafts a CBA, which makes no change to the existing wages being paid. Accordingly, the wage term has no e?ect on the Employer ?s pro?ts. Since there is no standard as to whether wages are to be paid or pro?ts earned at an industry average or within a certain industry range, the issued by Mediators X, and are each supportable by the evidence received. Yet, each CBA contains different terms based on the same evidence and results in different wages and a different impact on the pro?t margin for each employer. 33 The instant case is an example of this very problem. The record showed that Gerawan paid its employees the highest average wages among its closest competitors; yet, the mediator elected to impose a wage increase in any event. The decision was justi?ed by weighing and considering a wide variety of factors. 50. Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 679?681;Kavanau 12. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 761, 768?769.) Here, in contrast, there is a broad range of factors but no standard. Moreover, we believe the inequality and arbitrariness of the MMC process are on a far grander scale than might occur under an inadequately worded rent control law because, unlike the case of rent control (which only decides on a single term of a broader contractual relationship), here the Board, through the mediator, establishes the entire CBA. For all of the above reasons, we agree with Justice Nicholson?s dissent in Hess that the MMC statute on its face violates equal protection principles. VI. Improper Delegation of Legislative Authority Gerawan argues that the MMC statute invalidly delegates legislative authority in violation of the California Constitution. An unconstitutional delegation of authority occurs when a legislative body leaves the resolution of fundamental policy issues to others or (2) fails to provide adequate direction for the implementation of that policy.? (Carson Mobz'lehome Park Owners?Assn. v. City of Carson (1983) 35 Cal.3d 184, 190.) ??This doctrine rests upon the premise that the legislative body must itself effectively resolve the truly fundamental issues. It cannot escape responsibility by explicitly delegating that function to others or by failing to establish an effective mechanism to assure the proper implementation of its policy decisions.? [Citation] The doctrine prohibiting delegations of legislative power does not invalidate reasonable grants of power to an administrative agency, when suitable safeguards are established to guide the power?s use and to protect against misuse. [Citations] The Legislature must make the fundamental policy determinations, but after declaring the legislative goals and establishing a yardstick guiding the administrator, it may authorize the administrator to adopt rules and regulations to promote the purposes of the legislation and to carry it into effect. [Citations] Moreover, standards for administrative application of a statute need not be expressly set forth; they may be 51. implied by the statutory purpose. [Citations.]? (People v. Wright (1982) 30 Cal.3d 705, 712?713.) In Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, the California Supreme Court held that the rent control scheme at issue in that case gave adequate guidance in its delegation of authority to the rent control board because, in addition to providing a nonexclusive list of relevant factors to be considered by the board in determining adjustment of maximum" rents, the stated purpose of the charter amendment furnished an implied standard for the board to apply. (Id. at p. 168.) ?[T]he charter amendment?s purpose of counteracting the ill effects of ?rapidly rising and exorbitant rents exploiting [the housing] shortage? [citation] implies a standard of ?xing maximum rent levels at a point that permits the landlord to charge a just and reasonable rent and no more.? (Ibid) Applying the above principles, we agree with Gerawan that the MMC statute improperly delegated legislative authority. Although the MMC statute enumerates several factors for the mediator to consider when making his or her various decisions about the terms of what will become a compelled CBA 1164, subd. it does not provide the mediator with any policy objective to be carried out or standard to be attained once those factors have been considered. Since there is no goal to aim for, no one would ever know if the mediator hit the correct target or even came close. As was observed by Justice Nicholson in his dissent in Hess: ?Even though under the statute at issue the mediator must make factual findings and those findings must be supported by the record, . there is no way to determine whether the facts found by the mediator support the decision unless one knows what basic public policy the mediator must vindicate.? (Hess, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1612.) Additionally, unlike the Birkenfeld case, the legislative purpose of the MMC statute fails to supply the necessary guidance to either the mediator or the Board. The stated purpose of the MMC statute is to ?ensure a more effective collective bargaining process between agricultural employers and agricultural employees, and thereby more 52. ?illy attain the purposes of the ameliorate the working conditions and economic standing of agricultural employees, create stability in the agricultural labor force, and promote California?s economic well-being by ensuring stability in its most vital industry.? (Stats. 2002, ch. 1145, 1.) Justice Nicholson is correct that ?[t]his pronouncement [is] so general it fail[s] to provide any actual guidance.? (Hess, supra, at p. 1612.) In short, no implied standard is discernable in the MMC statute. For this reason, the difference between the present case and Birkenfeld is substantial. In Birkenfeld, because there was an implied standard that the rent control board was to implement?a just and reasonable rental amount based on several factors-?? the rent control board had suf?cient direction and guidance regarding the responsibility delegated to it. (Birkenfeld, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 168-469.) In other words, there was a particular destination the rent control board was supposed to reach, and a reasonable roadmap for getting there. In theory, at least, all of the information gathered in the rent control proceeding could be weighed and considered in making the ultimate determination of a just and reasonable rental amount and, once so determined, the amount of rent that could pennissibly be charged was thereby established. In contrast under the MMC statute, there is no particular destination that is supposed to be reached by the mediator, no particular determination that is to be made, and nor is any direction given as to the mediator?s task or purpose other than to impose a CBA on the parties after considering the listed factors. We may further illustrate the lack of adequate standards under the MMC statute by posing a few questions with no discernable answers. Other than to create and impose an agreement, what is the mediator?s precise purpose, goal or aim under the MMC statute? Is it to raise workers? wages? Is it to improve working conditions? Is it to impose on the grower any and all union demands the mediator deems reasonable and which the mediator believes the grower can afford and, if so, how are reasonable and afford de?ned? Is it to ensure that wages paid are at least industry average for comparable 53. work? Is the mediator?s starting point to determine a minimum, fair pro?t margin for the grower and then to determine in what amount the workers are to be compensated without compromising that margin; or is it to ?rst determine a minimum amount the workers are to be compensated without regard to grower pro?t margins? By posing these questions, we are not saying that any of our questions embody wise or legitimate statutory objectives. We are simply pointing out that we cannot tell what the mediator?s task is supposed to be under the MMC statute, and these questions serve to highlight a number of hypothetical possibilities without in any way approving of them. The bottom line is this: In the MMC statute, the Legislature has delegated broad legislative authority to the mediator and the Board under the MMC process, but has not provided adequate standards to guide and direct the use of that delegated authority or prevent its misuse. Finally, the delegation of powers under the MMC statute also lacks the necessary procedural safeguards or mechanisms to assure a fair and evenhanded implementation of the legislative mandate to impose a CBA. Bz'rkenfeld held that even if there is ?legislative guidance by way of policy and primary standards,? it is not enough if the Legislature fails to establish safeguards or mechanisms to protect against unfaimess or favoritism. (Birkenfeld, supra, 17 Ca1.3d at p. 169.) Here, in addition to the lack of standards, we do not see how the highly deferential and limited review the Board undertakes of a mediator?s report under the MMC statute could be deemed a realistic safeguard against unfairness or favoritism. For the most part, the Board must approve the mediator?s report as the ?nal order of the Board unless a challenged CBA provision is either ?unrelated to wages, hours or other conditions of employment,? (ii) ?based on clearly erroneous ?ndings of material fact,? or ?arbitrary and capricious? in light of the mediator?s ?ndings of fact. 1164.3, subd. In practical effect, this means the Board must give virtually a rubber-stamp approval to the mediator?s reported CBA as long as the terms thereof have at least a small kernel of plausible support, are not wholly arbitrary, and the mediator has considered the factors listed in section 1164, subdivision (6). Except in 54. perhaps the most egregious instances of overreaching, the Board?s hands would be tied and the report would have to be approved. In light of the mediator?s considerable range of power to determine all aspects of a compelled CBA, which would include a broad array of important economic terms and relationships, such a highly deferential and narrow review mechanism would not be able to meaningfully protect the parties against favoritism or unfairness in regard to the determination of the terms. Potentially compounding the problem further is the fact that a mediator?s report to the Board may not necessarily provide a complete or adequate record of the rationale for the mediator?s various decisions concerning the terms of the CBA. During the voluntary mediation phase of the MMC process, the mediator may have received ex parte or con?dential communications, and may have been decisively in?uenced by what was said to him during that private phase of the proceedings. Although we do not say that merely having the same mediator conduct the voluntary mediation phase and the involuntary binding interest arbitration phase is a violation of due process, we do believe it is another factor that may hinder the effectiveness of the review mechanism provided in the MMC statute. Information divulged in the voluntary mediation phase would not likely make its way into the report or otherwise come to the Board?s attention, nor would it likely become part of the record brought before the Court of Appeal when judicial review of the Board?s decision is requested under section 1164.5. For all of the above reasons, we conclude that in its delegation of legislative authority to the mediator and the Board, the MMC statute did not provide an adequate procedural mechanism to protect the parties from favoritism or unfairness in the MMC process. In summary, the MMC statute grants to the mediator and the Board the power to establish employment terms that will be imposed by the force of law to legislate) with regard to a particular employer create and compel an entire CBA) without any de?nite policy direction, goal or standard that is supposed to be reached or implemented. The law presents factors, but factors alone are not enough. Additionally, there are no 55. adequate mechanisms or safeguards in place under the MMC statute to protect against favoritism in the use of such delegated power. We conclude the MMC statute involves an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, because it leaves the resolution of fundamental policy issues to others and it fails to provide adequate direction and safeguards for the implementation of that policy. THE CONSOLIDATED CASE (CASE NO. F068676) VII. Denial of Writ Relief Af?rmed on Narrow Grounds After the Board initially ordered Gerawan and UFW to commence the MMC process, Gerawan ?led a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court challenging the validity of the Board?s order. In that petition to the trial court, and in the points and authorities ?led in support of said petition, Gerawan raised the same statutory issues and many of the same constitutional issues that were presented in the instant petition for review to this court, which we have granted case No. F068526, decided above). The particular statutory issues raised by Gerawan in the trial court petition for writ of mandate were that the Board erroneously construed the criteria of sections 1164 and 1164.11 and wrongly concluded that such criteria were satis?ed in this case, which errors included the Board?s improper refusal to allow Gerawan to prove that UFW had abandoned its status as the employees? bargaining representative. The constitutional issues raised in the trial court petition for writ of mandate focused on due process challenges to the MMC statute, including a claim that the MMC statute violates due process because of its use of a single mediator to handle both mediation and arbitration, especially where that person would be privy to ex parte discussions with the parties that are off the record. In seeking a writ of mandate in the trial court, the petition also contended that section 1164.9 did not preclude the trial court from hearing the matter. The trial court allowed Gerawan?s petition for writ of mandate to proceed (rejecting the Board?s argument that section 1164.9 precluded it from exercising jurisdiction), but the court ultimately denied the relief sought in Gerawan?s petition. The 56. primary ground for the trial court?s denial of relief was that the matter had not reached suf?cient administrative ?nality to warrant writ relief, because the Board?s order was merely ?the ?rst step in a multi?step process which culminates in a ?nal order from the [Board]. [Citation.]? That being the case, the trial court also found that it would be speculative at that point to conclude that de?nite harm would result if the court did not issue a writ. The trial court further noted there were administrative and judicial remedies provided, including a provision for judicial review at the end of the administrative process. The trial court did not reach the constitutional due process issue, because it did not appear to be ripe. For these and other reasons, the trial court concluded that the issuance of a writ of mandate was not procedurally necessary or appropriate, especially due to lack of administrative ?nality, and the petition was denied.39 Gerawan appealed from the trial court?s denial of the petition for writ of mandate, which we have ordered consolidated with the instant petition for review. Since we have addressed and resolved the statutory issues above (in connection with the petition for review), it is unnecessary to do so again. As to the constitutional issues, we have concluded above that the MMC statute violates equal protection of the law and the prohibition against imprOper delegation of legislative powers. In light of that ruling, it is unnecessary to address the additional claims of constitutional law defects regarding the MMC statute. (See Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardz?no, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 230 [courts refrain from rendering unnecessary constitutional law decisions].) 39 In so holding, the trial court further noted that, in any event, there was no abuse of discretion evident, because it appeared to the court that all the statutory criteria necessary for the commencement of the MMC process were satis?ed. Although this particular ground for the trial court?s ruling that the statutory criteria were all satis?ed) was incorrect in view of our conclusion above relating to the abandonment issue, as explained below we will affn'm the trial court?s result (the denial of the writ), even though we do not agree with this ground stated by the trial court. 57. In addition to the fact that our ruling in the petition for review (above) has rendered the speci?c relief sought in the petition for writ of mandate unnecessary and largely moot, we note further that it appears Gerawan had an adequate remedy within the context of the administrative process the petition for review) in this particular case and, therefore, a clear basis for the trial court?s denial of extraordinary relief existed. That is, the same essential statutory and constitutional challenges to the MMC process could have been, and actually were, adequately raised by Gerawan in its petition for review, which we have heard and considered. Hence, in this particular instance at least, Gerawan had an adequate remedy.40 (Code Civ. Proc., 1086 [extraordinary writ relief is properly denied where the party has an adequate remedy].) On the narrow ground that an adequate remedy existed, we af?rm the denial of the writ petition in the trial court. (Phelan v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363, 366, 370?371 [writ correctly denied where another adequate remedy present].) DISPOSITION The Board?s order in Gerawan Farming, Ina, supra, 39 ALRB No. 17 (case No. F068526) is reversed and set aside. In light of the above ruling, the trial court?s denial of the writ in case No. F068676 is af?rmed. Costs are awarded to Gerawan. KANE, J. WE CONCUR: HILL, P.J. LEVY, J. 40 We do not decide whether, or in what circumstances, a party may be permitted to seek a writ of mandate in the trial court in this context. Thus, we leave unanswered the question of Whether section 1164.9 precluded the petition for writ of mandate in the trial court. 58. HO 0 ?l Paul A. Greenberg, State Bar #76604 Iris Weinmann, State Bar #161101 3 . . . Jane Tanimura, State Bar #288120 ?pan? 90"? cahfom?a' GREENBERG WEINMANN Sediments 1101 Montana Ave, Suite Santa Monica, CA 90403 5 2014 Telephone: (310) 3196188 Fax: (310) 319-6189 Deputy E-mail: Qaulfr?greenberglawcom can. Humbug J. Bernard Alexander, State Bar #128307 34-201 4-091 ALEXANDER, KRAKOW GLICK LLP 401 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1000 Santa Monica, CA 90401 Telephone: (310) 394~0888 Fax: (310) 394-0811 E-mail: Attorneys For Plaintiff FRANCISCO T. ACERON, JR. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO FRANCISCO T. ACERON, JR. 3 Case No. Plaintiff, 3 COMPLAINT FOR: VS- 3 1. Discrimination and Harassment Based on Age in Violation of the Fair Employment AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS and Housing Act; BOARD, a cahforma Government AanFy; 2. Discrimination and Harassment Based on SYLVIA Race and National Origin in Violation of ALEGRIA DE LA CRUZ: . the Fair Employment and Housing Act; SILAS an IndWIduaJ?and DOES 1) 3. Failing to Take All Reasonable Steps to uswe? Prevent Discrimination and Harassment; Defendants and 4. Retaliation in Violation of the Fair Employment and Hausing Act. [Demand for Jury Trial] 1 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL hum INTRODUCTION. 1. Plaintiff Francisco T. Aceron, Jr. has been employed as an attorney for the Agricultural Labor Relations Board since 2000. Plaintiff Aceron was promoted to Assistant General Counsel I in 2001, and then promoted to Assistant General in 2003, consistently performed hisjob well, and was commended for his performance. In 201 l, a new general counsel was appointed to head the ALRB, which started pushing out all of the older attorneys. As part of this targeted campaign against older employees and also, in part, because Plaintiff is the only staff member of Asian descent, Plaintiff has been subjected to an ongoing pattern of harassment, humiliation and differential treatment, which includes unjust criticism of his performance, stripping away his duties, denying him a premotion to which he was eminently qualified, and demoting him several grades down, while replacing him and other older attorneys with much younger and inexperienced staff. The conduct constitutes unlawful discrimination based on age, race and nation] origin, as well as unlawful retaliation. THE PARTIES. 2. Plaintiff FRANCISCO T. ACERON, IR. is an individual residing in Visalia, Tulare County, California. 3. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that, at all times relevant hereto, Defendant AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD was a Califomia state government agency. 4. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that, at all times relevant hereto, Defendant SYLVIA TORRES-GUILLEN was an individual and a management level employee of the ALRB. 5. Plaintiff is infomted and believes and thereupon alleges that, at all times relevant hereto, Defendant ALEGRIA DE LA CRUZ was an individual and a management level employee of the ALRB. 2 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL venture and with the permission and consent of each of the other Defendants. l5. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that, at all times relevant hereto, Defendant SILAS SHAWVER was an individual and a management level employee of the ALRB. 7: The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise, of the Defendants named herein as Does 1 through 50, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiff at this time and therefore said Defendants are Sued by such ?ctiti0us names. Plaintiff will seek leave to amend this Complaint to insert the true names and capacities of said Defendants when the same become. known to Plaintiff. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that each of the ?ctitiously named Defendants is responsible'for the wrongful acts alleged herein, and is therefore liable to Plaintiff as alleged hereinafter. 8. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that at all times relevant hereto, Defendants, and each of them, were the agents, employees, coconspirators, parent corporation, joint employers, alter ego, and/or joint venturers of the other Defendants, and each of them, and in doing the things alleged herein, were acting at least in part within the course and scepe of said agency, employment, conspiracy, joint employer, alter ego status, and/orjoint 9. Whenever and wherever reference is made in this complaint to any act or failure to act by a defendant or co-defendant, such allegations and references shall also be deemed to mean the acts and/or failures to act by each defendant acting individually,jointly and severally. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS. 10. Plaintiff began his employment with the ALRB in 2000 as Legal Counsel. In 2001, Plaintiff was promoted to Assistant General C0unsel I. In 2003, Plaintiff was promoted to Assistant General Counsel II. Plaintiff held this position as Assistant General Counsel II for more than 11 years, working in the Visalia Regional Of?ce. Throughout his employment, until the ALRB began its practice of forcing Out older workers, Plaintiff received good performance reviews and was commended for his work performance and worked primarily doing litigation 3 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL and trial work through administrative hearings of unfair labor practice violations Plaintiff has had several trials published as successful ALRB Board Decisions throughout his 14 V2 years with the ALRB. 11. In August, 2011, Governor Brown appointed Sylvia Torres?Guillen as the new General Counsel for the ALRB. In December 2011, Governor Brown appointed Alegria De La Cruz as the new Supervising Staff Counsel. By late 20] 1, many of Plaintiff's older colleagues had been forced out of their long term positions at the ALRB, and replaced by new attorneys with or less years of legal eXperience, all under the age of 40. 12. In or about late January or early February 2012, Plaintiff was approached by Supervising Staff Counsel De La Cruz one evening at the of?ce. De La Cruz questioned Plaintiff about the work ethic of Field Examiner Pauline Alvarez, who had been with the ALRB for over 25 years. De La Cruz questioned Plaintiff about whether Alvarez can be pushed to work harder and be more efficient. Plaintiff defended Alvarez?s work ethic by explaining to De La Cruz that Ms. Alvarez has been with the agency for over 25 years and has been a committed public servant in defending farm worker justice and rights. Plaintiff also expressed to De La Cruz that these counseling memos to the Field Examiners were counterproductive and not justified and that the write-ups should st0p. 13. On or about February 10, 2012, Plaintiff was called into a meeting by the General Counsel and the Supervising Staff Counsel. They began asking Plaintiff questions about an older, experienced Field Examiner, Ray Val Verde. Mr. Val Verde was over 60 years old. Mr. Val Verde was clearly a target, as the General Counsel and Supervising Staff Counsel asked Plaintiff to watch over his work ethic and work habits. Plaintiff also defended Mr. Val Verde?s work ethic and emphasized that all of the Field Examiners at the of?ce work hard. Plaintiff made these statements in defense of Mr. Val Verde, despite Plaintiff?s understanding that he was being solicited to undermine Mr. Val Verde?s position. 14. On or about March 26, 2012, Mr. Val Verde resigned due to werk pressure. 4 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 15. Beginning shortly after Plaintist opposition to what he believed to be age discriminatory animus towards Mr. Val Verde and Ms. Alvarez, treatment of Plaintiff began to change at the of?ce. Plaintiff was subjected to a series of subtle and not-so-subtle adverse actions. 16. . During March, April and May of 20] 2, the new, young attorneys were given their own caseloads; were learning how to investigate and prepare cases; were learning how to write up the agenda memos; and meeting with the General Counsel and Supervising Staff Counsel on litigation. In contrast, during this time, no cases were assigned to Plaintiff. Instead, Plaintiff was assigned the task of cleaning out the storage by reviewing all the old ?les in the ?le room, and preparing an inventory of ?les that should be kept and ?les that should be sent for shredding. Plaintiff was instructed to physically move old cases from the of?ce file room to the rented storage room, on one Saturday morning, only to find that the storage room had been locked by the storage company due to the failure to pay the rental bill. Plaintiff had never before been assigned Such duties in his 12 plus years with the ALRB. During this time, Plaintiff was also assigned to perform miscellaneous Support work on various assignments. A 17. In early April 2012, General Counsel Sylvia Torres Guillen and Supervising Staff Counsel De La Cruz met with Plaintiff, and Field Examiners Pauline Alvarez, Victoria Torrez, and Veronica Cervantes in the Visalia Regional Of?ce?s conference room and congratulated Plaintiff on his leadership and accomplishment in leading a team of Field Examiners to close the old cases named Ukegawa and Kawano. The General Counsel also observed the several hundreds of documents that had been organized by this legal team and she expressly applauded the organization of these ?les and touted to this team the success in ?nally closing these investigations. These cases did not have any complete investigations for almost 30 years until Plaintiff led the investigations to ?le successful Motions to Close these cases. The success of Plaintiff?s leadership in closing these cases was minimized after this meeting. From October 2011 to April 2012, Plaintiff was the lead attorney in ?ling Motions to Close on all the remaining 5 DEMAND FOR JURY TREAL older cases where some were older than 30 years. All these cases required Plaintiff to review thousands of pages of documents that were contained in several boxes in the storage room and had previously been stored in the El Centro of?ce. Plaintiff had not been involved in any of these older cases before being assigned to investigate whether they needed to be closed. Plaintiff had to learn on these cases in just weeks, and had to review, evaluate, analyze, and prepare motions to close the cases. All the Motions to Close that Plaintiff ?led were granted by the Board. 18. Throughout the hiring of new attorneys from 2012 to the present, Plaintiff has never attended any of the new attorney training sessions given to the new attorneys and has never been provided any of the training binders and materials provided to new attorneys. 19. In late April and early May 2012, three new attorneys were hired at the Visalia Regional Of?ce. Of the new attorneys hired, Silas Shawver, an attorney under 40 years old and Caucasian with no previous agricultural labor relations experience, was hired at the Visalia Regional Office as an Assistant General Counsel. 20. Before the hiring of these new attorneys, from August 2011 to late April 2012, Plaintiff was the only attorney in the Visalia Regional Of?ce perf0rming all the legal work since General Counsel was appointed in August 2011. After the hiring of these new attorneys, Defendants? harassment and discriminatory conduct against Plaintiff intensi?ed through several unjust disciplinary measures to humiliate, denigrate, and coerce Plaintiff to quit his job. 21. Beginning in May, 2012, and after the hiring of the younger, and inexperienced new attorneys, Plaintiff began receiving unfair and unjust written criticisms regarding his legal writing and analysis, and abilities to investigate unfair labor practice charges for the ?rst time in his 14 1/2 year employment history with the ALRB. On May 30, 2012, Plaintiff received an Expectations Memo, which was a type of a ?Corrective Memo?, in which he received criticisms relating to written briefs and motions that had all been finished by March, 2012. ironically, on the same day that Plaintiff received this Expectations Memo, the ALRB issued and published a 6 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Board Decision regarding a case involving San Joaquin Tomato Growers, Inc, in the favor based on the criticized briefs. Plaintiff was the exclusive trial attorney for the ALRB in this trial. 22. Despite having over 12 years of litigation experience at the ALRB, and over 25 years= experience as an attorney in litigation, Plaintiff was never assigned to work in ALRB trials or hearings since General Counsel Torres-Guillen was appointed. Since Torres-Guillen has been the General Counsel, Plaintiff has never been asked to assist any of the new attorneys at hearings, deepite his experience and success in trials with the ALRB for the past 12 years. 23. At the end of May, 2012, Plaintiff was given his first Unfair Labor Practice Case by the new Supervising Staff Counsel De La Cruz. On June 15, 2012, Plaintiff was assigned the entire caseload of another attorney who had resigned. After being assigned these cases, Plaintiff was set up to fail by being given arbitrary deadlines by his supervisors, that were impossible to meet. Plaintiff believes that he has been the only attorney receiving these disciplinary measures despite other attorneys failing to meet similar arbitrary deadlines. 24. On July 20, 201.2, Plaintiff was issued another Corrective Memo when these unreasonable deadlines were not met. Plaintiff met with the Acting Regional Director Eduardo Blanco and the Supervising Staff Counsel De La Cruz to discuss the Corrective Memo. Plaintiff explained that he felt that he was being targeted; that the Corrective memo was unfair and unjust; and that there was clearly a hidden agenda for the write up. Plaintiff received no response. - 25. Two and a half months after this meeting, on about October 10, 2012, Plaintiff received a third Corrective Memo. The continuous harassing nature of these corrective, memos was obviously designed to pressure Plaintiff to quit, since there was virtually no time in the interim to overcome the pretextual criticisms. During the interim between these successive Corrective Memos, there were no meetings, no offers for training, no attempts to discuss any of the work that Plaintiff submitted and no constructive efforts whatsoever. Moreover, Plainti?? 7 DEMAND FOR JURY was the only attorney being written up, even though the cases of other, younger attorneys were also delayed. . 26. On November 6, 2012, Plaintiff received his ?rst perfonnance evaluation under the new supervision. Despite all the work that Plaintiff had performed during the past year, in litigating complex cases and closing out older cases of over 20 to 30 years, including receiving the successful May 30, 2012 San Joaquin Tomato Growers, Inc. published Board decision that awarded a makewhole amount of over $800,000 to over 700 farm workers, the largest ?nancial make-whole award received by the ALRB of?ce in memory, the evaluation contained only criticisms and failed to reflect any of Plaintiff?s accomplishments. Shortly thereafter, in December, 2012, Plaintiff settled a case for the highest individual back pay award for a single worker, an amount of 1 8,000, for the entire agency for that calendar year. Like Plaintiffs Board Decision, this settlement was never mentioned in connection with any of Plaintiff?s evaluations, at any time. Rather, the ALRB engaged in a pattern of continually minimizing Plaintiff?s work product, ignoring the numerous successes achieved for the farm workers and the state agency, all in a transparent attempt to remove the oldest remaining attorney and the only Asian~American in all of the regional of?ces. 27. On January 7, 2013, just 2 days after Plaintiff returned front the holiday vacation, and without any forewarning, Plaintiff was punished by being served with a 5% pay reduction for 12 mOnths. This pay reduction violated the union contract and was later rescinded. On January 22, 2013, Plaintiff ?led an internal complaint with the ALRB regarding the discrimination, harassment and retaliation to which he had been subj ected. Plaintiff's January 22, 2013 internal complaint was sent to General Counsel Sylvia Torres Guillen, Supervising Staff Counsel Alegria De La Cruz, Acting Regional Director Eduardo Blanco, Secretary of Labor and Workforce Development Marty Morgenstem, and Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. 28. Two days later, on January 24, 2013 Plaintiff was served with notice that he was being suspended for 3 weeks, to be served during the entire month of February. This adverse 8 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL action served to take away Plaintist entire salary for the month and constituted a severe ?nancial hardship and would have left Plaintiff with net eamings of just a few hundred dollars. Plaintiff, along with a union representative, participated in a Skelly Hearing, in which the Skelly Of?cer changed the suspension dates to lessen the economic hardship to Plaintiff. 29. Just weeks after Plaintiff was served with the 3~week suspension,-on about the last week of January 2013, defendant Shawver was promoted to Acting Regional Director of the Visalia Regional Office. Defendant Shawver had been with the ALRB for nine months when he was promoted to the ?Acting Regional Director?, the highest position at the Regional Office level. Plaintiff had been with the ALRB for almost 13 years at the time of Shawver?s promotion. 30. Just two weeks after returning from this unjust 3?week su5pension, on about March 26, 2013, Plaintiff received another Corrective Memo alleging other fabricated de?ciencies in cases where he had no responsibilities in working. Defendants? conduct in harassing Plaintiff forjust two weeks of work after Plaintiff returned after an unjust 3?week suspension was malicious with the intent to force Plaintiff to quit. 31. On or about March 2013, Plaintiff filed an EEOC claim alleging age, racial, and national origin discrimination against the ALRB regarding the unjust 3-week suspension. 32. On about April 2013, Plaintiff applied for the Associate General Counsel position, which was equitable to the Visalia Regional Director position and received a State Employment Ranking in the 95% in the level number 1 of applicants. 33. From the period from about January 2012 until May 2013, Plaintiff has been subject to continuous harassment by Defendants in his abilities to perform his work and has been subject to demeaning, disrespectful, humiliating conduct at staff meetings regarding case updates with other staff members, and during case update meetings with only the Defendants present with Plaintiff. 9 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL LaMay 2013, Plainti?? left the Visalia Regional Office for a 4-month Family Medical Leave. 35. In August, 2013, based on his ranking for the Associate General Counsel position, which was never ?lled, Plaintiff quali?ed for an interview for the position as Visalia Regional Director, a position he was well quali?ed to assume. In August 2013, Plaintiff interviewed for the Visalia Regional Director position. Only two attorneys interviewed for this position, Plaintiff and Silas Shawver. 36. Despite being the most experienced attorney with over 13 years at the agency, on about August 19, 2013, Plaintiff was denied the position of Regional Director in favor of Silas Shawver, an attorney with less than 15 months tenure at the agency and only 6 years of experience as a lawyer. 37. On October 1, 2013, Plaintiff returned to work at the Visalia Regional Of?ce after a 4+rnonth Family Medical Leave. From October 1, 2013 to the present, Shamrer has been the Visalia Regional Director and Plaintiff?s direct supervisor over all Plaintist cases and work reSponsibilities and has targeted Plaintiff with harassment and retaliation. 38. Since his return on October 1, 2013, Plaintiff was aware that cases that he had previOusly been assigned to before his 4-month Family Medical Leave and set for trial were not reassigned to him, but had been reassigned to younger attorneys. 39. On or about February 2014, Plaintiff ?led another EEOC claim for age, race, national origin, based on discriminatory promotion and harassment by defendant Shawver. 40. On May 1, 2014, Plaintiff was stripped of his title of Assistant General Counsel II, a position and title that he had held since 2003, over 11 years, and demoted two levels to the entry level position of Legal Counsel, the position he held 13 years earlier. The title of ?Legal Counsel? is the legal position that attorneys are hired as at the entry level. Despite having over 14 years? experience as a trial attorney with the ALRB, and over 26 years as a licensed attorney 10 DEMAND FOR JURY California, Plaintiff was now working as a ?Legal Counsel?, the title reserved for an entry level attorney at the ALRB. 41. Since his demotion, Plaintiff is aware that a new attorney was hired in January 2014 at the level of Assistant General Counsel. This new attorney is a 26 year old Caucasian man who was hired in January 2014 with only one month as an attorney and no prior agricultural labor relations law experience. At least four?additional attorneys, much younger than Plaintiff and with considerably less experience, have also been hired at the Visalia of?ce at position and salary levels equal to or higher than Plaintiff?s. All the new younger attorneys have had no prior agricultural labor relations law experience. . 42. Plaintiff has exhausted all of his administrative remedies, as required by statute. Plaintiff filed a timely charge of discrimination with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing An EEOC investigation has been initiated and remains on-going. As such, this action has been timely ?led under Gov. Code section 12965(d). FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (For Discrimination and Harassment Based on Age in Violation of California?s Fair Employment and Housing Act Against All Defendants) 43. Plaintiff refers to the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 42, inciusive, of this complaint, and by reference thereto, incorporates the same herein as though fully set forth. 44. Plaintiff is 56 years old. 45. The fact that Plaintiff is Over the age of forty was a subatantial factor in Defendants? treatment of Plaintiff, in unjustly criticizing Plaintiff?s performance, minimizing his accomplishments, stripping him of job duties, harassing, humiliating and suspending him, docking his pay, refusing to promote him and demoting him two levels to an entry level legal position. ll DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL. 46. Defendants stated that its conduct toward and treatment of Plaintiff was for reasons other than dismiminatitm and harassment based on age. The reasons stated are a pretext for discriminatiOn. 47. Defendants? discriminatory and harassing conduct constitutes unlawful discrimination in employment (in account of age in violation of Government Code 12940. 48. As a proximate result of Defendants? discriminatory and harassing actions against Plaintiff, as alleged above, Plaintiff has been harmed in that he has suffered the loss of wages, bene?ts, and additional amounts of money he would have received if he had not been demoted and denied promotion. As a result of such discrimination and consequent harm, Plaintiff has suffered economic damages in an amount according to proof at time of trial. 49. As a further proximate result of Defendants? discriminatory actions against Plaintiff, Plaintiff has been harmed in that he has suffered physical sickness, and resulting humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress. As a result of such discrimination and 00nsequent harm, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount according to proof at time of trial. 50. The above recited actions of Defendants in discriminating against and harassing Plaintiff based on his age were done with malice, fraud and/or oppression and in reckless diSregard of the rights of Plaintiff under the Fair Employment and Housing Act. Plaintiff is informed and believes and on that basis alleges that the discriminatory acts taken towards him were carried out by managing agents of ALRB, including Sylvia Torres-Guillen, Alegria De La Cruz, Silas Shawver, and Eduardo Blanco, and/or with the rati?cation and approval of of?cers, directors and/or managing agents of ALRB in a malicious, oppressive and fraudulent manner in order to harm Plaintiff, or with a willful and conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights, thereby causing him unjust hardship, humiliation and/or emotional distress. Such c0nduct was deepicable, and justifies an award of punitive damages against Defendants in an amount suf?cient to deter them from engaging in such conduct again in the future, in an amount according to proof at time of trial. 12 DEMAND FOR JURY TRJAL. IxSECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (For DiscriminatiOn and Harassment Based on Race and National Origin in Violation of California?s Fair Employment and Housing Act Against All Defendants) 51. Plaintiff refers to the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50, inclusive, of this complaint, and by reference thereto,incorporates the same herein as though fully set ferth. 52. ALRB is an employer that regularly employs ?ve (5) or more persons. 53. Plaintiff is an individual of Asian (Filipino) descent. He is the only Asian attorney or staff member in all the state-wide regional of?ces. 54. Defendants? conduct in unjustly criticizing Plaintiffs performance, minimizing his accomplishments, stripping him of his job duties, harassing, humiliating, suspending and docking his pay, refusing to promote him and demoting him two levels to an entry level attorney position, has been done, in part, because Plaintiff is of Asian descent. Defendants? conduct in so harassing and discriminating against Plaintiff violates the provisions of California Government Code section 12940, et seq. 55. As a proximate result of Defendants? discriminatory and harassing conduct against Plaintiff, Plaintiff has been banned in that he has suffered the loss of wages, bene?ts, and additional amounts of money he would have received if he had not been demoted and denied promotion, in an amount according to proof at time of trial. 56. As a further proximate result of Defendants? discriminatory and harassing conduct against Plaintiff, Plaintiff has been harmed in that he has suffered physical sickness and resulting humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress. As a result of such discrimination and consequent harm, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount according to proof at time of trial. 57. The above recited actions of Defendants in harassing and discriminating against Plaintiff were based, at least in part, on his race and national origin, and were done with malice, 13 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL fraud andlor oppression and in reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiff under the Fair Employment and Housing Act. Plaintiff is informed and believes and on that basis alleges that the discriminatory and harassing acts taken towards him were carried out by managing agents of ALRB, including Sylvia Torres-Guillen, Alegria De La Cruz, Silas Shawver, and Eduardo Blanco and/or with the rati?cation and approval of of?cers andfor managing agents of ALRB in a malicious, oppressive and fraudulent manner in order to harm Plaintiff, or with a willful and conscious disregard of Plainti??s rights, thereby causing him unjust hardship, humiliation and/ci- emotional distress. Such conduct was despicable, and justi?es an award of punitive damages against Defendants in an amount suf?cient to deter them from engaging in such conduct again in the future, in an amount according to proof at time of. trial. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (For Failure to?Take All Reasonable Steps to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment and Retaliation in Violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act Against Defendant Agricultural Labor Relations Board) 58. Plaintiff refers to the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 57, inclusive, of this Complaint, and by reference thereto incorporates the same herein as though fully set forth. - S9. Defendants failed to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination, harassment and retaliation, in violation of the provisions of Government Code Section 1294000. Defendants failed to ensure that Plaintiff would not suffer retaliation when he protested the age discriminatory treatment of his co-workers, failed to investigate or otherwise respond to Plaintiff?s complaints of discrimination, harassment and retaliation, and enabled management to continue and intensify their harassing, discriminatory and retaliatory conduct after Plaintiff's formal complaints. 14 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL AWN proximate result of Defendants? conduct, Plaintiff has been harmed in that he has suffered the loss of wages, bene?ts and additional amounts of money he would have received if he had not been demoted and denied promotion, in an amount according to proof at time of trial. 61. As a further proximate result of Defendants? conduct, Plaintiff has been harmed in that he has suffered physical sickness and resulting humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress. As a result of such discrimination and consequent harm, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount according to proof at time of trial. 62. Defendants? conduct was done with malice, fraud and/or oppression and in reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiff under the FEHA. Plaintiff is informed and believes and on that basis alleges that the retaliatory acts taken towards him were carried out by managing agents of ALRB, including Sylvia Torres~Guillen, Alegria De La Cruz, Silas Shawver, and Eduardo Blanco and/or with the rati?cation and approval of of?cers and/or managing agents of ALRB, in a malicious, oppressive and fraudulent manner in order to harm Plaintiff, or with a willful and conscious disregard of Plaintiff?s rights, thereby causing him unjust hardship, humiliation and/or emotional distress. Such conduct was despicable and justi?es an award of punitive damages against Defendants in an amount suf?cient to deter them from engaging in such conduct again in the future, in an amount according to proof at time of trial. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION (For Retaliation in Violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act Against All Defendants) 63. Plaintiff refers to the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 62, inclusive, of this Complaint, and by reference thereto incorporates the same herein as though fully set forth. 64. After Plaintiff protested Defendants? discriminatory stance towards his co- workers, and then protested the discrimination and harassment against himself, Defendants 15 DEMAND FORJURY TRIAL retaliated against Plaintiff by unjustly criticizing Plaintiff?s performance, minimizing his accomplishmtents, stripping him of his job duties, harassing and humiliating him, susPending him, refusing to promote him and demoting him by two levels. 65. Defendants? conduct constitutes unlawful retaliation in violation of California Government Code 12940. 66, As a proximate result of Defendants? retaliatory actions against Plaintiff, as alleged above, Plaintiff has been banned in that he has suffered the loss of wages, benefits, and additional amounts of money he would have received if he had not been demoted and denied promotion, in an amount according to proof at time of trial. . 67. As a further proximate result of Defendants? retaliatory actions against Plaintiff, Plaintiff has been harmed in that he has suffered physical sickness and resulting humiliatiOn, mental anguish and emotional distress. As a result of such retaliation and consequent harm, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount according to proof at time of trial. 68. Defendants? retaliatory conduct was done with malice, fraud and/or oppression and in reckless diSregard of the rights of Plaintiff under the Fair Employment and Housing Act. Plaintiff is informed and believes and on that basis alleges that the retaliatory acts taken towards him were carried out by managing agents of ALRB, including Sylvia Torres-Guillen, Alegria De La Cruz, Silas Shawver, and Eduardo Blanco and/or with the rati?cation and approval of of?cers, directors and/or managing agents of ALRB in a malicious, oppressive and fraudulent manner in order to harm Plaintiff, or with a willful and conscious disregard of Plaintiff?s rights, thereby causing him unjust hardship, humiliation andfor emotional distress. Such conduct was despicable, and justi?es an award of punitive damages against Defendants in an amount suf?cient to deter them from engaging in such conduct again in the future, in an amount according to proof at time of trial. 16 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - r?J?l C) PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants, and each of them, as follows: FIRST THROUGH FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION: 1. For compensatory damages, including lost earnings and other employment bene?ts in an amount according to proof at time of trial; 2. For damages for emotional distress, humiliation and mental anguish in an amount according to proof at time of trial; 3. For punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish Defendants and to deter others from engaging in similar conduct; 4. For attorney?s fees pursuant to California Government code ?12965(b); 5. For injunctive relief, including without limitation, a requirement that Defendants, under court supervision, conduct training for all employees, supervisors and management on the requirements of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, the rights and remedies of those who allege a violation of the FEHA, and the employer?s internal grievance procedure; 6. For injunctive relief restraining Defendants from engaging in any further acts of discrimination or retaliation against employees over the age of 40, or against employees based on their race and/or national origin; 7. For such further inj unctive relief as the court may deem appropriate to both prevent and deter unlawful employment practices and redress the adverse effects of those practices on plaintiff and other aggrieved persons; ALL CAUSES OF ACTION: 8. For interest on unpaid wages, lost earnings, lost bene?ts and emotional distress damages at the prevailing legal rate from the date of breach as proved at time of trial; 13. For attorney?s fees and costs of suit incurred herein; and i7 DEMAND FORJURY 14. For such other and ?thher relief as the Court may deemjust and proper. DATED: September a ,2014 ALEXANDER, LLP GREENBE A. IRIS WEINMANN JANE TANIMURA Attorneys for Plaintiff FRANCISCO T. ACERON, IR. 18 DEMAND OR JURY TRIAL DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Plaintiff demands a jury trial. DATED: September ,2014 ALEXANDER, GLICK LLP PAW. MBERG IRIS WEINMANN JANE Attorneys for Plaintiff FRANCISCO T. ACERON, JR. d:AccrorUComplainLdac 19 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL . . . ?In Cahoots? The Illegal Relationship Between ALRB Lawyers and the UFW Page 1 of 4 ?Share News Sources Editorials Columnists Websites Blog Roll Resources FR Info FR Blog Because Campaigns Monet ?tn Cahoots? - The Relationship Between ALRB Lawyers and the UFW Posted by Katy Grimes at 9:40 pm on Jun 09,2015 One of the most significant labor relations fights in the country is currently taking piece in California?s Central Valley. The California state agency mandated by law to be an impartial farmworkers? advocate between employers and unions is "in cahoots" with the United Farm Workers labor union. At issue are the iegal tactics and scruples of the Caiilornia Agricultural Labor Relations Board. Protecting A state superior court judge told an Agricuitural Labor Relations Board attorney fTaglaagefS in 2013 that it appeared they were ?in cahoots" with the United Farm Workers or ears labor union. Even an independent investigation has confirmed that this Since being appointed ALRB General Counsei in 201?] by Gov. Jerry Brown. I'Rgu Sytvia Torres?Guill?n has transformed her of?ce from ineffective but impartial Workers? advocate to a hive of United Farm Workers activist attorneys. 5 That advocacy is against the Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975, which mandates the ALRB to be completely impartial between employers and unions. By openly favoring the UFW, Torres-Guillen and her staff are violating the iaw. Rm My?esggneetothe rs A study of the ALRB activist iawyers? professional conduct and social networking shows that some of Torres-Guill?n?s attorneys have lifeiong mm relations with the UFW in ways that threaten the board?s credibility and Flash authority. As far back as August. 2013, California Superior Court Judge Jeffrey Y. Hamilton, Jr., took ALRB Regional Director Silas Shawver to task for working overtime to stop farmWorkers from voting on whether or not to decertify the UFW as their collective bargaining representative. Judge Hamilton accused Shawver of ?overreach? of his legal authority in trying to stop the vote. ?So the ?g 1% 193:; Court is very suspect of, one, the ALRB's position here," Hamilton said. "It almost seems like it?s in i mes cahoots" with the UFW. ?And the Court finds it very troubling that the ALRB is taking such a position, especiain sitting in a prosecutorial rote," he told Shawver. who is a lawyer. ?That is a role you should not be mm taking when you sit as a prosecutor." A search of pubiicly availabte sociai media sites and donor records show ciose personal relationships between ALRB tawyers hired under Torres-Guill?n, and the UFW, and UFerelated causes. Torres~Guill?n, in her present position as ALRB General Counsei, was the keynote speaker at the UFWs Hm 50th anniversary gala in 2012. Perched before a Cesar Chavez portrait, she piedged to the union that she woutd ?regain their trust." Speaking at a 2015 forum marking the 40m anniversary of the ALRB. Torres? Guill?n quoted glowineg from Chavez. One popular photo shows ALRB attorney Jessica -- Arciniega, ALRB Regional Director Alegria de la mm Cruz, and ALRB General Counsel Syivia Torres~ Caggmiammagwg Guiti?n in a celebratory photo with UFW attorney Mario Martinez and a UFW organizer who is giving the thumbs-up. {photo -- Arciniega was Facebook friends with UFW Vice 4mm President Armando Elenes. She is shown in a photo on the UFWs Facebook page as a ieader of a UFW street protest, carrying the union's red banner. g/2O 1 5 06/ . . 1/22/2016 ?In Cahoots? The Illegal Relationship Between ALRB Lawyers and the UP ?etr'Abmt the L058 0! saw invatment l? ti Pension Reform Seat in the 91855 cm 3W l2 JUST HOW lCl?t l3fo HOW WE S9ERD, mm Saggmegto?s Tom 'The - to Metro? t?y segret ?ml . ill is meated at last Donatd Trumg Arnold Smwarzemge; Click here to blog Photo 1 A third~generation UFW supporter, since childhood de la Cruz has been steeped in UFW activism and organizing. She is the granddaughter of the fate Jesse de la Cruz, an early female organizer of the UFW a halfscentury ago. Both her parents ?were also weft-known and active UFW organizers,? acoording to a 2013 complaint before a California superior court by Anthony Raimondo, an attorney for farm laborer Francisco Napoles. ?In fact, her parents met on a campaign for the UFW and later married,? Raimondo said ?When Photo 3 Chavez when she was a seven-year-old child: (Photo 2) Another photo shows Arciniega wearing a UFW nametag. (Photo 3; Arclniega is at right) The ALRB has two regional directors, both of whom are attorneys: Alegria de la Cruz, who runs the Salinas office; and Silas Shawver, who heads the of?ce in Visaiia. Both worked together on the Catifornia Rural Legal Assistance. A report filed with the California superior court alleges that Shawver is the godfather of de la Cruz's child, Salinas Regional Director Alegria de la Cruz: 3rd generation UFW Photo 2 speaking of her upbringing, Ms. Dela Cruz boasted that her parents ?were both organizers and raised four kids in the movement. By the time i was old enough to waEk and talk, i was doing outreach in front of supermarkets, cotiecting stgnatures on petitions.? A photograph posted online shows de la Cruz as an infant, being held in Cesar Chavez?s lap_ (see Photo 4) Her brother appears on another soctal media page with a large UFW logo tattooed across his back. the 2006 CRLA Annual Report, de la Cruz recalied her relations with UFW founder Cesar "Tell me who your grandparents are, Alegria," Chavez would ask her repeatedly, pointedly, as if preparing her for an exam, "My parents, they're farm workers and organizers.? "Your parents, who are your parents?? "My parents are organizers." ?What about you, Alegria? What are you going to be?? "i don?t know," she?d say, a typical response of any child age 7 or so. But he wouldn?t let her off that easy, tell you, Alegria. You?re going to be a lawyert Because the next step to organizing is the law. We need people who understand where we come from to be lawyers, judges, and legislators." Alegria de la Cruz did j?ust what Chavez predicted and grew up to become a lawyerr While ALRB Photo 4 Regionaf Director in Salinas, de la Cruz was Facebook friends with UFW Vice President Armando Elenesr She donated to a Kickstarter.com groiect to make "Cesar?s Last Fast,? a dooumentary t?onizing UFW founder Cesar Chavez, De la Cruz argued in front of Judge Hamilton to force the UFW contract on Gerawan employees, while a thousand ofthe workers were outside the courtroom opposing it, Page 2 of 4 1 5/06/0 1/22/201 6 ?In Cahoots? The Illegal Relationship Between ALRB Lawyers and the UFW Page 3 of 4 De la Cruz operates a separate Facebook page under the pseudonym Valencia Gael, On that page, she is friends with UFW Vice President Armando Eienes and UFW President Arturo S. Rodriguez. ALRB Visaiia Regional Director Silas Shawver?s UFW ties On his Facebook page, Shawver is friends with UFW National Vice President Armando Elenes, former UFW regional director Gustavo Aguirre, UFW labor organizer Yolanda Chacon, UFW representative Eri Fernandez, UFW external organizer Reyna Madrigal Casteltanos, UFW organizer Maria Gallegos Martinez, UFW organizer and campaign coordinator Jennifer Hernandez, UFW organizer Lupe Martinez, and UFW Foundation Executive Director Diana Teiiefson. David Bacon, a former UFW organizer who is now a writer for Al Jazeera and who has covered the Gerawan farmworker controversy for the Qatar?owned propaganda outiet, is also a Facebook friend of Shawver. (The Qatar government and ruling royal family ban labor unions in their country.) Shawver?s Facebook page says he lives in Mexico City. His Facebook friends are not visible to those who are not among his 710 listed friends. Photos of Shawver on a former girlfriend?s Flickr page show the ALRB attorney performing acrobatics while wearing a UFW shirt. (Photo 5) photos have become the subject of a YouTube video and animated graphics casting doubt on Shawver?s impartiality as an ALRB regional director and attorney. Torres?GuiEl?n?s UFW activist hiring strategy ALRB General Counsel strategy to hire UFW loyalists in her rapidly expanded staff of lawyers ?rst came to light in 2013. in a situation similar to the better-known Gerawan Farming union decertification controversy, workers at Arnaudo Brothers, a San Joaquin Valley asparagus grower, tried to fight the resurgent UFW after the union had ~i abandoned the farmworkers for nearly three decades. Francisco Napoles, a field laborer at Arnaudo Brothers, petitioned the state superior court to block the ALRB from forcing a UFW contract on him and his fellow workers. in his court filing, Napoles alleged that "the ALRB has adopted a specific hiring strategy to staff the Regional Offices with individuats who are closely aligned with the UFW, and in some cases, tied closely to each other, for the purpose of creating a closed cadre of individuals who will pursue a pro-UFW agenda.? Photo 5 He specifically referenced Alegria de la Cruz, whose behavior he described in the complaint as very similar to the behavior subsequently documented about de la Cruz?s comrade regional director in Visalia, Shawver, in his campaign against Gerawan workers, Napoles? petition showed information that ?longer term staff who have been willing to align themselves with the organizational goals have done so to protect their careers, while those who refuse to be beholden to the UFW are marginalized and/or forced out of the agency, As a result, the ALRB has created a culture at the Regional Office where protecting the UFW is considered one and the same as protecting the rights of farm workers." Tags: Alegria la Cruz, ALRB, Anthony; Raimondo, Arturo S. Rodriguez, Ca?i?ornia, California Legislature, Cesar Chavez= CRLA, Democrats, farm workers, Gerawan Farming, Government, Jerry Brown, Jessica Arciniega, Katy Grimes, labor unions, Mario Martinez, organized labor, S?ias Shawver, Superior Court, Syivia Torres-Guillen, UFW, Unions This entry was posted on Tuesday, June 9th. 2015 at 9:40 pm and is filed under Bing Posts. Previous Post Next Post 1/22/2016 ?In Cahoots? The Illegal Relationship Between ALRB Lawyers and the UFW Page 4 of 4 8 Comments 8011 by Tat Cloud - President at Paper, Pulp Film Amazing thatALRB is still not counting the ballots. Like 4 Reply A i: 1 Jun 10, 2015 10:26am Jesse Rojas Business Development at REDtrac I cannot beiieve this is our state of California. Corrupted at around by unions and bureaucrats in all agencies. Where are the rights of the peopie? 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Sacramento CA 85823 ?ective Date Period of Contract Inde?n?e 01/01/2015 Agencies to be Lobbied State of Finance Descri ti_on of Employer?s Lobbying interests Leg/s ation related to charitable donations,job training and employment Employer's Name, Address and Telephone Number United Farm Workers Keene CA 93531 Effective Date Period of Contract 01/01/2015 Indefinite Agencies to be Lobbied State Legislature Governor,De t. of Finance Agricultural Labor Reiations Board, galifomia Labor 8? Workforce evelopment Agency,Ca:1forn:a Health Human - entices Agency Descrilption of Employer's Lobbying interests Legis ation related to agricu tural employees Employer?s Name, Address and Teiephone Numbear American Civil Liberties Union of Northern Caiifornia Sacramento CA 95814 Effective Date Period of Contract Indefinite 01/01/2015 Agencies to be Lobbied State Le islature,G.overnor,Department of Finance,State Board of Education,De - partmen of Education Descri tipn oiEmployer?s Lobbying lnterests L_e is ation reiated to k-12 education and c1v1i rig Empioyer?s Name, Address and ielephone Number American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California Sacramento CA 95814 Effective Date Period of Contract 01/01/2015 ?de?nite Agencies to be Lobbied State Le istature,G.overnor,Department of Finance,State Board of Education,De - partmen of Education Description of Empioyer's Lobbying interests . L_e {station related to k-12 education and Hg 5 Version3.8 FPPC Form 601 (7/98) For Technical Assistance: 916/322-5660 Lobbying Firm Registration Statement Type or Print in ink NAME OF FIRM: RICHARD 5/5 ll Lobbyist Employers SECTION A (Continued) Empioyer?s Name, Address and Telephone Number Effective Date Period of Contract American Federation of State,County and Municipai Employees Locai 3299 Inde?nite 04/13/2015 Description of Empioyer's Lobbying interests Oakland CA 94612 Labor Union Agencies to be Lobbied State Legisiature,Governor's Of?ce FPPC Form 601 (7198) For Technicai Assistance: 9161322?5660 Version3.8 REPORT OF LOBBYING FIRM (Government Code Section 86114) REPORT COVERS PERIOD FROM 07/01/2014 THROUGH 09/30/2014 FORM 625 CUMULATIVE 1:512:00 01/01/2013 1990 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TYPE OR PRINT IN INK A AMENDMENT 001 For information required to be provided to you pursuant to the information Practices Act of 1977, see i i I rovsi Polii Rform ct. AMF LOBBING FIRM: RICHARD BUSINESS ADDRESS: (Number and Street) (City) (State) (Zip Code) TELEPHONE NUMBER: CA 95811 MAILING ADDRESS: (if different than above) PART (Read the instructions on the reverse before compieting this section. Then. check on_e_0f the boxes below and complete Part PARTNERS, OWNERS, OFFICERS, OR EMPLOYEES WHOSE (FORM 615) ARE ATTACHED TO THIS REPORTDB PARTNERS, OWNERS, OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES WHO ENGAGED IN DIRECT COMMUNICATION ON AT LEAST FIVE 0 SEPARATE OCCASIONS DURING THE PERIOD Richard Ross If more space is needed, check box and attach continuation sheets. SUMMARY OF PAYMENTS THIS PERIOD A. GRAND TOTAL PAYMENTS RECEIVED: 33750.00 E. CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS MADE: i (From SmeIaIs In Part 0 IE None This Period Part EV Completed and Attached B. TOTAL EXPENSES: 0.00 (From Part ill, Section A, 3) 0- TOTAL PAYMENTS TO OTHER 17250-00 F. ES THE FIRM A MEMBER OF A LOBBYING LOBBYING FIRMS: (From Pan m' seam B) No Yes (Complete and attach Form 630) D, GRAND TOTAL PAYMENTS MADE: 5 17250.00 (B C, above) VERIFICATION I have used all reasonable diligence in preparing this Report. I have reviewed the Report and to the best of my knowl? edge the information contained herein and in the attached schedules is true and complete. I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (Date) At (City and State) By (Signature of Responsible Of?cer) 1 1/05/2014 Sacramento,CA Richard Ross Name of Responsible Of?cer (Type or Print) Title Richard Ross Owner Version3.B 2l9 PERIOD COVERED: 07/01/2014 09/30/2014 NAME OF LOBBYING FIRM: ROSS: RICHARD PART II - PAYMENTS RECEEVED IN CONNECTION WITH LOBBYING ACTIVITY (Amounts may be rounded offto whole doiiars. See Instructions on reverse.) Employer's Name, Address and Telephone Number American Federation of State,County and Municipal Employees Local 3299 Oakland CA 94612 Legislative or State Agency Administrative Actions "Activeiy" Lobbied During the Period. (See instructions on reverse.) None Fees and Reimbursements of Advances or Other Payments Total This Cumulative Retainers Expenses (attach explanation) Period Totai to Date 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16000.00 Empioyer's Name, Address and Telephone Number Sacramento CA 95814 Legislative or State Agency Administrative Actions "Actively" Lobbied During the Period. (See instructions on reverse. AB 116 2355. SB 1048,58 1270. State Legislature,Governor?s Of?ce ,Department of Finance,Department of Conservation,State Mining and Geology Board Fees and Reimbursements of Advances or Other Payments Totai This Cumulative Retainers Expenses (attach explanation) Period Total to Date 11250.00 5 0.00 0.00 11250.00 78750.00 Employer?s Name, Address and Telephone Number California Attorneys Association Sacramento CA 95814 Legisiative or State Agency Administrative Actions "Actively" Lobbied During the Period. (See instructions on reverse.) State Legisiature: regulations for Return to Work Fund Fees and Reimbursements of Advances or Other Payments Total This Cumuiative Retainers Expenses (attach explanation) Period Totai to Date 12000.00 0.00 0.00 12000.00 132000.00 If more space is needed, check box and attach continuation sheets SUBTOTAL 3 33750.00 3/9 PERIOD COVERED: 07/01/2014 09/30/2014 NAME OF LOBBYING FIRM: RICHARD PART - PAYMENTS MADE IN CONNECTION WITH LOBBYING ACTIVITIES SECTION A: ACTIVITY EXPENSES (See instructions on reverse.) 1. ACTIVITY EXPENSES ARRANGED, INCURRED, OR PAID BY THE LOBBYING FIRM (OTHER THAN THOSE PAID OR INCURRED BY A LOBBYIST) Name and Of?cia! Position . . Date Name and Address of Payee of Reportable Persons and Desc?ptlo? OI TetaI Arnlount Amount Bene?ting Each Consuderation of Actiwty Reference No: If more space is needed, check box and attach continuation sheets TOTAL SECTION A. 1. (Include all subtotais from Continuation Sheets) 0.00 2. TOTAL ACTIVITY EXPENSES PAID, INCURRED, OR ARRANGED BY ALL LOBBYISTS EMPLOYED BY THE LOBBYING FIRM WHICH HAVE BEEN OR WILL BE REIMBURSED OR PAID BY THE FIRM. 0?00 3. TOTAL ACTIVITY EXPENSES (Section A, Parts 1 2) 0 00 4/9 COVERED: 07/01/2014 09/30/2014 NAME OF LOBBYING RJCHARD PART - PAYMENTS MADE (Continued) SECTION B: PAYMENTS MADE TO OTHER LOBBYING FIRMS Name Name, Address and Telephone Wh yt ct ien or Amount Cumulative Number of Firm Contracted With ?m "3 was This Period Total to Date Retained to Lobby Goodwiil Industries of Sacramento Speranza 055 Vailey and Northern Nevada,inc. 0.00 7000.00 Sacramento CA 95811 Esperanza Ross Jack Londen 6000 00 42000 00 Sacramento CA 95811 Espe'anza Rm 11250 00 56250 00 Sacramento CA 95811 TOTAL PAYMENTS 172500 If more space is needed, check box and attach (inciude at! subtotals continuation sheets. from continuation sheets) PART 3V - CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS MADE (Monetary and non-monetary campaign contributions of $100 or more made to or on behalf of state candidates, elected state of?cers and any of their controlied committees, or committees supporting such candidates or of?cers must be reported in A or below.) A- If the contributions made by you during the period covered by this report, or by a committee you sponsor, are contained in a campaign disciosure statement which is on ?le with the Secretary of State, report the name of the committee and its identi?cation number, if any, beiow. Name of Major Donor or Recipient Committee Which Has Fited A Identi?cation Number if Campaign Disclosure Statement: Recipient Committee: B. Contributions of $100 or more which have not been reported on a campaign disclosure statement, inciuding contributions made by an organization's sponsored committee, must be itemized below. ID. Number if Amount Date Name of Recipient . Committee If more space is needed, check box and attach continuation sheets. NOTE: Disclosure in this report does not reiieve a flier of any obligation to file the campaign disclosure statements required by Gov. Code Section 84200, et seq. 5/9 PERIOD COVERED: 07/01/2014 09/30/2014 NAME OF LOBBYENG FIRM: ROSS: RICHARD PART II PAYMENTS RECEIVED IN CONNECTION WITH LOBBYING ACTIVITY (Amounts may be rounded off to whole dollars. See instructions on reverse.) Employer's Name, Address and Telephone Number Goodwill industries of Sacramento Valiey and Northern NevadaJnc. Sacramento CA 95623 BFsi?'t?e' 606015 1116 Period. (see instructions on reverse.) State Legislature re: sub-minimum wage Fees and Reimbursements of Advances or Other Payments Total This Cumulative Retainers Expenses (attach explanation) Period Total to Date 15 1500.00 0.00 0.00 1500.00 5 8500.00 Employer's Name, Address and Telephone Number United Farm Workers Keene CA 93531 Period. (See instructions on reverse.) SB 1474,38 870. State Office Department of Labor Workforce Development Agency, grlcuitural Labor Relations Board,Health and Hum an Services Agency Fees and Reimbursements 0f Advances or Other Payments Total This Cumulative Retainers Expenses (attach explanation) Period Total to Date 3000.00 55 0.00 0.00 3000.00 5 16000.00 Employer?s Name, Address and Teiephone Number Jack Londen San Francisco CA 94122 Period. (See instructions on reverse.) SB 1172. State Legislature Fees and Reimbursements of Advances or Other Payments Totai This Cumulative Retainers Expenses (attach explanation) Period Total to Date 6000.00 5 0.00 0.00 6000.00 66000.00 PAGE SUBTOTAL 1050000 VersionlB AMENDMENT TO LOBBYING DISCLOSURE REPORT 5/9 FOR USE BY FILE RS AMENDING REPORTS FILED PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT CODE 86100-86117 FORM 690 1990 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TYPE OR IN INK A For information required to be provided to you pursuant to the Information Practices Act of 1977. see Information 3 Manual gn Prgyisigns gf the Politiggl Agt. NAME OF FILER: RICHARD NAME OF EMPLOYER OR FIRM: (If this amendment is being filed by a lobbyist) BUSINESS ADDRESS OF FILER: (Number and Street) (City) (Zip Code) TELEPHONE NUMBER: SACRAMENTO CA 9581 ?l (The information required must correspond to the information provided on the original report filed.) 1. The following information amends the lobbying disciosure report Form No. F625 executed on 10/17/2014 (Mo. Day - Year) for the period 07/01/2014 to 09/30/2014 2. Amended information affects items on Part(s) Ii Section(s) 3. Describe changes below. Remove $6,000 from - reported iast quarter VERIFICATION i have used reasonable diligence in preparing this Amendment. I have reviewed the Amendment and to the best of my knowiedge the information contained herein is true and complete. I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. ExeCuted on (Date) 1 1/05/20 14 At (City and State) Sacramento,CA By (Signature of Filer) Richard Ross Name of Filer (Type or Print) Richard Ross Titie Owner Version3.3 TEXT AN NOTATION PAGE 2 Schedule F625P2 Reference No: 2 PAGE 2 Scheduie F625P2 Reference No: 3 PAGE 4 Schedufe F625PSB Reference No: 8 CAL2PDF Version3.8 TEXT ANNOTATION PAGE 4 Schedule F625PBB Reference No: 9 PAGE 4 Schedule F625P3B Reference No: 10 PAGE 5 Schedule F625P2 Reference No: 5 CAL2PDF Version 3.8 TEXT ANNOTATION PAGE 5 Schedule F625P2 Reference No: 6 5 Schedule F625P2 Reference No: 7 Version3.8 (Pagel of 12) Recipient Committee Campaign Statement Cover Page (Government Code Sections 84200-842165] covee PAGE I Date Stamp a a RECEIVED .- from 10/20/2002 12/31/2002 Data of election if 2 Month, Day. Year) or Official Use Only JAN 3 2833 .4 1 . Type of Recipient Committee: All Committees - Complete Parts 1. 2, 3, and 4. Of?ceholder. Candidate Controiied Committee Ballot Measure committee 0 State Candidate Election Committee 0 Primarily Formed Fiecaii Controlied {Aim Complete Pan 5.) 0 Sponsored (Also Complete Part 5.) General Purposa Committee 0 Sponsored 0 Small Contributor Committee 0 Political Party/Central Committee Primarily Formed Candidate! Officeholder Committee (Aloe Gambia Part 7.) to. f?nr ?ecrmType of Stat Pro?election Statement Quarterly Statement SpeciaiOdd-Year Report Supplemental Pro-election Statement - Attach Form 495 Semi~annuai Statement [3 Termination Statement [3 Amendment (Explain below) . . LD. NUMBER 3. Committee Information 9 8 1 92 9 COMMITTEE NAME Genevieve Shiroma for SMUD Board STREET Aoo?'?ss mo 9.0. 30x1 i 555 Capitol Mall. Suite 1425 STATE it? cooE Sacramento CA 95 8 14 ADDRESS N0. AND STREET on v.0. eox AREA (916) 442-2952 CITY STATE CODE AREA CODEIFHONE OPTIONAL: ADDRESS Treasurerls) NAME OF TREASURER Michael D. Abbott: ADDRESS 2337 Portola Way CITY STATE Sacramento CA CODE 95813 CODEIPHONE (916) 454*5398 NAME OF ASSESTANT TREASURER. IF ANY MAILING AoonEss STATE ZIP CODE AREA CODEIPHONE FAME-MAIL ADDRESS 4. Verification i have used all reasonable in preparing and reviewing this statement and to the best of my knowledge the information contairied herein and in the attached schedules is true and complete. certin under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is 2g, 2423 lDetl 912' I '5 Data Executed on 4 Executed on Exewted on By -"?0vowirL 539nm.? Curlew? 4 0mm. tuition. item Mame Propenant or Reaper-mole Of?cer of Smear - run: of Wit Treasurer Date Executed on By . Date Star-rm. 95mm- of omw??i?m, Mm, sum Manure mm wiring Of?ceholder. W. State Propane-n FPPC Form 460 lJunelOll State of California (Page 2 of 12) Recipient Committee Campaign Statement Cover Page Part 2 COVER PAGE - PART 2 ?l1 5. Officeholder or Candidate Controlled Comm?rttee NAME OF OFFICEHOLDER OR CANDIDATE Genevieve ShirOma OFFICE SOUGHT on HELD IINCLUDE LOCATION AND DISTRICT NUMBER IF APPLICABLE) Board of Directors, SMUD, Ward 4 RESIDENTIALIBUSIMESS ADDRESS (NO. AND STREET) CITY STATE ZIP 2337 Portola Way Sacramento CA 95818 Related Committees Not Included in this Statement: committee: not lndudedin We 3mm that are canMedby you orare primer?y fonmdto receive contributions or make expenc?rmee on behalf of canddecy. COMMITTEE NAME ID. NUMBER NAME OF TREASURER CONTROLLED [1 ?155 N0 COMMITTEE ADDRESS . STREET ADDRESS (NO P.O. BOX) CITY STATE ZIP CODE AREA CODEIPHONE COMMITTEE NAME LD. NUMBER NAME OF TREASURER CONTROLLED [Ives NO COMMITTEE ADDRESS STREET ADDRESS (NO P.D. BOX) CITY STATE ZIP CODE AREA 6. Ballot Measure Committee NAME or BALLOT MEASURE BALLOT NO. OFI LETTER JURISDICTION SUPPORT omse Identify the controlling Of?ceholder, candidate, or state measure proponent, if any. NAME OF OFFICEHOLDER. CANDIDATE on. OFFICE SOUGHT OR HELD DISTRICT NO. IF ANY 7. Primarin Formed Committee Letmmas of o?cehalderl?s} or underarm; for which We committee is fanned. NAME OF OFFICEHOLDER on CANDIDATE OFFICE SOUGHT on HELD - SUPPORT OPPOSE NAME OF OFHCEHOLDEII on CANDIDATE OFFICE SOUGHT on HELD SUPPORT OPPOSE NAME OF OFFICEHOLDER OR CANDIDATE OFFICE SOUGHT OR HELD SUPPORT [j OPPOSE NAME OF on CANDIDATE OFFICE souem on HELD SUPPORT OPPOSE Attach con?rmation sheets if necessary FPPC Form 460 State of California of 12) Campaign Disclosure Statement Summary Page from Statementcoverlperiod 10/20/2002 ?009,, 12/31/2002 SUMMARY PAGE Page l2 of NAME OF FILER Genevieve Shiroma for SMUD Board 1.0. NUMBER 98 1 92 9 Contributions Received Phid'd'lo Monetary Contributions . .. Schend A, an; 3 Loans Received Schedule 8, Line 7 SUBTOTAL CASH CONTRIBUTIONS .. 1 2 Nonmonetary Contributions Schedule c, Line 3 TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED Addtinass 4 Expenditures Made 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Expenditures Made SdreduIe 5.10144 Loans Made Schedule H, Line 7 SUBTOTAL CASH PAYMENTS Accrued Expenses (Unpaid Billsl .. ScheduleF, Linea Add Lines 6 7 Nanrnonetary Adjustment TOTAL EXPENDITURES MADE Schedule 0, Line 3 aunt-neuruu-nnla.? Addiinm?? .9 +10 Column A TOTAL THIS PERIOD IFRW SCHEDULESI 6,331.00 0.00 6,331.00 0.00 6,331.00 2,454.51 0.00 2,454.51 0.00 0.00 2,454.51 Cohmn YEAH TOTAL TO DATE 35,881.00 0.00 35,881.00 2,459.58 38,350.58 27,836.71 0.00 27,836.71 0.00 2,469.58 30,306.29 Current Cash Statement 12. 13. 14. 15. 16? Beginning Cash Balance . .. . Previous Summary Page, Line 15 Cash Receipts .. .. Miscellaneous Increases to Cash Schmidt! 1, Una 4' Cash Payments one. ENDING CASH BALANCE Addtinos 12 13 14, r5 if this is a termination sratemen r. Line 16? must be zero. Cqumn A, line 8 above 10,641.20 6,331.00 0.00 2,454.51 14,517.77 17. LOAN GUARANTEES RECEIVED Scheduie B, Parr 2 Cash Equivalents and Outstanding Debts 1-8. 19. Cash Equivalents .. Outstanding Debts .. Add Line 2 Line 9 In Cofumn a above 0.00 0.00 To calculate Column B. add amounts in Column A to the corresponding amounts from Column of your last report. Some amounts In Column A may be negative figures that should be subtracted form previous period amounts. If this is the first report being filed tor this calendar year, only carry over the amounts from Lines 2. 7. and 9 (it HHYI . Calendar Year Summary for Candidates Running in Both the State Primary and General Elections through 630 7/1 to Date 20. Contributions Received 21 . Expenditures Made 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Expenditure Limit Summary for State Candidates 22. Cumulatlve Expenditures Made' (If Subloct to Voluntary Expenditure Limit) Date of ElectiOn Tote! to Date wanna? ?Since Jam-dry 1, 2001. Amounts in this section may be different from amounts reported in Column B. FPPC Form 46011119101) of 12) Schedule SCHEDULEE Payments Made WOMEN from 10/20/2002 FORM Waugh 12/31/2002 PH \Llof I I.D.NUMBER 931929 NAME OF FILER Genevieve Shiroma for SMUD Board CODES: If one of the following codes accurately describes the payment, you may enter thecode. Otherwise, describe the payment. CMP campaign MBR member communications RAD radio airtime and production costs CNS campaign consultants MTG meetings and appearances RFD returned contributions CTB contribution (explain nonmonetaryr OFC office expenses . SAL campaign workers' salanes CVC civic donations PET petition circulating TEL Lv. or cable airtime and production costs candidate tilingiba?ot fees PHD phone banks TRC candidate travel. lodging and meals FND fundraising events POL polling and survey research TRS sta?'lspouse travel. lodging and meals independent eXpenditure supportinglopposing others (explain)" PDS postage, delivery and messenger services TSF transfer between committees of the same candidatelsponsor LEG legal defense PRO professional sennces (legal, accounting) VDT voter registratlon campaign literature and mailings PRT print ads WEB lnfonnation technology costs (intemet, e-mall) NAME AND ADDRESS OF PAYEE (IF coma-res. ALSO ENTER 1.0. CODE OF PAYMENT AMOUNT PAID Olson, Hagel 5e Fishburn LLP PRO 1,385.27 555 Capitol Mall, Suite 1425 Sacramento, CA 95814 Ross Communications Inc. RAD 1700 Street Sacramento, CA 95814 ?Payments that are contributions or independent expendimres must also be summarized on Schedule D. SUBTOTAL 2 454 . 51 Schedule Summary 1. Payments made this period of $100 or more. (Include all Schedule subtotalsUnitemized payments made this period of under $100 .. 0 - 00 3. Total interest paid this period on loans. (Enter amount from Schedule B, Part 2. Column (dl.l . .. 0 A 00 4.?Total payments made this period. (Add Lines 1, 2, and 3. Enter here and on the Summary Page. Column A, Line 6.) ..TOTAL 2 . 454 - 51 I FPPC Form 460 Form Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax Under section 501(c), 527. or 4947(a)(l) ol the Internet Revenue Code (exceptblack lung benefit trust or private foundation) OMB No 1545-0047 2006 Open to Public 323$;th The organization may have to use a copy at return to satisfy state reporting requirements. Inspection A For the 2005 catender year. or tax year beginning JAN 1 3 20 0 6 and ending DEC 3 1 6 Chou .r PM 6 Name 01 organization Employer identi?cation number ?mmMEASURE FOR LOWER Em ?izmces 87-0759436 Number and street (or P.0. box it man rs not delivered to street address) Room/suds Telephone number are. ems-555 CAPITOL HALL 1425 (916)442?2952 its". "221? City or town, state or country, and ZIP 4 mining method Cash Ana-uni return SACRAMNTO. CA 95814~4602 [3mm 0 Section 501(c)(3) organizations and nonexempt charitable trusts and 4 am notappmame to 59mm 527 organizamm ti Website: gN A Organization type (chad: outrun?) 501(c)( 4 Check here it the organization us not a 509(a)(3) supporting organization and us gross receipts are normally not more than $25,000. A return rs not required, but if the organtron must attach a completed Schedule A (Form 990 or 990-EZ). chooses to hie a return, be sure to file a complete return. Gross receipts: Add trnes_6b, Bb, 9t), and 10th line 12 [Part I) Revenue, Expenses, and Changes in Net Ass )4 (mean no) or E) 527 1,16%. 888. H(a) Is this a group return for : Yes [it No lt(b) it 'Yes,? enter number of athletes} NZA H(c) Eras Dun (It'ltlofattachailst) db H(d) st rsasaparateretarn le yan or- Elks gamzatron covered by a group ruhng? I Grcu Exam tron Number!? Check i it the organization rs not requrred to attach Sch. 0 (Form 990. 990-EZ. or ets or Fund Balances 1 Contributions, grits, grants, and amounts reserved: a Contributions to donor advrsed tunds ta Direct public support(not rnciudad on line ta54;: Indirect pubtrc support (not included on has 1a) 1c (32 (1 Government (grants) (not included on tine 1a) 1d 2 1 154 854. noncashS te 1 16%, 854. 2 Program servrce revenue including overnment tees and contracts (trom Part VII, ?ne 93) 2 a Membership dues and assessments 3 4 interest on sayings and temporary cash Investments 4 5 and Interest from secuntres 5 3 4 . 6 a Grass rents Ga Less: rentai expenses 6b on a, Net rental income or (toss). Subtract line 6b trom lrne Be 8c 3 7 Other investment income (describe 7 gs a Gross amount trom sales of assets other (A) Secerrtres (B) Other I than inventory Ba Less: cost or other basrs and sales expenses at: Gain or (loss) (attach schedule) so Net gain or (toss). Combine Il?? 8c, cotumns (A) and (0) 8d 9 Specrai events and (attach schedule). It any amount ts from gaming. check here I: 8 Gross revenue oreontnbubons reported on line 1b) 93 Less: direct expenses other than tundra:er expenses 9b Net mom or (loss) from specrat events. Subtract line 913 from (me 9a 94: 10 a Gross sales of inventory, less returns and ailowances 10a Less: cost of goods sold 10b Gross prolrt or (loss) from sales of inventory (attach schedule). Subtract tine 10b from [me 10a 10c 11 Other revenue (from Part Vii, trne 103) 11 12 total revenue. Adam is8d, 9c. 10c, and 11 12 1 1644 888 . a 13 Proram servrces(trom lrne 44, column Management and genera: (from trne 44, column ZUU7 (from lrne 44, coiumn :9 1 15 .3 16 Payments to af?liates (attach scheduie) 16 17 Total expenses. Add ?ms 16 and 44, column (A) AnnExcess or (deficit) lor the year. Subtract lrne 171mm line Net assets or fund batances at beginning of year (trom line 73, column $9 0 . 23 20 Other changes In net assets or fund balances (attach exptanatron) 20 0 . 21 Net assets or land balances at end at year. Combine tines 1831933? LHA For Privacy Act and Paperwork Reduction Act Notice. see the separate instructions. Form 990 (2006) 1 11070503 748144 922565 2006 . 05050 SMUD YES ON MEASURE 922565,?,1 SHUD YES 0N MEASURE FOR LOWER Form 990 2006 RATES 8 7 0 7 53.2% 3 5 P3923. ?Part II Statement of All organizatlons must complete cotumn (A). Columns (B), (C), and (D) are requtred for sechon 501(c)(3) Functional Expenses and (4) orgamzatlons and sectton 4947(a)(t) nonexempt charitahte trusts but ophonat tor others. matinazzfaz?'xfeaait ?mom (32:23:: witnesses? 223 Grants patd from donor adwsed funds (attach schedule) (cash sans 0 . if one armn: Includes toretgn pants, and: two 22a 22!! Other grants and allocations (attach schadute (cash a . 0 . noncasns 0 . If this amount mdudas faretgn pants. much have 22!: 23 Speci?c assistance to (attach schedule) 23 24 Benefits paid to or for members (attach schedule) 24 25: Compensation of current officers, drrectors, key employees, etc. listed Compensatlon ot former of?cers, directors, key empl0yees, etc. ltsted In Part V-B (25b Compensatzon and other not included above, to dtsquahlted persons (as de?ned under section 4958(l)( and persons described In sectlon 4958(c)(3)( B) . (go 26 Salaries and wages of employees not Included on ltnes 253, b, and 26 27 Penelon ptan contnbuttons not mctuded on lines 25a, b, and 27 28 Empioyee bene?ts not Included on lInes 25a - 27 28 29 Payroll taxes 29 30 Prolessuonal fees 30 31 fees 31 32 Legal tees 32 33 Supplies 33 31.509. 3.151. 34 Telephone 34 L82 . _2_5 4 . 28 . 35 35 1337.036. 114.332. 12.70444. 36 Occupancy 3B 879. 791. 83. 37 Equtpment rental and matntenance 37 33 and pubtlcatlons _4r1 . 39 Travel 39 407. 355. 41. 40 Conferences, conventions. and meet:Interest . 41 42 Deprecuanon. depletion, etc. (attach schedule) 1g 43 Other expenses not covered above (nemlze) a 533 43!: 43:: 43?! a ?39 I a SEE STATEMENT 1 43d 994.357. 989,977. @380. 44 Total functional expenses. Add lines 22a through 439. (Drgamzattons completing cotumns 44 1.159.311. 1.138.830. 20.481. 0. Joint Costs. Check If you are foliowmg SOP 98-2. Are any (om! costs from a educational campaegq and tundrarsmg soElcttatlon reponed In (B) Program servtces? I: Yes No it 'Yes.? enter the aggregate amount of these tomt costs 35 A (it) the amount allocated to Program serwces A (its! the amount allocated to Management and genera! A and (iv: the amount allocated to A 823?" Form 990 (2006) 0 1-23-07 2 11070503 748144 922565 2006.05050 SMUD YES ON MEASURE I YES 0N MEASURE FOR LOWER Form 990 .2006 RATES I Part [Statement of Program Service Accomplishments (See the Instructions) Form 990 IS available for public Inspection and, for some peeple, serves as the pnmary or sole source of Information about a particular organization. How the public perceives an organization In such cases may be detenmned by the mforrnatlon presented on he retum Therefore, ptease make sure the retum IS complete and accurate and fully describes, an Part ill, the organzatron's programs and accomplishments. 37-0759435 game What Is the organization's primary exempt purpose? Program Service Expenses (Requued for 501(c)(3) and (4) eros, and 4947mm trusts; but optional tor others.) All organizatlons must describe therr exempt purpOSe achievements In a clear and concise manner State the number of clients served, publications issued. etc. achievements that are not measurabte. (Section 501(c)(3) and (4) organizations and 4947(a)(1) nonexempt charitable must also enter the amount of grants and allocations to others Other program services (attach schedule) 1.138.830. Form990(2006) Total of Program Service Expenses (should aqua! line 44. column (B). Program serVIceSJ 523021 01-15-07 3 2006.05050 SMUD YES ON MEASURE 922565?; 11070503 748144 922565 I SMUD YES ON MEASURE FOR LOWER FoerQO 2006 RATES 87?0759436 Pam I Part IV I Balnce Sheets (See the Note: Where recurred, attached schedules and amounts the column (A) (B) should be tor end-of-year amounts only. Beginning of year End at year 45 Cash - . ?5 5 5'77 . 46 Sawan and temporary cash Investments . 46 47 3 Accounts resolvable . 47: It Less. allowance for doubtful accounts . 47? 43 a Pledges recervabte . . 43: Less allowance for doubtful accounts . 485 is 49 Grants recewable . . . . . . 49 50 a Recenvabtes from current and farmer of?cers. drrectors. trustees, and key employees . . . . . . .. 50! Recervables from other disquali?ed persons {as de?ned under 566115?! 4958mm) and persons descnbed In section 4958(c)(3 (B) it: a 51 at Other notes and loans resolvable Sta 5 Less: allowance tar doubltul accounts 5th 51: 52 lnventones fer sale or use 52 53 Prepaid expenses and deferred charges 53 54 a lnvestments - secuntres Cost '3 FMV 54a 5 lnvestments - other secunttes Cost FMV 54 55 a lnvestments - land, butldangs, and equtpment basrs 55a 5 Less accumulated deprecratron A 55b 55c 56 lnvestments - other 56 57 a Land, and equipment: bests 57:: It Less. accumulated deprecratron 575 57c 53 Other assets, including program-related lnvestments jg 53 Iotal ages-ts (must gust line 74). Add lines 45 throucrh Accounts payable and accmed expenses 60 51 Grants payable . . 61 a 52 Deferred revenue 62 :3 53 Loans from of?cers, drrectors. tmstees. and key employees 63 64 a Tax-exempt bond trabrlmes Mortgages and other notes payable . 645 55 Other (describe _6?5 66 Total liabilities. Adams so 211:0th 65 . 66 . Organizations that follow SPAS 117. check here It and complete lines a 67 through 69 and lines Temporanty . 61 59 Permanently 89 Organizations that do not follow SPAS 117. check here El and ?t complete lines 70 through 74. 70 Caprtal stock. trust or current funds . Pard-rn or caprtal surplus. or land, budding, and equrpment fund Retarned endowment. accumulated rncome, or other funds 0 . 72 0 . 73 Total net assets or fund balances. Add lines 67 through 69 or knee 70 through 72. (Column (A) must equal line 19 and column (B) must equal lane 21Total liabilities and net assetsltund balances. Add lines Form 990 (2006) Biggie 4 11070503 748144 922565 2006.05050 SMUD YES ON MEASURE 922565_1 . . - SMUD YES 1 YES ON MEASURE FOR LOWER Fonn990 2006 RATES 87*0759436 Page5 Part IV-A econci iation of Revenue per Audited Financial Statements With Revenue per Hetum (See the mstrucrrons.) a 'Total revenue, gains, and other support per audrted ?nancrai statements a A Amounts inciuded on ?ne a but not on Part 1. ?ne 12: 1 Net unrealized gains on Investments b1 2 Donated services and use of facrfmes b2 8 Fiecovenes of pnor year grants . b3 4 Other (specrfy): in! Add tines b1 through b4 I: Subtract lane from line a . It Amounts Included on Part 1. lane 12Investment expenses not Included on Part 1, line so . I 2 Other (specrfy). L12 Add lines d1 and d2 Total revenue art 1 tune 12 Add tmescand d. . 1 . D- I [sort iV-? I Reconciliation o? moses per Audited Financial Statements With Expenses per Return a Totat expenses and losses per audited frnancral statements IN A II Amounts Included on line a but not on Part I. the 17 1 Donated servrces and use of b1 2 Pnor year adjustments reported on Part E. tine 20 I b2 3 Losses reported an Part line 20 b3 4 Other (speedy): Add lines b1 through b4 . Subtract line from line a Amounts included on Part 1, line 17. but not on line a: 1 Investment expenses not included an Part I, lune 6b . d1 2 Other (speedy): 62 Add tines d1 and d2 a Total ex noes Part I iane17 . Add [mes sand [m Current Officers, Directors, Trustees, and Key Employees (List each person who was an of?cer, director, tmstee, or key employee at any time dunng the year even If they were not compensated (See the instructions.) (A) Name and address 35'3th ?gms 3:033:23: postmn mans other allowances ELLA PRESIDENT 1119.142 .. SECRETARY 23.31 .. M3110. CA 95818 1.00 0. 0. O. SUSAN. .. TREASURER 3.1. ERIE .. FOLSOM. CA 95360 1.00 0. O. 0. 12th ggsgem ATTORNEY CONTRACT 5. 5.5. SUSIE ?1.4.2.5 .. SACRAMENTO: CA 95814 1.00 0. 0. 0. Form 990 (2006) 023041 01-15-07 5 11070503 748144 922565 2006.05050 SMUD YES ON MEASURE 922565__1 SMUD YES ON MEASURE FOR LOWER Fonn990 zoos RATES 87-0759436 Page5 Part Current Officers, Directors, Trustees, and Key Employees (continued) Yes No 75 a .Enter the total number of of?cers, directors, and trustees to vote on organization business at board meetings . . . . - . . . 4 0 Are any of?cers. directors. trustees, 0r key employees listed in Form 990. Part V-A. or highest compensated employees tisted in Schedule A, Part I, or highest compensated professionai and other independent contractors listed in Schedule A Part ll-A or 0-3. related to each other through famlly or business reltionships? If 'Yes.? attach a statement that identifies the indiViduals and explains the relationshipls). 755 o? Do any of?cers. directors, trustees. or key employees listed .in Form 990, Part VA. or highest compensated employees listed in Schedule A, Part l, or highest compensated professionai and other independent contractOrs listed in Schedule A. Part ll-A 0r ii-B. receive compensation from any other organizations, wi'iether tax exempt or taxable. that are rotated to the organization? See the instructions for the definition of 'related organizatron.? . . 75? it 'Yes,? attach a statement that includes the information descnbed in the instructions. it Does the or anization have a written con?ict of interest a - licy? 75d - Former Of?cers, Directors, Trustees, and Key Employees That Received Compensation or Other Benefits (if any former officer, director. trustee. or key employee received compensation or other bene?ts (described below) during the year, list that person below and enter the amount of compensation or other benefits in the appropnate column See the instructions.) A (8) Compensation to (E) Expense (A) Name and address (B) Loans and Advances (it not paid, account and NONE enter 43-) out?? other aiiowances [T?art Vi Other information (See the Yes No 76 Did the organization make a change in activmes er methods of conducting activrties? If 'Yes.? attach a detailed sttement of each change 78 77 Were any changes made in the organizmg or governing documents but not reported to the 77 If 'Yes." attach a conformed copy of the changes. 78 a Did the organization have unrelated business gross income of $1,000 or more dunng the year covered by this return? 783 if 'Yes," has it ?led a tax retum on Form QQO-T for this year? A 78b 79 Was there a liqmdation, dissolution, tennination, or substantial comraction during the year? If ?Yes.' attach a statement 79 80 a Is the organization related (other than by association With a stateWide or nationmde organization) through common membership. governing bodies, tmstees, of?cers. etc to any other exempt or nonexempt organization? 808 If 'Yes.? enter the name of the organization) and check whether it is exempt or nanexempl 81 3 Enter direct or indirect political expenditures. (See ?ne 81 instructions.) 81: I 0 . Did the organization ?le Form 1120-POL for this year? 81!: Form 990 (2005) azsiaim-ie-or 6 11070503 748144 922565 2006.05050 SMUD YES 0N MEASURE 922565_1 - - SMUD YES ON MEASURE FOR LOWER Ferm990(2006) RATES 87-?0759436 Page'l Part VI 1 Other information (continued) Yes No 82 a Did the organization recerve donated servrces or the use of materials, equipment, or facIlItres at no charge or at substantially less than ten rental value'Yes,? you may the value of these Items here. Do not Include amount as revenue In Part I or as an expense In Part ll. (See Instructions In Part IllDad the organization comply With the public inspectmn requrrernents for returns and exemptron 83a ii I: the orgamzatron comply the dIsclosure requtrements relating to pro quo contnbutIons? A 83!: 84 I: Did the organization any contnbutrons or grits that were not tax deductible? 843 It If 'Yes.? the organIzatron rnclude With every an express statement that such contnbutmns 0r were not tax . I 84!: 85 501(c)(4), (5), or organzatrons. a Were substantially all dues by members? 85a II the organIzatIon make only rn-hcuse lobbying expenditures at $2,000 or less? 85b If 'Yes' was answered to erther 852 or 85b. do not complete 35c throth 85h below Unless the organIzatron received a waiver for proxy tax awed for the pnor year. Dues. assessments. and srmilar amounts from members 85: Sectron 162(9) lobbying and expendrtures 85!! Aggregate amount of sectron 6033(e)(1)(A) dues notIces 858 Taxable amount of lobbying and polItIcal expendrtures (lIne 85d less 85e) 851 9 Does the organrzatron elect to pay the sectron 6033(e) tax on the amount on lrne 85f? . 859 II If sectIOn 6033(e)(1)(A) dues notices were sent, does the organrzatron agree to add the amount on lrne 35f to Its reasOnable estimate of dues allocable to lobbying and expendrtures fer the followrng tax year" . . 85h 86 501(c)(7) organzatrons Enter: a fees and caprtal contnbutrons rncluded on 12 86a A Gross receipts, Included 0n lrne 12. for publIc use of club 86h 87 501(c)(12) organizations. Enter: a Gross Income from members or shareholders 87: ll Gross Income from other sources (Do not not amounts due or paid to other sources against amounts due or received from them.) 87!) an a At any trme dunng the year, the organizatron own a 50% or greater Interest In a taxable corporation or partnershIp, or an dIsregarded as separate from the organization under Regulations sections 301.7701-2 and 301.7701 if ?Yes,' complete Part Ix . I 83: At any trme dunng the year. did the organrzatron. directly or Indrrectly. own a controlled entIty Within the meaning of sectron 512(b)(13)? If 'Yes,? complete Part )0 a b? 88!: 89 a 501mm) organizations. Enter Amount of tax Imposed on the organization dunng the year under: sectron 4911b A ;section 4912 :sectron 4955 A II 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organzatrons. the organization engage In any sectron 4958 excess bene?t transaction dunng the year Or It become aware of an excess bene?t transaction from a pnor year? if 'Yes,? attach a statement each transaction a A 89b Enter. Amount of tax Imposed on the orgamzatron managers or disqualrfred persons dunng the year under sections 4912, 4955, and 4955 0 . it Enter. Amount of tax on lrne 89c, above, rermbursed by the organrzatron 0 . 9 All organizations At any trme during the tax year, was the organizatron a party to a tax shelter transactron? We All organizations the organzatron acqurre a Meet 0r Indrrect interest in any applicable insurance contract? 89l For organrzatrons and sponsor-mg organrzatrons donor advrsed funds. the supporting organization, or a fund maintained by a sponsonng organization, have excess business holdings at any trme durIng the year? 8911 90 a the states which a copy of this return Is ?led IDN ON I: Number of employees employed in the pay period that Includes March 12, 2006 L90b I 0 91 a The books are rn care of DIANE . OLSON HAGEL ET A Telephone nab 19 161442- 29 52 Located at 5 55 CAPITOL MALL . SUITE 1425 . SACRAMENTO . CA ZIP 4 I- 95814-41603 At any trme dunng the calendar year. the organization have an interest In or a srgnature or other authomy over Yes N0 a ?nancial account In a t0rergn country (such as a bank account, secuntres account, or other financial account)? 91!: if 'Yes,? enter the name of the foreign country A See the Instructions for exceptrons and tilIng requrrements for Form To SID-22.1. Report of Forergn Bank and Frnanetal Accounts Form 990 (2006) 623162 [01-18-07 11070503 748144 922565 7 2006.05050 YES 0N MEASURE a . SHUD YES 0N MEASURE FOR LOWER RATES 87-0759436 Payee [Fart Other Information (contrnued) 4 Yes No At any trme dunng the calendar year. the organization mamtarn an of?ce outsrde of the Unrted States? 91c it 'Yes,? enter the name of the forergn country A 92 Section 4947(a)(1) nonexempt chantabl?e trusts ?ling Form 990m Ireu of Form 1041- Check here . and enter the amount of tax-exam Interest recerved or accrued dunn the tax year I 92 I I Part I Analysis of Income-Producing Activities (See the Note: Ema, gross amounts unms ?heme (summed business 1000013 game by acme 512, 513, or 51? (E, muted BUSWSS Argglunt 5:33." that": new? or exempt 93 Program servrce revenue. code o_o_d_e "mm" ?mom a Medrcare/Medrcard payments 9 Fees and contracts from government agencres 94 Membership dues and assessments 95 Interest on savmgs and temporary cash Investments 96 Dwrdends and Interest from secuntres 1 4H 3 4 . 97 Net rental income or (loss) from reai estate: a debt~trnanced property It not debt-?nanced property 98 Net rentai Income or (loss) from personal property 99 Other Investment Income 100 Sam or (loss) from sales of assets other than Inventory 101 Net Income or (loss) from specral events 102 Gross pro?t or (loss) from sales of rnventory 103 Other revenue a 104 Subtotal (add columns and . 3 4, 0 . 105 Total (add tine 104. columns (8). (D). and (El) 3 4 . Note: Lrne 105 plus Irne 1 Part should the amount on Irne 1 Part! the Line No. Explain how each for Income IS reported an column (E) of Part VII contributed rmportantly to the accomplishment of the organization's exempt purposes other than by prowde funds for such purposes). the Nature of Total Income re the Dad the organrzatron, dump the year. recenre any funds, directly or Indirectly, to pay premiums on a personal benefit contract? Yes No the organization, dump the year. pay premiums, directly or Indirectly, on a personal benefit contract? Yes No Note: If 'Yes' to ?le Form 8870 and Form 4720 (see Form 990 (2005) sets, 8 11070503 748144 922565 2006.05050 SMUD YES ON MEASURE 922565_1 I SMUD YES ON MEASURE FOR LOWER Form 990(2008) RATES 87~0759?36 Page9 I Part Xi Infon'nation Regarding Transfers To and From Controlted Entities. Complete the organrzm?ron rs a controflmg organzatron as de?ned rn section 512(b)(13). A Yes No 106 Did the reportmg organrzatlon make any transfers to a controlled as de?ned In section of the Code? if 'Yes.? comptete the schedute below for each controlled (A) (3) (C) (0) Name, address. of each Description of Amount of controlled entity exul?aeron transfer transfer a -.. Yes No 107 Did the reporting orgamzatron receive any transfers from a controtled entity as de?ned tn section 512(b)(13) of the Code? it 'Yes.? complete the schedule be_t_ow for entity. (M 0) w) (m Name, address, of each I Description of Amount of controlled "mike: transfer transfer a -- 1b?? No 108 Did the organization have a binding wnt'ten contract In effect On August 17, 2006, covenng the rntemst, rents. roya?res, and Under penattres of perm. declare that have erarntned this return. Irrcludrng accompanying sot-newt and statements. and to the best of my knowledge and belief. I1 I: true. correct. and complete Dedaretron of proper: (otha? than attics) :5 based on at! Infonntlon of wtud'l proper: has any knowledge 5'9" Signature of ottrcer Data Susan Patterson, Treasurer . Preparers Date Check It Preparers sent or PM (See Gm ms: :9 Pa rt 59% Pre'parer's Signature 533:,le GIBSON 5: COMPANY2743 7 3 5:33;? 4 6 0 0 BLVD SUITE 1 1 5 SACRAMENTO CA 95334 Form 990 (2006) 8231641014643? 9 11070503 748144 922565 2006.05050 SHUD YES 0N MEASURE 922565_1 SMUD?imss 0N MEASURE FOR LOWER RAT 87-0759436 FORM 990 STATEMENT 1 OTHER EXPENSES (A) (B) (C) (D) PROGRAM MANAGEMENT DESCRIPTION TOTAL SERVICES AND GENERAL FUNDRAISING SERVICES 27,055. 24,350. 2,705. BUSINESS 864. 778. 86. 1,237. 1,113. 124. INSURANCE 1,540. 1,386. 154. NON STAFF SERVICES 9,900. 8,910. 990. 8,167. 8,084. 83. RENTAL FEES 2,000. 1,800. 200. FOOD BEVERAGES 91. 82. 9. CAMPAIGN MANAGEMENT 134,696. 134,696. CONSULTING 59,390. 59,390. GATHERERS 50,300. 60,300. TV (PURCHASE PRODUCTION) 678,846. 678,846. 289. 289. BUMPER 1,497. 1,497. POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 1,800. 1,800. MISCELLANEOUS 285. 256. 29. SLATE MAILER 6,400. 6,400. TOTAL TO FM 990, LN 43 994,357. 989,977. 4,380. 18 1 11070503 748144 922565 2006.05050 SMUD YES ON MEASURE 922565ul (Pagel of 11) I . Reelplent ?5 . a LOCAL SEQ ., . 01332 an?: (cavemqu Code Sections 042004142105: 3; ?Magma 01/01/2006 0313122006 1 MAY 0 2005 I "fiat oniy I (?02800 LTvpe of Recipient Committee: 2. Typeofs Officeholder. Candidate controlad Committee HM Famed Balm Manure - 0 Sim Cmd?m Cm? W- [j Sand-annual Summit sumac: wa?rn??ou?w? 0 Renal Conqu El Tomlinth Shaman: Sum?! Maturation wan cur-pun Pan 5.) 0 Sponsored ti. a Four: 410 Tmhotionl El Statement - Attach Form 495 an Gannon Pat madam: lEmloh below Gonna! Purpose Committee Sponsor-d Prlmarity Fonnad Candidate! 0 Small Contributor Committee O?icoholdet Carmluea 0 Political PortvICmml Comings 7" 3. Committee Information I I 1282451 Tmasurerlsl NAME (00 NAME u= no comm um: or msunen SMUD Customers YES to Low Rates Susan Patterson MAILING ADDRESS 431 5. Lexington Drive mm 5.0. Hm i cm STATE CODE AREA comm-cone 1700 Street Folsom CA 95630 (916) 442?2952 cm sum ?cone nmsorAsosummrAm Sacramento CA 95814 (916) 441-1995 IF DE RENT) ND. AND STREET on PD. Box MAILING ADDRESS 555 Capitol Mall, Suite 1425 CITY STATE ZIP CODE AREA CITY SVATE CODE Sacramento CA 95814 [916) 44242952 Worm} 'Aoo' ns?s AREA CODEIPHONE WONAL: ADDRESS 4. Veri?cation lhava med reasonable diligence in papal-inn and Man this mun-lent ind to tho beat of my brow cormyundetponaltvotpmjurv underthalawoolthoStm ofCallfon?oth-M duforogoing la tmondc . Executedon 0 a ii:- ?m m. Banned 4 Iv Exawtedon 11L it -. - Execume lodge the infatuation contahed heroin and In the attached schedules In true and complete. an: Farm 400 umml A FPPC Tau-Fm "chino: 0601mm ?mom's-3772: 5m 0! Miami (PageZ of 11) .. Recipient Committee Campaign Statement Cover Page Part 2 WALD, 5. Of?ceholdet or Candidate Controiled Committee 6. Hinar?y Fatmed Ballot Measure Committee HARE OF OFFICEHDLDEH OR CANDIDATE MADE OF BALLOT MEASURE ?u Approval of District Expansion to Yolo County OFFICE souam on HELD ?Mame memos AND DISTRICT WMBER IF Ba Ea? SUPPORT Count om Sacrax?nto/ Placer SE RESIDEWUBINESS monass (MD. AND can sing ZIP NAME OF CANDIDATE on. PROPONENT A . . Susan Patterson rated Omittees I?l'rroltt Lgcluded figment. tyne-mm om mm on HELD no, u: Am Wummdem_m?- Ban-d Member, 3mm comrrEE NAME LD. numen 7. Prinmiiv Formed CandidateIOf?caholdor Canmitteo an of mormusuaen mam: no Yip mm: or omcsuomen on CANDIDATE omce souem on HELD commas smear (no no. aux) - [j SUPPORT oppose cm mm: m. CODE mm"; mm 0F on CANDIDATE omcs SOUGHT on HELD SUPPORT [j OPPOSE COMMITTEE NAME 8.9. NUMBER NAMEOFOFH DERDR mama CEHOL CA TE mm ORHEL as mamas NAME OF TREASURER NAME OF OFFICEHOLDER BR CAWTE OFFICE SOUGHT OR HELD . summ a No Oppose ADDRESS STREET P.O. cm' STATE zTPcooE AHEAODDEIPHONE Am? cum if Form ?an pumps) mun-m {866127537723 Sun of Clilomia Recipient Committee Campaign Statement Cover Page - Part 2 (Continuation Sheet) COVER PAGE - PART 2 ICONTJ Menu-patina 01/01/2006 03/31/2006 NAME OF FILER SMUD Customers say YES to Low Rates I.D. NUMBER 12 8 2 451 6. Primar?y Famed Ballot Measure Committee BALLOT WASUFIE BALLOT NO. on LETTER 3m, [3 mumm.m. ?mnem- Ill-1y. or OFFICEHOLDEFI. CANDIDATE on. moronsm Genevieve Sh'i'roma - omce SOUGHT on 0:310:01 no. u= AM Board Member, SHED Wat'm?t MEASURE NAME OF BALLOI MEASURE BALLOT NO. LETTER NEEDICTION sun-oar [3099055 NAME OF OFFICEHOIDER. CANDIDATE OH. PROPONENT wu 11am statoia OFHCE SOUGHT OR HELD DISTRICT NO. IF ANY Board Member SMUD NAME OF BALLOT msuE BALLOT ND. OH LETTER JLHISDICTIOH SUPPORT [1 ems: mumm. Madam-mum a my. NAME OF OFFICEHOLDER. CANDIDATE on, moronsm OFFICE SOUGHT OH HELD DISTRICT NO. IF ANY NAME OF BALLOT BALLOT NO. on LETTER JURISDICTION sum,? Dome NAME OF CANDIDATE OR. ma?a?Em om SOUGHT OR FELD DISTRICT NO. IF ANY BALLOT no. on LETTER sum-r [3 oppose Whm?um.mammw law. MAREOFOFFICEHOIDER. OFFICE SOUGHT OR HELD DISTRICT NO. IF ANY 53 BALLOT MLLOT NO. on LETTER JURISDICTION sum OPPOSE NAME OFOFFICEHOLDEH. CANDIDATE 0H. PROPONENT OFFICE SOUGHT OH OIQTRICT NO. Ii: ANY FPPC Fun: 460 FFPC Tel-Fae (66612754772) sum 01' Mom Schedule (Continuation Sheet) Payments Made My: man wind? 01/01/2006 03/31/2006 m.qu NAME OF FILER SMUD Customers say YES to Low Rates ID. NUMBER 128245]. NAME AND ADDRESS OF PAYEE IF comm. mm 1.0 mm CODE OR DESCRIPTION OF PAVMENT AMOUNT PAD Toni Roberts Productions, Inc. 2005 Street Sacramento, CA 9581; 8,766.30 Rosa Communications, Inc. 1700 Street Sacramento, CA 95814 30,000.00 Ted Sheedy, Inc. 2 115 Oxford Street Sacramento, CA 95815 5.000.00 SUBTOTAL 43,766.30 . rm: Form 400 mummy" IOSI me Tm mum: awasxm (seams-3712: Recipi?pt Committee I . A . Campaign Statement . . - . Cover Page . - . . 'im. t? wa {mm-Wamzmn . ~i mama i i - i - - ,uun 04/01/2006 I . I IAUG I 2005 . . I . 'i oslaolz?os ?13 . . Lhn?, . 2. Typedsei?ihmcomment-um; [j wood-Variant: minimum Sponsored avg: . b" . - .. MWMIJ - . I i Lu. mm 12924551 auaan patcezsqn 5mm - 3mm i323! Yes on thallium Ufa): lower Rates .1 431 9. Mon Drive mm 1700 street . Unison - - CA 95630 - 1916) 442-2952 01V I sum: HALEOFWANTMIEEIFANY Sacrahento . ca 9531; (916) 441-1995 - i .AHD 555 (3.91:01 Hall, Suite. 1425 . . enema . an aunt (9151 4424952 5 onr.o.nox STATE 13? WONG 45Vdri??a?on I . i . a?mmW 54mm? '51 L0 (a ?Ewan 7" (31100sums arcane mm: Sun-?calm (Page 2 of 17) Campaign Disclosure Statement - . - SUMMARY PAGE Summary Page 04/01/2006 .1 06/30/2006 a a, IILNUMBEH 1202451 Cohmn A Cohmn Calendar Year Summary for Candidates Contributions Received TOTAL EH00 CALM YW mum?: g-?unrmgin?o?t?toStatoPrimand Monetary Contributions .. mama 173,139.00 5 337.839-00 . i . . ?3 NAME OF FILER Yes on Measure for Lower Rates Loans Received .. mama SUBTOTAL CASH .. .. mum 2 5 1'73. 139 - 00 337. 839 .00 . 20. Cowman 1 . 1 O, . Nonmonetary ContnbutIons .. Expenditures TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED .. 4 103, 494 .51 5 348,194.51 Mada ?oit'i'dtui I. 8 3 Expenditures Made . Expenditure Limit Summary for State 6. Expenditutes Made .. 4 5 74: 492 - 72 124' 123 79 Con?dent: 7. Loans Mada .. mmuma 0-00 0-00 a. SUBTOTAL CASH .. Add?nu? 2 '74: 492 372 124:123-79 22' ?nd?tmm?f 9. Accrued Expenses {Unpaid Bills} .. Wayne: 59? - no 2 1 000 ~00 Data of Election Total to 10. Nonmonatary Adjustment .. MC. the355 ~51 mm!de 11. TOTAL EXPENDITURES MADE .. Add?! 9 10 81.253 - 33 135-479-40 . . I I Currant Cash Statement 12. Beginning Cash Balance .. re To calculate Column 3, odd I I 13. Cash Receipts .. coumAma-am 173:139-00 mmsinComnAtn?n - mmpOI'Iding amount: I I 14: MilC?uanms Increases to .. We I. u" {mm Conn-?n a of your 15. Cash Payments .. cmAmanbm 74-492 72 ?Mrmm I I Colmhmaybo negative 10. ENDING CASH BALANCE 12+ 13+ 213:521-02 noun-summa- . . . unheated form preview . I I If miss a ?moon anummr. Lh- 16 mm? bl 100?- pgnod mm. at I: the Hm rapoct being filed 17. LOAN GUARANTEES RECEIVED .. same. 2 "mm" m" ?Wm? m? i? m" "mum can our tho Irmunts reported in Column 0. Cosh Equivalents and Outstanding Debts 1mm Lino: 2.1, and 0 [if 1- any}. 18 00 . Can uwa ants .. - M- 19. Outstanding Debts 1. Addth +Lbn9hCnlunI?I-bow 2,000.00 . I. - FPPC Faun 400 me Tam Hanna; MASK-PPR: 1006121541121 Schedule A Monetary Contributions Received We?: period 04/01/2006 LhAtlstiNIAi-m} 06/30/2006 SCHEDULE A 01'1- NAME OF Fm SHUD Yes on Measure for Lower Rates 1.0. NUMBER 1232451 DATE FULL NAME. STREET ADDRESS AND 2? CODE OF CONTRIBUTOR RECEIVED rim. A100 men 1.0. mm - CONNOR WDE IF AN INDIVIDUAL ENTER occur/mo" AND EMPLOYER IF mom. 9mm NAME or may RECEIVED THIS PERIOD OJMULAIWE TO DATE CALENDAR YEAR 1 - DEC. 31) 0F REQUIRED) 06/30/2006 ASH Southpoxt II, LLC 1107 Kentucky Street Fairfield. CA 94533 mo COM 0 om PTY 500 12,500.00 12 500 .00 04/11/2006 Devile.E. Aladjem 2867 Quail Street Davis, CA 95616 IND COM 0TH PW - SCC Attorney Downey Brand Attogneye LLP 1,000.00 1,000.00 06/14/2006 Bear. Steame Company. Inc. BIND 115 South Jefferson Road, Building [Hhippany. NJ 07981 . DPTY El 500 5,000 .00 5,000.00 05/01/2006 Brian L. Becker: ?i 913 Green Lane . La Canada, CA 91011-2411 soc Attorney Bright 5. Brown 1,000.00 1,000.00 04/17/2006 Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkere Local 3 PAC 555 Capitol Mall. Suite 1425 Sacramento, CA 95814 I.D. Number: 1244975 IND COM 0TH El PTY SCC 250 .00 250.00 Schedule A Summary 1. Mount reoeivod'thls period itemlzed monetary contributions. {inciude Sch-each.- A subtotal!? SUBTOTAL 2. Amount received this period -- unitemized contributions of less than $100 Tote! monetary contributions received this period. (Add Lines 1 and 2. Enter here and on the Summary Page. Column A. Line .. TOTALS 8 19,750.00 172,050.00 289.00 1'73. 139.00 maroon.- mu: Codes IND - lndividuai COM - accident Committee 0TH - Other (0.9.. hairless entity! PTY - Political Party . - Smell Contributor Committee (carer than PTY or $00) (866/275-3772! Schedule @937" (Continuation Sheet] . Payments Made 04/01/2006 06/30/2006 Pm ID. NUMBER 1282451 NAME OF FILER SHUD 295 on Measure for Lower Rates NME AND ADDRESS OF PAYEE 0F smut-rs: mm 9051 3.0. CODE on 0m OF PAYMENT AMOUNT PM) . -.. .0..- 013cm Hegel Fishburn 1.1.9 PRO 555 Capitol.Ma11. Suite 1425 Sacramento, CA 95014 5,511.10 Toni Roberts Productions. Inc.? END 18,907.55 2005 Street POS 98 . 05 Sacramento, CA 95814 Roan Communications, Inc. UMP 397.78 1700 Street CNS 40,000.00 Sacramento, CA 95814 LIT . 69-50 OFC I 295.00 Ted Sheedy. Inc. . run 2115 Oxford Street . Sacramento.'CA 95815 i 7,591.31 Studio LIT 3181 Street Sacramento, CA 95816 510 . 96 SUBTOTALS 73,381.46 FFPC ?lm 460 (Jail-tle5] FPPC W: MASK-NFC [86512754772] (Page 1 of 22) ?o?ipient Committee ?Campaign Statement Cover Page (Government Code Scotlan- MWZIGJI COVER PAGE 1 u? v?rnI-n-Ir ur-i?v 5.. Dansm. .- i 07/01/2006 09/30/2006 Dmfoloc?onif m-amj *1 Una Oniy 11/07/2006 ?miType of Recipient Committee: "mm-mm 1.2.3.104. Of?ceholdor. Candidate Contme Committee 0 Slate Candidate Election Committee 0 Fiscal Mm P?marlv Fonnod Baum Honours Con-mitten Controlled 0 Samurai! (Abe 6.) Filmorin Famed Candldoml O?icoholdar Conunltm Miro Cambi- 7.) Committee 0 Spomorod Smail Contributor Com?too 0 Political Party/Contra! Committee 2. Type of Statement: Pro-alum atmrnom Semi-Innual Summon! Tormhation Statement who ?le a Form 410 Tominotionl Ammdmom {Explah below} I: Guanody Stateroom SpeciaIOdd-Yolr Report a Supplemental Prov-516::th Summit Attach Form 495 El . Committee Information ID. HUNGER 1282451 COMMTTEE NAME CANDIDATES NAME IF NO SHUD Yea on Measure 1. for Lower Rates (no no. 0? 1700 Street . sun's Sacramento CA 95814 (916) 441-1995 MAILI GADDRESS U: . MD smEETonP.o.aox 555 Capitol Mall, Suite 1425 CITY ATE Sacramento CA OPTIONAL: FAKE-MAIL mom: 255 55E AREA CWW mc [Pi-Ions 95814 (916) 442-2952 . Veri?cation I have mod (amoebic diligence in proparing and reviewing this statement and to the host of my Imowlo certify under penalty of padunr the iaws of the State of California that the foregoing is true und WI More Evan-0nd hr- 7 Executed on Exoomod on . Ooh a: [ohm (O By - Troosure?s) HAIE OF TREASURER Susan Patterson MAILING ADDRESS I131 S. Lexington Drive CITY STATE ZIP CODE Folsom CA 95630 NAME OF ASSISTANT TREASURER, 0: ANY AREA (916) 442?2952 MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE ZIP CODE AREA OPTIONAL: ADDRESS dgo the Information contained herein and In the attached windqu is one and complete. I .. .mac' mmum' 105? rpm-rm Robina: {scams-37721 I (Page xReEipient Committee - Campaign Statement CovBr Page Part 2 I 5. Of ?ceholder or Candidate Controlled Committee NAME OF crocenomsn on cmmonm OFFICE SOUGHT OR HELD (INCLUDE LOCATION AND DISTRICT NUMBER IF APPLICABLE) RESIDENTIALIBJSINESS AIIJHESS INC. AND STREET) CITY STATE ZIP Related Committees Not Included in this Statement: ?MWdemm . NAME NAME OF TREASURER COWTTEE ADDRESS STREET ADDRESS IND no. 80"! 6. Primarily Formed. Ballot Measure Committee NAME OF BALLOT MEASURE Approval of District Expansion to Yolo County mum N0.0HLETTEB SW1. I unt mg agoragento/ Placer me or aroma. momma on. morousm Susan Patterson OFFICE SOUGHT on HELD Board Member. SMUD DISTRICT NO. IF ANY 7. Fri ari idata Off Com ittee Iv'fgnned Cage" I ?teamwork 'mm of NAME OF OFFICEHOLDER OR CANDIDATE summon mu? [j summ- . [3099055 CITY STATE ZIP CODE COMMITTEE NAME LO. NW NAME OF TREASURER CONTROMD Elves [jun comems ADDRESS smEEr ADDRESS mo no. son CITY STATE ZIP CODE CODEME NAME OF WW1: on momma omce SOUGHT on HELD [j SUPPORT oppose NAME OF on CANDIDATE mac; savour on HELD sum? [3 cause NAME OF OFFICEHOIDER OR CAIIDIDATE omca swam on HELD {j amass Alt-d: teamworme 2! COVER PAGE - PART 2' I 1 Recipient Committee Campaign Statement Cover Page - Part 2 (Continuation Sheet) 1mm 5W ?I?m 09/30/2006 00ng PAGE mu 2? 100m.) gm 07/01/2006 NAMEOF PEER suun Yes on Measure for Lower Rates ID. NUMBER 128245]. OF- BALLET MEASURE NAME OF BALLOT MEASURE BALLOT NO. OH LETTER JURISDICTION [3 50mm [3 omen: NAME OF OFFICEHOUDEH. CANDIDATE OH, PROPONENT Genevieve Shi roma omc-e souqm on HELD DISTRICT NO. IF ANY Board Member, SMUD BALLOT HO. OH LETTER JURISDICTION DSUPPORT Ll Dumas: Mumm.mwm MW Haw. NAME OF OFFICEHO-LDER. CANDIDATE 0R. WENT William Slaton OFFICE SOUGHT on HELD Board Member, SMUD NAME 65 WOT MEASURE DISTRICT NO. 1F ANY BALLOT ND. OH LETTER JURISDICTION SUPPORT [j ems: NAME OF CANDIDATE on. OFFICE WWI-IT OR HELD DISTRICT NO. IF ANY BALLOT MEASURE BALLOT NO. OR LETTH [j SUPPORT OPPOSE mumm.m. any. HM 0F OFFICEHOLDER. CANDIDATE on. OFFICE SOUGHT URI-ELI) NO. IF ANY We? m_ BALLOT NO. on LETTER JURISDICTION swam 099055 NAME or omcgumnsn. WAVE on. PHOPONENT ?at scum-n on Hem DISTRICT NO. IF ANY W. NAME OF BALLOT MEASURE BALLOT N0. OR LETTER JURISDICTION [1 SUPPORT oppose NAME OF OHRCEHOLDER. CANDIDATE OR. PROPONENT OFFICE SOUGHT 0R HELD DISTRICT NO. IF ANY ?mcm'm - m: [86512753 . ?Stluofm Schedule SCHEDULE (coma; (Continuation Sheet) Payments Made 1 07/01/2006 09/3012006 ?17002 Lo. NUMBER 1282451 NAME OF FILER SMUD YESI Yes on Measure for Lower Rates NAME AND ADDRESS OF PAYEE IF Cm m. Mam CODE DESCIUPTION OF PAYMENT AMOUNT PAID Digital Tractor LIT 1700 Street . Sacramento, CA 95014 692.83 Newstrak LLC DEC 3104 0 Street, #306 Sacramento, CA 95816 110.00 Olson Hegel Fiahburn LLP we PRO 555 Capitol Mall. Suite 1425 Sacramento, CA 95814 4,703.76 Palisades Media Grou RAD 1620 26th Street, Su te 2050 North Santa Monica, CA 90404 90,195.00 Political Beta. Inc. LIT 174.16 P.O. Box 1706 0 Burbank, CA 91507 Toni Roberts graduationa, Inc. END 7,361.20 2005 Street P09 3.7a Sacramento, CA 95814 Rosa Conmunicationa. Inc. 145.31 1700 Street CNS 20,000.00 Sacramento, CA 95814 SUBTOTAL 123,891.04 Tm W: {368127537723 Amman on we all! .. . In. gynaiw?saimo . . . . is. in 02: . a 83:gimp 095F135 .53932: . 52433.. filial: - . a. initial: Bali-Fauna: . . ighfs. .?un I 53:33 a?fuoam snowman?"gnu N. H.133: . 231531;?! ?523! . in; .O ?Egan?5.39.35. . 93-mi- . . . . Gui-Eng; . . 33981538 . 0 n? . {5-3.5338u . . rip-aligns . .. . . . J11 11'. N. 0953335 Egan: . . . ?Wu. in; .gll..?liug..i?.?ll.lu?ND. .05 ?Oi-g H. . .. . "an; .. Eng . 5H m. Han?hung 6353 my. 1.1! H188 n: . guano Eva. in?owHQOQ H. mn?Hanan ?Ugh. t?Punuuw . . 1. 41.1.{ill}! .1 gh?ag?g is . . lull! . i=2: g. . . . . an?..wa rut. ?Bum.Siun Hana-um Egg . alanine . n5 St: 95.35 ., . . .. n41; . r. cg. ?hunky-.335: . . a . {1.5043 91Wm1 . . .. EC: . . .1 it1.. .9219 Do 1.. .. . gin?.8 3 ain?t-la . gagg??ai . . Egan-:53? tionv? .llilr Ill 13/232325 39:17 bums 'paaz Recipient Cummittee ?mam ?'95 in?? Campaign Statement - Cover Page -- Part 2 4 EORM 5. Of?ceholder or Candidate Conueued Committee a. P?ma?ly Formed Ballot Measur'e'Comminee NM or on ERIE OF wishes Approval of District Expansion to Yolo County was souem mile memos Loumou nun mam NUMBER a: mum: 5:33:57 suppom Count . I. Sacrag?nto/Placer OPPOSE ADDRESS (N0. AND CITY STATE 25* 3 NM OF OFFICEHOIDER. CANDIDATE on. mom"? Related Committees Not Included in this Statement: Us: my mum.? sun? Patten? OFHCESOUGHTORHELD Board Member, 3mm COMMITTEE NAME 3.0. WEBER 7. Primarily Formed Committee an at NAME OF TREASURER CONTROLLED mm ?team For um dull committee 8 El 9&5 No . NAME OF 0mm OFFICE SOUGHT OH HELD COMMWEE ADDREBS STREET 9.0. sumnr [j OPPOSE CIT, STATE CODE AREA comma?; 0F OFFICEHGLOER 0R CANDIDATE OFHCE 03 HELD El arr-use NAME LD. NUMBER NAME OF meow OB WDATE OFFICE SOUGHT 0R HELD SUPPORT owes: as or ormmwea an cannons omce 50mm an new m, YES "o . crease oom?rss ADDRESS smear menses mo 9.0. cox; Rum 4&0 WIDE FPPC ?I'd?Free W: [Mfrs-3772) Sub of California Recipient Committee . Campaign Statement Cover Page - Part 2 (Continuation Sheet} ?coven PAGE . PART 2 {comm . r- 10/01/2005 0702-0 10/21/2005 NAME OF FILER Yes on Measure for lower Rates LD. NUMBER 1232451 6. Plimarily Fnrmed Ballot Measure Committeg 53 ELIOT WSW BALLOT HO. OH LETTER JURISDICTION SUPPORT orross mumm.m.uMWMum. NAME OF OFFICEHDLUER. CANDIDATE on. PROPONENT Genevieve Shimma OFFICE :30qu on HEIO DISTRICT no. IF ANY Board ?ember, SMUD NAME OF BALLOT MEASURE BALLOT no. on LETTER JURISDICTION SUPPORT OPPOSE NAME OF OFFICEHOLDEH. OR. PROPOHENT H11 liam Slaton OFHCE SOUGHT OH HELD DISTRICT NO. iF ANY Board Member. sum m?u'or" sax-Fe no. on LETTER mmsucmn sum?: [3 099055 NAME or oihcmomsn, amorous on. PROPONENT BALLOT LETTER NWSDICTION SUPPORT 099055 NAME OF 0mm, CANDEATE on. mononem CFFICE 50mm on HELD 0155mm ND. IF ANY NAME OF BALLOT WERE aALLor no. on LETTER Ju??smcnou suppo?'t oppose NAME osomceumn?h. CANDIDATE on. momma"; . OFFICE SOUGHT on HELD DISTRICT NO. IF ANY We MEASURE BALLOT HO. OH LETTER supponr OFPOSE NAME OF omeeuanen. an. men-r omcs 30mm on E10 answer 010. SF ANY FFPC Faun 460 FPPC Tel-Fun Hdp?m: 866M3ch {86612753772} State at Caifunia - Schedule (Continuation Sheet) Payments Made NAME OF SMUD Yes on Measure for Lower Rates 10/01/2006 my} 10/21/2006 LD. NUMBER 1282451 NAME AND ADDRESS OF PAVEE Hr 00mm. use mm CODE OR OF PAYMENT AMOUNT PAID Rachel's Petting Zoo P.O. Box 971 Lincoln, CA 95648 Pumpkin Patch EVent Entertainment 750.00 River City Stadium Management, LLC 400 Ball Park Drive West Sacramento, CA 95691 Pumpkin Patch Event Facility Rental 2,000.00 Ross Communications, Inc. 1700 Street Sacramento, CA 95014 ms 10,000.00 United States Treasury P.O. Box 192 Covington, KY 41012 OFC . . 750.00 SUBTOTAL 13,500.00 (Page 1 of 31) Recipient Committee Campaign Statement Cover Page (Gowth Code Sections 64200-842165) COVER PAGE .. 10/2212006 12/31/2006 Dmde Mohav?d minute-v 1. Type of Recipient Committee: Aim-mm I. 2.3.:114. Offlcoholdet, Candidate Controlled Comittu Hilarity Formod?allot Measure 0 State Candidate Election Committee Committee I 0 Recon Controlod MWMEJ 0 Sponsored who Calum- me.) Prlmat?v Formed Candidate] Of?cehokkr Committee I (Aha Conan-M 7.) Guantanamo:- Can-mitten 0 Sponsored 0 Smart ConuibInoICDmmiItoa 2. Type of Statement hovel-cum Statement Semi-mount Statement Termination (Also flu Form 410Tutri1ltlon) El Magma-It (Explain below! 00"!!er Statement SpeciuiOdd-Yenr?opon [j Supphmontni moon Statement Attach Faun 495 . 3. Cor'nmitteo Information . comma NAME Ioncmmo??e'snme MD comma Yes on Measure for lower Rates REEF ADDRESS Inc 9.0. 1700 Street . cm STATE Sacramento CA 95814 (916) 441-1995 LING ADDRE (IF NO. AND STREET OR 9.0. 90K ?1 Treamrls) NAM OF TREASURER Susan Patterson MAILING ADDRESS 431 . mington Drive - CITY STATE ZIP coma AREA CODEIPHDNE Folsom CA 95630 (916) 4424952 NAME OF ASSISTANT TREASURER. IF ANY MAILING ADDRESS 555 Capitol Mall. Suite 1425 CITY STATE Sacramento CA 95814 AREA cm (916) 442 -2952 STATE ZIP CODE AREA CODEJPHONE OPTIONAL: rule-MAIL ADDRESS 4. Veri?cation lhavouuod I certify undoI' panaltyotpotiurv undettha WoodeDStIIm of Califomiu that theion?ngiatme Ind Iguana?LT/l? 31' on a 7 By Exocutedon a} in By Ila-r- WI Ttumu . - Exacutud on By mm rm: Form 460 gamma me Tol-Ft-D Holmium: mame 186612153772] State at cum \rng: Recipient Committee Campaign Statement Cover Page -- Part 2_ I RESIDENTIAUBUSINESS ADDRESS (NO. AND STREET) 5. Of?ceholder or Candidate Controlled Committee NAME OF OFFICEHOIDEH 0H CANDIDATE OFFICE SOUGHT OR HELD IINCLUDE LOCATION AND DISTRICT NUMBER IF APPLICABLE) CITY STATE ZIP Related Committees Not Included in this Statement: Uumy commas Wumm?mmwummp COMMITTEE NAME LO. HUME NAME OF TREASURER CONTROLLED Owes ONO COMMITTEE ADDRESS STREET ADDRESS (NO 9.0. Box: CITY STATE ZIP CODE AREA CODEIPHONE COMMTTEE NAME LO. NUMBER NAME OF TREASURER commas Elves NO COMMITTEE ADDRESS STREET ADDRESS (MO RC. 8030 . CITY STATE IIF CODE AREA CODEIPMONE Pt?marily Formed Ballot Measure Committee NAME OF BALLOT MEASURE Approval of District Expansion to Yolo County BALLOT NO. on JURISDICTION Count SUPPORT Sacrag?nto/ Place: OPPOSE ifmy. NAME OF DFFICEHOLDER. CANDIDATE 0R. PROPONENT Susan Patterson OFFICE SOUGHT on HELD Board Member, SMUD DISTRICT nan: ANY 7. Primarily Formed Candidato/Of?cohnldet Committee mm of NAME 01: ommoea on cmmoxre OFFICE scum-n on new mm oppose ?Aw: OF muomen on can mars omcs swear on new SUPPORT DOPPOSE OF OFFICEHOLDER on CANDIDATE o?SUPPORT DOPPOSE NAME OF (racemes on momma OFFICE swam on ma: - [j SUPPORT I V. WIN: Tel-Frau MASK-FITS [mm-3112) . Sun of Wm? Recipient Committee Campaign Statement Cover Page - Part 2 (Continuation Sheet) no.? 10/22/2006 12/31/2006 NAMEOF Fm Yes on Measure for Lower Rates LO. WMBEH 1282451 6. Primatin Fomled Ballot Measure Committee NAME OF BALLOI MEASURE BALLOT HO. OH LETTER JURISDICTION SUPPORT Domse? Wumm,m. ism. NAME OF OFFICEHOLDER, CANDIDATE oi. F?bronem Genevieve Shi roula OFFICE SOUGHT on HELD I DISTRICT NO. IF ANY Board Member, SMUD NAME 6? MEASURE BALLOT NO. on LETTER JURISDICTION 0 SW oppose My?umnm?agm.m, arm-mm- NAMEOF OFFICEHOLDEH. CANDIDATE OR. William Slaton OFFICE SOUGHT OR HELD DISTRICT NO. IF ANY Board Member, SMUD NAME OF BALLOT MEASURE BALLOT NO. OR LETTER JURISDICTION SUPPORT crease NAME OF OFFICEHOLDER. MATE OR. PROMISNT I omce SOUGHT on HELIJ ms'rmcr . 4. A OF gi'su??e BALLOT NO. on Jumsn'icnoe suapohr [j OPPOSE iflnv. NAME OF OFFICEHOLDER. CANDIDATE OR, PROPONENT OFFICE SOUGHT MELT: ousr?a?fho. IF ANY NAME OF BALLOT MEASURE BALLOT ND. OH LETTER JURISDICTION SUPPORT [1 arms: if my. NAME OF OFFICEHOLDEFI. CANDIDATE OR. PROPOIIENT OFFICE SOUGHT OR HELD DISTRICT NO. IF ANY NAM OF BALLOT MEASURE BALLOT N0. OR LETTER .RJRISDICTION mm- cross maximum-mm. Ham. NAME OF OFFICEHOLOEH, CANDIDATE OR, FROPONENT OFFICE SOUGHT UH DISTRICT NO. if; hid? I FPPC Till-Fm. (856075-3772) mam Schedule (Continuation Sheet) Payments Made mun 10f22/2006 NAME OF SMUD Yes on Measure Ed: Lower Rates ?mun? 12/31/2006 SCHEDULE ICONTJ Hun ngkt? 5! ID. NUMBER 1232451 NAME AND ADDESS OF PAYEE womHM?eamoemmLuuwum done - amnion OF PAYMENT AMOUNT PAID Ross Communications, Inc. 1700 Street Sacramento. CA 95814 Jbaquin Ross dba Joaquin Ross media 1700 Street Sacramento, CA 95814 TV and Radio Production 38,576.25 Ted Sheedy. Inc. 2115 Oxford Street Sacramento, CA 95815 2,500.00 Bill Slaton 2538 Willow way Carmichael. CA 95608 233.91 U.S. Bank P.O. Box 1800 Saint Paul. MN 55101 OFC 114.50 Waste Management of Sacramento 8761 Ybunger Creek Drive Sacramento, CA 95828 OFC 392.45 Yblo Customers for SHED 5429 Madison Avenue Sacramento, CA 95841 I.D. Khmberx 1283979 1,800.00 3 60,617.11 (Page 25 of 31) Sh?medl?elF- SCHEDULEF Accrued Expenses {Unpaid Billsl I 10/22/2006 12/31/2006 M. .225 NAME or run ID. NUMBER 1282451 SHUD Yes on Measure 1. for tor-ref Rates mum.me mum Mada WEB memte-M) 30390200 i PHD POL P08 LEG bouldefense . PRO er PRT carnpalgn liter-arm and "?llings . ll) lo) NAME AND ADDRESS OF CODE 0" OUTSTANDING mount warmer: mourn PAID OUTSTANDING ?m "1 m? 0mm 0" PAYMENT BALANCE THIS nus PERIOD BALANCE A'r nose or nus PERIOD mm ON a OF THIS Psmoo - Patricia M. Cole Pumpkin Patch 4,373.21 0.00 4,373.21 0.00 2596 Roslyn Hay Event Expenses Sacramento, CA 95821 1 Ryan Rauzon dba Rauzon Media CH3 10,000.00 2571 River Plaza Drive, #138 . Sacramento, CA 95833 0.00 10,000.00 . 0.00 Rose Inc. we . 0.00 3,000.00 . 0.00 1700 Street Sacramento, CA. 95814 'm?mnmu numb-0h I has. I. D. WW SUBTOTALS 14,373.21 3 . 3,000.00 ?3 14,373.21 5 3,000.00 Schedule Summary 1. Total accrued expenses incurred this period. (Include all Schedule F, Column subtotals for . A accrued expenses of $100 or more, plua total uniternized accrued expenses under $100.} .. WTOTALS 8 3 000 00 Total accrued expenses paid this period. (Include all Schedule F, Column (cl subtotals for payments on accrued expenses of $100 or ?rare, plus total unitemlzed payments on accrued expenses under $100.) TOTNSS 14 373 31 ?ler change this period. (Subtract Line 2 from Line 1. Enter the difference here and on the Summary Page, Column A, Line -11,373.21 Marla-Iva Helpli-re: MASK-FIFE: [966127537721 (Pagel of 9) Recipient Committee . ?We? Campaign Statement DeuStarnp - 2001:02 Cover Page . 5? iGovematCodeSoctme4ZOD-a421e?i A BHHIIWED 3' Wm?; pm madam if A I Mum-Y?, 01/01/2007 . MAY 2 4 2007 04/30/2007 W. Plan of 03:03! Use Oniy . 1. Type of Recipient Cornmittea: "cam-Wheatzamun. 2. Type of Stat-em Officeholder. Candidate Continued Commune Primarily Formed Ballot Measure ?0 State Candidate Election Conuniuee Carmela-e 0 Controled Canaan 5.) 0 Sponsored Pro-election Statement A [3 Quarterly 01mm" Mum-immanent Special Odd:Yw Report Termth Stetermm Suppiermntei Pro-election {Also fiie 0 Form 410 Termlnetbni Stetmtyi?ttech Form 495 Amendment (Emmi below} El . ?he Wm 5.: General Purpose Committee 0 mam? - [3 Found Candidate! 0 Smell Commuter Committee O?icehoider mm 0 Putnyentral Committee ?In Cor-?ue Pen 7.) 3. Committee lnfonnation- ., Tremorisi I NAME ion NAME IF NO com?ea NAME OF TREASURER 3mm Yes on Measure for lower: Rates Susan Patterson MAMNG ADDRESS 431 S. Lexington Drive WIND anion - CITY STATE zrrcooe Ant/i - i . 1700, Street . Folsom . - CA 95630 (916) 442 ~2952 STATE ZIP WE AREA NAME OF ASSISTANT TREASURER, IF ANY Sacramento - CA 95814 (916) 441 1995 DRE in: EMT) 0. mos HEETORPD. amt mum ADDRESS 555 Capitol Mall. Suite .1425 - We ZIP CODE my; c50?rmous""' CITY STATE ZIP com: AREA Sacramento CH 95814 - (916) 442-2952 MAL: AXE-MAIL ADDRESS OPTIONAL: FAME-MAIL ADDRESS 4. Veri?cation - iheve used mountable in preparing and revieka this eutement end tothe beat of my knowledge the ir?ormeticnoorrtoimd herein and in tho attached eutTemIee is true a'nd con-rotate. i certify under penalty 01? periuy order the laws of the State of Cel?omie that the foregoing it true end correct 5715/ 675' 'Exooutedon \i ,Exewtedon Executed on be- By mm. mean 400 tJerunry?JSi Tar-rm ?chino: sea/mm rewarwnr sum of mania (Page 2 of 9) Recipient Committee PART: Campaign Statement . Cover Page Part 2 50?3"? . 6. Primarily Famed BoIIot Measure Committee I OF BALLOT MEASURE 5. or?ooholdor or Candidate Controlled Committee WE OF OFFICEHOLDEH 3n CANDIDATE . Approval of District Expansion to Yolo County OFFICE SOUGHT on HELD LOCATION AND NUMBER iF . mm ?"53 SLPPORT II Sacrag?nto/ Placer 0' I 0 5E RESIDENTIALIBUSINESS mumps m0. AND CITY STATE ZIP . WMWW, m.UMnminmmt.ffmy. NAME OF CANDIDATE on. Related Committees Not Included in this Statement: any sue? Patten? comm arm-kc mm on of My. COMMITTEE NAME I LO. NUMBER Board Member, 5mm 7. moo:in Formed CmdidataIOf?oeholdar ConTmittea NAME OF OFFEEHOLDER on CANOIOATE OFFICE scum-IT on new COMMITTEE monass STREET ADDRESS no. - [3 SUPPORT OFFOSG cm sure up come AREA mom NM or :3qu OR WINE OFFICE SOUGHT on HELD [j OPPOSE - NAME LD. Human NAME OF OFHCEHOLDER OR CANDIDATE OFFICE SOUGHT 0R HELD [3 SUPPOTIT [j OPPOSE we as TREASURER CONTROLLED NAME OF on YES No . sumpm oppose COMMITTEE ADDRESS STREET ADDRESS mo 9.0. aux: OFFICE SOUGHT Ca HELO STATE ZIP CODE cm mm I'fmy . Form 460 W105) ma: Ton-Faun Hakim: MASK-FER: (866127537721 Stab at Gila-nu m. Recipient Committee . covsnrAGE PART campaign'smtemem A A A Cover Page - Part 2 . 01/01/2007 Foam (Continuation Sheet) -- - - - 04/30/2007 HM ?If! I to. NUMBER 12 82451 NAME OF FEES SMUD :33! Yes on Measure for Lower Rates 6. Primarin Formed Ballot Measure Committee NAME OF BALLOT MEASURE NAME 6; BALLOT BALLOT HO. OH LETTER SUPPORT BALLOT no. on LEITEFI [j ore-ass NAME OF o?cEHoLnen, CANDIDATE on, PROPONENT Genevieve Shiroma OFFICE SOUGHT oni'?io 05ch no. IF AM Board Member. SMUD OF mum ?AsunE [j SUPPORT [j OPFOSE NAME OF OFFICE-IOLIIR. CANDIDATE OR. PROM-NT OFFICE SOUGHT OR HELD I DISTRICT NO. IF ANY OF BALLOT MEASURE BALLOT NO. DR LETTER JURPSDICTLON SUPPORT BALLOT NO. OR LETTER amuse - Wmm?um.Mummleum NAME or amen. CANDIDATE on, PROPONFNT William Slater: omce SOUGHT on HELD ommcr no. ANY Board Member. Wmluum Mae SUPPORT [j OPPOSE OF ummATE on. FROPONEHT OR FELD DISTRICT NO. IF ANY NAME OF BALLOT WEE BALLOT ND. OH LETTER JURISDICTION [j SUPPORT BALLOT NO. on LETTER [j OPPOSE NAME OF amcanLnER. CANDIDATE on. PROPONENT SUPPORT [3 mos; Mina-Wm,mwuuamm I?m. NAME OF OR. WENT OFFICE SOUGHTORHELD DISTRICTNOJFANV OFFICE SOUGHT OR HELD DISTRICT NO. IF ANY FPPC Form 460 LIMIOSI FPFC Talfm min: MASK-PFC (86612753172! SI 1 of . Schedule . scum?. Payments Made . .m 01/01/2007 . Page C9 m. nausea 1292451 ?numb 04/30/2007 NAMEOFFKER SMUD Yes on Measure for Louver Rates CODES: if one of the following codes accurately describes the payment, you may enter the code. Otherwise. describe the payment. CMP mmpalgn paraplmtaliafmlac. MBR mar-harm CNS campaiguwmltants MTG mm ?appearances RFD mm OTB oomhtlar?uplalnmmomtuyr OFC album SN. Mum?salanes CV6 olth TEL PHO mm 1110 Fm ?mum POL palmme 1R8 IND P05 TSP LEG mam PRO var vote-registration UT PRT made WEB meWo-ma?) um?mo ADDRESS or PAYEE or com use mat Lo. mam CODE 0R momma 0F . AMOUNT PAID Patricia H. Cole OFC 643.15 2596 Roalyn_Way Sacramento, CA 95821 . I Olson Hegel E: Fishburn? LLP PRO 4,889.25 555 Capitol Mall. Suite 1425 Sacramento, CA 95814 Rose Conmnicatione. Inc. CNS 3,000.00 1700 Street . Sacramento. CA 95814 I 8,532.40 Schodule Summary - A 1. Itemized payments made this period. (Include all Schedule subtotalUn'rtemized payments made this period of under $100 0 - 00 3. Total interest peld parlor] on?loans. (Enter amount from Schedule B, Part Column tel.) I 0 .00 3. Total payments made this period. (Add Lines 1. 2, and 3. Enter here and on the summary Page. Column A. Line 6.l TOTAL 8 9- 532 ~40 Faun 460 FPPC Toll-Rue W: MASK-PPR: m75?3772l Schedule . . Accrued Expenses (Unpaid Bills) - 01/01/2007 IFORM Pm af?? LD.HUMBEH 1282451 04130/2007 NAME Oi: FILER SHUD Yes on Measure for Lower Rates CODES: if one oi the following codes accurately describes the payment. may enter the code. Otherwise, describe the payment. CMP HER CNS ammonium MTG meetlmsaideppeeremee RFD rotunda-mutilate OTB or-?c oil'lceexpemee - SAL CVO dirch PET TEL FIL Whale THC FND Wm POL ms IND WmewponirvoppoemOumwmr P08 TSF PRO VGT magictaiim UT menmm PRT prlriadu WEB id NAME AND ADDRESS 0" CREDITOR - CODE 03 OUTSTANDING mourn NCURHED mourn PAID OUTSTANDING m? ?m ?m 0'55me OF PAYMENT BALANCE BEGINNING THIS PERIOD THIS PERIOD wares AT CLOSE OF THIS PERIOD wso on a OF THIS PERIOD Ross COWications, Inc. CRIS 3,000.00 0.00 3,000.00 0.00 1700 Street Sacramento. CA 95814 I Schedule Summary . . I 1. Total accrued expenses incurred this period. (Include all Schedule F, Column [bl subtotais for accrued expenses of $100 or more, plus total unltemized eccruad expenses under $100.] . .. 0 - 0? Total accrued expenses paid this period. (Include all Schedule F, Column (cl subtotal: for payments on I accrued expenses Of $100 or more, plus total unitemized payments on accrued expenses under $100.) TOTALS 3 000 ~00 8. Net change this period. {Subtract Line 2 from Line 1 . Enter the difference here and on the Summary Page. Column A. Line 9neg-Ilia lumber - FPPC Form 460 FPPC Tel-Free "chime: MASK-81H: (?275-37721 From: Brian T. Hildreth To: Ron Barsamian Cc: mmallery Subject: RE: Public comments by Richie Ross *atty-client* Date: Tue, Jan 12, 2016 10:03 am Attachments: Richie Ross - Lobby Registration Statement 2015.pdf (35K), Richie Ross Lobby Report Showing SB 25 Lobbying 2014.pdf (65K), Measure 990.pdf (680K), Shiroma - Major Donor Screenpdf (238K) The foliowing source docs are attached: Richie Ross Form 601 - introduced to demonstrate Richie Ross? ongoing representation of UFW. Richie Ross Form 625 (07/01/2014 09/30/2014) Introduced to demonstrate Richie Ross lobbying in favor of bill to benefit the UFW and the ALRB. Genevieve Shiroma Major Donor Registration Screen from SOS introduced to demonstrate Shiroma?s significant politicai participation a donor to democrat candidates and causes. Form 990 for Yes on Measure SMUD Introduced to show a nonprofit 501c4 organization controiied by Shiroma hired Richie Ross in 2006. Documents needed: Shiroma?s Form 460?s from her 2002 SMUD Campaign MARK BOGETECH SHOULD HAVE THIS. SMUD Yes on Measure Form 460?s from 2006 MARK BOGETICH SHOULD HAVE THIS. Shiroma?s Form 461 Major Donor Reports We are sending someone to the SOS today to retrieve. 455 CapitolMa/l, Suite 600 Bria" H?Idreth Sher-'omemo, CA 95814 Partn er (916) 442?7757 BELL, MCANDREWS 1567104424759 LLP 5W Follow us: @Political Law This communication is con?dential and may be legally privileged. High stakes in Yolo energy fight Annexation plan gives SMUD chance to expand, while stands to lose substantial base. By Robert D. Davila -- Bee Staff Writer Published 2:15 am PST Sunday, January 22, 2006 Story appeared in Metro section, Page BI The Sacramento Municipal Utility District blinked first in the political staredown with Pacific Gas and Electric Co. over its insistence that SMUD ratepayers be allowed to vote on their utility's plans to annex 70,000 of Yolo County customers. SMUD's decision Jan. 12 to let ratepayers have the final say after months of rejecting that notion doesn't suggest the utility has lost ground in its annexation drive. But the political chess game under way between the rival utilities does speak to how high the stakes are. The annexation battle is about more than just who should own and operate the power lines in eastern Yolo County. The proposal offers a chance for SMUD to grow instantly by 12 percent, expanding into populated territory and providing a larger base to spread costs. The adjacent, compact area is easy to reach, and SMUD would be positioned to benefit from future development in West Sacramento and Woodland. "To have our neighbors come ask to join is a real shot in the arm for us," SMUD President Genevieve Shiroma said. "It will make us stronger to face whatever the future holds." For the bottom line is its bottom line: profits from 70,000 Yolo County customers in the annexation area. The multibillion-dollar company is fighting to keep a franchise it has served for more than a century. is trying to exert its eminent domain power to condemn a private business and seize property, just to have government provide the exact same service," spokeswoman Jann Taber said. "We?re not for sale." Not surprisingly, the rival utilities already are in the thick of a political struggle. Each has lined up community supporters, technical experts, lawyers and political strategists in anticipation of an expensive and contentious campaign. An early result is the likelihood that Sacramento County voters will face two elections in June and November - on annexation-related measures. "It's SMUD's battle to lose, and they will if they don't step up," said Barbara O'Connor, director of the Institute for the Study of Politics and Media at California State University, Sacramento. is not going to go quietly into the night and give up Yolo County." is following an aggressive strategy it has used to defeat other public-power efforts in Northern California, including San Francisco ballot measures in 2001 and 2002. Opponents call the plan - based on a guide developed by an electric industry group playbook." In Sacramento County, has spent heavily on advertising and organized a coalition of SMUD ratepayers to oppose annexation. Using paid solicitors, the Coalition for Reliable and Affordable Electricity collected 53,000 signatures caliing for a June initiative that would let SMUD ratepayers cast a nonbinding vote on major boundary changes. The efforts prompted SMUD to reverse course after insisting for months that only Yoio County voters should decide annexa?on. Board members agreed to put the issue to a binding vote in November among SMUD's 575,000 current ratepayers in Sacramento and Placer counties. Directors ordered staff to draft ballot language making it clear to SMUD voters that the full cost of annexation will be paid by Yolo County residents. To comply with legal restrictions on the board's political activity, some SMUD directors have formed an independent political action committee, SMUD Customers Say Yes to Low Rates, to run the annexation drive. About the writer: The group has hired political consultant Richie Ross, Shiroma 'said Friday.- She said the committee "just recently" organized and would begin seeking political and financial support. SMUD also is counting on public meetings to educate voters. At a workshop last week, SMUD staff presented a forecast indicating annexation would generate $404 million in total economic benefits over 20 years for ratepayers on both sides of the Sacramento River. "If you look at past election battles, it's not always about who has the most money," SMUD board member Bill Slaton said. "Ultimately, the truth does weigh out. Our customers are smartmake this understandable." Meanwhile, annexation opponents will spend "whatever it takes to get our word out," said Jeff Raimundo, spokesman for the PG&E-backed coalition. He dismissed complaints that deep pockets give an unfair campaign advantage. was ali over the newspaper last week with that workshop," said Raimundo, a political consultant. "They get free publicity with every single board meeting they hold that's worth tens of thousands of dollars." a The Bee?s Robert D. D?vila can be reached at (916) 321-1077 or bdavila@sacbee.com. SBA?razigigig (A hl OFFICE . . e245 N.FRESND STREET #105 SACRAM ENTO, CA 94249-0023 FRESNO CA 93710 (916) 319-2023 gaff . r' . (559) 445?2029 FAX (916} 319-2123 I 11111131 giggt?iz?fute FAX (559) 445-2028 TWENTY-THIRD DISTRICT September 26, 2014 The Honorable Edmund G. Brown Governor, State of California State Capitol, First Floor Sacramento, CA 95814 RE: Agricultural Labor Relations Board, General Counsel Dear Governor, The Bill of Rights and Article 1, Section 3 of the California Constitution grant to the people the ?right to . . . petition government for redress of grievances.? There is no right more fundamental to the operation of our system of government. We were therefore troubled to learn that the General Counsel of the California Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) ?led a complaint last week accusing an employer of committing an ?unfair labor practice? because its owner ?invited [certain employees] to join him on a trip to Sacramento to lobby State Legislators over SB 25 a bill that would have made it more dif?cult for agricultural employees to decertify their union.? This complaint also alleges that on ?approximately August 14, 2013, Silvia Lopez, Rolando Padilla and other employees accompanied Dan Gerawan and the president of the California Grape and Tree Fruit League, Barry Bedwell, on a trip to Sacramento where they met with legislators to urge them to vote against SB 25.? The General Counsel claims this conduct supported and assisted the efforts of workers to petition the ALRB for a decerti?cation election. The complaint seeks a ?cease and desist order? against the employer and its ?agents? from ,?taking actions to undemune the status as the collective bargaining representative of Gerawan?s employees,? and an order dismissing the decerti?cation petition, thereby throwing out the thousands of ballots cast by these workers in the November 5, 2013 election ordered by the Board. No citizen of this State should fear that they will be sued by the State of California as the price of admission to the Legislature. There is no sign over the Capitol door which warns citizens to ?enter at your own peril.? No one should be targeted for interrogation by state investigators, sued in administrative proceedings, or enjoined from the exercise of their First Amendment rights because they petitioned their elected of?cials. Printed on Recycled Paper It is ?indamental to our system of separation of powers, and essential to the conduct of the people?s business, that unfettered and unconditional access to our chambers be permitted. Neither this state agency, nor this unelected of?cial, should be allowed to chill these rights, or sue those who exercise these'liberties guaranteed under our Constitution. What makes this abuse of power even more egregious is that the direct bene?ciary of the legislation that the employer and workers lobbied against is this same agency, and the very same of?cer, who are now interrogating and suing them for it. SB 25 would give her the power to seek immediate enforcement of a state-ordered ?contract? against the will of the employees and employer. The General Counsel tried already once, without success, to summarily enforce this contract on the employer and workers, but the Superior Court told the General Counsel that enforcement was neither just nor proper. Govemor, you signed the Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975 which was created to restore peace in the ?elds. You helped draft the language and over the years have overseen many of its most signi?cant amendments. As you know, the preamble of the Act, Labor Code Section 1 140.2, states: "It is hereby stated to be the policy of the State of California to encourage andproteet the right ofogriculturol employees tofull??eea'om of association, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment, and to be ?ee from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation ofsuch representatives or in scary-organization or in other concerted activities fer the purpose of collective bargaining or other nmtuai aid or protection. Now, the General Counsel of the ALRB, which you appointed, is taking it upon herself to limit the meaning of these words. It seems that to her, full freedom of association can only be sought if she agrees with it. What about being free from interference, restraint, or coercion from the Government? This latest example of abuse of authority is not the ?rst time we have received complaints about the General Counsel?s conduct but it is certainly the most dramatic and concerning, particularly because it involves the blatant infringement of the constitutional rights of California citizens by an of?cer of the court. We ask you to take action to prevent the abuse of the General Counsel?s prosecutorial power, and to preserve the rights of everyone to petition government, without fear of retaliation by of?cers you have appointed, or by any instrumentality of the Executive Branch of the State. Sincerely, i Patterson Connie Conway 0 23rd District 26?1 District Tim Donnelly 33rd District CLll?t agman 55th District Andyf Vida?k Senator, 161h District Shannon Grove 3-4til District Kristin Olsen 12th District #1212016 Est-2153 . a Elected Officials 8: Ballot Measures Committees, Parties-f Meier Donors Siate Mailers Delivfltatef Soecial Filincrs Califorria Secretary of State - Calecess Campaign Firmoe Campaign Finance: SHIROMA, GENEVIEVE Election Cycle: to?. 2015 through 2016 Historical View Information: (Due to the amount of data, these pages may take some time to load.) General Information Contributions Received Contributions Made Expenditures Made Late and $5000+ Contributions Received Late Contributions Made Late Independent Expenditures Eiectronic This is the of?cial name of the committee, political party, or major donor as registered with the Secretary of State. It}: mm #1236184 FILER Eti?ii?iiti: (916) 442-2952 mm ?am El?i?i-iia?? E'E'il??ivi?t; STENEVIEVE (E3155 1 ACTIVE CURRENT STATUS This committee has not electronically filed a Form 460/461l450 for this election cycle. For further information, click on prior sessions to see if historical filings are available. Also check for late contribution filings if a major filing deadline has not yet occurred for this election cycle. 1/1 Sill/0010:5- Contributor Report Last Update: 124104-2010 11:12:47 7521491301000 [MS-Excel Download I R650 rd: .3: .. Re?ne Search II New Search I To sort: dick on the column name header Found 220 . . . Amgum; Contribution ContributionI ?00m: . 920100.019; We gm EN I IROMA I TEEN - SAC 0 CA MEL-.13 2??14 WE PARENTAL NOTIFICATION $1,000.00 9/15/2008 MONETARY mm INTIATIVE 4 WA. ELIMINATES RIGHT OF SAME- SEX COUPLES TO EQUALI 593 MARRY. $1,000.00 9/17/2008 MONETARY .W INITIATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. 8 NEW 2/35 VOTE NO ON PROP 16. REQUIREMENT STQP [le Egg? FOR LOCAL MAIL POWER ELECTRICITY LOQAL POKER PROVIDERS $1,000.00 5/25/2010 MONETARY STATEWIDE WI INITIATIVE CONSITUTIONAL 21 57 AMENDMENT (09- 0015), PROP. 16 EQIJALIZATIQN, Other $500.00 3/30/2001 MONETARY END OF SESSION $500.00 9/8/2001 MONETARY SA RAM 0 EMS QAMPALGH $500.00 6/30/2003 MONETARY am. State Treasurer $500 00 6/30/2004 MONETARY . 103.12.512.14. CALIEQBNIA ggoe JOHE State Controller $500.00 6/30/2005 MONETARY 7 000500.503 [0,21 29314? State Controller $500.00 10/26/2010 MON ETARY 1 2033. State Senate 06 $500.00 10/30/2014 MONETARY Other $100.00 8/28/2001 MON ETARY State Assembly 49 $100.00 5/19/2008 MONETARY $100.00 5/15/2008 MON ETARY Total Monetary $6,800.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $6,800.00 NT ADVOCATES MAR MQNIE EAL $500.00 10/30/2014 MON ETARY Total Monetary $500.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $500.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE MRS., STATE OF CALIFORNJA, CHAIR LABOR BOARD, CA 95818 ELANMEQ ADVOCATES MAR MONTE, 1.0328115; $750.00 11/13/2002 MONETARY ELANNED PARENTHOOQ ADVOCATES MAR MIL ID1 $500.00 5/8/2002 MONETARY ELANNED PAW ADVOCATES MAR MQNIL 1032.81.15; $250.00 10/7/2001 MONETARY PLANNED EARENIHQQD ADVOCATES MAR MONTE, $250.00 10/7/2001 MONETARY mop. ADVOCATES MAR MONTE, ID 1 $250.00 9/23/2002 MONETARY BLAME PA RENTH ADVOCATES MAR $100.00 1/23/2002 MONETARY MONTE, 112M353. Total Monetary $2,100.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $2,100.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., AGRICULTURAL ILABOR RELATIONS BOARD, BOARD $500.00 12/15/2007 MONETARY MEMBER, AT-LARGE, 1 4 SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 Total Monetary $500.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $500.00 SHIROMA GENEVTEVE am A., AGRICULTURAL AW State Assembly LABOR RELATEONS DR Ru? BE 05 $150.00 9/12/2010 MONETARY YBOARD, BOARD I 19 MEMBER: 203.503 SACRAMENTO) CA State Assembly 95318 05 $100.00 10/16/2010 MONETARY Total Monetary $250.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Nonsmonetary $0.00 ?Grand Total $250.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE STEINEEBQ A., AGRICULTURAL LABOR State Assembly $100.00 5/25/2003 MONETARY BOARD, CHAERWOMAN, 09 DARRELL. SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 Total Monetary $100.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $100.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS MACHADQ FQR BOARD, STATE State Senate 05 $250.00 10/4/2000 MONETARY EMPLOYEE, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 Total Monetary $250.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $250.00 SHIROMA GENEVEEVE A., AGRICULTURAL TRUMAN CLUE. - $400.00 5/8/2006 MONETARY LABOR BOARD, BOARD I 7 MEMBER, . SACRAMENTO, CA ETETE $250.00 4/6/2010 MONETARY 95318 1122010220 BABELS. 2 - 00.00 5/15/2007 MONETARY 51m. 5 55ng 5. - $100.00 5/15/2007 MONETARY ED 7 1 Total Monetary $950.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Nontmonetary 00 Grand Total $950.00 SHIROMA GENEVEEVE A., AGRICULTURE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD OF CALIFORNIA, CHAIRPERSON, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 FOR ASSEMBLL CAROLE, State Assembly 06 $250.00 2/14/2000 MONETARY Total Monetary $250.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $250.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., AGRICULTURE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, CHAIRWOMAN, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 PHIL. State Treasurer $200.00 6/29/2001 MONETARY Total Monetary $200.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $200.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., ALRB, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 Mi. Lieutenant Governor $100.00 10/18/2011 MONETARY Total Monetary $100.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 EGrand Total $100.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., ALRB, CHAIRPERSON, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 i HE WALL or THE QF QEM PARTY, 1W M8933. Governor 00 $500.00 8/7/2003 MONETARY SAW WE .QLIEE Governor 00 $500.00 9/26/2003 MONETARY ENTERTAINMENT DEM 00mm QQMEENQR GRAY DAVIS IQEI 25?416 Total Monetary $1 ,000.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $1,000.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE IELEQB A., CA AGRICULTURAL RELATIONS State Controller $250.00 5/25/2013 MONETARY BOARD, CHAIR, SACRAMENTO, CA YEE 95818 State Controller $250.00 6/28/2013 MONETARY Total Monetary $500.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non?monetary $0.00 Grand Total $500.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., CA AGRICULTURAL W990 IELABOR RELATIONS ADVOCATES MAR BOARD, CHAIRWOMAN, MON I SACRAMENTO, CA Em m; $500.00 9/24/2010 MONETARY 95818 [0312525128 Total Monetary $500.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $500.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., CA AIR RESOURCES State Assembly BOARD, - ENE 09 $250.00 9/22/2004 MONETARY ENVIRONMENTAL mg; Wm SUPERVISOR, SACRAMENTO, CA Div/E State g?gembly $137.00 6/25/2003 MONETARY 95313- s? State Assembly DAHE 09 $100.00 6/25/2003 MONETARY Total Monetary $487.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $487.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., CA AIR RESOURCES SA BOARD, ENVIRONMENTAL Mill $150.00 3/29/2000 MONETARY ENGINEER, SACRAMENTO, CA 1058111]; 95818 Total Monetary $150.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $150.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE Board of A., CA ALRB, MEMBER, ualization 01 $250.00 9/6/2005 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 Board of . . $100.00 7/16/2005 MONETARY Equahzatlon 01 ID 73115 Board of IYI uauzation 01 $100.00 8/18/2005 MONETARY ?23223115 cI Total Monetary $450.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $450.00 iH??mgminVE CLASSIFICATEON ASEAN AMERICAN BY RACE, AGRICULTURAL LABOR ?55 ETHNECITY RELATIONS BOARD, $100.00 9/3/2003 MONETARY AQAINSI PBQP COLOR OR CHAIRPERSON, 5! iD 252 15g NATEONAL SACRAMENTO, CA ORIGIN 54 95818 Total Monetary $100.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $100.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A-. SACRAMENTO 01 State Senate 06 $250.00 10/9/2007 MONETARY MUNICIPAL UTILITIES BOARD MEMBER, WEB SACRAMENTO, CA SENA I State Senate 06 $250.00 10/15/2008 MONETARY 95818- 10512228211 Total Monetary $500.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Totai $500.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE CAMEAIQN EQR A., SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITIES WA PARENTAL MEMBER, NOTIFICATION SACRAMENTO, CA $500.00 9/21/2006 MONETARY 95818 RAW PETITION 35 AEEILIAIESJZE Total Monetary $500.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $500.00 SHIROMA QHU EQR A., SACRAMENTO ASSEMBLY 2002. State Assembly MUNICIPAL UTELITY 49 $250.00 10/30/2001 MONETARY DIST., BOARD MEMBER, CA 004 State Assembly $250 00 6/30/2003 M0 TARY 95816 49 - NE I 1 90 QHU CAMEAEQN IDY $250.00 6/30/2003 MONETARY State Assem Ey 49 $250.00 10/28/2004 MONETARY Ctlu EQR State Assembly JHEX 49 $200.00 3/27/2001 MONETARY CAMEAIQN Board of Equa?zation 04 $120.00 11/29/2005 MONETARY Total Monetary $1,320.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $1,320.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE EEJBLIIANI EQR A., SACRAMENTO MB State Assembly MUNJCIPAL UTILITY 55 $100.00 9/8/2004 MONETARY IIDIST., BOARD magma MEMBER, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 EREH State gembly $100.00 3/26/2005 MONETARY W2 ASEEMBLX. State gem!" $100.00 9/4/2007 MONETARY Total Monetary $300.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $300.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY Inga FDR BOARD 293;, State Assembl MEMBER, El 19 $100.00 11/2/2012 MONETARY AGRICULTURAL LABOR ED 4 1 7 RELATIONS BOARD, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818-3553 Total Monetary $100.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $100.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE CAQEQRMANS A., SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY IDISTRICT, BOARD WA MEMBER, EEQAECLQE SACRAMENTO, CA PI ?mg $200.00 10/21/2004 MONETARY 95818 CALIEQBNIA, 521 Total Monetary $200.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $200.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY State Assembl DISTRICT, BOARD OF $100.00 8/28/2001 MONETARY DARRELL 09 DIRECTORS, IE E232 Izg SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 Total Monetary $100.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $100.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., SMUD BOARD OF State Assembly DERECTORS, DSRBEH 09 $100.00 12/7/2013 MONETARY PRESIDENT, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 State Assembly 09 $100.00 10/30/2014 MONETARY 135 7 Total Monetary $200.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $200.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE mm A., SMUD, DIRECTOR, State Assembly SACRAMENTO, CA IE 09 $100.00 10/27/2004 MONETARY 95318- 112911251014 Total Monetary $100.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $100.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE STEINEEBQ EQR A., SMUD, PRESIDENT, State Senate 06 $250.00 10/9/2007 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA 1 4 95818 SEW 0 State Senate 06 $250.00 8/8/2007 MONETARY [0&1292825 Total Monetary $500.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $500.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., SMUD, MR OF 1w; Attorney General $200.00 6/25/2002 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 Total Monetary $200.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $200.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE CHIANG EQR A., STATE OF CA, ALRB ARD CHAIR, SACRAMENTO, Other $250.00 10/19/2001 MONETARY 95818 MEL I CALIFORNIA, mm State Treasurer $250.00 4/21/2005 MONETARY I 4 4 CALIFQBBIA 2 Jm I State Controller $250.00 5/7/2005 MONETARY 2022121002; 252"; State Controller $250.00 6/30/2005 MONETARY WEE CHIANQ FQB CALIEQENIA 2w: mg I State Controller $150.00 10/24/2006 MONETARY 76 7 CHIANQ EQB State Treasurer $100.00 9/25/2003 MONETARY gg?12?4z74 State Treasurer $100.00 3/30/2004 MONETARY Chi/30mg LIF RNA 2005. 405:1. {9&1276625 State Controller $100.00 6/30/2005 MON ETARY Total Monetary $1 ,450.00 Total Loan 50100 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $1,450.00 GENEVIEVE A., STATE OF CA, BOARD MEMBER, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 ETY 1 $250.00 8/16/2011 MONETARY $100.00 10/22/2011 MON ETARY Total Monetary $350.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $350.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., STATE OF CA, CHAIR ALRB, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 43 $500 .00 1/21 /2000 MONETARY Insurance Commissioner $500.00 6/7/2004 MON ETARY Insurance Commissioner 550000 3/11/2005 MONETARY Secretary of State $500.00 5/12/2006 MONETARY SE RETARY Secretary of State $500.00 4/26/2007 MONETARY Insurance Commissioner $250.00 3/19/2004 MONETARY Insurance Commissioner $250.00 9/20/2004 MONETARY Insurance Commissioner $250.00 9/24/2004 MONETARY insurance AGRICULTURAL LABOR I AT Commissioner $250.00 11/11/2004 MONETARY DBILLEQB SIAIE. Secretary of A State $250.00 3/10/2006 MONETARY 1253931511. QBIILEQB SIAIL Secretary of State $250.00 11/3/2005 MONETARY State ?embw $100.00 6/8/2000 MONETARY QEDLEQR. Insurance Commissioner 1/10/2005 MONETARY QEBQBAHS Total Monetary $2,600.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $2,600.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., STATE OF CA, KCHAIRWOMAN, AGRICULTURAL LABOR - $445.00 2/6/2003 MONETARY RELATIONS BOARD, CALM SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 Total Monetary $445.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $445.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE Em STATE OF ASSEMBLY, State Assembl IIDEPT. HEAD, $100.00 12/5/2005 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA $533 49 95818 Total Monetary $100.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $100.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE Au STATE OF SENATE State Senate 06 $250.00 4/20/2004 MONETARY KCALIFORNIA, ?$125501 AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD IN ER CHAIR, SACRAMENTO, State Senate 06 $100.00 10/19/2005 MONETARY CA 95313 M23001 Total Monetary $350.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $350.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE DI I A., STATE OF SENATE 2914, State Senate 06 $250.00 3/17/2014 MONETARY RELATIONS BOARD I KI MEMBER, SENATE 2014, SACRAMENTO, CA EGEE State Senate 06 $100.00 7/15/2014 MONETARY 95818 ?231353340 Total Monetary $350.00 Totai Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand TotaE $350.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AGRICULTURAL LABOR Insurance ERELATIONS BOARD, Commissioner 5250'00 9?12/2005 MONETARY BOARD MEMBER, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 Total Monetary $250.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $250.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., STATE OF QEMQQMES OF CALIFORNIA, APPOINTEE 0F xi! ITY $100.00 5/26/2011 MONETARY AGRICULTURE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 0 0 SACRAMENTO, CA mgbd?ti 95313 SACRAMENTO - 100.00 6/9/2012 MONETARY mom 5 A NT - 100.00 2/8/2014 MONETARY mum 5 IWQSQI, ID 7 0 DEMOCRATS QE $25.00 3/22/2011 MONETARY Total Monetary $325.00 Totat Loan $0.00 Total Non~monetary $0.00 Grand Total $325.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., STATE OF CALIFORNIA, BD MBR. QF AGREC LABOR $250.00 6/1/2012 MONETARY RELATIONS BD, SAEB rm SACRAMENTO, CA 95818-3553 Total Monetary $250.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $250.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE STATE OF M295 CALIFORNIA, BOARD A ENT MEMBER AGRICULTURE $50.00 12/21/2014 MONETARY LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, SACRAMENTO, 1D 3 CA 95818 Total Monetary $50.00 Totat Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $50.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., STATE OF CALIFORNIA, BOARD MEMBER FOR 10 State Assembty LAGRICULTURAL LABOR RQQEB 09 $250.00 3/16/2012 MONETARY RELATIONS, [0,2131 ZTZQ SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 Totat Monetary $250.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $250.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., STATE OF AF - CALIFORNIA, BOARD WA MEMBER, EROJEQT QE PARENTAL LAGRICULTURAL LABOR MED NOTIFICATION $1,000.00 7/3/2008 MONETARY RELATIONS BOARD, PAREN I INTIATIVE 4 SACRAMENTO, CA AEEILIATES QF 95313? FOE SAEEH . MEN PARENTAL PAR NOTIFICATION $100.00 10/8/2008 MONETARY mm INTIATIVE 4 AEEILIAIES QF CALIEQBNIAA 1 7 4 SAMEAIQNIQB TE PLANNED $100.00 10/28/2008 MONETARY AFFILIATES QE Total Monetary $1,200.00 Totai Loan $0.00 Total Non~monetary $0.00 Grand Totai $1,200.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE NEW 2/35 VOTE A., STATE OF NO ON PROP 16. REQUIREMENT CALIFORNIA, BOARD FOR LOCAL MEMBER, BOW POWER SACRAMENTO, CA ELECTRICITY 95818 PROVIDERS $200.00 6/7/2010 MONETARY STATEWIDE UTILITY REFORM INITIATIVE Jim CONSITUTIONAL [931321952 AMENDMENT (09- 0015), PROP. 16 Total Monetary $200.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Totai $200.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE ON A., STATE OF DEMQQBA I g; CALIFORNIA, BOARD HE OF MEMBER: AGRIC LABOR EBEATEB - $100.00 11/11/2012 MONETARY IRELATIONS BOARD, A NT SACRAMENTO, CA 95818-3553 Total Monetary $100.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $100.00 SHEROMA GENEVIEVE A., STATE OF CALIFORNIA, BOARD MEMBER: AGRICULTURAL LABOR TIRELATIONS BOARD, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818-3553 SEQNEWALL QEMQQBA I IC $500.00 6/2/2014 MONETARY $375.00 5/19/2013 MONETARY QREATER 500.119.05.010. $100.00 12/1/2013 MONETARY 1001102022. $100.00 12/3/2014 MONETARY Total Monetary $1,075.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 tGrand Total $1,075.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CHAIR AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, SIAIE 0.0mm State Assembly 08 $500.00 4/16/2001 MON ETARY SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 A SIAIE ASSEMBLY. State Assembly 08 $334.25 6/15/2001 NON- MONETARY State Senate 05 $250.00 9/12/2000 MON ETARY State Assembly 08 $2 50.00 2/18/2001 MONETARY State Assembly 08 $100.00 6/29/2001 MONETARY WEB. ID 4 State Assembly 08 $100.00 6/16/2001 MON ETARY Tootary $1,200.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $334.25 Grand Total $1,534.25 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., STATE OF AESEMELX CALIFORNIA, CHAIR ALRB, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 LEAQERSHIP 43 $500.00 5/15/2000 MONETARY 43 $500.00 8/30/2000 MONETARY 43 $500.00 10/25/2000 MONETARY 43 $250.00 6/30/2000 MONETARY $150.00 7/20/2005- MONETARY 43 $100.00 12/11/2000 MONETARY otal Monetary $2,000.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Totai $2,000.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CHAIR, AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, SIAIE ASSEMELL State Assembly 08 $500.00 9/13/2001 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 STATE mg} 231 94!; State Assembly 08 $250.00 9/21/2001 MONETARY $115.00 4/4/2005 MONETARY Total Monetary $865.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $865.00 I SHIROMA GENEVIEVE A., STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN AGRICULTURAL BOARD, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 PAI IEEN SQFEH - BLAME). AFEILIATES QF LIFORNEA ID 1 PARENTAL NOTIFICATION INITIATIVE PETITION 73 $500.00 10/5/2005 MONETARY PARENTAL NOTI FICATIO INITIATIVE PETITION $300.00 11/3/2005 MONETARY Total Monetary $800.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $800.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE STATE CE Secreta of CALIFORNJA, CHAER STATE-29112, Stat? $250.00 7/8/2001 MONETARY ALRB, SACRAMENTO, CA 95813 Total Monetary $250.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $250.00 GENEVEEVE, HCONSUMER, AW INSURANCE CA REFORM YES ON $100.00 2/25/2000 MONETARY PROPOSJTION 30 9191 TotaE Monetary $100.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $100.00 SHIROMA GENEVJEVE, AG LABOR RELATEONS, Insurance SACRAMENTO, Commissioner $100.00 10/8/2012 MONETARY CA 95818 2014, DAME, Total Monetary $100.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non?monetary $0.00 EGrand Total $100.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, AGRJCULTURAL LABOR BAILEQB BOARD, State Assembly QBOARD MEMBER, EL 05 $100.00 5/22/2010 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA 919 95818 Total Monetary $100.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $100.00 SHEROMA GENEVEEVE, HAXASHI. AGRICULTURAL ERELATIONS BOARD, - $250.00 9/24/2004 MONETARY CHAIRWOMAN, MABL SACRAMENTO, CA lD?] 200222 95313 my; State ?s'f?embly 515000 9/29/2006 MONETARY MARI. 02.20220. RA 2252520002; $100.00 3/31/2005 MONETARY MARI. 12 7 9 State Assembly 18 $100.00 3/17/2006 MONETARY MARI. ID 12 729 EN Total Monetary $600.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $600.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, CA AGRIC LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, gm . SACRAMENTO: $385.00 12/8/2004 MONETARY CA 95818 SACRAMENIQL Total Monetary $385.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 glGrand Total $385.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, AGRICULTURE RELATIONS BOARD, State Assembly 09 $100.00 1/9/2003 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA 95181 Total Monetary $100.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $100.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, CA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, ENVIRONMENTAL CAMPAIGN - $150.00 6/12/2001 MONETARY IENGINEER, ?000.. SACRAMENTO, CA mull; 95818 Total Monetary $150.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $150.00 zilgngOENEstVE, 5mm,? 1 AGRICULTURE LABOR El HERA IIRELATEONS, BOARD - $320.00 6/5/2008 MONETARY QBEAIEB. MEMBER, NTO SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 Total Monetary $320.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $320.00 22' CONSULTANT, State 1:45?ny $100.00 6/29/2002 MONETARY CA 1 3 99 95818 Total Monetary $100.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 IGrand Total $100.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, ELANNEO CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL LABOR ADVOCATES MAR RELATIONS BOARD, MONTE - $350.00 6/30/2012 MONETARY CHAIRWOMAN, ANDI TE SACRAMENTO, CA EAL 95818 ED 1 716 PLANNED lgGrand Total ll MAR $125.00 5/12/2011 MONETARY CANDEDATE 71 0 Toary $475.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $475.00 VE 223330.65? AGRICULTURE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, QREETER $250.00 6/10/2010 MONETARY BOARD MEMBER, 52:8 2 ?El 11g SACRAMENTO, CA is $124789?- 95818 Total Monetary $250.00 Totai Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $250.00 SHIROMA LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, CHAIR, $150.00 9/13/2002 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 1212251009 Total Monetary $150.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $150.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, WA RELATIONS BOARD, CHAIR AGRIC LABOR, SACRAMENTO, CA - $200.00 5/31/2007 MONETARY 95818 10312478522 Total Monetary $200.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $200.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, 322%?333311 State ?fembly $250.00 10/11 12000 MONETARY UTILITIES DISTRICT, DEBRA, VICE PRESEDENT BOARD OF SACRAMENTO, CA 95313 AS State Assembly $100.00 5/13/2000 MONETARY 10 Total Monetary $350.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $350.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, SACRAMENTO METROPOLTTAN UTILITY DISTRICT, SENATE 200$ State Senate 05 $250.00 4/19/2004 MONETARY BOARD MEMBER, i 1 7 SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 Total Monetary $250.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 $250.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, LE SACRAMENTO WATER State Assembw $100.00 15/29/2000 MONETARY MEMBER, 44 SACRAMENTO, CA ID 0 95313 I EOR ASSEMQLI, State Assembly 44 $100.00 7/18/2001 MONETARY W5. Total Monetary $200.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 ?Grand Total $200.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, 20141, State Assembly $250.00 6/18/2013 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA 07 95318 Total Monetary $250.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 ?Grand Total $250.00 SHEROMA GENEVIEVE, SMUD, DJRECTOR, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 $100.00 2/10/2009 MONETARY M033. Total Monetary $100.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 kGrand Total $100.00 SHEROMA GENEVIEVE, JQNES FQR SMUD, MEMBER OF ASSEMBLY 2006. State Assembly THE BOARD, i 09 $250.00 11/4/2005 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA 95813 ZOOQ, State Assembly EA: 09 $150.00 9/20/2006 MONETARY Total Monetary $400.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $400.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, SMUD, RTY FOR DIRECTOR, ASSEMBLY 2010. State gzsembly 510000 5/4/2010 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 Total Monetary $100.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non~monetary $0.00 Grand Total $100.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, STATE CONFERENCE AC PUBLIC AFFAIRS, BOARD . MEMBER AGRIC. LABOR $100.00 12/7/2007 MONETARY EREL. BOARD, SACRAMENTO, CA 0 1 4 95818 Total Monetary $100.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $100.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, II STATE OF CA AGRICULTURAL LABOR 30., SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 5mm QEEQBAEL. 1.0020001; State Senate 06 $250.00 1 /17/2001 MONETARY Total Monetary $250.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $250.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, STATE OF CA LABOR ERELATIONS BOARD, CHAIRWOMAN, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 2002, i State Senate 06 $500.00 8/15/2001 MONETARY State Senate 06 $2 50.00 3/15/2002 MONETARY State Senate 06 $200.00 6/30/2001 MONETARY State Senate 06 $150.00 6/17/2002 MONETARY State Senate 06 $130.00 3/1/2002 NON- MONETARY 2002, M88180 FR State Senate 06 $100.00 10/29/2001 MONETARY 2902, FMILZEFR I11 State Senate 06 $38.00 3/13/2002 NON- MONETARY Total Monetary $1,200.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $168.00 BGrand Total $1,368.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, STATE OF CA LABOR IRELATIONS BOARD, CHAJRWOMAN, SACRAMENTO, CA 95313- FOR State Senate 06 $500.00 5/1/2003 MONETARY DEB 19%; State Senate 06 $150.00 6/ 27/ 2003 MONETARY Total Monetary $650.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 IiGrand Total $650.00 SHEROMA GENEVIEVE, STATE OF CA, ALRB SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 JONES FOR 5 008 DAMEL 1909 State Assembly 09 $250.00 8/ 10/2007 MONETARY $250.00 total Monetary Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $250.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, AGRIC LABOR RELNHONSBD, 95818-3553 .SIQNEWALL $250.00 5/20/2011 MON ETARY $100.00 11/9/2011 MON ETARY Total Monetary $350.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $350.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, STATE OF CA, BOARD MEMBER AGRIC LABOR HREL BOARD, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 WALL QBEAIEB 103.125.2822 $200.00 5/25/2006 MONETARY Total Monetary $200.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $200.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, STATE OF CA, BOARD MEMBER AGRICULTURAL LABOR IIRELATIONS BOARD, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 MCLABIYEQB 2916. . 0230222252 State Assembly 07 $250.00 6/29/2015 MONETARY Total Monetary $250.00 Total Loan $0.00 Totai Non-monetary SO. 00 Grand Total $250.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, STATE OF CA, BOARD MEMBER, SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 mm 1 I NE I 114000 Insurance Commissioner $250.00 4/26/2010 MONETARY Insurance Commissioner $250.00 9/27/2010 MONETARY 201;, State Assembly 66 $250.00 9/30/2012 MONETARY Mg EQB ASSEMBLY 2010. 1 13997 State Assembly 09 $200.00 12/30/2008 MONETARY EQE 2010, DAVE, Insurance Commissioner $150.00 5/31/2010 MONETARY 2012. State Assembly 66 $100.00 6/3/2012 MONETARY 1! Total Monetary $1,200.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $1,200.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, 1 STATE OF CA, BOARD MEMBER, 5 State Assembly $150.00 11/3/2014 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA I ?ll? 8 6" 95318-3553 M- Total Monetary $150.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $150.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, MC CARTY FQR STATE OF CA, State ?g?embly $300.00 10/31/2014 MONETARY BOARDMEMBER, 1001357503 SACRAMENTO, CA Mg [93 I 95818 SE 4 me ?6?me $250.00 5/22/2014 MONETARY W593 Total Monetary $550.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $550.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, WEE STATE OF CA, CHAIR AGRIC LABOR RELATIONS $300.00 7/30/2005 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA SACRAMENTO, 95318 1021231022 Total Monetary $300.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non?monetary $0.00 Grand Total $300.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, STATE OF CA, CHAIR, STATE ALRB, SACRAMENTO, ASSEMRLI. State gem? $500.00 12/4/2001 MONETARY CA 95313 1031231949 STAIE State ?embly 5200.0012/23/2001 MONETARY State gsasembly $100.00 11/7/2001 MONETARY 10 1 31946 A STATE ASSEMEIL State Assembly 5100.0010/31/2001 MONETARY 03 ID 1 1 4 STATE State gembly 550.0010/26/2001 MONETARY 101121231940 Total Monetary $950.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $950.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, SACRAMENIQR STATE OF CA, WEHEHS CHAIRWOMAN, ALRB, 5150.00 6/7/2002 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA FUND, 95818 0001127?; Total Monetary $150.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $150.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, A - 5800.0010/29/2008 MONETARY ALRB BOARD 100800014 MEMEBER: CALIEQRLIIA SACRAMENTO: CA 3A0, $100.00 10/1/2006 MONETARY 95313 1001880224 Total Monetary $900.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Nowmonetary $0.00 IIGrand Total $900.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 2000. - 5500.00 4/17/2007 MONETARY ABOARD MEMBER 1000223062 AGRICULTURAL LABOR gum RELATIONSBOARD, 2000. $500.00 6/21/2007 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA I 0 9 0A0ALQQN 2008,, State ?embly $250.00 10/12/2007 MONETARY 1001293062 MIME. CALIFQRNIA, $150.00 11/3/2014 MONETARY WM ELIMINATES RIGHT OF SAME- mm SEX COUPLES TO EQUALITY FQB MARRY. $100.00 8/26/2008 MONETARY INITIATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. 8 A $100.00 12/3/2014 MONETARY 10 1 87 46 Total Monetary $1,600.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non?monetary $0.00 Grand Total $1,600.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 00030.01: BOARD MEMBER, EQQALIZAIIQN. AGRICULTURAL LABOR I TRI Board of RELATIONS BOARD, 2010, Equalization 02 510030 10? 24? 2010 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA TAXPA 95818 011315, ID 4 5030001 EQR ASSEMBLY 2014. State ?fembly $100.00 9/30/2014 MONETARY I I I - Total Monetary $200.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetaIy $0.00 IGrand Total $200.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, BOARD MEMBER, AGRICULTURAL LABOR A I RELATJONS BOARD, m1 8 6 $500.00 4/17/2007 MONETARY SAC RAMENTO, CA 958183553 Total Monetary $500.00 Total Loan $0.00 Totai Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $500.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, STATE OF QALIFQBNIA. $500.00 6/2/2014 MONETARY BOARD MEMBER, AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, gm - $250.00 5/12/2010 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA 95818-3553 mum? $150.00 5/31/2010 MONETARY 7 4 QALIFQBNEA, - $100.00 10/24/2010 MONETARY 2:110 Governor $100.00 10/24/2010 MONETARY AQIELQE QALIEQBNIA, - $100.00 5/26/2011 MONETARY 112312525110 AQIBLUE QALIEQRNIA, - $100.00 5/10/2012 MONETARY QALIEQRNJA, $100.00 6/3/2012 MONETARY QALIFQRNIA, $100.00 11/2/2012 MONETARY AQIELQE WM. $100.00 11/30/2013 MONETARY BLUE QALIFQBNIA, $100.00 10/30/2014 MONETARY iQ?128784? Total Monetary $1 ,700.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 HGrand Total $1,700.00 SHIROMA STATE OF CALEFORNIA, Am BOARD MEMBER, ALRB, - $125.00 3/16/2011 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA 95818-3553 Total Monetary $125.00 Totai Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 RGrand Total $125.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, AQTEI STATE OF CALIFORNIA, EAT - $250.00 6/28/2014 MONETARY BOARD CHAIR AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BO, SACRAMENTO, CA QALIEQBNIA, $100.00 6/9/2012 MONETARY 95313 1 1 7 46 Total Monetary $350.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $350.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, AC I ELUE STATE OF A IF $250.00 6/12/2013 MONETARY MEMBER, AGRICULTURAL LABOR IRELATIONS ALI IA $100.00 2/8/2014 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 Total Monetary $350.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $350.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, WA STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, $100.00 10/4/2006 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 Wm may?, 112L335 $100.00 10/2/2007 MONETARY Total Monetary $200.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 Grand Total $200.00 SHIROMA GENEVIEVE, CABALQQE UNKNOWN, CQMMIJIEL UNKNOWN, Mama - $250.00 8/2/2008 MONETARY SACRAMENTO, CA 95818 Total Monetary $250.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non-monetary $0.00 IIGrand Total $250.00 SHIRQMA, GENEVIEVE SMALL CARD SACRAMEMQLA 95514 $500.00 10/1 /2009 MONETARY SACRAMENTQ, IQET 24759; Total Monetary $500.00 Total Loan $0.00 Total Non~monetary $0.00 Grand Total $500.00 Search criteria used to create this report Contributor Name: shiroma, genevieve Contributor Name Search Type: Keyword (ignores punctuation) Contributor Code: Individual Contributor Code: Recipient Committee Contributor Code: Other Contributor Code: Political Party Contributor Code: Small Contributor Committee Contribution Type: Monetary Contribution Type: Loan Contribution Type: Non~Monetary Data far this report was last updated on 12-JAN-2016 11:12:47 Version 2.1.0.0 Capyright ?2003 - 2016 California Secretary of State. PROOF OF SERVICE I am a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action. My business address is Raimondo Associates, 7080 North Marks Avenue, Suite 117, Fresno, California 93711. On January 22, 2016 I served the within documents: PETITIONER SILVIA PETITION TO DISQUALIFY BOARD MEMBER SHIROMA BY OVERNIGHT MAIL: I enclosed the document(s) in an envelope or package provided by an overnight delivery carrier and addressed to the persons at the address(es) set forth below. I placed the enve10pe or package for collection and overnight delivery at an of?ce or a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight delivery carrier. J. Antonio Barbosa, Executive Secretary Agricultural Labor Relations Board 1325 St., Suite Sacramento, CA 95814 Mark Woo-Sam, General Counsel Agricultural Labor Relations Board 1325 St, Suite 1900 Sacramento, CA 95814 Delia Martinez Acting Regional Director ALRB, Visalia Regional Of?ce 1642 W. Wahiut Avenue Visalia, CA 93277?5348 Paul . Bauer, Esq. Walter Wilhelm Law Group 205 E. River Park Circle, Suite 410 Fresno, CA 93720 Ronald H. Barsamian Barsamian Moody 1141 W. Shaw Avenue, #104 Fresno, CA 93711 David Abba Schwarz Irell Manella 1800 Avenue of the Stars #900 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Mario Martinez Martinez Aguilasocho APLC Administration Building 29700 WoodforduTehachapi Rd. Keene, CA 93 531 I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in af?davit. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on January 22', 2016, at Fres ania. *3 Adrienne McDowell . i 1.14 i1